Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (Remedial) Order 2020

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Thursday 3rd September 2020 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook]

That the Grand Committee do consider the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (Remedial) Order 2020.

Relevant document: 4th Report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, I am afraid that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, is unable to be here so I am taking this order through on his behalf.

This draft order seeks to rectify an incompatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights identified by the Court of Appeal in the 2017 case of Jacqueline Smith v Lancashire Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust and others. This relates to limits on the categories of person eligible to receive an award of bereavement damages under Section 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976, which excludes a person who has cohabited with the deceased person for a period of at least two years immediately prior to the death.

The draft order was laid in Parliament on 12 February 2020 and was approved by the House of Commons on 15 June, so this debate represents the final stage in the parliamentary process, after which it will become law. As noble Lords will be aware, the terms of the Human Rights Act 1998 in relation to remedial orders require the order to be strictly focused on rectifying the incompatibility that has been identified; it cannot extend to addressing wider issues.

The bereavement damages award is set by the Lord Chancellor and is a fixed payment in acknowledgment of the grief caused by a wrongful death. The level of the award is currently £15,120, having recently been increased in line with inflation. The award is currently available to a limited number of people, including the wife, husband or civil partner of the deceased person.

Unlike civil damages generally, which are intended to compensate fully for the loss suffered, the bereavement damages award is, and was only ever intended to be, a token award payable to a limited category of people. When the award was first introduced in the Administration of Justice Act 1982, it was acknowledged by Parliament that it is impossible to quantify or provide adequate financial compensation for the grief felt at the loss of a loved one. Similarly, the limits on the categories of people able to claim are not intended to imply that people outside those groups would not be severely emotionally affected by the death in question.

The draft remedial order provides that a claimant who cohabited with the deceased person for a period of at least two years immediately prior to the death will be eligible to receive the bereavement damages award. In view of the fact that this is a fixed, token award, it is desirable for the system governing it to be as simple and straightforward as possible to avoid unnecessary complexity that would add to the cost of litigation and the potential for disputes.

In that context, we consider that it is reasonable to set a limit that objectively evidences a relationship of permanence and commitment and avoids the need for intrusive inquiries into the quality and durability of the relationship in individual cases. We believe that two years is an appropriate qualifying period. This period is already applied under Section 1 of the 1976 Act in relation to claims by cohabitants for dependency damages, and unnecessary complexity would arise in a claim involving both types of damages if different definitions were used.

In the very rare instances in which both a qualifying cohabitant and a spouse will be eligible—that is, in circumstances where the deceased was still married and not yet divorced or separated but had been in a cohabiting relationship for at least two years—the draft order provides for the award to be divided equally between the two eligible claimants. We consider that this is the fairest approach to adopt, given that it is desirable to avoid the potential for intrusive inquiries into the quality and durability of an eligible relationship or, in this particular situation, into the respective merits of the two claimants.

I am grateful to the Joint Committee on Human Rights for its scrutiny of this draft order. A remedial order is seldom used to correct incompatibilities in primary legislation with the European Convention on Human Rights. It is therefore right that each order be scrutinised carefully both to ensure compliance with the procedure laid down in the Human Rights Act 1998 and to ensure that the incompatibilities found by the courts are addressed.

The Government welcome the committee’s recommendation that Parliament approves the order and I hope that my comments have addressed the main points on which it has expressed concern in relation to the contents of the draft order. It remains our position that some of the issues raised by the committee go beyond the Court of Appeal’s ruling on incompatibility and are therefore beyond the scope of the order. I beg to move.