Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Greaves Excerpts

Wednesday 8th January 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, ahead of Report in the House of Commons, the Government published draft guidance for front-line professionals on the new anti-social behaviour powers. With the exception of those sections dealing with the review of criminal behaviour orders and the community remedy, this was to be non-statutory guidance.

In addition to the draft guidance produced by the Home Office, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs published a draft practitioner’s manual for tackling irresponsible dog ownership. Of course, the content of the draft guidance has been the subject of discussion during our Committee deliberations. On a number of points, noble Lords expressed concern that our expectations of how the power should be used would be in guidance with no statutory basis.

While I believe that the new powers have sufficient safeguards to ensure appropriate and proportionate use, I see merit in making the guidance statutory for all the new anti-social behaviour powers. Our intention is not to be prescriptive; it is essential that professionals and the courts have the flexibility to consider the facts of each case and choose the most appropriate course of action. However, statutory guidance will help them use the new powers more effectively. The amendments in this group will achieve that result and I trust noble Lords will support them. I beg to move.

[Lord Greaves (LD)]

My Lords, I wish to speak on the statutory guidance sections. I have one little amendment, Amendment 57, in this group, and it is fairly clear what it means.

This is the first time that I have spoken at this stage of the Bill, apart from one intervention, so I should declare my interests again in relation to this group and some others that we will come to. They are my membership of a district council in Lancashire as a councillor, my membership of the British Mountaineering Council, of which I am a patron, and my vice-presidency of the Open Spaces Society, and they relate to things that will come up later.

I thank the Ministers—particularly the noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Holbeach, who is not yet in his place—for the way in which they have approached this Bill, for the way in which they have been open to discussion and to holding meetings with the Bill team, and for the large amount of material that they have sent out in letters and so on. Their readiness to look at a lot of the questions raised at Second Reading and in Committee, and to come forward with quite a lot of amendments today—most of the amendments that we are discussing at the moment are government amendments—shows that they have been willing to listen. I have absolutely no doubt that the parts of the Bill in which I am interested—those on anti-social behaviour—are a lot better for that process, so I will put on record my personal thanks to them.

These amendments are all about guidance. As the Minister said, they mean that the guidance that we were told would be issued—we have already seen the draft guidance—and that is now out for consultation with various bodies will become statutory. This is very welcome. A caveat to that is that I would much have preferred the guidance to be statutory instruments and regulations, as those would have had the benefit of having to come before the House of Commons and your Lordships’ House. Nevertheless, it is better that the guidance should be statutory rather than it being left open as to whether or not people will bother to produce guidance. The fact that it is statutory guidance means that there will have to be proper consultation on it, that it will have to be published and everybody will know that, and that the Ministers issuing the guidance will have some accountability to the Houses of Parliament if we want to raise questions as a result of what is in it. That is welcome and it is being welcomed by a number of organisations with which I am in touch.

The guidance referred to in this group of amendments covers a number of different parts of the Bill, including IPNAs—I am interested that we are still calling them IPNAs following the amendment that was agreed this afternoon; I was trying to work out whether they should now be called IPHADs but at the moment they are called IPNAs—criminal behaviour orders, the powers of police community support officers, community protection notices, public space protection orders and the question of the closure of premises, and there may be others. The point that I would have made if I had been able to get in during the debate this afternoon is that the Bill is not really about everything that was discussed this afternoon.

Most of the debate was about free speech, freedom of assembly and the right of people to protest, as by-products of Clause 1. In practice, this Bill is about anti-social behaviour—or at least the majority of it that refers to anti-social behaviour is—and about whether it is successful in tackling anti-social behaviour more effectively than the existing regime based on ASBOs. I am optimistic that it will be more successful, but the guidance that we are discussing is going to be crucial to how it works on the ground. At the moment if you have to make an ASBO, you have failed.

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Moved by

[Lord Greaves]

28A: Clause 28, page 16, line 15, leave out “the Isle of Wight” and insert “a county in which there are no districts”

[Lord Greaves]

My Lords, this amendment is just trying to help the Government. They have a bit here that is wrong. I raised it in Committee and I thought it would be sorted out. I apologise that I did not notice that it had not been until it was too late to get it on the Marshalled List. Never mind: it has appeared.

In all these different sections and all the alphabet soup of IPNAs, PSPOs and the rest, there is a definition of what the local authority is in relation to that particular area. In the case of IPNAs it is all the principal local authorities. In most of them it is the lowest-tier principal local authority. For example, in relation to public space protection orders it reads:

“‘local authority’ means—in relation to England, a district council, a county council for an area for which there is no district council, a London borough council, the Common Council of the City of London or the Council of the Isles of Scilly”.

The definition here in relation to criminal behaviour orders is outdated. The definition in Clause 28(4) has, I think, been picked up from previous legislation which must have been enacted before there were any unitary authorities apart from the Isle of Wight, and certainly before there were any unitary counties. It simply reads:

“‘local government area’ means—in relation to England, a district or London borough, the City of London, the Isle of Wight and the Isles of Scilly”.

This means that those areas where there is a unitary county, not a unitary district, are not included and so they are simply missed out of the list. These include Northumberland, Durham and Cornwall, for example, and, I think, one or two more.

My amendment will simply delete “the Isle of Wight”, which is a unitary county, and insert the words,

“a county in which there are no districts”.

That is equivalent to the wording elsewhere. As I say, I am just trying to help the Government by making the legislation cover the whole of England and to get it right. I beg to move.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I am for ever grateful to my noble friend Lord Greaves for continuing to keep us on our toes with his scrutiny of the various definitions of local government area as used in the Bill. This amendment relates to Clause 28 which, as my noble friend said, requires a chief officer, in carrying out a review of a criminal behaviour order made against a person under 18, to act in co-operation with the council for the local government area where the offender lives.

This is an area of statute law where there is more than one way of defining a local government area. I have to advise noble Lords that the definition in Clause 28 is correct, but I accept that the drafting could always adopt a different approach. In order to preserve the overall structure laid down by the Local Government Act 1972, the area of a unitary council is usually designated both a county area and a district area, even though it has only a district or a county council. Therefore, in an area where there is a unitary county council, that council will be the council for the district in which the offender resides. In short, the provision works as drafted.

Just as a clarification on the issue of the Isle of Wight, my understanding is that it is a case apart in that it still has districts, albeit no district councils. The express reference to the Isle of Wight therefore avoids any ambiguity in this respect. In light of this explanation, I hope that my noble friend is minded to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Greaves]

I refer the Minister to page 31 of the Bill and the meaning of “local authority” under community protection notices, for example, where the list is different. That specifically refers to,

“in relation to England, a district council, a county council for an area for which there is no district council, a London borough council, the Common Council of the City of London or the Council of the Isles of Scilly”.

It does not refer to the Isle of Wight specifically and separately but refers to,

“a county council for an area for which there is no district council”.

In Clause 67, on page 40, the definition is identical to that for community protection notices.

It may be that, as the Minister said, Northumberland, Durham and Cornwall are districts as well as counties, but that would be news to them since they think that all their districts were abolished a few years ago and that, in common parlance, they are unitary counties. In normal lists of local authorities in England, you refer either to unitary authorities if that is what you mean—you could do that—or to unitary districts and unitary councils. Clearly, unitary districts such as those in Berkshire are districts and so come under the general thing of districts.

Even if the Minister’s rather obscure explanation is right, why is the same terminology not used in different parts of the Bill? Different terminology is used for IPNAs, community protection notices and public space protection orders. It is different because it has simply been picked up, in the case of Part 2 of the Bill on criminal behaviour orders, from previous legislation. All I ask is that the Minister goes away and looks at this again. Even if what he says is right, surely the terminology in the different parts of the Bill should be the same. Could the Minister respond to that?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, again, if I follow my noble friend’s point, it partly proves my own that different drafting approaches to this issue can achieve the same end. I am assured that the Bill is not defective as drafted so I urge my noble friend to accept the approach we have taken, but I listened to his comments again. I assure him that I will sit down with my noble friend Lord Taylor and the officials once more to get the required assurance that the drafting is correct. I will write to my noble friend Lord Greaves in that regard.

[Lord Greaves]

I am grateful for that. I hope the Minister will write to me in good time: I will put the same amendment down at Third Reading if I do not get satisfaction. If it is true that the Isle of Wight is a case on its own and has to be mentioned separately, why is it not mentioned separately in all the other cases of IPNAs, PSPOs, community protection notices and so on? The Minister seems to have it both ways. Again, he has not answered my basic question as to why—so that people can understand it—the same terminology is not used in different parts of the same Bill. The answer will be that different officials wrote different parts of the Bill but that is no reason for not standardising it when you have the opportunity. Having said that, when a Minister makes an offer, I believe it is within the traditions and courtesy of the House to accept it. I will do so and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 28A withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Greaves]

47: Clause 55, page 32, line 36, at end insert—
“( ) A public spaces protection order on land which has the status of—
(a) a town or village green or forms part of such a green,(b) access land under Part I of the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000, or(c) a footpath, bridleway, restricted byway or byway open to all traffic that is shown in a definitive map and statement of rights of way under Part III of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981,shall not restrict those rights that are conferred on persons by virtue of that status.”

[Lord Greaves]

My Lords, I return again to the relationship between public spaces protection orders and what I call special categories of land. This in an important issue, so I will dwell on it for a few minutes. I raised this at Second Reading and in Committee I suggested that these special types of land, where public access is specified and guaranteed by other legislation, should be excluded from public spaces protection orders. The categories of land are: access land under the Countryside and Rights of Way Act, which is mountain, moor, heath, down and commons and now includes the coastal footpath and coastal access land where that has so far been designated in England; village greens and town greens; and rights of way—mainly footpaths and bridleways—which appear on a definitive map and the statement of rights of way which nowadays comes under the Wildlife and Countryside Act and is held by top-tier local authorities.

The purpose of the designation of these kinds of land is to allow public access. To have public spaces protection orders put on them which deny that access looks like an easy and quick way for local authorities to prevent access, which is otherwise a fairly difficult and convoluted process. Public footpaths can be closed or diverted. There is a process by which, over time, access land can have its designation removed. There is also a process by which exceptions and exclusions can be made to access land, under the CROW Act. However, these take time and are difficult, for very good reasons.

In Committee, the Minister said this was okay but that rights of access were for specific purposes. For village greens it is informal recreation. For footpaths it is, obviously, walking along them. For access land it is for accessing that land on foot, together with a restricted number of ancillary activities, such as stopping and having a picnic or taking photographs, but there are a lot of activities which are not allowed. Anti-social behaviour may well be taking place on some of that land which is affecting the enjoyment of it by the people for whom the designation has been made, such as the people walking on it. That is a fair point, so Amendment 47 does not say that public spaces protection orders should not be made on this land. It says that, if they are made, they cannot remove the right of access which is the whole purpose of the land.

I know the Government do not want to do this. I do not know why, because it is very sensible. Nevertheless, I am pressing the case to give the Minister the opportunity of saying exactly how these access rights will be protected. I have had a letter about this from Norman Baker, who was in charge of the Bill within the department. I will read some of it out, because it has not been widely circulated and it is worth putting on record:

“I note your concerns that the new public spaces protection order is a much wider power than the three orders it replaces, and as such could be used to restrict access to common land, access land and rights of way on the definitive map. However, I believe the test and the safeguards we have built in mitigate such a risk.

As Lord Taylor made clear during the debate in Committee, these types of land are important and certainly worthy of the additional debate they received. In fact, in the draft guidance, we specifically mentioned a number of these categories of land because of their importance to both the local community and visitors to the area”.

One of the points that I raised in Committee was the importance of the national bodies that look after this kind of land—the Ramblers, the British Mountaineering Council and the Open Spaces Society, as well as landowners’ organisations and others—being involved in any change in the system. Mr Baker writes:

“We also made clear that where restrictions were necessary, national bodies could play an important role in the consultation process”—

that is not something that I had picked up—

“to ensure that all those affected have a chance to comment. I know my officials are continuing to work with interested groups with a view to making this even clearer in the final iteration”.

This is the vital importance of the statutory guidance, as it now will be, to prevent what I might call rogue local authorities—there are one or two—taking advantage of this legislation and doing things that are not intended. The letter continues:

“However, in terms of restricting access on certain categories of land, I do not believe that this would pass the test, in part because of the final limb, which states that the anti-social behaviour, ‘justifies the restrictions imposed by the notice’. Given the importance of these areas, whether coastal access land or registered common, I cannot envisage a level of behaviour that would constitute such a draconian response. Where a problem behaviour does exist, the flexibility within the PSPO means that the behaviour itself can be targeted rather than access in its totality. This is a major failing in the current system where unless the anti-social behaviour is related to dogs or alcohol, the local authority is left with limited options, too quickly resorted to ‘gating’ in some situations.

In addition, the behaviour that has to be restricted on this land has to be ‘unreasonable’. Again, given the rights afforded to commoners through other legislation, I fail to see how someone exercising these rights in a responsible manner (for instance, pannage) could be considered to be acting in an unreasonable way. As such, I believe these rights are adequately protected”.

In reading that out, I apologise to the Minister if I have stolen his thunder and he was going to say exactly the same things. However, at the very least, I would like him to guarantee here in the Chamber that what I have said is true and that that is the way in which the Government look at it. In the end, of course, how it comes out in the wash will be how we will judge it. However, the discussions that we have had have been useful in clarifying these issues and in concentrating the minds of people in government as to exactly how these things might work. I hope that the Government will accept my amendment. I have no great optimism about that but, anyway, I beg to move.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Greaves has once again articulated his argument well and, if I may say so, he has also articulated mine. In quoting the letter from Norman Baker he has to some degree stolen my thunder. However, as my noble friend asked that I reiterate the position of the Government on the record, I will do so.

The types of land that he mentioned in his amendment are important and worthy of the additional discussion. Common land, village greens, rights of way and open access land all play an important part both in local communities and in our nation’s heritage. This is exactly why they should be protected from the minority of anti-social individuals who ruin this enjoyment by acting in a way that is unreasonable. I am glad that my noble friend has accepted that the new public spaces protection order could be used positively to protect the categories of land he identifies.

The amendment itself, though, seeks to protect any rights conferred on individuals or groups as a result of other legislation. As I have said before, this amendment is unnecessary. For a new order to be made, the activities have to be “unreasonable”. I do not believe that someone exercising their rights to, for example, collect firewood in a particular woodland could be considered to be acting unreasonably. In addition, while in theory the council could seek to restrict access to that land altogether, I do not believe that that would meet the final limb of the test—namely, that the activities justified the restrictions. Such an absolute ban would likely be disproportionate in legal terms. Indeed, it is the flexibility that we have built into the new power that makes sure that the nuclear option, to use that phrase, is truly a last resort. Where problem behaviour does exist, this flexibility means that the behaviour itself can be targeted rather than access in its totality. This is a major failing in the current system where unless the anti-social behaviour is related to dogs or alcohol, the council is left with limited options, and too quickly resorts to gating in some situations.

However, I do believe that where the anti-social behaviour is unreasonable and so bad as to justify restrictions, the council, in consultation with the police and others, should have the ability to act, and act fast. That said, given the continuing concerns which my noble friend has expressed, I assure him that Home Office officials will continue to work with interested bodies to see how the statutory guidance can address these issues more effectively. We have already emphasised in the draft guidance the importance of these categories of land, but the draft guidance is exactly that—a draft. We want to make sure that by the time we publish the final statutory guidance, it reflects the needs of professionals and the interests of the users of rights of way, access land and village greens.

Many professionals will be aware of the special rights and protections afforded to such land, but where they are not, we can make sure they have the relevant information so that their decisions and actions reflect the needs of the whole community. In the light of these assurances I have given, rather reiterating points made by my friend, colleague and fellow Minister Mr Norman Baker, I ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Greaves]

I also dodged the issue of whether Norman Baker was right honourable or honourable.

I am grateful for what the Minister has said and I think that the general tenor of what the Government are saying on these has shifted a little bit in the right direction. I am grateful to the Minister for his help and assistance in these matters.

I still think there is a possibility of conflict—for example, if there is a village green where traditionally the kids play cricket in the middle of summer, and the cottages around the village green are all bought up by townies who go and live there at weekends and complain about the fact that cricket balls are coming into their gardens. That is the kind of conflict which could happen, and where a PSPO might try to stop them playing cricket despite the fact that that was part of the traditional informal recreation there.

However, the national organisations now clearly have an accepted role, which was in doubt at the beginning of this process, so—combined with the tenacity and vigour with which my friends in the Open Spaces Society pursue these matters—I hope that it will never get to the High Court to sort things out, but at least I am happy in the knowledge that that would be possible if it came to it. Having said that, I am grateful to the Minister for all his help, and for that of his colleague, and I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 47 withdrawn.

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I am grateful to my noble friend for drawing our attention to these matters and I commend this set of amendments to the House.

[Lord Greaves]

My Lords, I suppose that I ought to say thank you. As my noble friend Lady Hamwee said, when amendments come back like this from the Government, you sometimes think that all the time and effort spent in Committee has produced something worth while. Therefore, I am very grateful to the Government: when I saw this particular amendment, I thought that it was a late Christmas present.

It is an odd amendment because it is an odd new clause, including two completely different things. However, both are very welcome. The reference to the rights of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly are extremely useful. With this Bill—and all the fuss this afternoon bemused me a little—I have always been of the view that the public spaces protection order provisions had the potential to be a greater danger to freedom of speech and assembly and to the civil right to protest and so on than the injunctions for the prevention of nuisance and annoyance. The reason, as the Minister said when he introduced an earlier amendment, is that PSPOs are about territory and areas, and therefore, unless very specific provisions are made, they apply to everybody. Unlike IPNAs, which are injunctions against individual people or groups of people, as I understand it public spaces protection orders, which can last for up to five years and are renewable, would apply to everybody and stop normal activities such as handing out leaflets, parading with banners, making speeches and holding meetings. Therefore, this part of this new clause is extremely useful and valuable and the Government are to be congratulated. I am a little bemused as to why on earth they did not just produce a clause such as this and attach it to IPNAs, as that might have defused a great deal of the fuss earlier today. However, that is for the Government to think about, not me.

The publicity stuff is useful. A lot of this brings together what is already in different bits of the Bill and puts it in one place. The specific provisions are very useful. My amendment is just to query the difference in subsection (4) of the proposed new clause, under the definition of “necessary publicity”,

“in the case of a proposed order or variation, publishing the text of it”,

and,

“in the case of a proposed extension or discharge, publicising the proposal”.

I am not quite sure what the difference is there, and this is to probe that in a minor way. I am grateful for the inclusion of the county councils and parish councils under “the necessary notification”, which is common sense, but sometimes you put forward amendments on these matters and common sense does not always apply. On this occasion it has and again I am very grateful.

My final point is that one of the things that my friend Norman Baker sent to me was a draft of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (Publication of Public Spaces Protection Orders) Regulations. This point is not exactly in this amendment but perhaps noble Lords will bear with me for two sentences. The regulations set out the instructions to local authorities that where a public spaces protection order has been made it has to be published on the council’s website and the council has to,

“cause to be erected on or adjacent to the land in relation to which the public spaces protection order has been made … such notice … as it considers sufficient to draw the attention of any member of the public using the land to the fact that a public spaces protection has been made and the effect of that order being made”.

It is the same for variations.

Again, this is very welcome. The fact that it will be in regulations is welcome, because councils will not be able to get out of it. If the notices fall into disrepair over time, they will have to replace them and keep the information before the public. I put these amendments forward in Committee, and I am grateful that the Government are taking them up and putting them into a statutory instrument regulations. I thank the Government for this amendment and those in relation to the community remedy documents, where, as the Minister said, the Government have taken up my suggestions about consulting the local authority. That will be in the Bill. This is all excellent stuff. Thank you very much.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, may I say a word following on from Amendment 54? It is on a matter that I raised in Committee, which is how parts of this Bill fit in with the existing nuisance legislation.

My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones and those with whom he worked on what is now the Live Music Act 2012 remain concerned about the possibility of local authorities using public space protection order powers when there is existing nuisance legislation that could be used against a particular nuisance—though I think that they do not regard much music as “nuisance”. There have been some awkward examples of some local authorities banning busking and other live music-making during “reasonable hours”; and when I say that, I would probably agree that they are reasonable, but I do not particularly want to bring that into the equation here. During hours when there have been a small number of complaints, the local authorities would argue that such action is reasonable and there is a concern that the powers might be used far more extensively than the Government would have in mind. They have spoken to me about balancing competing rights between freedom of expression and the right to peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions—in this case the items that are being used for busking.

I am making the point now in the hope that the Government may be able to say something about guidance on the fit between the statutory powers under this Bill and statutory nuisance. I raised the issue at the previous stage following discussions with the Chartered Institute of Environmental Health. I know that officials are working on this area of the guidance but I also know that those who have been in touch with me will be grateful if they can have further discussions on and further input into what will now be statutory guidance. Clearly those who are working on these issues day-to-day still feel uncomfortable that their concerns about what I called “workability” have not quite been taken on board.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I thank my noble friends Lord Greaves and Lady Hamwee for their hard work on this section of the Bill. They have proposed a number of amendments, many of which have informed government thinking. Indeed, these government amendments are based on ideas that came from the debates we had in Committee with them. We have yet to dispose of my noble friend’s Amendment 55, but I hope he will at a suitable moment see fit not to move it.

The role that my noble friend Lady Hamwee has emphasised depends on the statutory guidance, which is very important in this area. This is a matter for consultation. We want to get the statutory guidance right and ensure that it allows councils maximum flexibility. We do not want to miss the chance, particularly as the guidance will now be statutory, of making sure that we give background information on the exercise of all the elements of these parts of the Bill for the efficient use of anti-social behaviour powers.

I hope I have reassured my noble friend Lady Hamwee on the importance we attach to the guidance and my noble friend Lord Greaves about our recognition of the need to publicise what is going on in connection with the consultations that will take place.

[Lord Greaves]

Why does it say “publish” for one and “publicise” for the other?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I am sure someone will know the answer to that; I am not entirely sure. “Publish”, I suspect, implies that it is in a particular form; “publicise” is perhaps multiple publication. However, I am only hazarding a guess, without being particularly good in my command of language.

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[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, in Committee my noble friend Lord Faulks and other noble Lords questioned the effect of Clause 62(7). He asked whether this had the effect of stopping an application for judicial review against a council that makes a public spaces protection order. I agreed to go back and consider the matter further. On reflection, it is true that, as originally worded, the clause meant that judicial review was not available. This was because an interested person can challenge an order in a broader way than is open under a judicial review and, as such, the requirement for that process did not seem necessary. I believe that this is right: it ought not to be possible for the same person to challenge a public spaces protection order on effectively the same grounds through two different legal procedures.

However, as my noble friend pointed out, because only “interested persons” as defined in the Bill may challenge a decision to make an order, this has inadvertently left national bodies and others who do not fall into the category of an “interested person” without any means to challenge a decision. Amendment 51 rectifies this and ensures that the option of judicial review is available to those who do not qualify as “interested persons”. I hope the House will agree that this is a fair way of ensuring that all parties with an interest in a public spaces protection order can challenge the terms of the order should they consider there to be a case for doing so. I beg to move.

[Lord Greaves]

My Lords, there was quite a lot of discussion about this question in Committee and it became clear that the Bill was not very clear. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser was involved in those discussions. The amendment now proposed is extremely welcome and has been welcomed by various national organisations that were concerned about it. Again, it is to the credit of the Government that they have seen the sense of this and sorted it out.

Amendment 51 agreed.