Nuclear Industries Security (Amendment) Regulations 2017

Lord Jones Excerpts

Tuesday 28th February 2017 Grand Committee

[Baroness Buscombe (Con)]

My Lords, I will begin by giving some background information and explaining why we are making these amendments. The UK takes civil nuclear security issues very seriously, including with regard to regulation. Since 1980, the UK has been a signatory to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material—the CPPNM. The convention requires signatories to have in place a robust legislative and regulatory regime to ensure the security of civil nuclear materials stored or in transit. The UK also complies with international guidance and best practice in this field produced by international bodies, in particular the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The Nuclear Industries Security Regulations 2003—NISRs—represent the cornerstone of the United Kingdom’s regulatory regime for civil nuclear security. The NISRs place significant obligations on the operators of civil licensed nuclear sites with regard to physical security measures for facilities, nuclear material and the security of sensitive nuclear information. The NISRs also cover the movement of nuclear material by air, road and rail in the UK and globally in UK-flagged vessels. This legislation requires all civil nuclear operators to produce and implement robust nuclear site security plans, and for transporters of nuclear material to produce transport security statements.

These draft amendments would update the NISRs in four key areas. Their overarching aim is to further enhance civil nuclear security arrangements and ensure that the United Kingdom’s regulatory regime remains up to date, comprehensive and robust. This will help ensure that the United Kingdom continues to give effect to its obligations under the CPPNM. I will provide further detail on each of the amendments.

The first amendment is to Regulation 4(1) of the NISRs, which requires that a nuclear site security plan approved by the ONR is in place for each nuclear site. However, at present the NISRs do not specify on whom this obligation is placed. The amendment will make it the responsibility of the designated “responsible person” for the nuclear site, as defined in the NISRs, to ensure that there is an approved security plan in place at all times. In tandem with this, a related amendment to Regulation 25 makes it a criminal offence for the responsible person to fail to meet their obligations under Regulation 4(1) as amended. The creation of this offence underlines the security imperative that the Government place on nuclear operators maintaining up-to-date security plans that have the approval of the independent regulator. In combination, the amendments to Regulations 4(1) and 25 will add clarity to the regulatory regime by making the responsible person accountable for ensuring that their site has approved nuclear security measures in place at all times. The implications of creating a new criminal offence have been fully considered and the Ministry of Justice has approved the measure.

We are also amending Regulations 4(3)(d) and 16(3)(c). These amendments are aimed at further enhancing industry information security and preparedness for cyber-related incidents. It will be a requirement for nuclear site security plans and transport security statements to set out the steps to be taken in the event of the loss or theft of or unauthorised access to sensitive nuclear information. Requiring duty holders to outline these contingencies will help ensure that risks associated with information security and cyberattacks are identified from the outset and effectively managed using measures approved by the ONR.

We are also making amendments to Regulations 9, 17(3) and 22(7), which relate to personnel security. Ensuring robust measures are in place to combat the potential threat that insiders pose to the civil nuclear industry is, of course, a key priority for the Government and the regulator. These amendments are intended to provide the ONR with greater flexibility in determining whether nuclear premises’ relevant personnel are suitable in security terms. Instead of solely approving all relevant personnel itself, the ONR will be able to assess and approve the industry’s broader personnel security arrangements; for example, by examining the effectiveness of review and aftercare arrangements for personnel working in the sector. This will allow the ONR to approve processes to be used by duty holders to determine whether relevant personnel are suitable in security terms. This will involve consideration by the ONR of whether the measures used by duty holders are in accordance with Her Majesty’s Government’s personnel security policy. We are also making an amendment to Regulation 22(5)(a) to remove a reference to guidance published by the ONR on security classifications that has now become obsolete.

The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy conducted an industry consultation on these amendments between 24 June and 22 July 2016. In total, 19 responses were received from a range of industry stakeholders. On the basis of these responses, department economists have forecast one-off administrative costs to the civil nuclear industry of less than £100,000 arising from the changes. This assessment has been approved by the Regulatory Policy Committee. I consider the security benefits arising from these changes to far outweigh the costs.

In parallel to the amendments, the ONR intends to issue revised security guidelines to the civil nuclear industry. These guidelines, known as the security assessment principles, are closely aligned to emerging threats to nuclear security, especially in relation to cybersecurity and information assurance. The amendments that I have outlined will complement the revised guidelines. I therefore commend these draft regulations to the Committee and beg to move.

[Lord Jones (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her clear exposition on such a serious measure and offer support for the draft instrument. There are two nuclear power stations in Wales: Trawsfynydd in the wilds of Meirionnydd and Wylfa in Môn Mam Cymru—Anglesey. Trawsfynydd may have reached the end of its productive life, but the hope is that Wylfa reactor 2 will come into being at an appropriate time. These stations in the far north-west of the lovely land of Wales are hugely important for employment, well-paid jobs and skills, and generate supporting jobs distances away from the plants.

How many people at each of those stations are engaged in security—if the Minister is allowed to give me that answer? I think it is a reasonable question. How many nuclear security police are there at each of those plants? I have read the Explanatory Memorandum and the instrument. When the stations were built, it was inevitable that road improvements would have to be made, and the rail links became ever more important—for obvious reasons when we consider nuclear waste.

In paragraph 7, headed “Policy background”, of the Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph 7.2 refers to,

“an approved nuclear site security plan be in place for each nuclear premise. The current requirement does not specify upon whom the duty is placed. These regulations clarify the position by specifying that it is the responsible person in relation to each nuclear premise who has the duty to ensure that there is an approved nuclear site security plan in place, and make it a criminal offence for the responsible person to fail to do so”.

I have mentioned two nuclear sites in Wales. What would be the rank and description of such a person referred to in paragraph 7.2?

I spent nearly 10 years on the Intelligence and Security Committee, and think I am asking responsible questions, but I would understand if the Minister could not immediately offer an answer or felt that she had to give me a reason why she could not give an answer.

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[Baroness Buscombe]

I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to the debate on this Motion. First, I turn to the noble Lord, Lord Jones, although it is with some trepidation because I am a little afraid of trying to pronounce the names of the stations he referenced: Wylfa and Trawsfynydd—that is my attempt.

[Lord Jones]

Splendid!

[Baroness Buscombe]

I thank the noble Lord for that. I welcome what he said about supporting jobs on those sites. He asked a number of questions, including about the number of people on those sites. I am not at liberty to say exactly how many people are employed. However, for example, the rank and description of the person described in paragraph 7.2 of the Explanatory Memorandum will be the holder of the nuclear site licence and this will vary by establishment.

The noble Lord also asked about personnel security. Nuclear sites must comply with personnel security vetting requirements and all workers in the sector must be cleared to a level commensurate to their required access to nuclear material and sensitive nuclear information. Given the noble Lord’s past experience in this area, he will appreciate that it is very difficult for me to give much detail on each site.

[Lord Jones]

If, on further thought, the Minister may be able with the assistance of her officials to write to me, I would not object to that.

[Baroness Buscombe]

Of course I would be happy to write, if I fail to provide the noble Lord with sufficient reassurance.

All staff have responsibility for ensuring effective security at civil nuclear sites. Having an effective security culture is, of course, very important. There will be a number of security-specific roles at civil nuclear establishments, and these vary depending on the site. All sites are subject to the same requirements and standards. In line with the graded approach, the level of security at each site will be determined by the nature of materials and equipment and the information held.

I welcome the very positive response from the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, to the measure and agree that it is non-contentious. He asked a number of questions, and I will deal first with Euratom. If he will allow me, I want to spend a few moments on this because it is important to be as clear as I can. Leaving Euratom is a result of the decision to leave the EU, as they are uniquely legally joined. However, the UK supports Euratom and will want to see continuity of co-operation and standards. We remain absolutely committed to the highest standards of nuclear safety, safeguards and support for the industry. Our aim is clear: we want to maintain our mutually successful civil nuclear co-operation with Euratom. The statutory regime for civil nuclear security is based solely on UK legislation. There are no Euratom or EU directives relating to nuclear security that the UK is required to comply with. In fact, the EU has no competence in relation to nuclear security. Euratom has no role in setting security standards, regulations or the inspection of security arrangements in the UK civil nuclear sector.

The Government do not comment on specific security or intelligence arrangements at individual sites. The most sensitive commissioned civil nuclear sites and transportations of nuclear materials in the UK are protected by the Civil Nuclear Constabulary. The CNC is a specialised, dedicated elite firearms force, with a Royal College of Policing firearms licence, charged with the protection of the most sensitive civil nuclear sites and nuclear materials in England, Scotland and Wales.

The noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, asked one other question about defence sites such as Aldermaston; indeed, it is a question I asked officials last week. The answer is categorically no, they are not subject to this SI and are not a part of these regulations. There is a separate regulatory regime that applies to defence sites. I hope I have been able to respond sufficiently fully.