Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Lord Etherton Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 29th January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, there are so many impermissible aspects to this Bill that it is difficult to know where to start. There is the overarching point that the Rwanda treaty—which underpins the central theme of the Bill that Rwanda is a safe country—has not yet been ratified, and then there are all those aspects of the Bill which contravene our constitutional norms or breach our international obligations.

The Bill seeks to pre-empt any future consideration by the courts on the factual question of whether Rwanda is a safe country. This is a blatant usurpation of the judiciary’s function. Contrary to Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Bill contains no domestic remedy should the courts conclude at any time that the Bill is incompatible with Articles 2 or 3 of the ECHR. The courts could make a declaration of incompatibility under Section 4 of the Human Rights Act, but that would not be an effective remedy in the present case, as it is plain that the Government have no intention of complying with their obligations in so far as they conflict with the Bill.

Clause 4, which provides for a decision not to remove based on compelling evidence relating specifically to a person’s particular individual circumstances, is inconsistent with established jurisprudence that, for members of a particular social group within Article 1A(2) of the refugee convention who have a well-founded fear of persecution, it is sufficient merely to establish membership of such a social group. This is of particular importance to LGBT+ people. I was given assurances from the Dispatch Box during the passage of the Illegal Migration Bill by both the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, that the principles found in the 2010 Supreme Court case HJ (Iran) would continue to apply. They expressly confirmed that, if the open expression of a person’s sexual orientation would prevent them living in a third country without facing persecution, that would constitute a risk of serious and irreversible harm. Rwanda is such a country, as the Government accept and as the current travel advice of the FCDO describes.

Clause 5, which gives Ministers a discretion to ignore interim measures of the ECHR, plainly breaches the convention. It would deny a refugee an effective right to apply to the European court and be in direct conflict with the obligation to comply with decisions of the court. In its latest analysis, the UNHCR has repeated that the Bill represents impermissible burden-shifting in contravention of the refugee convention.

Finally, the proposed Rwanda treaty does not remedy the human rights deficiencies in Rwanda—other than refoulement—mentioned in the Supreme Court judgment. I have already described the hazardous situation there of LGBT+ individuals seeking to live openly, consistent with their sexual orientation.

What conclusion can we draw from all this? The Bill is a travesty of our constitutional and legal norms and our historical moral standards.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Lord Etherton Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 19th February 2024 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Etherton]

38: Clause 4, page 4, line 12, after “question” insert “or, where the person in question is a member of a particular social group within Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention 1951, for that group”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment and the related amendments to Clause 4(1)(b) and Clause 4(4) provide for the situation where the person in question is a member of a particular social group, the members of which have a well founded fear of persecution, and following the decision of the Supreme Court in HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31 the focus is on the group and not the individual circumstances of each member of the group.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, in speaking to this amendment I will speak to Amendments 40, 43, 45 and 51, which I tabled, all of which are connected.

The current version of Clause 4(1) enables an applicant to oppose removal to Rwanda on the ground that it is not a safe country for the applicant only if the applicant provides

“compelling evidence relating specifically to the person’s particular individual circumstances”.

Clause 4(4) provides that the court or tribunal may grant an interim relief

“only if the court or tribunal is satisfied that the person would, before the review or appeal is determined, face a real, imminent and foreseeable risk of serious and irreversible harm”

if removed to Rwanda.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, as we have previously set out, the purpose of the Bill is to stop the boats and end the perilous journeys being made across the channel as it is the busiest shipping lane in the world. These journeys are overwhelmingly made by young, fit men in search of better job opportunities, who are travelling from a safe country. Males represented 88% of small boat arrivals in the year ending September 2023. This is a similar proportion as each year from 2018 to 2021.

Since January 2018, 75% of small boat arrivals have been adult males aged 18 and over. We need a strong deterrent to stop illegal migration and measures to prevent removals being frustrated; we have therefore taken bold steps. However, to ensure that we are meeting our international obligations, Clause 4 provides that a Home Office decision-maker or a court or tribunal can consider a claim that Rwanda is unsafe based on compelling evidence relating specifically to a person’s individual circumstances.

As the Government have set out, since the partnership was announced, UK officials have worked closely with the Government of Rwanda to ensure that individuals relocated under the agreement will be safe and that their rights will be protected. The Government’s legal position, published on 11 December 2023, further sets out that the treaty, and the evidence pack, provide for compliance with the Government’s substantive obligations under international law. Therefore, no one will be removed to Rwanda if they face a real risk of serious and irreversible harm.

I turn to Amendments 38, 40, 43, 45 and 51 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, and Amendment 41 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, as spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Cashman. These proposed amendments to Clause 4 would undermine one of the principles that the Bill is seeking to address; namely, to limit the challenges that can be brought against the general safety of Rwanda, even with the signed treaty and updated evidence presented by the Government.

The legislation is clear and affords the appropriate safeguards to ensure that decision makers make a decision about the particular circumstances of each case. The Bill already allows decision-makers and the courts to consider certain claims that Rwanda is unsafe for an individual person due to their particular circumstances, despite the safeguards in the treaty, if there is compelling evidence to that effect.

I of course entirely understand the desire of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, and the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, to get clarity and certainty on this issue. For people who identify as LGBT+, that consideration would include any assessment of any compelling evidence reviewed in line with the principles outlined in HJ (Iran)—as referenced by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti—that being LGBT+ would mean that Rwanda was not safe for them in their particular circumstances.

As in all cases under the provisions of the Bill, individuals will be given the opportunity to provide that compelling evidence that they would be at risk in their particular circumstances if they were relocated to Rwanda. That would include any alleged harm as a result of an individual’s gender or sexuality. As I say, any such claims would be assessed on a case-by-case basis, and in the case of LGBT+ claims, that would include any assessment in line with the principles outlined in HJ (Iran).

I make it clear that the Rwandan penal code does not punish homosexuality or relations between people of the same sex. The constitution of Rwanda includes a broad prohibition of discrimination and does not criminalise or discriminate against sexual orientation in law or policy. As regards the FCDO advice, which I was asked about, paragraphs 173 and 174 of the policy statement deal with this, stating:

“As experts on the bilateral relationship between the UK and Rwanda and its development over the past thirty years, FCDO officials based in the relevant geographic and thematic departments working closely with colleagues in the British High Commission in Kigali have liaised with the Home Office throughout the production of this Policy Statement … Information drawn from their institutional expertise as to the in-country situation in Rwanda, and Rwanda’s history of compliance with its international obligations is reflected as appropriate throughout”.


The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, raised concerns about the unequal treatment of women in Rwanda during Monday’s debate. The Rwanda country report refers to the National Commission for Human Rights, or NCHR, which is a constitutional commission provided for by the Rwandan constitution. The NCHR is made up of seven commissioners. Each of them has a specific area of focus, including the rights of women. There is a commissioner who is a focal person for or who is in charge of those rights.

The country report concludes that the general treatment of women is good. Women and children’s rights, among those the NCHR monitors, have seen an improvement since the creation of the NCHR. That is reflected in the laws and the constitution, which provides for specific groups’ rights; for example, women, children, and the disabled. The situation is the same for women as for those who are disabled. They are allowed to be elected, and at each administrative level at least 30% of representatives have to be women. In Parliament, more than 60% of representatives are women; the current Rwandan cabinet is 50% women, and five out of the seven commissioners in the NCHR are women.

Women’s rights are respected in every area. Although the NCHR receives some complaints about rights to property, Rwandan family law was amended to allow women to inherit from parents in 1999. The country information note also refers to the police response to victims of gender-based violence and the Gender Monitoring Office, which considers specific issues relating to gender-based violence. The National Women’s Council is represented from village level and at every level above and is a channel for sharing information on anything regarding gender-based violence. It is the responsibility of local leaders to ensure that there are no gender-based violence issues in their area of control. Police monitor what is going on; they can investigate and come up with a report or action.

Furthermore, the rule of law index, which ranks countries on indicators including equal treatment and the absence of discrimination, ranks Rwanda 26th out of 142 countries worldwide and first out of 34 countries in the region. That is a measure of whether individuals are free from discrimination—based on socioeconomic status, gender, ethnicity, religion, national origin, sexual orientation or gender identity—with respect to public services, employment, court proceedings and the justice system. I add that the 2022 US State Department human rights practices report on Rwanda noted:

“Women have the same legal status and are entitled to the same rights as men, including under family, labor, nationality, and inheritance laws. … The law requires equal pay for equal work and prohibits discrimination in hiring decisions”.


As I indicated at the start, this clause provides the foundations for the Bill as a whole; it is fundamental to the effective operation of the scheme, and the amendments put forward would serve only to weaken its effectiveness. I therefore invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

I am very grateful to the Minister for his reply and to those who have spoken. What the debate has shown, short as it was, is that the issue of social groups and how they fit into the legislation is very important. Many points were made on various issues that were all extremely valuable, including the wonderful examples given by the noble Lord, Lord Cashman. The noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, referred to the ongoing discrimination even after decriminalisation took place here; the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, made criticism of the equality impact assessment; and the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, referred to Human Rights Watch’s latest report.

In addition to those points, what this debate has teased out—and this fits in with the amendment spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs—is what the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, referred to as the “false binary”. It is a critical issue. For this, I am extremely grateful to my noble friend Lord Carlile, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. Even after the Minister’s reply, it remains unclear how one treats someone who has not personally experienced persecution, because, for example, they have hidden their sexuality, their religious views or their political views, but who is a member of a group that has a well-founded fear of persecution were there to be an honest expression of their sexuality or their political and social views or a display of their ethnicity or race. How would one treat those people? The false binary does not allow one to take into account the effect of being a member of a group, as opposed to—as my noble friend Lord Carlile referred to it—being “about me”.

I ask the Government to consider carefully whether, without any undermining of the Bill and its purposes, the introduction of the amendments that I have tabled would not add an important element of clarity, both for those assessing claims—the Ministers, the Government and immigration officers—and for the courts. Subject to that, and on that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 38 withdrawn.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Lord Etherton Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 19th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I completely agree with that. The Ministerial Code is to be enforced politically, in many respects, not by courts. However, if the position is that it is a breach of international law not to comply with Rule 39, how could a Minister be acting lawfully? I assume that this Government are committed to the rule of law and therefore if it is a breach of international law not to comply with Rule 39—which is what the European Court of Human Rights says, and we are a country that abides by the law—is it not reasonable for that to be struck down on judicial review? I could be wrong about that and would be very interested to hear what the Minister has to say about it.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, I have given notice, with the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, of my intention to oppose the Question that Clause 5 stand part of the Bill. That is because, notwithstanding the eloquence of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffmann, and the noble Lord, Lord Howard, its provisions are in plain breach of the United Kingdom’s obligations under international law and in breach of the rule of law.

Although complications have been cited and expanded on, the reasons for this are very simply stated. Article 32 of the convention states that the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights

“extends to all matters concerning the interpretation”

and

“the application of the convention”.

Critically, in the event of

“dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the Court shall decide”.

That is an approach that is not unknown to our own law in certain circumstances. Rule 39 of the rules of the European Court of Human Rights provides for the court to make interim orders. 

In Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey, to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, referred, which was a case decided by the court in 2005, and Paladi v Moldova, decided by the same court in 2009, the European Court of Human Rights said that the failure of a member state to comply with interim measures is a breach of Article 34 of the convention. That article states that member states undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of the right of the court to receive applications from any person.

Reference has been made to a lengthy and elaborate argument in a Policy Exchange document, published in 2023 during the passage of the Illegal Migration Bill, by Professor Richard Ekins, in which he contended that the power to make interim measures was outside the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. That is the document with which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffmann, expresses his agreement. What is clear is that Article 32 confers on the court the right to determine the extent of its jurisdiction in the event that it is disputed. That article says so in the plainest terms, and, as a member state, we have signed up to that.

What is also indisputable, and is accepted by Professor Ekins, is that since the decision of Mamatkulov in 2005, the European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly upheld the binding nature of Rule 39 interim measures, and the UK Government have never once challenged before the Strasbourg court that decision and the binding nature of interim measures. Indeed, the United Kingdom has not only complied with such measures but called on other states to comply with them. It has supported resolutions and declarations that assume that Rule 39 is legally binding.

International law has, therefore, reached a settled state of practice and agreement between member states and the Strasbourg court. Whatever other course might properly be taken in the future—that could include matters concerning the way in which these orders are dealt with, about which the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, complained—it is clear that it would be a breach of international law and the rule of law for that settled agreement and practice to be peremptorily and unilaterally jettisoned by the United Kingdom acting alone. That is a basic principle of international law.

The wording of Clause 5 reflects similar, but not identical, provisions in the Illegal Migration Act. The challenge by Members of this House to those provisions in that Act were rejected by the Government and voted down in the other place. Should we then just placidly accept them now? I believe that it would be quite wrong to do so. This is yet another example of a blatant breach of the United Kingdom’s legal obligations. The other amendments in this group are worthy attempts to leave Clause 5 in the Bill but, in effect, to neuter its current intent and effect. My contention is that our constitutional role in this House impels us to reject Clause 5 in its entirety, and not provide it with any blanket of legitimacy, either in its current form or with amendments.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I was in a queue waiting to pay my bill at dinner and therefore arrived a few minutes late. I am very grateful for the Committee allowing me to speak.

I listened with particular interest to two of the most distinguished lawyers in this House: the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffmann, with whom I sat on the Court of Appeal regularly, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton. There is undoubtedly a potential dispute. Without going into what it should be, Clause 5(2) and (3) exclude the English court. The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, complained about the international court; ought we not to be complaining that the English court is excluded?

If there is to be a dispute with the Court of Human Rights, we might bear in mind that we are a member of the Council of Europe. If we blatantly refuse to follow the ECHR at Strasbourg, we might be turfed out, like Russia. Would we want to be the second country after Russia to be excluded from the Council of Europe? Some might not care, but others might think it would not look very good.

What I am complaining about is that Clause 5(2) and (3) will stop our domestic court making a decision. That seems a very good reason to support some, if not all, of the amendments.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Lord Etherton Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 4th March 2024 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Etherton]

22: Clause 4, page 4, line 12, after “question” insert “or, where the person in question is a member of a particular social group within Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention 1951, for that group”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment and the related amendments to Clause 4(1)(b) and Clause 4(4) provide for the situation where the person in question is a member of a particular social group, the members of which have a well founded fear of persecution, and following the decision of the Supreme Court in HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31 the focus is on the group and not the individual circumstances of each member of the group.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, I will also speak to related amendments that I have tabled: Amendments 24, 26, 28 and 30. I am extremely grateful to those who have co-signed all or some of those amendments: the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton.

I will speak very briefly, because I spoke previously about this both on Second Reading and in Committee. The current version of Clause 4(1) enables an applicant to oppose removal to Rwanda on the grounds that it is not a safe country for the applicant, but only if the applicant provides

“compelling evidence relating specifically to the person’s particular individual circumstances”.

Similarly, Clause 4(4), on the ability to obtain interim relief from removal to Rwanda, depends on particular individual circumstances relating to the applicant in question.

The defect in those provisions—a very basic defect—is that no provision is currently made for applicants in one of the important categories of refugee defined in Article 1A(2) of the 1951 refugee convention. That category comprises applicants who have a well-founded fear of persecution because of their

“membership of a particular social group”.

You can immediately see the difference between other categories of refugee under the convention, who are individual persons, and this category—which is probably the largest, or certainly the most important—comprising a large number of people who qualify as refugees because they are members of a particular social group. Yet when we look at Clause 4—I mentioned subsection (1) as well as subsection (4) on interim relief—there is no reference whatever to “group”, so one category of refugee has simply dropped off the list completely.

The proper approach of courts and tribunals to such a refugee was described in detail by the Supreme Court in HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, a 2010 decision, especially in the judgment of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry. I will not take the House through the case in detail. It is sufficient for me to say briefly that the approach to be taken, as established by that case, is that, if the applicant for asylum claims to be a member of a particular social group, the other members of which have a well-founded fear of persecution, the applicant is entitled to be considered a refugee provided that they satisfy the particular decision-maker that they are a member of that social group.

HJ (Iran) and the other case I mentioned concerned men who wanted to live an openly gay life and would have faced persecution in their home country had they done so, but the principle that I just described of the way to treat this category of refugee, as set out in HJ (Iran), applies across the board. It is not limited to people who are LGBT but applies to those who are members of a particular social group because of their ethnicity or gender or who hold a particular religious or political belief. For example, by way of analogy with the LGBT men who applied in HJ (Iran), if people hold particular philosophical, political or religious views that they have not expressed because of a real risk of persecution, but would like to do so and to live a life in which they can express those views, they are to be treated as members of a social group and granted the status of a refugee accordingly.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said in Committee, the Bill presents us with a false dichotomy. On the one hand, it is all about me—the claimant, the individual; on the other hand, it is about Rwanda generally. The former, the Bill says in Clause 4, allows you to make a claim for interim relief or removal generally to Rwanda, but the latter does not. In between those two extremes is the category of a member of a social group with a well-founded fear of persecution. This is not a torpedo point; it is not intended to undermine or delay this legislation. It is a reflection of the omission of a basic category of refugee defined in the convention, and an extremely important category as well. On that basis, I beg to move.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I have put my name to the four amendments tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton. I support everything he says and, since we are on Report, I do not propose to add to it. I also have my own Amendment 42. I declare an interest as the co-chairman of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Human Trafficking and Modern Slavery and the deputy chair of the Human Trafficking Foundation.

I spoke to this in Committee. Quite simply, and taking on what the noble and learned Lord has just said, this is a very special group of people who are in this country not because they have chosen to take the boat trip but because they have been brought here, by boat, lorry or some other route, and they are victims. When one starts complaining about people who should have stopped in France because France is a safe country, it absolutely does not apply to victims of modern slavery. They are here on an involuntary basis and need to be regarded in a totally different way.

Since I have been opposing much of the Rwanda Bill, I have heard endlessly, “What is it that you or other opposition would do to improve the situation of those crossing the channel?” I deeply regret those crossing the channel and I do not have an answer, but I do not believe that the need to stop people crossing the channel in a dangerous situation is any reason to pass an utterly shocking Bill. It is constitutionally incorrect and does not look at genuine victims, such as those victims of modern slavery. It is no answer to those of us who cannot accept what is going wrong in this country and what is going wrong in this Bill that, because we cannot offer an answer to the people crossing the channel, therefore we should be disregarded. Modern slavery is one of the most shocking crimes, making vast sums for perpetrators across the world. About a third to half the victims of modern slavery come to this country. The Government are ignoring the plight of this most vulnerable group of people. I hope that, at this last moment, they will think again about victims of modern slavery.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am advised by my noble and learned friend Lord Stewart of Dirleton that “must” and “shall” both have a mandatory quality, but I will of course write to the noble Lord.

If there is compelling evidence, despite the safeguards in the treaty, decision-makers will be able to consider certain claims that Rwanda is unsafe for an individual due to their particular circumstances, as we have discussed a number of times. However, I say again that these amendments are unnecessary. On that basis, I invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment and urge other noble Lords not to press theirs.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

I am very grateful to the Minister for that analysis of the speeches made and the Government’s response to them. I am also grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, which has raised some important points about people who are extremely vulnerable.

The noble Lords, Lord Kerr and Lord Coaker, articulated the point that all these amendments dealing with exemptions are objectively extremely reasonable and important, and do not involve huge numbers of people such as to undermine the effectiveness of this proposed legislation. Descending to details to say that they are not necessary, when it is plain that they are, shows a certain lack of not only sensitivity to the Chamber but a spirit of humanity which should underlie the Government’s response.

Turning to my Amendment 22 and its consequential amendments, I find it difficult to understand how the Government can justify dropping and effectively disfranchising one of the expressly specified categories of refugee in the convention. There is nothing in the policy statement issued by the Government when the Bill was published or in the Explanatory Notes to say that they would do this. I would have thought that dropping a specific category of refugee defined by this convention which we have signed up to is an extraordinary move.

The justification seems to be that the Government will not permit reference to groups because it would significantly enlarge the number of those entitled to claim. However, if they are entitled to claim by virtue of a convention which we have signed up to, the Government must accept that, like all the other 149 states signed up to it. You cannot simply say, “We’ll ignore this or that category of refugee” or “We’ll just rely on this category of refugee”. There must be an ability, in one way or another, for all those mentioned as refugees to explain why removal would result in persecution and serious harm.

Leaving that matter aside, I will comment on the intervention by the noble Lord, Lord Murray, on comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, about the situation of LGBT people in Rwanda. I do not want to go through this again, but there are two factors on which the noble Lord, Lord Murray, did not comment, and in fact have never been commented on appropriately by the Government, by way of some sort of excuse in relation to LGBT people and the risk that they face in leading an openly gay life in Rwanda.

First, the travel information provided by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office remains the same as it always has done, as it was at the time of the Illegal Migration Act: there is a danger to LGBT people living openly as such in Rwanda. Secondly, and importantly, no reference has been made to something that I mentioned in Committee: the country report on Rwanda of the US State Department, which was published only one year ago, and which talks about persecution and the possibility of physical harm to LGBT people. The Government have never addressed those points at all, but I am not going to go further into that.

As to the others, I personally strongly support all the other exemptions, which seem to me to be reasonable, humane and entirely appropriate, not designed to undermine the Bill but really rising to the level of morality which we should display as a country in relation to these categories of people. Having said all of that, and having heard the Minister, the best thing that I can do is to leave it to the amendment in the next group, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, which contains reference to groups. For my part, having had this debate will have been useful in honing the points that will have to be met in relation to that. On that basis, and that basis alone, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 22 withdrawn.