Afghanistan (International Relations and Defence Committee Report)

Lord Purvis of Tweed Excerpts

Monday 24th January 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, as one of, I think, 12 members of today’s Committee who are former or current members of the International Relations and Defence Committee, I too commend our chair for suggesting that the committee conducted our inquiry and then for chairing it and introducing this debate so well. I do not think it is acceptable that it has been a year since we concluded a prescient report, which had constructive requests of the Government and of the whole House, and that it has taken so long for us to debate this.

As has been said, the intervening period has confirmed the benefit of such a committee report if the conclusions are not only read but acted upon, because we took a wide view. We took evidence as to the very mixed nature of human development in Afghanistan, specifically over the last decade. Certain parts of Afghanistan had seen negative human development, while there was positive human development in others, especially for women’s rights and children.

In some measures, we looked at the regional impact, which has become so obviously important, whether for Qatar and the UAE, from differing perspectives, or for Pakistan and the other neighbouring countries. We looked at how relevant they have become and took that into consideration. We also looked at the likely impact of the aid and development cuts. The noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, was absolutely right when she indicated that, from 2019 to 2020, UK funding was £240 million but, in 2021, went down to £168 million. Therefore, in many respects, what is being committed over a three-year period will only regain territory lost. That cannot be right, given the scale of the humanitarian crisis that Afghanistan is suffering from.

As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, indicated, the committee wished to be fair to the Government in agreeing with what they considered to be their own legacies as far as Afghanistan is concerned. The report states that the Government

“defines its legacy in terms of improvements in human rights, particularly of women and girls, and the strengthening of the Afghan state”.

Clearly, these have been failures since August. As we said:

“There is a real risk that … the gains … could be lost.”


Now we know that those gains have been lost, what is the way forward?

It is 20 years since the start of the American operation termed Enduring Freedom. Published just two weeks ago, UN OCHA’s planned humanitarian response for Afghanistan makes for profoundly depressing reading. I quote the foreword of the humanitarian response plan after 20 years of the operation:

“We go into 2022 with unprecedented levels of need amongst ordinary women, men and children of Afghanistan. 24.4 million people are in humanitarian need—more than half the population. Years of compounded crises and under-investment have resulted in nearly four times the number of people in need of lifesaving humanitarian assistance compared to just three years ago.”


That appeal has been matched with a funding appeal for the plan of $869 million, but, according to OCHA, there is a shortfall of $105 million. The UK has responded to the plan with $21 million, but that is behind Sweden, Germany, Japan, France and Denmark. Why are we behind those countries for this humanitarian response plan?

Our wider support is welcome. The UK has committed £82 million for the separate wider humanitarian appeal. However, as the noble Baroness indicated, a concern has been raised that, of the totality of the £286 million that has been announced over a three-year period, only around half—the figure of £145 million has been reported—has actually been allocated. I, too, want clarity on the distribution and allocation of the funds. Obviously, concerns have been raised among the charity and NGO sectors that if the remainder of the funding is not dispersed to the field before the end of this financial year, the Treasury will claw back any unallocated and undispersed funding. I hope that, in summing up, it will be a straightforward job for the Minister to state categorically that this will not happen; that no funds previously allocated to Afghanistan will be clawed back if they have not been distributed.

Urgency is key, of course, but there has been some degree of sympathy for the point made by the noble Baroness about the use of the Taliban for the distribution of certain funds. The Minister was categorical when he gave evidence to our inquiry and has been consistent to this day—he deserves credit for that—that funds will not be distributed through the Taliban. However, as we hear in some of the discussions with the UK envoy and in the discussions that Norway is now facilitating, there are areas controlled by the Taliban that, by necessity, UK funds will have to be distributed through.

That is why it is so important that charities and NGOs know with absolute clarity what the Government’s legislation will be on the use of sanctions. There are, of course, UN sanctions, but there are separate UK sanctions. Therefore, clarity and whether we will be in a position openly and substantially to debate the statutory instruments that will come through on this will be very important. Charities and NGOs have said to me and others that clarity is important for them, not just for now but to have ongoing security with a regime that is unlikely to change.

My second point was also raised by the committee: it is with regard to UK capacity and administration. A very brave Foreign Office whistleblower highlighted in a devastating report the lack of integrated IT, language skills and individual computers for staff; the 5,000 unanswered emails and the block-flagging of unread emails to show that they had been read; disengaged political and head of department leadership; and the complex decision-making which was set aside, notwithstanding the very hard work of certain officials in our Armed Forces and Civil Service. I do not cast any aspersions on our Minister’s work, but it is clear that some lives were lost. The Foreign Office spokesman said at the time that we could not help everybody but our support for those people was enduring. As my noble friend Lady Smith of Newnham and others will no doubt say in this debate, in many respects the meagre and confused resettlement schemes have not been an illustration of our enduring support as referred to by that press spokesman.

Finally, I shall pick up a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. Coincidentally, Losing Afghanistan: the Fall of Kabul and the End of Western Intervention, edited by Dr Brian Brivati, was published today. It raises difficult questions about the future of intervention, given the context of Afghanistan. My essay in the collection offers a slight degree of optimism but redefines what intervention must be. Only 16 months separated Operation Noble Anvil—the bombing of Serbia—and Operation Enduring Freedom. It is probably clear to many of us that one of those operations has been sustainable and more successful than the other. We need to redefine what intervention is. We need to look at the tools open to us and our allies and partners and be free to allow them to be used when we recognise that a regime that we sought to defeat and deny access is now in place. This is not a time for timidity, even though the circumstances and a humanitarian crisis are there. Reports such as this one and others from charities and NGOs have to be listened to.

Retired General Sir Jack Deverell, former Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Northern Europe, said this about the book, and I think it is worth closing on it:

“Above all the book poses a question: how can we in the West claim we know so much yet demonstrate in Afghanistan that we understand so little?”


If we do not debate reports such this one and others, we will continue to understand so little at a time when the people of Afghanistan, especially the women and children, demand of us that we understand more.