European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Lisvane Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 21st February 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lisvane (CB)]

My Lords, almost exactly 44 years ago I was in Strasbourg as one of the secretaries of the British delegation to the European Parliament, at the first session of the Parliament that had the United Kingdom as a member state. Bringing up the century as the 100th contributor in this unprecedentedly long list of speakers may have a certain symmetry about it, but it is in no way an outcome that I wished for when I cast my vote on 23 June last year.

Over the years, I have spent a good deal of time on the relationship between this Parliament and European institutions. I devised the protocol on the role of national parliaments which was appended to the Amsterdam treaty, thanks to its enthusiastic endorsement by the highly effective then Minister for Europe during a UK presidency, someone for whom I had and continue to have great regard—and who by one of life’s little ironies is now the Secretary of State for Exiting the EU.

As many noble Lords have said, this is a refreshingly short Bill, but I am a little puzzled by the catch-all provision in subsection (2) of Clause 1. Is it simply an insurance policy—an attempt to avoid an “Oh crikey” moment within Government when some inconvenient provision of legislation is unearthed? Or do the drafters have something particular in mind—something which might be found to be at odds with the main provision of the Bill? It is as well to recall the old rule of legislative drafting: if you do not specify the target at which you are aiming, the courts may not agree that you have hit it. I am also looking forward keenly to the Government’s response to the magisterial intervention of my noble and learned friend Lord Hope of Craighead about what further legislative authority may be required. No doubt there will need to be a ratification of the exit treaty according to the CRAG 2010 procedure, but if prior approval of the terms of that exit requires legislation, that would of course add a new dimension. How practical any choice would be as the clock ticks towards the end of two years is another matter entirely.

The noble Lord, Lord Boswell of Aynho, and others, have spoken about parliamentary scrutiny of the negotiations as they proceed. My particular concern is about the legislative process that will follow, and of which the Bill now before us is a precursor. Chapter 1 of the White Paper says that the great repeal Bill will repeal the ECA 1972, preserve EU law where it stands at the moment we leave the EU, and where necessary make changes to allow that law to function sensibly. There will be a triage process where this Parliament and the devolved legislatures will,

“be able to decide which elements of that law to keep, amend or repeal”.

In the referendum campaign we heard a lot about regaining our parliamentary sovereignty; perhaps it is a little ironic that we have had in the first instance to rely upon the assistance of the courts. However, it would be even more ironic if the legislative process of withdrawal involved a major transfer of power to the Executive.

The extent of delegation of powers to Ministers, and the level of parliamentary scrutiny, will be crucial. One test, and it would be a strict one, could of course be that secondary legislation must be “necessary” to allow EU law to function sensibly, and to reflect the outcome of negotiations. However, if the test is merely that that subordinate legislation should be “expedient” then that allows a much greater degree of ministerial discretion. The means of scrutiny will be key. Although super-affirmative instruments allow in-depth scrutiny, Governments are quite allergic to them, and I doubt whether Ministers would be attracted by a surge of super-affirmatives. Perhaps some bespoke process might be devised—the issues are certainly substantial enough to warrant it—and I look forward to the conclusions of the Constitution Committee on this aspect.

I will conclude with two other thoughts. The first is on timing. There is a temptation to think that policy areas will come forward one by one to be tied up in neat parcels and dealt with by whatever legislative or scrutiny process is in place, but that is not the way that negotiations proceed in practice. A deal in one area may depend on reaching agreement on a wholly unrelated issue elsewhere. The practical effect of all this will probably be to move everything to the right, and only late in the two-year process will there be something to bite on in legislative terms.

It is welcome that the White Paper states in paragraph 1.8 that,

“any significant policy changes will be underpinned by other primary legislation”.

Here again, however, the pressure of time may be the problem. The process will, in any case, be a business management nightmare and the temptation to proceed by skeleton Bills will be powerful. That will pose real questions about parliamentary accountability.

Whatever means are found to scrutinise and authorise the process, I hope that it will involve people outside government, Parliament and the devolved legislatures. The changes in prospect will have profound effects on the lives and livelihoods of the people of this country, and Parliament has some ground to make up. Evidence-based scrutiny is the best sort, and this should be an opportunity to allow access to the process to those who will be directly affected, rather than have them simply as onlookers of a private conversation between Parliament and the Executive.

Noble Lords might feel that I have strayed a little from the Bill before us, but I would suggest not. The Bill would trigger notification, but it would also start us on what will be an extraordinary challenging time for Parliament. Now is the time to think seriously about how we meet that challenge.

European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Lisvane Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 1st March 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Higgins (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 17 is tremendously important because it seeks to assert that the decisions on these matters should be taken by Parliament. I have great difficulty understanding why the Prime Minister and, apparently, the Government have seemed so determined to avoid that happening, to the extent of bringing a totally unnecessary court case. They could have gone back right from the start on the procedure we are now going through at considerable public expense. Against that background, it is very important that we should get this amendment right. We must have an awful lot of thought between now and next week to ensure that the amendment we actually pass is the right amendment.

The other point that one needs to take into account is the situation likely to arise towards the conclusion of the negotiations. It seems to me essential that Parliament should decide whether it does or does not accept those negotiations. The difficulty is that if no deal is reached, the whole deal is off and we are back to the situation before we joined the European Union. The interesting question is: if the deal is clearly worse than remaining in the European Union, what happens then? At that point, Parliament needs to consider whether it has accepted the result of the referendum. If it has done everything possible to bring it about but now finds itself in the situation where it is blatantly obvious that the deal is worse than remaining in, it ought to make that decision. Those who voted in the referendum in favour of leaving should realise that that is a sensible solution for us to adopt.

There is one further point that we need to consider before next week and we will need to read very carefully everything that has been said this evening. We may find at the end of negotiations that we would like to change our minds and it would be better to go back to the situation before the referendum. A committee of your Lordships’ House dealt with that issue very clearly having taken expert advice from, I am assured, some very good lawyers, who said that we could change our minds. That possibility was disputed by a number of other lawyers, not least international lawyers. It would be extremely helpful if we could have a definitive view from the Government next week on what the situation is.

We have a lot of work ahead of us for the next few days, but this has been an immensely helpful debate. There is a problem with proposed new subsection (4) of the amendment. I interpreted that as being enormously pro-Brexit. It states that Ministers are not allowed to stop the arrangements if they want to. Having said all that, it has been helpful to have this debate this evening and I look forward to hearing my noble friend Lord Hailsham, who was kind enough to give way to let me speak before him.

[Lord Lisvane (CB)]

My Lords, I hope that the noble Viscount will be kind enough to allow me to interpose very briefly. I support the thrust of Amendment 17 and certainly the aim that it seeks to achieve, but I have a couple of questions about the mechanisms that it proposes to do that. It proposes proceeding by resolution of each House. There are two issues. First, what happens if a straightforward approval Motion is amended and the final result is a resolution that overall approves an outcome but contains some sort of rider or condition? Regulating parliamentary proceedings by statute, in my experience, generally ends in some sort of tears. A question of whether the outcome met the requirements of the legislation could be resolved only by the courts, and that might not be a welcome result.

Secondly, what happens if one House comes to the required resolution but the other does not? Perhaps the solution is one that would endorse the sage advice given earlier by my noble and learned friend Lord Hope of Craighead which is to employ primary legislation, because that contains very well-understood mechanisms for securing agreement between the two Houses.

[Viscount Hailsham]

My Lords, I know the hour is late so I will be very short; I will confine myself to making three points. The first is to adopt the language of my noble friend Lord Deben. This House must recognise that, ultimately, the decision has to be made by Parliament. Historically, there has always been tension between the Executive and Parliament and I happen to be a Roundhead on this matter. Let us not forget, as my noble friend pointed out, that we would not be debating this Bill had the courts not intervened. The truth is that Governments always seek to advance ministerial power at the expense of Parliament and we must push back. The historians among us will remember John Dunning saying that,

“the influence of the crown has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished”,

and, with suitable alteration, that is where I stand.

My second point refers to what the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, said a propos the risk of there being no agreement. The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, assessed that risk as being higher than 30% and I entirely share that view. We need to address that in statutory language. That is what I tried to achieve in the new clause that would be introduced by my Amendment 32.

My final point, turning to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—I know it is the view of the noble Baroness as well—is that assurances are well and good and I do not at all doubt the good faith of the Ministers who give them. But I prefer to see assurances in statutory language. Prime Ministers can go, Ministers can be sacked, Parliaments can change and Governments can cease to exist. One needs to enshrine assurances that stand against those changes in circumstances. Therefore, whenever we come to divide on this group of amendments, whichever is chosen, I shall support it because I stand in favour of parliamentary government.

European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Lisvane Excerpts

Report stage (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Tuesday 7th March 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Deech (CB)]

My Lords—

[Lord Lisvane (CB)]

My Lords—

[Noble Lords]

Lisvane!

[Lord Lisvane]

My Lords, I am extremely grateful to my noble friend; no doubt she will have her opportunity in a moment. After more than four decades in which I sought to make the most modest of modest contributions to parliamentary effectiveness and reputation, I hope that my credentials as an advocate of parliamentary sovereignty will not be challenged. I am very grateful to my noble friend Lord Pannick not only for his kind words but also for his recasting of Amendment 3. I agree with him that, if this amendment were to be agreed, the means of approval would be in the hands of the Government. So I hope that he and noble Lords will forgive me if I repeat some of the issues that, in that case, the Government should have in mind.

So far, ministerial language has been in terms of “a vote” and “a Motion”. That rather suggests proceeding by resolution—and, if so, the concerns I expressed in Committee are unallayed. What happens if one House votes one way and the other House votes the other way? Does qualified approval, perhaps with a conditional rider, count as approval? Would it be acceptable in those circumstances to give this House an effective veto over the process?

If, on the other hand, primary legislation is contemplated, the issue of interpreting some sort of qualified approval, or the terms of approval, remains. Even in the unloved Fixed-term Parliaments Act, specific wording for a Motion of confidence or no confidence was inserted to avoid the possibility of recourse to the courts. In matters of the present gravity, recourse to the courts would be even more unwelcome. My father had a ghastly warning about the dangers of overspecification in legislation. He quoted what was alleged to have been a rule at Heidelberg University, which stated: “No one shall tie anything, whether a nightwatchman or not a nightwatchman, to anything, whether a lightning conductor or not a lightning conductor, at any time, whether or not during a thunderstorm”. I do not ask for that degree of specification—but, if primary legislation is contemplated, the terms of approval need to be considered very carefully indeed.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I am genuinely torn on how to vote on this amendment and turn to my noble and very able friend the Minister to guide me in this respect. I listened very carefully to all the speakers this afternoon, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, who I think comes at this with the same approach that I do. These amendments seem based to me on a very simple proposition, which is that rights given to British subjects by statute can be removed only by statute.

Of the two alternatives available, particularly in Amendment 3, which I am tempted and minded to support—a resolution to be passed by both Houses or a Bill to be passed by both Houses—the amendment neatly leaves it to the Government to determine the means to choose. I would like to know—and I seek guidance from the Minister and very powerful arguments against—why it would not be appropriate to include the amendment here on the face of the Bill. I say this because this is the last procedural stage before we embark on the substance. We are told that there will not be just the great repeal Bill but a number of substantive primary pieces of legislation as well as, no doubt, multiple pieces of secondary legislation to repeal some of the acquis that we might wish no longer to apply.

Why is it important to write it on the face of the Bill? It is for so many reasons: times change; politics change and personalities change. We are being asked to take an awful lot on trust here, both in terms of a commitment from the Government and in terms of a commitment given on the Floor of the House of Commons that Parliament and the Government would hope to follow through. Surely it is only right and proper that it should be put on the face of the Bill.

I remind the House that we spent about two hours and 30 minutes talking about the rights of EU nationals going forward. If the referendum had been held on the same terms as the European Parliament elections, all the EU nationals living here for the required length of time would have been able to vote. As I understand it from memory, an amendment passed in this House deprived those 1 million EU nationals living in this country of the right to vote. In fact, that 1 million number could have changed the outcome of the referendum overnight.

I refer to the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, in summing up on Second Reading. He expressed to the Government, in a helpful way, that the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller went further than just this Bill before us today, which embarks on the negotiation procedure. A majority of the House would not wish to stand in the way of the triggering of the process. By the same token, the noble and learned Lord went on to say, in respect to not writing into the face of the Bill—I do not want to press him too hard, but I think that the noble and learned Lord was saying the same—that,

“obtaining approval by resolution in Parliament is not the same thing as being given statutory authority”.

That is why he cautioned the Government against thinking that this Bill before the House today,

“on its own will give them all the authority they need, or that obtaining approval for an agreement by resolution is the same thing as being given statutory authority to conclude that agreement”.—[Official Report, 20/2/17; col. 23.]

I will refer also to an article written by five eminent QCs, including three knights, who gave their opinion on the matter and stated:

“Meaningful Parliamentary decision-making cannot be achieved by Parliament authorising exit from the European Union, two years in advance, on as yet unknown terms. Equally, it cannot be achieved by a single ‘take it or leave it’ vote at the end of the process”.


The article argues very straightforwardly:

“The constitutional requirements for a decision by the United Kingdom to leave the European Union include the enactment of primary legislation consenting to give legal effect to the terms of a withdrawal agreement between the United Kingdom and the European Union”.


Therefore, rather than being a wrecking amendment, I see this amendment as being potentially helpful to the Government, responding to a situation that we found ourselves in, having now lost three to six months through a court case and then an appeal, by writing on to the face of the Bill that Parliament—these two Houses —will have the final say. It will be of the Government’s choosing what the mechanism will be—whether a resolution of both Houses or an Act of Parliament. Otherwise, there will be a complete lack of clarity over what remaining rights already extended to British subjects can continue to be relied on. I will go further and say that, when we come to the great repeal Bill, there will be a complete lack of clarity over the court on which we should rely to make sure that those outstanding rights can be enforced.