Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th January 2026 Lords Chamber

If the Government are serious about the work of the Select Committee on fraud and about doing something about this, the least they can do is accept the recommendation and the amendment; publish a report indicating how the telecommunications companies might be brought within the embrace of the penalty regime; and consult on it so that we can take it to the next stage. I hope that there will be a positive response to this amendment from the Minister.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, for bringing forward this amendment, which addresses a very important issue. According to UK Finance, authorised push payment fraud accounted for almost 41% of fraud losses in the first half of last year, while unauthorised fraud decreased by 3% on the year. APP increased by 12%. It is clearly a pressing issue, and I am grateful that we have the opportunity to debate it.

The proposition in question would require technology and telecommunications companies, first, to owe a duty of care to their customers to prevent fraud occurring on their platforms and services in general. I do not see an issue with this in principle. Companies should attempt to protect their customers from fraud by implementing general safeguarding measures that prevent against common tactics such as impersonation. I would rather that this did not come from government intervention but was instead the product of a competitive industry, but I recognise that there is only so much that the market can achieve in the short term. I look forward to hearing the Government’s position on this.

I am a little more hesitant to offer support to the second condition of the noble Lord’s amendment, which would require technology and telecommunications companies to contribute to the costs of reimbursing victims of APP fraud that has occurred on their platforms or services. While I acknowledge that there is already an existing framework for company reimbursement in the form of the PSR’s mandatory reimbursement measures of October 2024, I am not certain that the policy is transferable to technology and communications companies.

The PSR requires banks and payment firms to split reimbursement costs evenly between the sending and receiving institutions, and it is very easy to discern which companies are responsible and therefore liable for payment. Adding technology and communication companies into that framework is not so straightforward. These companies are essentially a third party in the actual fraud occurring: they are neither the sender nor the recipient of the defrauded money; they are the medium through which fraud is made possible but not through which it actually occurs. Responsibility for the fraud and subsequent reimbursement does not seem to me to be as clear cut with technology companies as it is with banks and payment firms.

Secondly, the second measure in the noble Lord’s amendment is not thorough enough to support, even if my worries were addressed. The PSR mandatory reimbursement policy, enacted a year and a half ago, was the product of almost seven years of deliberation and policy-making; extending this measure to a whole new industry should face more scrutiny than that which can be achieved for a single amendment. The amendment itself raises questions as to which companies will qualify, what will their contributions be, and how these will fit within the existing requirements placed upon banks and payment firms. These are just a few questions, but there are many more that will need answering if we are seriously to consider this measure as a law.

That is not to say that APP reimbursement has not proved an effective tool in mitigating the harmful effects of fraud. According to the 12 months of available data since the PSR introduced mandatory reimbursement for APP fraud victims by banks and payment firms, 88% of lost money in scope has been returned to victims. Nor is it to say that technology and communication companies will not in future be the vehicle by which APP is committed—ever-popular social media and the ever-increasing AI industry will make sure of that. It is simply to say that we do not know enough about the implementation of this measure to support it. I appreciate its aim, and I agree that something must be done to tackle this specific type of APP, but at the moment I am not sure that the amendment adequately achieves that, so I look forward to hearing what the noble Lord has to say in closing.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, this Government are deeply concerned by the devastating impact online fraud can have on individual victims, both financially and emotionally. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, for tabling this amendment, to the noble Lord, Lord Young, and to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for helping us to understand and acknowledge the importance of this issue. The Government recognise the importance of preserving trust in digital communications and online spaces in order that all our hard-working businesses operating in the UK can grow and prosper. We recognise that incentives are important for accountability for all stakeholders.

The Government have seen a significant contribution from the banking sector in preventing fraud and supporting victims in response to the Payment Systems Regulator’s new authorised push payment scams reimbursement requirement. In the first nine months of the APP reimbursement scheme, 88% of eligible losses were reimbursed, with £112 million returned to victims. These figures reflect a strong and sustained commitment to protecting consumers—a positive trajectory that deserves recognition. While we are on the PSR scheme, the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, asked about the transition of PSR into the FCA. It is worth noting that we consulted on that planned merger of PSR into the FCA in September and October last year. We are currently considering the responses to that consultation and will bring forward further proposals in due course. He would expect me to say that we want to manage this process in a way that very much does not undermine the work that the Payment Systems Regulator is already doing to ensure that this system works well.

However, every part of an ecosystem must play a meaningful role in fraud prevention, including the telecommunications and tech sector. The Government have already taken steps to ensure that the tech and telecommunications sectors are rightly incentivised to proactively tackle fraud on their networks. The Online Safety Act requires in-scope companies to take proactive steps to stop fraudulent content appearing on the platform and to remove fraudulent material quickly when they become aware of it. If they do not, they risk facing the full regulatory costs of failing to comply, which can extend to 10% of their global revenue.

Ofcom’s duties on user-generated content are now in force in relation to several online harms, including fraud, and the regulator is already assessing platforms’ compliance. Further duties concerning action against fraudulent advertising will be consulted on this year and are likely to come into effect in 2027.

The telecoms sector is subject to regulation that requires providers to block calls that appear to be from scammers and to prevent scammers from using telephone numbers. It is fair to point out that there has been a fair amount of success already in that effort. Voluntary action has proved effective, and under the first telecoms charter operators have introduced firewalls that have stopped more than 1 billion scam text messages since January 2022, so that indicates the scale of both the problem and the progress that has been made.

We are also working with the sector and Ofcom on a number of innovative further actions to tackle the criminal abuse of telecoms networks. The Government launched the second Telecoms Fraud Charter in November 2025. This is an ambitious charter that covers 50 actions the telecoms industry will implement to tackle fraud within the sector. It includes developing new AI systems to detect and prevent fraud, building a new call-tracing system to track down fraudulent communications and upgrading the UK’s networks to enable new features to protect customers from spoof calls. This is a voluntary commitment from the telecoms sector that aims to strengthen efforts to further identify, block and disrupt telecoms fraud through enhanced industry collaboration and robust duty of care towards UK consumers and smaller telecoms businesses that have themselves been victims of fraud. The previous Telecoms Fraud Charter helped UK mobile network operators to block over 1 billion scam messages through the implementation of firewalls. We want to go further than that, which is what the new telecoms charter seeks to achieve.

In addition, Ofcom launched a consultation in October, outlining new rules on how mobile providers must stop scammers sending mobile messages. These proposals draw on existing best practice in the mobile sector and are intended to both prevent scammers accessing mobile messaging services and stop their activities where they have gained access. Last July, Ofcom also published a consultation on new rules to stop scammers outside the UK reaching people and businesses with calls that imitate UK mobile numbers, and these are likely to be introduced this year. We expect these measures to address gaps in the industry’s existing counterscam measures, and to significantly reduce the risk of individuals and businesses receiving scam messages.

Furthermore, in the upcoming fraud strategy, which we discussed earlier in Committee, and which was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, the Government will explore options to make it harder for criminals to exploit UK telecoms networks to commit fraud. The noble Lord tempted me to stray off the primrose path of prudence when it comes to timing; I am afraid I cannot do any better than repeat what my noble friend the Minister said: it will be coming in due course. Obviously, we have some time left even in Committee, let alone further stages of this Bill, so I am afraid I can make no commitments there.

The Government will continue monitoring developments in this area to ensure the telecommunications and tech industries remain accountable for delivering on their commitments to tackle fraud and the criminal abuse of their services, in line with the plan we will set out in our soon-to-be-published fraud strategy. However, where insufficient progress is being made in reducing abuse of telecoms networks or tech platforms for the purposes of fraud, the Government, and regulators, will not hesitate to take necessary measures to compel further action. I am on common ground with the noble Lord, Lord Davies, who critiqued the amendment, describing the concern it shows for the intermediary nature of the liability some telecoms platforms would be under. It is a fact that a tech sector reimbursement scheme would undermine the UK’s long-standing intermediary liability regime, which means that platforms are not liable for illegal content posted by users provided they are unaware of the unlawful activity, and which underpins the interactive internet and is a cornerstone of digital innovation. I share his concern that a departure from intermediary liability would leave the UK out of sync with our international partners and potentially threaten growth of the UK’s digital economy.

Therefore, in view of the clear plan we are putting in place to tackle fraud, it is the Government’s assessment that the measures set out in this amendment are not necessary at this time, and I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Goodman of Wycombe (Con)]

My Lords, I strongly commend the report of the noble Lord, Lord Walney, which I have read. My purpose in speaking, very briefly, is to interrogate Amendment 369, in the light of what we already have.

What we already have was very well put in a report by David Spencer of Policy Exchange, the director of which is my noble friend Lord Godson. David Spencer put the current balance very well, I think in his report A Long, Long Way to Go. He wrote:

“The Human Rights Act 1998 does not refer to a ‘Right to Protest’ – the relevant rights are the ‘Right to freedom of expression’ (Article 10) and ‘Right to freedom of peaceful assembly’ (Article 11). However, the sense that many of the recent wave of protests have been ‘peaceful’ by any ordinary understanding of the word – particularly when filled with antisemitic chanting through mobile sound amplifiers, calls for ‘jihad’ on the streets of London, or the use of criminal damage as a tactic – is clearly false. Further, Articles 10 and 11 are qualified rights”—


and this is the point about balance that other noble Lords have made—

“in that they can be restricted where it is necessary and proportionate to protect public safety, prevent crime and protect the rights and freedoms of others”.

I myself think that the balance in the Human Rights Act really puts the matter rather well when it refers to this right of peaceful assembly. Peaceful assembly surely does not mean that the protest must be meek and mild. One must expect protests to be noisy, turbulent, robust and, up to a point, disruptive. But the right of protests to be disruptive, as the noble Lord, Lord Walney, said a few moments ago, must be balanced against the right of others not to have their lives disrupted. That is the balance of the thing.

Furthermore, just in closing, there is a very difficult issue here that David Spencer raises very profoundly about some of the language that has been used in demonstrations that is very close to—trembling on the verge of—incitement. In a country where we have seen what happened in the synagogue in Manchester, and where attacks are carried out on other institutions, we have to bear that in mind.

In short, it seems to me this amendment is either reproducing what is already in the Human Rights Act, in which case it is unnecessary, or it is complicating it, in which case it should not really be there. My own sense is that it is complicating it, and that it makes no sense at all to scatter different rights willy-nilly in different pieces of legislation, rather than—if one is going to set positive rights out in statute—putting them in one place in the Human Rights Act, which is what has been done. So I think that the balance we have got is satisfactory and that the amendment does not really stand up to robust interrogation.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for bringing forward these amendments. The importance of peaceful protest in a free and democratic society is of course a principle supported by all noble Lords. I want to be clear at the outset that no one on the Benches on this side questions either the legitimacy or the constitutional right to protest.

I first turn to Amendment 369, which seeks to place an express statutory right to protest into the Public Order Act 1986. This amendment risks solving a problem that does not exist. That is our belief. The right to protest is already deeply embedded in our constitutional and legal framework, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has so carefully explained. It is recognised in common law, it long predates our membership of the European Convention on Human Rights and it has been repeatedly affirmed by the courts as a fundamental freedom in our democratic tradition. Crucially, this right has never been absolute. Historically, it has always existed alongside the equally important duties of the state to maintain public order, protect public safety and safeguard the rights and freedoms of others. That careful balance has evolved over centuries through common law and legislation. It is not at all clear that reinstating the right to protest in statutory form would add meaningful protection beyond what already exists.

There is a real risk that codifying such a broad and long-standing right in statue could have unintended consequences. By setting out open-ended duties on public authorities to respect, protect and facilitate protest, the amendment would inevitably invite further litigation and judicial interpretation. Decisions about the proper balance between protest rights and competing public interests, such as disruption to essential services or public safety, could increasingly be determined in the courts rather than by Parliament or accountable Ministers. That risks further frustrating the will of the Executive and of Parliament. I do not believe that placing an express right to protest into statute is either necessary or desirable. Our system has functioned for generations without such a provision and it is not evident that this long-standing settlement is now deficient.

I turn to Amendment 371, which would require an independent review of the existing legislative framework governing protest. We on these Benches are unconvinced of the case for such a review. The Acts listed have been subject to extensive parliamentary scrutiny and their compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights has been debated at length in both Houses. We do not support proposed new subsection (5) in this amendment, which would require the review to have regard to the impacts of legislation on the exercise of rights under the ECHR. The ECHR is already subject to unwelcome litigation which brings about perverse outcomes that were never intended at its commencement: there are plenty of examples of that. An additional independent review would be unnecessarily burdensome and duplicative, consuming time and public resources without a clear or compelling purpose. For these reasons, we on these Benches do not support either amendment. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response and to further discussion of how best to uphold both the right to protest and the rule of law in a balanced and proportionate way.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I hope it does not surprise noble Lords if I confess that I have been on the odd protest in my time. I have quite enjoyed the freedom to have a protest. I have protested against the apartheid Government, against the National Front and, if the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, will bear with me, against his Government when he served as a Minister.

The right to peaceful protest is an important part of our democratic society. It is a long-standing tradition in this country that people are free to gather together and demonstrate their views, provided they do so within the law. This Government are committed to protecting and preserving that right. I hope that that gives some succour to the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Strasburger, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and indeed others who have spoken in favour.

The noble Lord, Lord Marks, set out his case for the two amendments on public order. Amendment 369 seeks to introduce a statutory right to protest into the Public Order Act 1986, along with a duty on public authorities to respect, protect and facilitate that right. I understand the concerns that he has put and I accept and appreciate those concerns, but, as has been said, not least by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, these protections are already firmly established in UK law. Public authorities are required under the Human Rights Act 1998, passed by a previous Government in which I was pleased to serve, to act in accordance with the rights to freedom of expression and assembly set out in Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

However, as has been said by a number of noble Lords today, including the noble Lords, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Davies of Gower, and as set out in the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, these rights are qualified. This point is illustrated by Amendments 369ZA and 369ZB, put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. On that qualification, I am not going to get into the argument between the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Blencathra, but for the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and others who have argued for the amendment today, the key point is that that right, as has been said, can be restricted only where restriction is lawful, proportionate and justified. The right to peaceful protest is also recognised under the common law and creating a separate statutory provision risks duplicating existing protections, which could lead to confusion in how the law is interpreted and applied. It might also complicate operational policing without offering any additional legal safeguards.

I have to say that I agreed with the noble Lord, Lord Goodman of Wycombe, that there is a fundamental right to protest. But I respectfully submit, as I think he argued in his contribution, that the amendment would not strengthen that commitments and might indeed introduce uncertainty into the law. That is a very valid and important point, because existing legislation under the Human Rights Act 1998 and Articles 10 and 11, qualified rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, set out the issues that again were ably outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that the right to protest exists: it is one that I cherish and have exercised myself and may even exercise myself again in the future, who knows? It is an important right, but his amendment would cause confusion and water down the ability to provide that security of protest under the existing legislation. Therefore, I ask him ultimately to not press it further.

I turn to Amendment 371, which would require the Government to commission an independent review of the existing protest legislation within 12 months of the Bill receiving Royal Assent. The noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, said that the Government called the review post the tabling of this amendment. We proposed the review on 5 October last year. The Home Secretary announced an independent review of public order and hate crime legislation on 5 October last year and I suggest that Amendment 371, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, would essentially be what the Government have already ordered and would, if agreed today, negate the purpose of what the Government have already ordered and extend the review that we have already ordered still further by establishing that review in law.

We announced the review on 5 October because of the very issues that all noble Lords have mentioned about balancing the right to peaceful protest and the right to enjoy non-harassment, the right to potentially go to a synagogue, or the right to go about your daily business. Those issues are extremely important, which is why the Home Secretary has appointed the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, KC, a former Director of Public Prosecutions, as one of the people to undertake the review. His independence and expertise will ensure a rigorous, impartial review. He will have the help and support of former assistant chief constable Owen Weatherill, who brings operational experience from his role with the National Police Chiefs’ Council as lead for civil contingencies and national mobilisation. That independent review reaffirms this Government’s ongoing commitment to keep public order legislation under review.