Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Wilson of Sedgefield Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 8th June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I welcome this Bill and the growth in competitive objectives that inform it. I thank the many organisations that have provided us with briefings, especially the APPG on Investment Fraud and Fairer Financial Services. Its 70-page analysis deals with each part of the Bill in depth and reaches an important overall conclusion, which is that the case for protecting consumers within any reform of financial services is not merely a moral case, although the moral case is strong, it is an economic case, grounded in a clear-eyed analysis of how trust works, how it is destroyed and what happens to markets when it is lost. The report also notes that the Bill should not simply make complaint handling faster or more predictable for institutions; it should ensure that ordinary people can get the real issue investigated, decided, escalated where necessary and put right. It is not at all clear that the Bill does this or does this sufficiently.

A look at Part 2 illustrates the problem. It contains a number of significant reforms: Clause 5, for example, which concerns the appointment of the chair of the FOS scheme operator. Under this clause, the chair is appointed directly by the Treasury. This is a major structural shift that was not included in the original consultation. The clause also states that the terms of appointment must secure the chair’s independence from both HMT and the FCA. The ombudsman scheme occupies a unique position within our regulatory architecture. It must command the confidence of consumers while maintaining credibility with the industry. Independence is therefore essential: it is not merely a matter of statutory wording; it is also a matter of perception. Where appointments are made directly by the Government, questions inevitably arise about whether sufficient distance exists between Ministers and those exercising important quasi-judicial functions.

Clause 6 also contains significant reform proposals. It addresses time limits for complaints under the compulsory jurisdiction. It introduces a long-stop period of 10 years from the relevant act or omission, while preserving the possibility of alternative limits set through rules and allowing exceptions in specified circumstances. This is a process which, though critical, allows no meaningful parliamentary scrutiny. It is of course true that there is a strong case for providing greater certainty. Financial firms should not face indefinite exposure to complaints relating to events that occurred decades earlier. It is also true that financial misconduct can sometimes take years to emerge. Consumers may not discover that they have suffered detriment until long after the original transaction occurred. The challenge is one of balance. Parliamentary involvement will be helpful.

Still in Part 2, Clause 7 introduces one of the most consequential innovations in the Bill: the referral of matters from the FOS to the FCA. The ombudsman may also seek the FCA’s opinion of FCA rules where ambiguity exists. This proposed reform reflects the concern that individual complaints can sometimes raise wider questions affecting thousands of consumers and firms. The proposed reform also reflects long-standing industry criticism that the ombudsman has occasionally interpreted regulatory requirements differently from the regulator. In reality, however, it is hard to see this as a well-founded or convincing criticism of the current set-up.

The FOS resolves over 200,000 cases each year, upholding about 30%. We are told that the FOS is acting inconsistently and that it has strayed into becoming a quasi-regulator. If that were true—if this were really a systemic problem—the Government should be able to produce a substantial body of evidence. If it were true, there should be hundreds or even thousands of FOS decisions demonstrating this pattern. If such a list exists, HMT and the FCA have not published it—it is certainly not in the impact assessment. If such a list does not exist, the case for much of the reforms to the FOS rests on assertion rather than evidence. I invite the Minister to point us towards the specific FOS cases that justify the proposed sweeping reforms.

As things stand, the Government appear to be jumping to conclusions that will reduce access to the FOS, reducing access to free and impartial redress; introduce extra bureaucracy and costs; and, ultimately, damage confidence and trust in the financial services industry. We must guard against any risk that the ombudsman becomes subordinate to the regulator or loses the independence that has been central to its legitimacy. There is a strong case for removing Clause 7.

Clause 8 reforms the test used when determining complaints under the compulsory jurisdiction. This may well be the most controversial provision in Part 2. Historically, the ombudsman has determined complaints according to what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances. Critics have argued that this has sometimes allowed decisions to diverge from the regulatory rule book, creating uncertainty for firms that believed that they had complied with the FCA requirements.

We should ask ourselves whether strict alignment with regulatory rules could weaken consumer protection in cases where the rules themselves are incomplete, outdated or silent on emerging risks. The strength of the ombudsman system has been its ability to look beyond technical compliance and to consider fairness in a broader sense. If that flexibility is narrowed too far, some consumers may find that conduct that was plainly unfair nevertheless escapes effective remedy.

There are already voices, such as the Centre for Responsible Credit, calling for the removal of Clause 8. StepChange has said:

“The ‘fair and reasonable’ test was carefully designed by Parliament”,


requiring FOS to consider

“all the circumstances of the case”.

In contrast,

“FCA rules are often high level and permissive”.


StepChange believes that:

“The scope and flexibility of the test is essential for FOS to decide cases in a manner that is … fair”.


Shifting this to be based on compliance with FCA rules risks creating a tick-box exercise and weakening consumer protection. Martin Lewis has warned that:

“Restricting … access to free and fair redress is not a recipe for economic growth. Once consumers are warned about the erosion of their rights, it’s possible it will lead to disengagement from … financial services … and diminishing trust”.


On this issue, as on others in the Bill, Parliament must ensure that in pursuing regulatory certainty, we do not sacrifice fairness; that in pursuing efficiency, we do not diminish accountability; and that in strengthening regulatory co-ordination, we do not weaken the independence of the ombudsman. The UK’s financial services sector thrives not merely because it is competitive but because it is trusted. To be trusted, consumers must have confidence that when things go wrong, there is an independent, accessible and effective route to redress.

The Bill may not expressly repeal consumer protections or statutory rights; the concern is more subtle. Rights created by Parliament may be diminished in practice if access to redress depends on FCA rule compliance, FCA intent, FCA interpretation or Treasury-made conditions rather than independent interpretation of the underlying legal issue.

I close by quoting Which?:

“The proposed reforms to the FOS and the FCA appear to come at the expense of consumer protections. Any benefits arising from weaker consumer safeguards are likely to be temporary while longer term costs could be significant, particularly for vulnerable who rely most on access to redress and effective regulatory protections”.


I agree with that.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Wilson of Sedgefield) (Lab)]

My Lords, before we move on to the Back Benches, I remind noble Lords that the advisory time limit is eight minutes. If we all stick within that, we can get everybody in, it is fair to everybody else and we will be able to finish at a reasonable time.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Wilson of Sedgefield Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 22nd June 2026 Grand Committee

Northern Ireland and Scottish legislative consent sought. Relevant document: 2nd Report from the Delegated Powers Committee.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Wilson of Sedgefield) (Lab)]

My Lords, before we start the debate on the first group, I remind the Committee of the rules on declaring interests. Noble Lords should declare any relevant financial interest the first time they speak at each stage of a Bill. This means that, in Committee, relevant financial interests should be declared during the first group on which a noble Lord speaks. Thereafter, the declaration does not need to be repeated in debates on later groups at this stage. Declarations should be specific and brief. Members should briefly indicate the nature of their financial interests, not simply refer to their entry in the Register of Lords’ Interests. I also remind noble Lords of guidance at paragraph 8.82 of the Companion: when withdrawing amendments, noble Lords should

“be brief and need not respond to all the points made during the debate”.

Clause 1: Consumer credit

Amendment 1

Moved by

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Clause 13 agreed.

[Lord Wilson of Sedgefield (Lab)]

We are about to move on to the last group of amendments and we have 35 minutes to go. I hope we can finish this group before we finish at 8.45 pm. If we do not, unfortunately we will have to break mid-group and reconvene on the same group on Wednesday, so it is in noble Lords’ hands what we do.

Amendment 46

Moved by

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Wilson of Sedgefield Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th June 2026 Grand Committee

Northern Ireland and Scottish legislative consent sought. Relevant document: 2nd Report from the Delegated Powers Committee.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Wilson of Sedgefield) (Lab)]

My Lords, before we start, I ask noble Lords, as I did on Monday, to declare their interests before they speak. If they did not do that on Monday, they need to do it today. In addition, as per paragraph 8.82 of the Companion, when it comes to pressing or withdrawing amendments at the end of the debate, I ask noble Lords to keep that debate short. We are not supposed to rehash and repeat the whole debate, so please keep it succinct.

Schedule 2: Payment systems regulation

Amendment 47A

Moved by

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Wilson of Sedgefield Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 29th June 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, we now come on to a bit of a ragbag group of amendments, which I should probably have split into more than one group. In moving Amendment 89, I shall also speak to Amendments 92, 93, 94, 96 and 98.

I will start with the FCA’s guidance. At present, the FCA has a power under Section 139A of FSMA to give guidance on, for example, the operation of specific parts of FSMA or its rules. Section 1K says that the guidance must—that is, must—

“include guidance about how it intends to advance its operational objectives … in relation to different categories of authorised person or regulated activity”,

and, inter alia, it has to consult on that guidance. What does this Bill do? Predictably, it eviscerates the provisions. Clause 18(2) removes Section 1K from FSMA, and Clause 18(8) takes all the substance out of Section 139A. This is part of the insidious pattern of this Bill, removing information that regulated persons might find useful—removing guidance about how a regulator would advance its objectives—and removing the requirement to consult on what is left of Section 139A. This is a Bill solely for the regulators’ convenience, regardless of the needs of those subject to regulation. Similarly, Section 2L of FSMA currently requires the PRA to consult those it regulates about how its general policies and practices are consistent with its general duties, and Clause 18(3) removes this. My Amendments 89 and 92 would remove these retrograde provisions from the Bill.

Amendments 96 and 98 are rather different. They concern statutory references to the Financial Services Regulation Committee, and I thank my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, for adding their names. The current FSMA wording about parliamentary committees derives from the 2023 Act, which, as initially drafted, referenced only the Treasury Select Committee in the other place, but that was amended during the passage of the Act to encompass any committee of your Lordships’ House set up to deal with financial services regulation or indeed any Joint Committee of both Houses. Following the passing of the Act, your Lordships’ House decided to set up the Financial Services Regulation Committee, to which I, like others, have referred several times in this Committee. Amendments 96 and 98 merely amend the 2023 wording inserted into FSMA to reflect the fact that your Lordships’ House now has a specific committee which should be referred to in legislation.

When the Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Act was passed last year, we managed to get it amended to incorporate a specific reference to the Financial Services Regulation Committee, and I am a bit disappointed that the Treasury, which agreed to those amendments last year, has already forgotten that the FSMA wording is out of date and needs to be amended. I therefore hope that Amendments 96 and 98 are non-controversial and that the Government will accept them. I should explain for those noble Lords who did not take part in the passage of the Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Act that the references in the amendments to the Chairman of Committees are in fact references to the Deputy Lord Speaker—when that role was created, it encompassed the function of the Chairman of Committees, but that nomenclature remains in statute. That is the Committee’s fun fact of the day.

My remaining two amendments in this group, Amendments 93 and 94, are pretty arcane for those who have not audited a bank or sat on a bank or insurer’s board. For my sins, I have done both. Following the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, FSMA was amended to require meetings at least annually between the regulators and the auditors of PRA-regulated persons. This was definitely overkill, and I am pleased that the Government have decided to delete most of Section 339B of FSMA, through Clause 18(11). They have, however, retained the requirement for the PRA to do those meetings, even if it no longer has to report on them; my Amendment 93 would remove Section 339B in its entirety. This does not mean that the PRA will never meet the auditors of the bodies it regulates: it used to meet the auditors before Clause 339B was enacted in 2013 and can continue to do so if the clause is eliminated, but it would remove the obligation on the PRA to do so. Clause 339B has in fact spawned a small industry of the PRA thinking up questions to ask the auditors to report on. The auditors then go away and write a report, usually asking their client to produce a lot of information first, and then the auditors ask the client for a fat fee. It is not value-added activity. We should leave meeting auditors to the regulator’s discretion.

In a similar vein, my Amendment 94 would amend Section 340 of FSMA, which requires the PRA to make rules about auditor co-operation. It has a similar provision for the FCA, but that merely empowers the FCA to do so. My amendment is unlike most “may”/“must” amendments in your Lordships’ House. We normally seek to replace “may” with “must”. My Amendment 94 does the reverse, so that the PRA “may” make rules if it chooses to do so, and hence aligns with the FCA by giving discretion to the PRA, which is also what my Amendment 93 aims to do. I beg to move.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Wilson of Sedgefield) (Lab)]

My Lords, before we continue the debate, we have started group 6 and we have one more complete group to do. We are going to finish at 8.45 pm and I would hate to think that we would finish mid-group, but I am in your Lordships’ hands as to whether we do that.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, this is the third of the trio. Clause 18 is a deletion clause, the final clause in the trio that removes consideration of the regulatory principles from the context of actual rule-making. It strips out the guidance duties, reporting duties and consultation hooks that once gave Parliament visibility into how the regulators applied their objectives and principles. Let us look at what is being systematically dismantled here. There is some overlap here with some of the things that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has addressed.

Clauses 18(1) and (2) delete the FCA’s and PRA’s guidance about their objectives—the very provisions which, as the Explanatory Notes admit, required the regulators to explain how they advanced those objectives. It is not a question that they still have to explain now; that has gone. Clauses 18(3) and (4) remove the explanations required on directions on consolidated supervision and authorised decisions. Clause 18(7) removes the FCA’s obligation to notify, consult or explain when issuing guidance relating to its objectives. Clauses 18(9) and (10) delete large parts of the FCA’s and PRA’s annual reporting requirements, one of the most sensible and accessible ways for Parliament to understand how objectives were dealt with in practice and would ideally be built upon. Clauses 18(12) to (14) remove linkages to other Acts of Parliament, including the auditor engagement duties that once provided an additional source of supervisory insight.

What is left? Guidance? Gone. Explanations? Gone. Participation? Gone. Annual reporting? Gone. Audit? Gone. These were the exact mechanisms through which Parliament and others scrutinised how the regulators applied their objectives and principles. Clause 18 removes them all. It is the inevitable consequence of the Clause 16 and 17 shift: the practical reality of decoupling principles from operational effectiveness and removing Parliament’s line of sight. It leaves us with no checks and absolutely no balances. For these reasons, I oppose Clause 18 standing part of the Bill.

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[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. Clause 18, guidance, consultation and whether regulators can be trusted is unfinished business as far as this Committee is concerned. I look forward to getting the answers on questions that have been put, but my instinct is that the Government’s approach is going too far in favour of letting the regulators determine what their interactions will be with the regulated community. On the one hand, there are independent regulators which need forms of oversight, and this Bill is just chipping away all the time at those points at which there can be some interaction between those charged with the oversight of them. By constantly removing these points at which there can be some intervention, we end up with a weaker situation overall. I will need to think very carefully about what we do about Clause 18 in general when we get to Report. I think it is part of the issues that we have been developing. Clauses 16, 17 and 18 are all part of one picture that we need a more satisfactory answer to.

Turning to the auditors. I was not trying to stop auditor meetings—

[Lord Wilson of Sedgefield (Lab)]

I mentioned at the beginning of this afternoon that when an amendment is being pressed, noble Lords have to be short. The withdrawal of amendments is starting to take longer and longer, which eats into the time for the other groups.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

I hear what the noble Lord has said. I think it is important that we have the opportunity to comment before withdrawing amendments. It is not simply a case of getting up and saying, “I withdraw”.

[Lord Wilson of Sedgefield (Lab)]

I just say to the noble Baroness that it is clear in paragraph 8.82 of the Companion that noble Lords should

“be brief and need not respond to all the points made during the debate”.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I had no intention of responding to all points made in the debate. There are a number of different amendments in this group. They could have been degrouped into four or five separate groups, and we could have had a short winding-up on each one of them. We have effectively four groups here, so we are going to be talking about all of them.

On auditors, I was not trying to suggest that auditor meetings should not take place: of course, there is value in those meetings, which have taken place for decades. They were not invented when FSMA was being drafted; they were already part of the thing. The amendments are not that important; I was simply trying to give the PRA the same flexibility that the FCA has.

On the nomenclature in the Act and the Financial Services Regulation Committee, I give notice that I will return to that matter in Committee. My committee will think that it is important that, now that it exists, it is reflected in statute. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak also to Amendments 100 and 102 in this group. I thank my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for adding her name to Amendments 99 and 102, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, for adding his name to Amendments 99 and 100. My noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral is unable to be with us today, as he is on our Front Bench in the Chamber dealing with the Steel Industry (Nationalisation) Bill, so I shall also speak briefly to his Amendment 101.

Amendment 99 concerns the secondary competitiveness and growth objective, which applies to both the FCA and the PRA. When it was introduced in the 2023 Act, it was no secret that the regulators were less than enthusiastic. Our regulators have always been heavily involved with the international financial institution community. They often act as chairmen, as is currently the case with the Governor of the Bank of England and the Financial Stability Board. They are members of as many committees as they can get on, and they are completely embedded in the international standards infrastructure. It was unsurprising, therefore, when they managed to convince the Treasury that it should make the secondary competitive and growth objective subject to alignment with international standards.

During the passage of the 2023 Act, I tried to get this watered down, because I had a real concern that the PRA and the FCA would hide behind international standards when making rules, in a way that does not optimise UK competitiveness and growth. International standards are a good thing, but only if all the major countries implement them. In fact, there is a history of patchy adoption—not least by the United States of America, which is, of course, one of our main competitors in financial services. Unfortunately, the Treasury supported the regulators and kept alignment in the 2023 Act.

I return to this theme with Amendment 99, which would change the words of the competitiveness and growth objective so that the regulators must consider international standards only, rather than automatically aligning with them. We have had three years of experience of the operation of the Act. It is time, I believe, that we made growth and competitiveness an unambiguous part of the regulators’ objectives.

In the past three years, we have seen the continuation of US exceptionalism. It has not implemented Basel III, and we have to remember that it never implemented Basel II. To be fair to the PRA, it has found reasons to follow what other countries are doing to delay certain aspects of Basel III and has performed contortions to justify implementing other aspects in a way that does not fully hit smaller UK banks, but the fact is that other countries are implementing Basel III in ways that suit them, and it would be more honest if our own regulators were given that freedom.

Another problem area in bank capital is the requirement to hold MREL, the minimum requirement for eligible liabilities. This started as a European requirement that went way beyond the international rules for total loss-absorbing capital for global systemically important banks. The UK has just three G-SIBs out of 29. Unfortunately, the UK sets MREL for many more banks than three. This is not set by the PRA, which might have a problem justifying it by reference to international standards, because the international standards are clearly less than the European model which we are sticking to. It is in fact set by the Bank of England, which does not have a competitiveness and growth objective. This shows what happens when regulation is detached from the interests of the UK economy.

I turn to the FCA. When the Financial Services Regulation Committee looked at stablecoins, we asked the FCA about its work on stablecoins aligning with the secondary competitiveness and growth objective. The director of payments and digital assets at the FCA was keen to tell us what the FCA did on committees at IOSCO, how it helped to draft the FSB’s paper on stablecoins and how it brought together regulators and standard-setting bodies in London. Although the executive director for payments said that the FCA was trying to find solutions right for the UK, it is clear that the instincts of the regulators’ staff is to look to international standards bodies rather than to think about what is best for UK competitiveness and growth. I do not think that the secondary objective’s potential will be maximised while the comfort blanket of international standards is reinforced by the FSMA requirement to align with them.

Amendment 100 is much more straightforward and I hope that it is uncontentious. I fully support Clause 20’s requirement for the regulators to report annually on the secondary objective. The two initial reports required by the 2023 Act make it clear that the competitiveness and growth objective is not a finite event but a continuing challenge. This was also one of the key findings of the first report by the Financial Services Regulation Committee. My amendment would merely require the Treasury to lay the annual reports before Parliament. It is customary to lay key accountability documents before Parliament. If this is not a key accountability document, I do not know what is. I hope that the Minister can accept this amendment.

I was going to go on to Amendment 101 in the name of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral, in anticipation of his absence, but I see that he is with us, so I will not speak to his amendment but will conclude with my final amendment in this group, Amendment 102.

[Lord Wilson of Sedgefield (Lab)]

I am afraid that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Wirral, was not here at the start as he came into the Room two minutes late, so the noble Baroness may go ahead.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for telling me about my noble friend’s disqualification from speaking; I will now speak to his Amendment 101. I find that it would be a useful addition to Clause 20, by imposing some modest requirements such as making the reports comparable with previous reports and covering things such as the cumulative cost of regulation and an explanation of how proportionality has been applied, including for SMEs. I do not think that any part of this amendment should be controversial, and I hope that the Minister will be able to accept it.

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[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to speak against all of these amendments, but the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, has asked an interesting question here: are we making this legislation for the City or for the country? My question to the Minister, therefore, is: does aligning with international standards mean that we can actually set higher standards? That is certainly what I would like us to do in terms of money laundering and the other issues that I raised earlier, but I think that the assumption in this amendment is that we might set lower standards.

One of the things that aligning with international standards would do is improve our international standing in this uncertain geopolitical age. Undercutting standards would be severely damaging to our international standing in the world. That is a much broader question than just the City.

I will cover all these amendments collectively. It is no secret that throughout all the previous financial services Bills I have worked on, I have opposed competitiveness and growth objectives. I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, will be delighted to know that it was his earlier contribution to the clause stand part debate that helped me to see clearly that what we are doing here is singling out the growth and competitiveness objectives from everything else. One of the ways in which noble Lords tried to deal with that in earlier groups was by adding crucial issues such as climate. The other way of approaching the problem, which I may well be tempted to do on Report, is by proposing that Clause 20 does not stand part.

It is important to raise the issue again now, given that just this week the Bank for International Settlements has spoken about the financial risk associated with big tech’s AI spending spree—in its terminology—which could lead to a prolonged investment bust that could have significant impacts on financial markets and the global economy. It produced the figure that the five biggest hyperscalers expect to invest more than $1 trillion from 2025 to the end of 2026. We are in a position of risk, so I believe we should look at growth and competitiveness again.

Amendments 102 and 104 seek to extend further than the Government have gone on the growth and competitiveness agendas. That is an extraordinarily bad and extremely risky idea. I am happy to carry forward that idea and keep saying it on Report.

[Lord Wilson of Sedgefield (Lab)]

My Lords, we have come to the end of the time available for Grand Committee today. Although it is unusual, I beg to move that the debate on this amendment be adjourned. We will return to this debate on the next day in Committee. Only those noble Lords present at the start of this group can speak when the group resumes. I have asked the clerk to circulate a list of those present in the usual channels.

Debate on Amendment 99 adjourned.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Wilson of Sedgefield Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 1st July 2026 Grand Committee

Relevant documents: 2nd report from the Delegated Powers Committee (Northern Ireland and Scottish Legislative Consent sought)

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Wilson of Sedgefield) (Lab)]

My Lords, I want to address a few key areas before we begin. First, we are starting today with the debate on an adjourned group. Only those noble Lords present earlier in the week at the start of the group should contribute. We have a list to help manage that. I am expecting, based on the adjourned debate, that debate will go straight to Front-Bench contributions.

Secondly, on the general rules, I remind noble Lords again that they should declare any relevant financial interest the first time they speak at each stage of the Bill. This means that, in Committee, relevant financial interests should be declared during the first group to which the noble Lord contributes. The declaration does not need to be repeated in debate on later groups at this stage. The declaration should be specific and brief. Members should briefly indicate the nature of their financial interests and not simply refer to their entry in the Register of Lords’ Interests.

I remind the Committee of the guidance in paragraph 8.82 of the Companion that, when withdrawing amendments, noble Lords should be brief, need not respond to all the points made during the debate and should not revisit points made when moving the amendment. A number of contributions made when withdrawing amendments on previous days were lengthy. I encourage all participants to keep their remarks short, in the spirit of the Companion.

Debate on Amendment 99 resumed.

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[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I sometimes think that a useful thing to do with the Minister would be to sit down with him with the rulebook and go through some scrutiny. Perhaps he might then begin to see the scale of the task.

As I have said, when I chaired the ECON in the European Parliament, the committee there had nearly 100 full and substitute members. All of them were capable of doing work in specialist clusters, doing legislation and scrutinising everything. It was basically a full-time job—they did it all day, every day—and it did not even have anything to do with what was happening in supervision.

This task is not within the capacity of a national Parliament. The Minister was out of the Room when I explained that Australia had a royal commission, as part of its post-financial crisis review, to look at what went wrong with regulation. As royal commissions do, it took a long time. When it finally reported, it came to the consultation that an oversight body was needed; similar has been done in New Zealand and the United States, where they have powerful oversight over all of their regulators.

It is unreasonable to suggest that a committee that sits once a week for three hours could in any way touch this issue. Our committees are really good at doing specific inquiries into problem areas, but they cannot see things across the piece. That is what I described as our first need, when we left the EU. It has perhaps taken some people who do not have my experience a while to gain an understanding of how much it would take, but it happened pretty soon afterwards because, a year later, when the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, came forward with his proposals, the Industry and Regulators Committee had already realised that we needed more.

Then there is, as I said, a second need, following on from the Bill, which has distanced us further away because we do not even have the things we are supposed to measure. We do not have the information. Clause 16 creates the strategy—

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Wilson of Sedgefield) (Lab)]

Can the noble Baroness take a seat, please?

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

I think that the Committee would like to hear from the noble Baroness.

[Lord Wilson of Sedgefield (Lab)]

As I said at the start of this session, when it comes to withdrawing an amendment, noble Lords need to be brief. We do not want them to rehash the whole debate. They have to be respectful to the Committee because we have other amendments to discuss.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

We are a self-regulating House, and this is such an important area that I would like to hear the end of the noble Baroness’s remarks.

[Lord Wilson of Sedgefield (Lab)]

The noble Baroness is absolutely right that this is a self-regulating House, but the other side of the coin is self-discipline.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

I am sorry, but I am replying to the Minister, and I have to say some things again because he was out of the Room. I am trying to explain that the Bill introduces a second need, because we will no longer have access to the information. It is going into a strategy and there is no link to operational duties, no reporting or guidance, and the annual report is only about competitiveness and growth. We are short of the basic information on which we are supposed to do this scrutiny: it is not coming to us; it is being rubbed out by the Bill. It is no good saying that a committee of this House—able, competent and hard-working though the committees are—can do it when you have taken the basic information away. That is the point. There is the fundamental size need, and then the removal of the information need. We need this independent body for the first need and, my goodness, we will jolly well need it if the Act ends up being anything like the Bill is now.

I think we will all want to return to this on Report, but for now, I will withdraw my amendment, even though the Minister seems to think that he has the equivalent of a perpetual motion machine and that something will happen with no input.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Wilson of Sedgefield Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 6th July 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

Not content.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Wilson of Sedgefield) (Lab)]

I put on the record that parliamentary counsel has advised that this amendment and all the other government amendments in this group are all technical amendments. If the noble Baroness’s objection is based on the fact that she believes that an all-Peers letter should have been sent for a handful of technical amendments, then that is not normally the case. However, if she wants to object, we will not move them.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

The Minister and I had a meeting on this last week, so I am surprised that he is raising the issue today. I notified on Friday that I would be continuing the line that I had taken on the first Committee day.

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[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

Not content.

[Lord Wilson of Sedgefield (Lab)]

Can I just ask the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, on that basis—parliamentary counsel has advised that these are technical amendments, and therefore that Peers’ letters do not need to be sent out—does she not agree with the parliamentary counsel?

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

I am merely keeping to what I said on the first Committee day.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Wilson of Sedgefield Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 8th July 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response and everyone who has taken part in this interesting and informative debate. We have engaged with some interesting and broad issues. I particularly commend the noble Lord, Lord Pitt-Watson, who gave us some interesting suggestions and proposals that I am certainly going to go away and think about. I do not think that continuing with the history is necessarily the right thing to do, but that does not mean we cannot learn from history. The idea of the City of London having responsibility for its tradespeople has an interesting comparison, which makes me wonder: had we held the City responsible for the financial crash of 2007-08, and if the City had paid some of the large expenses that were instead, by austerity, put on the shoulders of the poor, the disabled and the young around the country, how different things might have been.

I note that the noble Lord also said that the City should be responsible for seeing that these services should deliver benefit to the world. That is an interesting proposal that I will take away. In responding to what the Minister and the noble Baroness, Lady Dacres, said, questioning what influence the City has over the FCA and the PRA, I will refer to the contribution from the noble Baroness, Lady Bi—

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Wilson of Sedgefield) (Lab)]

The noble Baroness was not here at the start of this sitting, which started earlier this afternoon, almost five hours ago. I point out that, as far as the Companion is concerned, when noble Lords are withdrawing amendments, they must be short and not rehash the whole argument or make responses to all the points made during the debate. If the noble Baroness would move towards withdrawing the amendment, that would be good.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

I thank the noble Lord, the Whip. I am not rehashing; I am engaging with the contributions.

[Lord Wilson of Sedgefield (Lab)]

No. Paragraph 8.82 of the Companion says that when withdrawing amendments, noble Lords should be short in doing so and should not engage, because they will have done that during the debate.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

I was speaking for about a minute and a half before the noble Lord interrupted me. I think three minutes might count as short, and I have two short points to make. The first, as I was saying before I was interrupted, is that the noble Baroness, Lady Bi, said that the City—