Holocaust Memorial Bill Debate

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Department: Leader of the House
Wednesday 21st January 2026

(1 day, 7 hours ago)

Lords Chamber
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In other words, Holocaust denial and Holocaust relativism have become normalised in society, particularly among young people. I feel as though there is an obligation to use the learning centre to take that on and not pretend it is not happening. So I would prefer to have received a guarantee, rather than having to put up with an assurance. Regardless, we have to ensure that we use the learning centre to counter a battle of ideas on this—one that, if I am honest, we are not necessarily winning.
Lord Hacking Portrait Lord Hacking (Lab)
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My Lords, can the speakers in this debate concentrate on the issue? The issue is whether this amendment should remain in the Bill. We have had two long speeches that have not addressed that.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar Portrait Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
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My Lords, I will speak very briefly, and I will try to address that. I will speak briefly not because the subject is not important—it is such an important subject that there could be no end of words said about it—but because we are focusing on the Commons reason and our response to it. For reasons that I gave at the time, I supported the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame. As the Minister pointed out, the purpose of that amendment was to ensure no mission creep—if I can pick up his phrase.

I am one of the Members of this House who have had sustained, constructive and helpful engagement from the Minister, his staff and his team of civil servants. I was pleased to hear the clear and constructive statements that he made, and those made from the Dispatch Box in another place. When we are talking about governance provisions in a trust document, those are legally binding and effective. The nice legal and constitutional question of whether a Government can bind their successor is one thing, but a board of trustees is bound by its constitutional documents.

The important thing to me tonight is that we simply have to get on with this project. I am concerned that there is a risk that further delay will lead not just to further cost but to question marks over the project. We have had a good debate about it, and I think we all share the concern behind the amendment. Indeed, as I say, I supported it. But now we have to get on and not so much complete the job but complete the legislative job and begin the real action on the ground.

The noble Baroness, Lady Deech, knows the high regard I have for her. She explained her opposition to parts of this project very clearly. We agree on some points and we do not agree on others. Disagreement is part of what this place is all about. I respectfully say, on the proposed amendment to say that the “main purpose” must be the provision of education—as opposed to the original amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, which had the “sole purpose”—that saying “main purpose” is worse than saying nothing. If you say that the main purpose is X, you are almost admitting, accepting and implying that you can also do Y and Z. It is not just nearly like “sole”. In law, there is a clear distinction between “main purpose” and “sole purpose”. In any event, that is not the real focus of my remarks, which is that we need to get on with it, for the reasons I have given.

I put on record my personal thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Khan of Burnley, who started the work on the Bill in this House. Both in the Chamber and out of it, he and I had many conversations about it, all of which were constructive and conducted in the best traditions of this House. We all owe the noble Lord a huge debt of gratitude. Perhaps he might think about this: his name will always be linked to this Bill because he made the rather prosaic statement, noble Lords might think, set out in Section 19(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act, to the effect that the provisions of the Bill are compatible with convention rights. We can have arguments about Strasbourg jurisprudence—that is not for now—but it struck me, reading those words in the Bill, that it is not just that the provisions of the Holocaust Memorial Bill are compatible with convention rights but that the Holocaust is a reminder of what may happen if fundamental rights are not protected.