Arms and Military Cargo Export Controls: Israel

Richard Burgon Excerpts

Monday 2nd June 2025 Commons Chamber

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Richard Burgon (Leeds East) (Lab)]

One horrific example of why we must stop supplying the parts for the F-35 fighter jets is the al-Mawasi attack last July. F-35s dropped 2,000 lb bombs on a designated safe zone in Gaza, killing 90 civilians and injuring 300. The use of such powerful munitions in densely populated areas is clearly a violation of international humanitarian law. As my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Riverside (Kim Johnson) said, key parts of the F-35s that carried out that attack may well have come from Britain; they clearly have done in other attacks. If we want to avoid any complicity in such Israeli war crimes, do we not need to stop these exports immediately?

[Steve Witherden]

I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention. I am very glad that the al-Mawasi attack has been mentioned and I wholeheartedly agree with the sentiments he expressed.

Freedom of information data reveals that the F-35 open general export licence was used 14 times to export to Israel in 2023—three times as much as in any other year. Israel is heavily reliant on F-35s for its attack on Gaza and is expanding its fleet. Without UK components, those jets could not fly.

The latest report from the Palestinian Youth Movement further details the F-35 supply chain. It shows that subassemblies and parts for F35s, including those used for repairs and maintenance, are all “logged and documented”, and that the global supply chain for the US-run F-35 maintenance programme has “robust traceability”. Therefore, the Government’s claim that it is impossible to halt supplies of F-35 components to Israel without undermining the global F-35 supply chain does not stand up to scrutiny. That raises serious questions around the UK’s legal duty to prevent genocide, yet the weapons continue to flow.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Alexander]

We make approximately 15% of the components that contribute to the F-35 programme; it is an international programme of which we are but one partner. We continue to supply the programme because our judgment as a Government is that not doing so would undermine the continuing functioning of the programme, which is in the Government’s view, as I say, of critical importance to European and global security.

[Richard Burgon]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Alexander]

I have given way several times on that point, so I am keen to make some progress. The Government have made these judgments calmly and soberly, and will continue to do so with full awareness of our responsibility.

Let me now turn to the question of transparency. As the UK Government, we publish quarterly official statistics and an annual report about export licences granted and refused. We provide a searchable database allowing users to produce bespoke reports, drawing on this data, and we are committed to openness on strategic export licensing, which provides the means for Parliament and the public to hold us to account.

[Mr Alexander]

I am keen to make a little more progress before I take further interventions.

Because these are exceptional circumstances, the Government have heard requests from Members on both sides of the House for us to release further details, including information on licence applications in progress, and as full information as we can disclose on the types of equipment that are covered by each extant licence. Recognising the exceptional nature of this issue and the importance of providing transparent and robust information to ensure that Parliament and the public can hold the Government to account, in December we laid in the Library of the House an exceptional release of export licensing data focused specifically on Israel, setting out plainly how many licences remained extant at that time, how many had been granted since June 2024, and how many had been refused.

In summarising that release, let me assure Members that remaining licences relate to non-military items, military items for civilian use, or items not for use in military operations in Gaza. These licences also extend to components in items for re-export to other countries—that is, those that then leave Israel. Ongoing licensing applications are also decided on that basis. In fact, of the 352 licences extant for Israel, as of 6 December 191 were non-military. They included commercial aircraft components, equipment for private manufacturing firms, and parts for submersible vessels for use in scientific research. That left 161 licences relating to military equipment. However, less than half those related to the Government of Israel or the IDF. Most related either to UK components that private Israeli companies would incorporate before re-exporting an item to a third country, or to military-grade equipment for civilians such as body armour for journalists and NGOs.

I can advise the House that recent reporting on this topic does not provide distinctions between items for civilian and for military use, or between items remaining in Israel and those for re-export. The UK is not allowing the direct export of arms for use in Israel’s military operations in Gaza.

[Richard Burgon]

The Minister is giving a detailed response, but may I return him to the issue of the international pool of F-35 spares? Is it the Government’s contention that a conditional licence is impossible—that is, that we could provide F-35 spares, but on the basis that they are not then sent to Israel to be used in Gaza?

[Mr Alexander]

I am acutely conscious of the time, Madam Deputy Speaker. The exclusion from the suspension decision for F-35 components should not, in principle, apply to licences for F-35 components that could be identified as going to Israel for use by Israel. Exports of F-35 components directly to Israel are therefore suspended unless they are for re-export.

Let me return to the specific point that I know has been the subject of much scrutiny in relation to recent reporting outside the House. The majority of military licences approved last year are for components of military items for re-export to third countries, including the UK’s NATO allies, of about £142 million-worth of military goods licensed for Israel and in 2024. The vast majority of that overall value was supporting the production of items for use outside Israel. That includes more than £120 million, or about 85% of the total licence value, for components to support exports of military items from Israeli companies to a single programme for a NATO ally.

These remaining licences have no utility in military operations in Gaza. The suspension of such licences was not required by our export licence criteria, and would have done nothing but harm UK companies and UK businesses engaged in authorised and legal trade. Since September, we have refused all licence applications for military goods that might be used by Israel in the current conflict in line with the suspension decision. More applications were refused in 2024 than in the preceding four years combined.

Question put and agreed to.