Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Lord Cameron of Lochiel Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 8th July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed. Just, I hope, to bring a little clarity to the latter discussion between my noble friend Lord Harper and the noble Lord, Lord German, as I read it, Clause 13, “Supplying articles for use in immigration crime”, sets out in its first subsection the offence, and it does so neatly separating the actus reus, the actual act—here, offering to supply a relevant article—from the mens rea, which is knowledge or suspicion. Subsection (2) goes on to state:

“It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to show that they had a reasonable excuse”.


It was subsection (2) that we debated at length on the previous day in Committee on this Bill, and it is at that point that the burden of proof shifts to the defence to prove their defence under the subsection.

I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, for bringing these amendments. It has proved to be a very stimulating debate. As others have said, I have an immense amount of respect for him, given his long and distinguished career, and I am also grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. I listened very carefully to what they both said. I have to say that I fundamentally disagree with the amendments that they have brought, however. They seek to alter the mens rea principle in Clauses 13, 14 and 16, by replacing the current standard of knowledge or suspicion with one of “intent” in the case of the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Alton, or “belief” in the case of the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. It does not seem to me to be in dispute that these amendments, if passed, would introduce a higher and more complex threshold for the mental elements of the offences, thereby raising the requirements for securing conviction and making it significantly more difficult to hold to account those involved in supplying equipment for illegal crossings and other articles used in the facilitation of unlawful entry into the United Kingdom. In doing so, they would risk creating precisely the kind of ambiguity that organised criminal gangs thrive on.

I think it is important to remind ourselves what this clause is designed to address. It is aimed at those who provide the tools that make dangerous, illegal crossings possible: those who supply forged passports, false work permits, dinghies and outboard motors that fuel the people-smuggling trade. These individuals are the logistical agents of criminal networks responsible not only for undermining the security of our borders but for endangering lives.

Let us not forget that more than 20,000 people have now crossed the channel in small boats in 2025 alone and, tragically, some have died in the attempt, fundamentally because the journeys are facilitated by those who care more about profit than human life. If we are to be serious about tackling this, we must ensure that the legal framework is as robust and usable as possible. If we replace the standard of knowledge or suspicion with intention or belief, prosecutors will be forced to demonstrate not merely that a person knew or suspected that their goods would be used for immigration crime but that they positively intended or actively believed that they would be used as such. That is a much higher bar, and one that would inevitably lead to fewer prosecutions, fewer convictions and fewer disruptions to these dangerous criminal networks.

The very thorough report from the Joint Committee said that the current standard in the Bill is a low threshold compared to, for example, intentional recklessness. We note that comparable precursor terrorism offences have a higher mental element, requiring intention to commit or assist in the commission of terrorist acts. I think this was quoted by the noble Lord, Lord Alton. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, correctly said, these terrorism offences are not precursors and so are not comparable.

The mens rea test of knowledge used in this Bill—the one that the noble Lord and the JCHR have criticised—is the same standard that is used in offences under the Immigration Act 1971, albeit about entry and not the supply of articles. Section 24B(1) of that Act states that:

“A person who … requires leave to enter the United Kingdom under this Act, and … knowingly enters the United Kingdom without such leave, commits an offence”.


The operative word here is “knowingly”. This is the same standard that is applied to the offences in Sections 24(A1), (C1), (D1) and (E1), and Sections 24A, 25 and 25A, of the Immigration Act 1971. In short, existing immigration offences all use the test of knowledge to determine the mental element of an offence. It is therefore entirely consistent for the offences in Clauses 13, 14 and 16 to use the same test.

These are not minor procedural safeguards. These are the tools that we need to dismantle the infrastructure of people smuggling. The law should be a shield for the vulnerable, not a loophole for the criminals who exploit them. We have to construct a strong legal framework, not one that is diluted and less able to protect vulnerable people as a result. My noble friend Lord Harper made the point very powerfully that this is about creating a deterrent. We need to confront this threat with a strong legal arsenal, not a weakened one. We should not be inserting language into this Bill that makes it harder to prosecute those who supply the means for deadly journeys. These are serious offences with serious consequences, and the law must reflect that seriousness. In this instance, I oppose these amendments.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for tabling their amendments. They have stimulated a discussion on important points that the Committee needs to consider. I am also grateful to noble Lords for attending this debate when such powerful alternative options are available not 200 metres away—I will use metres instead of my normal yards—where the President of the Republic is addressing both Houses of Parliament.

The noble Lord, Lord German, tempts me to discuss what the President of the Republic is currently saying. Our relationship is very strong. There are a number of issues on which we are expected to make positive statements in the next couple of days, and we are working very closely on re-intensifying our activities on the northern coast. I will allow further discussions to take place prior to any announcements from this Dispatch Box about the outcome of any discussions between the Prime Minister, the Government and the President of the Republic. I am sure that we will return to those points when the discussions have taken place in a positive framework—as they will.

I start by saying to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, that I welcome the JCHR report that was published on 20 June and thank the JCHR for its work. As the noble Lord knows, I have given commitments that the Government will respond in due course. It is worth putting on the record that all measures in this Bill are considered to be compliant with the UK’s human rights obligations, including the European Convention on Human Rights, and that the Government are fully committed to human rights at home and abroad. As my right honourable friend the Prime Minister has made clear, the United Kingdom is unequivocally committed to the European Convention on Human Rights. We will respond to those issues in due course, but I wanted to set that out at the beginning, because it is important and part of the framework that the noble Lord has brought forward.

I am grateful to the noble Lord for moving his amendment. He started by giving a couple of caveats. Like him, I am a product of a council estate and proud of it, and like him, Latin passed me by at my comprehensive school—I think some people did it, but it passed me by. That does not mean that we cannot address the substance of the points that the noble Lord and the noble Baroness have made. These important issues deserve full merit and consideration.

Amendments 31 and 41, on changing the mens rea in Clauses 13 and 14 from “knows or suspects that” to “intends that, or is reckless as to whether”, follow the findings from the JCHR. Those findings have unanimous support, and we will return to them in due course. In bringing those amendments forward, the CT-style power is now more in line with the counterterror legislation, which is what the noble Lord is intending. Reasonable suspicion is the same threshold as for the offence in Sections 57 and 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000. In fact, Section 57 does not have a “reasonable excuse” defence; instead, a person must show that

“his possession of the article was not for a purpose connected with the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism”.

The Section 57 and 58 offences contain no more safeguards when compared with the offences in Clauses 13 and 14.

The mens rea of the current drafting of the clause is designed to enable law enforcement to act earlier and faster to disrupt these criminal smuggling gangs—the very point that the noble Lord, Lord Harper, has alluded to. Day in, day out, these ruthless people smugglers put vulnerable people on boats in the channel or into the back of refrigerated lorries, not caring if they live or die. As the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, mentioned, people have died as a result. Changing the mens rea to require law enforcement to show intention or recklessness would place undue pressure on those on the front line of tackling organised immigration crime and would slow down the response to stopping these evil criminals undertaking their actions. It is right that we do whatever we can to support law enforcement in tackling these criminals at the earliest possible stages of criminality. For that reason, disappointing as I know it will be to the noble Lord, I cannot accept the amendments.

Amendments 32, 42 and 53 seek to change the mens rea for these offences from suspicion to belief. For the supplying and handling of articles and collection of information offences, amending this threshold would significantly raise the bar for enforcement. That is a point made by His Majesty’s Opposition Front Bench, along with the noble Lords, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, Lord Harper and Lord Green of Deddington. I find myself on occasion in company that I am not normally in, but it is right that, if noble Lords are right and make a sensible case, that support is welcome—as it is on this occasion.

A “suspicion” threshold allows for earlier, preventive action, which is a core feature of the legislation. It is designed to enable authorities to disrupt organised crime at the preparatory stage, while still requiring a proper investigation into an individual’s activity, and not in any way damaging a defence’s ability to put up a defence to the prosecution’s case in due course. The shift from suspicion to belief would narrow the scope of these clauses, undermine their preventive purpose, reduce the chance of successful prosecutions and place a greater strain on investigative resources in the first place.

It is important to note that the “knows or suspects” threshold is not novel. It is well established in UK criminal law, especially in regimes aimed at early intervention. For example, under Section 330 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, professionals commit an offence if they

“know or suspect that another person is engaged in money laundering”

and fail to make a disclosure.

Similarly, Section 19 of the Terrorism Act 2000 criminalises failure to disclose information where someone “believes or suspects” it might be useful to prevent terrorism. In both the Proceeds of Crime Act and the anti-terror legislation, the mental thresholds are designed to trigger preventive action and have been consistently upheld in the courts as proportionate and compatible with Article 6 and Article 7 of the ECHR. I go back to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Harper, mentioned: namely, that the offences in the Bill serve a preventive purpose. They are not about punishing people after harm has occurred but are instead about stopping harm happening at all.

I will also speak to the concerns that the current offences might criminalise those who are acting innocently or for humanitarian reasons. Each of the relevant clauses includes the reasonable excuse defence, which is non-exhaustive and allows courts to consider the full context of the person’s action. Any good defence would bring forward those defences if, again, the thresholds were passed by the police and the CPS for bringing prosecutions under any legislation that was ultimately passed by both Houses.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, the debate has obviously spanned beyond the amendments before us, but it is worth stating at the outset that the focus of these amendments is to determine that the provisions are aimed at the particular people who are breaking the law—the smugglers. The focus has to be that it helps law enforcement and the judiciary to focus their resources on the people that the Government really want to apprehend in order to tackle the criminal gangs. There are words—which I will come to in a moment—on which I agree a different definition might be more helpful, but it is worth while repeating the words of the noble Lord, Lord Deben, about the international regulations and rules that guide us and we put around ourselves and the importance of those.

I am reluctant to go into this field of the reinterpretation of the ECHR, but one mistake relates to the fact that some countries signed an unaddressed letter which gave no indication whatever of what changes to the ECHR they were looking for. The person who was supposed to receive it read about it in the newspapers. I contrast that arrangement, where nothing could be made of the letter because it gave no sense of what was to be changed, to the approach of the British Secretary of State for Justice, who approached the matter in a proper manner and spoke to the people concerned, the right Committee of Ministers, who are responsible for any review of the ECHR. There is already a set of motions in place to enable that discussion to occur. It would be worth while trying to understand what people in other countries want to do and what they need to happen in order to change, but those discussions are under way because, essentially, this is a living document that needs to be changed, interpreted and looked at as time goes by, and that is happening at present.

We should be clear that these amendments would simply treat the people who are coming here with a deal of compassion. I absolutely agree that we have to separate genuine asylum seekers from the rest. We cannot do that by our own legislation until they arrive here. There are no routes by which people can arrive here, apart from the few which would not affect the people from the countries who are most affected in this matter. What makes sense with these amendments—maybe not entirely in the words they use—is that they are trying to distinguish who we are going for and who we are gunning at, as it were.

Amendment 33 seeks to ensure that the scope of the offences in Clauses 13 and 14 apply only to the smugglers. The amendments seek to link the offences to financial and material gain. If there is another way of explaining the financial and material gain as being the method by which you determine a smuggler, then obviously it would be worth noting.

In that respect, I took note of what the noble Lord, Lord Harper, said about how to deal effectively with the migrants situation. Fortunately, I went to visit the site of the Jungle in Calais two weeks ago. It is now fields; there is nothing there but fields, grass and animals grazing, and that is because the French authorities dealt with groups of people to make sure that they fit with the strategy they are adopting. They had no complaints about the way that was working at the present time. Maybe times have changed, and maybe people need to be thinking differently.

Amendment 35 proposes that the defence excuse in Clause 13 should ensure the protection of

“refugees, smuggled persons, and victims of trafficking, in certain circumstances”—

and that is the question. In mentioning “certain circumstances”, one needs to define what those circumstances are; otherwise, the courts would not be able to make the appropriate case work.

Amendment 38 suggests that the scope of offence of Clause 14 should include for financial or material gain. That is the distinguishing factor between those who are smuggled and those who are not.

Amendment 44 suggests that the defence excuse in Clause 14 should ensure protection of

“refugees, smuggled persons, and victims of trafficking, in certain circumstances”.

Again, one has to define the words “certain circumstances”, because otherwise it becomes too general.

Amendment 57 suggests that the reasonable excuse defence in Clause 16 should ensure the protection of

“refugees, smuggled persons, and victims of trafficking, in certain circumstances”.

Again, that wording needs to be tightened up.

Finally, Amendment 203 would provide

“a statutory defence for refugees in certain circumstances”

for the offences in Clauses 13, 14 and 16. Obviously, there is a need for tightening up in this matter to ensure that we can separate out the people for whom the Bill is intended to deal with: those who are causing the misery, those who are trafficking and those who are smuggling and those who are spread around Europe to make sure that these schemes work. These are the people whom the Bill should be aimed at and is aimed at. All these amendments would do is make sure that we entirely focus our efforts on those people who are causing these criminal acts.

Therefore, I suggest that these amendments have a right sense of direction in what they intend. They enshrine the international regulations which we sit within. It is not just one convention; it is quite clear from the opening speech of the noble Lord, Lord Alton, that there are a raft of international conventions, laws and rules that we sit behind. We are part of that international way of dealing with matters, and if we lose that way of dealing with it and do not follow it through, we will never be able to solve something which is so international in its nature.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their speeches in this group. Again, I listened very carefully to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and the rationale behind these amendments. The general thrust of all noble Lords’ amendments, however, is to seek to impose further limits on the exercise of legal powers designed to tackle people-smuggling gangs and their supply chains.

On all these new offences, we need to be both clear and bold in providing our law enforcement agencies and our courts with the legal tools and powers they need to be robust in tackling the gangs, who are both the root cause of and the major beneficiaries from this problem. We on these Benches have rightly criticised the Government for the rhetoric around smashing the gangs—which in our view, at least at the moment, is empty rhetoric—but it is a clear fact that we need to tackle the criminal gangs, and it is right that we use this as an opportunity to shape our legislative framework so that we can do that as effectively as possible.

Amendments 33 and 38 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Alton, would add an additional demand: for the person to have committed an offence, it must be demonstrated as well that they have financially benefited from the supply of a relevant article for use in connection with an offence. Again, I understand the rationale and the intentions behind the amendment, but I put myself against it and support the current Government—again, a slightly rare position to be in. Unlike other aspects of the Bill, it seems clear to us on these Benches that, as it stands, the text of Clauses 13, 14 and 16, which create these offences, is adequate, clear and sufficient.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, we have Amendments 51 and 51B in this group. Amendment 51 would add mobile phones and chargers to the list of relevant articles. The noble Lord, Lord Alton, is just leaving; he may be coming back. There are innocent examples of the use of mobile phones in the JCHR’s report. Mobile phones are very common, and we are looking for proportionality in all this. Some years ago, I quite often heard opponents of asylum seekers and refugees, who were outraged, say, “They even have mobile phones”, as if that was some sort of great luxury and that having them meant they would be perfectly capable of getting, possibly not first-class seats, but certainly seats on a plane, because they were clearly very civilised, well-equipped and moneyed. I have not actually heard that for some time. Mobile phones are not a luxury these days; they enable asylum seekers to keep in touch with their family. I think that is hugely important, not for any sinister reason but because they are a lifeline for mental health, quite apart from more practical examples.

Amendment 51B speaks to the regulations which I mentioned in the last group. The Secretary of State can, by regulations, alter the list of relevant articles, and my amendment would provide for consultation with organisations that aim, without charge, to assist asylum seekers. I think that that point was made by one of those organisations in its briefings to noble Lords. After all, if there is to be a change, it is perfectly reasonable and proper that the people who know what happens on the ground—I am not suggesting that the Government do not—and who have that particular take on it should be consulted.

I have signed Amendment 56, to which the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, has spoken. People travel in groups—not everybody, but some people—and it seems natural, to me anyway, that a husband would perhaps carry documents for his wife and children, or a mother would carry documents for her children. I think that it would be right to make that change.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

Once again, I am grateful to noble Lords for their contributions to this group of amendments around the safeguards to the offences. As I have already said on previous groups, it is the position of His Majesty’s Opposition Benches that the new criminal offences in the Bill must be as watertight as possible. We know that people-smuggling criminal gangs are incredibly innovative in their efforts to continue running their illegal operations, concocting ever more ingenious methods to circumvent the law. We must do all we can to frustrate that. To do so, we need to ensure that there are no loopholes that could be used to evade legal repercussions.

I turn to the amendments. Amendment 46, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord German, seems, to us, with respect, to be unnecessary. As the Bill stands, the person in question already has a defence if they are able to show that they were carrying out a rescue, or if

“they were acting on behalf of an organisation which … aims to assist asylum-seekers, and … does not charge for its services”.

In my view, if someone has broken a law, as they will have done if they are charged under this clause, without being able to avail themselves of those two specific defences, then they have committed an offence for which they should be held liable. The amendment proposes that we, in effect, waive the law if the person shows that their actions were self-relating. That is a dangerous precedent to establish—that someone acting to benefit only themselves can get away with actions that are demonstrably illegal. If someone knowingly engages in criminal activity and is unable to have recourse to the defences set out in the Bill, we need to be clear that they have committed a crime and should still be liable as a result. In our view, the amendment would blow wide open the rigour and focus of the offences as currently drafted, which is the opposite of the strong message we need to send to those who—we cannot forget—are illegally violating our borders.

Amendments 50 and 62 would mean that, for the purposes of the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, any offence committed under the relevant clauses would not be regarded as a particularly serious crime. I listened to the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, explain the rationale for the amendments, and I completely understand the concern that lies behind them. I think I am right in saying that the convention talks about constituting

“a danger to the community of that country”,

and I completely accept that that is very strong language, but I think it is important to consider this in context. Illegal migrants enter the UK without going through any checks whatever. It can be almost impossible to find out who such migrants are, where they have come from, what their history is, and, fundamentally, what sort of people they are. Safe and legal routes are safe and legal precisely because they answer these questions. Let us not forget the incident that happened in May, when five Iranian nationals were arrested for planning what the Home Secretary described as a major terror attack. They arrived in the United Kingdom by irregular means, including small boats and a lorry, before claiming asylum. One of those people was taken out of his taxpayer-funded accommodation when he was arrested. Is it not clear that those men constituted a danger to the community of our country? We need to appreciate the risks that we run when faced with this system and with the problem that we have no idea of who those people are or the potential risk they pose. The police and security services were successful in foiling that attack, but we cannot guarantee that that would happen indefinitely. This problem obviously and demonstrably risks the safety of our national community, and we need to engage with the law in a way that reflects this. For that reason, we oppose those amendments.