Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 3rd September 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Browne of Ladyton]

104: Clause 38, page 31, line 13, leave out “58” and insert “59”

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 104 in my name and that of my friend the noble Lord, Lord Cashman. In so doing, I would like to take this opportunity to thank my noble friend Lord Dubs, who, in my absence, moved and spoke to amendments in my name. He did so with characteristic thoughtfulness, eloquence and rigour, and I am pleased to have this chance to record my gratitude. I am also pleased to have this chance to record my gratitude to the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, who was willing to move and speak to Amendment 104 on 10 July, had he not been defeated by time.

This amendment seeks to do something essentially very simple to the Bill that is before the Committee and the legislation it relates to. However, I hope that the Committee will bear with me as in some ways it requires a complicated explanation—I will do my best not to complicate it even more. Essentially, it seeks to repeal Section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act and, in so doing, remove certain anomalies, which I will come to.

Section 59 extends the current inadmissibility process for certain asylum claims and other human rights claims from what was, initially, broadly nationals or those who came from the EEA states, one or two other European states and other countries that are deemed safe. The mechanism for this in Section 59 is a list of safe states—countries from which an asylum or human rights claim must be declared inadmissible unless exceptional circumstances apply. That list can be added to, and the list that was originally drafted in the clause was increased to include India and Georgia by regulations that were laid on 8 November 2023.

I could detain the Committee for quite a time explaining the state these countries were in in respect of human rights on that date. I will read, in short, from the United States’s 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Georgia—that is the source of the information and noble Lords can find it and read it for themselves. I will read only two of about seven lines:

“Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: torture or inhuman, cruel, or degrading treatment; arbitrary arrest or incarcerations; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary, along with investigations and prosecutions widely considered to be politically motivated; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media”.


The first three lines of the United States’s 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: India included the following:

“Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: unlawful and arbitrary killings, including extrajudicial killings by the government or its agents; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by police and prison officials; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; political prisoners or detainees; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy”.


I will stop there—that is enough. There are many other lines that come with that.

Despite this and other information from other sources, the then Government thought that these two countries were candidates for a list of safe states, and therefore places from which certain asylum or human rights claims would be declared inadmissible.

I believe that this amendment to repeal this is in harmony with the animating spirit of this legislation. Repealing Section 59 would terminate the proposition in it that you can declare states to be safe in this way, despite the evidence, and would remove certain anomalies that I will come to. It presently extends the inadmissibility process for asylum claims and other human rights claims. The distinction between human rights claims and claims to asylum is critical, but Section 59 conflates them. Unlike asylum claims, many human rights claims are founded not on an assessment of a country’s safety but on an individual’s connection with this country: family ties and relationships. As it stands, we risk imposing what amounts, in an anomalous fashion, to a blanket ban on consideration of human rights claims from a country because it is deemed safe, when that is irrelevant to the nature of the claim.

Section 59 deprives individuals of a right to appeal, as these claims, because they are disregarded from the outset, go unconsidered rather than refused, and therefore there is no right of appeal unless there are exceptional circumstances. But what might be considered exceptional circumstances are defined in the legislation in a non-exhaustive way, with narrow examples, such as derogations from human rights obligations under the ECHR or suspension from the EU by the country itself. They are simply inapplicable to states such as India, leaving us with legal uncertainty, over and above all the other problems with this process.

Noble Lords will know that exceptional circumstances have been narrowly interpreted by the Court of Appeal in the past as requiring compelling reasons to believe that there is a clear risk that the individual will be liable to persecution in the country of origin. This test is clearly incorrect for private and family life claims—again a result of the conflation of human rights and asylum claims.

Returning to the list of safe countries, I believe that this involves the other place and your Lordships’ House being asked to do something that they are plainly ill-equipped to do. The list of safe states in Section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act may be altered by the Government and future Governments through affirmative regulations, but I for one would feel myself placed in an invidious situation if asked to vote on whether a member of a religious minority could be considered safe in parts of India; on whether a young Bohra girl is safe in India, given the very high incidence of FGM in that community; or on whether a gay man in Georgia can be considered as residing in a safe country. To reach an informed judgment in these cases would require an omniscience that I do not pretend to possess.

I am grateful to the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association, which, in the case of Georgia, drew my attention to the case of Noah, a man who, mere months before Georgia was declared safe, was granted refugee status in the UK. After coming out as gay, he was physically attacked by his own family members, he was forced to stay in a hospital for people with mental illnesses, and he had an exorcism performed on him at his local church. His partner was attacked too, but the police in Georgia did not protect either of them—but the United Kingdom did, despite this legislation being in power at the time.

Considering this case and others like it, the lack of an obligation to keep the list of safe countries under constant review is troubling, over and above all the criticism that I have. The Committee needs no reminder of the tortuous logic-chopping that accompanied the decision to legislate as to the absolute and perpetual safety of the country of Rwanda. I worry that the absence of a reviewing mechanism for this list threatens to put us in a similarly invidious position.

Of course, Section 59 has not been fully commenced, but, given that the Home Office has granted asylum or human rights protections to hundreds of people from the countries on the list in recent years, even the shadow of the Section 59 provision is damaging. If commenced, these individuals would have no way to challenge a decision wrongfully to deport them. So either the Home Office has, in granting asylum or human rights claims, been acting out of a superfluity of compassion, or the suggestion that these countries are in all circumstances safe is wrong.

It is my belief that Section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act is ill-conceived and that it ties the hands of the Home Secretary, who, under its provision, must declare asylum and human rights claims from these countries as an inadmissible, save where largely undefined exceptional circumstances are detected. If fully commenced, it risks involving us, going forward under a new Government, in multiple breaches of our obligations under international law. I urge the Committee to support Amendment 104. I beg to move.

[Lord Cashman (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 104 and I am proud to follow my noble friend after the passionate and eloquent way he introduced it. He spoke passionately and deeply about the young man, Noah, and the experience that he had in Georgia. Before I speak further in support of this amendment, to which I have added my name, I wish to pay tribute to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, who, as your Lordships know, died on 6 May this year. I had the privilege to work alongside him on immigration and asylum legislation in this House. He was always seeking to bring justice and fairness where there was none and to give a voice to the voiceless. His contributions will be greatly missed. It is clear to me, having listened to previous interventions on this Bill and from the media stigmatisation of migrants, that this vital work of bringing justice and fairness to the system must go on.

I support Amendment 104, which, as I said, has been put before your Lordships’ House so eloquently by my noble friend. I also welcome and support Amendment 203E. These amendments bring us back to addressing the primary reasons of those seeking asylum. It is vital that each case is processed solely on its merits and not on the presumption of the safety of the country from which the person has fled, despite the issue of exceptional circumstances to which my noble friend has already referred. I am pleased to say the noble Lord, Lord Browne, has put the case exhaustively and therefore there is very little for me to add.

I believe this amendment to be essential because Section 59, once fully commenced, will make far-reaching amendments to the general inadmissibility of asylum claims from EU nationals, introduced by the Nationalities and Borders Act 2022. This could result in violations of the UK’s international human rights obligations, and I am grateful for the briefings that I have received, particularly from the Refugee Council. Section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act extends the current general inadmissibility of asylum claims from nationals of EU member states to cover human rights claims and to cover nationals of other countries deemed to be safe, despite concerns expressed about the safety of three of those states: India, Albania and Georgia.

There can be no general safety presumption if there is a risk of persecution to even one recognisable section of a community. Concerns have been raised by numerous organisations on protection issues in India, Albania and Georgia, including those faced by women and girls, victims of trafficking, and minorities such as certain religious groups and LGBTQ+ people. In relation to the latter, we must recall and recognise the Supreme Court judgment of 2010, HG (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v the Home Secretary, particularly in relation to the lived experiences of such individuals seeking asylum.

Finally, there is a fundamental issue with legislating for so-called safe states. The list of safe states in Section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 may be altered by the Executive through affirmative regulations, but Members of this House have expressed concern time and time again, particularly throughout the passage of the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024, that we are institutionally ill-equipped to act decisively to determine the safety of a state.

We have also expressed in your Lordships’ House concerns that we have been repeatedly asked to rubber-stamp such decisions of the Government of the day. It is our contention that the safety of a state must be designated by a review on the basis of reliable and objective information from a range of sources and regularly updated and published. I urge the Government to consider and reflect widely on this sensible and notable amendment and to work with us and the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, to accept this amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I thought that was what I said. I hope we can agree, at the end of this group of amendments that was livelier than I initially anticipated, that the Committee can support the Government’s direction of travel. However, I hope the amendment before the Committee today will be withdrawn.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, I offer my final remarks with the traditional thanks to all those who have contributed to the debate on Amendment 104. When I saw that I had the overt support of my friend the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Brinton—whose support was more implied than overt—and the noble Lord, Lord German, whose support was overt, I began to think the only group that is of similar value to this one are the players that Liverpool signed in the transfer window. I thought, “I cannot possibly lose this argument”, until my noble friend explained operational benefit. I do not know if I should be pleased about the noble Lord, Lord German, reminding him of the possibility of “operational benefit”, but he found it—I will come back to that in a moment.

I heard nine Conservative speeches. I was astonished that, until the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, not one defended it—not one—and I think at least one of them may well have been responsible for the drafting of the legislation that Section 59 was in. I was therefore surprised when the noble Lord found that there was a pretty straightforward principle for Section 59, which is not that much different in its outcome to the speech made by my noble friend Lord Hanson. However, in reply to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron—and I will spend some time expanding this argument—if one looks at Clause 38 of the Bill, Section 59 is going to be pretty much alone as something that was in the Illegal Migration Act 2023. It is going to find itself in a very lonely context. The noble Lord’s argument was that one had to see this in context, but that will disappear if this Bill is passed. I will spend some more time between now and Report looking at just what that means for the ambitions that people have for Section 59 as it is presently drafted.

Some of the most important points that were made in this debate are well worth repeating. I do not intend to repeat very many of them because it has been a very wide-ranging debate and there has been a lot of repetition. It is important to start as my friend the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, encourages us to do, not only in debates but in conversations: to remember that it is people’s lived experience that should decide whether they deserve asylum or human rights protection, not conclusions that Governments or officials have come to about the temporary safety of the environments in which they may be living. This is all about people, and if we start from there and take into account all the other complexities of this legislation, we get to a point where there should be no room for Section 59 in the legislation going forward. There may need to be something similar to provide a benefit to the management of an issue of this scale, but it will not be that particular section in my view. This is a matter that I will come to again.