Economy: Growth

Lord Skidelsky Excerpts

Tuesday 29th January 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Skidelsky]

My Lords, I join the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, in welcoming the noble Lord, Lord Deighton, to the Treasury Bench; I hope that he enjoyed the experience of renewed contact with the supervision of his former teacher.

When George Osborne took over the controls at the Treasury, he decided that fiscal policy would be governed not by the state of the real economy but by the state of the public finances, as measured by preset fiscal targets, particularly the rate of deficit reduction. Those targets were designed to reassure investors in government debt that the state was solvent and would remain so. Half-way through the life of this Parliament, we can say that the effects of that policy in terms of output and growth have been disastrous. Britain, like the eurozone, remains stuck in the slow lane. We did not grow at all last year, and we enter 2013 with a realistic prospect of a triple-dip recession. Despite our freedom to devalue and massive open-market operations by the central bank, British output is 3% lower than in 2008. The results of the fiscal targets are correspondingly dismal. A state with high debt where no growth has become the new normal will not retain the triple-A rating on its sovereign debt.

What has gone wrong? The central design failure is that the targets were set on the heroic assumption that the economy would recover despite the tightening of fiscal policy implied by the targets themselves. In a balance sheet recession, when the private sector is cutting spending to reduce its overindebtedness, that assumption was just wrong. Put simply, we cannot all deleverage at once. To save more, you spend less, and if everyone does that, including the Government, the economy shrinks. That is lesson number one to which the noble Lord might respond.

George Osborne blames the failure of Britain to grow on the eurozone, but that argument is circular, as it is following exactly the same policy as we are. It is the Chancellor’s own policy which explains the stagnation of the British economy, not the eurozone.

Mad economists are emerging from the woodwork to say that George Osborne is not cutting deep or fast enough. For example, Andrew Lilico appeared on the “Today” programme this morning telling us that the reason that the deficit is not going down is that austerity has not started. Apparently we are in the middle of a Keynesian boom. We need more cutting. Cut benefits, cut the welfare state, cut government, cut everything that can possibly be cut—and behold, the private sector phoenix will rise from the ashes. These Einsteins of finance never explain how bigger cuts are supposed to produce recovery, or, indeed, even cut the deficit itself. It makes one despair of economics.

The Chancellor can claim that the unemployment figures are slightly lower than they were some months ago. How can this be when output has not grown and may even have fallen? There is a puzzle here, but it is not a large one. The reason is that today, with a more flexible labour market, a fall in output is not necessarily, or immediately, reflected in a fall in employment. It may simply lead to a movement of workers into lower-paid, part-time or intermittent jobs or work training schemes, none of which count towards recorded unemployment. This has certainly been happening. It also explains why the Government can claim success in increasing private sector employment faster than the public sector is shedding employment.

I have no doubt that if the Chancellor continues cutting as hard and fast as Mr Lilico wants, those of us left with decent jobs or incomes will be able to have as many drivers, gardeners, trainers, cleaners, nannies, domestic servants, chefs, butlers and waiters as we can possibly want, and, no doubt, at the equivalent of Victorian wage levels. In other words, back to the world of “Downton Abbey”. After two centuries of industrialisation, what a wonderful solution to the unemployment problem.

The obvious alternative to blind faith in fiscal targets is action to restore the economic trajectory that underpinned the targets in the first place. The international organisations are now saying this; the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, has quoted Olivier Blanchard, who has just said that the Chancellor should “ease up” on fiscal austerity, which is as near as an international civil servant can come to saying that his policy is dead wrong. Even Boris Johnson says we should junk the word “austerity”.

In plain English, “easing up” on austerity means stimulating investment. Public capital spending is not included in the current deficit target, so the Government can restart the investment machine without breaching their own targets on current spending. That is the only way to get the deficit down, or to meet their targets.

In this context, I welcome the Government’s announcement that they have approved the second phase of High Speed 2. However, I have two questions. Why will it take so long? The first phase is scheduled to be completed in 13 years’ time, and the second phase in 2033. Two years ago I asked the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, who had just stepped down as Secretary of State for Transport, how long it would take to complete this project with any sense of urgency. He said that it would take about five years. He is in his place, and I hope that he does not tell me that I have remembered that wrong. As I have said before, if only we had a Lloyd George in charge of this programme, we would get some movement.

My second question is: how will it be funded? According to the Financial Times, the Government will have to,

“start raising private sector finance to part fund the £34bn project”.

Why? Here is an opportunity for the Government to take advantage of the spectacularly low cost of their own borrowing—why it is so low is the subject of another discussion—to finance the whole thing itself. It is a genuine capital investment, which will yield an identifiable rate of return. Perhaps the noble Lord would give us some indication of how the Government will finance this project. I hope that they will not repeat the disastrous PPP schemes which made such a mess of the London Underground and Channel Tunnel projects.

Will an investment strategy such as I have proposed not cause the public debt to increase? This is the crunch question. The Minister said in opening that it would not be possible to borrow our way out of our debt crisis. If indeed the project starts reasonably expeditiously, the debt will go up. There is no doubt that it will be higher in 2015 or 2017 than it would have been otherwise, but so will the capital stock and the economy itself, while the increased output can be taxed to finance the interest cost of the extra debt.

There are, of course, obvious risks. The risk of a pro-growth strategy is that borrowing more than initially planned may spook the bond markets and lead to a rise in borrowing costs. However, it is a much smaller risk than putting one’s faith in pre-set fiscal targets which produce a stalling economy, without any guarantee that this will actually deliver on the fiscal numbers. Which strategy does the Chancellor really think is more likely to keep our AAA rating with the credit markets?

If the growth-first strategy makes sense for Britain, it should make sense for Europe as well. This country was a pacesetter in adopting fiscal targets as a guide to policy after the financial crisis. Why not be the first mover in showing how to reset policy and help lead Europe out of self-defeating austerity?

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

My Lords, I join with other Members of the House in congratulating the noble Lord, Lord Deighton, on his maiden speech from the Front Bench. Like other noble Lords on this side, I am delighted to find that he is not entirely still under the spell of his former distinguished teacher.

Growth ought to be the natural state of an economy. Most economies tend to grow over time. Financial crises, bad harvests and various other factors can, of course, delay or obstruct that growth. But growth is the natural order over time, because human beings have a natural instinct to make two blades of grass grow where one grew before and a natural instinct to innovate. Growth, it is worth remembering, does not come from Governments; it comes from individuals.

What, then, should our reaction be to the figures which were released last week and showed a 0.3% drop in GDP in the final quarter? The figures can always be sliced in many different ways. One can portray them, as indeed the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, did, as saying that four out of the last five quarters have been negative; that the economy was flat all last year; and that the economy is still below the 2008 peak. On the other hand, you can formulate them a slightly different way: the economy grew by 0.3% in the last six months; although the economy is below the peak of 2008, if you exclude North Sea oil production it is only a whisker below that peak, and North Sea oil has been in dramatic decline with interruptions to production. The fact that there has been no growth last year is the same as in France, while the 0.3% drop in GDP in the last quarter compares with a drop of 0.5% in Germany; and, collectively, the whole of the eurozone is currently in recession. What I draw from all that is that when the dust settles and this is all in the history books, I suspect we will find that almost all the countries in this part of the world had a broadly similar experience, whichever way one tends to look at the figures at any particular moment.

We heard a lot about the views of the IMF, but we have not actually had the views of the IMF; we have had the views of Mr Blanchard. Christine Lagarde, the director-general of the IMF, has been extremely supportive of the Government’s strategy and we will only officially hear the views of the IMF in May, when we hear the results of the article 4 consultation. The noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, talked a lot about the multiplier effects. Interestingly, there was a report in the press at the weekend that the IMF has concluded that the multiplier effects, both of austerity or of any deficit spending, are extremely slight in the case of the UK. No doubt we will hear more about that when the article 4 consultation takes place.

There is no doubt that the figures for the last quarter were extremely disappointing, but the idea that some extreme excess of austerity is holding back the British economy seems to me very much open to question. The Government have shown that they are prepared to be flexible in their deficit reduction programme. They have relaxed the programme twice and put back the date at which they expect, and are aiming for, a fall in the total debt-to-GDP ratio. As my noble friend Lord Forsyth said, the difference between the Government and the Opposition is much exaggerated by both sides for the purposes of both sides. I do not think that the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, is right in saying that the capital expenditure planned under the last Government was higher than that of this Government; in fact, the cuts that Alistair Darling put forward were bigger than those of this Government, some of which have been reversed. Can the Minister comment on that precise point?

Despite the small differences between the planned reductions in expenditure, it is true that if you compare the outcome of expenditure with the original Darling plan for reductions in expenditure, the latter was much tighter and more austere than what the Government have implemented. If you compare our austerity programme to that in other EU countries, it is difficult to argue that these cuts are savage or that this fiscal consolidation is sudden and dramatic. At the beginning of this crisis we had a deficit to GDP of around 12%. That was almost exactly the same as Greece’s. I am sorry to say that today Greece has a considerably lower deficit than the UK’s. Italy, France, Ireland, Portugal, and Greece all have lower deficits than we do. These have not been caused by growth—a solution somehow magicked out of the air by the party opposite. That is not how they have reduced their deficits. They have done so by making more savage cuts and far severer fiscal consolidations than we have made.

With a debt-to-GDP ratio of around 70% to 80%, which is where it is expected to peak out, if we go on adding to that overall stock of debt at the rate of 12%, as it was when we started off, or 7% or 8%, because the annual deficit is the amount that we add to it each year, we would soon get to a situation in which a debt-to-GDP ratio would be 100%. As economists such as Reinhart and Rogoff have argued, that is the level at which the overall stock of debt becomes dangerous for the long-term growth of an economy. They would argue that that is why Japan has had such a bad time for such a long period. If deficits really solved long-term economic growth, Japan would not have been stranded in the situation in which it has been for such a long time.

If deficits of 7% to 8% per annum have left the country not growing, is it credible that one of 10% or 12% will suddenly cause the economy to leap into life? We hear about the multiplier effects, but never about what is going to happen when these so-called stimuli are withdrawn. Anyone who thinks that this would be the real world experience of deficits ought to read the diaries of Mr Morgenthau, President Roosevelt’s treasury secretary, who expressed his disillusionment with the deficits being run in America in the 1930s. He wrote that all the United States had to show for it was unemployment at much the same level and no increase in production. In the UK today we are running deficits that are considerably higher than those run by the Roosevelt administration.

[Lord Skidelsky]

The noble Lord mentioned a point of history. Of course, American unemployment fell very rapidly in the 1930s, so if he wants to leave the House with the impression that it did not fall, I must say to him that that is just wrong.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

No. President Roosevelt initiated back to work programmes—that is true—but the private sector, the economy, was not generating growth. If the noble Lord, who is a very eminent historian, wishes to doubt that, just let him read the Morganthau diaries, because they are full of deep disillusionment about the pointlessness of the programme that he himself was implementing and the effect that it was having on the growth of the economy.

I am not arguing that deficit financing can never be of use or play a part in taking up the slack in the economy when the private sector is unable to borrow, but we are in a position where both public and private finances are under pressure at the same time. It is a much favoured parlour game to decide what Keynes would have thought of doing in this scenario today. Of course, the House is very fortunate in having the eminent historian, the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, who knows more about this subject than anyone else, to tell us. Indeed, we also have the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, a most distinguished Cambridge economist—a university that is profoundly affected today by the shadow of Maynard Keynes. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, remembers Milton Friedman’s comment about Cambridge academics and their theories, which have applications within 25 miles of Cambridge University.

This recession is indeed different from a normal cyclical recession. It is, as the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, said, a balance sheet recession, but it is a recession that has followed a severe banking crisis. As economists such as Rogoff and Reinhart have shown, I think quite tellingly, such recessions tend to last much longer than normal, cyclical recessions, and are much deeper.

So what can be done to stimulate growth? I believe that there are things on the supply side that can do this—training; lifting and relaxing planning controls, as the Government have done; infrastructure spending, very much as the Minister outlined, although if infrastructure spending is to be financed by cuts in current spending, that will squeeze consumption further, which has been one of the problems of the economy, because inflation has not come down, and it has been inflation that has been squeezing consumption and living standards.

However, the real problem of the economy, I believe, is not fiscal policy but the lack of credit in the economy and the failure of the banking system still to make credit available. The risk is that the new businesses that drive innovation and produce the new products will be strangled because of the lack of credit. The Government have introduced the Funding for Lending scheme. It is too easy to say what the effects of that are, but if it has a good effect, maybe it ought to be expanded further. However, they have been piling regulation upon regulation on and demands for more capital from the banks, and that, in the last analysis, is incompatible with more lending and makes more lending more difficult and more expensive for the banks.

The Government have said that they want to see new entrants into the banking sector, which I think would be highly desirable, but I am not sure that that message has got through to all parts, particularly the lower parts, of the Financial Services Authority. I noticed that the chairman of Metro Bank said the other day that if he had known what was involved in starting a new bank in the UK, he is not sure that he would do it again or would have done it in the first place.

We await the arrival of Governor Carney, and there are great expectations of him, but he will not exactly be a man on a white horse, and I think it would be unfair to regard him as that. He has talked a lot already about central banks doing more to promote growth. I hope, however, that the Bank and the Government will be cautious about more quantitative easing. There is in this situation, even now when we do not have growth in the economy, a danger of creating more asset bubbles. We have seen the consequences of the “Greenspan put” in the past, where central bank action has been taken to keep the financial markets buoyant and the result has not been that we have avoided a crisis but that the crises have got successively worse. When I look at the level of the stock market, which of course can be interpreted favourably in one sense, I wonder whether it is reflecting the prospects for the economy or the consequences of quantitative easing.

The Opposition have inevitably been very critical and the Government inevitably are in a difficult situation. I think it was Boileau, the French writer, who once observed that those who come to tell the people they are not well governed will never lack a welcome. The only surprising thing is that those who are telling the people they are not well governed are those who were in charge five minutes ago and helped to create the situation we are in. It is not an easy situation and, most of all, I think what we need are what Tolstoy called those two grand old warriors—time and patience.