Elections Bill

Lord Stunell Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage
Thursday 10th March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ashton of Hyde (Con)]

Now we have a debate, which the Minister can answer.

[Lord Stunell (LD)]

I thank noble Lords and join in the general confusion about where we are up to. I speak in favour of the two amendments in this group tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher. They seem to be a ranging shot on one of the most important issues embedded in this Bill.

I hope that noble Lords will excuse me if I take this opportunity to explore what the amendments do and why it is so important that they and other matters relating to Clauses 14 and 15 are given serious consideration. These provisions are at the heart of the matter which I want to speak about. The question is really: is the United Kingdom to retain, as one of its trusted institutions and symbols of democratic legitimacy, the Electoral Commission, or is it to join an increasingly long list of countries that have, step by step and little by little, eroded their democratic base, undermined trust in their electoral processes and cast doubt on the legitimacy of their elected representatives?

The Electoral Commission was set up as a direct result of recommendations by the Committee on Standards in Public Life, on which I serve. The committee is chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Evans of Weardale, and its first chairman was Lord Nolan. People refer frequently to the Nolan principles but those are in the guardianship of the Committee on Standards in Public Life; so, we believe, is the Electoral Commission. It is a body which emerged from recommendations presented to the Prime Minister by the CSPL. It has since been overhauled and reviewed by the CSPL and there have been changes made in legislation, again based on recommendations made directly by the CSPL. In a report last year, the Committee made further recommendations to the Prime Minister about changes that needed to be made in response to the inquiry and the evidence that it took. All those recommendations were designed to make the Electoral Commission a more effective body, with clear and specific recommendations on how that should be done in each case.

The Electoral Commission was set up on the advice of the CSPL. It was updated on advice from the CSPL, and the Government have before them clear recommendations from the CSPL on how it could be improved further. Our report strongly emphasised what every piece of evidence showed: that to maintain trust in the electoral integrity of our democratic processes, it was essential that the Electoral Commission retains its independence from political interference—interference from any political party or faction, but particularly from the party in power at any one time. Unfortunately, Clauses 14 and 15 take our country in the wrong direction. The two amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, try hard to pull it back from the brink, so yes, they have our support.

At Second Reading, I asked whether the Minister would be ready to hand over to a future radical-left Government the powers that the Bill, in its present form, would give them. He is far too skilled an operator to answer that question, but it is very hard to believe that he would. It could start off with something as innocuous as a requirement for the Electoral Commission to have regard to the Government’s manifesto policies; levelling up, for instance, or maybe levelling down, as will surely be achieved as a completely accidental by-product of other provisions in the Bill.

In many areas, but particularly Clauses 14 and 15, the Bill seems to have been drawn up by people who have never been in opposition, which is startling because the Minister has plenty of experience of that, having lived as an oppressed political minority in the Liberal Democrat-run London Borough of Richmond upon Thames. The Minister may protest that there is to be a comprehensive consultation with various bodies before any strategy statements come into force. Of course, the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, very much bear on the question of the terms and conditions on which such a strategy report might be made.

The Minister might refer me to the elaborate wording of proposed new Section 4C, which is in Clause 14. But when I pointed out to him at Second Reading, as many noble Lords did, that practically every outside body that had expressed an opinion on these changes had strongly advised against them, and that the CSPL itself, which created the commission, had said that our electoral processes must be overseen by an independent regulator protected from political pressures and separate from the Government, and that it must demonstrate its impartiality and effectiveness at all times, the Minister’s reply was that the Government take a different view.

Noble Lords should bear in mind that five bodies must be consulted, according to proposed new Section 4C, before any such strategy document moves forward. It would be interesting to know what they will do when they get their first strategy statement. Actually, we do not have to wonder, as they have already commented on the proposals in front of them. Two opted out in disgust, which is why the Scottish and Welsh amendments flow in the next group. The Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee has strenuously protested and recommended that the Government take these provisions out of the Bill. That is three of them. The Speaker’s Committee is packed with Cabinet Ministers, which is an offence when it is the budget holder for the Electoral Commission—a matter we shall talk about later. It is also worthy of note that all but one of the Electoral Commissioners jointly wrote an open letter of protest, pointing out that this fundamentally undermines their legitimacy and our democratic system. Therefore, of the five consultees in proposed new Section 4C, four have expressed vigorous dissent with the proposal and one is packed with Cabinet Ministers.

Interestingly, neither the CSPL or any local government institution was consulted: the one which created the electoral commission, and the people who will receive the benefit of its administration above anybody else. What we learn from this is that a fig leaf of consultation, even when we have a benign regime such as this, is not a safeguard. Under a less benign regime, as seen from the Minister’s viewpoint, that fig leaf could be gone in the space of a short consultation. I repeat my question: is the Minister completely at ease with the provisions in these two clauses? I and my noble friends are certainly not.

A look at the international stage may help noble Lords to understand our deep unease more clearly and explain why we are so strongly in favour of the Minister giving a fair wind, at the very minimum, to the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher.

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[Lord Lipsey (Lab)]

My Lords, I will briefly make a point about these proceedings. As I understood it, when we debated the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, the Minister said, “We should not have these general arguments; we should be focusing on the specific amendments.” In a corner, as he was, I can see that that was the best sort of argument available to him. Now we have nearly 100 amendments which change the law of this nation, and how much time did the Minister devote to each of them? It was six seconds. This is not a detailed examination of a Bill; it is a Minister who thinks that whatever he happens to want—I am sure that most of these amendments are completely acceptable—should go through without proper debate, consideration and deliberation by this House.

I say that both as a protest and as something that I hope the House will carry forward in its future deliberations on the Bill. It cannot be done at the kind of speed whereby 100 amendments are considered in one grouping. It will not be done, and we will stop it being done.

[Lord Stunell (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak very briefly to this amendment. I seem to have used my time allocation earlier—I apologise to the Minister for wasting his time. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, and my noble friend just pointed out—the Minister probably cannot hear me with my mask on, so I am sorry about that as well—it is six seconds per amendment against 13 per amendment on my part. I apologise for that.

I will pick up on a couple of things. The Minister expressed regret that Scotland and Wales had opted out of the application of Clause 14 in those two nations. He will understand that I think they have shown the utmost common sense in doing so, and I do not think it is a cause for regret at all. I certainly support what my noble friend Lady Humphreys had to say about that.

I will bring the Minister back to the fig leaf of consultation in new Section 4A in Clause 14. I said before that of the five bodies, four were completely hostile and one other was captured by the Cabinet. There is now a proposal here which means that one of those—PACAC—is captured by the Select Committee for the Department of Levelling Up Housing and Communities, and that Secretary of State will be making the strategy statement: that is something else that has got worse as a consequence of that.

I put back into play the point I made before, that if Scotland and Wales are not going to be part of new Section 4A and if PACAC is going to be neutered and transformed, it might be time to add the CSPL as one of those bodies which should be statutorily consulted as the creator and, up till now, the recommender of progress and developments on that Electoral Commission body. I would have thought that some voice for local government in that consultation should be statutory there, of course only for England, because Scotland and Wales have sensibly opted out.

We shall not oppose these amendments but we believe that the direction of travel on this suggests even more reasons for reforming the application of Clause 14 when we get to that debate.

[Baroness Hayman of Ullock (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his introduction. Clearly, these amendments are technical and we agree with noble Lords that they are required.

I agree with my noble friends Lord Lipsey and Lord Foulkes that this enormous number of amendments was chucked at us in one go, with very little time to look at the detail, not just of what they say but of what the implications are. Noble Lords made an extremely important point about that. That has happened with other Bills as well. In debates on the Building Safety Bill, which I have also been working on, an enormous number—38 pages—of amendments were given to us with a very short time to assess them. Can the Minister take that away and think about it for future legislation? It is difficult for noble Lords to assess such amendments in a reasonable fashion.

We need to look at why the amendments are necessary. Clearly, as noble Lords have explained, it is to do with the devolved Administrations. When the Bill was originally proposed, it was for legislating on a UK-wide basis, and that included some areas where the devolved Parliaments in Scotland and Wales could legislate in respect of their own local and devolved elections. Clearly, the Government had to seek legislative consent Motions from the devolved Parliaments. Unfortunately for the UK Government, the Governments of Scotland and Wales both declined to lay consent Motions and requested that all aspects which relate to devolved matters be removed from the Bill, hence the large number of amendments.

I will just draw the attention of the Committee to the fact that, out of more than 350 legislative consent Motions, consent has been denied just 13 times, according to the Institute for Government. UK Bills have been redrafted previously when devolved Administration consent has been withheld under the Sewel convention. Can the Minister say why that option was not considered? Perhaps it was considered and we do not know about that, but it was rejected.

The Government have said that they were disappointed by the move—the Minister used the word “regrettable”—but said that they would respect this request by preparing the necessary amendments to the Bill, which is why we have so many before us in this group. I thank the Minister for apologising for this to the Committee—I appreciate that, as I am sure other noble Lords do.

I want to look at why the Welsh and Scottish Governments did not agree with the Bill. As the Government did not redraft it following the concerns raised but instead decided to plough on regardless, it is important to draw this to the attention of the Committee to fully understand the implications of many of its proposals.

In the Welsh Government, the Elections Bill was scrutinised by two Senedd committees: the Legislation, Justice and Constitution Committee, and the Local Government and Housing Committee. I commend the noble Baroness, Lady Humphreys, on her excellent speech about disappointment in Wales over the Government’s behaviour around the Bill, particularly because they completely refused to listen to the findings of the Llywydd’s Committee.

The Local Government and Housing Committee report agreed with the Welsh Government’s memorandum that consent should not be granted, saying:

“The majority of the Committee believe any proposals to legislate on these devolved matters should be brought forward by the Welsh Government and subject to full scrutiny by the Senedd.”


The Legislation, Justice and Constitution Committee also expressed concern at the lack of engagement between the UK Government and the Welsh Government. Can the Minister say why there was a lack of engagement —what went wrong with that process?

In addition, the committee agreed with the Welsh Government that some of the reserved measures would have a considerable impact on electoral administrators in Wales, particularly around voter ID. The same will happen in England. It highlighted the potential for voter and candidate confusion and complexity for electoral administrators if devolved elections happen close together or on the same day as a reserved election, as happened in May 2021. This could lead to a situation where postal and proxy voting rules were different and voter ID requirements in polling stations were different for polls happening together. My noble friend Lord Foulkes talked about the importance of consistency. Diversion will only cause confusion.

On voter ID, the committee also cited Electoral Reform Society Cymru concerns about poll clerks becoming

“bouncers at the ballot box”

and being required to turn away

“potentially thousands of would-be voters each election.”

Concerns have also been raised by Jess Blair, director of the Electoral Reform Society Cymru, who said that the Elections Bill makes

“sweeping changes to our democracy.”

She said that

“it looks like UK ministers have barely engaged with Wales or Scotland so far. This bill is being swiftly rammed through with little consultation”.

That echoes the concerns expressed already in your Lordships’ House. She continued:

“Moreover, the changes to the Electoral Commission represent a UK government power grab, with ministers given new controls over our elections watchdog. This is a dangerous and unprecedented move that the Welsh Government is right to oppose. This Elections Bill could lead to a ‘two tier franchise’ in Wales, with some elections banning those without ID, and others remaining open and free. Both the Welsh Parliament and Holyrood should use their powers to pause this power-grab bill, and secure changes to protect the right to vote.”


So they have done.

Elections Bill

Lord Stunell Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Thursday 10th March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)]

May I interrupt again? The Minister jumps from the specific to the general and keeps saying that this statement is going to be innocuous. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, says it is going to be about five-year plans and longer-term strategies, and then the Minister talks about specific illegal acts and the failure to address some of them. We are jumping around. If there are problems—and this is why I jumped up before—particularly on postal votes, let us put in laws to address them. But we are not talking about new laws and new regulations; we are talking about how the Electoral Commission operates within its statutory functions, and the Government now want to interfere in that. This is the issue that concerns everyone. The Minister jumps from broad, innocuous strategy to specific regulation—very dangerous.

[Lord Stunell (LD)]

I appreciate the Minister giving way. I hope that his response will include a little more about what the Committee on Standards in Public Life recommended as the solution to the problem that the Minister quite rightly drew to our attention, because the solution recommended by the committee to the Government is not included in the Bill, and the solution brought forward by the Government is condemned by the committee.

[Lord True (Con)]

I was answering the question I was asked in Committee; I was asked in a supplementary question, and then in another, to give an example of where there has been a complaint about the Electoral Commission, so I tried to serve the Committee by giving two answers. Perhaps that was ill-advised, but I am happy for them to stand on the record. I did say that we would be discussing on this legislation what the appropriate response is. We think that the measures that the Government have put forward, and we will debate this shortly, are proportionate and reasonable, and they are not a direction. When we see what is contained therein, they neither constrain the role of the Electoral Commission, nor direct it.

The Government oppose these amendments. Amendment 3 proposes that the power to designate a statement expires after 12 months of the Act being passed. It is unclear if the intention is that the initial statement should be designated within 12 months or that no statement should be enforced after 12 months. If the limitation is intended to attach to the initial statement, the Government’s view would be that it would add unnecessary pressure to the timetable and could curtail the amount of time afforded to the consultation.

I cannot anticipate the length for production—I was asked that, and I do not think I can respond in writing on this, because it is provisional, in a sense. Parliament has to agree the concept first, then the consultation has to proceed. It does say within the Bill that, in a subsequent review, the review period would be nine months; that is what is envisaged in the case of a review, but in saying that I am not making any commitment on progress, should Parliament agree to these procedures. I am not in a position to do so. If the statement, as drafted, prevents any further statement or revision beyond the initial 12-month period, we could not accept that, because we believe that it is important that, subsequent to any additional statement that Parliament may agree, the Government of the day and the Secretary of State should have the power to make changes and to review to ensure that it remains up to date with any emerging concerns.

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[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, we can all agree that the Government are constantly overreaching themselves and trying to accrue more and more powers. It is perfectly acceptable to try to ensure that the Government do not do so in this case. The Electoral Commission must be independent of both the Government and Parliament. This is a way to avoid any sort of conflict of interest for all MPs and, at times, for us. While we normally support any efforts to subject decisions to parliamentary scrutiny, it would be a false solution in this case. The strategy and policy statement must be removed from the Bill absolutely and entirely, rather than simply adding Parliament’s conflict of interest to that of the Government. We heard from noble Lords earlier who said, “Let’s get rid of the Bill”. Let us get rid of as much as we can on the way.

[Lord Stunell (LD)]

My Lords, the merits of the amendment are secondary to the replies that the Minister gave on the previous group of amendments. I thought that he might like a second go when responding to this group. I sum up the Minister’s defence of the strategy statement as standing on two legs. The first leg is that it is vital to the proper conduct of future elections that the Electoral Commission has a government-sponsored strategy statement in its toolbox. The second is that any strategy statement which this Government could devise would be so bland, inoffensive and harmless that it would make no practical difference to the way in which elections are conducted. That was a phrase the Minister used in his reply to the noble Lord, Lord Collins, in the previous group. Would the Minister like to have a go at seeing which of those two legs he wants to stand on when replying to this group?

Perhaps he could also scoop up the third argument he deployed: that flexibility is essential and speed may sometimes be needed, and this would justify missing out any consultation. He further said that every Government would want to see consultation take place. I can think of quite a few Governments who very much did not want consultation to take place. It is very commonly the job of Oppositions to remind Governments that consultation is a necessary preliminary to getting good legislation. I am delighted if, somehow, he has been taken in by the idea that every Government would want to see consultation. However, I would remind him that even during the coalition’s time—when I saw behind the scenery slightly more than I was expecting—it was a constant fight within departments for my colleagues and I to persuade his colleagues that consulting properly before legislating would be a good step forward. I hope he will be able to reconcile his two conflicting arguments about why we need it, while tackling and giving a response to the circumstances in which avoiding consultation might be—at least in some way—justified, rather than simply for the convenience of a Government at the time.

[Baroness Hayman of Ullock (Lab)]

My Lords, just on that point on consultation, I suggest that the Minister, when he responds, thinks of the expression “more haste, less speed”. Rushing things through without proper consultation can lead only to difficulties and the issue being revisited at a later date.

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[Lord True (Con)]

I note what the noble Lord opposite says. I believe that I have set out the correct constitutional position. If he wishes to persuade your Lordships’ House to act differently from the way it normally operates, it is up to him to make that argument and it is his privilege at the time, but that is not the argument before the Committee. I do not believe that the statement or the illustrative example of a statement justifies the kind of language which has been used about it today. We will have a debate on clause stand part shortly, but since the effect of the amendment is simply to replicate what is already in the Bill, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw it.

[Lord Stunell (LD)]

On a straight point of information, if an emergency statement is produced without consultation, can the Minister give us an assurance that it will itself come before both Houses of Parliament or will it bypass that process as well?

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, any statement has to be treated in the light in which Parliament enacts statements to be approved, and that is by affirmative resolution.

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[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, I always have some empathy with the noble Lord opposite, who I greatly respect, when he speaks of Labour tradition, the tradition of working people and social traditions. My mother’s grandfather and his family were brought up in Salford and teeming parts of Manchester, and the education they had that led them to improve their lives and secure some degree of prosperity came through the mechanics’ institutes and institutions created by civil society with a good social instinct. So I understand what the noble Lord says and how he feels. I also understand how the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, feels when she speaks about civil society.

These amendments propose extending statutory consultation to specific groups, however defined. As the Bill stands, the consultation process provided in Clause 14 will already ensure that the statement will be subject, where applicable, to some statutory consultation with key stakeholders, including the Electoral Commission, the Speaker’s Committee on the Electoral Commission and the Levelling Up, Housing and Communities Committee. If the amendments your Lordships agreed earlier and are about to agree are agreed by the House of Commons, those institutions and bodies would be involved before the draft statement is submitted for the approval of Parliament.

The Secretary of State and officials will hear what has been said, but of course, the Secretary of State is not limited to consulting with only those bodies in considering legislation. I am grateful for what the noble Baroness said about reaching out to civil society. Government Ministers regularly engage with relevant stakeholders across civil society—I am sure that will continue—and a wide range of views can be considered by the Secretary of State when preparing a draft statement. I remind the Committee that the Secretary of State concerned is the one who bears responsibility for local government. Obviously, there is a particular, constant and important engagement between their department and local government. I understand the meaning and sense of the amendment asking for local government to be consulted, but that is, if you like, a standing counterparty of that department.

In addition, both Houses of Parliament play an important role in allowing for the views of wider society; your Lordships’ House is admirable in that. This already ensures that groups such as those noted in these amendments, including trade unions—which never lack a powerful voice in this House, notably from the noble Lord opposite—will be adequately represented through Parliament in scrutinising any draft statement. Additionally, the Speaker’s Committee on the Electoral Commission, which is a statutory consultee, is a cross-party group of MPs and that will further allow for representation of the views of different parts of the electorate.

So, while understanding the spirit in which these amendments are advanced and certainly giving the assurance that the Government are not limited to consulting only those bodies listed in the Bill, I urge that the amendments be withdrawn or not moved.

[Lord Stunell (LD)]

Could the Minister confirm that, when he referred to the Speaker’s commission just now, he meant the Speaker’s committee? He suggested that it had a wide remit to consult with society, whereas I am sure he will recall that it is substantially made up of Conservative Cabinet Ministers.

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As I said, Clause 17 amends Schedule 1(2) to PPERA to expressly remove the potential for the commission to bring criminal prosecutions in England, Wales and Northern Ireland—obviously, it does not apply in Scotland, where there is already the single prosecuting authority. I will not go into detail on that because, clearly, the next group of amendments in the name of the Lord, Lord Wallace, will probe much further into Clause 17 and the criminal procedures that it refers to, about which others have already expressed concerns, including in evidence given to different committees. I will not go into that, as we are about to debate it; this is a simple probing amendment to find out exactly what the thinking is and how it fits with other, similar organisations.

[Lord Stunell (LD)]

My Lords, I support the amendment, probing as it is, from the noble Baroness. As she quite rightly said, this in large measure prefigures the next debate we are going to have. I await with interest the answers that we will hear. Particularly in the case of the borrowing power, it seems somewhat otiose to put in a power that has never been exercised in any way at all.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, it seems that it is time for a change of horse—although it is fair to say that the highway that this one is on is broadly the same. On this amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman of Ullock, I respect her wish to explore the issue; I understand that it is a probing amendment on the question of whether the Electoral Commission can borrow money. I will try my best to answer the questions that have been raised. It is our view, at the outset, that we do not think that this is necessary, but it is of course incumbent on me to explain why.

It is important to note that the Electoral Commission is funded through Parliament each year, following scrutiny by the Speaker’s Committee on the Electoral Commission. The commission submits a main estimate, outlining its required funding for the financial year ahead for approval by that committee, with the estimate then laid before the House of Commons. Should the commission require any further funding for the year, it is able to submit supplementary estimates throughout the year to the Speaker’s Committee on the Electoral Commission as necessary. This could be where project costs have risen for unforeseeable circumstances or for unscheduled electoral events. Given this annual funding through Parliament, and with the ability to seek further funding if required for unforeseen projects or events, it is the view of the Government that the commission therefore does not need to borrow money. I think that is probably what the noble Baroness was seeking confirmation of, and I can confirm it. It is further noted that this restriction has been in place since the establishment of the commission.

On the noble Baroness’s specific question as to why it therefore needs to be in the Bill, I am seeking that answer. It may just be that it is confirmatory and needs to be put in but, if there is anything further to say on that, I will most certainly write to the noble Baroness, as it is a very fair and rather basic question.

On the other public bodies that might be in a position to borrow money—that is, who they are and perhaps to what extent—again, that is something I will need to write on. It may be a very long list or it may be a very short list, but it is a fair point in terms of providing some sort of context to this matter.

I hope that that provides a little reassurance. With that, I ask that the amendment be withdrawn.

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Debate on whether Clause 17 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Stunell (LD)]

I rise to oppose the proposition that Clause 17 should stand part of the Bill.

Clause 17 is a strange animal. In explaining something of the context for new sub-paragraph (2)(a), the Minister did not give me the impression that there is a clear context for its inclusion in the Bill. However, it is much easier to see what it is for when you look at new sub-paragraph (2)(b). The way I see it—perhaps the Minister can tell me whether I have got it wrong—this is, in essence, the wing-clipping clause. Wing clipping leaves the bird looking fine; it just cannot fly. So the Electoral Commission will retain all its plumage and hopefully make all the right noises at the right time, but it will not be allowed to deliver so much as a peck to miscreants, let alone take off and fly. In short, new sub-paragraph (2)(b) removes the Electoral Commission’s right to instigate criminal proceedings.

In our report on this exact matter last year, the Committee on Standards in Public Life looked very hard at the issue, not least because some of the Minister’s friends in the other place had clearly expressed strong views on it. We heard some of the context for that from the noble Lord, Lord Hayward, earlier. If I change the metaphor from birds to football, I could say that the Minister’s friends in the other place objected to the yellow cards that the Electoral Commission issued following the 2015 general election. They wanted to appeal to the FA on the grounds that the referee was biased, did not understand the offside rule and had taken a long time studying VAR before reaching for his card.

The committee heard—indeed, the noble Baroness quoted our evidence—that it had been a very stressful time for some people, not least because there was an extended period of uncertainty and a high risk of reputational damage. Nevertheless, the fact is that offences were committed, breaches of electoral law were found and convictions followed. I might say in passing that, as an amateur agent and candidate multiple times over a period of more than 40 years, it is a stressful time. However, of all the difficulties in understanding and accurately following election rules during that time, I must say that I never found the rule that national and local expenditure should be kept separate particularly taxing or problematic—but they found it to be so.

I recommend that noble Lords take a close look at the CSPL report on this, which I believe they will find balanced and persuasive, although it does not seem to have persuaded the Government. In one particular respect, we recommended that the Electoral Commission should in fact have extra powers to grant permission to parties and non-party and referendum campaigners to pay late invoices or bills from suppliers. That is taking over a function that is currently exercised by the courts. At present, there is a very cumbersome process of applying to the courts for relief if a small mistake—or indeed a large one, although most are very trivial—has been made in paying invoices and bills at the end of an election campaign. That application to the courts is certainly stressful and wholly disproportionate. If stress relief is the aim of this clause, or the Bill as a whole, that CSPL recommendation ought to be included in it—that provision should be there.

One argument that has been advanced and that the Minister may be tempted to deploy is that it is not appropriate for the rule-maker to be the prosecutor of breaches of those laws. Well, quite a lot of people exercise power in situations where they might have a conflict of interest, which has been referred to by my noble friend Lord Scriven. I remind the Minister that the Health and Safety Executive is one of many regulators that do exactly that: it manages the regulations and carries out prosecutions. I further remind him that his noble friend, the noble Lord, Lord Greenhalgh, is about to give the Health and Safety Executive, via the building safety regulator, a hugely extended role in tackling the cladding scandal and the many examples of poor practice in the building industry. It may be too much to expect consistency of approach from two Ministers dealing with two Bills on the same issue in the same week, but, in one case, a regulator is being given a greatly enhanced reach of powers to prosecute and fine, and, in the other, one is having its teeth ripped out.

It may be said that there have not been any prosecutions by the Electoral Commission and you never miss what you do not have. That of course is a completely post hoc position; it would make more sense to deploy that argument if there had not in fact been dirty work at the Thanet crossroads—but the court found that there had been. The evidence given to CSPL was that, in England, the very many different police forces have very different levels of expertise in election law and offences. They were often very hesitant to get involved in complex and possibly highly politically charged cases where there is little by way of case law to guide them and quite a low chance of securing a conviction. I do not know whether the Minister has any evidence to the contrary—has he got chief police constables and police and crime commissioners queueing up to ask him, “Please can we take on more election offences”?—but I have to say that that evidence missed CSPL. So, in the absence of that, what does subsection (4)(2)(b) achieve? As far as I can see, it reduces the chance of a successful prosecution or inquiry.

So, if there is no evidence that the police are gagging to take on more work, the impression that the Electoral Commission’s wings are simply being clipped is strengthened. So I want hear how the Minister expects prosecutions of egregious offences to proceed if this is removed from the system. If the system is to function effectively, the Electoral Commission needs the backstop power to institute proceedings, not least as a spur or lever to make sure that police engage properly in taking action in an area of law where they have traditionally shied away from it.

Although Clause 17 is by no means as dangerous as the earlier ones—Clauses 14 and 15—it is here simply as a piece of red meat to give to disgruntled politicians who had a near miss. It is out of place in a Bill that was once called the “election integrity Bill”—very sensibly, the Government dropped the word “integrity”. I am afraid that it diminishes the power of the Electoral Commission in yet another small way and reduces its capacity to deliver fully and properly on one of its core functions. It runs entirely contrary to the recommendations made by CSPL, which have been delivered to the Prime Minister after a most careful consideration of all of the available evidence. I and my noble friends say that it should come out of the Bill.

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[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, it is quite sweet to have these two amendments in the same group. I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, knows which one I prefer.

Clearly, you have to make the political parties pay attention. At the moment political parties face higher fines for data protection breaches than they do for breaking election law, which is really inappropriate. The risk is that fines for breaking election law just become part of the cost of doing business for political parties, especially those with the deepest pockets and richest donors. That is clearly not the Green Party, but it could be other political parties represented in this Chamber.

Amendment 18 would mean that the penalties for breaking election law would actually hurt the law-breakers. It follows the same logic as the general data protection regulations by implementing proportional fines so that big organisations have to pay attention.

[Lord Stunell (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to support my noble friend and Amendment 18 and to thank the noble Lord, Lord Young, who, once again, trumps everybody by having been the Minister, which is a bit of a theme in the debates he has contributed to that I have heard. He is all the more welcome for that, and I hope that in due course his DNA may reappear on the ministerial file so he can complete the job.

I think the case has been made very clear. In fact, the noble Baroness from the Green Party, whose name has just evaporated—the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, I do beg her pardon—made the clear comparison between the fine a party might get from screwing up on its data protection and the fine it might get from screwing up on its election expenses. I think any ordinary member of the public, and indeed any rational Member of this House, would think that if one offence were worse than the other, the election offence is surely the more serious. I hope we shall hear that, subsequent to the new Minister picking up the file, he has been able to talk to the relevant officials who decide these things on his behalf and will be able to give us some idea that the Government will produce their own amendment on Report, or perhaps will assist the noble Lord, Lord Young, in tweaking his, so that it is at an acceptable level for his officials to approve.

I want to make the case that we and my noble friend Lord Rennard set out very clearly to make this proportionate to the fines and the impact that other regulators can have on the behaviour of the organisations they regulate. This may not be entirely in the best interests of those of us in this room, because it could be our political parties that end up paying significant amounts of money. That, of course, is the trouble, because whether the turkeys will vote for Christmas is always a difficult question to answer. Actually, it is an easy question to answer, but how do you overcome the natural reluctance there is to impose on ourselves the burdens that we willingly impose on other people when they offend regulatory standards?

I hope to hear something from the Minister. If he cannot come in at £500,000, could he at least, for goodness’ sake, come in at £50,000 and give those of us here who think this system urgently needs uprating some glimmer of hope that progress is being made?

[Lord Khan of Burnley (Lab)]

My Lords, I first say how much I am enjoying hearing the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, expressing his views in an unconstrained manner. I am also glad that he still has his DNA all over this folder, which means there are some valuable contributions.

The amendments in this group, which would have the effect of increasing the fines the Electoral Commission can apply, raise the question of how the commission can effectively deter non-compliance. This is an especially pertinent question given that the Bill removes its power to institute criminal proceedings.

In the past year alone, the commission has investigated close to 40 different parties, individuals and campaigners. Many of these investigations have led to fines. These include penalties totalling almost £18,000 to the Conservative Party for failing to deliver accurate quarterly donation reports and failing to keep accurate accounting records. In the most recent recording period, however, there seems to be no instance of the commission imposing the maximum fine. Can the Minister confirm how many instances there have been of the full £20,000 fine being applied?

The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, raises the possibility that the fine could equal a percentage of the total spend of the organisation—a point that the noble Lord, Lord Rennard, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, have raised in relation to bringing it in line with the fairness of other organisations, such as GDPR and the Information Commissioner’s Office. This is significant in relation to raising the possibility of the equal percentage of the total spend of the organisation, because a number of smaller parties have received fines that are as large as the main parties’ fines. I look forward to hearing the Minister address the concerns raised by noble Lords in this group in particular.

Lobbying of Ministers

Lord Stunell Excerpts

Tuesday 1st March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, when the register was introduced by a Conservative Government, other propositions were put forward. At the time we felt that widening the scope could place a significant burden on charities and so on. However, we are conducting post-legislative scrutiny of the lobbying legislation. That has obviously been affected by the progress of Covid, but the point the noble Baroness and others make will be taken into consideration.

[Lord Stunell (LD)]

My Lords, in June last year the Committee on Standards in Public Life, of which I am a member, submitted recommendations to the Prime Minister for action by the Cabinet Office on ministerial lobbying. After eight months of careful consideration, can the Minister for the Cabinet Office tell us how many of the seven recommendations in that report he intends to implement, and on what timescale?

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, a number of important documents and proposals have been presented to the Government; the noble Lord mentions one of them. We have the Boardman recommendations and the post-legislative scrutiny, which I have just mentioned. All those mesh together and the Government will respond, as I said in the previous answer.

Elections Bill

Lord Stunell Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 23rd February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stunell (LD)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Willetts, and I very much endorse his remarks. I extend my congratulations to the noble Lord, Lord Moore, on his very witty and thoughtful speech.

This is a pivotal debate on a Bill where there is much at stake. A number of speakers have talked about ways in which the playing field may be tilted one way or another, but I want to concentrate on what is happening to the referee—the Electoral Commission. Are the Government going to press forward with measures which will throw away the UK’s reputation as a staunch upholder of sound democratic best practice and move another step towards undermining public trust in the integrity of our electoral system, or will they instead take a deep breath and pause to rebuild a consensus for legitimate reform to reinvigorate our democracy? The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, made the case for this with tremendous eloquence and power at the start of our debate.

I am a member of the Committee on Standards in Public Life—CSPL—and serve as one of the three political members of that committee, alongside a majority of independent members under the chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Evans of Weardale. Much of what I intend to say is drawn from my experience on that Committee. It was the body that in 2000 first recommended the creation of a fully independent election regulator, which lead directly to the formation of the Electoral Commission. The committee has asserted ever since that a fundamental characteristic of the commission was and had to be its independence from political interference, let alone its domination or redirection by one particular political party. The committee expressed that in our report Regulating Election Finance last July, which said that

“it is imperative that there exists a strong, independent electoral regulator. For the electoral system to be fair and to be seen to be fair, and to command the confidence of political parties and the public, it must be overseen by an independent regulator, protected from political pressures and separate from the government. Such a regulator must demonstrate its impartiality and effectiveness at all times”.

Far from trimming down the Electoral Commission’s independence and remit, our report also recommended,

“a focus on increasing the effectiveness of the system for securing compliance with election finance law,”

It included recommendations among others to:

“Give the Electoral Commission additional powers … to impose more proportionate and meaningful sanctions”


and to—

“Transfer responsibility from the courts to the Electoral Commission for granting permission to parties, non-party campaigners and referendum campaigners to pay late invoices or bills from suppliers.”

Those and other measures which I have not quoted are proposed by the committee to enhance the working of the Electoral Commission as a strong independent regulator, as part of a package of robust measures to strengthen our democracy.

In more normal times, the Government of the day, on receipt of such recommendations from the CSPL, would seek to find as quickly as they could a legislative slot to implement them. That is what has always happened before, when the CSPL has made recommendations about the Electoral Commission. Instead, we have this Bill, which undermines the commission’s central function and leaves it beholden to the best interests of the party in power. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, made that point with greater eloquence than me. We might expect to see that kind of thing to be reported from Belarus perhaps, or from Russia certainly, but surely not from Britain. This is not a minority view. The Conservative-led Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee in the other place said bluntly:

“We recommend that Clauses 13 to 15 of the Bill are removed”.


Those, of course, are the key clauses that would strike the fatal blow to the Electoral Commission’s independence.

Of course, the Government will say that they are a benign and well-meaning Administration, and any inference otherwise is an outrageous and partisan slur. However, we were only one general election away from having a radical left-led Government in Britain that the Minister would be all too ready to demonise and attribute the most ill-founded and evil motives to. Is the Minister confident that these powers, if incorporated as set out in the Bill now, would be good ones to have handed over to them? That, surely, is the test. I want to hear from him when he winds up that he clearly does agree that those powers should be in the Bill and that in future a left-led Government should be free to exercise the options that he says he is so self-controlled that he would never abuse.

The Bill is a depth charge placed under the Electoral Commission that threatens not just the commission but public confidence and trust in the whole functioning of the regulatory oversight of our democratic system. It is not simply a bad legislative package; it has actively displaced sensible proposals for reform, which are queuing up for implementation. The Government all the time are protesting that they have not the time to do the job properly. My noble friends and I will wish to return to many of these matters at subsequent stages of the Bill.

Standards in Public Life

Lord Stunell Excerpts

Thursday 9th September 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stunell (LD)]

My Lords, I think I should steer clear of the topics raised by the noble Lord who spoke most recently, but I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Donaghy, for her kind words about my late colleague Diana Maddock. She is much missed on our side. She was a predecessor on the Committee on Standards in Public Life on which I now serve.

One of the key tasks of that committee is to monitor how the seven principles are being applied and to assess the relevance and resilience of those principles in an age when society is changing and evolving, when legislation imposes new challenges and demands on those who deliver public services, and when public expectations are a moveable feast and reshaped. There are new risks and new opportunities, so the committee has a full agenda.

The principles operate in a dynamic society. Even seemingly rock-solid principles, such as the principle of objectivity, which require office holders to act “without discrimination or bias”, change from generation to generation. I will give an example: when my mother got married, she was required to resign from her job in the Civil Service. There was not much objectivity there. In my generation, the fight for equal pay for equal work across public services finished only when it was resolved in the High Court. There was not much objectivity there. Now, my children have expectations about protection from sexual harassment and bullying in their workplace that would have been unimaginable 20 years ago. Noble Lords may well think it has been a change in the application of the principle of objectivity in the right direction.

However, some changes have had more mixed results. The advent of social media has indeed dramatically improved openness, but it has also—as the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, pointed out—enhanced bullying and created a polarised climate in which calm and balanced decision-making may put at risk. That polarisation has made custodianship of those principles—

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for giving way. I am grateful to him for referring to my contribution earlier, but I am just a little concerned: I was not suggesting anything in the way that he is interpreting—I did not refer to anything in the way that he is suggesting I meant. I would just like to correct him on that.

[Lord Stunell (LD)]

My Lords, I deeply apologise if I misunderstood or misinterpreted what the noble Baroness said. I certainly would not wish to sustain that. What I will say is that there has been a polarisation in political dialogue, which has led to the custodianship of those principles being an increasingly challenging task.

An example I will give is that, when the Chancellor of the Exchequer Hugh Dalton gave a hint of a tax change to a journalist a few moments before giving his 1947 Budget speech, he felt compelled to resign over his leak. Last Friday, the Prime Minister set out a new tax policy in a daily newspaper, with a three-day lapse before a Statement was made in the House. Any idea that this breach should lead to his resignation is now regarded as absurd in the popular discourse. That means that, clearly, the application of the principles of integrity and selflessness have migrated in that period. Yet the principle of leadership still requires a leader to

“be willing to challenge poor behaviour wherever it occurs.”

The CSPL does not deal with individual cases. It does not make findings of fact nor does it pass sentence. Where appropriate, that is the task of the various regulatory and monitoring bodies. Nevertheless, when a pattern of practice emerges in public life that, at the very least, challenges the conventionally understood meaning of the principles, the committee does report on it and makes recommendations. Those recommendations go via the Cabinet Office direct to the Prime Minister. That is of course both a great strength and a serious weakness. However, those who argue that it should report instead to Parliament, or maybe have a free-standing statutory constitutional position, are surely mistaking the presenting symptom for the underlying disease, which is that the UK has a uniquely powerful prime ministerial constitutional model.

All roads lead to the door of No. 10. Everything depends on the occupant leading from the top, whether it is on Covid, Brexit, or standards in public life. Seen that way, the more directly that the Committee on Standards in Public Life sends its good advice and strong recommendations to the top, the better. There is certainly a strong case for urgent reform of our current model of prime ministerial power, but that is a matter for a further debate.