European Union Bill

Lord Liddle Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd May 2011 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Liddle]

21: Page 3, line 43, leave out subsection (3)

[Lord Liddle]

My Lords, I readily confess that in the annals of arcaneness this is a very arcane subject for an amendment but it is not the fault of noble Lords on this side of the Committee. The fact is that this is an extremely arcane Bill with provisions of mind-boggling complexity. Therefore, if we are to address it with proper scrutiny we will inevitably end up moving arcane amendments.

In simple terms the purpose of Ministers is, we have been told in this legislation, to detail every possible transfer of power to Brussels and bind it in the form of some indestructible referendum lock, which will last at least for this Parliament and probably a long way beyond. Their argument is that this is necessary to restore public trust in the European Union. This proposition is made without any real evidence being offered that this is an effective means of restoring trust in Europe. I could argue with equal force that a more effective European Union would be a better way to address this problem. In making the argument that we need these multiple referenda, the Government are launching the greatest attack on the sovereignty of Parliament that we have seen in recent times. The noble Lord, Lord Stoddart, argues that those of us on this side of the Committee who find the multiple referenda proposed in the Bill objectionable do so because we are frightened of losing. We are not frightened of losing but we stand for parliamentary sovereignty and representative democracy, and this Bill is a denial of those principles.

The second point is that the situation in which this Government intend to put their Ministers is profoundly against the national interest in dealings in the European Union, because it denies Ministers the pragmatic flexibility to agree to passerelles in the Lisbon treaty or to small changes which will enable Europe to be more effective and to win back that trust. The consequence will be not to stop things happening but that the rest of the European Union, if it thinks the issue sufficiently important, will go ahead without Britain being involved. For good reason or ill, the United Kingdom is already out of the euro and out of Schengen. We on this side of the Committee believe that the consequence of the Bill will be to put us out of virtually all areas of expanding EU activity. It will marginalise Britain in Europe and deny the British Government the power to tackle problems that the nation state on its own cannot tackle. This is not just a matter of applying a lock to change; it is also throwing away the key.

On previous days in Committee, we have argued that this extreme position that the Government have adopted on the referendum lock can at least be modified in a number of ways. In our previous day in Committee, we argued from this side that where changes need to be made on grounds of urgency they should be permitted. We also argued that the significance test, which is included in the Bill and which allows Ministers to decide that—

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

I certainly do not want to make a habit of too many interruptions, as we all know that debate in this place goes more smoothly without, but the noble Lord has made a number of statements which jar so strongly with the reality that I have to ask him what he means by them. He says that the passerelle and other arrangements in the Lisbon treaty would enable rapid changes to be made but we all know that any treaty, including the one now going through, takes 21 months. How can 21 months possibly be described as rapid? Furthermore, he seems to assume that the efficient and effective operation of the European Union demands all kinds of new treaties and to ignore the fact that within the vast range of competences that it has, a great deal can, must and will be done. Countries throughout the European Union are extremely reluctant to embark upon the complex, long process of European treaty change. These are all facts and they contrast completely with what the noble Lord has said in the past five minutes.

[Lord Liddle]

The Minister has misunderstood what I have been trying to say. I apologise to the Committee if I have been giving a false impression but this amendment’s subject encapsulates fully the point that I am trying to make. What concerns us is: why tie up all the flexibilities that are within the existing, ratified structure of the Lisbon treaty, which were discussed in this House in the previous Parliament? Why tie all of those up in referendum locks that could have a very negative effect on Britain's power to act in its own interests within the European Union? That is the point and this amendment looks at one of those specific and unnecessary locks. Let me try and explain its point.

Clause 4(1)(m), which we debated last week, requires an automatic referendum if any amendment is moved to the Lisbon treaty, as it could be within the terms of that treaty, to alter the right of member states to ensure suspension of the legislative procedure. In Euro-speak, this is called the emergency brake and covers three areas of EU activity: social security, judicial co-operation and cross-border crime. It is the right of a member state to refer a matter where legislation is proposed in those areas to the European Council before the legislation can proceed any further. Britain supported emergency brakes in these areas in the passage of the Lisbon treaty. It did so because the previous Government thought that as regards social security, judicial co-operation and cross-border crime there might well be an argument in principle for more Europe. Indeed, there were compelling arguments for more Europe in this area but as a safeguard, just in case we did not like the look of the way things were going, we wanted to see how it worked. Therefore there was a need for an emergency brake.

The logic of this very pragmatic position is that if we find in future years that the European Community is doing a good job in these fields, we will be prepared to rid ourselves of that emergency brake provision. Those who are disposed by nature to see everything that the EU does as a threat will never believe that anything can work, but those of us who think that it can be an opportunity should be open-minded about the possibility of the changes that are provided for in the Lisbon treaty.

I argue that these three areas are issues that are not of the highest national importance, like whether we join the euro, but are of significant importance where change might be necessary in processes that the Government might want to agree to. However, the Bill will require an automatic referendum. Look at them: first, social security legislation, which, as we know, is tied up with the right to work, study, and settle for retirement wherever you want in the EU, which is one of its most appealing citizenship rights; secondly, judicial co-operation, which is essential if we are going to effectively tackle the terrorist threats of the kind that the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, talked about earlier in his Statement on Osama bin Laden; and thirdly, cross-border crime, in terms of which we are all aware of the increasing problems of criminal gangs operated from outside the EU but often on its borders, in countries like Russia and some parts of the Balkans.

Surely we want to retain the flexibility to make Europe effective in those areas. That may require changes in these so-called emergency-brake provisions but, on a narrow but significant point, the Government are saying, “Oh no, we can’t do anything for at least seven years or so because we have to have a referendum and we are certainly not going to do anything about that this Parliament”. The argument from this side of the House is a different one: let us not tie ourselves up in these knots but have the confidence that in a representative democracy Parliament should deal with these questions; there is no place for a referendum on them.

[Lord Blackwell]

My Lords, I must apologise to the House and the Minister for having been unable to contribute to the debate on the Bill so far. I feel compelled to contribute at this point by the extraordinary speech of the noble Lord, Lord Liddle.

When the Government of the day brought the Lisbon treaty to this House, one of their proud claims was that they had protected the red lines that they had set out, including the red lines on areas such as social security and judicial co-operation, through the introduction of these emergency brakes. If legislation was brought forward in the European Union that was seen to be against our national interest in these areas, or against things that we could tolerate, we had the right to say, “We will not go along with this. We don’t think this should be applied to the UK”. Effectively, we have a veto. The other member states can proceed without us if they wish, but it gives us a cast-iron guarantee that in these very sensitive areas the EU cannot override the UK Parliament and the UK people in legislating in what are regarded as areas of national importance. For the noble Lord to say that we should now throw these emergency brakes away—

[Lord Liddle]

I am not saying that at all. I am saying that we should not tie ourselves up indefinitely in the need to have a referendum to make this change. That does not mean that I am in favour of immediate change in these things; I am not. But I want to hold open the possibility of flexibility in order that we can meet new circumstances if necessary.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

I was not aware that any of these clauses in any way undermined the Lisbon treaty. The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, who was much involved in the EU convention, is not here. Those of us who have read, as I have, a certain amount on the EU convention and the Lisbon treaty, which followed it, are well aware that the clauses on the emergency brake and passerelle were agreed after hard negotiations, in which it was not the United Kingdom versus all the others. Several member Governments in this now rather large and complex European Union wanted some reassurance that, as they touched on such sensitive areas as national sovereignty, law, finance and welfare provision—some of the issues covered by these emergency brake provisions—they would have, at the back, the ability to say, “No, we are not happy with what is proceeding”. That is what the emergency brake is about. It is not the case that Britain stands alone against 26 other member states that are determined to integrate further and sweep more powers into Brussels.

The United Kingdom and several others are pushing for further co-operation in a range of areas. Coalitions across the European Union differ according to each subject on which we negotiate. The noble Lord, Lord Liddle, knows better than me what it looks like once you are inside government. The emergency brakes are there to reassure member states—their public and their Governments—and those who care not just about the peculiarities of English criminal law and justice but about those of Polish and Romanian criminal law and justice. I have read what the then Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, said about this when he gave evidence to the House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee on the Lisbon treaty. He said that the Government hoped that the emergency brake would never have to be used, but that it was there as a reassurance to national Governments. I emphasise “Governments”; this was not just about the British.

Jack Straw went on to say to the House of Lords European Union Committee:

“So it is an additional protection and I think really rather an important one”.

Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, drafted this. Jack Straw then said:

“Again, it is quite a paradoxical point but I think the effect of it may be to provide greater confidence to British Government to get involved in opting into instruments, which is actually in principle what we want to do, and having done that then some additional surety which will get a satisfactory answer so that we do not have to apply the emergency brake”.

The noble Lord, Lord Liddle, said that sometimes the arguments around all this are arcane and of mind-boggling complexity. That sentence was not the easiest to read. However, the whole purpose of the emergency brakes is precisely to reassure national Governments on sensitive issues. It is not intended that they should be regularly used. It is highly unlikely that any Government will wish to remove them in the foreseeable future. Therefore, I suggest humbly that this amendment is one of the least useful that we have to consider.

[Lord Liddle]

I think the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, is trying to distort the position that I have put forward. I am not in favour of removing the emergency brakes. I am saying that the flexibility is there in the Lisbon treaty to do this. Those of us who have doubts about the Government’s Bill are saying that since this flexibility could be exercised only by Act of Parliament, why does it have to be done through a referendum? That is fundamentally the point. We heard the argument about what the former Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, said about the Lisbon treaty late at night in the previous session of the Committee. The point is that David Miliband recommended the Lisbon treaty to the other place on the basis of the flexibilities that it contains. However, the problem with the Bill is that it tries to tie up all those flexibilities with its wretched referendum lock.

The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, is trying to cover up the fact that his party is allowing the Conservative Party a second bite at the cherry on the referendum on the Lisbon treaty that it failed to secure. That is what much of the Bill is about. It is to my great regret that the British party that has been the strongest supporter of Britain’s membership of the European Union has gone along with what the Conservatives are asking for in this case. They are after a re-run of Lisbon. The amendments that we on this side of the Committee have put forward say, “Let us take the Lisbon treaty as it is and accept that the flexibilities within it do not require referenda”.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

It is my great regret that for 13 years under the previous Labour Government the balance of public opinion in this country became steadily more sceptical about the European Union and that the Government of Tony Blair and then of Gordon Brown failed to make a positive case for European Union engagement. That has left us with a very sceptical public and a deeply sceptical and antagonistic press. That is the problem with which this Bill deals. It is another problem that we have inherited from a succession of previous Governments. The noble Lord, Lord Liddle, might well have tried to do something about that at the time from inside government, but unfortunately he did not succeed.

[Lord Liddle]

We can have academic debates about these questions in other places, and I do not want to delay the Committee. However, on the facts, there has been no great swing of British public opinion against the European Union over the past 15 years or so. It has fluctuated with circumstances over time. The Eurosceptic press was not created by the previous Government; unfortunately, it has been with us for a lot longer than that.

We on this side fundamentally object to the idea that plebiscitary democracy is the way to restore public trust. I am surprised that the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, is going along with this. I do not know what the noble Lord’s views are on the current referendum campaign, but there does not seem to be a high quality of public debate on referenda, given the way in which some of the people involved in the referendum campaign have argued that we are missing out by not having these issues decided in Parliament, where there would at least be a more balanced consideration of them.

I will, of course, withdraw this amendment. However, we on this side have moved several amendments on these lines, and we see no give whatever on the Government’s part. On subsequent Committee days I will refer to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Williamson, to which the Government must face up: namely, if they think that something has to be done in the national interest, would it still require a referendum, and what would be their position on that? That question is highly relevant.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

What sort of policy proposals would the noble Lord want the emergency brake lifted for? Given that the emergency brake is there purely as a defensive mechanism, to be used rarely on occasions of national interest as a negative power, what circumstances can he envisage in which he would want to get rid of it? In all the areas that he has mentioned on which there might be co-operation, we can agree to co-operate anyway.

[Lord Liddle]

The noble Lord is right, of course, but it seems to me that on judicial co-operation, for instance, we had established the confidence that the former Foreign Secretary Jack Straw talked about and that Europe was important and effective in these areas. We might wish at some stage—I am not saying that we would but we might—to see some change in the processes. After all, it might be not only us who want to apply the emergency brake. Other member states might wish to do so, and that might be detrimental to the possibility of getting agreement on these questions. If we look back to Maastricht, we see that justice and home affairs were included in the European treaties for the first time on the basis of unanimity. However, by the time we got round to Lisbon there was an overwhelming consensus among member states that these matters should not be in a separate pillar but should be part of the main business of the Community, and that in the vast majority of cases there should be majority voting. Opinions change in the light of circumstances. Therefore, why should we tie ourselves up in referenda?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Liddle]

The noble Baroness comes to my aid and makes good points, for which I thank her. I shall withdraw the amendment, but the Government should think hard about flexibility in the Bill. At the moment it is profoundly damaging to the British national interest because it gives our Ministers no flexibility whatever in their dealings with the European Union.

Amendment 21 withdrawn.