Brexit: Parliamentary Approval of the Outcome of Negotiations with the European Union

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood Excerpts

Monday 28th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, it is imperative in my view, doubtless in common with the great majority of your Lordships, that we reach a deal. I believe that the Government themselves also feel this.

I do not believe that there is any greater chance of the Prime Minister allowing a no-deal Brexit, than there would be—obviously, in very different circumstances —of her authorising a nuclear strike. I am not suggesting that each would cause comparable devastation: plainly, that is not so. Indeed, it is a ridiculous thought. The critical point, however, is that it is vital to keep the risk of each—the possibility of each, however small—in play.

Obviously, no one, however passionately opposed to our maintaining a nuclear deterrent capability, could, while we continue to have it, seek to persuade Parliament to legislate against ever deploying it. Its value as a deterrent lies in the risk, however faint, that in retaliation we just might. So too, I suggest, with the possibility that we just might crash out of the EU. While that possibility exists, it must surely operate as an incentive for us to reach a deal. It is an incentive, let it be emphasised, on all—both on our own Members of Parliament and on the EU negotiators.

It is nothing short of absurd to argue that Parliament should now legislate to take a no-deal Brexit off the table. That would either force us to accept a less favourable deal than we might otherwise get or, alternatively, force us to stay in the EU.

I confess that at heart I remain a remainer, but I have finally come to accept that there should not, and now must not, be a further referendum, certainly not one that still caters to the possibility of remaining in the EU. The only conceivable further vote could be on a choice between accepting the deal on offer and exiting with no deal. But I would not legislate to take the possibility of remaining off the table either.

What of the proposed legislation to force the Prime Minister, if by 26 February she has still not achieved a parliamentary vote for a deal, to request of the EU an extension of the Article 50 process? This, I suggest, would again have the inevitable consequence of lessening the urgency of the need to agree a deal. Everyone acknowledges that EU deals are habitually reached at the 12th hour. Postpone the 12th hour, delay the date by which agreement is required and on would go this ever more depressing and debilitating process.

I do not know whether any of your Lordships have had the time or inclination over recent weeks to watch “Question Time”, now chaired by the estimable Fiona Bruce. I have watched them, and to my mind they have made one thing clear beyond all others: the general public—not every individual, of course, but the great majority—ache for a final end to this saga and are ever more critical of the politicians at Westminster for failing to bring this question to a conclusion.

I recognise, as plainly does the Prime Minister and, for that matter, the EU, that the closer to the 12th hour that any deal is agreed, the more obvious will be the need for what would, we hope, be only a short extension of the Article 50 process for the necessary legislative steps to be completed to give effect to it. But that request for an extension can and, I suggest, properly should be left to be made when the deal is struck, not in anticipation of failure and according to a given timetable.

In the last debate I voted in favour of the Motion tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith. I regret having done so for this reason: in my speech I made it explicit beyond question that I supported the Prime Minister’s deal and was urging Members at the other end to accept it, notwithstanding that the opposition Motion still included some criticisms, although markedly fewer than in the previous, pre-Christmas debate, of the deal’s likely adverse consequences. The noble Lord, Lord Butler, likewise voted for the Motion while also supporting the Prime Minister’s deal. We were therefore dismayed to hear the Opposition Bench thereafter, and indeed again today, lumping together all those who had voted for the Motion as having voted to reject the deal and calculating the majority accordingly.

[Baroness Smith of Basildon]

My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt the noble and learned Lord but perhaps I may just correct him. If he checks my comments of today in Hansard, I think he will see that I have made it clear that this House rejected no deal. My other comment was that we soundly rejected how the other place expressed its views on the Prime Minister’s deal. I made no reference in my speech today to our comments on the Prime Minister’s deal.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

I am grateful for that; clearly, one would always accept a clarification. I confess that I understood that what came from the Front Bench was to regard the votes of all who supported the Motion as votes against accepting the deal on offer. If I am wrong, of course I withdraw that point.

In any event, I shall not be supporting the opposition Motion this time. Despite the earlier intervention by the noble Lord, Lord Butler, I suggest that it is expressed in such abstract terms—it uses the hallowed word “appropriate”—begs so many questions and seems so elliptical in what it is inviting that it is mischievous rather than self-evidently helpful. I fear that it, too, could be misrepresented, at least to this extent. It could be misrepresented as support for legislating against a no-deal Brexit or compelling the Government to request an extension of the process, both of which—for the reasons I have already sought to give—I would regard as weakening the Government’s negotiating position and thus prejudicing the prospect of an acceptable early resolution of this most ghastly saga.