Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th May 2023 Lords Chamber

While I understand the general tenor of opinion in the Committee, which has been obvious so far, I do not want the Committee to think that this is other than a committed and understandable effort to resolve a difficult problem. Given what happened in the other Chamber, where there was a considerable majority for the Bill, I do not want the House of Lords to tie the hands of the Government unduly in dealing with this novel and difficult problem.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, first, I apologise for not having been able to participate in the Second Reading of the Bill. I support Amendment 4 very strongly because I believe it goes to the heart of the problems presented by the Bill.

The list of the international conventions which we should not infringe is pretty long and very important. I will start with the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which is perhaps sometimes a little overlooked in debates. The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, spent some very valuable time explaining why the Bill will contravene some of our obligations there. I had the honour of sitting beside the late Baroness Thatcher on the day she signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child— 28 September 1990. I can remember that as it is my birthday. I do not think she would have been terribly happy with legislation that cut across an international convention she had signed. I would like to hear from the Minister when he winds up how he answers the criticisms made by UNICEF, which is the body set up by all of us to adjudicate whether or not countries are living up to their obligations under the convention. I would like him to answer the question of the areas of the Bill which appear to be in contravention.

Then there is the refugee convention, which has been referred to on several occasions. The Minister has tried on previous occasions to say that there is nothing in the refugee convention being countered by the Bill, but I am afraid that, like many other statements he has made on the matter, it is a bit like the Red Queen in Alice. He is saying, “It is so because I say it is so”; that is not usually a convincing argument. I would like to hear from him which explicit provision of the convention allows us to extinguish the right of someone on our soil to claim asylum.

Of course, we have the right to reject that claim; if we do so, and if they cannot be sent back to their country of origin due to a risk of torture and death, we have to find an alternative place to send that person. I would like to hear what explicit provision in the refugee convention permits us to extinguish the right to claim asylum—not to have it, but to claim it.

A lot has been said about the European Convention on Human Rights. I will not weary the Committee with much more, except to say that the route down which the Government will go seems clear. They might say that they do not intend to get into a position of confrontation with the European court and so on, but they are either bluffing—and bluffing does not usually work terribly well—or they are setting off down a slippery slope, which will lead us into direct confrontation with the European Convention on Human Rights and with the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.

If we do that, we put at risk a substantial and extremely important chunk of the trade and co-operation agreement with the European Union. For that to fall away would be to have jumped out of the Northern Ireland protocol pan into the fire of losing a large chunk of justice and home affairs legislation, on which we worked together with the European Union.

Why do all these international complications matter? I would suggest that they matter a great deal because our Ministers—I applaud them for it—are standing at the Dispatch Box and going to international meetings, and they are saying that Britain stands for the rules-based international order. We are spending a lot of money and providing a lot of weapons—quite rightly so—to Ukraine to uphold the rules-based international order; but the list of obligations in Amendment 4 is a substantial part of the rules-based international order. If we contradict those obligations, what credibility will we have when we go around the world trying to uphold that rule? Not much, I would think. I would not fancy going to the countries of the global South and saying, “You really must take a stronger line on Ukraine”, to be told, “You say you are supporting the rules-based international order; well, here is a list of areas where you are breaking it”.

This is a serious matter that goes way beyond the responsibilities of the Home Office itself. Like others who have spoken in this debate, I do not wish for one minute to suggest that unlimited immigration is a good thing—that we do not want to stop the boats and so on. That is, frankly, not serious; it is just debating. I hope that, when the Minister replies to this debate, he will take on some of these international points and answer them in detail, with precision, and in a way that can convince us. Until that point in time, I remain a strong supporter of Amendment 4 and hope that it will stand in the Bill.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I apologise that I did not get to speak at Second Reading. I misread the Order Paper and thought that the day started with Questions. However, I listened to all the speeches and I certainly got a sense of the mood of the House; I note that, perhaps, that mood is at odds with the mood beyond the House. A previous point was made about unanimity; well, unanimity can be a cause for celebration but it can also be an echo chamber.

However, there are specific problems in the Bill that undoubtedly need to be tackled during scrutiny in the House of Lords. They need to be tackled if the Government are to fulfil their promise to the electorate to get to grips with controlling the borders of our country—controls that people feel are being flouted by an inability to stop the small boats. If this House can ensure that the Bill works, all to the good.

One aspect of that is that we are going to need some clarity about what and who will be affected by the Bill, and why. In that context, I am sympathetic to Amendment 1 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, because it is a valiant attempt to provide a definition of illegal and unlawful migration and it could be helpful in improving the public debate on the issue, which often gets in a muddle. So often when the issue of channel crossings arises and people say that they are illegal crossings, they are scolded and told that they are not illegal and that they ought to know the law better. If there is a way of clarifying what the law is, all to the better, because that can be frustrating. Many people feel they are being gaslit on the question of the law. Amendment 1 may give us some clarity, but achieving such clarity probably cannot be done just via definitions.

There is certainly an impression outside this House— I am sure that people will put me right—that whole swathes of lawyers, along with NGOs and their legal advisers, provide those in the boats with legal get-out clauses and exemptions such that, frankly, it looks like an organised system to game the system, and that is coming not from the people in the boats but from the legal minds that are sympathetic to their cause.

I can completely understand why anyone from many of the countries that they are travelling from would want to live in the UK and to improve their circumstances, but by any reasonable definition, many or at least some of the people in the boats are not refugees in need of asylum, even if they are desperate to improve their standard of living to get away from countries that they do not want to live in. I understand that they can be encouraged to follow a script to find a way to stay in this country—we can empathise with the desire to do that—but we can also note that, frankly, that tests the bounds of legality, and in the process there is a serious danger of discrediting, for example, what we mean by modern slavery, which I think is being exploited, and what we mean by legitimate asylum status.

I wonder what the noble Lord, Lord Best, would make of the legal rows that happen within the legal and judicial community about definitions—what words mean. It is not as though if you put it down it is always clear. We keep hearing about eminent lawyers, fine minds and so on. Believe it or not, among those fine minds, there are eminent lawyers who disagree with each other. I listened to a lively row between two fine, eminent legal minds about the legal interpretation of Article 31 of the refugee convention. One read it to say that refugees must come directly from a place of danger —that is, not France—present themselves immediately, show good cause for their illegal entry and so on. Then the other person explained that coming directly, among some judges, would mean having come through other countries. Anyway, the row went on and I am not saying I understood it all, but it is not as though, every time, great legal minds give a sense of legal certainty. All this legal confusion can and does lead to cynicism that people are illegally breaching border controls, and that illegality is not being tackled. There is a danger that this can discredit the rule of law itself. I certainly agree with the shadow Immigration Minister, Stephen Kinnock, who has talked about the whole process being slowed down and clogged up by legal challenges and the problems that that causes.

In a way, my question to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope is: even if we establish a clear legal definition, how do we tackle the various loopholes and spurious claims that can create incentives for illegality which we cannot deny happen? Adults claiming that they are children when they are adults in order to stay, destroying papers proving country of origin and so on—are we just to say that that never happens?

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Finally, before I sit down, I will suggest an answer to the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, who asked why Clause 1(2) was in the Bill. I suspect it is in the Bill because, in this area of the law, as in the area of ouster clauses, for example, there has been something of an arms race between the courts and Parliament. Parliament says X, and the courts say, “Well, did Parliament really mean X? I think it might have meant Y”. Then Parliament says, “No, no, we really meant X”. I suspect we have these purpose clauses to make sure that, on any question of interpretation that comes before the court, it is clear what Parliament was trying to do. Whether that is a good or bad way to legislate is a separate question, but that is an answer to the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. I was going to sit down, but I will give way.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

I am most grateful to the noble Lord, because I was following with interest his argument, which seems to be that there are two sorts of obligation—those we incorporate in domestic law and international obligations—and the international obligations are less binding, important and necessary. Perhaps the noble Lord could tell me what the status of the UN charter or the Brussels treaty on NATO is. Does he mean that we, as a Parliament, could decide not to apply Article 5 of the NATO treaty? That would be a pretty serious statement to make.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I am reluctant to give the noble Lord a private lecture on this, but I will set out a very short answer. I will be blunt but, I hope, legally accurate. The short answer to the noble Lord’s question is yes; we could do it. International treaties are not part of our domestic law. As far as our domestic courts are concerned—please let me finish and I will give way—if we were to legislate completely contrary to an international treaty, our domestic courts would have to abide by the Act of Parliament, because that is domestic law. Of course, that would put the UK in breach of the international treaty. It is not something I would recommend, but the noble Lord asked me a direct question about how the two interrelate, and that is a necessary consequence of being a dualist state. International treaties are not part of domestic law, unless and until they are incorporated.

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[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Migration and Borders (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)]

My Lords, we have had a very interesting, long and good debate, which has had perhaps more than a hint of a Second Reading debate—but, of course, that is unsurprising, given that Clause 1 sets out the purpose of the Bill. We will of course be able to revisit this debate in the second group when we have the “clause stand part” Question.

We have heard thoughtful speeches from many noble Lords, but I particularly valued the insights from the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, my noble friends Lord Hodgson, Lord Horam, Lord Sandhurst and Lady Lawlor, and my noble and learned friend Lord Wolfson.

For now, let me respond to the amendments directly. First, Amendments 1 and 5, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, seek to add into the Bill definitions of “illegal migration” and “unlawful migration”. The noble and learned Lord has suggested that this would be helpful in the interests of legal certainty. As a lawyer myself, I am all in favour of legal certainty but, in this instance, I am not persuaded that adding these definitions helps in this regard.

It is important to incorporate Bill-wide definitions in a Bill where terms are used across the Bill. We have done that in this Bill and, as noble Lords will have noticed, Clause 64 includes an index of defined expressions. But I put it to the noble and learned Lord that nothing hangs off the terms “unlawful migration” or “illegal migration” and, consequently, there is no need to define them. The term “unlawful migration” is used only once in the Bill, in Clause 1(1), while the term “illegal migration” is used only in the Short Title, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, observed. Moreover, it is clear from Clause 2 that the duty to make arrangements for removal applies to persons who meet the four conditions in that clause. It does not apply to other persons who may be in the country unlawfully—for example, because they have overstayed their limited leave to enter or remain. In short, the Bill is clear without these two terms being defined.

As regards the early intervention in the debate from the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, a point repeated by both the noble Baronesses, Lady Chakrabarti and Lady Hamwee, as well as my noble friend Lord Kirkhope and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chelmsford, I remind your Lordships that the Immigration Act 1971 was recently amended by the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 with regard to the criminal offences relating to illegal entry and arrival. This includes people who enter the UK without leave or arrive in the UK without permission: for example, without a visa where that is required under the Immigration Rules. This means that such persons are illegal migrants whether or not they go on to claim asylum. This, if I may say, answers the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, of what makes a route illegal. The answer is: legislation, passed in the normal way, and scrutinised and passed by this House.

The suggestion by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that anyone making claims under the refugee convention can never be illegal, represents, with respect, a muddled reading of the convention. The convention is clear that states can still operate controls on illegal migration and, under Article 31, it is expressly permitted to disadvantage those who have arrived illegally from safe countries—which is true of all who come from France. This embodies the first safe country principle in the sense that Article 31 protections apply only to those who have come directly from unsafe countries—a point made by my noble friend Lady Lawlor.

The first safe country principle is also widely recognised internationally, including in the Common European Asylum System, a framework of rules and procedures operated by EU countries together, based on the refugee convention. I would add that the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, may have overlooked the fact that, under Clause 2(4) of this Bill, the “duty to remove” does not apply to those who have come directly from unsafe countries, in line with the refugee convention.

The refugee convention seems to be raised to support statements that are not all borne out by its terms. We must interpret the convention as it is written, not as others would wish it to be written.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

I thank the Minister for giving way. I merely want to ask whether you are recommending that all of the 46,000 who arrived last year should be sent back to France. If so, has the Prime Minister had any discussions with President Macron about that?

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[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

As I have already outlined, it is clear that there is nothing in the Bill that would require the UK to breach its international obligations. The UK takes compliance with those obligations very seriously. As for the other international instruments referred to in these amendments, they have not, by and large, been incorporated into UK domestic law, and we should not seek to do so in this Bill through the back door.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

The Minister seems to be placing a great deal of weight on there being nothing in this Bill that requires the Government to take action contrary to our international obligations. He would surely agree, however, that there is a great deal in this Bill that enables the Government to take action that would be contrary to our international obligations—and that without any recourse to Parliament.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I am not sure that I agree with the noble Lord. There is no requirement that powers should conceivably be expressed on the face of every Bill in such a way that they are trammelled by international obligations. That would be contrary to the dualist system, as my noble and learned friend Lord Wolfson made abundantly clear. I am reluctant to reopen that particular exchange at this juncture, given the time that we have remaining prior to the dinner break.

States take different approaches to their international law obligations. Some states treat international law as part of their domestic law, but the UK, like other countries with similar constitutional arrangements, including many Commonwealth countries, has the dualist approach that we have discussed before. In those states, international law is treated as separate from domestic law and international law is incorporated into domestic law only by decisions of Parliaments through legislation. That is a point we have already discussed. The effect of these amendments would be to make the provisions of all the listed international agreements effectively justiciable in the UK courts. It is legitimate for noble Lords to make the case for incorporation into domestic law of one or more of these international instruments, but that is not the Government’s position, and we should not be using this Bill to secure that outcome.

I hope that, in light of my explanation, the noble and learned Lord will be content to withdraw his Amendment 1.