Courts and Tribunals (Online Procedure) Bill [HL]

Lord Judge Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 10th June 2019 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Judge]

9: Clause 2, page 3, line 17, at end insert—
“( ) Regulations may only be made under this section with the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice.”

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, since Second Reading, when I argued in support of these amendments, I have had a meeting with the Minister and, notwithstanding his customary courtesy, I was unable to persuade him of the good sense of these amendments. Listening to his response to today’s debate, it is quite obvious that we cannot expect a Damascene conversion on his part, but did I detect the tiniest shining light—the dawning of a better understanding of why these amendments should be made? If I detected a light, it was only a faint one and I shall certainly not turn the lights off. If we are talking about dawns, nor shall I allow any clouds to obscure my meaning.

We have discussed the issues and I shall not go over those that have already been ventilated in our debate. Lord Justice Briggs’s report is admirable and I continue to support it, but it was a report directed to a small feature of the system of litigation. The Bill, as has been said but is worth repeating, has the potential to cover every single aspect of the administration of civil justice, every single aspect of the administration of family justice and the entire tribunal system. It is difficult to exaggerate the level of interference with the administration of justice in all the areas that the Bill would give to the Lord Chancellor. As I say, the issues have been addressed and I shall not repeat them, but I have heard the Minister say on a number of occasions, “It’s all right because there is the committee with a judicial involvement”. Indeed, in answer to an earlier debate, he pointed out the happy differences between this committee and the Family Procedure Rule Committee, the Civil Procedure Rule Committee and so on. But there are two that he did not grasp and they are the ones that matter.

This is a committee on which the judiciary will be in a minority and it is the first such committee. It will be a committee of which the majority of the members will be appointed by the Lord Chancellor. Let us pause and think about that. The majority will be appointed by the Lord Chancellor and presumably it will be for him to dismiss them if he disagrees with them. That is consistent with the pernicious modern tendency, which I have go on about before, of our being asked to vest greater powers in the Executive—in this case in one Minister. We have become inured to it and it is particularly incongruous in the context of the administration of justice, where, as a matter of constitutional necessity, everyone accepts that the powers should be separate.

Since the constitutional reforms made in the early 2000s, ultimate responsibility for the administration of justice is vested not in the Lord Chancellor or in any other Minister of the Crown, but in the office of the Lord Chief Justice, an office I had the privilege to hold. At the time, none of the judges was urging any such change; we did not want to get rid of the Lord Chancellor. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, was not the Lord Chancellor at that time, but we were very happy with who we had had and did have. It came as a complete surprise to the judiciary, therefore, but it has come, and the consequence is this: a reduction in the responsibilities of the Lord Chancellor for the administration of justice, and a significantly enhanced responsibility of the Lord Chief Justice. He is responsible for what happens in the court system, and that must be understood when we are contemplating this Bill.

With one important exception—important for a reason to which I shall come—under the Bill in its present form, in the discharge of his responsibility for the day-to-day running of the family courts, the civil courts and, to the extent that he has responsibility over the tribunal system, the tribunal courts, the Lord Chief Justice is granted what is pushed as a “privilege” to be consulted by the Lord Chancellor if the Lord Chancellor and his committee have any proposals for change. However much the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, may be frightened of what the Lord Chief Justice may say, a political Lord Chancellor disagreeing with the Lord Chief Justice can simply disregard whatever he may say. It would for years, no doubt, be done with appropriate courtesy—and I hope that, in years to come, it will always be done with appropriate courtesy—but there is no guarantee even of that. But pause here because, after these changes have been implemented, the responsibility if they fail to work will fall not on the Lord Chancellor but on the Lord Chief Justice—even if, when consulted, he or his predecessor argued against them. In those circumstances, limiting the role of the Lord Chief Justice to consultation is absurd.

The change in the relative responsibilities of the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice has been understood and acknowledged in earlier arrangements. Thus, for example, when the question arises of whether court proceedings in England and Wales may be televised—and, if so, which part of such proceedings may be televised and what damage there may be, if any, to the administration of justice depending on what proceedings are televised, or how the administration of justice may be advanced if part of the proceedings are televised—that decision is not vested exclusively in the Minister, who may after all have political reasons for his decision; it requires the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice. On disciplinary proceedings, if a judge has misbehaved or misconducted himself or herself, there is a requirement for concurrence between the holders of the two offices. What is more, the Bill itself, in Clause 6(2), recognises circumstances in which concurrence is appropriate. The amendments proposed to this and the remaining clauses are therefore entirely consistent with a provision in the Bill and with other provisions outside it.

Concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice, and where appropriate the Senior President of Tribunals, is necessary surely when an issue affects the administration of justice on a day-to-day basis. That is what the Bill is about: the administration of justice, day to day. Questions of how proceedings in whichever area of law may be conducted and how they may not; whether, and if so in what circumstances, they must be conducted digitally or on paper; whether and how the interests of litigants who are not proficient are upheld, as we discussed earlier—that is all part of the day-to-day requirement of what goes on in our courts. There is one final consideration, which always seems to me to matter hugely: whether the unsuccessful litigant leaves court satisfied, not of course with the result but with the idea and conviction that he or she has been heard and understood. “Even if the judge got it wrong, he listened to me”, seems a very important part of the administration of justice. These are all questions for the day-to-day search for justice.

In the context of the Bill, which proposes at some stage along the line of history to give wide powers to a Minister, consultation alone is a meaningless handout from the Executive to the judiciary. More importantly, alone it offers no sufficient protection to the citizen against inappropriate Executive interference with the administration of justice. I beg to move.

[Lord Garnier]

My Lords, in agreeing with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, given his anticipation of beneficial light emerging from the Front Bench, I caution him that, as so often happens in these matters—particularly when the Government are giving something away, such as consultation—the light at the end of the tunnel ends up being the light of the approaching train. I urge that we temper our enthusiasm for any blandishments from the Government—not that my noble and learned friend on the Front Bench would ever be guilty of offering anything as vulgar as a blandishment.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has made all the points that need to be made and has made them better than I possibly could. However, if one strips away the words “the Lord Chancellor” and replaces them with the words “Secretary of State”—and Clause 6(2) condescends to do that, because clearly the Lord Chancellor cannot agree with himself and has to agree with his schizophrenic self, the Secretary of State—and if one strips away the ancient legal title and office of Lord Chancellor, one finds that one is in fact dealing with a political Minister in a spending department at the Ministry of Justice and that he or she will be placed under all the pressures of both self-interest and Cabinet responsibility that go with being in a spending department. If it is inconvenient for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to allow the Secretary of State to agree with the Lord Chief Justice, he will disagree with the Lord Chief Justice. We should not be under any misunderstanding about that.

In the what must now be 20 years since the removal of the office of Lord Chancellor as head of the judiciary—and I am standing behind one of the finest exemplars of that office—with that position having now gone to the Lord Chief Justice, the metaphorical gap and indeed the actual distance between the law and Parliament has grown immeasurably. The understanding between the law and those who administer it and politicians has grown immeasurably. One only has to look at the record of some Secretaries of State for Justice who have succeeded my noble and learned friend and who do not have that intimate knowledge of the administration of justice to understand the difficulties and dangers that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, anticipates—and have happened already.

While I support the sensible policy behind the Bill, all kinds of little niggles pop up from time to time which will destroy its purpose. They will make it less beneficial for the public good than it would otherwise be, were the suggestions made in the previous debate by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and in this current debate by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, taken into account. As a supporter of the Bill and the Government, I urge them not to allow themselves to be swept down the river of consultation when the river of agreement is a much safer journey to take.

--- Later in debate ---

Amendments 9 and 12 would require the Lord Chancellor or Secretary of State to seek the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice when specifying proceedings which are to be subject to the Online Procedure Rules. I would go so far as to say that I am sympathetic to concerns from your Lordships about the nature of the proceedings which may become subject to the online procedure and the consequences that may have for the administration of justice. Therefore, I see there are grounds for distinguishing that case from those I have just mentioned. It is in these circumstances that, as I indicated earlier, I would be happy to discuss this matter further with noble Lords before Report. I appreciate the level of concern expressed about that point and wish to address it further with noble Lords with regard to the issue raised in the context of Amendments 9 and 12. However, I hope noble Lords will appreciate that I cannot go further on that matter at the Dispatch Box at this stage. In the present circumstances, I do not know whether that counts as a train, a nuclear explosion or a light at the end of the tunnel, but whatever analogy might be drawn, I invite noble Lords not to press their amendments at this stage.

[Lord Judge]

My Lords, I thank everyone who has taken part in this debate. It has been short, but it matters. Perhaps I may answer two points made by the Minister. First, the difference between this committee and the committees to which he referred is that there is a majority of judicial members on all of them, whereas this committee has a majority appointed by the Lord Chancellor. That is a huge difference.

Secondly, although Section 5 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 gives the Lord Chief Justice the right to send a letter to Parliament expressing his concerns, I am willing to tell the Committee that there were occasions when I felt like writing such a letter, but it seemed to me that the first thing such a letter would do was to enmesh the Lord Chief Justice in a political quarrel. If nothing else, I could have seen the Government looking after the Lord Chancellor’s interests and therefore objecting to the Lord Chief Justice’s letter. I could see some Oppositions trying to twist the Government’s tail, thinking that they would support the Lord Chief Justice. The whole idea of that was a sop, because the reality is that if you use your nuclear option, you do not just blow up everybody else; you blow up yourself and your own case.

Subject to those two matters, and to further discussion with the Minister, for the time being I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 9 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, this amendment would extend somewhat the involvement in the committee that the Lord Chancellor will appoint across the relevant professions and service. It seems sensible to reflect the breadth of the legal service and the legal community. It would not be hugely burdensome in numbers. It seems to make sense. I hope the Minister will feel able, if not today then subsequently, to accept that this would be desirable.

I do not think I need to elaborate. The amendments are clear enough about the intention and the numbers to be involved. I hope the Minister will at least look at this again and recognise that it is in the interests of the changes that are about to be made to accept these suggestions. I beg to move.

[Lord Judge]

I will make just one small comment. If the appointments of these additional people are in the hands of the Lord Chancellor, he will end up with a majority of six to two on the committee. If the amendments are to be pursued, I respectfully ask that the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice to the appointment should be required.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd]

With the utmost respect to my predecessor, it would be usual for a magistrate to be appointed by the Lord Chief Justice rather than the Lord Chancellor. That would slightly affect the majority, but otherwise I agree with the points made.