Railways Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Olly Glover Excerpts

Thursday 5th February 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Rebecca Smith]

I agree with my hon. Friend. I alluded to that issue earlier in my comments, and my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham raised it on Tuesday. That is why we are concerned on behalf of not only open access, but first of all passengers, who are not going to get the best possible service because of the inbuilt assertion that open access can ultimately be discarded if the Government do not see it as palatable.

The written evidence from Lumo and Hull Trains also says:

“As the Government and GBR seek to deliver a thriving, growing railway, it is vital that the Railways Bill recognises and protects the contribution that Open Access makes to these shared goals. This will ensure that it will continue to deliver these benefits to the millions of passengers who rely on them, now and into the future…As the Government looks to modernise and centralise rail through GBR, it will be important that competition remains an embedded principle within this framework. Open Access provides a proven model of innovation and efficiency, which can help GBR achieve its statutory objectives. Recognising the role of competition as a driver of value and growth will ensure that passengers, the network, and the public purse all continue to benefit.”

FirstGroup’s written submission to the Transport Committee tells a similar story, saying that open access operators

“receive no government funding, take on full risk, and generate their own revenue— giving them very strong incentives to deliver a service which is endorsed by passengers…The way in which GBR structures its timetable will be critical. It should be obliged to carry out its functions fairly and without discrimination, so that if an open access train service can provide passenger benefit monopoly interests do not prevent that train from running.”

FirstGroup also says:

“Clause 63 must ensure that un-funded services which GBR ‘expects’ are not given train paths in advance of funded open access services, which will provide passenger benefit sooner.”

The Rail Freight Group is also concerned by the clause, telling the Transport Committee:

“We understand that the basis of the new approach will be via Infrastructure Capacity Plans (Clause 61) and, for GBR’s own trains, via the Capacity Duty (Clause 63). It is very difficult from these clauses to have a clear understanding of how the new process will operate, and how rail freight and rail freight growth will be facilitated, including in contractual rights for operators…For example, we understand from our discussions that there could be numerous infrastructure capacity plans across the network which a new freight service will have to navigate. We also understand that when an infrastructure capacity plan is reviewed, existing freight services could be stopped from operating if other services are considered to be higher value, as contractual commitments are expected to expire in line with the capacity plans.”

Nick Brooks from ALLRAIL told the Transport Committee:

“I think we would look for clarification, regarding clause 63, that GBR cannot reserve capacity for hypothetical future GBR long-distance services at the expense of privately funded open-access proposals or existing services that provide immediate benefits—and extra infrastructure income, of course, because open-access operators are paying track access fees too. For that, I think you need to prioritise funded open access over speculative GBR services ‘someday in the future.’”

It is very clear what the sector thinks: clause 63 needs substantial clarification. That is why, along with the Lib Dems, we have tabled a number of amendments, which I will briefly speak to. Amendment 81 would make it clear that capacity allocation should be based on a level playing field, without priority given to any particular operator. That would allow the best outcome for the passenger, and allows the public interest bit in clause 18 to take the lead. Proceeding on any other basis will leave us with a monopoly that is allowed to abuse its position.

Amendment 80 puts forward an alternative approach, based on key performance indicators, but it is clear the Government are not interested, so in the interests of time I will not pursue that further today—that will be one fewer Division, the Government will be pleased to hear.

Amendment 253, in the name of the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage, requires GBR “to retain sufficient capacity” to ensure that the rail freight target is met. To progress, there would need to be a mechanism to reach a decision if that conflicted with any planned GBR service.

Amendment 211 would require GBR

“to publish a statement explaining any decision not to grant access to a specific part of the network on the basis of network capacity.”

For an appeals process to have any meaning at all, that would need to be a pre-requisite.

Amendment 229 would ensure that

“capacity allocation decisions reflect both planning priorities and freight-increase ambitions”

and would require

“GBR to publish and maintain a list of strategic freight corridors and ensures that any material reduction in capacity must be approved by the ORR.”

The amendment would give a better balance to capacity considerations than the current wholly one-sided drafting. That is incredibly important because, ultimately, the Government are seeking to reduce climate change and achieve net zero. Freight plays a huge part in that, and if we do not have strategic freight corridors to ensure that we can make use of the freight system, we will fall short of what could be achieved.

Finally, new clause 56, in the name of the Libs Dems,

“requires GBR to explore and consider the potential benefits of centralised train planning and auctioning.”

That is an interesting concept and could have significant benefits for passengers and taxpayers by driving competitive pricing for certain routes, while avoiding the abstraction arguments in relation to competing open access applications.

[Olly Glover (Didcot and Wantage) (LD)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship once again on the Committee, Mr Western. I will no doubt be told off for getting her title wrong, but I agree with the Conservative spokesperson, the hon. Member for—

[Rebecca Smith]

South West Devon.

[Olly Glover]

I knew the hon. Lady’s seat; it is just that I got told off the other day by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham, for calling him the spokesperson instead.

Carrying on, I agree with the hon. Lady’s comments on the Opposition’s amendments. I think most of them are sound and reflect the intention to strike a better balance in the Bill between GBR wanting to protect its interests and objectives, and recognising that there are valid and competing objectives elsewhere in the industry, particularly on the freight side, as well as on the open access passenger side.

Let me speak briefly to our new clause 56. The hon. Lady accurately summarised our intention. The new clause does not require GBR to adopt the idea of auctioning train paths, but it does require it to examine the potential of the idea, which is used to good effect on the Italian and Spanish high-speed rail networks. This idea, basically, retains the guiding mind approach to timetable development and construction but would recognise that for routes with a high-revenue yield and limited competition, such as London to Manchester, it may well be best, in the interests of both revenue and getting more people on to trains, to auction off one of the paths—London to Manchester has three an hour—to another operator. That would help GBR to provide some competitive tension to improve its own delivery.

I appreciate that the Government would probably say that Avanti West Coast is terrible and when it becomes GBR everything will be a land of milk, sweetness and honey; however, the real structural problem is that at the moment there is no realistic competition between London and Manchester. That is why—certainly from the figures that I have seen most recently—passenger numbers have recovered far less than they have on the east coast main line, where there is competition and a real spirit of customer choice. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s comments on that.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Olly Glover, do you wish to move amendment 253?

[Olly Glover]

That is not our amendment.

[Rebecca Smith]

It is. It was debated in the previous group.

[Olly Glover]

Apologies, Mr Western; the confusion has arisen because the selection and grouping paper lists it as an Opposition amendment. I do not wish to move it.

[The Chair]

We move to amendment 211.

[The Chair]

Olly Glover, do you wish to move amendment 211?

[Olly Glover]

Yes, Mr Western. Thank you.

Amendment proposed: 211, in clause 63, page 35, line 39, at end insert—

“(3) Where Great British Railways decides not to grant access to persons to a specific part of the network to reserve capacity, Great British Railways must—

(a) publish a statement (a ‘capacity reservation statement’) setting out the evidence relating to the decision;

(b) consult—

(i) the Office for Rail and Road, and

(ii) any other persons who have sought access to that part of the network.

(4) A capacity reservation statement must explain how the decision taken by Great British Railways under subsection (3) reflects the best use of GBR infrastructure for the operation of trains as set out in the infrastructure capacity plan.

(5) The ORR must review a capacity reservation statement.

(6) The ORR may direct Great British Railways to reconsider its assessment if it considers that the exclusion of other operators is not necessary for Great British Railways to retain sufficient capacity over GBR infrastructure.”—(Olly Glover.)

This amendment requires Great British Railways to publish a statement explaining any decision not to grant access to a specific part of the network on the basis of network capacity.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Rebecca Smith]

I can appreciate where the hon. Member is coming from. It sounds like a good idea; however, it could still be in the legislation directly, and the illustration he gave still leaves a huge number of questions about what happens if there is more than one user of that bit of infrastructure. Why should the private operator be the one that has to pay for the infrastructure? If anything, there is an issue, which I may come to, about the impact on fares, because ultimately, by the sound of it, GBR is going to have far fewer costs than other operators. In principle, I can see why the hon. Member made that point, but I think it is not clear enough at this stage.

Clause 64(8) allows a right of appeal, but only under judicial review-type provisions, which is no right at all. Any of us who has worked with anyone who ever wanted to get a judicial review knows that it is incredibly difficult. It is also incredibly expensive, so it is certainly not a level playing field.

The industry has rightly been outspoken on clause 64. In evidence to the Transport Committee, the Rail Freight Group stated:

“The Bill sets out the future framework for access charges for freight. In headline terms the charges will be calculated in a similar way to today (costs directly incurred by running the train) which we welcome. However, the Bill provides for extra costs to be levied on freight services

a. Through a mandatory reservation charge for capacity which is booked and then not used (for example, if a customer cancels a train due to poor weather) (Clause 64)

b. Through a general clause 64(3) which allows GBR discretion to charge more if ‘an efficient operator can pay it’. This is a very broad test and far wider than the test in current law ‘if the market can bear it’. This raises the prospect of far higher, and potentially uncapped charges being levied.

Increasing the costs of rail freight will simply make using rail too expensive for customers when compared to road freight, and will reverse modal shift and undermine growth. It is essential that the powers to charge more than the standard charge are strictly limited for GBR.”

The key point there is about reversing modal shift. On the one hand, the Government want to promote modal shift. Indeed, there is a scheme coming in— I mentioned it on Tuesday, but now I cannot remember its name—that will look at different types of transport, and one of the plans is to ensure modal shift. Anything that undermines that is potentially contradictory and a backwards step.

The Transport Committee also heard evidence from Nick Brooks of ALLRAIL, who said:

“I was just going to say something about privately owned investors and privately owned operators, specifically privately owned investors that want to invest in our sector rather than in other sectors—aviation, the road sector, or even completely different sectors. There is a certain risk. There is a commercial risk, of course, and ultimately they are looking for lower fixed costs and higher variable costs. The worry with GBR is this: who determines what the market can bear? Is GBR an independent entity, or not? I think the Bill says it should be GBR itself that determines that, if I am not mistaken.

It is a little bit like another conflict, or potential problem, with track access fees. Who decides the size of the track access fees? If you are a privately owned operator, is it your competitor—GBR—that decides your track access fees? That is a potential cause of worry.”

Lumo and Hull Trains also had similar concerns, which they raised in their written evidence to the Transport Committee:

“A transparent and proportionate charging regime will be critical to ensuring the financial sustainability and competitiveness of the railway. If GBR were able to set and revise access charges without independent oversight (as suggested by clause 64), it could create uncertainty and deter private investment. Independent regulation of charging is therefore vital to maintain investor confidence and ensure fairness between different operators. Open Access operators already make a substantial contribution to the upkeep of the network while receiving no public subsidy. The charges paid by Open Access are calculated independently by ORR to encourage investment, sweat the railway asset and deliver connectivity and the associated economic benefits. It also acts as an additional income stream to Network Rail. These arrangements demonstrate the sector’s willingness to invest and its commitment to supporting the network’s long-term health.

Ensuring that access charges remain proportionate and independently regulated will help reinforce the Government’s objective of crowding in private capital to support network growth. Confidence in a fair charging regime is essential for the continued profitability of private operators. Reinforcing a transparent and proportionate charging system will also help deliver the Government’s wider fiscal priorities by attracting and retaining private investment. By giving investors certainty that network costs are predictable and fairly allocated, the Bill can ensure that private operators continue to play a central role in funding innovation and expanding passenger capacity across the UK.”

Lumo and Hull Trains recommend:

“The updated charging regime must be developed in consultation with private stakeholders, appropriate for the markets being served and regulated with independent oversight from the ORR. This will sustain confidence in a fair and transparent access regime and ensure that private investment continues to play a central role in delivering a successful railway.”

Amendment 83 would prevent GBR from charging any sum it liked without notice. Instead, it would be required to follow the standard pricing structure set out in clause 64(2), based on actual costs incurred as a result of the activity. Does the Minister agree that any serious business case for private investment in our railways will need to have the certainty of fixed costs? How does the clause achieve anything other than the opposite?

Amendment 82 would remove the right of GBR to charge its competitors costs, basically at any time and without notice, on grounds that they have access to more money that they could pay. Instead, it would impose a duty on GBR to give other operators a minimum of 12 months’ notice of changes to the charging scheme, so at least they can react to the change and seek any appeal before the event rather than after it.

Speaking to amendments 82 and 83, the Rail Forum has said:

“We strongly support these amendment, access and other charges should be reasonable and operators should have sufficient warning of changes to be able to plan accordingly.”

The amendments are not just a nice idea being suggested from the Opposition Benches, but something that the industry would like to see as well.

Amendment 84 would provide that neither the Secretary of State nor Great British Railways can take any step to implement any part of the charging scheme until it has been laid before Parliament for three months. Once again, that would put accountability and transparency back into the system—something the Government seem hellbent on ignoring.

The second impact would be to allow affected organisations time to prepare an appeal. Judicial review requires a very short application process of just 12 weeks. This amended clause would help aggrieved parties to prepare a complex challenge in time for a JR timetable. Amendment 84 is more a probing one, so it will be interesting to hear the Minister’s response. The reflection on the judicial review process is particularly important, because we do not want to crowd people out of the opportunity to appeal. Anything he can offer in response would be appreciated.

Amendment 230 would ensure that services are not caught within the charging scheme if they cannot operate due to GBR failures or actions—a case of natural justice. Does the Minister accept that the existing wording of the clause would allow GBR to profit from a cancellation of services caused by GBR’s failure to provide infra-structure? If so, will he explain how that could be a fair result?

Amendment 242 would remove the requirement for GBR to charge in relation to trains that are planned to use GBR infrastructure, but do not operate or do not operate in full. Again, that is in effect a probing amendment, or a making-a-point amendment, as it were. With that, I shall sit down.

[Olly Glover]

I have a few brief thoughts on what the Conservative spokesperson has said about this clause. On the Liberal Democrat Benches, we feel that a lot of the amendments ask good questions about transparency and about accountability for how the access charging regime will work. We are definitely interested to hear the Minister’s response.

A couple of the Opposition amendments perhaps go a little too far, or at least questions could be asked about them. Amendment 242, on what I am calling phantom paths, addresses an interesting phenomenon in the railway at the moment. Many freight paths are in the timetable, but seldom used; they are reserved by freight operators for a variety of reasons in case they might be used. People in the industry say that they sometimes present problems for optimum timetable development or use of capacity. It will be interesting to hear from both the Minister and, perhaps, the Conservative spokesperson as to how they feel that those phantom paths can be dealt with, absent an ability by GBR to apply access charges to trains that do not run.

Conservative amendment 83 attempts to remove GBR’s ability to charge higher than the normal rate, the likely revenue to be obtained by running train services does not vary significantly based on the type of railway and the type of service concerned. The most extreme example of that is that the typical fare yield for Manchester to Blackburn will obviously be a lot less than for London to Manchester. The concept of GBR applying differential access charges is not necessarily one that I would be inclined to oppose, but the criteria that it uses in doing so needs to be transparent. The amendments that we tabled earlier allude to that. It will be interesting to hear from the Minister how the Government intend for GBR to make that process transparent, particularly given the high judicial review bar for challenging some of those decisions. That way, hopefully, a new system can be created in which everyone might have faith.

[Keir Mather]

I will briefly turn back to the debate on the previous clauses; because the Opposition spokesperson asked me to provide an example of the motion of consent in general as it relates to timetabling and I was remiss in my duty in not doing so. To give more context, the network code currently sets out the circumstances where train service timings need to be adjusted by a few minutes without requiring specific consent. GBR will follow a very similar process and that is a normal process that industry would expect us to follow.

I now turn to the amendments at hand, all of which seek to make changes to GBR’s charging scheme. I confirm to the hon. Member for South West Devon that the charging regime broadly replicates the one that is in place today. That is intentional, so that all of the charges and discounts referenced will be familiar to industry to achieve a smooth transition to the new framework.

Furthermore, given that GBR will be bound by public law duties, which require fairness, reasonableness and non-discrimination in actions and decision making, there is no reason to think that GBR will behave unreasonably. Rather, when making or amending its charging scheme, GBR will be required to balance the various duties set out in clause 18, which include promoting the interests of passengers, promoting the use of the network for carrying freight and enabling operators to plan the future of their businesses. GBR will also be required to consult with industry through the development of its charging scheme, and will be held to account via a clear route to appeal to the ORR on the scheme’s design and application.

Given that existing competition law and applicable subsidy rules will automatically apply to GBR, GBR will not be able to treat other operators unfairly or start levying excessive charges that would undermine their ability to operate successful, profit-driven services. That will be further supported by the ORR’s continued role as competition regulator for the railway. I hope that gives hon. Members some assurance to begin with.

I now turn to amendment 242, which proposes to remove the provision at clause 64(1)(b) that enables GBR to charge operators for services that do not run as planned. In today’s system, that mechanism is called a reservation charge, and the Bill replicates that for GBR. Importantly, the Bill does not mandate that a reservation charge must be issued in all instances where services do not run. Instead, GBR will have discretion regarding how and when to use it. That is particularly important for taking into consideration different industry operating models, especially freight, which is market driven and therefore has to live with less certainty over the services that it needs to run to serve its customers.

A routine and technical example of when a reservation charge is used today, and likely to be replicated in the future, is one affecting passenger services, not freight. Where a passenger service is allocated to a path that is expected to stop at eight stations but—for reasons of its own making and not GBR’s—it terminates short of its final destination and stops at only seven, it could still be charged as planned for the full service. In addition, with finite capacity on the network it is important that, when passenger operators are granted access, they provide those services they said they were going to run and are disincentivised to simply hold on to capacity.

To use a different example, if an operator consistently failed to run a service in its entirety, it would disadvantage passengers seeking to use that train and other operators that might wish to operate a passenger or freight service on an unused path. It could therefore be charged in full. As I have outlined, the purpose of the measure is to encourage operators to use the capacity that they have been allocated. Therefore, the ability to levy a reservation charge is an extremely useful tool to drive the right behaviours on the network. It ensures that best use is made of capacity and that operators remain accountable for providing the services in the timetable that they agreed to deliver.