Planning and Infrastructure Bill

Lord Shipley Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 15th September 2025 Lords Chamber

In short, the amendment deals with the symptom—overlaps in jurisdiction—but not with the cause, which is the lack of a clear statutory framework for how development corporations fit into a devolved governance.

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

My Lords, having listened very carefully to the debate so far, I think the next best step would be to hear from the Minister, but I want to express some support for Amendment 362 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, and Amendment 195A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Scott. I hope the Minister will provide clarity on those when she replies.

On 3 April, guidance was issued by the Government to clarify the legislation, scrutiny and governance of mayoral development corporations in combined authorities and combined county authorities. I am pleased that steps have been taken to incorporate the recommendations of the Tees Valley Review, published over 18 months ago, to clarify the regulations for the Tees Valley Combined Authority and the South Tees Development Corporation. It is important to ensure that there is absolute clarity about oversight, reserved matters, consent and stranded liabilities, and I welcome the Government’s firm intention to do so.

However, it has puzzled me that the words “risk” and “risk management” do not appear in the guidance published in April. There is also nothing about capacity building; that point was raised a moment ago by the noble Baroness, Lady Scott. It is very important that development corporations have the capacity to fulfil the expectations of the Government.

There is an issue, which we may come to in the next group of amendments, about where the development corporations will get their income from. I look forward to that discussion. I am concerned about how the mayoral development corporations will be structured to ensure that full risk analysis takes place on the decision-making for what will be major capital infrastructure investment. Overview and scrutiny are overview and scrutiny: scrutiny is scrutiny of a decision, and overview is overview of how decisions are being made. Risk and risk analysis come at the start of a decision to invest money, so this is not just about overview and scrutiny; it is about preventing risky investments.

When the Minister replies, will she explain who is going to pick up the bill if risk is not properly considered at the right point in the decision-making process? At the moment, I suspect that the bill will be carried by council tax payers in the area concerned and I would like that point to be clarified, because I do not think that a system based on the council tax payer being the body of last resort to make up a loss would be appropriate. I very much hope to hear the Minister’s views on those matters.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I will start with the notice from the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, opposing Clause 93 standing part. I welcome the opportunity to explain the intentions behind this clause. Clause 93 clarifies and extends areas for development and the remit of development corporation models. It includes changes to legislation that would extend the remit of mayoral development corporations, so that they can deliver regeneration and new town development rather than just regeneration. It also allows that separate parcels of land can be designated as one new town area, overseen by one new town development corporation.

The current framework is outdated and not fit for purpose. Each development corporation model was developed to address a specific circumstance at the time of its introduction. This poses a significant risk to the effective delivery of the development corporations. For example, mayoral development corporations can be used only for regeneration projects, as the model was developed initially for London but then widened out to areas outside London, including rural areas. The English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill will enable strategic authorities to create more mayoral development corporations, so it is even more important to ensure that the legislation is fit for purpose.

Amendment 195A aims to remove the power permitting new town development corporations

“to do anything necessary or expedient for the purposes or incidental purposes of the new town”.

I reassure the noble Baroness that this is not a new addition to the new town development corporation framework. This provision is already written into primary legislation underpinning new town development corporations, as well as urban development corporation models. The changes to the infrastructure provision include listing specific functions and bringing them in line with mayoral development corporations, with the addition of heat pumps, which have been added to the list of infrastructure that can be delivered by all models.

As development corporations are used to respond to the specific needs of developments or regeneration schemes, it is important that the legislation offers this level of flexibility so that they can be tailored accordingly. We all want to see large-scale developments and infrastructure projects that will support housing and economic growth, but they need to be supported by the right infrastructure without compromising existing provisions. It would be a step backwards if we were to take the power away from new town development corporations and instead provide only a list of infrastructure, as some developments may require new technologies. Decisions to establish development corporations and the powers each will have will be made via regulations. Their oversight will be carefully designed and subject to statutory consultation.

Amendments 351ZA and 362, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, would standardise and extend powers in respect of mayoral development corporations to mayors of all strategic authorities outside London. I welcome his proposal. It is vital that we empower local leaders to transform underused sites to create thriving communities tailored to local needs. For this purpose, mayoral development corporations should be part of every mayor’s toolkit. However, we believe these amendments are unnecessary. The changes the noble Lord is proposing are already being made through the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill introduced on 10 July 2025. Given its scope, that Bill is the most appropriate vehicle for these changes. I take the noble Lord’s point about delay, but I am not under the impression that there is going to be any grass growing under the feet of the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill. I think that is going to get moved on at pace and I hope that it will be appropriate for the changes that we are talking about.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

Can the Minister explain who the funder of last resort is when a loss is delivered by a mayoral development corporation? Is it the council tax payer for the geographical area of the development corporation, the combined authority or the Government? To put it another way, who makes up, pays for, a loss if a development corporation makes one?

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

Of course, we all hope there will not be a loss, but we must always have provision in place for that. I know that there is ongoing discussion with Sir Michael Lyons and others in the taskforce about how the financial details and programme work, so it is probably best if I reply to noble Lords in writing on that issue.

In relation to the points about capacity, which were very well made, again, discussions are going on with Sir Michael Lyons about how we make all this happen. We have already allocated £46 million to planning, but we will continue to have those discussions with the taskforce about what the delivery mechanisms are to be. That said, I hope that the noble Lord has had some reassurance and that he will agree not to press his amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Fuller (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak also to my Amendments 190 and 192. I welcome the broad thrust of empowering and reinvigorating the development corporations contemplated in the legislation. This is the best part of a complex Bill, although we know that it has already been overtaken by the devolution Bill launched in the other place.

Clause 94 seeks the achievement of sustainable development, and the mitigation of and adaption to climate change, but there would be no sustainable development without commercially sustainable financing of the proposals that the corporations bring forward. My amendment seeks to bring sustainable finance alongside those other sustainability issues. I approach this subject in the knowledge that local authorities may be reorganised and that mayors may be created in what we now learn to be a cat’s cradle of overlapping and competing responsibilities. Regardless of that, the day-to-day financial pressures felt by national and local government have never been greater.

In a former time, development corporations would simply hold out their hand to the Government or local councils for funding. Of course, that route may still be open, but we need to recognise that the old ways, with joint severability between various tiers of local government, are falling away. Building new towns is the work of generations; it goes beyond political cycles. Relying on national and local politicians will not be enough in a world where building a secondary school costs £40 million and a flyover £100 million. In the pursuit of sustainable development and delivery on the plans, the money needs to be right, because without the money, how can all the desirable options in Clause 94 be delivered?

We need to give the development corporations powers to exploit the difference between funding and financing—by explanation, funding is writing the cheque, but financing is putting the deal together. It is no surprise that it is the financiers in the City of London who are the highest paid, because their task of turning those good ideas into reality is the hardest.

Development corporations are independent, but they have the benefit of being able to lean on the covenant strength that comes from being a statutory body. I will not dwell too much on the significance of the governance of development corporations, but I will make the factual observation that strong governance leads to higher covenant strength, the ability to take a higher credit rating, and the willingness of institutional investors to pony up the cash. We need to make it easy for development corporations to raise funds in new and creative ways at the lowest possible coupon. My amendments would path find those.

Get this right and we will provide investable opportunities for pension funds that desire to invest in infrastructure bonds, for local people who want to invest in local facilities that benefit their area, or for sovereign wealth that seeks a home for its money within an advanced economy with well-defined property rights. But the well of wealth from these sources may not be enough, and there may be other ways to skin the cat. The corporations need to be empowered to engage in all manner of financial instruments, including the traditional issuance of bonds, debt or similar instruments. But we should contemplate other sources of finance. That extends to entering into joint ventures with landowners whose land is to be incorporated as an in-kind contribution to the whole, so that they may enjoy the uplift over a long period rather than cash up front. 

It should not be right that development corporations feel they need to reach for the CPO lever by default and then be forced to pony-up a premium price to the owner up front after the unpleasantness of the process—there are lots of “p”s in that sentence. In other words, development corporations need to have powers not just to assemble land but to be creative in the assembly of that land. The creative concept of the joint venture would allow more money to be spent on upfront infrastructure than on land acquisition. That is a better-value enterprise. By thinking creatively like this, the amount of upfront funding will be less and the ability to deliver essential infrastructure at the outset greater. 

 I want to place finance in its widest possible context, not just rooting it in the sort of funding where you stand on the street corner with your hand out. Let us seed these stand-alone corporations away from the other financial pressures that afflict local government and free them from the apron strings of those local authorities. While I accept that the development corporations can plan for an area and have regard to all manner of desirable outcomes, contemplated in Clause 93, ultimately those plans or outcomes will stand or fall on whether the money can be raised and the finance deals put together. That is what my amendments seek to achieve. I beg to move.

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

My Lords, in the absence of other speakers, I am interested in the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, and will be even more interested in the Minister’s response, bearing in mind what I said in the previous group about management of risk and who underpins a development corporation in the event of financial loss.

Amendment 197 is very important. There are two issues: the automatic

“removal of hope value from the valuation of the relevant land”

proposed for development and, secondly, whether land purchases by development corporations should be seen as

“public sector investments to be counted against departmental expenditure limits”.

This amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, is important and I hope that the Minister will respond to it.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Fuller for his amendments. The financing of development corporations is an important issue and we will continue to engage on it. I look forward to the views of Sir Michael Lyons’s task force on the issues raised by noble Lords in this and the previous group on the financial aspects of development corporations.

We need to ensure that financing is long term and sustainable. If corporations are to take on debt to fund infrastructure, they and their lenders will need confidence that the debt will be repaid. This is a particular issue as a current Government cannot bind a future one. I will not comment on the issues in Amendment 197 as it has not been spoken to, but I assume that they will be discussed in group seven.