Pension Schemes Bill

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

2nd reading
Thursday 18th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, it is about five years since we last saw a Pension Schemes Bill in this House, and it is good to see so many familiar faces, albeit sitting in different places in the Chamber. It is also good to be welcoming some new faces to our small band of pension enthusiasts, and I am particularly looking forward to hearing the maiden speech of my noble friend Lady White of Tufnell Park.

This is a big Bill, and there is a lot in it, much of which is to be welcomed and is not particularly controversial. I am going to restrict my comments to two areas of the Bill, one of which I think we will hear quite a lot about.

First, I understand and agree with the reasons and the desire to consolidate small dormant pension pots, but I have some concerns about the details. We are all aware of the problem of lost pensions, whereby a person has forgotten about a pension, perhaps from a long-ago short period of employment. This is one of the problems that the much-delayed pensions dashboard is designed to solve. Compulsorily moving a small pot from one provider to another risks increasing that problem: it will be much more difficult to track down a pension that you dimly remember if it has been moved, perhaps with any correspondence having been sent to an out-of-date address.

The definition of “dormant” is also slightly concerning: a pension pot will be considered dormant if no contributions have been made into the pot during the last 12 months and the individual has taken no steps to confirm or alter the way the pension pot is invested. I have a couple of pension pots that would be considered dormant under that definition, but that is simply because I am happy with the choices I made in the past; I would not consider them to be dormant. In the opposite direction, £1,000 seems a rather low definition of small, although I see it can be changed by regulation.

I am not clear when the Secretary of State intends to make the relevant regulations, but to avoid making the problem of lost pensions worse, I would suggest that it should not be done until the first pensions dashboard is fully operational and accessible to the public. As I understand it, that will not be until late 2027. Perhaps the Minister could provide a brief update on that. Also, there should be a clear requirement that any such transfer, carried out in a situation where no response has been received from the individual, should be clearly flagged on the dashboard to help people track them down.

The second issue I want to raise is more important. Here, I fear that a trend is beginning to emerge already—and that, most unusually, I am going to find myself in disagreement with the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. This is the power for the Government to mandate the asset allocation of a master trust or group personal pension scheme. Pension schemes should be managed for the benefit of the beneficiaries. The trustees have a fiduciary duty to that effect. The Government mandating that a proportion—and there is no limit to this in the Bill—should be directed into types of assets and locations chosen by them rides a coach and horses through that principle. Who will be liable if such investments are not suitable or go badly wrong? I do not see any indemnification of trustees here. What makes the Government think that they know better than a professional qualified pension manager as to what is best for scheme members? The track record of government investing is not stellar, to say the least.

Of course, the reason for this is to push more pension funds into UK assets, often described as “productive assets”. Like the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, I have that in inverted commas here, but even that makes little sense in this respect. Let us look at the sorts of assets that the Bill refers to. The first is private equity. Now, private equity may be a good place for a pension fund to put some of its money. Over time, returns have generally exceeded public markets and bonds, primarily because of the use of leverage, but I would love to understand why the Government think this would be a good thing for the country.

What private equity does is buy existing assets, then leverage them up with high levels of debt, thereby gearing up the possible returns that can be made on normal levels of growth. That reduces the corporation tax payable by the company because debt interest is tax-deductible, and the debt is often located in overseas low-tax jurisdictions. Typically, then, overheads and costs are reduced as far as they can be to make the company appear more profitable for sale after three to five years, and that often has the effect of reducing investment in the company and often leads to job reductions.

So where is the benefit to the country from this? If noble Lords do not believe me, I give them Thames Water, left underinvested and indebted by Macquarie, which took out billions in the process, or Debenhams, where the three private equity owners collected £1.2 billion of dividends financed by debt and property sales that left the company to go bust. Others we could mention would be Southern Cross Healthcare and Silentnight, where, ironically, pensioners also lost out, and we have the current anti-competitive situation with veterinary practices. Of course, this is a generalisation, and there are exceptions, but the idea that PE generates growth is doubtful at best—venture capital, development capital, growth capital, yes; PE, not so much. Why do the Government think it would be a good idea to force pension funds to invest in private equity?

Amazingly, the Bill does not actually set out that allocations must be made into UK assets. The wording is drafted so widely that the only assets globally that cannot be prescribed are assets listed on a recognised exchange; nor does it set any limits to what percentage should be allocated into the assets the Government prescribe. In theory, 100% could be allocated. The only safeguard in the Bill—contrary to the Minister’s comment that there are many safeguards—is that the Secretary of State must review the effects of any such regulation within five years of the regulations coming into force. We should note that this is not an independent review; it is a review by the Secretary of State, the very person who made the regulations. That does not fill me with huge confidence. Anyway, if things have gone wrong after five years, what can be done? Is the Secretary of State to be liable for the losses that scheme members have incurred because of the Government overriding the fiduciary duty?

We are an outlier in terms of our pension funds investing in their own country’s productive assets, especially when compared with countries such as Canada and Australia, so I understand why the Government wish to change that, but the way to achieve that is first to understand why it is not happening now. I would be interested to hear from the Minister why she thinks that is. I suspect it is down to a number of issues, including demographic issues, the attractiveness of our markets versus others, regulation, taxation—Gordon Brown’s dividend stealth tax has a lot to answer for—and, I am sure, others. The better solution, surely, is to identify and deal with the barriers that exist to make UK productive assets a more attractive investment prospect, not to take the frankly lazy and inefficient route of mandating without addressing the underlying reasons. Neither Canada nor Australia mandates. Rather, they promote domestic investment in infrastructure and projects through collaboration, not by forcing specific allocations. We should learn from those examples.

The Minister has been clear that the Government do not expect to use this mandation power. This raises a wider point of principle, one that the Minister and I have debated in other contexts in the past, which is that the Government should not give themselves powers that they do not intend to use. As the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, said, there is a tendency to use them regardless at some point, even if it is another Government who use them. This is becoming a bit of a trend, and one that I feel should be strongly resisted. There are two potential solutions to this part of the Bill. Either we need to clarify the whole fiduciary duty principle and improve safeguards, or we should remove the power altogether, and I must say that I favour the latter.

With that, I look forward to working with Members from all around the House, as ever, and the Minister on the Bill. In the meantime, I wish everyone a very happy Christmas.

Pension Schemes Bill

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd January 2026 Grand Committee

I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, before I start, I apologise to the Grand Committee for failing to be here to speak a previous amendment. It was unavoidable, unfortunately. I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, for stepping into the breach. I have had an exciting afternoon moving from R&R to pension schemes. I apologise that I am afraid I am going to be in the same position next week, so it will not be me speaking to my Amendment 119. Anyway, there we go.

I speak in support of Amendments 111, 161 and 162, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, to which I have added my name. To be honest, I support all the amendments in this group that seek to remove the asset allocation mandation powers, which is probably the most controversial part of the Bill. The trustees or managers of pension schemes have an obligation to act in the best interests of scheme members. That is their fiduciary duty. It is not their job to carry out government policy and they should not be forced to act in a way that they may believe is not in the best interests of scheme members. That is the clear implication of mandation. If the assets that the Government wish to mandate are so suitable or attractive for the relevant scheme, the trustees would presumably already be investing in them. If mandation is required to force trustees to invest in such assets, it implies that they have decided that they are not suitable assets for the scheme. That drives a coach and horses through the whole fiduciary principle. As we will come to in a later group, personally I would feel very uncomfortable about taking up a trustee role in such circumstances.

It begs a range of questions. Who will be liable if the mandated assets perform poorly? The Bill is silent on this. Why should scheme members take a hit because of government policy? Are the trustees liable for any below-par performance? Why do the Government feel they know better than professional managers and trustees? I do not see any evidence at all that the Government are a better manager of investments. Who will decide on the asset allocation, and based on what criteria? There is nothing in Bill that sets out the purpose or criteria for the asset allocation: just some examples, including private equity, which the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, mentioned, which will be looked at in a different group. All the Bill says specifically is that the allocation may not include securities listed on a recognised exchange. How will the impact be measured and reported? The Bill does require the Secretary of State to publish a report setting out the expected impacts on scheme members and UK economic growth, but there are no reporting requirements on the actual outcomes.

Surely it would be better to try to understand why pension schemes are not currently investing in these so-called productive assets. What are the barriers to them doing so? That is not a rhetorical question; I would very much like to hear why the Minister thinks this has not been happening. What is, or has been, stopping the pension schemes investing in those assets they believe are so desirable? Surely, the better answer must be to try to remove those barriers, to make the assets more investable, rather than mandating, perhaps by refining regulation or adjusting tax—Gordon Brown’s dividend tax raid has, I am sure, quite a lot to do with this—or taking whatever other actions may be required to remove or reduce the identified barriers. Mandation is, frankly, the lazy option. We should identify and deal with the root causes if we want a sustainable solution.

The Government say they do not intend to use the mandation powers and, in some ways, that is worse than using them. The powers are there as a stick in the background, to force trustees to invest as they want, but without giving the trustees any of the protections that might exist if they could at least show they were acting as required by law. In any case, as a matter of principle, Governments should never take powers that they have no intention of using. This mandation power drives a coach and horses through the fundamental fiduciary duties of trustees. The Government say they do not intend to use it; it should be removed.

[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group. I echo the words of noble colleagues in the Committee about the dangers of the Government mandating any particular asset allocation, especially the concerns about mandating what is the highest risk and the highest cost end of the equity spectrum at a time when we are aware that pension schemes have probably been too risk-averse and are trying to row back from that.

What is interesting, in the context of the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, is that I was instrumental in setting up the Myners review in 1999, which reported in 2001, under the then Labour Administration. As Chancellor, Gordon Brown’s particular concern was about why pension funds do not invest much in private equity or venture capital. That was the remit of the review. The conclusions it reached were that we needed to remove the investment barriers, to change legislation, to encourage more asset diversification, to have more transparency and to address the short-term thinking driven by actuarial standards—at the time, it was the minimum funding requirement, which was far weaker than the regime established under the Pensions Regulator in 2004.

So this is not a new issue, but there was no consideration at that time of forcing pension schemes to invest in just this one asset class. The barriers still exist. In an environment where pension schemes have been encouraged, for many years, to think that the right way forward is to invest by reducing or controlling risk and to look for low cost, it is clear that the private equity situation would not fit with those categories. Therefore, I urge the Government to think again about mandating this one area of the investment market, when there are so many other areas that a diversified portfolio could benefit from, leaving the field open for the trustees to decide which area is best for their scheme.

I am particularly concerned that, as has been said in relation to previous groups, private equity and venture capital have had a really good run. We may be driving pension schemes to buy this particular asset class at a time when we know that private equity funds are trying to set up continuation vehicles—or continuation of continuation vehicles—because they cannot sell the underlying investments at reasonable or profitable prices and are desperately looking for pools of assets to support those investments, made some time ago, which would not necessarily be of benefit to members in the long run.

Pension Schemes Bill

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 3rd February 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Sharkey sends his apologies; he is at a funeral and will read Hansard with great attention. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for supporting me on Amendment 167. I think it is the first time in 15 years that I have degrouped an amendment to stand by itself, but I can see no other way to ensure a clear answer from the Government: will they put their money where their mouth is?

The Committee has discussed qualified assets and, while I do not intend to repeat the discussion, I hope that everyone understands how high risk a portfolio of such assets is. The Financial Services Regulation Committee, in January, titled its look at the private equity markets as Private Markets: Unknown Unknowns. Some 75% of firms invested in by venture capital fail. Complex infrastructure is both high risk and illiquid; we can think HS2, the Elizabeth Line—four years delayed and £4 billion over budget—and Hinkley Point, which seems to run out of money time after time. If someone with a substantial pension wants to invest in such assets, that is fine with me, but the Mansion House Compact —or accord, I do not care which terminology is used—covers only auto-enrolment default fund pension schemes. These are vehicles for those with the narrowest shoulders, with low incomes, small pensions and little financial knowledge. The downside risk for them means poverty.

The Government have assured us, and those pension savers with the narrowest shoulders, that under the Mansion House Compact, and by putting 10% of their pensions into qualified assets, they will be winners—to quote the Minister on the first day in Committee:

“with an average earner potentially gaining up to £29,000 more by retirement”.—[Official Report, 12/1/26; col. GC 205.]

No warning of the downside was mentioned and clearly, to the Minister, the downside does not seriously exist. I challenge that. I am always very wary of promises of low-risk, high-return investments.

The Government have argued that the Mansion House Compact, combined with the provisions in this Bill, brings great benefits because risk can in effect be eliminated by the structures that have been introduced and the use of large providers. I want to challenge some of those shibboleths. Large providers have explained to me that they can enhance pensions and use qualified assets safely through lifestyle investing, where more is invested into high-risk assets early in the life of the pension, switching later to low-risk investments. If I lose £100 in the first year that I save in a pension, the loss is compounded through the life of the pension and I will have thousands less to get me through retirement. If I lose £100 the day before my pension matures, I lose £100. Early losses are never made up by later gains because they in no way enhance the performance of other assets in the portfolio. If you lose on A, there is no sudden guarantee that you will gain on B. Lifestyle investment is a marketing tool to sell schemes to the financially anxious.

The Government and the Minister argue that the risks in qualified assets can be mitigated away through diversification. For a fund fully invested in good-quality assets, such as the FTSE 100 or the S&P 500, I see the argument for diversification to manage risk, but diversification loses its effectiveness in high-risk portfolios, as everyone should have learned from the collateralised debt obligation scandal that triggered the financial crisis in 2008. Let me illustrate with an extreme example. I go to the casino, maybe several casinos. I play the slot machine, roulette and blackjack. I am beautifully diversified. But we all know that I will still lose my money.

The Government’s case that pensioners with the narrowest shoulders should be 10% invested in qualified assets really depends on assumptions that it makes about asset allocation. The argument is that the pension companies involved would employ the best experts to pick winners among those qualified assets. Some experts are better than others, though I note that they all will find statistics and present them to show that they have the Midas touch.

I note the analysis of the Government Actuary’s Department, which shows that over time and on average—that is a key word—virtually every model portfolio tested delivers similar results. But there is a catch, as the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, pointed out last week—the GAD’s conclusion underscored its uncertainty. It said that

“there is considerable uncertainty, particularly with the assumptions for projected future investment returns”.

The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, also quoted from the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries, which made the point even more forcefully. I could not work out what the mean looked like when I looked at that work done by the government department. Obviously, the mean really matters because an average can be made up of a few big winners and a lot of small losers. It is the losers in the high stakes game of qualified assets that worry me.

I am not attempting to stop the Mansion House Compact and the Government’s plan to put 10% of the assets of auto-enrolment default funds into qualified assets even though they are unlisted, opaque, high-risk and illiquid. My amendment would simply require the Government to provide a safety net for those who are in no position to live with the downside in these investments.

The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, last week said that

“the inevitable corollary of mandation”,

which is where he was focused,

“is responsibility for the outcome”.—[Official Report, 26/1/26; col. GC 284.]

But I regard the Mansion House Compact as very much a government-driven agreement designed by the industry to head off even more coercive action and so I think that the same principle applies: “responsibility for the outcome”.

My amendment is simple:

“Upon the individual becoming entitled to receive retirement benefits under the scheme, the trustees or managers must obtain an actuarial assessment of—


(a) the net investment return attributable to the qualifying assets held within the default arrangement over the period during which the individual’s rights were so invested, and


(b) the net investment return that would have been achieved over the same period had those assets instead been invested in a prescribed benchmark fund”.


In the amendment, benchmark fund

“means a diversified, low-cost equity index fund of a description specified in regulations”.

If the benchmark fund would have performed better, the Government make up the difference to the pensioner. The calculation, despite what the Minister said, is very simple, requires no new data and can be crafted straightforwardly. Pension schemes would just code it into their normal reporting.

If the Minister and the Government are right, and investment in qualified assets, as structured under the Mansion House Compact and in this Bill, benefits and does not harm pensioners in auto-enrolment default schemes—those people I described at the beginning with the narrowest shoulders and least able to take risk—it costs the Government absolutely nothing to sign up to this protection provision. If the Government believe their own words, accepting my amendment means taking no risk at all for the Government or taxpayer. My amendment only costs the Government money if they are wrong in the promises that they are making. The amendment would certainly give peace of mind to the poorest pensioners and strengthen their confidence to save and to invest.

We all want auto-enrolment to better serve low earners, but that requires shaping policy around the capacity of low earners to take risk. I ask the Government to put their money where their mouth is and provide the pension value protection described in my amendment. I beg to move.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I apologise for not being able to be here last week for Amendment 142. I am grateful that the Minister responded to it regardless of that. I have added my name to Amendment 167. I will try to be very brief because the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, has explained it with her usual clarity, and the amendment covers some of the same ground that we debated in the last group—although it attacks the problem from the other direction.