Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

Lord Dear Excerpts

Wednesday 13th July 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I correct my noble friend Lord Hunt, who has underestimated the extent of the precept as a percentage of the local council tax, which would fall potentially to the acting commissioner to levy. It is 11 per cent in England and 15.5 per cent in Wales—even greater than my noble friend indicated. I respectfully suggest that there is potentially an equal underestimate in relation to the period of vacancy. As I read the Bill, the six-month period after which a vacancy would have to be declared and a new election take place, which would add to the length of time in any event, arises in connection with incapacity. However, there are other grounds on which a vacancy might arise. In particular, there is the possibility of a police and crime commissioner being suspended. That could conceivably take an even longer period to resolve, so there is the potential for this position to be filled by a second-hand appointee, as it were, for a long period. Of course, the whole rationale of the proposal for police commissioners—flawed in the opinion of many, certainly on this side of the House—is that it is necessary to have somebody who is elected and who has a direct mandate for the purposes of exercising the functions that the Bill confers on the holder of the office.

There will be no such democratic element in the event that the procedure currently in the Bill is enacted. There would be no democratic mandate of any kind—direct or indirect. It is intolerable that that should be the case when within the police and crime panel, there will be people with a mandate—not the complete mandate—that will be claimed for the police and crime commissioner in as much as he or she will be elected for the whole force area. There will at least be some democratic mandate for those elected local councillors who will constitute the majority of members of the police and crime panel. In those circumstances I can see no argument for allowing—indeed requiring—the appointment of somebody who has no mandate when there are those available within the structure who would have at least some mandate.

I hope that the Government will think again. The noble Baroness was unlike her old self, if I may say so, at the beginning of this debate when her rather surprisingly peremptory statements were made. I would like to see her return to what your Lordships might think is the much more acceptable Browning version.

[Lord Dear]

My Lords, we are working against the clock this evening so I will not repeat any of the powerful arguments adduced so far. I say simply that I agree with them and support the amendment.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

This is an extremely important issue and not one that we should rush through simply because we are fed up. I am sure that I have just as much stamina as the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, although I am not required to take the whole Bill through this House. We have to consider and debate these issues seriously because, after all, that is the function of this House.

This is a problem of the Government’s own making in that, having decided that police and crime commissioners—and for that matter MOPC in London, although the issues are slightly different—have substantial, individually held powers, the question then comes: what do you do in circumstances when there is a vacancy or someone needs to act while that happens? The Government cannot have it both ways. They cannot say, “Actually, it will be okay and we can have a member of the staff of the police and crime commissioner’s office to act in this function”, and at the same time say, “The police and crime commissioners are so important and will be so busy that they have to work full time on these functions”. What are they working full time on?

They are presumably setting direction—I am sure they are not intervening in operational matters because the Government are clear that they will not be doing that. They will be providing guidance on what is regarded as important to the electorate of that policing area. Among their duties will be setting the level of local taxation. There is no other area of British public life when something that impacts on taxation is not decided by people who are elected. If the noble Baroness wants to interrupt and tell me of one that I have not thought of, I would be delighted to receive it. There is no such area.

This is one of the most important decisions and it is one that will matter very much to the public in the area concerned. The task of being an elected politician is to balance what you believe are the important aspirations that you might have for the public service concerned and how much money can readily be raised in taxation. That is an issue that this and previous Governments have struggled with, and those who are actively engaged in local government struggle with it each year. You have to make a judgment and you can make it only if you see both sides of the equation. You see the side of expenditure and you see the side of what it will mean in taxation. Only somebody who is elected will have that perspective of what the public want in terms of services delivered and what they are prepared to buy through taxation. The public are not always single-minded on these matters. We are all aware of those stresses and strains, which is all the more reason why it must be an elected politician who makes that judgment. Only an elected politician with the authority of being elected can strike that balance knowing what the electorate of the area feel.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Henig]

Before the Minister replies, I have a brief query that I would like to ask. Between discussing this in Committee and on Report, the Minister has laid an amendment about deputies, so I think we have covered this. I am therefore assuming that it is possible that the noble Baroness might be saying—and it was certainly what I understood when it was first mentioned—that a deputy might assume this role of acting commissioner.

When I looked at this in some depth, it seemed to me that this deputy post was not one that would be exempted from Section 2 of the Local Government and Housing Act. In other words, it was going to be a post where the incumbent would have to be politically restricted. If that was in fact the case and it was a politically restricted post, it would seem to me to be completely wrong for that person who is politically restricted to be able to act up. Am I correct in my understanding of that? When that deputy post was created, I had rather assumed that one of the reasons for it was that the deputy could act up, but having looked at it, I do not see how that could work. I would be most grateful if the noble Baroness would perhaps say something about that as well in her reply.

[Lord Dear]

If an allegation of corruption or any other crime is made against someone, whoever the officer might be, the procedure is well laid down, and I do not think that the Bill would change it in any way. The complaint is made to the chief officer of police, who has to record the complaint, which is automatically notified to the Independent Police Complaints Commission. The IPCC can take over the inquiry or supervise it, and discipline remains a matter for the chief officer. If, in the doomsday scenario, the chief officer does not deal with the complaint properly, then it is for the police authority or, in this instance, the police and crime commissioner, to step in. I do not think the procedure would be changed by the Bill.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

I fully understand. That was an exceptionally clear explanation. However, if the commissioner was not there, and someone was standing in for the commissioner, would it be appropriate for the member of the panel who is standing in for the commissioner to deal with the issue in the same way as the commissioner would?

[Lord Dear]

In the theoretical instance cited by the noble Lord, I do not think it would work that way because the chief officer of police would have to demonstrate that he had not dealt with the complaint properly, and that would take some time. We are talking about six months plus two months before an election, so by the time that doomsday scenario occurred, you would have an elected individual in place as the PCC, as I understand it.

[Baroness Browning]

My Lords, this amendment seeks to secure the appointment of an acting PCC from the panel rather than from the PCC's staff. I recognise the points made today and previously in Committee and remain open to suggestions about how we might secure a process of appointment for an acting PCC which provides the safeguards and political neutrality that I have described in previous debates and which would also provide assurance to a PCC that any appointment of a temporary stand-in would not endanger the continued delivery of the police and crime plan and objectives. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, that I am very happy to consider taking forward the situation with the deputy, but the deputy is not politically restricted.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Dear]

My Lords, I wonder if I might put a different gloss on the matters that we are debating in this group of amendments. We know that there is a strong likelihood that there will be a national crime agency some time in the next calendar year. We already have a discussion document about that. It refers to tasking, which I am confidently assured means direction from the centre. That means that there is bound to be tension between local and national issues, which is a good thing. It is democracy in action. It is inevitable that the inspectorate will become involved, at the behest of local or national figures. That is what it is there for and that is my experience, having served in it for more than five years, albeit some time ago.

I am concerned that the Bill is in grave danger of becoming overprescriptive. We are covering detail, which is good as far as it goes. However, to put it in the Bill rather than take it as a matter of good sense or encompass it in regulation stretches too far the issue of what should be in the Bill.

I shall refer to Amendment 235A. Having followed an all-encompassing definition of national crime, we are then invited to put in something about children, vulnerable adults, members of minority groups and so on. I do not at all underestimate the threat to those groups; terrible things are done to and with them. However, if we are to pick out those groups, why do we not put in something about drugs, counterterrorism, and the theft of high-value motor vehicles and plant, all of which happen on a European—if not a more international—scale? Why do we not put in something about cybercrime or identity theft? I shall sit down soon because I want to brief, but my point is that we should not drop into the trap of being overprescriptive. Valid though all the comments from speakers so far have been, it is asking the Bill to accept too much.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, this has been a very interesting debate. I understand what the noble Lord, Lord Dear, is saying about the risks of overprescription. However, we are talking about strategic policing requirements. This is a matter of national importance. My noble friends have argued very well for their respective amendments.

No election will be won by a police and crime commissioner on issues to do with national policing. They will be won on local manifestos. Almost every candidate will promise more police on the beat. The question will be an auction over just how many police will be on the beat at any one time. That is fair enough and clearly responds to a general view held by many members of the public, who like the police to be visible. I do not argue with that. However, it will have some consequences. It will put the squeeze on the specialist units that the police forces have developed. It will also put the squeeze on each force’s responsibility to the national policing requirement. In some way or other, without being wholly prescriptive, we need to find a way in which to reassure Parliament that the national strategic policing requirement will be carried out as effectively as possible. It is not just terrorism; it is also about serious organised crime. My noble friends Lord Harris and Lord Foulkes were absolutely right to develop the argument about the threats that we face. We are in no position today to be complacent about those threats.

In their approach to the Bill the Government have really rather pooh-poohed the current tripartite relationship. They have criticised police authorities for a lack of visibility—although I have yet to hear any conclusive evidence put forward on why they ought to be visible. Furthermore, they believe that the tripartite arrangement is at fault because Home Secretaries have indulged in too much target-making. There will be a debate about targets and their place but there should be no doubt that in the end the Home Secretary is accountable to Parliament and ought to be accountable to Parliament for national policing strategy and the effectiveness of police forces in making a contribution to that strategy.

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Dear, about the implications of the national crime agency. I also agree with him that some tension will be constructive—but tension could also be destructive. In the Bill we see that the requirement in relation to the strategic policing requirement is placed on chief officers of police. In exercising the functions, they must have regard to the strategic policing requirement. In other words, they can ignore it, because “have regard to” is a very weak use of parliamentary language. They have to have regard to it, alongside other matters that are placed in the Bill.

We then look to page 2 of the Bill and see that in Clause 1(4) that the,

“police and crime commissioner must … hold the chief constable to account for”,

a series of actions, but also,

“the exercise of the duty under section 37A(2) of the Police Act 1996 (duty to have regard to strategic policing requirement)”.

All we have in statute is a requirement on the police and crime commissioner to hold the chief constable to account. Then we find that the actual requirement is simply to have regard to. What if the police and commissioner does not effectively hold the chief constable to account? What if the chief constable has regard to but does not take the necessary action? Where are the safeguards and sanctions? There are none. That is really our concern.

The amendments seem to be helpful and constructive. My noble friend Lady Henig asks for a report to be prepared assessing the extent to which the strategic policing requirement has been met in each police area. That does not seem overprescriptive; it is simply giving an assurance to Parliament that there will be a process by which Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary has a means of looking at each police force area and reporting on how they are doing in their contribution to the strategic policing requirement.

My noble friend Lord Harris has another constructive amendment around the inspection programme. In our first debate the Minister was very helpful, although I did not really follow her arguments. She was very constructive in being willing to engage in the area of the acting police and crime commissioner. Nothing is more important than the national strategic policing requirement. I hope that the noble Lord, who, I suspect, is going to respond to the amendment, will be able to be as constructive as his noble friend.