Defence Reform

Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton Excerpts
Tuesday 26th June 2012

(11 years, 10 months ago)

Commons Chamber
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Kevan Jones Portrait Mr Jones
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Let me read what the NAO report says—for the third time:

“The size of the gap is highly sensitive to the budget growth assumptions used. If the Defence budget remained constant in real terms, and using the Department’s forecast for defence inflation of 2.7 per cent, the gap would now be £6 billion.”

The figure of £36 billion is reached only if flat cash over 10 years is included. Ministers said that the £38 billion figure is over 10 years—that is not the impression they have been giving to the media, the armed forces and the public. Instead, they have been suggesting that we somehow have to lay our hands instantly on £38 billion. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Coventry North East said, the idea that that figure can be wiped out in two years is an accounting fantasy.

Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton Portrait Mark Lancaster (Milton Keynes North) (Con)
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Listening to this debate, the one thing that is clear and that the hon. Gentleman accepts is that there is a gap, be it £6 billion or £38 billion. Given that there is a gap, why did the last Government not balance the budget?

Kevan Jones Portrait Mr Jones
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We were on line in that regard. One of the jobs that my right hon. Friend the Member for Coventry North East gave me when he was Secretary of State—it was something of a poisoned chalice—was to draw up some reductions. Just before the general election, I had already identified some £1.2 billion of savings, but some of that involved investing money in order to save it. The problem at the moment is that the Treasury want instant cash out of the budget, and the only way to do that is to slash personnel and equipment straight away. The more sensible approach that we were going to implement was a planned phase of three to five years, involving some investment and some reductions. That is in stark contrast to the Government’s approach. What is driving this process is not defence strategy but the desire of this Government and the Treasury to take 8% out of the budget in years one and two. That has led to the short-termism we are seeing now.

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Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton Portrait Mark Lancaster (Milton Keynes North) (Con)
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I declare an interest as a member of the Territorial Army.

I listened with interest to the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), who has just left his place. I thought he was a perfectly competent Defence Minister, although not quite as competent as the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, my right hon. Friend the Member for South Leicestershire (Mr Robathan). Having listened carefully to the hon. Gentleman’s remarks, I am clear about several matters being pursued by the Government that he does not support, but, given his acceptance that there is a deficit and that it needs to be addressed, I am less clear about what exactly the Labour party would do to address it. I hope that in her winding-up speech the hon. Member for West Dunbartonshire (Gemma Doyle) will explain to the House exactly what the Labour party would do to deal with the deficit. Without that explanation, I fear that many of its claims will look rather hollow.

I want to focus on the plan for an integrated Army by 2020. I congratulate General Carter on his review. Frankly, he was handed a poisoned chalice, but he has managed to deliver an optimal military solution from very clear terms of reference. I want to be equally controversial by saying that sometimes arguments in the House about which regiments should be saved leave me slightly cold. I understand the historic significance of many regiments, and it is right that hon. Members should defend those regiments, but ultimately, if I were a senior officer, I would be holding my head in my hands, because, following this review, politicians are now tinkering with it and seeking to influence the decision for reasons based on political grounds, rather than optimal military grounds. It is not beyond the wit of the British Army to save various regimental cap badges, so I think that my hon. Friends should relax—I am sure that these cap badges will be saved. Instead, we must focus on the optimal military solution.

The integrated Army 2020 proposition, the skeleton of which was unveiled earlier this month at the Royal United Services Institute land warfare conference, is a neat solution to dealing with a period of strategic uncertainty at a time of economic austerity, and inevitably it involves smaller land forces. Indeed, it proposes a reduction in the regular force from 102,000 to 82,000, countered by an increase in the trained reserve forces to about 30,000, with an additional 8,000 under training. It aims to deliver an Army designed to meet the capability, aspirations and commitments of the strategic defence and security review 2010.

Equally, however, the proposal has to deliver contingent capabilities and meet the requirements of the Government’s “Building Stability Overseas Strategy”, published last year. Although I am confident that General Carter’s proposals provide an optimal military solution for the requirements of the SDSR, some cross-Government work is clearly still required to flesh out how this upstream engagement in fragile states will be delivered in order to meet the requirements of the overseas stability strategy. It is here, I believe, that the unique specialist skills that so many members of the reserve forces possess should be utilised. As I understand it, the proposed force structure aims to hold defence capabilities at different levels of readiness based on a balanced mix of reaction and adaptable forces. It is key, however, that to deliver this desired outcome, the Army must be able predictably to integrate its regular and reserve components, with the reserves likely to be required routinely to undertake roles such as providing for the UN battalion in Cyprus, as it has done sporadically in the past.

At the heart of the plan is a progressive move from a reserve force that provides individual augmentees for current operations to one that delivers a scalable, adaptable response by individuals to formed sub-units. This aspiration would certainly be welcomed by the TA, but will be welcomed by the Regular Army only if the TA can be relied upon to deliver. For the individual reservists, this calls for sustained commitment to regular training attendance and predictable periodic mobilisation. This is undoubtedly an ambitious target, but it can be achieved. It is important to realise, however, that there must be not only the military will to achieve it but significant political will and leadership, if the structure and reliance on reserves is to work.

Bob Stewart Portrait Bob Stewart
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There is one other requirement: money for the reserves to train properly. Otherwise, they cannot attain the same level as the regular forces.

Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton Portrait Mark Lancaster
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I agree. Indeed, I would argue that ambition without funding is simply hallucination, which is why I am delighted that £1.2 billion has been allocated for this upskilling of the reserves.

I have two concerns about the upskilling, however. First, I want to add to the comment from my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr Brazier). When it comes to the reserve units, we must be careful, because a larger TA might actually result in a smaller footprint. We must be careful about which TA units we close, simply because, as I know from my experience as an officer commanding a squadron, we cannot simply move personnel and expect them to move units and travel some 20 miles to continue training.

Equally, I am convinced that there must be a compulsion to train. At the moment, we simply have a gentlemen’s agreement to turn up and train with the TA. Without that compulsion, I fear that the reserves cannot fulfil the commitment that they are being asked to make. We are fortunate that section 22 in part III of the Reserve Forces Act 1996 already allows for compulsory training, but we need to look carefully at how to implement it, so that we do not end up offending employers, who might then not wish to allow their reservists to go and train. It is a very difficult circle to square. Equally, we need to look at TA regulations to ensure that bounty, a tax-free payment for people who are fit for role, can be adjusted to ensure that such compulsion can be taken into account.

In my last 27 seconds, I would like to highlight to hon. Members that tomorrow is “wear your uniform to work” day, which is a celebration of our reserve forces, with some 1,900 of them currently being mobilised in support of the Olympics and some 700 on operations in Afghanistan. I hope that hon. Members will join me in celebrating their reservists, although they do not have to go as far as I will by wearing my uniform tomorrow.