Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate

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Department: Home Office
Lord Hope of Craighead Portrait Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)
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My Lords, there is so much in this Bill that causes concern, whatever else in it we can agree with, so I will focus on only three points. It is a bit difficult for me, as the 45th speaker in this debate, to find something new to say, but I think my first point is new; the second point, not so new; and the third point has been dealt with by several others.

My first point relates to new offence in Clause 66 of causing serious injury by careless or inconsiderate driving, which will attract a prison sentence. My second point relates to the provision in Clause 106 to increase the minimum term for discretionary life sentences from one-half to two-thirds. My third point relates to the powers given to the Secretary of State to make provision, by regulation, about the meaning of key phrases in Part 3 of the Bill relating to public order—a matter referred to in powerful speeches by my noble and learned friend Lord Judge and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra.

Of all the driving offences, careless or inconsiderate driving is at the bottom of the scale. It has never been thought until now that it should attract a prison sentence. A moment’s inattention is all it takes, and that may happen even in the case of the most careful and responsible driver. There is no criminal intent whatever. Where criminal intent exists, it is possible that the prospect of a prison sentence may act as a deterrent, but that is not so where intention of that kind is not part of the offence at all. As for serious injury, a broken arm or broken leg will do, and that can happen to someone who, by a moment’s inattention, is knocked off a bicycle. The injury is of course to be regretted, but it seems to me that the imposition of a prison sentence for an offence of this kind is disproportionate. Do we really need to do this? Has any assessment been made of the consequences of this seemingly well-meaning measure?

At the other end of the scale is the discretionary life sentence. Not so long ago, the minimum term was reduced from two-thirds to one-half. I think that was to help to reduce prison numbers, and because it was after all only a minimum term. Given the fact that our prison population is still rising, why revert to two-thirds? Has any assessment been made of the consequences for our prisons and of the pattern of release dates since the minimum term was reduced?

I turn to a matter that has been discussed by many other speakers, on Part 3 of the Bill. The right to peaceful protest, whatever the issue and whether or not we agree with it, is an essential part of our democracy. There is no doubt that our laws are being challenged by the way in which that right is currently being exercised but any attempt by the Government to curtail that right, such as we find in Part 3, must be scrutinised with great care. I focus on the changes as to the powers of the police to give directions under Sections 12 and 14 of the Public Order Act, a breach of which amounts to a criminal offence. That is the context for the measure that the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, emphasised in his speech not long ago. If the police reasonably believe that a procession or an assembly may result in public disorder or disruption to the life of the community, they may give such a direction. Now we find that the Secretary of State is to be given power to make provision by regulation as to what is or is not to be treated as falling within these expressions. That excludes not only a power to define these expressions but also to give examples of cases that are to be treated as falling within them. In effect, as there are no limits, she and her successors are being given the power to declare the kind of protests, the reasons for them and their effect that the Government simply find inconvenient or unacceptable. That declaration will then be used for the giving of directions by the police, with its criminal consequences. As the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, said, the use of delegated powers in this way is unacceptable.

The guiding principle must surely be that it is for Parliament, not the Executive, to decide what powers to give to the police. The words in the Public Order Act speak for themselves; as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, might say, we know what they mean. Because they are broadly expressed, they can be adapted to the needs of each case. However, if amendments are needed, they should be put in the Bill—so why are the changes, which are already in draft in respect of one of these phrases, not here in the Bill so that we can subject them to scrutiny in the usual way? Can the Minister say why that should not be done?