Employment Tribunals Act 1996 (Tribunal Composition) Order 2012 Debate

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Department: Department for Transport

Employment Tribunals Act 1996 (Tribunal Composition) Order 2012

Lord Borrie Excerpts
Wednesday 28th March 2012

(12 years, 7 months ago)

Lords Chamber
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Baroness Turner of Camden Portrait Baroness Turner of Camden
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My Lords, I support my noble friend’s Motions. We had a wide-ranging debate on both these orders in Grand Committee. I opposed both, and I still do. Both orders undermine the employment rights that many people have fought for over the years. The first deals with the qualifying period and the right of workers to receive a reason for dismissal. The second provides for the removal of lay members from industrial tribunals that deal with cases of unfair dismissal. As noble Lords indicated in our previous debate, this has been opposed not only by the TUC and the CBI but by the Engineering Employers Federation and Citizens Advice.

Those who supported the Government in our previous debate did so, as I understand it, because they believed that if employers did not have to comply with employment laws, they would be able to employ more people. I doubt that. I oppose the orders for a different reason: I believe that, in a civilised community, the worker has rights which must be observed. An overriding one must be the right to continued employment unless there are very good reasons for this not to be maintained. Is it right that employees should simply be regarded as disposable? The loss of employment is often a disaster; not only for the employee but for his or her family. Many may face a decline in living standards and perhaps years spent on benefits. The trauma is even worse when the decision is felt to be unfair and if there is little alternative work available.

I agree that conciliation or mediation should be tried rather than immediate reference to a tribunal, but this is attempted nowadays and may not always work out. The opportunity to go to a tribunal should exist if such procedures do not provide an acceptable solution. The presence of lay representatives from both sides of industry or commerce, in addition to a judge who presides, produces an informal—and informed —atmosphere, conducive to a fair hearing by litigants. Most organisations familiar with our present arrangements, including many judges themselves, are supportive of the involvement of lay representatives.

The Government want to change the arrangements for hearing unfair dismissals so that the litigant will appear before a judge sitting alone. In other words, there will be a more legal set-up but no access to legal aid, since this is being removed by legislation recently before our House. There is no doubt that the Government believe there have been too many tribunal cases and that there will be fewer under their new proposals—and no doubt fewer successful cases. This is grossly unfair. There is no more important area of life than the work that most people do. Without it, life changes dramatically, not only for the individual concerned, but the family which he or she has to support. The loss, if unfair, should be compensated. The least the Government can do is examine how these changes impact upon people, which is what is proposed by my noble friend’s Motions. I hope the Government will accept them. If they are interested in fairness and justice, they can really do no other.

Lord Borrie Portrait Lord Borrie
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My Lords, I would also like to support the amendment proposed by my noble friend on the Front Bench. The two SIs before us today are shabby. They are retrograde and in opposition to models of procedure and rights that have been with us for many years. I do not think that the Minister who argued the case for the statutory instruments today made a better case than he did in Grand Committee. An odd thing that he said today in support of the statutory instrument dealing with unfair dismissal was that, because workers now have certain rights that they did not have 30 years ago, such as those in relation to discrimination, it is reasonable that the qualifying period for claiming unfair dismissal should be extended to two years.

He indicated that there are rights of discrimination—sex and racial discrimination—that did not exist 20 or 30 years ago. That is true. How on earth can that justify greater rights for the employer to dismiss without due cause or indicating what the reasons are? Someone not fitting in or being surplus to requirements would not be an adequate reason if the unfair dismissal qualifying period was available.

The noble Lord on the Labour Front Bench and my noble friend Lady Turner have indicated reasons why we doubt the desirability of changing the composition of the tribunals, so that the judge or chairman—the legally qualified person—can, at his discretion alone, determine that the composition should do without lay members in future.