Offshore Petroleum Licensing Bill

Debate between Rosie Winterton and Alan Whitehead

Committee of the whole House
Tuesday 20th February 2024 Commons Chamber

[The First Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

Order. We are in Committee, so I remind Members that the Chair should be addressed by name or as “Chair” or “Madam Chair”, as Sir Alok Sharma did, and not as “Mr Deputy Speaker” or “Madam Deputy Speaker”.

Before I call the shadow Minister, I want to make it clear that I will be calling those who have amendments down first and I will then move on to others, going from side to side.

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

I would like to speak to our amendments 17, 18, 19 and 20, to comment on other amendments before us today and then to place all this into the context of the Bill as a whole by way of what will effectively be a stand-part contribution. This Bill remains an ill-advised, pointless piece of political posturing—

Domestic Gas and Electricity (Tariff Cap) Bill

Debate between Rosie Winterton and Alan Whitehead

3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Monday 30th April 2018 Commons Chamber

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 5, in clause 1, page 1, line 3, leave out “after this Act is” and insert

“, and within five months of this Act being”.

This amendment would require the Authority to insert the standard supply licence conditions within five months of Royal Assent.

Amendment 2, page 1, line 9, at end insert—

“(1A) A cap imposed by tariff cap conditions shall be calculated so as to require that the difference between the cheapest advertised tariff and the most expensive standard variable or default tariff offered by a holder of a supply licence is no more than a specified proportion of the cheapest advertised tariff.

(1B) The proportion under subsection (1A) shall be specified by the tariff cap conditions.”

This amendment would require the tariff cap to be calculated with reference to the difference between supplier’s cheapest tariff and most expensive variable or default rate.

Amendment 3, page 1, line 24, at end insert—

“(c) “cheapest advertised rate” means the lowest rate or amount charged for, or in relation to, the supply of gas or electricity under any contract available to the customer.”

This amendment is consequential to Amendment 2 and provides a definition of “cheapest advertised rate”.

Amendment 4, page 2, line 15, at end insert—

“(e) the ability of the Authority to accurately forecast and model wholesale energy prices, and the need to minimise the impact of inaccuracies on domestic customers and holders of supply licences in the future.

(f) the difference between the cheapest advertised rate and the most expensive standard variable or default rate offered by a holder of a supply licence.”

This amendment would extend the matters Ofgem is required to consider when setting the tariff cap to include the matters listed in the amendment.

Amendment 6, page 2, line 15, at end insert—

“(e) the need to ensure that customers on standard variable and default rates have their annual expenditure on gas and electricity reduced by no less than £100 as a result of the tariff cap conditions”

This amendment would require the Authority to ensure that the tariff cap conditions result in customers on standard variable and default rates having their annual expenditure reduced by no less than £100.

Amendment 7, page 2, line 15, at end insert—

“(e) the need to ensure that adequate protection exists for vulnerable domestic customers, including ensuring those customers who currently benefit under a cap imposed by the Authority on rates or amounts charged for, or in relation to, the supply of gas or electricity because they appear to the Authority to be vulnerable, retain those benefits.”

This amendment would require the Authority to have regard to the protection of vulnerable customers, including ensuring those who currently benefit under a safeguard tariff continue to do so.

Amendment 9, page 2, line 15, at end insert—

“(e) the need to ensure that adequate protection exists for—

(i) customers who benefit from a cap imposed by the Authority on rates or amounts charged for, or in relation to, the supply of gas or electricity on the basis that they appear to the Authority to be vulnerable;

(ii) in circumstances where a cap described in sub-paragraph (i) has been withdrawn, customers who would have benefited from such a cap had it still been in force; and

(iii) other vulnerable domestic customers.”

This amendment would ensure that when exercising its functions under this section, the Authority must have regard to protection for vulnerable customers, including those who are protected or (in circumstances where it is no longer in force) would have been protected by a safeguard tariff.

Amendment 8, in clause 7, page 4, line 39, leave out from “must” to end of line 40 and insert “have regard to the extent to which—

(a) progress has been made in installing smart meters for use by domestic customers,

(b) incentives for holders of energy supply licences to improve their efficiency have been created,

(c) holders of energy supply licences are able to compete effectively for domestic supply contracts,

(d) incentives for domestic customers to switch to different supply contracts are in place,

(e) the barriers which prevent the customers from switching from different supply contracts quickly and easily are addressed,

(f) holders of supply licences who operate efficiently are able to finance activities authorised by the licence,

(g) holders of supply licences have eliminated practices that are to the detriment of customers in their tariff structures,

(h) District Network Operator costs and dividends are proportionate to expectations and the impact of that on domestic supply contracts, and

(i) vulnerable and disabled customers are adequately protected.”

This amendment sets out additional matters that the Authority must have regard to when conducting a review of competition for domestic supply contracts.

Amendment 1, page 4, line 39, leave out from “which” to the end of line 40 and insert “—

(a) progress has been made in installing smart meters for use by domestic customers; and

(b) holders of supply licences are using available data, whether collected through smart meters or through other means, to—

(i) assess the energy consumption patterns of domestic customers; and

(ii) use such data to identify, and move domestic customers onto, the most competitive tariff.”

This amendment requires Ofgem to consider the progress made by energy companies in offering domestic customers the cheapest available rate based on their individual consumption patterns when determining whether there is an effective market.

[Dr Whitehead]

We support the Government’s aim to introduce a temporary absolute price cap as set out in the Bill. We claim some intellectual property rights in this, in that Labour proposed a temporary price cap before the 2015 election, which was famously denounced by the then Prime Minister as

“wanting to live in some sort of Marxist universe.”

It is good to see that the Government have not flinched at the possibility of the apparition of its former leader returning to denounce this price cap in the same terms, but then we live in interesting times.

It is necessary to introduce an absolute cap, not a relative price cap, as soon as possible and for a limited period beginning no later than this winter. We have noted the continuing anomalies in the market, the continuing opportunities to game the market, and indeed, the report by the Competition and Markets Authority that customers were being overcharged by £1.2 billion over the recent period as a result of those anomalies. Therefore, a price cap and a pause in price increases, other than those agreed by Ofgem and relating to wholesale price movements, is the right thing to do now, providing, as we have always said and as we said when we introduced the idea of a price cap previously, that action is taken to correct those anomalies during the period of the cap, so that the market resumes at the end of it under circumstances that do not just result in prices running away again and our all being here a little further down the road, finding that nothing has changed and that perhaps a further cap is necessary.



We want to ensure that the Bill does just that—that the terms under which Ofgem operates the price cap give due attention to the current market problems; that the basis on which the cap is ended is clear in the legislation; and that, subsequent to the cap ending, there are measures in place to ensure that some of the more egregious problems of the present market arrangements are not repeated in the future. That is the basis on which we are judging the Bill and on which we are suggesting amendments, as we did in Committee. We do not want to overthrow or weaken the Bill, and we understand that it needs to be robust against possible challenges. Our amendments would therefore have the sole effect of strengthening the Bill and its purpose, and they would ensure that its architecture fully reflects that purpose.

Nuclear Safeguards Bill

Debate between Rosie Winterton and Alan Whitehead

3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Tuesday 23rd January 2018 Commons Chamber

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 2—Purpose—

“The purpose of this Act is to provide for a contingent arrangement for nuclear safeguarding arrangements under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the event that the United Kingdom no longer has membership or associate membership of EURATOM, to ensure that qualifying nuclear material, facilities or equipment are only available for use for civil activities (whether in the United Kingdom or elsewhere).”

This new clause would be a purpose clause, to establish that the provisions of the Bill are contingency arrangements if it proves impossible to establish an association with EURATOM after the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.

New clause 3—EURATOM: maintenance of nuclear safeguarding arrangements—

“No power to make regulations under this Act shall be exercised until the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament a report on his or her efforts to—

(a) seek associate membership of EURATOM, or

(b) otherwise maintain the implementation of nuclear safeguarding arrangements in the UK through EURATOM

after the UK has left the European Union.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to report to Parliament on his or her efforts to maintain the implementation of nuclear safeguarding arrangements through EURATOM after the UK has left the EU.

Amendment 3, in clause 1, page 2, line 14, at end insert—

“(3A) No regulations may be made under this section unless the Secretary of State has laid before both Houses of Parliament a statement certifying that, in his or her opinion, it is no longer possible to retain membership of EURATOM or establish an association with EURATOM that permits the operation of nuclear safeguarding activity through its administrative arrangements.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to certify, before making any regulations to provide for nuclear safeguarding regulations, that it was not possible to remain a member of EURATOM or have an association with it.

Amendment 2, page 3, line 3, at end insert—

“(11) Regulations may not be made under this section unless the Secretary of State has laid before both Houses of Parliament a report detailing his strategy for seeking associate membership of EURATOM or setting out his reasons for choosing to make nuclear safeguards regulations under this Act rather than seeking associate membership of EURATOM.”

This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from using the powers under Clause 1 to set out a nuclear safeguards regime through regulations until a report has been laid before each House setting out a strategy for seeking associate membership of EURATOM or explaining why the UK cannot seek associate membership of EURATOM.

Amendment 7, in clause 4, page 5, line 6, at end insert—

“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until—

(a) the Government has laid before Parliament a strategy for maintaining those protections, safeguards, programmes for participation in nuclear research and development, and trading or other arrangements which will lapse as a result of the UK’s withdrawal from membership of and participation in EURATOM, and

(b) the strategy has been considered by both Houses of Parliament.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to lay a report before Parliament on the protection and trading arrangements that arise from membership of EURATOM, and his strategy for maintaining them prior to making regulations concerning nuclear safeguarding.

[Dr Whitehead]

The proposed new clauses and amendments appear in my name and those of my hon. Friends the Members for Salford and Eccles (Rebecca Long Bailey), who is the shadow Secretary of State, and for Sheffield Central (Paul Blomfield) and others.

First and foremost, I want to set down a marker on new clause 2, because it represents the dividing line between us and the Government on membership, associate or otherwise, of Euratom. This purpose clause makes explicit that this is a contingency Bill. In other words, it is being enacted to deal with circumstances that may never arise—namely, that we as a country have no future association or membership with Euratom that would enable us to continue to reap the benefits of association or membership in a way that I think is almost universally agreed.

I think that it is agreed—the Minister has stated as much during the passage of this Bill—that Euratom has served well our purposes as a nuclear nation over the past 40 years, and nuclear safeguarding has worked very well in inspecting and representing our obligations to international agencies such as the International Atomic Energy Authority.

It is clear that our interests as a country would be best served by continuing our membership of Euratom, which was founded by a different treaty from that which brought about the EU. Indeed, during evidence to the Public Bill Committee, we heard strong arguments along those lines from eminent lawyers who had been called as witnesses. However, we appear to be in the position of assuming that our future membership of Euratom is not possible, because essentially the Prime Minister, as a matter of choice, included exit from Euratom in her letter to the Commission informing it that we were invoking article 50.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitehead]

I beg to move amendment 1, page 1, line 22, at end insert—

“(c) ensuring that inspections of nuclear facilities and materials for the purpose of nuclear safeguards continue at the level previously established by UK membership of EURATOM.”

This amendment would aim to ensure that nuclear safeguarding inspections continue at the same level subsequent to leaving EURATOM as they were when the UK was a member of EURATOM.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 4, page 2, line 41, leave out from “must” to the end of line 44 and insert—

“(a) consult—

(i) the ONR,

(ii) the National Audit Office, and

(iii) such other persons (if any) as the Secretary of State considers it appropriate to consult, and

(b) lay before Parliament a statement declaring that he or she is satisfied that the staffing and financial resource available to the ONR is sufficient for the purpose of assuming responsibility for nuclear safeguarding in the United Kingdom.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to declare that the ONR has the resources necessary to take on extra responsibilities for nuclear safeguarding in the UK.

Amendment 5, in clause 2, page 4, line 13, at end insert—

“(1A) The Secretary of State may only exercise powers under this section at the point at which amendment of any of the legislation in subsection (1) becomes necessary in order to complete the process of transposition of responsibility for nuclear safeguarding from EURATOM to the Office for Nuclear Regulation, and for no other purpose.

(1B) Upon exercising the power set out in subsection (1), the Secretary of State shall lay before both Houses of Parliament a report on the operation of the power.”

This amendment would limit circumstances under which the Secretary of State may exercise certain powers in this section and requires a report to be laid before Parliament.

Amendment 6, in clause 4, page 4, line 41, at end insert

“, but not before the Secretary of State has published draft regulations relating to each of the other provisions of this Act under which the Secretary of State may make regulations.”

This amendment would ensure that draft regulations specified in the Bill are published before the provisions of the Act come into force.