Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Thursday 22nd April 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I declare my interest as vice-chair of and consultant to the Nuclear Threat Initiative. In the other place, Tobias Ellwood, anticipating the visit of General Austin, the US Secretary of Defense, said:

“our special relationship requires work.”

Predicting warm words about the special relationship and our planned investment in

“special forces, cyber and space resilience,”—[Official Report, Commons, 14/4/21; col. 395]

he suggested that, in private, Austin would more candidly say our navy is way too small, conventional fighting capability should not be cut and nor should the F-35 order.

Although those words reflect Labour’s criticism of the integrated review, I want to focus on another aspect of the review and what it means for the relationship with the US. In doing so, I shall expand upon one of the issues raised by my noble friend Lord Reid. The meeting took place last Thursday, but I can find no reference to what was discussed on the MoD’s website. Five days later, the DoD carried a readout, which makes the usual positive noises about the relationship, mentions Russia amassing of forces on Ukraine’s border and an orderly end to the war in Afghanistan. It has a reference, expanded upon in a terse and matter-of-fact joint statement, to past and continuing consultation on the review and strategic alignment.

There is no reference to consultation with the Biden Administration but rather between the respective defence departments. That difference is not lost on those who have been commenting on the gaping disparity now between our new nuclear weapons posture and that of President Biden, who has spoken of a national security imperative and moral responsibility to manage and eliminate the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction.

UK officials have been briefing on the review in the US. One, asked whether the removal of the cap had been discussed with the Biden Administration, responded that the Government wanted to report to Parliament first. As our current nuclear posture is more an echo of the Trump Administration’s 2019 posture review than the aspirations of the new President, was prior discussion with the DoD under the previous Administration? An increase in the cap on our nuclear weapons stockpile to more than 260 warheads is a significant reversal from the long-standing position on reducing numbers while maintaining a minimum deterrent force.

Equally concerning to Biden must be that while Russia and the US publicly declare their numbers, we will no longer publish details of our operational nuclear stockpile and deployed warheads and missiles. This is a significant blow to transparency. The justification so far is thin and unconvincing. The review lacks a compelling rationale for raising the warhead cap. There is a brief reference to an

“evolving security environment, including the developing range of technological and doctrinal threats,”—

a reference to Russia’s new and planned nuclear systems. No explanation is given for how increasing the stockpile will provide a more credible deterrent, improve UK security or impress Moscow, whose nuclear force will continue to dwarf ours.

Now, we reserve the right to threaten nuclear use if a threat from chemical and biological weapons or “emerging technologies” makes it necessary. What does this really mean? This policy shift is not proportionate to the threat and under any circumstances is not credible. Would the UK ever use a nuclear weapon against a chemical, biological, or cyber attack? An expanded use policy for nuclear weapons is directly counter to Biden’s commitment to consult with allies about moving towards a “sole purpose” declaratory policy that the nuclear arsenal is only for deterring or retaliating against nuclear attacks.

Coming weeks after the announcement of the US and Russia agreeing to extend New START and to engage in successor agreement discussions, this flies in the face of this new opportunity to stop the nuclear arms race. When its closest ally moves in a contrary direction, it presents a significant barrier for the new Biden Administration. Will the Minister expand on the joint statement agreed between Ben Wallace and General Austin? When did consultation take place? What was the US response to what is universally now interpreted as an inexplicable abdication of the long-standing leadership role on nuclear disarmament by policy change, counter to Biden’s commitment to reduce the role of nuclear weapons and his commitment to sole purpose?