Soft Power and Conflict Prevention

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Friday 5th December 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, it is a privilege to follow the noble Baroness, whose knowledge of these issues is profound.

Given the stress in the debate’s title on non-military means of conflict prevention, I hope that the most reverend Primate, who opened it in a most interesting and thought-provoking way, will not take it amiss if one who has spent his whole professional life in the Armed Forces should presume to contribute. I fully share the vision that it is far better to deal with situations by non-military means and sensible applications of soft power, however defined. I shall allude to its application for deterrence or prevention of conflict rather than to Joseph Nye’s definition of an ability to attract and co-opt others.

When I was studying for my RAF promotion exams more than 60 years ago, I was taught to consider three aspects in dealing with potential adversaries. They were political, economic and military. Non-conflict concepts were alive all those years ago. Today they have been rebranded and brigaded in a contemporary media-savvy vision called soft power. I leave it to others to unwrap the conundrum that so many from overseas wish to live and stay in this country while many others are so militantly averse to all that we stand for and believe in.

I turn to my third heading and the point I wish to make. It may be summed up in that phrase first attributed to Theodore Roosevelt. He wrote in 1900 that you can go far if you:

“Speak softly and carry a big stick”.

Others have coined the phrase, “an iron fist in a velvet glove”. My concern about the values of non-coercive soft power and non-military intervention lies not in their intrinsic worth but in the context in which they are applied.

The debate focuses on conflict prevention, not just winning the hearts and minds of others, so the perceptions of the interlocutors in the exchanges are all-important. The view from their end of the telescope may well not match ours. They may need to be cajoled or won over with economic or political gestures—but will those suffice to ensure a satisfactory outcome? The other side will certainly be weighing up what more it might extract, or what pressures it might face.

I fear that in recent years—I know this from my own experience—we have had harsh lessons, paid for in blood and treasure, about an opposition’s presumptions about the temper of the iron in our national fist. For decades before 1982, we had expended much effort in political-diplomatic exchanges to dissuade the Argentinians over their claim to the Falkland Islands. During the mid-1970s, the Argentinians became more belligerent—so much so that a nuclear-powered submarine was dispatched at short notice to the southern Atlantic as a successful deterrent.

As a then Assistant Chief of Air Staff at the MoD, I looked at the possibility of flying ground reinforcement into the Falklands by Hercules. Regrettably, I had to advise that, while a Hercules transport aircraft could, indeed, just fly into Port Stanley’s short airstrip, insufficient fuel was stored there, let alone runway length, to recover even a single aircraft. The idea of building a new airfield of reasonable size to allow for rapid reinforcement and in-theatre operations was considered, following an in-depth report by Lord Shackleton. However, the cost was sizeable and no department felt that it could be afforded, so it was dismissed as unnecessary. Non-military negotiation should continue and would—it was presumed—prove as adequate as in the past.

In subsequent years, the Argentinians noted that our military commitment to the Falklands was further and further diminished, with the withdrawal of a guard ship and eventually HMS “Endeavour”. By the time the Argentinians invaded in 1982, there were just 40 marines in place and no prospect of rapid reinforcement by air. Only after recapture did we get round to building the airfield at Mount Pleasant and positioning aircraft and radar for deterrence and protection. Soft power on that occasion lacked the deterrent of robust and timely further action, and we paid a dreadful price in lives lost, young individuals scarred for life and tragedy for the families involved.

Moving forward to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the first Gulf conflict, Saddam Hussein’s presumption was that the reduction in military capability, as the US and Britain sought to benefit from a peace dividend following the end of the Cold War, made it less likely that we would embark on hostile military action. Between August 1990 and February 1991, this perception of his must have been strengthened in spite of sizeable deployment of coalition forces into theatre, as the US, with our active support, sought to find a non-military solution. Nothing budged Hussein until his forces were attacked by air and, finally, by ground forces.

We lost six Tornado aircraft in that conflict, but there were adequate numbers to sustain our operational tempo. Today, there seems little dialogue with ISIL and we and our allies have embarked on a muted application of force. Is it not sobering to realise that our total offensive contribution to this ongoing operation, apart from some UAV sorties, is just six Tornados? Even with the life extension recently given to the Tornado force to remain at three full squadrons for a further year, there is no continuous capability for an air combat force to remain deployed globally, as a deterrent or for use, as far and as wide as it has been. Other tasks may become more pressing.

I have chosen the Tornado force to illustrate my point, but similar analogies may be made for naval and Army forces. All three services are shadows of their former selves of even a couple of decades ago. The Air Force that I was privileged to lead in the mid-1980s was 100,000 strong. Today, it is down to close on 30,000 and force numbers have declined in proportion. Does this ORBAT any longer have a hope of being the big stick or iron fist that history teaches us is an essential long-stop to soft power and other non-military engagement with recalcitrant opponents?

I repeat that of course I welcome all steps—any steps—that can resolve difficulties between nations without recourse to war and bloodshed. However, these have far greater hope of success if the stick and fist are first class and sizeable enough to carry weight in the minds of those we seek to win over. We deceive ourselves if we believe that today’s force levels are still adequate to foster and promote the success of soft power in conflict prevention. President Putin’s annexation of Crimea, so robustly decried by our Government and many in the West as unacceptable, is now a fait accompli. The strategic prize for Russia must surely outweigh any or all inconvenience caused to its economy, or even individuals, by sanctions, which are the most that NATO and the EU seem capable, or willing, to call upon. The labours of those who diligently seek to solve problems with soft power might be more productive if those who bear responsibility for defence consider the adequacy of the available strengths rather than assume that all is well because we input some now very small amount of GDP on defence capability.

I applaud the efforts and enthusiasm of the most reverend Primate and other noble Lords. I hope that more will be done for the Armed Forces to give him and others the deterrent muscle of “big stick” and well tempered “iron fist” to promote success—the success that a combination of hard and soft power, or “smart power”, may bring. Hard power, it has been said, begets soft power.

Afghanistan

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Thursday 30th October 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, at the Tokyo conference in 2012, a number of states and international organisations made pledges amounting to £16 billion for reconstruction in Afghanistan. On 3 and 4 December we will jointly host a conference in London with the Afghan Government, at which a number of other Governments will be invited to recommit themselves to the development of Afghanistan as a collective effort over the next few years.

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, a considerable number of the available Tornado GR4s are still deployed in Afghanistan. Now that combat operations have ceased, what future plans do the Government have for that force in Afghanistan?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, I will have to write to the noble and gallant Lord about that. I am not entirely up to date on where all the Tornados are.

Armed Forces: Accommodation

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Thursday 15th September 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Craig of Radley]

My Lords, does the Minister recall this quotation:

“Poor accommodation is an issue which is creating difficulties in retaining personnel in the armed forces”?

That was Dr Liam Fox as shadow Defence Secretary in 2007. Has the Defence Secretary changed his mind?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

I assure the House that the Defence Secretary has not changed his mind, and I repeat: we should pay tribute to the previous Administration’s considerable efforts in recent years to upgrade service accommodation, which are continuing. A further 900 houses have already been upgraded since this Administration took office. We are very conscious of the importance of this programme. Perhaps I should also mention that alongside it, a substantial programme is to be undertaken in the next five years of service accommodation adjustment to accommodate troops who will be returning from Germany. That is not part of this pause.

Armed Forces Bill

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Thursday 8th September 2011 Grand Committee

[Lord Touhig]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 25 in my name and also supporting Amendments 26 and 27, I know that many in your Lordships’ House, and others in the other place too, have great concerns about the way in which the Committee on the Grant of Honours, Decorations and Medals, which advises the sovereign on the award of honours, has gone about its task. It has been argued over the years that the committee, known as the HD committee, is the right model to consider what advice to give to the sovereign. We are told that it is the right model because it is made up of senior civil servants from across Whitehall and that, due to the way it is made up and operates, it is protected against that terrible scourge, political influence—something which over the years officials have told me must be resisted. But, for the life of me, I do not see why it is thought that a body of top officials who meet in secret and are not accountable to anyone is considered better equipped to be part of this process than, say, Members of Parliament, who are elected by the people and obviously enjoy the people’s confidence, or indeed Members of your Lordships’ House, a number of whom are noble and gallant Lords who have served our country in the Armed Forces with great distinction.

The point I am making is this. The lack of transparency and accountability which is at the heart of the way in which the HD committee operates is no longer defensible. Most of the time, the HD committee does not even meet; its members communicate with one another by telephone and e-mail. Even more worrying, at the very helpful briefing on this Bill arranged by the Minister on Tuesday, we learnt that there is not even a statutory basis for the way in which the HD operates—its decisions are based on conventions.

The system by which advice on honours is given to the sovereign has existed for some decades and needs to be overhauled. I have come to this conclusion having for some years now tried to understand how the HD committee reached a decision to advise Her Majesty the Queen that 35,000 veterans of the Malaysian campaign can accept the Pingat Jasa Malaysia Medal from the King of Malaysia but must not wear it—accept it but must not wear it. To deny our servicemen the right to wear the PJM was an unfair and cruel act by the committee, and I have attempted by way of Parliamentary Questions and freedom of information requests to lift the blanket of secrecy surrounding this decision. All my efforts have been thwarted, and a veil of secrecy descends on Whitehall.

I have been told that there are two enduring rules governing the work of the HD committee in these matters—the five-year rule and the double-medalling rule. The five-year rule prevents the award of honours more than five years after a conflict has taken place, and the double-medalling rule forbids the award of a medal for which an earlier medal has been presented. However, the HD committee set aside both rules and advised Her Majesty the Queen that the men should accept the medal from the King of Malaysia, but then it reimposed both rules to prevent them wearing the medal. I would add that not all British servicemen who took part in the Malaysian campaign even got the campaign medal from this country—so clearly there will be no double medalling in their case.

Some 114 Commonwealth servicemen lost their lives in that campaign; 180 were wounded. Is this the way in which a grateful country should honour their sacrifice? The veterans are told that they can accept the medal but must not wear it. That is an affront, and it is an insult. I should add that the Governments of Australia and New Zealand advised Her Majesty the Queen that their servicemen should accept and wear the PJM.

To add further dishonour to this whole affair, the HD committee lifted the ban on wearing the PJM for one week during the 50th anniversary of Malaysian independence. I have in my possession Foreign Office documents which make it clear that the decision was lifted only because the Malaysians had invited British and Commonwealth ex-servicemen to attend the celebrations and it was feared that British veterans would cause some embarrassing scenes when they saw the Anzac ex-servicemen wearing their PJM, which the British were not allowed to do.

I will not detain the Committee much longer, save to say that the discredit that this has brought on our country over the PJM is the prime reason for my amendment, which would remove the HD committee from having any responsibility in future to advise the sovereign on the acceptance of honours awarded to service people. I am suggesting that this would be better done by a committee representing both Houses of Parliament and others appointed by the Secretary of State for Defence, who would represent the services. The committee, to be named the Committee on the Grant of Medals to Service Members, would be required to make an annual report on the discharge of its functions to the Secretary of State and that report should be laid before Parliament. I believe that there is no more appropriate time than now, with this Armed Forces Bill—a Bill that comes only once every five years. This Bill enshrines at its heart the military covenant. If we were to honour the courage and valour of all our ex-servicemen, particularly the veterans of the Malaysian campaign, we should right the wrong on them. If we do this, we can be proud that this country will do a lot better in future to honour and value those who have given their lives and continue to put their lives on the line in defence of the freedom of our country. I beg to move.

[Lord Craig of Radley]

My Lords, I shall speak to my Amendment 26, which is in the same group. The Minister and other noble Lords will be aware that I tabled a Written Question on 14 July about the Pingat Jasa Malaysia Medal, about which the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, has just spoken. As he mentioned, this medal was awarded by the King and Government of Malaysia to all members of Commonwealth Armed Forces who were involved in the Malayan emergency and the confrontation with Indonesia between 1957 and 1966.

A similar Question was asked by the noble Lord, Lord Chadlington, in January 2005. The response that he was given by the noble Baroness, Lady Symons of Vernham Dean, then the Minister of State in the Foreign Office, explained that government policy,

“on the acceptance and wearing of foreign awards preclude[s] the acceptance of medals for events in the distant past or more than five years previously. In addition, the rules do not allow for a foreign award to be accepted if a British award has been given for the same service”.—[Official Report, 11/1/05; col. WA34.]

The position upheld then was that all British citizens required the permission of Her Majesty's Government to accept and wear foreign state awards and that the Government would adhere to the rules that I have outlined. Subsequently, in 2006, the Government agreed that the PJM medal could be accepted by veterans who had been in Malaysia at the relevant time, but that the wearing of the medal was not approved. The stance was in stark contrast to that taken by other Commonwealth countries, which approved not only the acceptance but the wearing of the medal. The Answer that I had seven weeks after I posed the Question, dated 2 September 2011, from the noble Lord, Lord Astor of Hever, who I believe is himself a recipient of the PJM, was far from explicit. I had anticipated that the response would be from a Minister in the Foreign Office, as the FCO has traditionally had the lead on foreign awards and medals. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Astor, said that the FCO had the lead. But he stated:

“Permission was not however recommended for the PJM to be worn by veterans as the majority had previously been awarded the British General Service Medal (GSM), for their service in the region. There was a period of time, between 1960 and 1962 and, in the case of the Army, from mid-1965 onwards when the risk and rigour was not deemed sufficient to award a medal to British troops stationed in the area”.—[Official Report, 5/9/11; col. WA16.]

Having prayed in aid the “no double-medalling convention”, the Minister goes on to assert that the lack of a GSM or a clasp to it does not in itself mean automatic qualification to wear the PJM. Tossing a coin, if it is heads you do not qualify and if it is tails you cannot wear it.

As has been pointed out to me, over the years the Government of the day have agreed to the award and wearing of more than one medal for a specific operation—a number during the Second World War and in subsequent operations too numerous to record now, but ranging from the mid-1970s in Oman to the Malta GC 50th Anniversary of the end of the War Medal. In order to qualify for that medal, the recipient had to have the British Africa Star—in other words, imposing a double-medalling requirement. This Malta medal of course broke by some years the five-year rule, having received unrestricted approval for wear some 50 years after the event.

The Accumulated Campaign Service Medal is a further example of double-medalling. It was introduced in 1994 specifically to award more than one medal to those serving repeat tours in Northern Ireland who would otherwise receive just one GSM for their service. The medal has since been extended to include medals awarded for more recent operations, such as in the south Atlantic and the Gulf.

The acceptance of medals issued by foreign Governments and by United Nations and NATO authorities to British citizens on a considerable number of occasions has also been approved. Each has been deemed, no doubt, as an exceptional case. Given the large number of exceptions that I have mentioned, surely it is no longer tenable to attempt to uphold the policy that I outlined in my opening remarks on the grounds of precedence.

Modern operational conflicts are taking place all over the globe, often with allies—particularly Commonwealth allies—involved. Should a Commonwealth country that British Armed Forces personnel have assisted in a matter of national importance to that country wish to recognise that help with the award of a medal, it would be that much more appreciated by both donor and recipient if there were a presumption of acceptance and wear before such an award were proposed. I suggest in my amendment that this might be confined—at least for the present—to Commonwealth country awards. I hope that the Minister will not accept any advice that it would be invidious to make a distinction between medals awarded by a Commonwealth as opposed to a non-Commonwealth country. The purpose of my amendment is indeed to give precedence to the Commonwealth, not to diminish it. Indeed, this could be a timely moment for the Prime Minister attending the next CHOGM in Australia to demonstrate a special interest in this matter. The current stance seems far too insular and unreceptive of the appreciation being conveyed by the donor nation.

I personally cannot lay claim to a chestful of medals. I am the most senior member of my service not to have an operational service award, let alone a GSM—and that in spite of more than 40 years’ service in the Royal Air Force. However, those with more medals that I have are, and should be, rightly proud of their contributions to national duty which their awards reflect. I do not believe that accepting and wearing a medal awarded by a Commonwealth country in any way belittles the national medal that may also have been awarded. Surely the acceptance and wearing of a Commonwealth medal alongside a national one adds to, rather than detracts from, the importance or significance of the latter. It serves to emphasise the contribution made by that individual and the recognition of the efforts that he or she has made. Is this not the time to review and change the long-standing but frequently overruled policy rules that were drawn up in a very different age?

The rules prayed in aid by the committee on honours, decorations and awards seem to be designed to produce a default position of refusal for any foreign medal and are blindly and often stubbornly asserted by the honours committee. Along with the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, I urge the Minister and the Government to take this matter away for review and renewal. Will they also clarify whether the advice being forwarded to the sovereign is from the honours committee direct or from the appropriate Minister in the Government? If the latter, it seems to me that the royal prerogative is being invoked.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Craig of Radley]

26: After Clause 23, insert the following new Clause—
“Commonwealth medals
After section 339 of AFA 2006 insert—
“339A Commonwealth medals
Medals awarded by Commonwealth governments to present or former members of Her Majesty’s armed forces may be worn without restriction.””

[Lord Craig of Radley]

I thank noble Lords who have spoken on behalf of my amendment. I listened with great interest to the details of the speech that the Minister made. I made a point at the end of my comments about whether this advice to the sovereign was or was not prerogatively engaged. The Minister made it very clear that the sovereign was being advised by the HD committee, whereas I have in front of me two statements. The first, a Written Answer by the noble Baroness, Lady Symons of Vernham Dean, says:

“HMG's rules on the acceptance and wearing of foreign awards preclude the acceptance”,

and so on, and that,

“All British citizens require permission from HMG to accept and wear foreign state awards”.—[Official Report, 11/1/05; col. WA34.]

A year later, in January 2006, there was a Written Ministerial Statement that said:

“It is longstanding government policy that non-British medals will not be approved for events or service”—[Official Report, 31/1/06; col. WS14]—

that is, events or service governed by the five-year rule or the double-medalling rule. So I am not absolutely clear, and perhaps the Minister either now or at a later date can clarify for us the position, as he sees it being adopted.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall)]

My Lords, I believe that if the noble and gallant Lord would like the Minister to reply to his remarks, it would be advisable for him to move his amendment.

[Lord Craig of Radley]

I beg to move.

[Lord De Mauley]

My Lords, I understand the noble and gallant Lord’s question. This is a complicated area. May I write to him in response?

[Lord Craig of Radley]

Yes, of course I accept that. Thank you very much. I withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 26 withdrawn.