Renters (Reform) Bill (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Matthew Pennycook and Shaun Bailey

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st November 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Matthew Pennycook]

Clause 3 amends the grounds for possession in schedule 2 to the 1988 Act, by means of the changes set out in schedule 1 to the Bill, which we will debate separately later today. Taken together, amendments 145, 146 and 150 would extend “greater hardship” provisions to three of the mandatory grounds set out in amended schedule 2 to the 1988 Act, namely grounds 1, 1A and 6A.

Ideally, we would have debated these amendments as the last amendments to clause 3, because they are very much our fall-back position if we cannot convince the Government to accept the other changes that we propose to the clause. In due course, we will debate our concerns about several of the revised or new possession grounds provided for by the Bill that can still be fairly categorised as de facto “no fault”. These include grounds 1, 1A and 6A.

In cases where a landlord has proved a discretionary possession ground, a judge must decide whether it is reasonable to make the possession order. In reaching their decision, a judge can consider not just the reason for the possession claim, but anything relevant to the case, including the tenant’s conduct and the likely consequences of eviction for the individual or individuals in question. They can also consider whether the tenant has tried to put things right since the claim was issued. If the judge is not satisfied that it is reasonable to award possession in these discretionary cases, they can dismiss the claim all together. In contrast, if a landlord proceeds on a mandatory ground—I remind the Committee again that proposed new grounds 1, 1A and 6A are mandatory—the judge must make an order, if the landlord has proved their case.

The amendments would give the court very limited discretion, in relation to mandatory grounds 1, 1A and 6A, to consider whether the tenant would suffer greater hardship as a result of the possession order being granted.

[Shaun Bailey]

I appreciate that the hon. Gentleman has tabled further amendments on the evidential burden, but does he not appreciate my concern that there is perhaps a little bit of a floodgate situation around appeals on this issue? Notwithstanding his comments about the judicial system and the court system, I am conscious that we may have a scenario where judges’ decisions are challenged and we end up with a backlog. As a result, what the amendment tries to do would either be delayed, or would end up in a system of appeal after appeal, because clearly the result would be down to a judge’s subjective decision, based on the evidence in front of them at the time.

[Matthew Pennycook]

I thank the hon. Member for his intervention. Perhaps I have not explained myself clearly. These amendments do not provide for an appeals process. As I have tried to make clear, when it comes to a discretionary possession ground, judges can weigh up the evidence. That is not the case for a mandatory ground. The amendment provides for not an appeal process, but discretion for the court and the judge to consider whether their decision would cause greater hardship to the tenant. I will come on to explain how that would work.

[Shaun Bailey]

To clarify my point, I am aware that the amendment is not about an appeals process. However, as the hon. Gentleman will know, an application for appeal can be made against any judge’s decision, and that application can be granted by the superior courts, so the process is not immune from appeal; decisions can be taken to appeal. That is a right, which would be granted, and it could be achieved through another part of the system. I just wanted to clarify my position on that point.

[Matthew Pennycook]

It is an interesting debate, but not particularly pertinent to the amendments. It is not my understanding that a mandatory possession ground order can be appealed. If it can, then I think that the instances in which it can are vanishingly small. However, that is not what these amendments seek to do. They purely seek to protect very vulnerable tenants who might suffer great hardship as a result of the court’s decision.

The starting point for the court would remain that the landlord in question has proved his or her intention to either occupy the property under ground 1 or sell it under ground 1A, or the need to respond to enforcement action under ground 6A. In other words, the presumption would be that a possession order will be made, and in most cases it would be. However, the amendments would provide tenants with the opportunity to demonstrate to the court—not at appeal, but at a hearing of the court—that their eviction on any of the three grounds in question would lead to hardship greater than that of the landlord or, in the case of amended ground 1, potentially the landlord’s family. If the judge determined that the hardships each party is likely to experience were the same, under these amendments, the tenants would not succeed, and the possession order would still be made. However, if the tenant could prove to a court that they or a member of their household would suffer greater hardship than the landlord or the landlord’s family if a possession order were made, the court could refuse to make the possession order.