Russia

Lord Moynihan Excerpts

Thursday 16th October 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Moynihan (Con)]

My Lords, on two occasions in my career I have been involved in British foreign policy, as a political adviser in 1982 to the then Foreign Secretary Francis Pym, and then as foreign affairs spokesman in your Lordships’ House—prior to the outstanding work undertaken by my noble friend Lord Howell of Guildford, with whom I am in strong agreement today—where for years the noble Baronesses, Lady Symons and Lady Williams, and I sparred and reflected on the need to offer sound advice and effective stewardship to those in Russia seeking to undertake an economic revolution; prevent the lurching to and fro between revanchist politics; and alleviate the threat of civil war in 1993 and the chaos of monetary, military and economic relations among the successor states of the Soviet empire. As Professor Sachs reflected on the early years after the ending of the Soviet era,

“the West did almost nothing to affect the outcomes for democracy and market reforms in Russia, despite all the high-minded rhetoric to the contrary”.

From the power vacuum that Vladimir Putin experienced as an insider at the early stages of his political career, the Russian people have sought political resurrection through strong leadership, “a strong hand”, always aware that deeply embedded in the Russian DNA was a growing link between a yearning for nationalism and an awareness of what they perceived as the historical injustice to the sizeable Russian-speaking minorities in the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, especially in the other major Slav state, Ukraine, and in Crimea.

Like the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, I believe that it is only by wiping the fog off the history lens that we can identify the building blocks to design a foreign policy towards Russia to counter perceived Russian aggression to the outside world and resurgent domestic nationalism. This pragmatic foreign policy should be equally beneficial to Russia and the successor states of the Soviet empire. On the one hand, such a policy should consistently reflect our belief in human rights, the rule of law, parliamentary democracy and democratic institutions. In so doing, we should never lose sight of recognising that, despite the Russia/Ukraine history, where the borders frequently changed in the 20th century, this House today rightly believes that international law should never be ignored, borders must not be changed by force and countries under the rule of law must be entitled to make their own choices.

So, the questions that we need to answer are as follows. Are the steps that we are taking now likely to achieve the goal of a new Ukraine that is acceptable equally to its people and to the interests of Russia and of the West? Is there a direct correlation between strengthening sanctions and the likelihood that Russia will withdraw support from eastern Ukraine? I am unconvinced that the current approach will necessarily succeed. If I am right, we need to be absolutely sure that our actions will not succumb to the law of unintended consequences. What is important is the need to explore a foreign policy based on compartmentalisation.

Let me briefly explain what I mean by compartmentalising our approach to Russia. Russia should be, and is, critical to the overall success of the war against ISIS. Russia is a key conduit to Iran and Assad. I am sure that Russia should and would welcome our approach for a joint policy towards ISIS, especially so since Russia itself is not immune to fanatical and murderous extremism. That was amply demonstrated only a few days ago when a suicide bomber blew himself up in the Chechen capital, Grozny, killing five police officers and wounding at least 12 civilians. It is therefore essential that we seek to separate out a row we have with Russia on the key issue of Ukraine while designing a framework of engagement on strategic, political and economic matters that are relevant to us both. That is not to say that we should not maintain strong pressure on the Russian Federation about Ukraine and Crimea using a range of measures, but we should compartmentalise that approach in order to pursue areas of mutual interest.

The key date woven into this growing tapestry of cross-border interests was 30 August 2013, when the vote about taking concerted action with the United States against Assad was lost in the House of Commons, with a corresponding collapse of momentum in Washington. Once the West backed down from taking action in the face of the blatant use of chemical weapons, the pendulum had swung. A new era—sadly but correctly interpreted by President Putin as an age of reluctance—was born in which American power remains dominant but no longer determinant. Months later, the timing of Crimean annexation could wait until President Putin had returned to Moscow after the closing ceremony of the winter Olympic Games, while public support continued to climb across Russia as the troops moved in, dismissive of the United Kingdom in particular. We risk failing to grasp the importance of Russian influence in achieving our foreign policy goals.

Martin Wolf, writing on the conflict, concluded that,

“there is no greater foreign policy question than how to deal with today’s Russia”.

I add that there is no greater foreign policy question than how we see ourselves and, from that perspective, how we win the peace as well as wars, and how we define our role in foreign policy in the 21st century. If we do not follow a policy of compartmentalisation towards Russia and the successor states of the Soviet Union then, as you move east through Europe, starting in France and Germany, you can rest assured that Governments on mainland Europe, through either the front or back doors, will deliver on this agenda. In the mean time, as my noble friend Lord Howell said, the global oil price is most likely to prove the most potent foreign policy factor for a change in Russian policy direction towards both Ukraine and the West.