Russian Influence on UK Politics and Democracy

Luke Myer Excerpts

Monday 9th February 2026 Westminster Hall

[Ben Goldsborough (South Norfolk) (Lab)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered e-petition 744215 relating to Russian influence on UK politics and democracy.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Pritchard. In preparation for leading this debate, I met experts and researchers; I also spoke to Alex, the organiser of today’s petition. I thank everyone who took the time to speak with me, I thank the diligent staff of the Petitions Committee for their support in organising those meetings, and I thank the 114,704 signatories to the petition, who have brought this critical issue to the attention of the House.

I know that the Government have already commissioned an urgent review of foreign financial interference in UK politics, led by Philip Rycroft. That is extremely welcome, and I applaud the Government for doing it, but I want to make a clear distinction. Financial interference is just one way in which the Kremlin meddles in our democracy; there are other ways as well. The petition calls for a public inquiry into all Russian interference in our politics. Such an inquiry should be broad, covering all aspects of Russian interference. I know that my hon. Friend the Minister will want to address that in his response.

From my discussion with Alex, I also know that the petition was inspired by events including the conviction of Reform’s former leader in Wales, Nathan Gill, and concerns about Russian interference in the 2016 Brexit referendum and Boris Johnson’s close personal relationship with Evgeny Lebedev, a man whom Boris Johnson elevated to the other place and the son of a “former” KGB officer.

I strongly believe in looking for solutions and looking forward, not back, but it is clear to me that the petitioners are deeply concerned about past events. With that in mind, I will start by talking about some of those events and outline how we have reached this point, to explain why the petitioners are so deeply concerned. We then need to talk about the state of play today. Where are our weaknesses? Where are our vulnerabilities to Russian interference? How is the Russian state already meddling in our democracy? Finally, we need to talk about solutions. What can the Government do to mend and protect trust in British politics?

I will start with Nathan Gill. The fact that the petition received so many signatures in Welsh constituencies should tell us that the crimes of Reform’s former leader in Wales were a major cause for concern for all petitioners. Nathan Gill is currently serving a 10-and-a-half-year sentence for taking, at the very least, £40,000 in Russian bribes. Now, £40,000 is a huge amount of money, but I ask hon. Members: is it enough to betray your country? I suggest not. Perhaps Mr Gill’s political leanings were already closer to the Kremlin’s than those of the rest of us.

For the sum of £40,000, Nathan Gill gave TV interviews in favour of an ally of Vladimir Putin and made speeches in the European Parliament. Spouting pro-Russian talking points is not new for Reform politicians: Nathan Gill’s boss, the hon. Member for Clacton (Nigel Farage), blamed the EU and NATO for Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, said that the west had “provoked” the invasion and described Putin as the world leader he most admired. It seems that Reform politicians are comfortable doing the Kremlin’s dirty work for it, regardless of whether they get paid for the privilege. Maybe Russia should have asked Mr Gill to betray his country for free. It may as well have saved £40,000.

The problem spreads further and higher than Reform, however. The former Prime Minister Boris Johnson has serious questions to answer about his relationship with Lord Lebedev, whose father was a KGB officer. There is, as they say, no such thing as a former KGB officer. In April 2018, when Boris Johnson was Foreign Secretary, he visited Alexander Lebedev’s Italian villa, a location allegedly being investigated for use in spying. He did so without his officials and travelled to Lebedev’s villa directly from a NATO summit. We were told by the former Prime Minister that

“no Government business was discussed.”

We have only his word for that. I will let hon. Members make up their own mind about how much trust should be placed in the former Prime Minister’s words.

In 2021, Italy’s foreign intelligence agency wrote to the Italian Prime Minister to report that Lord Lebedev’s father

“enjoyed the favour and friendship of Vladimir Putin”

and continued to attend KGB meetings in Moscow. The House of Lords Appointments Commission raised concerns about “significant potential risks” from Lord Lebedev’s “familial links”, but thanks to the former Conservative Prime Minister, this man now sits in the other place, with all the access and credibility that that place imparts, not to mention the ability to make decisions about the direction of our country.

Where do we stand now? I found my conversations with various experts extremely helpful in answering that question, and the points that I am about to make owe a huge amount to them.

First, our defences against money as a vector for political persuasion and control are insufficient. The case of Nathan Gill proves that. Although we should be pleased and relieved that Mr Gill was caught and punished, the damage was already done. Appropriate systems must be put in place to prevent any recurrence of his treachery. Some experts mentioned concerns that Russian money is used to fund think-tank reports in Britain. I ask the Minister whether the Government will consider mandating that all UK-based think-tanks declare their funding.

Critically, cryptocurrencies pose a new threat to our democracy. If we do not have the tools to tackle and prevent old-fashioned cash-in-hand corruption, what can we do to tackle bribery and corruption founded on cryptocurrencies? I ask the Minister whether the Home Office is taking steps to develop digital tools to tackle cryptocurrency bribery and corruption. I appreciate that the Rycroft review will assess financial interference specifically, but I would be grateful if the Minister told the House what efforts the Home Office is already making to clamp down on the malign influence of Russian money in our democracy.

Secondly, we must discuss an issue outside the remit of the ongoing Rycroft review. The experts I spoke to were explicit: Britain is on the frontline of an information war. Thanks to the security, crime, and intelligence innovation institute at the University of Cardiff, we know that Russia employs at least 500 political technologists. These are people who plan Russia’s informational, political, economic, cultural and legal subversion of its enemies.

One such political technologist was in London on the day of the 2016 Brexit referendum. On the day we made one of our biggest ever decisions as a nation, this Russian political technologist was in our capital city, taking photos of polling stations and sharing them on social media with his followers in Russia. This man has personally met senior UK political figures, and he wrote a report that personally thanked someone who worked on Conservative campaign headquarters election campaigns and alongside two former Prime Ministers. This man is now using the skills he acquired in Britain to deliver a master’s degree in Moscow, designed to train specialists in information warfare.

Russia clearly sees that this is a war, even if we do not. Its strategy is one of division, to create distrust and to convince Brits that we are all the same.

[Luke Myer (Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland) (Lab)]

During last year’s election in Moldova, undercover reporters exposed a network of people who were being paid by Russia to produce disinformation content on social media platforms, including TikTok and Facebook. Does my hon. Friend agree that we are naive to assume that such things are not happening in this country, too?

[Ben Goldsborough]

My hon. Friend hits the nail on the head. One of the experts I spoke to worked on that campaign, to make sure that loopholes were being closed to protect Moldovan democracy. We are no different from anybody else; he is completely right.

Disinformation relies on and deepens political polarisation in our country, creating uncertainty, distrust of truth and a rush to political extremes. “The Integrity Initiative Guide to Countering Russian Disinformation” says:

“When people start to say, ‘You don’t know what to believe’ or ‘They’re all as bad as each other’, the disinformers are winning.”

Information warfare with the Russian state is not new. So much of what we are discussing today could be straight out of the cold war, but thanks to social media it is now easier than ever for Russia to disseminate disinformation. As one expert put it to me, the UK currently has an analogue response in a digital age. To put it another way, the Russian state has brought an ICBM to a knife fight.

The experts also pointed out that media literacy in our country is poor. We are not equipped to spot disinformation, so people fall prey to lies. This affects everyone: no one is immune to disinformation, and people who think they are immune are most at risk.

Thirdly, our own authorities are unarmed. The Electoral Commission is toothless and not fit for purpose. It is unable to tackle this existential threat and has been stripped of all the powers needed to tackle political interference. The Home Office, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and intelligence agencies are siloed. Our civil servants change jobs too frequently and do not have the experience or expertise necessary to deal with the threat.

What can we do to protect our democracy? First, we need to get real. We might not feel as if we are on the frontline, but we are. Russia knows it, and we need to recognise it now.

Secondly, we need a single agency responsible for identifying, tracking and defending against disinformation. The Swedish have their Psychological Defence Agency, which co-ordinates defence and provides agencies, local government, companies and organisations with support and education in countering disinformation. The French have VIGINUM, which detects information from hostile foreign actors and works to identify bot farms.

Thirdly, we need substantial investment in critical thinking education and a focus on training future generations to critically analyse sources. The threat will be with us for many years to come, and we must ensure that future generations have the tools they need. Much of the framework is already in place in the current curriculum, but we need to go further. Scrutiny of the provenance and validity of sources should be an absolute priority in the curriculum. Maths already does it, so will the Minister’s Department work with colleagues in the Department for Education to improve media literacy?

I cannot impress strongly enough on hon. Members how urgent the situation is. We must act swiftly and decisively to secure our nation from Russian interference.