One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Ukraine

Lord Fox Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd April 2025 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Fox]

That the Grand Committee takes note of the One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Ukraine.

Relevant document: 8th Report from the International Agreements Committee

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, I am moving this Motion on behalf of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, chair of the International Agreements Committee, who sadly is unavailable today.

The International Agreements Committee, of which I am a member, took great interest in the UK-Ukraine 100-year partnership agreement. We welcome the Government’s extension of the CRaG period for scrutiny of this agreement, which has allowed time for this debate. We think this is a useful window and believe it is an appropriate acknowledgement of the high level of interest in this agreement across both Houses.

The agreement has been laid in the context of a rapidly changing geopolitical environment. As noble Lords will appreciate, the situation has developed significantly even in the period between taking evidence and publishing our report, and has continued to change since the report’s publication. Amid these changes, the Government’s ongoing support for Ukraine remains firm, and the committee welcomes the Government’s resolution. It is in this context that we sought to assess this agreement.

We heard that this agreement seeks to put in place a long-term framework governing future co-operation between the UK and Ukraine across a range of areas and sectors. The Minister, Stephen Doughty, told us in evidence that the agreement reflects a fundamental change in the “context and depth” of the bilateral relationship. Hanna Hopko, co-founder of the International Center for Ukrainian Victory, told us that the agreement represents a “historic milestone” in our relationship.

Notwithstanding this rather dramatic framing, the aspiration to provide stability and structure to the UK- Ukraine relationship is laudable. However, as we note in the report, the title of this agreement, the 100-year partnership, raises expectations while distracting attention from the vital matter of the substance—or, in some cases, the lack thereof—contained in this agreement. Indeed, given that the agreement may be terminated with six months’ notice from either party, the title and stated duration of the agreement could be described as somewhat illusory.

The agreement itself is broad. Detail is included in the accompanying and non-binding political declaration. This declaration spans a range of areas including defence, security, maritime co-operation, co-operation on the economy, trade and investment, energy, justice and combating disinformation. We heard that this declaration is intended to evolve over time.

Our report focused on the areas it covered that we felt were significant to the national interest or had the potential to deliver tangible benefits for the United Kingdom. I turn first to the defence and security provisions. The agreement commits the parties to develop joint defence-industrial capabilities and to strengthen Ukraine’s defence procurement. The accompanying political declaration envisages creating

“rapid response mechanisms … and joint use of military formations and other specialised structures to provide … mutual defence and security services”.

It sets out ambitions jointly to produce and develop

“advanced weapons and ammunition manufacturing capabilities”,

to

“deepen cooperation on long-range strike capabilities”

and to integrate

“air and missile defence and complex weapons stockpiles”.

Your Lordships should note that it reiterates the Government’s previous commitment to provide Ukraine with £3 billion in annual military assistance

“until 2030/31 and for as long as needed to support Ukraine”.

I note that this is a very long-term and substantial commitment of taxpayers’ money.

Leaving the financial commitment to one side, in our report we considered the merits of this kind of co-operation. We heard of some opportunity costs to the UK’s military readiness but also of benefits both to the UK’s international reputation and, potentially, to our future defence and security capabilities and industrial base. Ukraine has developed modern military capabilities from which the UK stands to learn—for example, in AI-assisted drone technology. Yet it is impossible to truly assess how future benefits to the UK will be realised without greater detail on how these aspects of the agreement are to be implemented. In our report, we stress the need for the Government to develop more concrete plans as to how defence-industrial projects might be carried out under this agreement, to set out some indicative timeline and to provide assurance as to how these projects will benefit the United Kingdom.

In view of current events, our report also considers the important question of the relationship between this agreement and security guarantees to Ukraine. In doing so, we considered whether an agreement of this nature could possibly offer a deterrent to future Russian aggression in Ukraine. This is not a binding security guarantee of the type sought by Ukraine from its allies. As such, in and of itself, it likely will not offer a deterrent of this kind. However, witnesses told us that the agreement could help to

“maintain, increase and improve, through co-operative agreement, Ukraine’s ability to defend itself”

and that it facilitates the co-operation and action needed to underpin a future security guarantee. Were this to occur, we would welcome this outcome.

The agreement establishes a maritime partnership between the United Kingdom and Ukraine. The political declaration tells us that it is the aim of both parties to ensure the

“speedy restoration of Ukraine’s control over all temporarily occupied territories and strengthen its potential as a powerful maritime and riverine state”.

For my part, this is perhaps the crux of the overall partnership, as currently envisaged by this agreement. The Minister told us in evidence that this aspect of the agreement is about

“equipping Ukraine to protect its own assets and operations in line with international law”.

He highlighted that, in the short term, this partnership will involve “providing force-generation training” for the Ukrainian mine countermeasure task force to support Ukraine in dealing with mines in the Black Sea and other risks to future civilian and military navigation. Force generation in the NATO context refers to the process by which allies resource the personnel and equipment needed to carry out operations and missions, so perhaps the Minister can confirm whether this will mean Royal Navy personnel on board Ukrainian naval vessels in the Black Sea.

I turn to other aspects of support. As the committee understands it, the UK has to date provided £265 million in support of Ukraine’s maritime capabilities. It was not clear to us where the partnership proposed in the agreement departs from or builds on this existing practice. In order to assess the depth of the proposed maritime partnership, it would be helpful to hear from the Government exactly what additional support will be offered to Ukraine under the maritime partnership, and in what way this would complement existing arrangements.

Looking forward, I trust that when the strategic defence review is published it will explain how the Royal Navy will balance this currently open-ended commitment with a range of other needs, such as the UK’s recent accession to the Bahrain-US Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement, C-SIPA; an expanding need to protect subsea assets locally; and a likely need to expand operations in the Arctic. How will it achieve this while simultaneously maintaining the Navy’s other activities?

Returning to this report, the committee urges the Government to ensure that any maritime partnership as envisioned by this agreement contributes to the overall stability of the region. As such, we have recommended that the Government review the agreement in general, and the maritime partnership in particular, in the event of a peace settlement between Russia and Ukraine. This should also take into consideration the increased territorial claims made by Putin on the Black Sea area since this report was published, so we have asked the Government to keep Parliament informed of any such review.

I now turn to the economic, science and technology co-operation set out in the agreement. The Government’s evidence stressed that, beyond the immediate security needs of Ukraine, the priority of this agreement lies in securing growth, innovation and economic co-operation between our countries. The Minister told us that this included fostering business-to-business links and encouraging mutual investment and joint ventures. Our report welcomes the aspirations set out in the political declaration to support the development of Ukraine’s financial centre and business environment through sustained UK market access and the proposals to develop Ukraine’s public procurement regime. We note that this will not be a one-way process as the UK stands to learn from Ukraine’s experience—for example, in the development of critical technologies.

In this vein, we draw the attention of the Grand Committee to subsequent correspondence we received from the Government—it is available on our website—which outlines the sectors in the UK that stand to benefit commercially from co-operation under this agreement, including via UK Export Finance support for contracts in the defence, infrastructure and construction sectors. In view of the importance of securing stable market access for UK companies, we were pleased to hear that the Government are seeking to deepen co-operation on the crucial issues of the rule of law, good governance, anti-corruption and transparency. These are vital ingredients of a stable business environment and, accordingly, of the UK’s national interest in this agreement.

Our report calls on the Government to continue to work closely with Ukrainian counterparts to support governance reforms and strengthen the rule of law, including by structuring funding to encourage this outcome. We view this activity as vital to the success of this agreement and accordingly have asked the Government to keep Parliament informed on their work in these areas.

To sum up, the committee supports the underlying aims of the agreement, although we have concerns about the lack of substance and detail. Accordingly, we ask the Government to provide Parliament with a clear and realistic road map of how and when the activities on defence co-operation and maritime security will be undertaken. We have asked that the Government formally review the arrangement in the event of a settlement between Russia and Ukraine, with a particular focus on the maritime security partnership, and that they keep Parliament abreast of updates. We welcome the reports by the Minister that the UK continues to work with Ukrainian counterparts on governance and rule of law issues. We hope that this work can bring about a closer economic and investment relationship between our two countries.

To finish, I draw noble Lords’ attention to our final conclusion, which considers the ongoing work at an international level to bring Russian aggression in Ukraine to an end. The committee welcomes the Government’s ongoing support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, their position on security guarantees and a US backstop and their commitment to future domestic defence spending. We believe that these steps will be vital to achieving successful implementation of this agreement. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, this has been an important and valuable debate. I thank all noble Lords who have spoken and the Minister for his considered response. I will not try to summarise the debate, but I will make a few comments and points on it—perhaps abusing my position here. Noble Lords not on the committee may have detected the varying tones of its members, which speak to the challenge not just of chairing the sessions but of writing the report. You get a sense of that balance from the committee report, which was highlighted by some of the comments today.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Swansea, rightly pointed out the gaps in the CRaG process. Were it not for this report and the Government extending the deadline for us to have this debate, there would have been absolutely no parliamentary scrutiny of this at all. Frankly, a treaty or agreement of this nature should have more, not less. Those noble Lords not on the committee will be interested to know that the CRaG process itself is the subject of its latest inquiry.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, raised some important questions about Ukraine’s future relationship with NATO and the EU, which also came up later. This is a big issue. We talked a lot about NATO, but Ukraine’s potential EU relationship may be even more important because it may be more tangible. It will be interesting to see how the United Kingdom contributes to that, given our position outwith the EU.

The noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, and, to some extent, the noble Lord, Lord Marland, set out a number of concerns around how this will go forward, which points to what I raised earlier. Many of those concerns might have been dealt with had there been more detail. I understand the Minister’s dilemma in setting out detail for 100 years, but he could have started with the first two years, or perhaps three, of that 100, and set out some milestones. There is still time for the Government to look at that and come back to Parliament to explain how we are taking this forward piece by piece. If we dissect elements of the Minister’s speech, there were milestones in it. Frankly, if they had been made available in a more palatable way when we were considering the report, some of those reservations might have been less strident.

The noble Lord, Lord Marland, raised the issue of a critical minerals deal. That was spectacular by its absence in the evidence, the debate and otherwise, given the high-profile nature of this, so it remains something of an enigma. Again, there is more work to be done on how that fits into the overall frame.

The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton of Richmond, gave a tremendous strategic overview. I suggested that the strategic review had a lot of ground to cover, and I think the noble and gallant Lord really gave a sense of the huge nature of the challenge that this country, the defence establishment and the Government have to cover at least some of his six pillars, if not all of them. We absolutely need the strategic defence review, and the military industrial strategy that follows it, because we have to understand how we are going to move forward. Time is not on our side.

The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, clearly paid attention in his geography lesson back in the day, when he was looking at the industrial capabilities of Ukraine. It was helpful to pull us back to look at the economic value that Ukraine can generate. If there is a strong partnership, those partners will benefit from the economic power. However, I think the noble Lord’s warnings about Putin’s ambitions were starker. We should all take that seriously, and I do not think any of us trust what is going on. We must be vigilant and not start pulling back. With respect to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, I do not think we should start ticking off things that should not be in a peace agreement; everything has to be on the table at this point, rather than saying, “not Ukraine” or “not this or that”. We have to be firm now because—as the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, pointed out—in the mind of Putin, some territory will not be sufficient until it is all territory. I do not think we should pander to that.

My noble friend Lord Purvis made one of his characteristic speeches, and the history lesson was important. However, I pull out of it his reminder that we need commercial guard-rails. The report is very clear, some of your Lordships were clear and I was clear that a commercial environment is needed where British companies can safely go and collaborate with Ukrainian ones and not be fearful of their IP, money or other commercial things being stolen. If this partnership does nothing else but drive that business culture into Ukraine, it will have been a resounding success, so I endorse that.

My noble friend Lord Purvis also raised the exclusivity, or otherwise, of this agreement. I think we have to assume it is not exclusive so, in some sense, what we get back will be a function of what we put in and the way we do it. He suggested that other countries will be circling, and I add to his observation that Turkey has very strong hopes on the reconstruction contracts that will come out of Ukraine eventually. They are positioning themselves very meaningfully.

The noble Lord, Lord Callanan, is clearly very supportive of the current policies and where we are going forward, as are the Liberal Democrats. The unanimity in the approach to this is an important part of your Lordships’ House. I observe somewhat wryly that it is easier to be a hawk on the defence budget when you are on His Majesty’s loyal Opposition Benches than when you are on the other side of the Chamber.

As I said, the Minister gave a strong speech; if we pick out the bones, we have got quite a lot of detail of what we asked for. He did not speak to coming back to Parliament as matters change. I am sure, however, that the Minister meant to commit to that. I am also sure, without speaking for the committee, that in the event of things happening, we will be chivvying for the opportunity to come back to that.

The Minister framed this as collective security and shared interests, and that is the strength of this. Putting aside the hubris of the 100 years in the treaty title, I can understand how it sends a signal. Sometimes I think that people have to look past that at the practical and look at the next two, three, four or five years on the way to 100. However, I think we all agree that keeping Ukraine strong has to be a priority, because it is only from a position of strength, or relative strength, that we can move in the right direction.

In closing, I thank fellow members of the committee, the secretariat of the International Agreements Committee, our expert advisers and all those who gave evidence in the short time we had available. Once again, I thank all contributors to this debate, and I beg to move.

Motion agreed.