Oral Answers to Questions
Oliver Heald Excerpts(9 years, 3 months ago)
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James Brokenshire
The Government have taken steps to ensure that deportation is appropriate, and some removal centres have family issues absolutely at their heart to ensure that where we remove those who should not be in this country, whether family units or otherwise, it is done appropriately. We have a proud record on reducing and dealing with the deportation of children.
Sir Oliver Heald (North East Hertfordshire) (Con)
19. Will the Minister join me in paying tribute to the work of Assistant Commissioner Rowley and the Operation Nexus team, who do so much to find hardened foreign criminals in our country? Does he agree that it is vital to identify these people and, where possible, get them out of the country?
James Brokenshire
I am grateful to my hon. and learned Friend for highlighting the work of Operation Nexus, which has succeeded in removing 3,000 foreign national criminals by identifying them early in the custody suites and by working alongside our immigration enforcement teams and the police. This approach enables us to deal with any issues at the earliest opportunity and see that these people are removed.
EU Justice and Home Affairs Measures
Oliver Heald Excerpts(9 years, 5 months ago)
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Damian Green
Let me pick and choose. I give way to the former Solicitor-General.
Sir Oliver Heald (North East Hertfordshire) (Con)
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for giving way. Of course it is not a perfect agreement, but does he agree that it is a lot better than what went before, whereby it used to take 10 years in some cases to extradite criminals who had left our shores and whom we wanted back. Equally, if we have criminals from overseas who are on our territory, then of course we should send them back quickly to their own countries.
Damian Green
I entirely agree with my hon. and learned Friend. Indeed, it is the speed of operation of the European arrest warrant that is one of the most significant improvements over what was there before. I simply invite the House to consider this for a second or two not as a European issue but as a public safety issue. We live in an increasingly dangerous world in which criminals operate on an international scale and in which this country is a particular target not just for international terrorists but for serious criminals of all types. The three biggest and fastest growing international crimes are the trafficking of guns, drugs and people across frontiers, which is precisely why we need international measures such as the European arrest warrant to make us safe.
Graham Stringer (Blackley and Broughton) (Lab)
I congratulate the shadow Home Secretary on putting before the House a simple and straightforward motion. This difficult and complicated issue involves sovereignty, international crime and the future of the European Union, so it is right that elected Members—even those of us who do not agree with the shadow Home Secretary—can vote on such a straightforward motion.
If the debate was just about the improvements that the Government have made to the European arrest warrant, it might be possible to vote for it, although as my right hon. Friend the Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz) pointed out, many of those improvements do not go as far as they should. If this was simply a matter of the speed of getting through the judicial process, it would be easy to vote for it, for the reasons given by the right hon. Member for Ashford (Damian Green). But it goes much deeper than that. There are justices and injustices involved.
I do not know how to balance the injustices suffered by some people against the undoubted benefits derived from the European arrest warrant. How do we say to Symeou, Dark, Hainsworth, the Kings, Dines and other people who have suffered injustices, “Your injustice under the European arrest warrant is worth going through because it enables us to bring other criminals to court more quickly”? We cannot balance things that way. If we could, I would be interested to know what metric could be used.
The basic issue is not the speed of justice or improvements to the EAW. It is the fact that by entering the European arrest warrant system, we are giving recognition to courts throughout the European Union and passing sovereignty over to the European Court of Justice. To anybody who has read the accession documents just on Croatia—the same comments could be applied to Romania, Bulgaria and a number of other European countries—it is almost beyond dispute that those countries do not have a criminal justice system like ours. Theirs is subject to corruption and political interference, yet we are saying that the European arrest warrant procedure agreed in those countries will be recognised and followed through in this country.
I do not see how we can honour what has been honoured in this country for nearly 800 years—habeas corpus—when we allow British citizens to be taken by foreign courts that are subject to political interference and corruption, and locked up without the evidence being produced.
Sir Oliver Heald
It is not as though nothing is being done about that. The group of states against corruption, of which the UK is a very strong member, is doing work on these very issues—on corruption in courts and in Parliaments. It is going through the countries that the hon. Gentleman is talking about, reporting on these issues, highlighting them and pressing the Governments.
Graham Stringer
That is a fair point, but anyone who had been locked up in Romania or Croatia would not be pleased to hear that the situation will improve at some time in the future. The debate is among British politicians who are pragmatic; the arguments put forward by the Home Secretary and the shadow Home Secretary were powerful, pragmatic arguments about how there would be immediate benefit, but that is not the argument going on in the rest of the European Union.
Like many of the changes in the European Union, acceptance of the European arrest warrant is seen as a way of furthering integration. We are not entering into arrangements for the European prosecutor’s role, but I can almost guarantee—as much as one can guarantee anything in future—that in four, five, six or seven years’ time we will have adopted the European arrest warrant, this country will be in Eurojust and it will not look right if we are not in the European prosecutor system. We may well get a decision from the European Court of Justice that says, in effect, that we have to be in the European prosecutor system.
Child Abuse Inquiry
Oliver Heald Excerpts(9 years, 6 months ago)
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Sir Oliver Heald (North East Hertfordshire) (Con)
In joining in the welcome for the Home Secretary’s approach and tone, may I also ask her this: in the preparatory work and the taking of evidence that she has announced that the panel will be doing, can it be borne in mind that there may come a time when the chairman, having been appointed, wants to make a decision under the Inquiries Act 2005? Would it therefore be possible to ensure that the work of the panel is constructed in such a way that it avoids possible later duplication? That is the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) was making when he said that it might be necessary to recall witnesses and so on. If the panel had that in mind, it would be very useful.
Deregulation Bill
Oliver Heald Excerpts(9 years, 12 months ago)
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Norman Baker
Indeed they did, and I think they made a very wise decision and that businesses and the public in Newcastle will benefit from the Government’s sensible option of a late-night levy. I hope that other councils up and down the country will follow the example of the hon. Lady’s council and introduce such a levy, which not only helps deal with public disorder, but provides a necessary income stream to recognise the cost of disorder to a particular city.
I appreciate that the hon. Lady’s focus has been on the Deregulation Bill rather than on the subject of alcohol so she will not have had sight of all the issues, but she said that we have blocked the public health licensing objective. That is not true. The matter remains under consideration. The fact is that if she looks at the local alcohol action areas, she will see that they are being used as a pilot for what might be done for public health licensing objectives. I agree that there is a public health issue about alcohol that should be taken into account, but it is not as simple as it is sometimes made out. That matter is being taken forward under the guise of the local alcohol action areas introduced by the Government.
The hon. Lady mentioned fees, and I reiterate that they will be subject to consultation. She wondered whether local councils are out of pocket, and asserted that they are out of pocket as a consequence of handling the present licensing regime. Taking that at face value and assuming she is right for the purpose of this discussion, if that is the case, the introduction of a light-touch regime will divert people from what is—according to her—presumably a loss-making activity for local councils to one that is rather simpler and will therefore reduce the loss for local councils. That is the logic of her position, so I hope that she will welcome the measure on that basis. I confirm that it is subject to the affirmative procedure, so there will be a full opportunity for Members on both sides of the House to contribute to the discussion as the measure is taken forward in a sensible way.
Lastly, I can tell the hon. Member for Luton North that minimum unit pricing remains an option. It is on the radar—it has not been ruled out—and it will be particularly on the radar if the alcohol industry does not respond sensibly to the challenges made by the Government. I commend the new clause to the House.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 5 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Schedule 1
‘Part to be inserted as Part 5A of the Licensing Act 2003
“Part 5A
sale of alcohol at community events etc and ancillary business sale of alcohol
Conditions for permitted sales
110A General conditions
(1) A sale by retail of alcohol is a permitted sale by virtue of this Part if—
(a) the community event conditions (set out in section 110B or in regulations made under that section) or the ancillary business sales conditions (set out in section 110C or in regulations made under that section) are satisfied in relation to it, and
(b) the conditions set out in subsections (2) to (5) below are satisfied in relation to it.
(2) The sale must take place on premises specified in a notice that complies with section 110D (a “Part 5A notice”).
(3) No counter notice under section 110J must have been given in relation to the Part 5A notice.
(4) The sale must take place during the period of 36 months beginning with the date when the Part 5A notice takes effect.
(5) The sale must take place between 07.00 a.m. and 11.00 p.m.
110B Community event conditions
(1) The community event conditions, in relation to a sale by retail of alcohol, are the conditions set out in subsections (2) to (6) and any additional conditions set out in regulations under subsection (7).
(2) The sale must be made by or on behalf of a body that is—
(a) of a prescribed description,
(b) does not trade for profit, and
(c) meets any prescribed criteria.
(3) The sale must be ancillary to an event that—
(a) is taking place on the premises,
(b) is organised by the body by or on whose behalf the sale is made,
(c) has been advertised in advance, and
(d) meets any prescribed criteria.
(4) The sale must take place on the premises during the course of the event.
(5) The alcohol must be sold for consumption on the premises during the course of the event.
(6) The number of persons present on the premises at the time of the sale must not exceed 300.
(7) Regulations may provide for additional conditions prescribed in the regulations to be community event conditions.
110C Ancillary business sales conditions
(1) The ancillary business sales conditions, in relation to a sale by retail of alcohol, are the conditions set out in subsections (2) to (5) and any additional conditions set out in regulations under subsection (6).
(2) The sale must be made by or on behalf of a body that—
(a) is of a prescribed description, and
(b) meets any prescribed criteria.
(3) The sale must take place on premises that—
(a) are managed by the body by or on whose behalf the sale is made,
(b) are of a prescribed description, and
(c) meet any prescribed criteria.
(4) The sale must be ancillary to the provision of goods or services to a person on the premises where the sale takes place.
(5) Except in prescribed circumstances, the alcohol must be sold for consumption on those premises.
(6) Regulations may provide for additional conditions prescribed in the regulations to be ancillary business sales conditions.
Part 5A notices
110D Conditions for validity of notices
(1) A notice complies with this section if the conditions set out in subsections (2) to (10) are satisfied in relation to the notice.
(2) The notice must specify whether—
(a) the community event conditions (set out in section 110B or in regulations under that section), or
(b) the ancillary business sales conditions (set out in section 110C or in regulations under that section),
will be satisfied in relation to sales of alcohol on the premises in question.
(3) The notice must specify (for the purposes of section 110A(2))—
(a) in the case of a notice that specifies the ancillary business sales conditions, the set of premises to which it relates;
(b) in the case of a notice that specifies the community event conditions, no more than three sets of community premises, each of which must be wholly or partly in the area of the same licensing authority.
(4) The notice must be given, on behalf of the body by or on whose behalf the sale of alcohol on the premises would take place, by a person who is aged 18 or over and is concerned in the management of the body.
(5) The notice must be given to the relevant licensing authority, accompanied by the prescribed fee.
(6) Unless the notice is given to the relevant licensing authority by means of a relevant electronic facility, a copy of the notice must be given to each relevant person.
(7) The notice must be in the prescribed form.
(8) The notice must specify the date when it takes effect.
(9) The specified date must be at least 10 working days, but no more than 3 months, after the day on which the notice is given.
Where subsection (6) applies, the notice is treated as given only when that subsection is complied with.
(10) The notice must contain any other information that regulations require it to contain.
(11) In this Part, “relevant person”, in relation to any premises, means—
(a) the chief officer of police for any police area in which the premises are situated;
(b) the local authority by which statutory functions are exercisable in any area in which the premises are situated in relation to minimising or preventing the risk of pollution of the environment or of harm to human health.
110E Special restriction on giving of notices
(1) This section applies where—
(a) a Part 5A notice is given on behalf of a body, and
(b) a counter notice under section 110J is given in relation to the Part 5A notice.
(2) No further Part 5A notice may be given in respect of any premises specified in the notice, whether on behalf of that body or on behalf of another body that is an associate of it, before the end of the period of 12 months beginning with the day on which the counter notice is given.
(3) However, the restriction in subsection (2) ceases to apply if the counter notice is revoked under section 110K or quashed by a court.
(4) For the purposes of this section, a body is an associate of another body if it would be an associate of the other body for the purposes of the Estate Agents Act 1979 (see section 32(4) to (6) of that Act).
110F Date when Part 5A notice takes effect
(1) A Part 5A notice takes effect on the date specified under section 110D(8).
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply if a counter notice is given under section 110J in relation to the notice.
(For the case where a counter notice is revoked or quashed by a court, see section 110K(2).)
110G Acknowledgement of notice etc
(1) This section applies where a relevant licensing authority receives a notice that is, or purports to be, a Part 5A notice.
(2) The authority must give written acknowledgement of the receipt of the notice to the person who gave it.
(3) The acknowledgment must be given—
(a) before the end of the first working day following the day on which it was received, or
(b) if the day on which it was received was not a working day, before the end of the second working day following that day.
(4) If the licensing authority is of the opinion that the notice does not comply with section 110D, the authority must as soon as possible give to the person who gave the notice written notification of the reasons for its opinion.
(5) Subsection (2) does not apply where, before the time by which acknowledgement of the receipt of the notice must be given in accordance with subsection (3), the person who gave the notice has been given a counter notice under section 110J.
110H Theft, loss etc of Part 5A notice
(1) Where a Part 5A notice is lost, stolen, damaged or destroyed, the person who gave the notice may apply to the relevant licensing authority for a copy of the notice.
(2) The application must be accompanied by the prescribed fee.
(3) Where an application is made in accordance with this section, the licensing authority must issue the applicant with a copy of the notice (certified by the authority to be a true copy) if it is satisfied that the notice has been lost, stolen, damaged or destroyed.
(4) This Act applies in relation to a copy issued under this section as it applies in relation to an original notice.
Objections and counter notices
110I Objection to Part 5A notice by a relevant person
(1) Where a relevant person who is given a Part 5A notice is satisfied that allowing alcohol to be sold on the premises (or any of the premises) to which the notice relates would undermine a licensing objective, the relevant person must give a notice stating the reasons for being so satisfied (an “objection notice”)—
(a) to the relevant licensing authority,
(b) to the person who gave the Part 5A notice, and
(c) to every other relevant person.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply at any time after the relevant person has received a copy of a counter notice under section 110J in relation to the Part 5A notice.
(3) An objection notice may be given only during the period beginning with the day on which the relevant person is given the Part 5A notice and ending with the third working day following that day (“the three-day period”).
(4) The restriction in subsection (3) does not apply to an objection notice based on—
(a) things occurring after the end of the three-day period, or
(b) information that the relevant person was unaware of, and could not with reasonable diligence have discovered, until after the end of that period.
110J Counter notices
(1) Where a relevant licensing authority receives a Part 5A notice, the relevant licensing authority may—
(a) give the person who gave the Part 5A notice a counter notice under this section;
(b) give a copy of the counter notice to each relevant person.
(2) Where the relevant licensing authority receives an objection notice given in compliance with the requirement imposed by section 110I(3), the relevant licensing authority must decide whether to give a counter notice (and, if it does so decide, give that notice) no later than whichever of the following is the earlier—
(a) the day before the date when the Part 5A would take effect (see section 110D(8));
(b) the expiry of the period of 28 days beginning with the day on which the objection notice is received by the relevant licensing authority.
(3) The power conferred by subsection (1) may not be exercised at any time after the Part 5A notice takes effect unless an objection notice under section 110I has been given, by virtue of subsection (4) of that section, in relation to the notice.
(4) The counter notice must—
(a) be in the prescribed form, and
(b) be given in the prescribed manner.
110K Counter notices: revocation etc
(1) A relevant licensing authority must revoke a counter notice given under section 110J if—
(a) the counter notice was given in consequence of one or more objection notices under section 110I, and
(b) the objection notice or (as the case may be) each of them is withdrawn by the person who gave it or is quashed by a court.
(2) Where a counter notice is revoked or is quashed by a court—
(a) the counter notice is disregarded for the purposes of section 110A(3), except in relation to any time before the day on which it is revoked or quashed,
(b) the Part 5A notice takes effect on that day, and
(c) the relevant licensing authority must as soon as possible notify the person who gave the Part 5A notice of the date on which it takes effect.
Rights of entry, production of notice, etc
110L Right of entry where Part 5A notice given
(1) A constable or an authorised officer may, at any reasonable time, enter premises to which a Part 5A notice relates to assess the likely effect of the notice on the promotion of the crime prevention objective.
(2) An authorised officer exercising the power conferred by this section must, if so requested, produce evidence of the officer’s authority to exercise the power.
(3) It is an offence intentionally to obstruct an authorised officer exercising a power conferred by this section.
(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 2 on the standard scale.
(5) In this section “authorised officer” means—
(a) an officer of the licensing authority in whose area the premises are situated, or
(b) if the premises are situated in the area of more than one licensing authority, an officer of any of those authorities,
authorised for the purposes of this Act.
110M Duty to keep and produce Part 5A notice
(1) This section applies whenever premises are being used for sales of alcohol which are, or are purported to be, permitted sales by virtue of this Part.
(2) The person who gave the Part 5A notice must secure that a copy of the notice is either—
(a) prominently displayed at the premises, or
(b) kept at the premises in the custody of that person or of someone who is present and working at the premises and whom that person has nominated for the purposes of this section (a “nominated person”).
(3) Where a copy of the Part 5A notice is kept in the custody of a nominated person (and not prominently displayed at the premises) the person who gave the Part 5A notice must secure that a notice—
(a) stating that the Part 5A notice is in the nominated person’s custody, and
(b) specifying the position held at the premises by the nominated person,
is prominently displayed at the premises.
(4) It is an offence for the person who gave the Part 5A notice to fail, without reasonable excuse, to comply with subsection (2) or (where it applies) subsection (3).
(5) Where—
(a) a copy of the Part 5A notice is not prominently displayed at the premises, and
(b) no notice is displayed as mentioned in subsection (3),
a constable or authorised officer may require the person who gave the Part 5A notice to produce a copy of it for examination.
(6) Where a notice is displayed as mentioned in subsection (3), a constable or authorised officer may require the nominated person to produce a copy of the Part 5A notice for examination.
(7) An authorised officer exercising the power conferred by subsection (5) or (6) must, if so requested, produce evidence of the officer’s authority to exercise the power.
(8) It is an offence for a person to fail, without reasonable excuse, to produce a copy of a Part 5A notice in accordance with a requirement under subsection (5) or (6).
(9) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 2 on the standard scale.
(10) In this section “authorised officer” has the meaning given in section 110L(5).
Supplementary
110N The relevant licensing authority
(1) For the purposes of this Part, the “relevant licensing authority”, in relation to any premises, is determined in accordance with this section.
(2) In the case of a Part 5A notice that specifies the ancillary business sales conditions or in the case of Part 5A notice that specifies the community event conditions in relation to only one set of premises, the relevant licensing authority is, subject to subsection (3), the authority in whose area the premises are situated.
(3) Where the premises are situated in the areas of two or more licensing authorities, the relevant licensing authority is—
(a) the licensing authority in whose area the greater or greatest part of the premises is situated, or
(b) if there is no authority to which paragraph (a) applies, such one of the authorities as the person giving the Part 5A notice may choose.
(4) In the case of a Part 5A notice that specifies the community event conditions in relation to more than one set of premises, the relevant licensing authority is—
(a) if there is only one licensing authority in whose area each set of premises is wholly or partly situated, that licensing authority;
(b) if each set of premises falls partly in the area of one authority and also partly in the area of another, such one of them as the person giving the Part 5A notice may choose.”’.—(Norman Baker.)
This amendment inserts the new Part 5A of the Licensing Act 2003 (see the explanatory statement to amendment NC5).
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
Schedule 18
Legislation no longer of practical use
The Solicitor-General (Oliver Heald)
I beg to move amendment 58, page 157, line 11, at end insert—
‘Mining Industry Act 1920 (c. 50)
3A The Mining Industry Act 1920 is repealed.
3B In consequence of paragraph 3A, in Schedule 4 to the Mines and Quarries Act 1954, omit the entry for the Mining Industry Act 1920.
Mining Industry Act 1926 (c. 28)
3C (1) In the Mining Industry Act 1926, omit section 20 (which confers power on coal-mining companies to establish profit sharing schemes irrespective of the terms of their articles of association).
(2) The repeal made by sub-paragraph (1) is to have no effect in relation to any scheme still in existence that was established, and is being carried on, in reliance on the power conferred by section 20 of the Mining Industry Act 1926.’.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 75 and 59.
Amendment 4, page 162, line 22, at end insert—
Part 7A
Civil Law
Defamation Act 1996 (c.31)
34A Omit section 13 of the Defamation Act 1996 (which allows an individual litigant in defamation cases to waive the ban in Article IX of the Bill of Rights on proceedings in Parliament being impeached or questioned in court).’.
The Joint Committees on Parliamentary Privilege in 1999 and 2013 both recommended the repeal of this hardly-used provision.
Government amendment 60.
Amendment 73, page 163, line 12, at end insert—
‘Part 9 Communications
Copyright Design and Patents Act 1988
37 The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 is amended as follows.
38 Section 73 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (Reception and re-transmission of wireless broadcast by cable) is revoked.’.
Section 73 was introduced in the 1980s to encourage cable roll-out as a competing platform to terrestrial (analogue) television. This has clearly now been achieved and cable is a highly-effective and well-resourced competitor to Sky and Freeview.
The Solicitor-General
This group contains amendments to schedule 18, which makes provision for repealing legislation that is no longer of practical use. Before I outline the amendments, may I say how much I welcome re-encountering the hon. Members for Chesterfield (Toby Perkins) and for Newcastle upon Tyne Central (Chi Onwurah), whose very helpful and constructive approach in Committee has improved the Bill?
The Mining Industry Act 1920 and section 20 of the Mining Industry Act 1926 will be repealed as they are no longer needed for mining and quarrying. Most of the Mining Industry Act 1920 has already been repealed, and we now seek to repeal the remaining provisions. That will not affect rights to ownership. The remaining sections are outdated administrative arrangements. For example, functions were originally conferred on the Board of Trade, but were long ago transferred to the Secretary of State through a transfer of functions. Sections 18 and 22 concern the powers to make drainage schemes for groups of mines, but they are now dealt with by negotiations between mine owners and other local landowners. Sections 25 and 26 are technical provisions.
Overall, the only matter that needs to be mentioned is section 20 of the 1926 Act, which provides for the establishment of profit-sharing schemes. It of course pre-dates the nationalisation and privatisation of the coal mining industry, as well as modern companies legislation. Such legislation should apply to coal mining companies in the same way as it applies to any others, so there is no need for any special provision. However, the amendment contains a saving provision, because it would clearly not be fair to undermine any existing profit-sharing schemes, and they will be allowed to continue.
Most of the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 has already been repealed. Section 37, which relates to the licensing of tidal works by harbour authorities, disapplies the requirements of section 34 of the Coast Protection Act 1949. That Act has already been repealed, so the saving provision is no longer of any practical effect.
Amendment 59 will extend the repeal of the Milk (Cessation of Production) Act 1985 to Northern Ireland. EU legislation in 1984 set up a system of production—the milk quota system—in which, in essence, each producer was allocated a quota. That will end on 31 March 2015, so the underlying EU legislation will cease to be effective next April. The amendment will allow the Bill to repeal and revoke all relevant UK legislation relating to Northern Ireland, as well as England and Wales.
Amendment 60 will ensure that the saving provision in paragraph 3 of schedule 18 to the Housing Act 1988 will cease to have effect in England, although it will continue to apply in Wales. The saving provision has become redundant in England. Essentially, sections 56 to 58 of the Housing Act 1980, which have been repealed, enabled landlords to grant assured tenancies for newly built or newly repaired dwellings. The vast majority of tenancies were converted in 1989 into new style assured tenancies under the Housing Act 1988. Sections 56 to 58 were repealed subject to a saving provision, which is now being abolished because there are no longer any assured tenancies under the 1980 Act in existence in England, and it is therefore redundant.
To turn to the non-Government amendments, amendment 73 would require the Government to revoke section 73 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Philip Davies) for raising that important issue. The effect of section 73 is that public service broadcasters cannot charge cable services for the inclusion of their channels on these services.
Section 73 is part of a much wider framework supporting the availability of television and investment in television programming in the UK. A variety of rules and regulations affect the production, availability and ease of discovery of public service programming and its relationship with the different platforms—cable, satellite, digital TV and terrestrial—that carry it. They include the obligations on public service broadcasters to offer their content to all relevant platforms, the rules governing payments by broadcasters for technical platform services and the powers for regulators to compel these services to carry public service broadcast content.
This is an area with many competing interests. The Department for Culture, Media and Sport produced a policy paper, “Connectivity, Content and Consumers” last year. The Government stated that their policy objective was zero net charges, where fees for access to the main platforms—cable, satellite, digital TV and terrestrial—would be cancelled out by charges made by the BBC, ITV, Channel 4 and Channel 5, so creating a zero net charge regime. That is close to the current market position, and it recognises the benefits to platforms, public service broadcasters and consumers.
Section 73 is an integral part of that picture, but the arrangement is under pressure. Online services rely on section 73 to exploit public service broadcaster content, but no benefit flows back to the public service broadcaster.
The Solicitor-General
There is litigation about that at present and my hon. Friend, who is right to raise the issue, will know that a case about to be heard in the Court of Appeal has a bearing on the issue. Because the case is sub judice, I cannot say much more about it, but it would be wrong to impose timetables for resolving the issues as regards satellite and cable without taking into account the situation—once it is definitive—as regards online services. I will obviously listen to my hon. Friend’s arguments, but he might want to think about whether the Government are right to wait for the decision from the Court of Appeal before taking action that might not be appropriate.
Philip Davies
The problem is that the litigation has been going on for four years already. Of course there are competing interests, but does my hon. and learned Friend not accept that section 73 was created in the 1980s, when the Government wanted to encourage the roll-out of the cable network? Given that that policy objective has been achieved, the section should surely be repealed.
The Solicitor-General
I agree to a considerable extent with the point that my hon. Friend makes. There is no question that the legislation was introduced to help cable roll-out. However, it is the definition of a cable service that is at issue in the Court of Appeal case. It is correct that it has taken a considerable amount of time to get to this point, where the Court of Appeal will soon be able to list the case and, hopefully, determine it. Having waited for that period for a definite conclusion, it would be wrong to act in haste and perhaps repent at leisure. I will be interested to hear his remarks and I think that there will be time for him to make them—I hope so, anyway.
I am pleased to announce that the Government will support the defamation amendment—amendment 4. It is a sensible amendment. As the House will be aware, the Government have made a commitment to repeal section 13 of the Defamation Act 1996. Their response to the report of the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege in 2013 stated that
“repealing Section 13 would be the wisest course of action”
and that the Government
“intends to do so when Parliamentary time and a suitable legislative opportunity allows.”
There has long been discussion about the provision. The 1999 and 2013 Joint Committees on Parliamentary Privilege recommended that section 13 be repealed. The Government agree with the conclusion of those Committees that section 13 is at odds with the principle of freedom of speech, which it is the privilege of this House as a whole to enjoy, not just individual Members. Section 13 also creates an imbalance, because one party to a proceeding may choose to use the parliamentary record when the other party does not wish that to happen. The provision has never been used and it creates an anomaly. For those reasons, I urge the House to accept amendment 4.
Chi Onwurah
I echo the pleasure that was expressed by the Solicitor-General at the reunion of the team that had so many lively and, at times, constructive debates in Committee.
The Opposition do not oppose Government amendments 58, 75, 59 and 60. However, I would like to make a small point about process. Will the Solicitor-General clarify for the House why time is being spent on removing obsolete legislation in parallel with the Law Commission’s statute law repeal programme? Given the resources available, the Law Commission’s work has been of a very high quality. We finished the Committee stage of the Bill with but seven minutes to spare, as the Solicitor-General will well remember, and we will not have time to discuss all the amendments we would like to discuss on Report.
The Solicitor-General
I very much agree with the hon. Lady that the Law Commission does a fantastic job. It is preparing the measures that she mentions. That does not mean that if a Department knows that it has a piece of redundant or useless legislation, it cannot ask the House to get rid of it. There is not an either/or choice; we can do both.
Chi Onwurah
I thank the Solicitor-General for that clarification. However, I think that the House should focus on that which will make the most difference to our constituents and the cost of living crisis. We should not seek to work in parallel with the Law Commission. However, I take his point. Although I am sad to see the repeal of the Mining Industry Act 1920 and the Merchant Shipping Act 1988, I agree with him that they do not serve a useful purpose at this time. It seems that this Tory Government are tidying up the last bits of mess that were left by the last one in undermining those great industries. I agree that, at this stage, those Acts perform no purpose.
We have some sympathy with amendment 73 on copyright, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Shipley (Philip Davies). We only wish that the Department for Culture, Media and Sport showed as much focus on the long-term future of the communications industry as the hon. Gentleman. As the Solicitor-General said, it is an anomaly that the BBC and other public service broadcasters have to pay cable companies for the transmission of their programmes, which so many of us enjoy. I should declare an interest because I served for six years at Ofcom, which regulates all the companies concerned.
It is impossible to explain to anyone outside the industry why it is not the Pay-TV companies that pay the BBC and ITV to carry their great content, but the BBC and ITV who pay the Pay-TV companies to do so. That cannot be right. We are glad that the discussions that the Solicitor-General mentioned have resulted in reductions in transmission fees to net zero. However, we do not feel that net zero is good enough. Public service broadcasters create fantastic, valuable and creative content that is the envy of the world, and they should be paid for it.
The Solicitor-General said that the legislation is complex and we recognise that. However, we question what work the Government are doing in this area. They dropped their communications Green Paper two years ago. Since then, we have had no meaningful communications strategy, even though the industry is critical to our economic and cultural future. There does not appear to be any work going on in the area now. The policy paper that the Solicitor-General mentioned so enthusiastically, “Connectivity, Content and Consumers”, does not look into the future in any meaningful way. I remind the House that Labour’s Communications Act 2003 looked 10 years into the future.
Philip Davies
It would enable a normal commercial arrangement to be reached, but it would not do anything to stop the terms of the Communications Act 2003, under which broadcasters must offer their public service broadcasting channels to cable and satellite platforms. That would still be the case, but the amendment would enable a commercial negotiation to take place, which would be fair to both parties. Otherwise, the situation works for neither party; it is to everybody’s advantage that an agreement is reached. Terrestrial broadcasters want their content on cable, and cable wants that content out there, so there is reason for reaching an agreement.
The Solicitor-General
I am carefully following my hon. Friend’s logic and he is looking at two aspects: pay TV and satellite. The fastest-growing area, however, is online, which is what the court case is about. Does he recognise that it would be a mistake to leave matters on the basis he suggests, without taking account of the online position? That needs to be tackled once we know the court decision.
Philip Davies
All these matters need to be tackled, and my amendment seeks to say just that to the Government. The problem is that they are not being tackled and are causing an unfair disadvantage to public service broadcasters. That is my point. Pay-TV companies are charging monthly subscriptions for access to pay TV, when most of the viewing is on public service broadcasting channels, which are an essential part of the offer being made. For example, ITV invests around £1 billion a year on programming, the majority of which is original UK content, driving UK economic growth and provided free to viewers at no cost to the taxpayer. Continuing to do that depends on its being able to make a commercial return on its investment, which at the moment it does not.
Section 73 currently allows platforms and online operators to extract increasing amounts of value from free-to-air content, with no return to investors, rightsholders and talent, or the UK creative economy. Those platforms are perfectly happy to pay for other channels on ITV, such as ITV2, ITV3 and ITV4, through normal commercial negotiations, so it is hard to understand why they would not also be prepared to do that for the main channel. Section 73 of the 1988 Act is completely outdated and does a great disservice to public service broadcasters. It has created unfair terms and conditions for public service broadcasters, and even if the Government do not accept my amendment, I hope that they will consider the issue and come back soon with proposals to deal with this serious anomaly concerning cable TV and online content.
Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)
I am most grateful to you, Madam Deputy Speaker, for your service on the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege along with me and the hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife (Thomas Docherty), not to mention the litany of others—the hon. Gentleman has already mentioned them, so I do not need to. Amendment 4 is necessary, and I will refer to articles 163 to 170 of the Committee’s report, which include our recommendations for the repeal of section 13 of the Defamation Act 1996, just to get that on the record and make it easier for people to follow what is being said—we do not have much time to go into all the ins and outs.
The hon. Gentleman has explained the background to this issue, but I will add one or two further points. As my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General stated, the proposal was endorsed by the 1999 Joint Committee, and most recently by the 2013 Joint Committee, in your presence, Madam Deputy Speaker. The 1999 Joint Committee stated that,
“the enactment of section 13, seeking to remedy a perceived injustice, had created indefensible anomalies of its own which should not be allowed to continue”.
That is why it recommended that section 13 be repealed. The fundamental flaw identified by the 1999 Joint Committee was that,
“the section undermined the basis of privilege: freedom of speech was the privilege of the House as a whole and not of the individual Member in his or her own right, although an individual Member could assert and rely on it.”
The 1999 Committee noted that,
“the anomaly that section 13 was available only in defamation proceedings and not in any other form of civil action”
or criminal action. The Committee pointed out that,
“since the exercise of section 13 is a matter of individual choice, where two people are involved in the same action, one may choose to waive privilege and another may not.”
The 1999 Committee recommend that,
“the mischief sought to be remedied by section 13 of the Defamation Act 1996 should be cured by a different means: the replacement of section 13 with a short statutory provision empowering each House to waive Article 9 for the purpose of any court proceedings, whether relating to defamation or to any other matter, where the words spoken or the acts done in proceedings in Parliament would not expose the speaker of the words or the doer of the acts to any legal liability.”
That approach was supported by Lord Lester of Herne Hill, and by Dr Adam Tucker and Geoffrey Lock, a former head of the research division in the House of Commons Library.
The Newspaper Society opposed any discretionary power to waive privilege, the use of which would be unpredictable and retrospective. It argued that,
“the power of waiver could create a chilling effect, by the mere threat or possibility of its use, which would be detrimental to openness of debate and press reporting of proceedings in Parliament.”
In its response to the Government consultation, the legislative council of Western Australia argued that,
“it was preferable for privilege not to be waived for any reason, in order to avoid the potential for the waiver being used for purely political purposes.”
Our Clerk of the House of Commons, the distinguished Sir Robert Rogers, who is sadly retiring, told us that his preference would be for the repeal of section 13, “without replacement”. The Media Lawyers Association took the same view.
In evidence, the Government told the 2013 Committee:
“There are clearly problems with Section 13 of the Defamation Act. It is at odds with the principle that freedom of speech is a privilege of the House, not just individual members and it can create an imbalance where one party to proceedings can choose to use the parliamentary record but the other cannot.”
At that time, the Government told us that,
“the Government is not aware of any instances in which anyone has used the power of waiver and as such it would not appear to be a pressing priority to repeal Section 13.”
On reflection, the Government have decided that repealing section 13 is a good idea. We are grateful to them for following our recommendation.
I ought to say that, initially, there was an attempt to include the proposal in the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill but, as a result of consultation, members of the Committee agreed that it was better to include it in the Deregulation Bill, which is why we are debating it. The Committee recommends the repeal of section 13 of the Defamation Act 1996. That is all I have to say for the time being.
The Solicitor-General
I commend the wise words of my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash). He summarised the position extremely well and I am glad that the proposal is going ahead.
I should tell my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Philip Davies) that the Government will bring forward proposals for consultation when the court case, which is set down for later this year, has concluded. I ask him not to press his amendment to a Division on the basis that the Government are taking the issue seriously.
In response to the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central (Chi Onwurah), the coherent strategy set out in the connectivity paper covers all the main issues: electronic programme guides, PSB prominence, bundling, switching off content, zero net fees, investment policy, child protection on the internet, internet access and comprehensive programme issues. It is a proper document, and she unfairly belittled it.
The only other point I wanted to make before commending the amendments is on the Law Commission, which does a marvellous job. I should like to put on the record the Government’s gratitude to Lord Justice Lloyd Jones, who heads it, and all the people who work for it. It is a marvellous institution.
Amendment 58 agreed to.
Schedule 18
Legislation no longer of practical use
Amendments made: 75, page 159, line 32, at end insert—
‘Merchant Shipping Act 1988 (c. 12)
The Merchant Shipping Act 1988 is repealed.’.
This amendment repeals the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 in the United Kingdom. The only operative provision is section 37. Section 37 provides for the disapplication of the requirements of the Coast Protection Act 1949, which has been repealed.
Amendment 59, page 162, line 2, at end insert—
‘The Milk (Cessation of Production) (Northern Ireland) Order 1985 (S.I. 1985/958 (N.I. 9)) is revoked.’.
This amendment revokes the Milk (Cessation of Production) ( Northern Ireland) Order 1985. All schemes made under this Order were revoked in 2007, and it is not intended to make any further schemes under it. The underlying European milk quota system is intended to cease with effect from 31 March 2015.
Amendment 4, page 162, line 22, at end insert—
Part 7A
Civil Law
Defamation Act 1996 (c.31)
34A Omit section 13 of the Defamation Act 1996 (which allows an individual litigant in defamation cases to waive the ban in Article IX of the Bill of Rights on proceedings in Parliament being impeached or questioned in court).’.
The Joint Committees on Parliamentary Privilege in 1999 and 2013 both recommended the repeal of this hardly used provision.
Amendment 60, page 163, line 12, at end insert—
Part 9
Housing
Housing Act 1988 (c. 50)
36 (1) Paragraph 3 of Schedule 18 to the Housing Act 1988 (saving provision in respect of repeal of sections 56 to 58 of the Housing Act 1980) ceases to have effect in relation to tenancies of dwelling-houses in England.
(2) Accordingly, in that paragraph of that Schedule, after “tenancy” insert “of a dwelling-house in Wales”.’.—(Oliver Heald.)
This amendment provides that the saving provision in paragraph 3 of Schedule 18 to the Housing Act 1988 ceases to have effect in relation to tenancies of dwelling-houses in England (and so will continue only for Wales). This is because no assured tenancies under section 56 of the Housing Act 1980 remain in existence for England.
New Clause 2
Requirements to wear safety helmets: exemption for Sikhs: Northern Ireland
‘(1) Article 13 of the Employment (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Northern Ireland) Order 1990 (S.I. 1990/246) is amended in accordance with subsections (2) to (8).
(2) In paragraph (1), for “on a construction site” substitute “at a workplace”.
(3) In paragraph (2), in sub-paragraph (a), for “on a construction site” substitute “at a workplace”.
(4) In paragraph (5), in the opening words, for “on a construction site” substitute “at a workplace”.
(5) After paragraph (6) insert—
“(6A) This Article does not apply to a Sikh who—
(a) works, or is training to work, in an occupation that involves (to any extent) providing an urgent response to fire, riot or other hazardous situations, and
(b) is at the workplace—
(i) to provide such a response in circumstances where the wearing of a safety helmet is necessary to protect the Sikh from a risk of injury, or
(ii) to receive training in how to provide such a response in circumstances of that kind.
(6B) This Article also does not apply to a Sikh who—
(a) is a member of Her Majesty’s forces or a person providing support to Her Majesty’s forces, and
(b) is at the workplace—
(i) to take part in a military operation in circumstances where the wearing of a safety helmet is necessary to protect the Sikh from a risk of injury, or
(ii) to receive training in how to take part in such an operation in circumstances of that kind.”
(6) In paragraph (7)—
(a) omit the definitions of “building operations”, “works of engineering construction” and “construction site”;
(b) before the definition of “injury”, insert—
““Her Majesty’s forces” has the same meaning as in the Armed Forces Act 2006;”;
(c) at the end insert—
““workplace” means any premises where work is being undertaken, including premises occupied or normally occupied as a private dwelling; and “premises” includes any place and, in particular, includes—
(a) any vehicle, vessel, aircraft or hovercraft,
(b) any installation (including a floating installation or one resting on the seabed or its subsoil or on other land covered with water or its subsoil), and
(c) any tent or moveable structure.”
(7) In paragraph (8), in sub-paragraph (b), for “on a construction site” substitute “at a workplace”.
(8) In the heading, for “on construction sites” substitute “at workplaces”.
(9) Article 13A of that Order (protection of Sikhs from racial discrimination in connection with requirements as to wearing of safety helmets) is amended as follows.
(10) In paragraph (1)—
(a) in sub-paragraph (a), for “on a construction site” substitute “at a workplace”;
(b) in sub-paragraph (b), for “on such a site” substitute “at such a workplace”.
(11) In paragraph (3), for “Paragraphs (7) and (8)” substitute “Paragraphs (6A) to (8)”.’.—(Oliver Heald.)
This new clause extends the scope of the exemption under Article 13 of the Employment (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Northern Ireland) Order 1990, currently limited to construction sites, so that turban-wearing Sikhs will be exempt from legal requirements to wear a safety helmet in a workplace of any kind (subject to exceptions set out in Article 13(6A) and (6B), as amended).
Brought up, and read the First time.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Mrs Eleanor Laing)
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 72, page 1, line 1, leave out clause 1.
The Solicitor-General
New clause 2 deals with the wearing of safety helmets by the Sikh community in Northern Ireland. Its purpose is to extend the provision in the Bill to Sikhs in Northern Ireland. We discussed the issue in Committee and it was hoped that it would be possible to introduce such a measure. Article 13 of the Employment (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Northern Ireland) Order 1990 exempts turban-wearing Sikhs from legal requirements to wear a safety helmet while on a construction site. It also protects employers from liability should a Sikh suffer injuries as a consequence of choosing not to wear a helmet. The new clause extends the scope of the exemption to all workplaces, subject to certain very narrow exclusions, and extends the limited liability provisions associated with the exemption for other persons, such as employers.
The exemption in the 1990 order was limited to construction sites because, at the time, only workers in the construction industry were mandated to wear safety helmets. Legislative requirements regarding the wearing of safety helmets have since developed and now extend to a number of other industries in which a risk assessment identifies the need for specialist head protection.
There are certain jobs and industries in which the wearing of a turban may come into conflict with legislative requirements regarding the wearing of safety helmets or other coverings. Employers in non-construction sectors must therefore balance their obligation to protect the health and safety of their employees against their duty not to discriminate against a turban-wearing Sikh employee on the grounds of religion or race.
Philip Davies
Surely one of the cornerstones of British law is that everybody is equal in the face of it. Either people should have to wear helmets for safety reasons or they should not. If a Sikh can decide not to wear a safety helmet on religious grounds, why cannot other workers decide not to wear them on grounds that they choose for themselves? Why should we have different laws for different people in this country? Many people find that troubling and offensive.
The Solicitor-General
An important history and a religious ethic applicable only to Sikhs are involved in this matter. It is a religious tenet for a Sikh male to wear a turban—that is not true of other religions. It is therefore a special circumstance. While addressing that, I should say what a great contribution the Sikh community makes in our country. Sikhs should be free to practise their religion and that central tenet of it. In certain circumstances, it would be wrong to allow a person not to wear their helmet because of the extreme danger involved—for example, when a fireman goes into a burning building. The circumstances where this provision cannot be followed are very narrow.
Mr Speaker
It is very generous of the Minister to offer the opportunity of a break in the proceedings. It would be churlish of me turn down his offer.
The Solicitor-General
Knowing that the House wants to know the answer, I give way. [Laughter.]
Mr Speaker
We are grateful to the Minister, particularly for his sensitivity to the sensibilities of colleagues.
Crime and Courts Bill [Lords]
Oliver Heald Excerpts(11 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Solicitor-General (Oliver Heald)
I beg to move amendment 22, page 17, line 21, at end insert—
‘Part 4A amends the selection procedure for certain senior judicial appointments until Part 4 of the Schedule is in force,’.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 10 to 21.
Amendment 100, page 224, line 42, schedule 13, at end insert—
‘Each of the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice must at all times engage in a programme of action which is designed—
(a) to secure, so far as it is reasonably practicable to do so, that appointments to listed judicial offices are such that those holding such offices are reflective of the community in England and Wales;
(b) to require the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, so far as it is reasonably practicable to do so, to secure that a range of persons reflective of the community in England and Wales is available for consideration by the Judicial Appointments Commission whenever it is required to select a person to be appointed, or recommended for appointment, to a listed judicial office.’.
Government amendments 23 to 59.
New clause 7—Enforcement services
‘(1) The Legal Services Act 2007 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 125 insert—
125A (1) For the purposes of this Part (and sections 1, 21 and 27 as they apply in relation to this Part)—
(a) the Bailiffs and Enforcement Agents Council is to be treated as an approved regulator;
(b) enforcement services are to be treated as a reserved legal activity;
(c) a person authorised under sections 63 and 64 of the Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act services is to be treated as an authorised person in relation to that activity;
(d) the Bailiffs and Enforcement Agents Council is to be treated as a relevant authorising body in relation to such a person, and
(e) regulations under the Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 and the National Standards for Enforcement Agents are to be treated as regulatory arrangements of the Bailiffs and Enforcement Agents Council as an approved regulator.
(2) For the purposes of sections 112 and 145 (as extended by this section), a person authorised under sections 63 and 64 of the Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act, is to be treated as a “relevant authorised person” in relation to the Regulator.”.’.
New clause 17—Protection of vulnerable debtors
‘(1) At any time after a notice required under paragraph 7, Schedule 12 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 is served on a debtor, the debtor may apply to the court to stay or suspend the notice on terms on either of the following grounds—
(a) the enforcement action being taken is disproportionate to the debt and circumstances involved; and
(b) the debtor’s goods may be insufficient in value to satisfy the debt involved.
(2) The court may, in its discretion and if satisfied with the above grounds, suspend or stay any judgment or order given or made in prior proceedings for such time and on such terms as the court thinks fit.
(3) Enforcement proceedings under Schedule 12 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 are proceedings for the purposes of section 71(2) and section 88 of the County Court Act 1984.
(4) Subject to the regulations under section 64 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 complaints against holders of certificates shall be considered by a designated judge and may include both complaints regarding compliance with the terms of certification as well as the exercise of legal powers under the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. Further to which—
(a) the designated judge may, on consideration of a complaint, exercise powers under section 64 to suspend or cancel a holder’s certificate; and
(b) the designated judge shall publish an annual report.
(5) The Lord Chancellor shall periodically review data concerning complaints against holders of certificates, update guidance where evidence of bad practice arises and respond to any recommendations set out in a report under subsection 2 within six months.’.
Government new clause 5—Supreme Court chief executive, officers and staff.
Government new clause 6—Making and use of recordings of Supreme Court proceedings.
Government amendments 60, 77 to 80, 82 and 83.
The Solicitor-General
I shall start by speaking to the Government amendments, but I should also like to hear the comments of the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw), the hon. Member for Darlington (Jenny Chapman) and my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon (Mr Buckland), if he arrives. I shall start with amendments 22, 57 and 58.
As hon. Members will be aware, the Government are making a number of changes to the judicial appointments process, including to the selection process for the Lord Chief Justice and the heads of division. As part of the changes, the details of the selection process that are currently in the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 will move into secondary legislation. There are many reasons for doing that, and many improvements are being made. There is an urgency to this, however, because the Lord Chief Justice is about to retire and we hope that it will be possible to deal with the new appointment and any consequential appointment of a head of division under the new system rather than the old. The amendments aim to achieve that by briefly inserting the new selection process into the 2005 Act, so that it applies to the appointment of Lord Judge’s successor. I must stress that it will be a transitory measure and will cease to have effect after the appointment of the next Lord Chief Justice and any consequent head of division. It is then intended that the secondary legislation will follow.
Amendments 25 to 55 deal with the technical aspects of the change to the Lord Chancellor’s role in the judicial appointments process, including the transfer to the Lord Chief Justice or the Senior President of Tribunals, as appropriate, of the power to decide upon selections made by the Judicial Appointments Commission for certain judicial offices below the High Court. The Government intend to retain the Lord Chancellor’s role in all other aspects of these appointments, particularly terms and conditions for fixed-term judicial appointments where a fee is paid. However, the Bill currently transfers the power to renew, or to refuse to renew, fixed-term judicial appointments to the Lord Chief Justice and Senior President of Tribunals. Amendments 25 to 55 therefore amend schedule 13 so that that power is retained with the Lord Chancellor. They ensure that, in exercising that role, the Lord Chancellor must, as now, if deciding not to renew a fixed-term appointment, comply with any requirement to secure the consent of the Lord Chief Justice or Senior President of Tribunals.
Amendments 23 and 24 also deal with the selection process for judicial appointments and the move from primary to secondary legislation. As part of these changes, the original idea was to move the requirement for there to be on the commission a commissioner with special knowledge of Wales into secondary legislation, but on further consideration, the Government decided that it was important to retain an appropriate level of input by a lay member of the commission with a special knowledge of Wales and that that requirement should remain in primary legislation. The amendments therefore reinstate the requirement in the 2005 Act that those selecting persons for appointment as commissioners should ensure, as far as practicable, that there is at least one lay commissioner with special knowledge of Wales.
Amendment 59 relates to the judicial deployment provisions in schedule 14. The objective is to give the Lord Chief Justice more flexibility in deploying judges to different courts and tribunals. That supports an important objective for the Government because it means that judges can be used efficiently. Individual judges will also benefit, if they have a wider breadth of experience and can develop their judicial careers as a result. The policy was brought forward in partnership with the judiciary and the aim has always been to move forward collectively in the delivery of our shared aims and objectives. After further consultation with the judiciary and further thought, it has been decided that the particular skills and experience needed in the Crown court mean that it should be removed from the flexible deployment provisions. Those matters should be dealt with by Crown court judges, as happens now.
Amendments 10 to 21 are technical and minor amendments dealing with the single family court provisions. I can be brief, because there is only one point of substance. At the moment, magistrates courts can vary maintenance orders registered with them, but because in future the family courts will be able to issue those orders, it is necessary to provide that magistrates will no longer have that variation power, which will lie with the family courts—a victory for the Committee, the other place and, of course, the Government.
New clause 5 relates to the appointment of the chief executive of the UK Supreme Court. I am confident it will be welcomed. A new clause along similar lines was tabled in the other place and again here in Committee. The Minister for Policing and Criminal Justice said at the time that we were going to discuss the matter with the powers that be. The appointments process for the chief executive of the UK Supreme Court has been discussed with the president of the Court, and I am pleased to report that those discussions have been successfully concluded, and the Government have therefore tabled the new clause with the Court’s agreement. Thus the president of the UK Supreme Court, not the Lord Chancellor, is responsible for the appointment of the chief executive. It is no longer necessary for the chief executive to agree the staffing structure with the Lord Chancellor, and the provision also clarifies that the Court’s officers and staff will be civil servants—something that needed to be done.
New clause 6 deals with broadcasting in the Supreme Court. To clarify matters, clause 28 expressly disapplies section 9 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, which prohibits sound recordings in court, to facilitate court broadcasting below the UK Supreme Court. It looks odd not to confirm at the same time that the Supreme Court is able to be exempt, so new clause 6 achieves that. Let me be clear that this is about clarifying the matter; there is no question that this has caused any problem in the past.
Amendments 60, 77, 78 and 82 make consequential amendments. I now reach the point where I can say that I am looking forward to hearing the right hon. Member for Blackburn and other colleagues presenting their new clauses and amendments.
Jenny Chapman (Darlington) (Lab)
I shall address my remarks to the Government amendments, but also to new clause 7, which deals with bailiffs, and amendment 100 on judicial diversity.
Let me start with a positive. We are pleased that the Government have seen fit to include new clause 5. These provisions were debated favourably in the other place and were introduced by the Opposition in Committee. The creation of the Supreme Court was, I think, an excellent achievement of the previous Government and it is right that Ministers have accepted the argument put to them by the Opposition and many in the profession for a further transfer of powers to strengthen the Court’s independence. We welcome the Government’s agreement with the recommendations and their decision to include in the Bill these important changes.
Continuing on a positive note, we completely accept the other Government new clauses and I am sure that you, Mr Deputy Speaker, will be pleased that a member of the Judicial Appointments Commission will have special knowledge of Wales in the future.
Amendment 100 was tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw). I have not heard what he is about to say, but I feel confident that I should agree with it. The Opposition are strongly in favour of that amendment. My noble Friend Baroness Hale gave a lecture a few weeks ago, in which she stated she was going to
“start by taking it for granted that judicial diversity is a good thing.”
For the purposes of this debate, I shall use a few more words to echo the arguments that will be put by my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn, but I think the House will agree that my noble Friend also speaks with considerable expertise on this issue.
The Government have recognised in the Bill that diversity in our judiciary is desirable, and unless we hold with the idea that talent is innately concentrated in one social group, we must acknowledge that for every exceptional judge we have, we are losing out on able candidates because we do not do enough to find them. Measures to support diversity seek not to give credit where it is not due, but to encourage ability wherever it may be found. We have seen many instances where it has been argued that merit and diversity are mutually exclusive, but we have argued that a diverse judiciary is not artificial or missing out on talent—it is quite the other way round. Diversity matters in both principle and practice. A judiciary that incorporates a range of voices, backgrounds and experiences brings more to the table. The differences, as Baroness Hale put it,
“add variety and depth to all decision-making.”
The Solicitor-General
Under the Legal Services Act 2007, the legal ombudsman only investigates cases about the service provided to the customer; it deals only with legal services that have been badly provided. If we were to say, “Oh well, let’s include bailiff services”, that would be very nice for the creditor, who would be able to report to the legal services ombudsman, but it would not help the debtors. They are the people for whom the hon. Lady is speaking, but they would not be able to complain to the legal services ombudsman because a service is not being provided to them.
Jenny Chapman
It was not me who made that suggestion; it came from the legal services ombudsman. So clearly there is a way around this matter and the Minister may wish to explore that a bit further. His intervention shows that the Government are not going to do this, but we would like them to commit to a robust complaints procedure to sort out the problems that our constituents face. They deserve access to a robust complaints procedure when things go wrong, as they too often do, so we hope that hon. Members on both sides of the House will support our proposal.
Mr Speaker
I have received no such indication from a Minister. The hon. Member for Vauxhall (Kate Hoey) is a ready source of information. She has now enlightened the House. I had not heard that news, but I imagine that it will now be well known to the Treasury Bench and her remarks will very soon find their way to Ministers, so my advice to her is that she should remain alert for any developments that might arise. I thank her for what she said.
The Solicitor-General
May I start where the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) left off? I entirely accept that what has happened since 2005 has been very disappointing indeed. We had high hopes. I was involved in the debates at that time and we expected that we would see far more women at the very top of the judiciary than we have done. He mentioned one out of 12 in the Supreme Court. I believe it is four out of 38 in the Court of Appeal. It is not acceptable and there is no question but that more needs to be done.
As the right hon. Gentleman conceded to some extent, we have done much in the Bill to try to achieve that, starting with flexible working, which could make a difference, and the tipping-point provisions where two people are of an equal standard. There has been a long debate in the legal profession and among judges about exactly what merit means in this context. Lord Bingham and Lord Phillips previously said that it was the judicial qualities, plus what the needs of the Court were, which had to be put together to establish what the commission should be looking for. One of the needs of the Court is to have the wisdom of highly intelligent women who have sat as judges for many years and who come to the role with the experience of women, which is, admittedly, different in all parts of the House. We are very keen to see the position improved.
There are one or two encouraging signs. For example, those entering the legal profession are now balanced and there is some progress, as the right hon. Gentleman said, at the lower levels. There is no question but that more needs to be done. The Bill makes a start with the flexible working and the tipping point. There was a great deal of discussion in the other place about how to try to make matters go forward faster, and it was accepted there that one way would be a statutory duty underpinning the leadership role of the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice. That is why, as the right hon. Gentleman said, paragraph 11 of schedule 13 provides that both office holders must take such steps as they consider appropriate for the purposes of encouraging diversity.
Of course, the right hon. Gentleman is correct that that is not the application of an objective standard. We are putting trust in the Lord Chief Justice and the Lord Chancellor to take this matter seriously and come up with a plan for the steps they consider appropriate for the purposes of encouraging diversity. For my part, given that we have not done that previously, and given that I trust those office holders to take it seriously and pursue it vigorously, I am prepared to give them the chance without making it an objective standard. We are putting trust in them, under paragraph 11 of schedule 13, to do the job. I believe that the current Lord Chief Justice takes that very seriously—I have discussed it with him and he certainly gives that impression—as does the Lord Chancellor.
Mr Straw
I have the highest regard for the Lord Chief Justice and, as it happens, for the Lord Chancellor, so that is not the issue. Will the hon. Gentleman explain something for me? Exactly the same arguments could have been used with regard to the Northern Ireland judiciary, because we were trusting the same Lord Chancellor—the same person—until 2009, and the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland is a man of the highest quality. Therefore, if these measures have not only been needed in Northern Ireland but have worked, why is the hon. Gentleman moving on to say—I think he is about to do so—that they are not needed in England and Wales?
The Solicitor-General
What I am saying is that the new provision was accepted in the other place, with wide acclaim—the Opposition thought that it was a major move forward—and an agreement about the way forward was established, so it is perhaps wrong for this House simply to say, “Oh well. Let’s nudge it another inch.” If Parliament is prepared to say that there will be a legal duty on those officer holders to take those steps, that seems to me to be a step forward. I do not believe that the right hon. Gentleman, when he was in that great role, would have taken it lightly if Parliament had told him that he must take such steps as he considered appropriate for the purposes of encouraging diversity.
Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South East) (Lab)
I do not want to sound repetitious, because I know that this point has been made, but why is what is good for Northern Ireland not also good for the United Kingdom?
The Solicitor-General
Of course, there are unique circumstances in Northern Ireland, as we know, and indeed as we have discussed today in other contexts. The point I am making is that an agreement was reached in the other place on the way forward and I think that we should give it a chance. I agree with the right hon. Member for Blackburn that there has been a disappointing performance since 2005, and I am happy to make it clear from the Dispatch Box that I share his concerns about that. We have tried to do a good deal about it in the Bill. The other point I will make—I do not know how far I can take this—is that we are about to see appointments to the Court of Appeal and to very high positions in the judiciary, and there are some very good candidates who are women, but we will have to see what the outcome will be.
Turning to bailiff regulation, new clause 7 echoes an amendment that was agreed in the other place but later removed from the Bill in Committee. New clause 17 proposes a role for the court in relation to every warrant and provides for the judiciary to compile an annual report on bailiff complaints for the Lord Chancellor to consider. My hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon (Mr Buckland) made a compelling argument on the need for a firm response to the misbehaviour of rogue bailiffs and suggested that one way of doing so would be through the court and its procedures. The Government’s approach, which I will come to shortly, is set out in the response to the “Transforming Bailiff Action” consultation, which was published on 25 January. It sets out the reforms that will tackle what we consider to be the root problems of the complaints about bailiffs. It introduces safeguards for debtors and, equally, allows creditors to collect money they are owed, which I think all parties agree is necessary.
It remains our belief that the package of reforms offers the most effective and proportionate response to the problem of aggressive bailiffs and that it will render unnecessary some of the cost and bureaucracy inherent in the proposals of the hon. Member for Darlington (Jenny Chapman) and the Opposition. It will be a new world, if I may put it that way.
The Government’s reforms centre on part 3 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007—the background is one of all-party consensus—and they do six things. They remove antiquated, confusing laws and clarify what the powers of bailiffs are, so those powers will be known. Regulations that we will publish this summer and aim to implement in April 2014 will set out what goods can and cannot be seized. There will also be a clear and fair charging regime. It is iniquitous for a bailiff to turn up at a door to collect three debts and then demand three fees when he has made only one visit.
Jenny Chapman
In the interests of moving the debate along, I have made it clear that we do not disagree with the Government on any of those things. Our point relates to when things go wrong. If the Solicitor-General could respond to that, perhaps we could make some progress.
The Solicitor-General
The point is that these things have not been happening, but they will happen under the Government’s reforms. They will change the landscape. That is why the word “transforming” is in the title of the consultation—they will transform things. The enhanced certification and mandatory training will make a difference and we all agree that that is a good thing. The county court certificate to practise, which a judge can withdraw on complaint, and the offence of not having a certificate when attempting enforcement are powerful new remedies that did not exist before.
The hon. Lady mentioned the legal ombudsman. It is difficult to see how the system would work effectively under her proposal. Eighty per cent. of the cases are local council cases, so the local government ombudsman will be available for complaint. That is a remedy, but the hon. Lady is complicating things by suggesting that there should be another remedy on top of it. A certification complaint is one possible route of complaint and strong remedy, as are court procedures, which my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon has mentioned, and the local government ombudsman. The hon. Lady also mentioned a whole host of internal complaint schemes and she wants to put another scheme on top of them, but her proposal will not work legally. She is trying to patch her proposed scheme on to the Legal Services Act 2007, but the legal ombudsman looks only into complaints about the service provided to the customer, and in these circumstances the customer is the creditor. It would be nice for the creditor to have an avenue of complaint, but that would not help the debtor.
Jenny Chapman
The Solicitor-General will forgive me for saying that he is repeating himself. My point is that we want a simpler ombudsman service, under which there would be one ombudsman for complaints about bailiffs. That would be far simpler and I do not know why the Solicitor-General feels the need to repeat his earlier comments, which have already been dealt with.
The Solicitor-General
The hon. Lady’s case is compelling in the sense that there are a lot of problems with bailiffs and their misbehaviour and that that needs to change. There is cross-party support for six changes that will change the landscape, but she is saying, “Oh, we want one more thing,” but that one more thing happens to be half-baked legally and would not do the job, so I have to make that point. Of course, it is wrong to repeat things over and over again, but I am trying to get the hon. Lady to agree that hers is not a sensible proposal.
The Solicitor-General
I have failed to persuade the hon. Lady, but I will certainly not make a concession. I hope she will forgive me in due course. I am sure she will.
Although we believe that the underlying causes of most, if not all, complaints will be dealt with by our reforms, officials are working with the advice sector to consider once more the types of complaints received. They will work with them to ensure that they are adequately addressed in the regulations, which are due in the summer.
The reforms are a significant step forward and it is worth giving them a chance. I know that the hon. Member for Darlington knows that in her heart of hearts. We are confident that our reforms will have a positive effect on bailiff action. It is time for action and something is now being done. The Bill responds to the concerns that inspired new clause 7. My hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon has pointed to some useful powers that can be held in reserve. It may be that in due course we will have to go that step further in court. We have given a commitment to review the reforms. That will happen one, three and, if necessary, five years after their introduction. We are working with stakeholders to ensure that there is a robust framework.
The Government are being reasonable and pro-active, so I ask the House to support the reforms. I urge the hon. Member for Darlington not to press new clause 7. My hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon said that new clause 17 was a probing amendment so I hope that he will not press it. I say to the right hon. Member for Blackburn that we are disappointed, but we are doing a lot in the Bill. Is it not right to trust the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice, when they are given a statutory duty such as the one in the Bill, to come up with a plan that works?
Amendment 22 agreed to.
Schedule 10
The Family Court
Amendments made: 10, page 166, line 12, after ‘court’ insert ‘and to be varied by that court’.
Amendment 11, page 167, line 15, leave out paragraph 8 and insert—
‘8 (1) Section 4 (variation etc of orders registered in a magistrates’ court) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1) (orders in relation to which section 4 applies) for “orders registered in magistrates’ courts” substitute “High Court orders registered in the family court”.
(3) In subsection (2)(a) (court of registration may vary rate of payments specified by order)—
(a) for “court of registration” substitute “family court”, and
(b) for “original court” substitute “High Court”.
(4) In subsection (2)(b) (general rule that variation of rate of payments specified by registered order is to be by court of registration) for the words from “court of registration” to the end substitute “family court.”
(5) Omit subsections (2A) to (2C), (5A), (5B) and (7).
(6) In subsection (4) (power of court of registration to remit application for variation of rate of payments to original court)—
(a) omit “it appears to the court to which”,
(b) after “registered order” insert “and it appears to the family court”,
(c) for “original court”, in both places, substitute “High Court”, and
(d) for “first-mentioned court” substitute “family court”.
(7) In subsection (5) (other circumstances in which original court has jurisdiction to vary rate of payments) for “original court” substitute “High Court”.
(8) In subsection (6A) (with the exception of power to make provision as to means of payment, magistrates’ courts in England and Wales have no power to vary certain orders made by Court of Session or by High Court in Northern Ireland)—
(a) for the words before “variation” substitute “Although such an order as is mentioned in this subsection may be varied under section 1 of the Maintenance Enforcement Act 1991 as applied by section 4A(2) of this Act, no application for any other”,
(b) for “any court” substitute “the family court”,
(c) for “that court” substitute “the family court”, and
(d) for “section 1(2)” substitute “sections 1(2) and 2(6A)”
(9) In subsection (6B) (no application to be made to a magistrates’ court for variation of certain orders) for “any court” substitute “the family court”.’.
Amendment 12, page 167, line 36, leave out ‘or an officer of that court’.
Amendment 13, page 167, line 39, leave out ‘or an officer of that court’.
Amendment 14, page 177, line 37, leave out ‘or an officer of the court’.
Amendment 15, page 177, line 40, leave out ‘, or an officer of the court,’.
Amendment 16, page 181, leave out lines 21 and 22.
Amendment 17, page 181, line 23, leave out ‘paragraphs 3 and’ and insert ‘paragraph’.
Amendment 18, page 182, line 10, leave out ‘paragraphs 4 and 5’ and insert ‘paragraph 4’.
Amendment 19, page 183, line 7, leave out ‘22,’ and insert ‘22(2),’.—(Oliver Heald.)
Schedule 11
Transfer of jurisdiction to family court
Amendments made: 20, page 188, line 14, leave out sub-paragraphs (3) to (7) and insert—
‘( ) For subsections (1A) to (1E) (powers of magistrates’ courts in England and Wales to vary registered orders) substitute—
“(1A) The family court may exercise the same powers in relation to an order registered in the family court under this Part of this Act as are exercisable by the family court under section 1 of the Maintenance Enforcement Act 1991 in relation to a qualifying periodical maintenance order (within the meaning of that section) which has been made by the family court, including the power under subsection (7) of that section to revoke, suspend, revive or vary any means of payment order (within the meaning of that subsection) made by virtue of this subsection.”’.
Amendment 21, page 216, line 37, column2, at end insert—
‘In Schedule 2, paragraph 3(3).’.—(Oliver Heald.)
Schedule 13
Judicial appointments
Amendment proposed: 100, page 224, line 42, at end insert
‘Each of the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice must at all times engage in a programme of action which is designed—
(a) to secure, so far as it is reasonably practicable to do so, that appointments to listed judicial offices are such that those holding such offices are reflective of the community in England and Wales;
(b) to require the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, so far as it is reasonably practicable to do so, to secure that a range of persons reflective of the community in England and Wales is available for consideration by the Judicial Appointments Commission whenever it is required to select a person to be appointed, or recommended for appointment, to a listed judicial office.’.—(Mr Straw.)
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Oral Answers to Questions
Oliver Heald Excerpts(12 years, 4 months ago)
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Mrs May
As the hon. Gentleman knows, we have made available some figures from the early assessment of the success rate of the pilot that was run in the summer. We are of course awaiting the independent investigation by the chief inspector of the UK Border Agency, which will not be available until the end of January.
Oliver Heald (North East Hertfordshire) (Con)
There has been a warm welcome in the House and the country for the firmer approach being taken by this Government, but can the Home Secretary give us any further information on the ending of the bogus colleges scam, and to what extent the Government are able to influence events in the Mediterranean to ensure that better naval patrolling takes place to turn back boats carrying illegal immigrants?
Mrs May
I am happy to tell my hon. Friend that there are now more than 450 colleges that have not been accredited under the scheme or did not apply to be accredited, which gives us a clear message about whether they were actually providing education. On his second point, it is important for this country to work with other countries and help them to improve their border security, so that the problem of people entering Europe and then the United Kingdom is reduced.
Government Reductions in Policing
Oliver Heald Excerpts(13 years, 1 month ago)
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Yvette Cooper
My hon. Friend is right to mention the concerns of the chief constable of South Yorkshire. He is reported as having recently raised concerns about what would happen to crime in many areas as a result of the scale of the cuts in the Government’s plans. The cuts go way beyond the 12% that Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary said could be made through genuine efficiency savings over several years, and they go way beyond the 12% cuts that the previous Labour Home Secretary identified and promised to implement over a Parliament—they are more than 15% in real terms in the first two years alone. The Government are cutting more in the first two years than Labour proposed to cut over a Parliament.
Mr Oliver Heald (North East Hertfordshire) (Con)
Does the right hon. Lady not feel any need to apologise for the state in which Labour left this country? We had the worst deficit in the G20—worse than Ireland and Greece. We are now trying to do something about it, but she criticises every saving. What is the matter with Labour? Do Labour Members not understand that everybody and every economic organisation across the world is saying that we need a deficit reduction package and that what she is saying is nonsense?
Yvette Cooper
Government Members have obviously been primed by the Whips today to join the debate but not make any points about policing. They are obviously afraid to discuss the consequences of the cuts for policing and crime in communities across the country, and they are starting to sound like a stuck record. They are cutting too far, too fast, and it is having serious consequences for our economy, the level of unemployment, and police forces. They are going too far, too fast, and communities will pay the price.
The charge against the Home Secretary, as she sits in the dock aided and abetted by the Minister for Policing and Criminal Justice, is serious. She is the first Conservative Home Secretary in history to champion cuts to the police as a way to cut crime. What is her defence? First, she tried to claim that she was not at the scene of the crime, and that it was the Chancellor who cut her budget and not her. She then tried to claim that no crime had been committed, saying
“lower budgets do not automatically have to mean lower police numbers.”
Faced with the incriminating evidence of 12,500 fewer police, she changed her story:
“We have been absolutely clear about the need for forces to ensure that the cuts are made to the back office, procurement, IT provision and so forth.”—[Official Report, 6 December 2010; Vol. 520, c. 19.]
Her accomplice, meanwhile, said that savings could all come from the back office and the newly defined “middle office”.
The expert witnesses from HMIC have blown that defence away. Instead of proving that cuts could all be made from the back office, they showed that 95% of police officers do not work in the back office. Instead of identifying a wasteful middle office, they said that that office carried out 60% of intelligence support, included the CID specialist crime units, and worked on tackling hate crime, vice, drugs and burglary. Even the Conservative councillor who chairs the Norfolk police authority has switched sides to give evidence for the prosecution. He stated:
“I have to fundamentally disagree with the Minister’s assertion that we can find further efficiencies in the so-called ‘back office’…you can’t take £24.5 million out of our annual spend and still deliver the policing service to the same current standards.”
Counter-terrorism and Security Powers
Oliver Heald Excerpts(13 years, 10 months ago)
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Mrs May
I am grateful to the hon. Lady, both for the action that she took previously to ensure that we did not go through with 90 days and for the point that she has made. My view is clear: we need to consider how we can reduce from 28 days. The debate tomorrow will be about the extension of the 28-day provision for six months, which gives us time to conduct the review properly, alongside all the other issues on counter-terrorism legislation that we are considering, so that we can look at that in a balanced and proportionate way.
Mr Oliver Heald (North East Hertfordshire) (Con)
In welcoming the statement, may I remind my right hon. Friend that when the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act was going through the House, Conservatives and Liberal Democrats made common cause in opposing the careless way in which the then Government wanted to give powers of data-mining for communications data and surveillance to a wide range of bodies, such as local authority waste departments and the Royal Parks constabulary? The issues that were looked at, such as dog fouling and littering, went far beyond what most people would consider reasonable. Will she carefully examine that Act and try to ensure that we do not have an unreasonable aggregation of powers that brings security into disrepute?
Mrs May
I thank my hon. Friend for the points that he has made. He played a very important part in the debate about that legislation when it was going through the House, and he raised exactly those points—as part of a coalition before the coalition, if I can describe it as such. We will, indeed, look carefully at the Act. Those powers have been added to over time, and as a result brought the matter into disrepute.