Employment Rights Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Young of Acton
Main Page: Lord Young of Acton (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Young of Acton's debates with the Department for Business and Trade
(1 day, 20 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in moving Amendment 101B, which seeks to amend the Equality Act 2010, I will also speak to Amendment 141A, which seeks to amend the Employment Rights Act 1996. I declare my interest as the general secretary of the Free Speech Union.
These amendments would protect job applicants and employees from being discriminated against by employers for their political opinions or affiliations, provided those opinions are not
“unworthy of respect in a democratic society”,
incompatible with
“the fundamental rights of others”,
and are not connected to a
“party, group or organisation which is proscribed for the purposes of the Terrorism Act 2000”.
In the Telegraph on Monday, a government spokesperson said these amendments are not necessary because:
“Any employee dismissed because of their political opinions can already bring a claim of unfair dismissal at any point”.
Well, they can. But whether they are successful or not depends on whether their political beliefs satisfy the Grainger test—a reference to a case in which an employee sued his employer, Grainger PLC, for discriminating against him because he believed in manmade climate change. It was established in that case that, in order to enjoy protected status under the Equality Act, a belief had to satisfy five separate conditions. This is the Grainger test:
“The belief must be genuinely held … It must be a belief and not … an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of information available”—
remember that one because I am going to come back to it.
“It must be a belief as to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour … It must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance … It must be worthy of respect in a democratic society, be not incompatible with human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental rights of others”.
Noble Lords will notice that the test I am proposing is a simpler alternative to the Grainger test. It is, in essence, just the fifth limb of the Grainger test.
So what is wrong with the Grainger test? For one thing, it is overcomplicated and leaves too much room for the personal political views of the members of a tribunal panel to creep in. That is why it has led to some arbitrary and biased decisions. For instance, the tribunal has ruled that anti-Zionism is a protected belief, while a belief in Zionism has not been granted that status, at least not yet. A belief in manmade climate change is protected—that was the judgment handed down in Grainger plc v Nicholson—but climate scepticism is not, and that has been tested in the tribunal. A belief in democratic socialism is protected but a belief in conservatism is not, and that too has been tested. In the case of Ms K Sunderland v The Hut.com Ltd—a Free Speech Union case—the tribunal ruled that a belief in a small state, low taxes, freedom of expression and as few controls on an individual’s freedom as are consistent with human rights was not protected.
That is one reason why the Free Speech Union currently has five cases in which employees have been dismissed because of their links to Reform UK. One such case is that of Saba Poursaeedi, who is in the Gallery as I speak. He lost his job at the Hightown Housing Association because he was due to stand as a Reform candidate. He was told that Reform’s policies on immigration, net zero and housing were “in direct conflict” with the values of the Hightown Housing Association—as clear a case of discrimination against someone for their political views as you could hope for. He is taking Hightown Housing Association to the tribunal but, given the judgment in Ms K Sunderland v The Hut.com, he may not be successful. That is one reason to accept these amendments: to level the playing field so that many people with right-of-centre political beliefs enjoy the same protection as people with left-of-centre political beliefs.
Another difficulty with the Grainger test is that it disadvantages open-minded people who, as the late Lord Keynes did, change their minds when the facts change. Remember the second limb of the Grainger test:
“It must be a belief and not … an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of information available”.
Do we really want the Equality Act to encourage dogmatism and punish open-mindedness in this way? Why should someone’s belief be undeserving of protection if it is susceptible to changing if the facts change?
The amendments would bring the Equality Act into line with the European Convention on Human Rights. Articles 9, 10, 11 and 14 provide a higher level of protection than that granted by the Equality Act, particularly Article 10, which protects freedom of expression, including the expression of political views. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, would no doubt point out if she was in the House, if there is a discrepancy between the Equality Act and the convention then its shortcomings will be corrected by the courts eventually, since, as per the Human Rights Act, our courts must interpret legislation in a way that is compatible with convention rights.
However, bringing a claim before the employment tribunal is a time-consuming process and one that can be extremely expensive. The Free Speech Union helped a man to bring a case for unfair dismissal against Lloyds Bank to the tribunal two years ago, and it cost over £85,000. Not only can it be eye-wateringly expensive but it takes a long time, given the current backlog of cases. Mr Poursaeedi’s case has been scheduled for July 2027, more than a year hence. In the meantime, he and other victims of discrimination based on their political beliefs are awaiting justice. Why not short-circuit that process, bring the Equality Act into line with the convention and ease the burden on the tribunal at the same time, as well as protect people now from being discriminated against in this way, by accepting my amendments?
My Lords, I put my name down on Amendments 101B and 141A, tackling employment discrimination on the basis of political opinions, because I wanted to probe whether the Government can see that it is a real, contemporary issue that needs to be tackled, however they do it. We know from the history of the labour movement that in the bad old days, as it were, attacking people’s employment rights, sacking them and suspending them were used by employers to discipline the workforce, and they were often focused on people who had the wrong views in the workplace. Often, the trade union organisers who were involved in left-wing parties and so on were the ones who were targeted, and we had McCarthyite-type purges, red scares and anti-trade union blacklists of individuals in workplaces—shocking, but those were the bad old days and it would not happen today, except that I think we are witnessing something similar today even if the political opinions of the victims might be very different and it might take a different form. This is an under-discussed phenomenon, and I hope the Government will see that the Bill is a way of tackling it.
My Lords, it is commonplace for individuals who express personal views that clash with the ethos of a particular company or institution to run into some trouble. Gary Lineker is the latest and most topical example, for displaying material that is considered to be antisemitic. My first experience, age 12, was my father refusing to let me display a political poster at a general election. If I had known about the Free Speech Union, maybe I would have joined the noble Lord, Lord Young, at that stage—maybe he should send Gary Lineker a membership form.
Oh, he has already done it—very good.
Let us be real about this. A lot of situations call for tact and diplomacy, and for us to be careful about the way we express difficult thing. A lot of people do not do that; they say what they like, thinking it is totally justified, and they get into difficulty. Unions spend a lot of time helping people get round those kinds of situations when they have got into trouble with their employer.
I do not think the argument coming from the other side of the Chamber is a convincing one. Let us remember a bit of common sense, and that tact and diplomacy are still required in many organisations, not just the BBC—and not just with my old dad, who did not like the fact that I had a “Vote Labour” poster in the window.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken. I think it would be helpful if I first clarify where the law stands on this.
On Amendment 101B, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, let me make it clear that religious and philosophical beliefs are already protected by the Equality Act 2010, including in the workplace. However, political belief—in the sense of a party-political affiliation or opinion—was not included as a protected characteristic in the Equality Act 2010. The noble Lord referred to the Grainger case. That case and the definition that the noble Lord read out referred to the issue of philosophical belief, which is already protected by the Act.
In 2015-16, the Equality and Human Rights Commission reviewed whether Great Britain’s equality and human rights legal framework sufficiently protects individuals with a religion or belief and the distinction of a religion or belief organisation while balancing the rights of others protected under the Equality Act 2010. The review found that the definition of religion or belief in the Equality Act is sufficiently broad to ensure wide protection for many religions or beliefs. It recommended no change to the definition of religion or belief or to the approach that the court should take in deciding whether any particular belief is protected under the Act.
We are not convinced that a political opinion or affiliation should be specifically protected by amendment to the Equality Act 2010 in contrast to other religions or beliefs. The extent of protected beliefs has been developed in case law, and we have not been presented with strong evidence that any legislative amendment is necessary. The amendment the noble Lord is proposing would potentially cause legal uncertainty over its relationship to the protected characteristic of religion or belief in Section 10 of the Equality Act, which has a much wider application than just the workplace.
The Government frequently receive calls for new protected characteristics—there have been over 21 suggested to date. While some of these carry merit, it simply would not be practical to include these all in the legislation, which would quickly become unmanageable for employers and service providers to follow, and for courts and tribunals to process and judge.
The noble Lord referred to the European Convention on Human Rights. The courts and tribunals will always be required to balance competing rights on the facts of a particular case, including the rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and freedom of expression under Articles 9 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as academic freedom.
Noble Lords have referred to a number of individual cases. They will appreciate that I cannot comment on individual cases. However, I can assure them that free speech is a cornerstone of British values. We are firmly committed to upholding the right of freedom of expression, which is protected by Article 10. I also absolutely agree with my noble friend Lord Monks that, in many cases—and preferably in all cases—it is ideal for these issues to be resolved by common sense at the workplace.
Turning to Amendment 141A, I seek to reassure the noble Lord that further legislative provision on this matter is not needed. Through the Bill, the Government are creating a day one right against unfair dismissal. As the noble Lord, Lord Young, acknowledged in his explanatory statement, additional protections for employees already exist under Section 108(4) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, which currently ensures that claims for unfair dismissal on the grounds of political opinion or affiliation are not subject to any qualification period. I can reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, that, while dismissal on the grounds of political beliefs and affiliations is not automatically unfair, if brought to a tribunal, the tribunal could find that it was unfair based on the circumstances at hand.
As we have said, these issues will very often have to be decided by a tribunal, based on the facts of the case. This will obviously also have to apply to the noble Lord’s amendment as well. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, that the delays in employment tribunals are a very real challenge that we are very conscious of, and we have already reported elsewhere in other debates on the Bill that we are taking steps to address this.
Relevant case law sets out the circumstances where political beliefs may constitute a philosophical belief for the purpose of the Equality Act 2010. In these cases, discrimination provisions could apply. Following a judgment from the European Court of Human Rights, the qualifying period for bringing a claim of unfair dismissal relating to political opinions or affiliation was removed, further strengthening employees’ access to justice in instances of unfair dismissal based on political views. The Bill ensures that claims for dismissal on this basis continue to be treated in the same way as claims for automatic unfair dismissal by carving them out in a new Section 108A from the requirement that any employee must have started work before a claim can be brought.
We regard this as the right approach. Making dismissal for political opinions automatically unfair, as this amendment seeks to do, would fundamentally change the way that free speech is considered in relation to dismissal for the holding of views or the expression of views that the employer regards as unacceptable. It could sweep up such a wide range of views as to be unworkable. As sufficient protection against dismissal for political beliefs already exists, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw Amendment 101B.
I thank all noble Lords who spoke in support of my amendments. I echo the tribute made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, to the journalist Patrick O’Flynn, who has just been taken from us so ahead of his time. I appreciate the remarks from the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, who I note did not oppose the amendments, although she was a little bit sceptical about the case I had made. I also thank my noble friend Lady Verma for her intervention.
In response to the Minister’s remarks, as she says, some political beliefs are protected by the Equality Act. The issue is that not all political beliefs are protected by the Equality Act. I gave some examples and I will give just one more: an employment tribunal decision that a belief in Scottish independence is protected, but a belief in unionism is not. There is often not much rhyme or reason to these employment tribunal decisions, because the Grainger test leaves so much room for bias, interpretation and subjective judgment. I am merely asking the Government to bring the Equality Act into line with the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 14 lists the characteristics that should be protected and includes the words “political … opinion”. That means all political opinions, not just those you disagree with.
Finally, I come to the intervention from the noble Lord, Lord Monks, and point out that Saba Poursaeedi did not lose his job at the housing association because he was tactless or undiplomatic; he lost it because he was intending to stand as a candidate for Reform UK. The association had no misgivings about his performance in his role; indeed, it promoted him. He was a model of tact and diplomacy when dealing with the residents managed by the housing association. That was not the reason he was fired. The noble Lord is, of course, welcome to join the Free Speech Union, and I hope that he does. I have reached out to Gary Lineker, not to defend him in any case he might want to bring against the BBC—which I do not think he intends—but because the police have said they may now be investigating his remarks. I reached out to him and said that, if that happens, we will provide him with a solicitor and, if necessary, a barrister.