Renters’ Rights Bill

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Tuesday 15th July 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

87: Clause 41, page 58, line 4, leave out “on the balance of probabilities” and insert “beyond reasonable doubt”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, in conjunction with another amendment in the name of Lord Keen of Elie to clause 58, imposes a uniform standard of proof – beyond reasonable doubt – where the local housing authority imposes a financial penalty.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I begin by referring to my interests as recorded in the register. I add that I am the proprietor of properties in London that are the subject of tenancy agreements and are managed by an agent.

In this group we have Amendments 87 and 88 in similar terms. Amendment 87 deals with an issue in Clause 41. It concerns the right of a local authority association to impose financial penalties and the burden of proof on that authority in respect of those penalties. I seek your Lordships’ leave to put this into context. Clause 41, on page 58 of the Bill, provides that:

“A local housing authority may impose a financial penalty under this subsection on a person if satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the person has breached a requirement imposed by … regulations made under section 40”.


Clause 58, on page 90, refers to a local housing authority being able to

“impose a financial penalty under this subsection on a person if satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the person has breached the prohibition imposed by section 57”.

But in Clause 67, which can be found on page 109, we have the provision that:

“A local housing authority may impose a financial penalty on a person if satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the person has … breached regulations”.


It is again a regulatory offence, but with a significantly different burden of proof placed on the same local housing authority.

Clause 92, on page 126, provides that:

“A local housing authority may impose a financial penalty on a person if satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the person has … breached a requirement imposed by section 83(1), (2) or (3)”.


That, in turn, refers to certain regulatory requirements that may be imposed on landlords.

So where do we find ourselves? We find ourselves in a situation in which a local authority is to be empowered to impose financial sanctions on landlords for breaches of regulations and yet, depending on which regulation is referred to, the burden of proof shifts between “balance of probabilities” and “beyond reasonable doubt”. The first point I make is that there is clearly a need for some kind of uniform standard in this legislation. What on earth will a local authority do when faced with the prospect that there may be multiple breaches of regulations, but different standards of proof applied in respect of whether they can find a breach? It produces a nonsense result.

Indeed, in circumstances where a local housing authority is entitled to impose very serious financial penalties running into thousands of pounds for breaches of regulations, I suggest that it is only appropriate that the relevant standard of proof should be that in any criminal proceedings—namely, “beyond reasonable doubt”. Otherwise, there is not only the risk of confusion, because of the different standards applied between different regulations in the legislation, but the very real risk of wrongful penalties being imposed in circumstances where a local housing authority thinks, “There may have been a breach of regulations—it’s in the balance, but we think there probably is—so we’ll fine them £7,000”. On the next alleged breach of regulation, they would say, “It’s in the balance, so we can’t possibly impose any kind of financial penalty”. It really is a nonsense.

It also, I respectfully suggest, raises a question of fairness and proportionality. Is it truly fair that we should have one set of regulations that can be met by way of a breach “on balance” and another that requires a proper standard of proof—namely, “beyond reasonable doubt”? It will also place pressure on local housing associations and their resources. Are they really equipped to distinguish between those two standards of proof for different sets of regulations?

Amendment 87 would amend the reference in Clause 41 to a housing association proceeding on the “balance of probabilities” and substitute the requirement for the standard to be “beyond reasonable doubt”. In Amendment 88 I seek to make the same amendment in order that Clauses 41 and 58, about the powers of a housing association and breaches of regulation, are simply brought into line with the provisions of Clauses 67 and 92 of the same Bill. I beg to move.

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[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

I am obliged to noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. I make a number of observations. First, I sympathise with the observations made by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, about the conduct of those she identifies as criminal landlords. But before someone should be stigmatised and identified as a criminal, they should be guilty of an offence that leads to them being stigmatised as a criminal. That should not be done on a balance of probabilities.

The relevant standard of proof in regard to criminality is “beyond reasonable doubt”. Indeed, where there is uncertainty about whether conduct is civil or criminal—a point brought up by the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell—it is important to ensure either that you can make that clear distinction, or that you understand that the relevant standard of proof must be that which is fair to both parties.

I have to disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill, when she suggests that, where it is difficult to prove a case, you should reduce the burden of proof. The consequences of that, if developed, are very wide-ranging indeed. We know that there are many areas of criminal prosecution where it is extremely difficult to secure a conviction, but no one would suggest that it is appropriate in these circumstances simply to reduce the burden of proof.

[Baroness Thornhill (LD)]

Given that we are not talking about criminal offences—we are talking about civil offences—and given the power imbalance between a landlord and a tenant, will the noble and learned Lord at least accept that by lowering the burden of proof we would allow the tenant to feel that they might have a voice and could possibly bring something? Otherwise, his amendment is, in effect, saying, “Well, just don’t bother. The burden of proof is too high, so please carry on with your poor behaviour”. This is civil conduct and behaviour.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

I do not accept the proposition advanced by the noble Baroness at all. In circumstances where you are going to stigmatise somebody’s conduct as criminal, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, pointed out, it is appropriate that there should be a relevant standard of proof. You are not taking away anyone’s voice in that context.

I come on briefly to deal with the helpful contributions from the Minister and in particular welcome her observation that inconsistency in legislation undermines a regime’s credibility. That is very much in point here, because I cannot accept as accurate her suggestion that you can distinguish the provisions in Clauses 41 and 58 from later provisions of the Bill on the basis that the latter lead to greater jeopardy and, as she put it, could result in a criminal offence. I merely remind noble Lords of what Clauses 67 and 92 actually say. Clause 67 says:

“A local housing authority may impose a financial penalty on a person if satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the person has … breached regulations under section 65(1)”—


that is not a criminal offence; it is a breach of civil regulations. Clause 92 says:

“A local housing authority may impose a financial penalty on a person if satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the person has … breached a requirement imposed by section 83(1), (2) or (3)”.


That is not a criminal offence. Again, what is being underlined here is the very point that the Minister wanted to avoid: the inconsistency in the legislation which is liable to undermine the regime’s credibility. It appears to me that there is a need, if nothing else, for consistency with regard to the obligations imposed by this series of provisions and regulations. I would therefore move to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 87.

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Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

88: Clause 58, page 90, line 33, leave out “on the balance of probabilities” and insert “beyond reasonable doubt”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, in conjunction with another amendment in the name of Lord Keen of Elie name to clause 41, imposes a uniform standard of proof – beyond reasonable doubt – where the local housing authority imposes a financial penalty.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

89: Clause 59, page 92, line 18, leave out “£40,000” and insert “£7,000”
Member’s explanatory statement
This limits the local housing authority’s power to impose a financial penalty to £7,000.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 89 is to Clause 59 and addresses the question of the penalty proposed in that provision, which is £40,000. Under the amendment, that would revert to the same level of penalty for other provisions in the Bill of £7,000, on the basis that £40,000 is simply excessive.

If we are to have enforcement regarding the various provisions in the Bill, consistency and uniformity are to be welcomed. In the context of a regulatory obligation as contained in Clause 59, it is appropriate that the level of penalty should be £7,000. I beg to move.

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The maximum penalties—again, I stress that these are maximums—of £7,000 for less serious breaches and £40,000 for more serious offences apply across the provisions in the Bill. Having a lower penalty regime for non-compliance with the database requirements would reduce the deterrent effect and send the wrong message. It would run counter to our aims for a consistent, robust and proportionate enforcement system for the whole private rented sector. That is not fair on tenants and it is not fair on good landlords either. So, for the reasons I have set out, I ask kindly that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, considers withdrawing his amendment.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I am obliged to all who have contributed to this aspect of the debate, and to the Minister for her explanation. On the financial provisions and our pursuant Amendments 89, 92 and 101, I will not insist on those amendments. I comment merely that, in my noble friend’s Amendments 98 and 99, it appears to be conceded that what is being addressed is persistent offences by particular rogue landlords. Therefore, it appears to me that the use of that term in the context of Clause 92 would be appropriate. I withdraw Amendment 89.

Amendment 89 withdrawn.