Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 8th September 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, we on these Benches agree that detained persons should, of course, have access to good legal representation when they are detained. This amendment pertains to legal aid for those detained persons. As noble Lords are aware, legal aid is already provided for those who bring asylum cases or other matters such as immigration bail, certain applications by victims of domestic abuse or trafficking, proceedings before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, asylum support applications and applications made by separated children. Put simply, this support is already clearly in place. It is our position that extensive provision is already made and at significant cost.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Bach for his amendment and for the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, on behalf of her noble friend Lady Ludford. I have also heard contributions from the Floor of the Committee from the noble Lords, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard and Lord Pannick, my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, all of which were broadly in support of my noble friend Lord Bach’s Amendment 137.

This amendment would impose a duty to make civil legal aid available to detained persons within 48 hours. I am going to repeat what noble Lords have said already, because it is important to put it on the record. People detained under immigration powers in prisons and in immigration removal centres are provided initially with 30 minutes of free legal aid advice through the detained duty advice scheme—DDAS. This is a triaged appointment which supports people to meet with a legal provider who may provide further advice, subject to the matter being within scope of legal aid and the detained person’s eligibility. I want to be clear that there is this 30-minute availability, as noble Lords have mentioned. It is important to re-emphasise that, following that DDAS assessment, whether a legal representative accepts or takes on a case is subject to a merit test and to a decision about independent legal representation, in line with legal aid. There is already some scope for reassurance. I hope that the Committee can accept that this well-established service is in place to provide people with quick and easy access to legal provision.

I am conscious that my noble friend Lord Bach mentioned the take-up. I fully accept that this is an important matter for him, and for the Committee and the Government to consider. Take-up is monitored by officials from the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice. It will be examined in detail. I am happy to look at how we can improve take-up of the initial provision, but the initial provision is there.

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I began my life as a historian at Cambridge. I know the contribution that overseas students make, but, ultimately, we need to look for other solutions for the cash-strapped universities. Many of them have already started to build overseas campuses, where students can be educated locally at far less cost to themselves and at far greater benefit to their own countries. It is for these reasons we need to start addressing the numbers here.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough for his amendment, which seeks to collect and publish data about overseas students who have committed criminal offences leading to the revocation of their student visas.

When immigrants commit crimes, we need to understand whether there are patterns that suggest wider or systemic abuses of the system. Data of this kind has immense practical importance. It allows us to identify risks, ensure accountability and take informed decisions about how to strengthen our Immigration Rules. When we talk about borders, we must do so with an eye to safety, fairness and national interest. The British people rightly expect that those who come to this country will contribute to it through our economy, workplace, communities and civic life. The vast majority of overseas students do just that, enriching our universities and our society. But when a small minority commit offences, we must have the tools to know about it, track it and respond effectively.

As my noble friend Lord Jackson mentioned, he has tried time and again, unfortunately in vain, to get the Home Office to release these statistics. The Answer my noble friend received to his Written Question on 7 April, that official statistics published by the Home Office are kept under review, is not particularly helpful. I hope the Minister will be able to finally give my noble friend the answer that he deserves. This amendment seeks to provide that clarity.

Amendments 198 and 199, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel, go to the heart of what it means to exercise control over our borders in a way that serves our national interest. The first amendment makes it clear that family migration through spouse and civil partner visas must be subject to sensible limits and rigorous criteria. This is about making sure that those who come here are ready to contribute, not to extract; to work, not to remain idle; and to build, not to burden.

Our economy, jobs market, public services and national identity all depend on a social contract: that people pay in before they take out. That is the foundation of our tax system, the National Health Service, schools, housing and every element of our welfare state. Introducing a salary threshold of £38,700 is not a punitive measure; it is common sense. It would ensure that new arrivals will be net contributors to this country, helping us to strengthen our economy at a time when the Government’s mismanagement has left us in a dreadful state. It would reassure the British people that migration is working for them, not against them, and it would help to rebuild the trust that is so essential if public confidence in our immigration system is to endure.

The second amendment addresses an equally important issue: the question of sovereignty. Put simply, we cannot allow this country’s ability to remove those with no right to remain to be dictated by the whims of foreign Governments. Our domestic policy must never be determined by third countries which frustrate deportations by refusing to co-operate with basic verification of identity. This amendment would strengthen the Government’s hand by making visa penalties mandatory when other countries refuse to play their part.

The link between border control and national well-being could not be clearer. Our economy, our jobs market, our communities and our state services depend on a system that is fair, firm and respected. The British people are generous, but they are not fools; they want an immigration system that supports growth, rewards contribution and protects our national autonomy. These amendments deliver on those principles; they are proportionate, robust and urgently needed. I urge the Government to recognise their merit and adopt them.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I will say something about Amendments 198 and 199, spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Davies. Amendment 198 would, as I understand it, specify a maximum number of persons who may enter the United Kingdom annually as a spouse or civil partner of another. If I were not already married, I would be exceptionally aggrieved to be told that my spouse, from whatever country she may come, would not be permitted to join me in the United Kingdom, despite the fact that I am a British citizen, because too many spouses or civil partners had already entered this country in the last year or because, looking at proposed new subsection (5), the country concerned cannot exceed 7% of the maximum number specified in the regulations. I do not know where 7% comes from rather than 6% or 8%, but that is what it provides.

It is not difficult to see that such arbitrary restrictions on spouses or civil partners coming to this country would be a manifest breach of this country’s international obligations under Article 8 in relation to family rights. It is also not difficult to see what the reaction of our closest allies—the United States, Australia, New Zealand and many other countries—would be to being told that their citizens cannot join their spouse in this country. Reciprocal measures of this nature would be highly likely to be adopted, to the detriment of everybody. It is also plain from this amendment that these arbitrary restrictions on numbers would apply irrespective of whether the person coming from abroad is to work here and irrespective of whether the spouse in this country, the British citizen, is able to accommodate and provide for them. I am afraid that this is simply not well thought out.

It also requires in proposed new subsection (10)(b) that the applicant in this country provides evidence that the happy couple were married or formed a civil partnership at least two years prior to the application. So, my beloved and I are to be arbitrarily prevented from living in this country together for at least two years. I cannot begin to understand the logic, the rationality or the justification of such a measure. I hope the Minister will tell the Committee that Amendment 198 is unacceptable.

Amendment 199 is equally unacceptable. It would impose, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, said, a mandatory obligation on the Government to impose visa penalties on unco-operative countries. The Government already have ample powers in their discretion to impose visa penalties on unco-operative countries. It makes no sense whatever to impose a mandatory duty on the Government to impose visa penalties. For this reason, the Government may well take the view that it is far more productive and effective to inform the country concerned of its failures, to negotiate with it and to seek to secure a resolution to the problem. A mandatory duty simply serves no sensible purpose.

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Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

146: Clause 43, page 38, line 30, at end insert—
“(2A) After section 3(1) insert—“(1A) The Secretary of State must, where a person breaches any of the conditions of their leave to enter or remain under subsection (1)(c), make a deportation order against the person.”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would ensure that anyone who breached a condition of their leave to enter or remain would be deported from the United Kingdom.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak in support of Amendments 146 and 147, tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel.

At the heart of these amendments is the principle of conditionality. Where an individual is granted conditional leave to enter or remain in this country, that permission is given on very clear terms. We need to be clear that these conditions are not arbitrary or frivolous. They are carefully set out to protect the fundamental interests of our economy, the integrity of our communities and the sustainability of our public funds. If those conditions are broken then the privilege of remaining in the United Kingdom should be forfeited. To do otherwise would render the entire conditionality regime meaningless. Rules that cannot be enforced are not rules at all; they are invitations to abuse and exploitation, and they undermine the trust of the British people in our immigration system.

The amendments before us are common sense. They would require that, where an individual breached the conditions of their leave, a deportation order must follow. That is a proportionate consequence, one that would reinforce the principle that with the right to stay comes the responsibility to comply. This is also about fairness to those who abide by the rules—fairness to the taxpayer who shoulders the cost of our public services, and fairness to our communities who deserve confidence that immigration is properly managed.

These are key aspects of government administration. Without robust enforcement, our borders cannot be effectively controlled and our laws risk becoming toothless. Through these amendments, we are providing the Government with the tools they need to deliver on their own stated objective of a firm but fair immigration system. The amendments are practical, enforceable and just. They would ensure that our conditionality regime had meaning, that our rules had effect and that the British people could have confidence that their borders were being properly secured.

On the question that Clause 43 does not stand part of the Bill, we on these Benches must disagree with the noble Lords, Lord Anderson of Ipswich and Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. I do not need to go into great detail on the point. Clause 43 pertains to conditions on limited leave to enter or remain, but we on these Benches are clear that, where this status is granted, it is vital that strict conditions are both met and enforced, and that anyone found to have broken those conditions should be deported. The Government have a duty to control and manage immigration in the interests of our country. We say that removing those conditions undermines the Government’s ability to do that, so I cannot support it.

The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bach, raises an interesting point in reference to the Immigration Act 2016 on the process of being granted bail accommodation. I too would be grateful, alongside the noble Lord, to hear from the Minister what the Government’s assessment of this is, whether it is a problem that they have identified and what plans they have to mitigate it. I beg to move.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I have tabled a notice to oppose Clause 43, which has been signed by a former immigration Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.

I have listened with great attention to what the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, has just said, so I shall make it clear what the amendment is about. We are not trying to stop the Government doing what they say they need to do, but we are objecting to a means of doing it that is arguably unnecessary and which is certainly exorbitant—indeed, dangerously so.

The provision that Clause 43 would amend is Section 3(1) of the Immigration Act 1971, under the title:

“General provisions for regulation and control”.


Section 3(1) is indeed general in its scope. It provides for conditions to be imposed on any person who is given limited leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom. That includes those who are here on a student visa, a business visa or a spousal visa. The conditions that can currently be imposed on the grant of such visas do not appear in the amendment. I remind noble Lords what they are: they include the power to issue visas for certain types of work only, and the power to require visa holders to maintain themselves and their dependants without recourse to public funds. They are fair conditions, and they are well understood by those who are subject to them. Those people include—and I declare an interest—one of my sons-in-law, who is on the five-year pathway to indefinite leave to remain. The happy couple have settled in Norwich, but I try not to hold that against them.

Clause 43, if we were to pass it into law, would allow the Secretary of State to impose on any of these visa holders such conditions as the Secretary of State thinks fit. No limit of any kind is placed on this power, and its potential severity is shown by the illustrative restrictions given in Clause 43(2): electronic tagging, a curfew to operate in a place specified by the Secretary of State for unlimited periods of day or night, and requirements on individuals not to enter a specified area—exclusion zones—and not to leave a specified area, so-called inclusion zones.

Such conditions are not entirely without precedent in our law. They will be familiar to your Lordships from the terrorism prevention and investigation measures, or TPIMs, introduced in the TPIM Act 2011 and echoed in Part 2 of the National Security Act 2023, for those believed to be involved in foreign power threat activity. It might be thought extraordinary enough if this clause allowed individuals whose only crime is to have studied here or married a British citizen to be treated like terrorist suspects, but it is worse than that. Clause 43 would introduce a materially harsher regime than TPIMs in at least three respects.

First, there is the threshold for their use. TPIMs require a reasonable belief on the part of the Secretary of State that the subject is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity. Clause 43, by contrast, is universal in its application. There is no threshold. Even the most blameless of migrants, whose only crime is to have come here for a wholly legitimate purpose, may in law be subject to its full rigour.

Secondly, there is the scope. The measures that appear in Clause 43(2) are all familiar from Schedule 1 to the TPIM Act, but the range of possible TPIMs is at least finite. Not even in respect of those believed to be terrorists did Parliament trust the Government with the unlimited power to impose, in the words of Clause 43,

“such other conditions as the Secretary of State thinks fit”.

Thirdly, there are the safeguards. TPIMs can be imposed only after the Home Secretary has obtained both the permission of the High Court and the confirmation of the CPS that it is not feasible to prosecute the subject for any criminal offence. No such safeguard exists in Clause 43, which would allow the severest restrictions on personal liberty to be imposed by the Executive without the intervention of a court on a potentially vast range of people, without any requirement for consultation, authorisation, automatic judicial review of the kind that exists for TPIMs, or oversight.

Clause 43 came late to this Bill. It was introduced in Committee in the Commons. No attempt was made to defend its breadth of application, but the Minister for Border Security and Asylum, Angela Eagle, did explain the limited circumstances in which the Government proposed to use the new powers for which they were asking. It was intended for use, she said:

“Where a person does not qualify for asylum or protection under the refugee convention but cannot be removed from the UK because of our obligations under domestic and international law”.—[Official Report, Commons, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill Committee, 13/3/25; col. 265.]


It was intended to allow the same conditions to be placed on such persons as they might have been subjected to under immigration bail. She said:

“The powers will be used only in cases involving conduct such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, extremism or serious crime, or where the person poses a threat to national security or public safety”.—[Official Report, Commons, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill Committee, 13/3/25; col. 268.]


Speaking for myself, that objective is entirely understandable, indeed defensible, though I pause to say that the definition of extremism is worryingly uncertain. Given the Government’s limited ambitions for the use of this clause, can the Minister explain why the existing powers to issue TPIMs, serious crime prevention orders and measures under Part 2 of the National Security Act 2023 are considered insufficient? They contain better safeguards and seem to meet precisely the cases that the Minister has in mind. Indeed, serious crime prevention orders are to be extended further by Part 3 of this Bill. If I am right about that, there is no need for Clause 43, but I am sure the Minister will explain.

Even if these existing powers are not sufficient, any new power must surely be tailored to its intended target, rather than to the vast range of innocent visa holders covered by Clause 43 in its current form. That is what the Constitution Committee had in mind when we recommended that the power be narrowed and that safeguards on its use be included in the Bill. The Joint Committee on Human Rights reported in similar terms. For anyone who is interested in more detail, I can recommend the useful briefings from Amnesty and the Public Law Project.

No one doubts for a moment the good faith of the Minister or his colleagues, but to legislate for unlimited powers and trust to assurances from the Dispatch Box about the narrow scope of their intended use would not just be poor legislative practice but an abandonment of parliamentary scrutiny at the very time when that scrutiny is most needed. The courts have no regard to ministerial assurances, save when the terms of an Act are ambiguous. That, as noble Lords know, is a rare eventuality.

No one who looks at the opinion polls can be confident that all possible future Governments would apply Clause 43 with the restraint to which this Government have committed. To enact Clause 43 would be a gift-wrapped present to any future Government who wished to threaten or erode the rights of immigrants across the board, without thresholds or oversight. If this clause is needed at all, I hope the Minister will agree that it should at least be confined in the Bill to the circumstances where that need arises.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

That point has been made, and I will discuss that with my colleagues in government. Clause 43 as drafted is before the Committee today, but there are opportunities to discuss it further if the noble Lord is not happy with any assurances that we can give outside the Committee to table amendments that can be debated and voted upon in due course. I will leave it at that.

Amendment 148 in the name of my noble friend Lord Bach seeks to clarify the eligibility criteria for bail accommodation under Schedule 10 to the Immigration Act 2016. Under this provision, the Secretary of State has the power to provide accommodation to someone in exceptional circumstances only when they have been granted immigration bail and are subject to a residence condition that requires them to live at an address specified in that condition. The Home Office recognises that, where the Secretary of State is required to provide a person with accommodation to enable them to meet their bail conditions, a specified address cannot always be known at the time of the bail grant. Accordingly, it has been a long-standing policy position that bail can be granted with a residence condition to an address that is known at the time of the grant of immigration bail, or an address that is yet to be specified. In 2024, this was also set out explicitly in the relevant guidance. The policy is clear, and operational teams are already operating the legislation in this way, to ensure that someone can apply to the Home Office for bail accommodation without having been granted bail to a specific address. Therefore, the amendment—with its good intention—would make no material difference to the current operation of the legislation and is not necessary. I am happy to hear further from the noble Lord, but I invite him not to move his amendment.

On the amendments from the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, Amendment 146 would require the Secretary of State to make a deportation order against persons who breach the conditions attached to their leave in the UK. Such breaches of conditions may already be addressed by cancelling that leave and removing the person from the UK without the need to seek a deportation order. Mandating deportation in such cases is not therefore necessary. It will provide no guarantee that a person’s removal from the UK could be enforced if they were to make a human rights or protection claim against their removal.

Finally, Amendment 147 would replace existing criminal sanctions for offences under Section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971 with a penalty of deportation. Overstayers and illegal entrants are already liable to removal from the UK. Where a person is convicted of an offence and sentenced to a period of imprisonment, consideration will be given to their deportation. With respect to the noble Lord, the amendment risks encouraging offending behaviour and would not result in an increase in removals from the UK.

This has been a serious debate that has raised a number of points. But I hope, given what I have said, that the noble Lord will not press his objection to Clause 43. I will meet noble Lords to discuss their objections further to understand their concerns better. I ask noble Lords not to press their amendments so that we can examine the clause together.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who spoke on this group for their contributions to this debate. This has been a group that clearly reflects several different views, and I welcome that we have been able to have a debate on these issues.

We on these Benches remain firm in our resolve that conditional leave to enter or remain should be just that—conditional on criteria that seek to safeguard our communities, our public services and our economy. These conditions do not undermine our capacity to be compassionate, our capacity to help those who are in need, or our record of supporting those who need our help. They ensure that we have a system that is controlled and protects our country, and over which the Government can exercise their dutiful authority. These are fundamental duties and we have sought to support the Government in meeting their own objectives. I therefore hope the Minister will seriously consider these amendments as a way of empowering him and his colleagues to take action that is needed to ensure that our conditions are not optional. However, for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 146 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, this need not, I hope, take anything like as long as the last group of amendments. Clause 46 relates to an appeal when a protection claim has been removed, and Clause 47 relates to protection and other human rights. The issue I am probing is the scope that these clauses give for the Government or Parliament to impose deadlines on the tribunal in determining appeals—in this case, a deadline of 24 weeks from the institution of the appeal. I am not arguing that appeals should not be dealt with as speedily as possible; instead, I would like to understand the scope for the tribunal to say, “Sorry, we can’t meet this timeframe”. In particular, how far can regard be had to other cases? Is it just for particular cases?

The wording is

“where the Tribunal considers that it is not reasonably practicable to do so”.

Is that confined to a particular appeal or is it about the workload in general? I am very uneasy about a statutory deadline on how tribunals of the judiciary operate. I know that we will be given some opportunities to be briefed on and to discuss the new procedures that the Government have in mind, but we must deal with this legislation as it is in front of us now. I beg to move.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, at the heart of Amendment 157, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel, is the fundamental principle that we must reduce the backlog, unblock the immigration system and ensure that people are not left waiting endlessly for a decision on their appeal. It is in no one’s interest that asylum seekers should be kept in hotels and HMOs for weeks on end while decisions are being made on their appeal. Delay does not serve anyone.

The present situation is intolerable. Recently reported statistics cited by the Law Society show that the waiting time for an appeal decision is, on average, nearly 50 weeks. There is almost a year of uncertainty, during which applicants remain in taxpayer-funded accommodation and support. It is in precisely this space that vexatious claims can be lodged, with the appeals process used not to seek justice but to delay removal and prolong the benefit of support. This is not acceptable, and it undermines public confidence in the integrity of the system.

Our amendment seeks to require the Secretary of State, first, to publish a clear date by which he expects appeals to be determined within a 24-week period, and then, within 12 months, to provide a report on how many cases have not met that standard; in other words, the Government would have to set out their ambition and then be held to account for whether or not they deliver it.

Amendments 203F and 203G, tabled by my noble friends Lord Murray of Blidworth and Lord Jackson, and the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Alton, are fundamentally about transparency, requiring that all judgments of the Upper Tribunal in immigration and asylum matters are published promptly and made accessible to the public. Why does this matter? First, it is because transparency allows us to assess the quality of the initial decision-making process. A high rate of successful appeals is a clear signal that something is going wrong further upstream, either with the application of the law or with the evidential standards being applied. Without clear and timely publication of judgments, it is difficult to see where those problems lie.

These amendments are about shining a light on the system. If the Government have nothing to hide, there can be no objection to Parliament and the public being able to see how decisions are being made. Indeed, such transparency will strengthen confidence that our border security is being upheld in the way that Ministers assure us it is. I hope that the Government will seriously consider this principle in light of the points than I and other noble Lords have raised.

[A noble Lord]

That is in the next group.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I know, I just realised that.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. I know that we will have a full discussion on Amendments 203F and 203G at a later date. I will take that as an hors d’oeuvre from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. It is important that he trails those issues because they are linked. I value that he has done that today. However, I will focus on the amendments before the Committee, Amendments 155 and 156, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. These seek to confirm that the resources of the tribunal and legal aid practitioners are sufficient to ensure that appeals are heard fairly within the 24-week timeframe.

Clauses 46 and 47 already set out that the statutory timeframe should be adhered to unless it is not reasonably practical to do so. This enables the judiciary to take into account any relevant factors when exercising its discretion and responsibility over case management and the listing of appeals. We in the Home Office are working very closely with the Ministry of Justice to ensure that the tribunal has the resources it needs to meet the growing backlog. and we want to ensure that we deliver on that backlog as a matter of some urgency. The tribunal has been given additional funding to boost the number of days it will be sitting in 2025-26 to near maximum capacity, and we are also consulting on uplifts to immigration and asylum legal aid fees to support that capacity.

The period of 24 weeks is carefully chosen, as it balances the importance of resolving cases quickly, while the Government recognise the need for appropriate safeguards to ensure access to justice for all. To provide further reassurance to the noble Baroness, the resources of the tribunal are taken into consideration, and these provisions will not apply immediately following Royal Assent. There will be a period of implementation and operationalisation, during which the Home Office, the MoJ and the Courts & Tribunals Service will ensure the tribunals’ readiness in the coming months. I hope all that will give the noble Baroness some reassurance on those issues.

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[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My noble friend Lady Brinton added her name to all these amendments. I was happy that she did so. I am also happy to have the opportunity —of course, not at her expense—of expressing my support for them this evening. Inevitably, as the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, has said, there is rather a lot of repetition in this over a period of years.

We touched on visual age assessments—I cannot remember on which day in Committee—and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, as she always has done, expressed her clear views about visual assessment being inappropriate. She said she had talked—coming from her cultural and ethnic background; I align myself with her in this—to young males whose looks raised a question in her mind as to what age they were. However hard we try, our own backgrounds leave us with a bias, I suppose—an inbuilt bias, an expectation. We have to put ourselves in other people’s shoes.

I recall being in the education centre of this House, talking to young students who I think were at the top end of primary school. There was one young student who, if you went by facial hair, would have been regarded as twice as old as he actually was. I recall also being very impressed by his presentation; the students were discussing how they would campaign for a change in the law, although I suppose I should not go into that tonight.

My noble friend also has in this group Amendments 180 and 194, supported by, among others, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Sheffield. Amendment 180 deals with criminal proceedings, and my noble friend says that a mandatory referral age for age assessment in those proceedings follows from the basic argument regarding assessment for immigration purposes.

Amendment 194, as the noble Baroness has said, is about accommodation. Some people assume that everyone in asylum accommodation is a criminal and a danger to local residents. It is good that we have the opportunity to recognise that a child in adult accommodation, in adult detention, is a vulnerable child, and I just use the amendment to make that point.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

This is an important set of amendments, but I am sure it will come as no surprise to the noble Lords supporting them that we on these Benches have some disagreements with them.

Amendment 162 proposes that, where there is any doubt as to age, we should simply presume that the individual is a child. I cannot think of a more reckless approach. We all know that children are entitled to greater rights and protections under our law, but those protections exist precisely because children are vulnerable. If we hand them out indiscriminately to anyone who claims to be under 18, we risk creating grave safeguarding failures. There are well-documented cases where individuals who arrived illegally have lied about their age, and as a result adult men were placed in classrooms with teenage girls or in accommodation with vulnerable children. This amendment, whatever its good intentions, would compromise safety, weaken enforcement and put children at risk, and we cannot allow that to happen. Furthermore, Amendment 163 seems to me to be completely impractical in operational terms.

The fundamental point is this: age is one of the characteristics that we need to determine as soon as someone arrives in the UK illegally. This is innately tied to the sort of support they receive, who they are housed with, what services they can access and how they will interact with other migrants and those already in the United Kingdom.