Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Lord Hain Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

My Lords, I hope that I will not embarrass the noble Lord, Lord Howard, by saying that I agree with virtually everything that he said.

First, however, I pay a brief tribute to May Blood, a stalwart warrior for peace who crunched fearlessly through all the political posturing, was dynamic, warm, passionate, blunt at times, and incredibly courageous on the front line of peace. I also apologise that, when the date was switched, I was unable to be present for Second Reading as I had intended. I speak in support of the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lady Chapman of Darlington, which I trust that she will re-table before Report and call a vote on if necessary.

Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Lord Hain Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 31st October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

I yield to none in my respect for the noble Lord, Lord McCrea, and the way he pursues this argument. It was an argument that we had earlier in our debate, and I share his distaste for the protocol, as he knows. I do not agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, that there is no democratic deficit. I think there is a real democratic deficit and it could be put right. It would be good if the noble Lord would think about the suggestions made by the noble Lord, Lord Hain, earlier in our debate. The argument that the protocol is inconsistent with the Good Friday agreement comes across rather badly from those who opposed the Good Friday agreement. I myself was strongly in favour of the Good Friday agreement and I was sorry to see the DUP against it at the time. It is hard to sustain the argument now, in any case, given that all the parties to the withdrawal agreement—in which the protocol rests—do not agree with it. The United Kingdom Government do not buy the argument that the DUP are making—or they have always, up to now, not bought that argument. Although I understand the concerns the noble Lord puts forward, I do not think it works as a matter of law or that the Gibraltar precedent—although he is quite right about it—is relevant.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

Will the noble Lord accept a small intervention to follow up on the point he made about the democratic deficit? I agree with him and he agrees with me on it. Would he confirm that Norway, for example, does not have Ministers in the Council of Ministers or direct representation in the European Parliament because it is not in the European Union, but does have consultative rights? It is consulted on all EU single market matters. Northern Ireland could be consulted in a similar way.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

I so confirm.

Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Lord Hain Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 2nd November 2022 Lords Chamber

Finally, can we not address the question of some diminution in this wide-ranging power? We really ought to find a way. I find it astonishing that across all sides of the House there is concern about these powers. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, is approaching the issue from his concern about the fact that the EU has these wide-ranging powers. Speaking for myself— I am only speaking for myself—I do not think we should have given those powers to the EU, but it was a consequence of signing in. I also think that, having given those powers to the EU and having been obliged to pass the necessary legislation when the EU said so, we have become habituated to passing all sorts of secondary legislation without proper analysis. I think it has contributed to the habitual way we behave. With great respect, we are concerned here with whether this Bill should give this Minister, or that Minister or the Ministers to come these wide-ranging powers. For my part, I do not think they should.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

My Lords, I speak to Amendments 21B, 21C, 23B and 23C, in my name and the names of my noble friends Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick and Lady Goudie. I am grateful for their support.

On Amendment 21B, Clause 13(1) removes the jurisdiction of the EU’s Court of Justice altogether, but the Court of Justice jurisdiction is essential to the operation of the single electricity market to keep the lights on in Northern Ireland, which the UK Government have said they wish to see remaining unaffected. This amendment ensures that there will be no inadvertent disruption to the single electricity market through the coming into force of this clause. Surely the Government should accept that.

On Amendment 21C, Clauses 13(4) and (5) allow a Minister of the Crown to make regulation in relation to any provision of the protocol relevant to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice or the application, supervision and enforcement of the protocol. There is a possibility that this could inadvertently affect the operation of the single electricity market. This amendment requires the Minister to make and publish an impact assessment prior to regulating under this clause in order to prevent such a risk to the single electricity market. I do not see what the problem with my amendment might be; it seems to me entirely reasonable.

On Amendment 23B, the operation of the single electricity market on the island of Ireland comes under the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union and is required to be interpreted in the light of case law of the CJEU. The scope of Clause 14 makes this impossible. This amendment would ensure that Ministers regulating in this area under Clause 14(4) would have to make and publish an impact assessment, prior to the regulation, in order to consider its possible negative implications on other aspects of the protocol that the Government wish to protect, including the single electricity market. Again, I cannot see what objection there might be to Amendment 23B.

On Amendment 23C, the operation of the single electricity market on the island of Ireland comes under the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU and is required to be interpreted in the light of its case law. The scope of Clause 14 makes this impossible and puts Article 9, on the single electricity market, at risk of being excluded from the protocol by accident, even though the Government say they wish to protect it. This amendment would ensure that the functioning of the single electricity market is specifically protected from the scope of this clause to maintain its operation, which is necessary for the electricity supply in Northern Ireland. Again, surely this is a no-brainer for all of us, including government Ministers.

By way of background, a wholesale electricity market is where electricity is bought and sold before being delivered to consumers. Market arrangements require generators and wholesale suppliers of electricity to forecast their generation and consumption and to bid at the price at which they are prepared to buy and sell. Competition between suppliers with equal access to a grid system should ensure value for customers, with a market price based on the minimisation of production cost.

Power markets have been evolving across Europe since the early 1990s. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty in late 2009, the EU gained formal competences in energy and embarked on electricity market reform. A core part of this was the so-called third energy package. To enable cross-border trade in electricity and gas, each coupled market adopts a common set of rules and standardised wholesale trading arrangements so that system operators can work together to allocate cross-border capacity and optimise cross-border flows. This is what is at work in the integrated single electricity market on the island of Ireland.

The SEM is a cross-jurisdictional wholesale electricity market that came into being in 2007. It allows generators and suppliers to trade electricity in a single market across the island of Ireland. Fundamentally, it helps ensure that there is sufficient capacity to meet electricity demand at all times in both Ireland and Northern Ireland. Being part of an all-island market brings benefits to electricity customers in Northern Ireland by reducing electricity prices and increasing the security of supply. It was further cemented in 2018 with the integrated pan-European market design of the third energy package.

An intergovernmental UK-Ireland memorandum of understanding co-ordinates non-mandated market arrangements, but the SEM functions through an overarching European Union-mandated convergence of energy policy and market structures, as governed by certain parts of the European Union acquis. The Ireland/Northern Ireland protocol to the withdrawal agreement provides the basis for the continued operation of the single electricity market after Brexit by including the minimal amount necessary of EU laws on energy markets.

To do this, Article 9 states:

“The provisions of Union law governing wholesale electricity markets listed in Annex 4 to this Protocol shall apply, under the conditions set out in that Annex, to and in the United Kingdom in respect of Northern Ireland.”


Annexe 4 then lists seven Acts that apply to the

“generation, transmission, distribution, and supply of electricity, trading in wholesale electricity or cross-border exchanges in electricity.”

These key elements of European energy law applying in Northern Ireland are, notably, largely in devolved competences. For example, the EU’s regulation on energy market integrity and transparency—REMIT—prohibits insider trading and energy market manipulation and makes provision for the monitoring of the market by regulators. REMIT continues to apply in Northern Ireland through the protocol.

The application of these Acts entails circumscribed participation in the EU market, which requires acceptance of EU governance. In practice, this means that the ultimate arbiter of EU law is the Court of Justice of the European Union. An essential criterion for transposing EU law into single electricity market rules is that single market rules cannot be differentiated across jurisdictions and alignment must be guaranteed for the future.

Article 13 of the protocol states that

“the provisions of this Protocol referring to Union law or to concepts or provisions thereof shall in their implementation and application be interpreted in conformity with the relevant case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.”

This includes the provisions listed under Annexe 4. This is to secure the governance of the internal energy market, as it covers the single electricity market. This is removed by the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill, Clause 13(1) of which sets out:

“Any provision of the Northern Ireland Protocol, or … the EU withdrawal agreement, is excluded … so far as it confers jurisdiction on the European Court in relation to … the Northern Ireland Protocol”.


The Explanatory Notes underline:

“That is the case whether the CJEU jurisdiction relates to excluded provisions or any other matter.”


With the removal of the CJEU and no means of referencing its case law or jurisprudence, the governance of the single electricity market is put in jeopardy and, thus, the continued functioning of the all-island market is as well. This is happening at a time when the pricing of electricity, security of supply and balancing supply and demand are at an almost unprecedented level of concern to consumers this winter on the island of Ireland and elsewhere in the world, including Great Britain.

A lot of concern has rightly been expressed about the unknowable consequences of the Bill, given that so much of its effect will come through powers that are neither clearly demarcated nor spelled out—the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, has spoken at length on this. However, I draw to noble Lords’ attention the dangers in what we do know about the Bill’s actual, if unintended, effects. On coming into force, even this skeleton Bill will be powerful enough to undermine the foundations of the protocol completely, with direct, immediate and practical consequences for Northern Ireland. This is primarily because the Bill removes the Court of Justice of the EU from having a role in the oversight of the protocol. Clause 13(1) sets out that any provision of the Northern Ireland protocol or withdrawal agreement is excluded so far as it confers jurisdiction on the Court of Justice,

“whether the jurisdiction relates to excluded provision or any other matter”.

As such, Court of Justice jurisdiction is removed altogether. Furthermore, Clause 20 means that domestic courts and tribunals cannot refer any matter to the Court of Justice in relation to the Northern Ireland protocol, and that they will not be required to follow the jurisprudence of the CJEU from the day the Act comes into force.

This is not merely a theological matter. Article 12(4) of the protocol spells out what the Court of Justice of the European Union has been given jurisdiction over for Northern Ireland. This includes customs and the movement of goods entering Northern Ireland and technical regulations and certification for goods, but it also includes the single electricity market. In addition, Article 13 states that the implementation and application of the protocol provisions referring to union law, concepts or provisions should be

“interpreted in conformity with the relevant case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.”

The EU has been absolutely clear that Northern Ireland’s free access to the EU single market is contingent on the jurisdiction and jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the EU.

I am sorry that I am speaking at some length on this, but it is quite complex and important. To change the position of the Court of Justice as proposed in the Bill would immediately erode the basis for an open Irish border. It is either naive or disingenuous of the Government to claim that the single electricity market will be unaffected by the Bill: the position of the Court of Justice is absolutely essential to its operation. The prospect of the collapse of the single electricity market at one point led UK officials to consider putting generators on barges in the Irish Sea in the event of a no-deal Brexit, which tells us that this is deadly serious.

I remind the Government, keen as they are to claim sovereignty over Northern Ireland, that it is their duty, not the European Union’s, to keep the lights on in Northern Ireland. If the EU decides to prevent the continued free flow of goods and electricity across the Irish border because of the removal of the CJEU from the protocol, it would be not a sign of its malintent but rather a well-flagged consequence of the wanton recklessness of the Government in writing the Bill in this way.

I will refer to another skeleton analogy: the Government are trying to claim that the benefits of the standing, walking protocol can be retained at the same time as cutting off its head and removing several of its major bones. Equipping the Government to fashion new plastic limbs over time to fix the problems that the Bill is deliberately inflicting on the protocol is one thing, but removing the head, in the form of Court of Justice jurisdiction, will of course mean that the protocol simply cannot function, and thus neither can things that it sustains, such as the open border and the single electricity market.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

I am glad to be of service to the noble Lord.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

The Minister has been very generous and kind in saying that he was grateful that I raised the single electricity market, but he has not addressed any of the issues I put to him. If he is not going to do so in his closing speech, could he write to me and say in what way, apart from seeking not to jeopardise the single electricity market, which nobody wants to do, obviously, he is going to prevent it being jeopardised, for the reasons I enunciated?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

I do not know if I disappoint or please by saying that there are several more pages in my speaking notes which may address in part what the noble Lord, Lord Hain, said, and this relates also to his amendments on the issue of assessments on non-excluded provisions. To make a general point, whether it is the perspective of the Government in introducing the Bill or the sentiments we have heard from our noble friends, including those within the DUP, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, I think we are all coming at this with the end objective of ensuring that the benefits there have been from the market should be protected. I am quite happy to discuss the specifics with the noble Lord, together with officials, after the debate to see if there is a specific insight we perhaps have not picked up on in respect of these amendments, and how we can have a further discussion in this respect. I fully accept the key principle—I think we all do—regarding the protections that have been afforded and the gains that have been made. Of course, no one wants any lights going off anywhere.

It is the Government’s view that Amendments 21C and 23B, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hain, would prevent any regulation being made under the powers in Clauses 13 and 14 before an impact assessment had been carried out with regard to the regulation’s effect on non-excluded provisions of the protocol. Regulations under Clauses 13 and 14 should not be presumed to have any impact on non-excluded provisions of the protocol. They are not excluded and will continue to apply—indeed, they will continue to attract the benefit of the EU law principle of supremacy.

However, if the noble Lord is simply after a more general economic impact assessment—this is where I am saying that a discussion may be helpful—I am not sure that these amendments are required either. Regulations under the specified clauses could be highly technical, with little economic impact. For example, Clause 13(5) specifies that regulations under Clause 13(4) may make provision about arrangements with the EU relating to the operation of the Northern Ireland protocol, including information sharing. As such, the Government could be forced to provide an impact assessment on, for example, a data-sharing system between two competent authorities, which has little or no impact on wider parts of the protocol or economic operators—or, indeed, any impact outside of government at all.

I assure noble Lords that the House will have the opportunity to scrutinise any regulations in the usual fashion, and that the Government will provide all the usual accompanying material under the normal parliamentary procedures, including economic impacts where relevant. However, it is the Government’s view that mandating by statute that impact assessments must be provided for every single regulation under Clauses 13 and 14 would be overburdensome, and it does not tally with the standard principles for impact assessments. To add to the point I made earlier, on the specifics that have not been covered in my concluding remarks, I will write to the noble Lord, Lord Hain. As I said, I believe that there is a common cause to be had here, so if time allows, I am quite happy for us to schedule a discussion on this as well.

Clause 13 outlines the exclusions that seek to redress the feeling that a democratic deficit is created by the arrangements for the implementation and enforcement of the protocol. First, via subsection (1), it provides that any provision of the protocol which confers jurisdiction on the CJEU over the arrangements in Northern Ireland is an excluded provision. This means that CJEU decisions, including infractions, will no longer have effect in domestic law across the entire protocol. Secondly, via subsections (2) and (3), it assists in restoring the Government’s sole oversight of arrangements on the ground in Northern Ireland, providing that the provisions relating to the powers and presence of EU representatives are excluded. Finally, to address the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, via subsections (4) and (5) it allows for the establishment of replacement arrangements, which provide the ability to put in place new supervisory and data-sharing arrangements with the European Union. This will support assurance processes to protect both the UK and EU markets and facilitate co-operation between UK and EU authorities. That is why we believe that the clause should stand part of the Bill.

Again, I am grateful for the discussions and debate on this group. While I am not suggesting that all noble Lords will have been fully satisfied by my response, I hope that they will be minded not to press their amendments at this time.