English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill

Lord Freyberg Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 11th February 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Young of Old Scone (Lab)]

I finish by saying that I also support the amendments so ably put forward by the noble Baronesses, Lady Freeman and Lady Bennett, about bringing forward the third leg of the three-legged stool that is supposed to be sustainability. It is difficult to sit on a two-legged stool; why is the environment missing when the economic and social elements are there?

[Lord Freyberg (CB)]

My Lords, I speak in support of all nine amendments in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty, to which I have added my name. They do two things, and are both modest in scope and significant in effect.

First, Amendment 233 gives a practical definition to the phrase “cultural interests” by setting out clear and familiar examples, such as we heard, including

“music venues, recording studios, theatres, rehearsal spaces, visual artists’ studios and other creative spaces”.

As it stands, the term “cultural interests” is vague and open to interpretation, as the noble Earl said. This amendment would remove that ambiguity, provide certainty for local authorities when making listing decisions and reflect the lived reality of how culture is made and sustained at a local level.

Secondly, the remaining amendments address a question of status. At present, cultural assets sit awkwardly beneath the heading of social assets and are implicitly treated as being of lesser importance than sporting assets. Yet within the Department for Culture, Media and Sport itself, culture and sport are regarded as equal partners. The Bill as drafted sends the opposite message by inserting “cultural” alongside “economic” throughout the relevant provisions of Schedule 29. These amendments would place cultural assets on an equal footing with sporting assets, reflecting their shared significance to community life, local identity and local economies.

If we accept that principle—that assets of genuine value to communities deserve explicit recognition and protection—the same logic would extend beyond culture. That is why I support Amendment 225, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Freeman of Steventon, to which I have also added my name, and why I am sympathetic to the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, and spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, which pursue the same objective for environmental assets. These amendments would extend the community right to buy to include assets that further the environmental well-being of local communities, alongside the economic and social benefits, provided that the land is not, as we have heard, allocated for other purposes in the local development plan.

Environmental assets may not host performances or exhibitions, but they are no less vital to the identity and well-being of a place. I am thinking of the green fields that provide breathing space between developments, the woodland that offers respite from urban density, the riverside walk that connects neighbourhoods or the community orchard that brings residents together across generations. These are the lungs and ligaments of our communities. If a theatre deserves protection as a community asset, so too does the green space that gives a neighbourhood its character and its calm.

I am also sympathetic to the probing amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, which ask important questions about the robustness of the designation framework itself. Should recent use, as well as current use, be considered when determining whether an asset qualifies? Is the automatic expiry of listings after five years appropriate, or does it leave valued assets vulnerable? Should buildings designated as assets of community value be protected from permitted development and demolition? These are sensible and searching questions. If we are to take community empowerment seriously, we must ensure that the criteria for designation are broad enough to capture what communities value and that the protections, once granted, are robust enough to be meaningful. Yet even the best definitions and the strongest protections will achieve little without the means to act.