Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 20th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, the Bill to which this House is being asked to give a Second Reading today is, in my view, both ill-timed and ill-conceived. It singles out Israel for special protection over any other country in the world in a remarkably discriminatory way—positive for Israel, negative for everywhere else—which, important though the preservation of Israel’s security and democracy undoubtedly is, can hardly be justified. Is it really that much more important to us than the countries of the Commonwealth?

The Bill is ill-timed in the sense that, while many will assert and defend Israel’s right to act militarily in self-defence in response to the onslaught unleashed against it by Hamas on 7 October, as does the present speaker, this is hardly the appropriate moment to bring forward a piece of legislation which appears to give Israel a blank cheque for whatever it does in Gaza and the other Occupied Territories.

It is ill-conceived because it would appear also to override some of the formal international positions taken by successive British Governments with respect to the West Bank and the settlements established there, to the Golan Heights and to east Jerusalem. Can the Minister confirm whether it remains the Government’s position, as set out in paragraph 5 of UN Security Council Resolution 2334, for which the UK voted, that the status of these territories can be determined only by international negotiations and agreement between the parties to the dispute between Israel and Palestine—and not, as is the view of the present Israeli Government, by the unilateral action of Israel—and that those settlements are illegal and that the assertion of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights and east Jerusalem has no basis in international law? If so, and given that that view is shared by the vast majority of the members of the UN, why is that distinction not recognised in the present Bill? Why, indeed, is it not recognised as being an obligation on public bodies in this country, just as they are not permitted—rightly, in the view of the present speaker—to try to impose their own trade sanctions on Israel?

Let us reflect for a moment on where we would have stood in the early 1990s with respect to investments in apartheid South Africa, had a Bill of the sort proposed been on the statute book. I listened with great interest to the reference made by the noble Lord, Lord Hain, to that issue. Do we really wish to tie the hands of public bodies in matters of investment, should such breaches of customary international law occur in the future?

The objections I have referred to relate to the international dimensions of this Bill, which seem far-reaching and undeniable. How do they respect the Government’s championing of the rules-based international order, of which the provisions relating to the status of the territories concerned are surely an integral part?

Other considerations, referred to by other noble Lords, such as whether it makes any sense to deprive public bodies of powers they would appear to possess, are matters for others with more expertise than me on such aspects of the legislation. The negative implications for the autonomy and freedom of speech of universities has been referred to by noble Lords and must be a matter of real concern.

The noble Lord, Lord Willetts, did us a favour by reading out the relevant passage from his party’s 2019 manifesto. The Salisbury/Addison convention is highly relevant to the Bill. There is no mention in the manifesto of Israel, and no mention of universities, which are not public bodies. This will be relevant as we look, as I believe we should, to produce some fairly radical amendments to the Bill in order to avoid setting off in quite the wrong direction.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

We will move on. Obviously, I agree that the history of—

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

On that point, if can help the Minister, I represented this country at the United Nations at the time and what the noble Lord, Lord Boateng, says is totally accurate.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

We will move on. I was just going to say that it was amazing that the change happened in South Africa. I remember visiting it in the 1990s, after the change.

Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 20th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, it seems to me that there is a bit of confusion going on. Amendment 7, which takes out the words in Clause 1(7), relates only to who is carrying out the disapproval. It is just amplifying those people whose disapproval is taken into account, to see whether or not the clause is engaged. It is not trying to add different categories of decision-maker, because the reference to decision-maker is clear in Clause 2, which we will come on to in another group. It is that definition that then drives enforcement, et cetera.

I was interested in Amendment 55 of the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman—although I think it is actually the wrong amendment asking for regulations—because it highlights that decision-makers might be individuals under the Bill, which they can be. As I understand it, the definition of “decision-maker” in Clause 2 encompasses some individuals being the decision-maker from whom all these consequences might flow. That was a complete surprise to me because the Bill is titled the Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill—a manifesto commitment related to public bodies. I was completely amazed to find that individuals might be public authorities within the terms of Clause 2, and therefore decision-makers.

I was interested in the noble Baroness’s probing amendment, because I hoped that she would be using that to ask the Minister what kinds of individuals could be decision-makers under the definition that we are using—the Human Rights Act definition. The limited research I have done produced the example of a doctor. When a doctor is carrying out his NHS work, he could be a public authority for that purpose, but when carrying out his private work, he could not be. I did not find much more than that, and I am rather hoping that the Minister will be able to explain to us in rather more detail precisely which individuals are decision-makers within Clause 2.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, I, too, will speak to this amendment and do so, like the noble Lords, Lord Wallace and Lord Johnson, in relation to universities and higher education. I had some experience of that: I was on two university councils—those of Birmingham and Kent—and I chaired the Birmingham council for five or six years in the early part of this century.

I have to say to the Minister that, as a result of a lot of extremely desirable reforms, the decision-making at universities was concentrated quite heavily on the council. The council did not micromanage every decision, but it was responsible for every decision taken at the university. That responsibility was clearly focused on a much-reduced size of council, down from the 30s or 40s to the 20s, and it meant that a quite a lot of responsibility came on to its members, who were a combination of academics and lay persons—with a majority, on the whole, of lay persons. The lay persons on the council were volunteers and were not paid a penny. Now, if the vagueness in this bit of the legislation is retained, I would not like to be out there trying to recruit new members to university councils, if they thought they were going to be liable for any of the sorts of problems that could arise under this legislation.

I suspect that this is just one of many pieces of this legislation that reinforce the case for simply taking higher education and universities completely out of it. I think that is what we will come to when we get to Report. This is just the first illustration that it will have a remarkably chilling effect on the conduct of councils and the way in which people are prepared to serve—for nothing and as volunteers—on university councils, giving up many hundreds of hours of their lives to making sure that the university is properly administered and decisions properly taken.

[Baroness Randerson (LD)]

My Lords, I preface my remarks by declaring an interest as chancellor of Cardiff University. I apologise that my duties at Cardiff University prevented me attending the whole of Second Reading—so I could not speak, although I attended a significant part of it.

Before I was chancellor of Cardiff University, I was a member of the council of Cardiff Metropolitan University, so I have a background in both executive and non-executive roles at universities. What I have to say very much follows neatly from the noble Lord. My experience is that university councils—and other bodies doing the same job but sometimes with different names—are very highly regulated already. They involve a great deal of training and responsibility and absolutely no financial reward—but there is great satisfaction for those who participate.

In both universities I have mentioned, our problem is always trying to get the suitable range of highly skilled, highly experienced people to participate. If you add another unnecessary layer of responsibility on to those people, you will deter very worthwhile recruits and you will make life more difficult again for our higher education sector. So can the Minister give us examples of universities—and individuals within universities—that have made these inappropriate decisions, so that we can see why universities are included? Otherwise, if there are no examples at the Minister’s fingertips, could the Government give further thought to whether they should be included at all?