Renters’ Rights Bill

Lord Howard of Rising Excerpts

Tuesday 6th May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 119 and 126 in my name, to which the noble Lord, Lord Black of Brentwood, has added his name. The provisions of my two amendments simply mirror the provisions that are in Amendments 118 and 125, so that they will apply to superior landlords as well as landlords. A superior landlord is a person who, for example, owns the block of flats and has a greater interest in the tenants than does the immediate landlord. I declare an interest as I have been affected twice recently by the superior landlord being in a position to deny any pet ownership.

I fully agree with the excellent introduction to this issue from the noble Lord, Lord Black of Brentwood, and all the points that he made, but, if this provision is not added to the Bill, I fear it will completely undermine the Government’s very good intentions, which we support, in bringing forward Clause 12, because the position of the superior landlord will almost always override that of the landlord.

The interests that I quote I will give as examples. The first was from when, during Covid, I rented out my flat. The family who rented it wanted to adopt a cat. The rules applying to the block of flats state that pets may not be kept, so although I as a landlord was happy that this family adopted a cat, the superior landlord rules for the block forbade it. More recently, this year, my husband and I have bought a flat, but even as owners we are subject to a rule that the superior landlord has to give permission for a pet. This means a lot of uncertainty for the vendor and for us, while the superior landlord decided whether we could keep our 15 year-old dog.

If the Government succeed in changing the position for renters, they must also address the issue of superior landlords and their ability to block any pet ownership. If the Government do not address this, the likelihood is that the good intentions behind this clause will fail because of the legal limitations for subtenants. Usually, they do not have a direct contractual relationship—that is, in legalese, no privity of contract—with the superior landlord, unless there is a direct agreement. This can mean that enforcing rights or obligations becomes very difficult if the issue lies with the superior landlord rather than with the immediate landlord.

I look forward to hearing the Minister’s reply to this issue, because I fear that, otherwise, as I said, the good intentions of Clause 12 will be totally undermined.

[Lord Howard of Rising (Con)]

My Lords, I am not quite sure what the Minister said earlier, but I would like to declare interest as an owner of rented property.

I shall speak to Amendments 120, 122 and 123 in my name in this group. All these amendments seek to highlight where pets could be unsuitable in a rented property. Although, as I have already said earlier during this Committee, as a landlord I have never refused a pet, a blank cheque for pets is not practical. Amendment 120 would allow landlords to reasonably refuse their consent to a pet if the allergies from that pet would have a negative impact on the landlord’s employees, their managing agents or other related persons, including future tenants. For those who suffer with allergies, this is a very serious matter and can have a debilitating effect, and it is not always possible to remove allergens through standard cleaning. We have all read and heard about the allergies from peanuts et cetera that can kill; well, the allergies from pets are not so serious, but they are very serious for people who suffer.

Amendment 122 would allow landlords to reasonably refuse their consent to a pet if they reasonably believe it is unsuitable for the property, may cause a nuisance to neighbours or may damage the property or place an unreasonable burden on its upkeep. Wooden floors get scratched and carpets get stained—if they are still there —when pets are involved, so flooring almost always needs to be replaced when a tenancy ends. Some may consider this reasonable wear and tear, and others may not, but it is certainly a much greater cost when there have been pets in a property, and it is an important factor to consider. Not every landlord is in a position always to replace everything every time there is a new tenancy. Of course, some pets are capable of causing more damage than others, and some properties are easier to upkeep than others. I think there should be some leniency and some leeway for landlords who know their properties to make a judgment on this.

Amendment 123 follows on from this and seeks to exclude pets which are inappropriate or disproportionate in size or number. I realise there will be difficulties in defining this. Are five Dobermann pinschers more or less suitable than 25 fox-terriers? Nevertheless, as the Bill stands, I am not clear whether a landlord would be free to make a judgment, which most noble Lords would agree would be very sensible, that a Great Dane could not be housed in a studio flat, or that 50 cats could not be kept in a small terraced house. Given the difficulties, will the Minister consider making it clear that the landlord has, or should have, discretion to make sensible decisions for the benefits of residents, neighbours and the pets themselves?

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Moved by

[Lord Howard of Rising]

121: Clause 12, page 19, line 36, at end insert—
“(5A) Where a landlord has given their consent under subsection (1) they may withdraw their consent at any time if they become aware that the pet in question is a dangerous wild animal under the Dangerous Wild Animals Act 1976 or in breach of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to enable landlords to refuse pets on the grounds that they are a dangerous wild animal.

[Lord Howard of Rising (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 121 seeks to probe and address the inadequate definition of “pet” in the Bill, which has already been mentioned by a number of noble Lords during this debate. Part 1, Chapter 1, Clause 12(2) inserts the following definition into Section 45(1) of the Housing Act 1988:

“‘pet’ means an animal kept by a person mainly for … personal interest … companionship … ornamental purposes … or any combination”

of those. My Amendment 121 seeks to probe whether pets that are considered dangerous and/or wild animals under the Dangerous Wild Animals Act 1976 or the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 should be counted as pets. This might sound like common sense, but I am not convinced that, under the current drafting of the Bill, landlords would not be forced to consider giving consent for unsuitable and, in this case, dangerous animals. These Acts already govern the keeping of dangerous animals, but it is good practice to ensure legal consistency, and it is not clear how they will interact with the Bill before us today.

For example, the Dangerous Wild Animals Act 1976 requires accommodation to be

“suitable as regards construction, size, temperature, lighting, ventilation, drainage and cleanliness”.

If a landlord’s property happens to fit the definition in that legislation, does that mean that an animal included therein would be considered a pet by the definition of this Bill? As we will hear in the next group, damage insurance is problematical, as it is for standard pets. Will any insurance provider give cover for the damage that could be caused by a dangerous animal? If the fact that an animal is dangerous and wild, or falls outside the definition of a pet, can be a reasonable ground for refusal, would it not be simpler to make that explicit by reference to an existing definition and list already in legislation? Why should landlords be required to make independent assessments to justify their refusal?

The Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 is another example. It bans the keeping of specific breeds without an exemption certificate and creates offences for dogs that are out of control or that cause injury or death. Again, it is unclear how this existing legislation interacts with the Bill. If the owner of a banned breed has an exemption certificate, would a landlord be able to refuse the animal in their property? Likewise, if a dog had been deemed dangerously out of control or had injured someone, what risk would this pose to the landlord, their property agents and others who need access? What risk would be considered acceptable, if any?

I hope that the Minister can answer these questions and clarify this matter. If she needs to write to me on any of them, I would be very happy to receive her letter, but I would like to be reassured that this amendment and others we will debate today are being considered as they should be. I beg to move.

[Lord Dobbs (Con)]

My Lords, what is a pet? That is a central question to everything that we are discussing. Some noble Lords will remember that there once was a parrot—a Norwegian Blue, to be precise—that was very sick. In fact, he was so sick, he was a deceased parrot—at least, that is how his new owner perceived it—and no amount of nailing that dead polly’s feet to the perch could change that. How we miss Monty Python.

Perceptions, rather like recollections, may differ, yet this Bill’s definition of a pet depends almost entirely on perception, and I suspect it is likely to cause quite a few ruffled feathers. Therefore, I have put down two amendments—Amendment 131 and the consequential Amendment 132—to prod and probe a little.

First, as the Chief Whip instructed, I declare my interest as a pet owner. Percy is our rescue cat—a very happy puss that has trained my family exceptionally well. So well that, if ever I were to ask my family who they love more, me or Percy, I would soon be looking for lodgings.

As the Explanatory Notes set out:

“The Bill requires landlords not to unreasonably withhold consent”


for tenants to have pets. Despite the split infinitive, I would have thought that that was the right target area: legislation based on what is reasonable. But the Bill goes further and howls at the moon in trying to define a pet. It does this in a very peculiar manner, by defining a pet not by what it is, but by how it is perceived. It offers three definitions, as my noble friend has already pointed out. A pet is defined as an animal kept, first, for mainly personal interest, secondly, for companionship, and thirdly—it is this that my amendment mostly concerns—mainly for ornamental purposes. That is a definition we should consider getting rid of.

What is a pet kept for ornamental purposes? I will take a calf as an example. Currently, the beautiful pastures around my home in Wylye are filled with any number of calves. They are so cute and cuddly, and my grandchildren always want to take one home. But I think we can agree that a calf is not really a pet; it is a would-be cow. Except, it would seem to fall directly under the Bill’s definition of a pet: first, it is personally interesting to my grandchildren; secondly, it is companionable, particularly so long as one has a bottle of milk handy; and thirdly, it is ornamental. A triple whammy.

I remember Margaret Thatcher once cuddled a calf. I was with her in Suffolk on the election trail in 1979 when she picked up this terrified young animal and embraced it. Did the fact that she found it personally interesting or exceptionally ornamental—and, as it happened, amazingly photogenic—make it a protected pet? Could she have taken it home? Apparently, the Daily Mirror paid the farmer £50 to let it know if the poor thing died before polling day. Can you imagine the headlines? “Maggie Thatcher, calf basher”—but I digress. The problem is that once we try to define what a pet is or is not in the way the Bill attempts, we start with a cat’s cradle of confusion and end up with a dog’s dinner. People nowadays get very protective about their pets, and very litigious; we need to take care.

Traditionally, working animals and pets have been regarded as separate categories, but it is not always clear cut. Take Larry, the Downing Street cat: is he not a working animal that is supposed to keep the place free of vermin? Good luck with that. Ever since the Prime Minister’s claim at his party conference that his main mission in life was to free the sausages—Remember that? It was a magical moment—I suspect that Larry has been working even harder to try to track down all those missing sausages.

However, it is the third category that really has me wondering. Clause 12 defines a pet as an animal that is kept for “mainly … ornamental purposes”. Forgive me, but what on earth does that mean? I am confused. Does it mean, for instance, an XL bully dog? I am told that many owners regard them as extremely attractive. It must be the way they smile, or drool. But does that give a tenant an unequivocal right to keep them? I ask the Minister: does the landlord have no grounds to refuse—even if keeping such animals might well cause fear for others, such their neighbours who have children or who own a small dog or cat? As my noble friend Lord Howard of Rising so eloquently pointed out, one pet owner’s rights can become another pet owner’s nightmare.

I should perhaps whimsically point out that for, the purposes of the discussion, I have decided this week to self-identify as a Chihuahua. So, hand on heart and paw on prostate, I say: these definitions are barking mad. I really do not want to end up as breakfast for next door’s bully dog, no matter how cute he looks.

Would it not be enough simply to require both tenant and landlord to be reasonable in the specific circumstances? The Minister keeps coming back to the concept of people being reasonable. That is a much stronger concept, it seems to me, than tying ourselves in knots trying to define what a pet is in the ways that the Bill currently attempts.

Our laws should offer clarity, not confusion. But, no matter how hard we try to nail these definitions to the perch, they will make about as much sense as a dead parrot. So their proper place is not in the Bill but in that great parliamentary litter tray in the sky. I request the Minister to go back and have a much closer look at the definition of a pet.

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[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lords, Lord Howard of Rising and Lord Dobbs, for their amendments relating to the definition of a pet. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Northbrook, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Miller and Lady Scott, for their comments on this debate. Even in these two short debates this afternoon, we have seen the benefit that our House can add to legislation, including probing very intensively a definition but also the entertaining nature of the speeches we are privileged to listen to. So I thank the noble Lord, Lord Dobbs, for his entertaining intervention.

Amendment 121 from the noble Lord, Lord Howard of Rising, seeks to allow landlords to withdraw consent for a pet if it is later found to be a dangerous wild animal under the Dangerous Wild Animals Act 1976, or in breach of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991. Although I of course fully support the principle that animals posing a serious risk to safety should not be kept in rental properties, this amendment is not necessary. The keeping of dangerous wild animals without a licence is already prohibited under the 1976 Act, and the 1991 Act imposes strict controls on specific dog breeds—I presume that includes the XL bullies that were mentioned by the noble Lord. These laws already provide local authorities with sufficient powers, and we would expect a request for a pet that falls foul of that legislation to give landlords a strong case for refusing consent. Local authorities have the powers to act, and the amendment would therefore duplicate existing protections and introduce unnecessary complexity into the Bill. For these reasons, we do not consider the amendment necessary, and I hope the noble Lord will consider withdrawing it.

Amendment 131, from the noble Lord, Lord Dobbs, seeks to remove the line in Clause 12 that includes keeping animals for “ornamental purposes” within the definition of a pet. Amendment 132 is consequential to Amendment 131. I understand that these are probing amendments, intended to seek clarity on the scope of the term “pet” as used in the Bill. Like the noble Lord, Lord Dobbs, I miss Monty Python—I have watched them over and again, I must admit—but I must respectfully resist these amendments. The line in question, referring to animals kept for ornamental purposes, is a deliberate and important part of the definition. The noble Lord will be pleased to learn that it does not refer to dead parrots, but it ensures that the Bill captures a broad and inclusive understanding of what a pet may be, reflecting the wide range of animals that people may choose to keep in their homes for companionship or decorative enjoyment. I am not sure whether Wilberforce the snake was decorative, ornamental or a pet, but he is obviously now enjoying somebody else’s company than his original owner.

Removing this provision could risk narrowing the scope of the definition, creating legal ambiguity and potentially excluding animals that are commonly accepted as pets, such as fish and birds—live ones. To support implementation, the Government will provide guidance, setting out examples of instances where animals are likely to fall into the definition of a pet. I hope that that will help to ensure consistency and clarity for both tenants and landlords, without placing restrictions on primary legislation. It is important to repeat that landlords are required to agree only to reasonable requests; a calf that may grow into a cow is unlikely to be reasonable in a small flat, for example. For these reasons, I do not consider these amendments necessary, and I hope the noble Lord will consider not pressing them.

[Lord Howard of Rising (Con)]

As my amendment alluded to, the Government’s definition of a pet is very broad and open to debate, although I believe that the Minister’s remarks were helpful. As we have heard from my noble friend Lord Dobbs, the definition could be stretched to the extreme. How is a landlord or tribunal expected to understand its meaning?

To summarise, the definition of a pet in this Bill poses more questions than it answers, and I hope that the Government can offer some much-needed reassurance on this. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 121 withdrawn.