Nuclear Safeguards Bill
Monday 16th October 2017
(6 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Greg Clark)
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
The Bill is straightforward. It ensures that when the United Kingdom is no longer a member of the European Atomic Energy Community—Euratom—we will have in place a legal framework that meets our future international obligations on nuclear safeguarding. Nuclear safeguards demonstrate to the international community that civil nuclear material is not diverted into military or weapons programmes. It is important to be clear about the definitions in and scope of the Bill, because nuclear safeguards are distinct from nuclear safety, which is about the prevention of nuclear accidents, and from nuclear security, which relates to the physical protection of nuclear material. Those topics are subject to different regulatory regimes.
Our current nuclear safeguards obligations arise from our voluntary offer agreement—an additional protocol—with the International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA is the UN-associated body responsible for the oversight of the global non-proliferation regime. The first requirement flowing from the UK’s commitments on safeguards is to have a domestic system that allows the state to know what civil nuclear material it has, where it is and whether any has been withdrawn from civil activities.
John Howell (Henley) (Con)
Following conversations with the leadership of the Culham Centre for Fusion Energy, which is in my constituency, does the Secretary of State agree that their stance on Euratom is not about Euratom itself, but about knowing when all the details will be finalised?
Greg Clark
My hon. Friend, who has a close connection with his constituents who work at Culham, is absolutely right. He knows that we are keen to agree the greatest possible continuity for the arrangements for research at Culham as soon as possible.
Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)
Will my right hon. Friend confirm that there is nothing in the Bill that will prevent us from seeking associate membership or arrangements with Euratom under article 206 of the existing Euratom treaty, and that it remains Government policy to seek to do so?
Greg Clark
I can confirm that the Bill has been prepared on a contingency basis. The discussions around our continued arrangements with Euratom and with the rest of the European Union have not been concluded, but it is right to put in place in good time any commitments that are needed in primary legislation. Euratom has served the United Kingdom and our nuclear industries well, so we want to see maximum continuity of those arrangements.
Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con)
My right hon. Friend has just confirmed that the Bill is necessary only because the Government have announced their intention to leave Euratom. I voted against the proposal when it was put to the House before the last general election, and I have yet to hear a rational reason for our leaving Euratom. As all our previously satisfactory arrangements for nuclear safeguarding are set aside, all our existing agreements with the IAEA are put in difficulty. Safeguarding is necessary to comply with the non-proliferation treaties, to which we apply a great deal of importance.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
Order. The right hon. and learned Gentleman may be the Father of the House, but that does not allow him to make a speech when everybody else is waiting. He has more experience of this House than I will ever have, and he ought to use it.
Mr Deputy Speaker
It might have been helpful if the right hon. and learned Gentleman had asked that question to begin with, rather than giving a speech.
Greg Clark
Triggering article 50 of the treaty on European Union also requires triggering article 50 on membership of Euratom. That is not just the Government’s view; it is the European Commission’s view, too. The Commission clearly stated to the European Parliament that,
“in accordance with Article 106(a) of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union applies also to the European Atomic Energy Community.”
That is the basis on which we are considering these safeguards.
Rebecca Pow (Taunton Deane) (Con)
Will the Secretary of State give an assurance that, as we leave the EU, the Bill will enable us to develop our own watertight system for complying with nuclear safeguards? As he says, that means introducing reporting and transparency to make it obvious that no nuclear material is going where it should not be going. We want assurances that all these boxes will be ticked, even if we leave Euratom.
Greg Clark
That is precisely the point of the Bill, and I will explain, perhaps at some length, the ways in which it might be done. I hope my hon. Friend will stay for that.
John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness) (Lab/Co-op)
The Secretary of State is being generous in giving way. We heard clearly enough that this is a contingency Bill. What I did not hear clearly is the Government’s policy on staying in Euratom. He says that the treaty requires us to come out, which is debatable. If it is the Government’s policy that we want associate membership status, will he make that clear now? Maximum continuity is a rather vague concept.
Greg Clark
It is very clear that membership of Euratom requires membership of the European Union, which is why we have this Bill. We have been satisfied with the arrangements we have, and part of the negotiation will be to ensure the greatest possible continuity, but that is to be negotiated with Euratom and the partners involved.
I have mentioned that the first requirement flowing from our commitments on safeguards is to have a domestic system that allows the state to know what civil nuclear material there is and where it is located, but the second fundamental principle of the global non-proliferation and safeguards regime is that there is some oversight of the system independent of the country itself. That provides obvious and necessary reassurance to the international community that material from civil nuclear programmes is not used other than for civil activities.
The UK has been a member of Euratom since 1 January 1973, and Euratom has carried out elements of both the domestic and the international activities set out in our agreements with the IAEA. The UK’s agreement with the IAEA on safeguards is a trilateral agreement, reflecting the relationship between the UK and Euratom. Upon withdrawal from Euratom, however, the UK’s main agreements with the IAEA will become ineffective, as they are predicated on Euratom membership. We are in discussions with the IAEA to agree replacements that reflect the UK domestic regime, including continued international verification by the IAEA. The Bill gives us the ability to give effect to precisely that regime. We have been working closely with the Office for Nuclear Regulation to ensure it will be ready to take on responsibilities for nuclear safeguarding that are currently delegated to Euratom inspectors.
Kelvin Hopkins (Luton North) (Lab)
Many professionals in the nuclear industry and outside academics are seriously concerned about the ongoing problem of what to do with nuclear waste from the civil programmes. Will the new arrangements simply parallel exactly what Euratom is doing or will they be stronger? Is the Minister not concerned that we still have to deal with the serious problem of long-term storage of civil nuclear waste?
Greg Clark
Let me say two things. First, we want to see maximum continuity of the standards—we do not want any reduction in them, as they have served us well and they give confidence to the industry. Secondly, the hon. Gentleman knows, from his many years in this House, that successive Governments have taken forward our long-term disposal of nuclear waste, and work on a long-term repository is being conducted, but that is a domestic responsibility, as it always has been.
John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)
I welcome the Secretary of State’s approach. Will he confirm it will mean that all the operational work that happens in the relevant plants will continue as if nothing had changed? It is done to a high standard and we wish to preserve those standards.
Greg Clark
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. As I say, I do not think anyone regards the arrangements that have prevailed as deficient, so it makes sense to replicate them as we can. We are being orderly in making sure that we have the right domestic framework in place in good time.
Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)
My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) referred to the fact that we have to make all these international agreements which have previously been reflected in agreements between the EU and international bodies and other countries. Is any other country outside the EU objecting to the likelihood that we will be seeking to make these arrangements, or to be a full member of the IAEA in our own right, with a voluntary agreement that it proposes?
Greg Clark
My hon. Friend will doubtless be aware that across the international community there is great recognition that there is little contention in this area. It is obviously in the global interest to have robust arrangements in place, and the discussions are taking place smoothly and without any contention.
Mr Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)
I congratulate my right hon. Friend on pursuing this issue with calm and decency. Will he take the opportunity to reflect on some of the scare nonsense that we heard earlier, particularly with regards to medical radioisotopes? That was front page—it was said that people would not be able to get their treatment—but nothing at all in our decision would ever stop the export of any of those medical radioisotopes to non-EU countries.
Greg Clark
My right hon. Friend is right; there is nothing in that at all.
Let me state it another way: the Bill enables the United Kingdom to set up a domestic safeguards regime to enable us to meet international safeguards and nuclear non- proliferation standards after we withdraw from Euratom, no matter what the outcome of the negotiations. So we are being prudent and prepared, taking these steps now, in very good time. The ONR does not currently have this role because, under the Euratom treaty, all members, including the UK, subject their civil nuclear material and facilities to nuclear safeguards inspections and assurance carried out by Euratom. Euratom then provides reporting on member states’ safeguards to the IAEA, which conducts nuclear safeguards globally. The United Kingdom's new regime, established under this Bill, will ensure that the UK has the right regime in place to enable the ONR to regulate nuclear safeguards following withdrawal from Euratom—it could not be more simple. That will ensure that the UK continues to maintain its position as a responsible nuclear state following withdrawal from Euratom.
Dr David Drew (Stroud) (Lab/Co-op)
Will the Secretary of State assure me that interested parties in the industry, principally the Nuclear Industry Association and Prospect, the trade union, which represents most workers in the industry, will continue to be consulted, as at the moment neither is convinced that the Bill is better than Euratom?
Greg Clark
I will certainly make that commitment. One feature of the nuclear industry is that it is, appropriately, highly consultative. People from across the sector talk to each other. It is a community of experts and they take advice. We will certainly continue to do that.
The hon. Gentleman mentioned the Nuclear Industry Association, with which I have meetings and with which the Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, my hon. Friend the Member for Watford (Richard Harrington) meets regularly. The NIA has said clearly that the publication of the Bill
“is a necessary legislative step in giving responsibility for safeguards inspections to the UK regulator”.
I have been clear with the House that the Bill is a prudent and timely set of measures that does not prejudge the discussions we will have with Euratom. I regard it as a model of good order.
Greg Clark
I give way to the Chair of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee.
Rachel Reeves
The Secretary of State says that he speaks regularly to the experts in the sector and industry; can he give an example of anybody in the industry who would prefer the powers to be transferred to the ONR rather than for us to stay in Euratom? Is there anyone?
Greg Clark
The hon. Lady justifies what I said at the outset. The arrangements we have had with Euratom have been perfectly satisfactory, and we want to see maximum continuity. I hope she would agree, though, that it is necessary and prudent to take legislative steps so that if we are not able to conclude a satisfactory agreement—I do not expect that—we nevertheless have a world-class nuclear safeguarding regime. I would have thought she would welcome our doing that in good time and sensibly.
Liz Saville Roberts (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)
The decommissioning of the UK’s ageing nuclear estate is a critical aspect of Euratom’s work, yet there is not a single mention in the Bill of decommissioning. Will the Secretary of State explain how the 17 nuclear sites that are currently in the process of decommissioning, including Trawsfynydd in my constituency, will be regulated and properly staffed and have the necessary expertise if the UK leaves Euratom?
Greg Clark
There is no difference in the arrangements. As I say, the Bill makes provisions for a safeguarding regime. It is not about safety or security; it is about making sure it can be verified that nuclear material that is used in the civil sector does not cross to other uses. The robust arrangements supervised by the ONR that we have in place for decommissioning continue.
Albert Owen (Ynys Môn) (Lab)
In response to my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud (Dr Drew), the Secretary of State said that Ministers regularly meet various industry experts and bodies. Will he go further and say that by the time the Bill is enacted it will contain a clause that says it is necessary to consult the industry as widely as possible? The trade unions and the trade bodies currently feel left out.
Greg Clark
Such consultation is the universal practice in the nuclear sector. The hon. Gentleman might serve on the Bill Committee, so perhaps he will be able to interrogate the issues he raises, but at every point the nuclear sector proceeds not through the unilateral fiat of Governments but appropriately, on the basis of expert advice. That is the culture of the nuclear industry and it will continue.
As I set out for the House in my written statement in September, our intention is for the new domestic regime to exceed the standard that the international community would expect from the UK as a member of the IAEA. The objective is for it to be as robust and comprehensive as that currently provided by Euratom. We are perfectly satisfied with the high standards that have prevailed under Euratom, so we do not want to take the opportunity to weaken them. As I have mentioned, we will also be agreeing new safeguards agreements with the IAEA. My officials have had meetings with officials from the IAEA at their headquarters in Vienna to take the discussions forward, and I am pleased to report that they are progressing extremely well.
On other aspects of the Euratom relationship, we have made it clear that we want to continue the successful co-operation. In June, I announced the Government’s commitment to underwrite the UK’s fair share of the costs for the Joint European Torus—the leading nuclear fusion facility in Oxfordshire—which supports 1,300 jobs, and we will continue to do that.
Let me briefly take the House through the clauses of the Bill. It is not a long Bill, as the House knows. Clause 1 amends the Energy Act 2013 to replace the Office for Nuclear Regulation’s existing nuclear safeguards purposes with a new definition. The ONR will regulate the new nuclear safeguards regime using its existing relevant functions and powers, so the measure is about clarifying its purposes. Clause 1 will also amend the Act by creating new powers so that we can set out in regulations the detail of the domestic safeguards regime, such as on accounting, reporting, and control and inspection arrangements.
Richard Graham (Gloucester) (Con)
The Nuclear Industry Association has made it absolutely clear that this legislation is necessary, but it has also spelled out that the best outcome would be for the UK to continue with some form of membership of Euratom. Will my right hon. Friend give the House an idea of whether he feels that the discussions so far with Euratom make it likely that we will be able to achieve some form of continuation of the existing arrangement?
Greg Clark
As I have made it repeatedly clear, we regard the arrangements with Euratom as having served this country well and we want to see maximum continuity. As far as I can see, all members of the nuclear industry regard that as being the case. This is a good example of where I hope it will be possible to agree quickly and with a maximum of consensus a regime that continues the high standards that we have observed.
John Woodcock
As the Secretary of State is of course aware, there is an extended search to find a new investor in the NuGen site. Potential buyers are looking on that with great interest. In his closest possible working with Euratom—or whatever his phrase was—is there a scenario in which there will not need to be new nuclear co-operation agreements, which could make the sale much more complicated and problematic?
Greg Clark
The fact of this legislation should send a signal to the world that we are absolutely determined to be forward facing and to make sure that we have a regime in place that can continue the high standards that we enjoy while pursuing, in negotiation with Euratom and with other countries, the same continuity of arrangements that we have enjoyed. I see absolutely no obstacle to that.
Clause 2 will create a limited power, enabling regulations to amend the Nuclear Safeguards and Electricity (Finance) Act 1978; the Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000; and the Nuclear Safeguards (Notification) Regulations 2004. This narrow power will mean that cross references in that legislation to existing agreements with the IAEA can be updated once new international agreements have been reached.
Let me summarise the four key points. We are totally committed to the current and future prosperity of the nuclear industry. It is an important part of our energy future, our security as a nation and our commitment to clean energy. We are committed to meeting all our international obligations and to retaining our world-leading status on nuclear research and development. We need the powers in the Bill to give the existing independent nuclear regulator—the ONR—a new role to regulate nuclear safeguards, alongside its existing role regulating the UK’s nuclear safety and security.
Alan Brown (Kilmarnock and Loudoun) (SNP)
I thank the Secretary of State for giving way one more time. I am not sure whether he is coming to an end, but he has not yet responded to the intervention on radioisotopes of the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr Duncan Smith). Does that mean that the Nuclear Industry Association, Dame Sue Ion, the honorary president of the National Skills Academy for Nuclear, and the Royal College of Radiologists are right to express concerns about the future possible supply of radioisotopes, especially given that, in the past, there have been global shortages? The Euratom supply chain was prominent in managing those shortages of supplies.
Greg Clark
Radioisotopes are not in scope of the measures before us today; this is about safeguards; and I replied perfectly adequately to my right hon. Friend.
The Bill sits alongside other work streams around our future relationship with Euratom, with the International Atomic Energy Agency and with third countries, and as such has been drafted to cater for a variety of possible outcomes to these talks. I want to reiterate our commitment to maximum continuity of these arrangements. The reason we are leaving Euratom is the decision to leave the European Union. The two treaties are uniquely legally joined. We continue to support Euratom and want to see a continuity of co-operation and standards and a close future partnership with it.
We do not know what the final arrangements will be, so we are doing what any responsible Government would do by putting in place now a civil nuclear safeguards regime for the United Kingdom through this Bill so that we will be fully prepared whatever the outcome of negotiations. I commend this Bill to the House.
Rebecca Long Bailey (Salford and Eccles) (Lab)
As the Secretary of State has outlined, this Bill will provide the legal framework for establishing a domestic nuclear safeguards regime. Nuclear safeguards are essential obligations to ensure that work and materials for civil nuclear do not get transposed into work or preparations for military nuclear, and that is done under the umbrella of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Arguably, the UK already has a perfectly good set of nuclear safeguards through its membership of Euratom, so why is the Bill needed?
The Bill is a contingency measure, as the Secretary of State has helpfully illustrated. If we are to leave Euratom, and if there is no associate membership that gives us continued nuclear safeguarding provisions, we will need to put in place a new system of safeguarding, and that needs to be to the satisfaction of the International Atomic Energy Authority. Now that takes us into rather strange territory: we have not yet left Euratom; it is not clear whether we have to leave Euratom; the House has not agreed that we should leave Euratom; and we have not put in place any parliamentary procedure for agreeing that we should leave Euratom. In effect, the Bill is based wholly on the declaration that the Prime Minister made in her letter to the EU informing it that we were going to invoke article 50—
Greg Clark
Is the hon. Lady saying that it is wrong for this House and this Government to prepare, in a prudent and orderly way, to maintain the excellent safeguards that we have? Is she somehow criticising that preparedness?
Rebecca Long Bailey
Clearly, the Secretary of State was not listening to what I was saying. If he displays some patience, he will hear a bit more about my thoughts on the Bill’s contents.
Euratom was agreed to as a body and a treaty before the EU treaty came about, and to that extent it is, arguably, separate from the actual formation and operation of the EU. That of course is the subject of fierce legal debate. It is true that its disputes mechanism does involve the European Court of Justice, and its terms include the free movement of scientists but those are specifically applied to civil nuclear activities and do not stray on to a wider canvas. Subject to legal debate, it certainly may have been possible—
Albert Owen (Ynys Môn) (Lab)
My hon. Friend is right that it is debateable whether, legally, we have to leave Euratom. Would it not be helpful if the Secretary of State published the legal advice that he has obtained? As a member of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, I have heard a number of experts saying a number of things about this very matter.
Rebecca Long Bailey
It certainly would be helpful for the House to hear about the discussions that have been taking place between the Government’s legal advisers and the Government. The Library has helpfully provided a number of solicitors who have disputed the point that the Secretary of State puts forward. There is legal discourse going on that disputes the fact that Euratom and the EU are intrinsically linked.
John Redwood
Does the hon. Lady remember the long debates on the article 50 letter and the legislation to approve it? It was made very clear in those debates that we would probably have to leave Euratom at the same time and that we would therefore plan on that basis. She and many of her right hon. and hon. Friends voted for the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill knowing that.
Rebecca Long Bailey
I earlier urged the Secretary of State to display a little bit of patience. If the right hon. Member for Wokingham (John Redwood) did the same, he might hear some of the answers he requires in the remainder of my contribution.
Subject to legal debate, it certainly may have been possible—had the Prime Minister not taken the unnecessary step of specifically including Euratom in her letter to the Commission—to retain the UK’s membership of Euratom. At worst, we could have secured a close association with Euratom that was good enough to allow the continuation of nuclear safeguarding within that amended framework.
The Opposition believe that continued membership of Euratom or a close associated status with it is possible and necessary for the efficient, continued working of a whole raft of procedures relating to the nuclear industry, not just safeguarding. We see this procedure of starting to set up identical but separate processes, instead of a relationship with Euratom, very much as a last resort or a back-up measure. We are frankly disappointed that the Government seem to be putting rather more effort into this than into seeking to maintain an arrangement with a body that does all this perfectly well, although the effort put into this Bill is also questionable. I will come to that in due course.
Gareth Johnson (Dartford) (Con)
Is the hon. Lady aware that the European Commission itself has said that no country that leaves the EU can continue being a member of Euratom? Is the Commission wrong?
Rebecca Long Bailey
The hon. Gentleman would do well to keep up. I have mentioned several times that there is a current legal discourse regarding this very issue. Perhaps he should refer to that.
Rebecca Long Bailey
I will just make some progress, if I may.
We have to be clear that the measures set out in the Bill are just a part of the process of disentangling ourselves from Euratom and replacing its provisions with satisfactory alternatives that allow the UK’s nuclear industry to continue working smoothly in conjunction with its international partners and not to face a cliff edge of uncertainty. Indeed, the position paper on the nuclear industry issued by the UK Government in the spring of this year lists a number of key activities of Euratom that are not covered by the nuclear safeguarding issue, but which are essential to place into a UK legislative framework if a tenable regime for nuclear power in the UK is to be created before Brexit.
One example is that we will need to reach an agreement on the international supply chain for nuclear reactors. Without such an arrangement in place, it is possible that the existing nuclear power stations such a Sizewell B will be forced to close until such time as the agreement is sorted out. The UK will need to conclude individual and separate nuclear co-operation agreements with non-EU countries such as Australia, Canada, Japan, South Africa, Kazakhstan, the United States of America and others. We will need to agree new inspections with the IAEA. The status of supply chains such as nuclear isotopes for medical treatment will need to be maintained, supplied by reactors in EU countries. There is the issue of research in nuclear technology including, importantly, the fusion research carried out at the Joint European Torus facility in Culham, which the Secretary of State has already mentioned. These are all at serious risk if a fully worked-out series of agreements is not in place to allow these activities continuous operation. Working out a way to honour our safeguarding commitments under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty is only the start of the process and we should not delude ourselves that achievement of that solves the Euratom issue. It does not.
Mike Wood (Dudley South) (Con)
The hon. Lady’s position seems to be that there is legal uncertainty about whether it is necessary for the UK to leave Euratom and that we should have left the issue until further in the negotiations, finding out whether we were leaving later on in the process. Would that not have just left rather less time to prepare if we did have to leave?
Rebecca Long Bailey
The point I am making is that there is legal uncertainty. Sadly, the Prime Minister firmly closed the door on the Euratom position, when it could have been left open. We could have passed this Bill through Parliament while questioning whether the legal position on Euratom membership was as the Commission states.
Rebecca Long Bailey
I will make some progress, if I may.
The Government stated in their notes on the Queen’s Speech that the Bill to be introduced on the future of safeguarding would also
“protect UK electricity supplied by nuclear power”.
This Bill clearly does not do that, which is perhaps why that claim has been dropped from the description of the Bill. But the challenge centrally remains, and it is likely that another Bill will be necessary to protect that electricity in its entirety. Will the Minister confirm when that legislation will be introduced?
Let us assume for the time being that maintaining membership of Euratom is not possible—by far the worst case scenario. How have the Government chosen to implement their limited stab at replacing the nuclear safeguarding regime? Well, they have chosen to do so by giving the Secretary of State all the power to make the changes. The Bill contains powers for the Secretary of State, by order, to provide all the detail and fill in the dots of the legislative changes without further meaningful recourse to the Floor of the House.
Clause 1 will give the Secretary of State powers to introduce substantial amendments to the UK’s safeguarding procedures and give effect to international agreements that are yet even to begin being negotiated without any further primary legislation. Furthermore, the Secretary of State will be given the power—also by order—to amend retrospectively, and without further meaningful recourse to the Floor of the House, no fewer than three pieces of existing legislation. Not only that, but he will have the power to amend those pieces of legislation, as the Government acknowledge in their explanatory notes accompanying the Bill, based on the outcome of negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency that the Government accept are not complete.
We have to take on trust that the negotiation with the IAEA to which Parliament will not be a party will proceed satisfactorily, and that the Secretary of State, in his infinite wisdom, will table the necessary amendments to primary and secondary legislation that will give effect to those agreements, whatever they are. While I am on this point, will the Secretary of State confirm the progress of such agreements and negotiations, and provide details?
Greg Clark
I hope the hon. Lady will be reassured if she actually reads the Bill. It is clear that the power to amend the legislation that she pointed out—I hope that she can see what I am pointing out—is limited to
“consequential, supplementary or incidental provision…transitional, transitory or saving provision.”
It is not a general power. It is intended to ensure that the transposition of one set of regulations to another can be made efficiently.
Rebecca Long Bailey
Let me take the Secretary of State on a little journey. If he listens carefully, he might see how dangerous the scope of certain parts of the Bill might be. The explanatory notes indicate that regulations under clause 1 will be subject to the affirmative procedure only “on first use”. It would be helpful if he confirmed that that wording is actually a terrible mistake, that he does not actually mean it and that, at the very least, all legislation on the domestic safeguarding regime will be subject to the affirmative procedure.
I would never cast aspersions on the Secretary of State, but, unfortunately, his ministerial colleagues have shown that they are prepared to use their delegated powers not just to avoid parliamentary scrutiny, but arguably to legislate in open defiance of the House. In particular, I refer to the recent rise in university tuition fees. The original Act allowed any statutory instrument raising the limit to be annulled by either House. Unfortunately, the Government first prevented any vote whatever, and then refused to accept the vote of the House against the regulations. In effect, they used secondary legislation to rule by ministerial decree. They tabled the regulations the day before Christmas recess and the Opposition tabled a prayer against them on the first sitting day after that. But, despite the conventions of the House, the Government dragged their feet for months until eventually conceding the point and scheduling a debate on 18 April. Of course, the Prime Minister dissolved Parliament before that vote could be held. After the election, the new Leader of the House said that there were “no plans” to allow time for the vote that her predecessor had solemnly promised from the Dispatch Box. It was left to my hon. Friend the Member for Ashton-under-Lyne (Angela Rayner) to secure parliamentary time under the rules of Standing Order No. 24. In that debate, the Minister for Universities, Science, Research and Innovation tried to deny that any vote had been secured, leading Mr Speaker to intervene and tell the House:
“I had thought there was an expectation of a debate and a vote, and that the Opposition had done what was necessary”.—[Official Report, 19 July 2017; Vol. 627, c. 895-6.]
Tom Pursglove
To return to the substance of the Bill, which is about contingency, will the hon. Lady confirm that at 10 o’clock tonight the Opposition will vote against that contingency?
Rebecca Long Bailey
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his question, but we are talking about very important arguments regarding the machinery of this House. If he will let me conclude my remarks, he might learn something very important.
Eventually, we had to use an Opposition day motion to revoke the regulations. The House agreed to it, only for the Government to refuse to accept the result after telling their Members to boycott the vote. When the Government say that Parliament still has a say on delegated legislation, there is a catch, and it is a Catch-22: they can refuse time for a vote within the 40 days and then say that it is too late for any vote to count once that deadline has passed. The Bill includes a power to amend primary legislation. The Government want us to trust them with the powers of Henry VIII when, to be frank, they behave like Charles I.
On the Brexit process, we have had long lectures from Government Members about parliamentary sovereignty, but Ministers have shown in practice that they will deny and defy this House. It is ironic that, just weeks ago, the Brexit Secretary was keen to assure us that no such thing could happen in legislation such as that under discussion. He told the House:
“Secondary legislation is still subject to parliamentary oversight and well established procedures. In no way does it provide unchecked unilateral powers to the Government.”—[Official Report, 7 September 2017; Vol. 628, c. 357.]
Even as he was saying that, his colleagues were refusing to follow those procedures, rejecting parliamentary oversight and using exactly those unchecked, unilateral powers to force higher fees on students.
The Bill will give the Government similar powers. We know that they will use secondary legislation not just for technical details, but to make controversial and important policy decisions by the stroke of a ministerial pen.
Mr Duncan Smith
The hon. Lady is going on and on, as is her wont, about the Government not giving the Opposition enough time or opportunities to vote against their proposals. There will, however, be a vote tonight on this Bill, so will the Opposition vote for or against it?
Rebecca Long Bailey
I am sorry that I am boring the right hon. Gentleman, but if he listens to the rest of my contribution perhaps his question will be answered at the end. Perhaps that will keep his attention.
The job of a legislature is to legislate. The Bill is effectively a blank cheque handing that job over to Ministers. I hope that the Minister will give an iron-clad guarantee that the Government will not use those powers in that way and an ultimate guarantee to change the Bill itself. Safeguards are vital for our nuclear industry, but they are needed for our parliamentary democracy as well.
The Bill’s Henry VIII clauses are particularly worrying, for the simple reason that if the Secretary of State does not use the powers effectively, the UK will simply not have a nuclear safeguarding regime. Our legislation book is scattered with such clauses that have never been enacted, so either the status quo ante prevails or some new primary legislation renders the power irrelevant. That is not the case, however, with the Bill, because if the regime is not fully established into UK law on exit day, it will not work.
The point is not only that the Secretary of State “may” introduce such legislation, but that they have to introduce it; otherwise the regime will not work. The Government are, in effect, asking us to trust that they will do the decent thing and make it work, while conceding that the Secretary of State may not, if he or she wishes, actually do it. That certainly does not look very good from the outside looking in, because there is no status quo ante to go back on in the event that the legislation is not properly translated into UK law. We will just fall of a cliff, as we depart from our membership of Euratom.
For all those reasons, it is evident that this barely fit for purpose Bill will, at the very least, need substantial amendment even to make it work on its own terms. Indeed, we also need a wider consideration of how the UK’s advantages and protections under Euratom can successfully be replaced in a national context.
We are clear, however, that, should all else fail, of course we need a nuclear safeguarding regime for the UK post Brexit—[Interruption.] I am pleased to get cheers from Government Members. But let me add a caveat: we will need to see evidence of substantial amendment to the procedure set out in the Bill, as well as evidence that the Government are really thinking about the best post-Brexit Euratom formulation, before we can wholeheartedly commit to agreeing to the passage of this Bill on Report and Third Reading.
Several hon. Members rose—
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
Order. May I say to Members that, if they speak for about eight minutes, everybody will get equal time?
Mr Edward Vaizey (Wantage) (Con)
Thank you for calling me to speak, Mr Deputy Speaker. I am grateful for the opportunity to talk about this important Bill, which is the first step to picking up the pieces from our withdrawal from Euratom. I am also grateful for the numerous briefings I have received from the Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, my hon. Friend the Member for Watford (Richard Harrington). He is an extremely assiduous Minister and I cannot go anywhere, least of all the Tea Room, without being stopped by him to be briefed on clause 3(3)(b).
The Secretary of State has already outlined the Bill’s purpose and the benefits we have gained from being members of Euratom, which is, in effect, the single market for the nuclear power industry. It allows us to move nuclear material between member states and, importantly, to move nuclear scientists, many of whom have moved to Culham, live in my constituency and contribute to the leading role that Britain continues to play in nuclear research.
Everyone in this House knows that the Government do not want to leave Euratom. The decision to leave is a case of, “It’s not you, it’s me.” Euratom is collateral damage from Brexit. Clever lawyers—we have not seen the legal advice—have decided that we have to leave Euratom because of the article 50 notice and it is extremely unhelpful, unfortunately, that the European Commission agrees with them; otherwise we might have had a fighting chance of persuading the Government to reverse their decision to withdraw from Euratom. I cannot help thinking that some such decisions are made slightly on the hoof. I only knew that we were withdrawing from Euratom on the day on which the article 50 Bill was published. It is quite hard to keep up with Government decisions on the issue, so I hope that from now on they will give us a heads up in plenty of time with regard to their decisions as we withdraw.
It is clear that the Bill deserves the House’s support, because it will transfer the safeguarding regime currently undertaken by Euratom to the Office for Nuclear Regulation, in preparation for our withdrawal. It will allow the ONR to monitor fissile material in the UK, to make sure that it is in the right place and being used for the right purpose.
Of course, that is just a small part of Euratom’s work. As Members’ interventions and, indeed, speeches have already highlighted, we need clarity on numerous other areas. The Secretary of State mentioned the very important nuclear co-operation agreements between Euratom and other countries around the world. The agreements allow us to trade in those nuclear markets outside Europe, including Australia, USA, Ukraine and numerous others. Clearly, we will have to replace those nuclear co-operation agreements with those individual states. Indeed, in some of those states, in particular the United States, it is a matter of law that they cannot trade with a country that does not have a nuclear co-operation agreement with them. Clearly, that issue is of the essence.
Secondly, we need—this phrase has been used in many cases with regard to Brexit—to replicate what we already have. In this instance, we need to replicate the common nuclear market that already exists because of our membership of Euratom. That is absolutely vital. Given the transfer of knowledge between highly skilled individuals, I do not think that anyone would object to nuclear specialists being able to move freely between countries and, indeed, to settle in countries where high-powered nuclear research—no pun intended—is being undertaken.
Thirdly, what comes out of our membership of Euratom is our leadership in nuclear research. Culham is a very serious project that has attracted hundreds of millions of pounds of investment through the Joint European Torus project. We were successful in ensuring that the next phase of JET, ITER—the international thermonuclear experimental reactor—will be based in France, despite talk of its being moved to Japan at one point. It is clear that Europe, partly because of the UK’s expertise, maintains its leadership in this regard. Following ITER, there will come another project, DEMO, which will be the first working nuclear fusion power plant: a demonstration plant—the clue is in the name. We were in pole position to get that in the UK, but I very much doubt, regrettably, that that will happen now.
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has referred to numerous trips to Vienna—a beautiful city—to talk to the International Atomic Energy Authority. He has hinted that progress has been made on the voluntary offer safeguards agreements—an additional protocol that we will need with the IAEA in future. I look forward to further discussions with him on that. I have already talked about the need for new co-operation agreements with the United States, Australia, Ukraine and others.
The issue of isotopes has been raised. The Government have made it clear that they do not regard isotopes as fissile material that is therefore within the scope of Euratom. However, I remind my right hon. Friend that there was in the past a crisis in isotope supply. We must remember that we do not create our own isotopes in this country because we do not have the right nuclear reactors, so we have to get them from our European partners. In fact, Euratom was there to step in when that crisis arose. In 2012, when the supply crisis happened, the Euratom Supply Agency specifically extended its remit to cover the supply of isotopes. It would be interesting to know what our relationship with the Euratom Supply Agency will be as we move forward.
I return to Culham and the fusion budget. I am pleased that the Government have made it clear that they will continue to fund Culham until 2020 regardless of whether that money is part of Euratom or otherwise. However, it is again worth pointing out what enormous benefits membership of Euratom has brought to British industry. Some 40 British companies are working on the next project, ITER, with £500 million-worth of contracts. I am sure that they will be maintained, but it would be good to hear reassurances that they will be. I stress that British scientists played a really key role in ensuring that ITER happened in France and not in Japan.
Then there is the question of whether the Office for Nuclear Regulation has the capacity to undertake the responsibilities it will be given in the Bill. As I understand it, eight members of staff at the ONR currently work on safeguarding, and about 40 Euratom staff do so. Incidentally, for those of us in this House who routinely refer to bloated European bureaucracy, I was interested to note that Euratom has only 160 staff, about 25% of whom work on safeguarding. Clearly, some financial support will be needed. The grant from the Government to the ONR is actually going down. Understandably, emphasis has been put on the nuclear industry funding the ONR, but it is a pity that the grant—admittedly it is very small, in the single millions—is being halved at precisely the time when new responsibilities are being put through in statute.
We now understand that the Government’s position on Brexit as a whole is to see a transition period. I cannot keep track of how long it will be, and who is in favour of it and who is not. I am in favour of the longest possible transition period—perhaps a couple of hundred years. [Laughter.] It would be delightful if we could get from the Minister some indication of whether the Government are thinking about a potential transition period as we leave Euratom so that we can remain members for a couple of years after we formally leave.
We will clearly have to look at associate membership of Euratom. However, nobody should be under any illusions that associate membership is something that we can take off the shelf. Switzerland and Ukraine are already associate members, but for very specific issues, mainly to do with nuclear research; they do not have nearly the same benefits that full Euratom membership brings. Therefore, yet again, we will be seeking a bespoke, special and close relationship with the single nuclear community otherwise known as Euratom.
Drew Hendry (Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey) (SNP)
It is woefully typical of the approach of this Government that despite their intention to abandon Euratom, this Bill falls significantly short of dealing with vital issues for the UK’s nuclear future. Without any confirmation of a transitionary deal, Ministers have left a host of unanswered questions around nuclear safety. The nuclear industry, the medical profession, our research sector and universities—virtually everyone associated with nuclear power or related supply chain industries—have asked for the answers to those questions. Breaking the news to Parliament that we will leave Euratom in a line of the Bill’s explanatory notes shows wilful disrespect to them.
It also betrays an all-too-common disregard for the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government, because while safety is reserved, areas of regulation are devolved. That regulatory role is just part of why the Scottish Government must be involved in discussions over Euratom as things move forward.
Alex Chalk (Cheltenham) (Con)
Do we not have to be very careful about our terminology? The Bill has absolutely nothing to do with safety standards as in the prevention of nuclear accidents—it is about safeguarding, which has an altogether different legal meaning. Is it not very important that we do not scaremonger about this?
Drew Hendry
It is very important that the unanswered questions are dealt with in this insufficient Bill—[Interruption.] Well, a lot of people will be concerned about the implications of what is not covered in this discussion, some of which I intend to cover.
With regard to nuclear safety, it is critical that we continue membership—or, at the very least, associate membership—of Euratom. Falling back on WTO rules could risk the UK breaking international law. It will come as no surprise that we in the SNP believe that the safest nuclear power policy is no nuclear power. We are determined to deliver just that.
Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)
Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Drew Hendry
I am going to make some headway.
In Scotland, we are already showing what can be achieved by renewable energy. New storage solutions for renewables are developing further access to the vast potential from offshore wind and tidal, meaning that an abundance of low-cost, clean energy will be generated. In contrast, this Government continue to chase the folly of new nuclear such as the white elephant that is Hinkley C, leading to exorbitant costs for consumers and leaving yet another burden for future generations to clean up—and that is if there is no more immediate crisis caused by failure or deliberate act leading to nuclear incident. I also wonder what care and attention has been given to people in Wales, as only days ago it came to light that about 300,000 tonnes of “radioactive mud”—a by-product of this Government’s nuclear obsession—is to be dredged and moved to Wales. I will leave that to hon. Members from Wales to debate further.
My constituency is in the highlands, which is not only the natural home of much of our renewable generation and its potential, but home to Dounreay. It is a place where the impact and long-term costs, both financial and environmental, of nuclear are well known. Those costs should not be repeated. The Minister pointed out that the responsibility for domestic nuclear safety resides in the UK, but that does not mean that the UK has a good record, especially prior to EU membership. Indeed, most of us living in the area can recall the various worrying nuclear material scares, and we are well versed on the dangerous radioactive levels recorded on Caithness beaches.
Each scare should remind us of why our membership of Euratom is so important—because while they can never be perfect, agreed EU directives over safety have been essential in ending some of the hair-raising practices in the UK nuclear industry. Who could forget that in 2006 the remains of actual plutonium rods were found on the beach at Sandside, in Caithness? Hon. Members earlier mentioned watertight provisions, but one retired Dounreay worker who was interviewed at the time spoke of a catalogue of errors, accidents and bad procedure, including claims that workers commonly disposed of radioactive material in the sea at night to avoid it having to appear on official documents. He told a reporter that he once saw a man
“using a Wellington boot tied to a piece of string”
to take test samples
“because the proper equipment had rusted”
beyond use. Mr Lyall, the retired worker who spoke out, had been a plant supervisor for many years.
Although the UK Atomic Energy Authority—as it would—denied that Mr Lyall’s claims were true, it did admit:
“There were practices from the 1950s to the 1960s that we would not repeat today.”
Those practices occurred before we were members of Euratom. In the same statement, the UKAEA told reporters:
“Standards have risen in health and safety and environmental protection, and government legislation has also been tightened considerably.”
Our membership of the EU, and especially of Euratom, has had a positive impact on the improvement of the standards that the UKAEA spoke of. In Scotland, although we are working towards a nuclear-free future, we have to maintain safety at existing facilities during that process, and we must plan for a future of decommissioning.
Robert Neill
I understand the point that the hon. Gentleman is making, but is not this the rub? He and I would both prefer to remain in Euratom if we could, but since the legal opinion, not just on this side of the channel but in the Commission, is that we cannot—that has not been challenged by any third party—we need this Bill to achieve exactly the laudable objectives that he and I share.
Drew Hendry
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his contribution, but he highlights the fact that we have not seen that legal opinion or any indication that it is watertight. We should have the opportunity to see it; perhaps it will be forthcoming as a result of this debate.
Drew Hendry
No, I am going to make some progress.
As I was saying, in Scotland, although we are working towards a nuclear-free future, we have to maintain safety at existing facilities. The current challenges exist in the other nations of the UK; indeed, they are multiplied by this Government’s obsession with pursuing costly and dangerous new nuclear. That obsession has put nuclear at the heart of energy strategy, while the Government’s other obsession with hard Brexit would see them leave the very agency that oversees the security of markets, businesses and workers in the sector. To most people looking on, that is baffling and dangerous. To us, it is yet another day in the growing chaos of this Tory Government.
Leaving Euratom serves no purpose other than to put at risk standards that have been in place for many years. Hon. Members do not even need to take my word for it. The Nuclear Industry Association has said:
“The nuclear industry has been clear that our preferred option is to seek to remain part of EURATOM, and that the UK government should negotiate this with the European Commission. The industry in both the UK and Europe want to maintain the same standards as apply now, and have worked well for more than 40 years. Without access to Euratom’s NCAs and common market, the nuclear new build programme, nuclear operations and the decommissioning mission could be seriously affected.”
Everything that can be done must be done to mitigate the risk of any incident, the effects of which would be measured in millennia. Failures in nuclear safety and decommissioning carry a potential catastrophic impact so great that our closest eye and the very best and most up-to-date research are required to avoid such outcomes.
Tom Pursglove
For the very reasons that he has just alluded to, will the hon. Gentleman confirm whether the Scottish National party will support the Bill at 10 o’clock tonight: yes or no?
Drew Hendry
What we would support is a sensible approach to maintaining either full or associate membership of Euratom.
The European regulator oversees nuclear matters as diverse as plutonium storage and medically vital radiotherapy supplies. For example, our membership of the Fusion for Energy programme allows the UK to receive contracts. So far, the UK supply chain has been awarded contracts worth €500 million, and that would have been expected to rise to at least €1 billion. Leaving Euratom seems to serve no purpose other than to satisfy this Government’s hard Brexit mantra.
Patricia Gibson (North Ayrshire and Arran) (SNP)
Does my hon. Friend agree that there seems to be a rigid consensus among Conservative Members that we cannot stay in Euratom if we leave the EU, and that they refuse to accept that legal opinion on the matter is divided? Does he agree that it is utterly incumbent on the Secretary of State to explore this divided legal opinion to see whether the UK can, indeed, stay in Euratom?
Drew Hendry
I agree that there are clearly unanswered questions about the legal position, which has not been challenged, exercised fully or even debated to any degree. Not only are our safety standards, research opportunities and business at risk, but we may see the most dramatic and negative effects of any withdrawal in the medical field.
Drew Hendry
No, I am going to make a bit of progress.
In its paper on radioisotopes and Brexit, the Royal College of Radiologists outlines the crucial role that radioisotopes play in medical advances. The majority of the UK’s supply of radioisotopes, used in scanning and the systemic and internal treatment of a wide range of cancers, is imported from Europe and further afield. The most commonly used radioisotope is used in 700,000 medical procedures each year, and global demand is growing by 0.5% a year. Radioisotopes are used for the diagnosis and treatment of various diseases, including cancers, cardiovascular conditions and brain disorders. The UK does not have any reactors capable of producing those isotopes, and because they decay rapidly—often within a matter of hours or days—hospitals in the UK cannot stockpile them and must rely on a continuous supply from reactors in the EU.
Drew Hendry
It is telling that Conservative Members are willing to ignore all advice from experts in the nuclear industry in order to uphold their position that we must have the hardest possible Brexit.
Drew Hendry
No, I am going to make some progress.
As I have said, the UK does not currently have any reactors capable of producing such isotopes.
Greg Clark
Perhaps I can help the hon. Gentleman. Euratom places no restrictions whatsoever on the export of medical isotopes, and so there are no further protections needed. It is irrelevant.
Drew Hendry
I do not think that the Minister is reflecting the view of the experts in the industry who are affected, and I will come on to underline that with some quotes.
Euratom supports the secure and safe supply and use of medical radioisotopes. If and when the UK withdraws, it will no longer—this is the critical point—have access to Euratom’s support, ending the certainty of a seamless and continuing supply. The Royal College of Radiologists points out that the supply of radioisotopes would be disrupted by leaving the single market, because transport delays will reduce the amount of useful radioisotopes that can be successfully transported to their destination.
Drew Hendry
No, I am going to make some progress. As I pointed out, radioisotopes decay within hours or days of production. The most common isotope has a half-life of just 66 hours. The consequences of a disrupted radioisotope supply was made clear not only during the incident that the right hon. Member for Wantage (Mr Vaizey) mentioned, but during the channel tunnel fire in 2008. That led to a reduction of the availability of radioisotopes, and to cancelled procedures. So, for patients, there can be no no-deal scenario. Such a scenario is a ludicrous proposition with regard to leaving the EU; as practitioners point out, however, in relation to medical isotopes it is a matter of people’s very lives.
Leaving Euratom will increase the difficulty of maintaining nuclear fuel in the longer term and threaten research funding into medical isotopes.
Drew Hendry
No, because I am going to conclude.
Most concerning of all is that leaving Euratom has the potential to reduce standards of protection for workers and the public. Since the UK Government have committed to a nuclear future, it would be pushing their irresponsible actions to critical levels if they were to forsake membership or, at the very least, associate membership of Euratom. Until there is no nuclear in Scotland—on our land, or in our waters—we should have the right to remain a member of it.
Chris Green (Bolton West) (Con)
It is abundantly clear, especially from the Westminster Hall debate secured by the hon. Member for Ynys Môn (Albert Owen), that Euratom is intrinsically entwined with our membership of the European Union. Legal advice says that, as does the Commission itself. That has been abundantly expressed during this debate, and no doubt it will be expressed again on many other occasions.
The tone of the Westminster Hall debate, and the contribution it made, was fantastic. Unfortunately, some aspects of the issue, as we have heard today, are actually a little more disturbing. The way the debate is going on medical isotopes—radioactive isotopes for cancer and other medical treatments—has been extraordinary, given that it is absolutely clear that this does not form part of the Bill. The impact of leaving Euratom will not be to stop people receiving such cancer treatments.
Albert Owen
I thank the hon. Gentleman for referring to the debate I led on 12 July. There was consensus in that debate in the Grand Committee Room that we should have associate membership of Euratom. That was the general theme of what was said by Members from both sides of the House, and we need to move towards it. In particular, I do not think that the Bill provides the lifeboat necessary for us to leave Euratom. Many of us are arguing for a transition period so that we will remain in Euratom until we get either associate membership or third-party agreements.
Chris Green
I appreciate the broad consensus in the Grand Committee Room, but not everyone had an opportunity to speak in that debate. No doubt there will be a transition period of some sort, but whether we have an associate membership or just a very close association at the end of it—like the association we will have with the European Union—we will look at what the EU does and how it goes about things, and we of course want similar standards. We are not looking to leave the European Union and then to reduce and cut all kinds of standards.
Drew Hendry
Will the hon. Gentleman advise us what kind of transition he would propose?
Chris Green
We are very early on in the negotiations, and I am sure the Minister for Climate Change and Industry and the Department for Exiting the European Union will look at that.
The extraordinary aspect of this debate is that some people are saying we will go off a cliff edge and valuable radioactive isotopes will no longer be available. What does that suggest about our friends in the European Union—that they will no longer sell these products, or that they will choose not to allow those products to be sent over to the United Kingdom? It is extraordinary to suggest that such sales will cease.
Layla Moran (Oxford West and Abingdon) (LD)
Does the hon. Gentleman agree that is not about the EU wanting to give us radioisotopes, but about half-lives? The radioisotopes we are talking about have extremely short half-lives, so any delay at all at the border means fewer patients will be able to benefit from them.
Chris Green
Yes, I understand that some half-lives can be as short as six hours, so the efficacy of the isotopes will diminish in an incredibly short period. However, to say that the European Union and the British Government are not fully aware of that and that getting such materials from Europe over to the United Kingdom cannot or will not happen is extraordinary.
Chris Green
I have already given way on this issue.
It is absolutely extraordinary to suggest that these materials will dry up overnight. Clearly, we are going to have a good relationship with the European Union and there are going to be sales of these products.
Michelle Donelan (Chippenham) (Con)
Does my hon. Friend agree that implying that the Bill will have an impact on the supply of medical isotopes is shameful scaremongering that could deeply upset and distress seriously ill people in this country?
Chris Green
Absolutely. I agree wholeheartedly with my hon. Friend. As has been highlighted, 500 medical procedures a year, involving 10,000 people in the United Kingdom, depend on these products, yet we hear that they are going to be withdrawn and taken away, or that they will be held at the ports.
Chris Green
No, I have already given way.
That is an extraordinary thing to suggest, and since this is outside the scope of the Bill, it is clearly scaremongering.
Chris Green
No. I am going to make some progress.
As we leave the European Union, we want to continue research relationships with it on many projects. We will see through Horizon 2020 to the end, and we must consider what kind of relationship we will have on the successor programme—framework programme 9. We need a close relationship with the European Union on Horizon 2020, but we must also consider what relationship we need or want on framework programme 9, and we must be mindful of the direction of travel with the European Union.
Alan Brown
The hon. Gentleman is talking about the period beyond 2020. All things being equal, this Parliament, being a fixed-term Parliament, will last until 2022. Should the Government not already be signalling how much money they will put towards future funding?
Chris Green
There will be an ongoing consultation on the relationship the university and scientific sector in the United Kingdom wants on the successor programme. As I am sure the hon. Gentleman will know, Horizon 2020 really focuses on top-end research—the things that we often do very well in the United Kingdom—which is why this country has a disproportionately large share of the Horizon 2020 money. On the successor programme, however, the moneys may be directed towards capacity building, which would favour other regions of the European Union more and the United Kingdom less. We must look into that and watch the direction of travel in the European Union. This is not set in stone, and we should not think that the successor programme to Horizon 2020 will merely “cut and paste” what we have today.
My big concern about where we go from here, post-Brexit, is the migration to the United Kingdom of European Union citizens and people from across the world who want to take up jobs in the nuclear industry. There is a huge opportunity in this, post-Brexit, for trained and qualified staff who currently work in Euratom to come across and work in the United Kingdom or for us to recruit and bring in people from across the world. Once we leave the European Union, we will have an opportunity to set the skill requirements we need in this country.
Mr Jim Cunningham (Coventry South) (Lab)
The hon. Gentleman is making some interesting points. I have consulted the powers that be in my constituency, where I have two universities, and there is concern about the consequences for science of ending the free movement of labour, certainly in relation to the specialists who come in to help train people. Experts very often come from Europe to teach science and technology, and there is concern because if we do not get this right, those people may well not be available for those universities.
Chris Green
That is a fair point, and why we have to ensure that we have as close a relationship as possible, consistent with having left, with the European Union post Brexit. Universities will be one of the prime sectors that the Government look to to ensure that we have that co-operation. It is such an important sector for the UK.
When thinking about who we need in the UK, people often focus on the highly qualified—professors, lecturers and so on—and the technicians that universities need can be overlooked. They are often paid significantly less, but we need them to come over, too.
Finally, will the Minister comment in the winding-up speech about arrangements for co-operation with countries outside the EU, such as the United States and Canada?
Rachel Reeves (Leeds West) (Lab)
I do not think that anybody debated or considered leaving Euratom, or voted to leave it on 23 June 2016—
Rachel Reeves
Except the hon. Gentleman. However, we are where we are, and the Government have made their decision. I urge them not to abandon what I and many hon. Members regard as a sensible approach: to pursue a transition period during which we stay under Euratom’s auspices, and then seek some sort of associate membership so that we do not have to recreate everything that the Minister and others have said that we value from our membership.
I understand the need for the Bill. There is a risk that we could crash out of the EU and Euratom, and we need a back-up, given that the Office for Nuclear Regulation will take on the responsibilities that Euratom has today. Unlike trade, there is no fall-back option for nuclear. With trade, we have the World Trade Organisation, but with nuclear, if we do not have an arrangement with the IAEA, we will not be able to trade or move nuclear materials around the EU. The Bill is an important belt-and-braces measure in case we crash out, which I hope does not happen, but is a risk.
The Bill does part of one thing—pass the remit for safeguarding inspections from Euratom to our regulator, the ONR. As hon. Members know, the ONR is not new, but there are serious pressures on its capacity. It is currently recruiting a new chief nuclear inspector, and only last week the Government had to put aside more money for it as part of the clean growth strategy. We therefore know that the ONR is under pressure even before taking on the new responsibilities that the Government may pass on to it. As a senior ONR official was forced to admit to a Select Committee in the other place, the timescale for adding safeguarding responsibilities is “very challenging”.
Albert Owen
My hon. Friend is making an important point about the ONR’s resources. Indeed, it takes about seven years to train the experts to ensure that they are competent enough to do the work. The lack of resources means that we really need a transitional period.
Rachel Reeves
My hon. Friend speaks with great knowledge. He led the Westminster Hall debate and has a constituency interest. He is absolutely right, and some of the questions I will pose later are about how we can be sure that the ONR has the capacity and the capability to take on the responsibility that the Government will pass on to it.
The Bill does not resolve all the safeguarding issues. It does not solve the difficulties associated with the common nuclear market that exists as part of the Euratom framework, and it does not put in place the nuclear co-operation agreements with other countries that we would require to enable trading and even the exchange of information between nuclear states. It does nothing to resolve the arrangements to continue the world-leading fusion research, funded by Euratom but located in Oxfordshire, as the right hon. Member for Wantage (Mr Vaizey) pointed out. I know that Members who represent those communities have real concerns about the impact. When I visited Culham a couple of weeks ago, it was made clear to me that those working there would prefer to stay in Euratom and had serious concerns about our exit.
Despite what some hon. Members think and say, the Bill does not provide the assurance that radiographers and others have sought for months from the Government that medical radioisotopes, again not made here, can be seamlessly transported to the UK for diagnostics and treatment. No one in this Chamber can say with certainty what will happen in March 2019, and whether agreements will be put in place for the frictionless movement of goods and services. Without that, we cannot be certain that those radioisotopes can come into this country easily and without hindrance.
Given that list, it should not be a surprise to Ministers or the House that my Committee—the Select Committee on Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy—has launched an inquiry into the impact of the Government’s decision to leave Euratom. The House will also not be surprised to learn that a lot of detailed and concerning evidence has been submitted to us. As well as my visit to Culham and the Joint European Torus—JET—I was at Hinkley Point today, meeting representatives from Hinkley Point C. Again, concerns were expressed to us about ensuring that nuclear fuel can get into the country once we have left Euratom. Ministers should be mindful of that.
Let us be clear: the process of ceasing to be part of Euratom, if that is what we end up doing, is complex, time consuming, and relies on good will, negotiation and agreement with third parties. Ministers cannot simply say that we will get those arrangements—they are up for negotiation. The Bill is just one small part of that complex picture, and as Ministers know, there is a very limited timeframe to get a series of agreements with a range of third party states to replicate what already exists as part of the Euratom framework.
My biggest concern about the Bill as it stands is that although it provides for permission to transfer the responsibility for safeguarding, it leaves to a later date all the arrangements that need to be made to ensure that the ONR can carry out those new functions. It leaves it to Ministers to determine them, at an undetermined time—increasingly a feature of the Government’s attitude to this as well as other aspects of the process of disentangling the UK from the EU. That is worrying, and should concern every Member of this House. Parliament should be involved because the decisions made here will affect all our constituents.
If we consent to the Bill as it stands, and transfer authority from Euratom to the ONR, it is important that we are confident in the arrangements to effect that change. We must be confident that, as my hon. Friend the Member for Ynys Môn (Albert Owen) said, the ONR has enough qualified and relevantly experienced personnel, because this is a specialist and skilled task, to do the job. Given that it is currently done and has been done for decades by another organisation, we must be confident that those people have had the right training, that the equipment required for monitoring special fissile material—by inspection in person and remotely—is in place, and that we know that the IAEA, the international body responsible for safeguarding standards, is satisfied and confident that this can be done effectively.
However collegiate or conciliatory Ministers are during the Bill’s passage, and I know that they will be, they cannot provide those assurances to Parliament today, or any time soon, and they have no way of knowing whether the conditions will be met. It is a very big gamble, and frankly, it is unacceptable to say, “Don’t worry, it will all happen through regulation and we will deal with it later; we have a very good relationship”. It is Ministers’ and the Government’s responsibility to provide Parliament with the assurances, detailed information and confidence on this matter, and all those aspects of replicating what we currently benefit from as part of Euratom.
In the context of the Bill and what needs to happen in addition to it, there are several questions that need answers before Members can be convinced that the Government’s course of action—their choice that we go our own way rather than negotiate for a transition period and associate membership—is correct. When can Ministers tell the House more about the terms of any agreement with the IAEA? It has been suggested that standards will be broadly equivalent to those from which we benefit now. What does “broadly equivalent” mean? What is the difference between what we currently have and what the Government are seeking to get from the IAEA? When will the voluntary offer be agreed, ratified and confirmed by the IAEA? What measures do the Government have in mind to ensure that the Office for Nuclear Regulation has the right skills and resources in place, given how long it takes to train a nuclear safeguards inspector and the skills shortages that already exist in the sector?
The Minister knows well that many experts in the field are concerned about the decision to leave Euratom. Since its inception, Euratom has helped to facilitate trade, promoted key research and development programmes, allowed for the movement of skills and maintained high safeguarding standards. While nobody in this House would demur from the absolute requirement that safeguarding inspections happen, or from the need for the ONR to have powers from this House if it is to undertake that role, the Minister must realise too that, notwithstanding that position, many questions remain unanswered. I hope a better way forward can be found—transition and associate membership, not a risky and costly process of transferring powers to the ONR for something that by its very nature relies on international co-operation, agreement and trust.
Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)
I am grateful and very pleased to be here as the first brick is placed into the strong foundation that we will be building for a post-Brexit Britain. This is the first real piece of legislation enabling us to see what it will look like. I congratulate the Minister on the Bill’s brevity and concision. Hopefully that pattern will be repeated.
I welcome the Bill and indeed our leaving Euratom, as I said earlier, although I recognise that many will not. Warm has been the embrace of Euratom for the past 40-odd years. Much has been achieved, in both research and safeguarding standards, but in truth the mourning bell has been tolling for Euratom for some time, because it is clear that the EU is turning its face against civil nuclear power. Germany is phasing it out by 2020, in a decision taken a couple of years ago, while Belgium, in a decision taken by our friend Mr Verhofstadt when he was Prime Minister, has decided to phase it out by 2025. Italy and Denmark have already made nuclear power generation illegal. Greece and Spain are phasing it out. Austria—ironically, as the home of the IAEA—has made it illegal even to transport nuclear material across its territory, such is its antipathy to it.
Given that the aggressively anti-nuclear Green party peppers Parliaments across the continent and has 51 seats in the European Parliament, serious questions need to be asked about the future of Euratom and its funding. When we recognise that much of the Horizon 2020 funding, which will go towards nuclear research, is generated by Germany, which will not be using the technology invented under that programme, we have to ask how long Germany will tolerate the notion that it should be pouring hundreds of millions of euros into nuclear research.
Kwasi Kwarteng (Spelthorne) (Con)
My hon. Friend clearly knows a lot about this subject, so on a point of information to illuminate the House, what does he think about the French attitude to nuclear power?
Kit Malthouse
As I was about to say, in truth, Euratom is the French. It is anchored around France, with its 58 reactors, and they are the only serious nuclear player among the EU 27. The UK is second and Ukraine, although not a member—as my right hon. Friend the Member for Wantage (Mr Vaizey) pointed out, it is now a special associate of Euratom, as it were—is third. Nevertheless, we now have the opportunity to look strategically at where our civil nuclear is going, what global alliances we should have, the direction of Euratom and EU nuclear research, and whether there is a better way.
Wera Hobhouse (Bath) (LD)
Does the hon. Gentleman not agree that the future of nuclear is still very uncertain? If the Romans had invented nuclear power, we would still be guarding our nuclear waste sites.
Kit Malthouse
I absolutely think that nuclear waste is important, particularly to us in this country. That is why we should have total control of it ourselves and not be reliant on a series of countries that will perhaps not even be willing to put money into researching how to dispose of, or reprocess or otherwise use nuclear waste.
We have been members of the IAEA since 1957. We have the capability to make the change; indeed, there is a strategic argument that the Office for Nuclear Regulation would be much better served if it had responsibility for all three of the civil nuclear strands—safety, security, and regulation and safeguarding. We lead the world in safety regulation; we can lead the world in the other two.
Mr Vaizey
I am immensely enjoying my hon. Friend’s speech, not least as I have discovered that the one person in the country who went to the polls on 23 June specifically to get us out of Euratom also happens to be a Member of this House. It is a remarkable coincidence. If I may probe his argument, does it not have a weakness, in that if he is saying that so many members of the EU want to undermine civil nuclear power, is this not precisely the wrong time for the Brits to leave the French to themselves? Does he also agree that, regardless of his attitude to Euratom, we will still have to go through an incredible number of hoops to recreate what we have benefited from?
Kit Malthouse
No, I completely disagree with my right hon. Friend. This is not the wrong time; it is exactly the right time for us to recognise that there is a world beyond the EU in terms of nuclear research. There has been much angst in the House already about nuclear scientists being able to travel freely, but I would point out that they do actually exist outside the European Union. There are lots of them in Japan, Korea, China and elsewhere. Indeed, the leading edge of nuclear research and the development of civil nuclear power is elsewhere. As I have said, we are dealing with a community of countries that are turning their back on this technology. Even if we get to the holy grail of fission, and we manage to get fusion going from the great reactor in my right hon. Friend’s constituency, the Germans will not use it. They have said already that it is of no use to them. The idea that they will continue to fund it into the future is fallacious.
Mr Vaizey
I am always further intrigued by the arguments of people such as my hon. Friend, who imply that we could do nothing outside Europe when we were members of Euratom. However, we got the Chinese to invest in Hinkley while remaining members. How did our membership prevent us from co-operating with other nuclear states?
Kit Malthouse
It has not prevented us, but we now have the opportunity to recognise that the nuclear community is global. While Euratom has served its purpose thus far, the point I am trying to make is that the trend of European opinion is very much against nuclear, so those countries are unlikely to continue pumping the money into Euratom that it has hitherto enjoyed. That is why we need to look elsewhere. It is perfectly possible for us to have a bilateral relationship with France. We have one on nuclear defence at the moment, which was signed in 2010; we can do the same on power. There is absolutely no threat to our participation in some of the global research programmes, such as the one at Culham and the ITER in the south of France, which currently includes Korea, China, Japan and Russia. There are lots of ways in which we can be involved.
My message today, I guess, is that people have to learn that Euratom cannot be part of project fear. It must not be part of project fear; it is far too strategically important to us not to reach out to the rest of the world. I am quite happy for us to have an associate membership, if that is what is required, but there is a world beyond the EU, and we have seen that in medical isotopes. As my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton West (Chris Green) said, no one is pretending that we will not be sent medical isotopes when we come out, but that points to a strategic problem because of our membership of Euratom: we should be manufacturing those isotopes here. Why have we not got a reactor that will create them? We have the largest agglomeration of life sciences research on the planet, yet we do not have this feather in our cap—this piece of the jigsaw. Notwithstanding the SNP’s antipathy to nuclear, perhaps we should build that kind of reactor in Scotland, given that thousands and thousands of Scots benefit from medical isotopes every year.
The argument about Euratom has exposed the strategic nature of nuclear to us, in defence, civil nuclear and medical, and allows us now to think more coherently about which way we go. Civil nuclear is an international effort. Regulation should be at international level, as should partnership, so that we can finally find the holy grail of fusion power, which will solve our power generation problems well into the next century.
John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness) (Lab/Co-op)
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse)—[Hon. Members: “Why?”]—because he at least made an argument, unlike some previous Conservative Members, whose speeches were filled with vapid nonsense about how everything would be wonderful. His argument, however, was essentially: the Germans are coming and we need to pull up the nuclear drawbridge.
Kwasi Kwarteng
My hon. Friend’s precise point was that the Germans had retreated and left the field of civil nuclear energy. So the hon. Gentleman has drawn exactly the wrong conclusion.
John Woodcock
I tried to listen carefully.
I have some sympathy with Ministers. I am reminded of Dora Gaitskell in 1961 when she turned to her husband Hugh, that great leader of the Labour party—
John Woodcock
Don’t tempt me!
Hugh Gaitskell had just turned on its head his previously strong support for the EU by saying that joining Euratom would be like reversing 1,000 years of Britain as an independent state, and Dora said to her husband, “All the wrong people are cheering”. The Minister has had enthusiastic endorsements not only from the hon. Member for North West Hampshire, who belongs to the new generation of hard Brexiteer, but from the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr Duncan Smith), who I saw leaping to his feet enthusiastically, and others. He needs to look around at who his friends are on this and push much harder for the view that we might speculate is his own personal view—that the course the Government have set is potentially deeply damaging for the nation, for civil nuclear power and, as I will come to, for many workers in my constituency and far more in that of the hon. Member for Copeland (Trudy Harrison).
The Bill is a hastily constructed life raft. Labour Members are not against life rafts—some of us have of late considered them in other circumstances. They might sometimes be necessary, and we will engage constructively in Committee to improve this hastily and poorly constructed life raft, but we should not be seeking to bail from the nuclear ship at all, as is currently the Government’s policy. I asked the Secretary of State two important questions—he was generous in allowing me to intervene on him twice—but to my mind he answered neither. The Minister might do so now or in his summing up if he wishes. First, is it the Government’s policy to negotiate a transition agreement beyond 2019, so that the cliff edge we are currently facing recedes at least by a few years? Secondly, are the Government seeking associate membership, which would negate the need for a whole new set of nuclear co-operation agreements?
I know that Ministers are inclined to put on a brave face, but still I must note the level of optimism coming from the Dispatch Box. The Minister will know better than me that the civil service is bursting at the seams trying to deliver the panoply of new treaties and arrangements that Brexit is forcing on the country. It is at best highly doubtful that there will be the capacity in the system at our end to put together a whole new set of comprehensive NCAs to alleviate the problem by 2019, and that puts at risk not only the current generation of civil nuclear power stations but the future generation.
Since the Minister took up his job, he has been engaged privately, like his predecessors, in trying to rescue the NuGen deal, which, if it goes ahead, will create up to 20,000 jobs in Copeland’s local economy. Several hundred of my constituents already go up the road and coast every day to work at Sellafield. We are talking about thousands more jobs, but that deal has potentially been damaged by the uncertainty around the post-Brexit arrangements—not only the final outcome but the Government’s intentions now. That uncertainty might deter this vital new investor, which can keep those 20,000 jobs on track in our local economy and help the UK to keep the lights on.
The situation is deeply worrying. I realise that many current and future Ministers will not have wanted to be in this situation, but they have some agency and could be clearer with the nuclear industry and other nations watching about where exactly they want to end up. That is the responsible way to safeguard jobs in our local area.
Trudy Harrison (Copeland) (Con)
It is a pleasure to follow my constituency neighbour, the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness (John Woodcock), with whom I share a passion for nuclear energy.
I am grateful for the opportunity to speak in an important debate that is crucial for my constituency. Fellow Members will have heard me speak previously of the world-class nuclear skills in my constituency, of its internationally celebrated safe ways of working and of the challenges my community is overcoming in dealing with the world’s most complex nuclear legacy clean-up. Sellafield and the supply chain are world leading in this field. Sellafield is Europe’s biggest and most complex nuclear site and has been central to the UK’s nuclear development right from the beginning.
The UK established the world’s first civil nuclear programme, with the opening the first nuclear power station in my constituency at Calder Hall, which was first connected to the grid in 1956 and officially opened by the Queen. It was the world’s first power station to generate electricity on a commercial scale and operated for 47 years until it closed in 2003. The International Atomic Energy Agency was formed in March 1957 to support civil nuclear collaboration across the globe, and again we were world leaders in its formation. It is critical that we continue to benefit from being part of the IAEA and Euratom after we leave the EU.
Since being elected in February, I have visited both of Copeland’s nuclear licensed sites, Sellafield and the Low Level Waste Repository, to see for myself the incredible work done there by humble but highly skilled workers—scientists, engineers, tradespeople, those working in quality assurance and the enormous support operations. Sellafield has changed considerably since I worked there 20 years ago. I should declare an interest, as my husband, father and brother all work at Sellafield or in the nuclear industry—but then so do more than half my constituents, either directly or indirectly.
I have visited over 70 of the nuclear supply chain companies operating in my constituency. From global household names such AECOM, Arup, Atkins and Ansaldo NES to the more bespoke, locally grown, niche businesses of Delkia and REACT Engineering. We have an incredible wealth of talent and capability, matched by enormous opportunity, but each of these businesses is wholly dependent on the Government getting this right. Even to make a phone call between countries depends on getting this right. For an engineer in Copeland to speak with a supplier in Savannah River requires bilateral agreements. With Hinkley Point C in mid-construction and a raft of nuclear new build on the horizon, including Moorside adjacent to Sellafield, all the more urgency and precision is required in maintaining the benefits we currently enjoy through our membership of Euratom.
As we leave the European Union, the Bill is a much-needed step that will potentially give the Office for Nuclear Regulation the necessary powers to take up and continue the role that about 40 Euratom officials currently undertake, if that is required. I understand that there may well be a potential for the United Kingdom to remain part of Euratom, or to become an associate member if an agreement can be reached that is mutually beneficial and suits the UK. Switzerland and the UK show that there is a precedent, but a deal of this kind must be right for the UK’s interests. However, it is essential to have a plan B, which is what the Bill provides.
The Bill seeks to transfer the responsibility for safeguarding inspections from Euratom to the ONR. It is important to note that Euratom currently has no impact on the management and safety of the UK’s many nuclear sites, which are solely the responsibility of the ONR, guided by UK policy. Of course, our policies reflect agreed international standards, and our standards are extremely high. There is no reason, in my opinion, that a similar set-up could not exist in respect of Euratom. The UK has a robust and well-established civil nuclear safety regime, which will not change if all the necessary steps are taken to ensure confidence and continuity throughout the transition stage.
The Government’s decision to withdraw from Euratom is a key concern for many businesses in my constituency and for those working in the nuclear industry throughout the UK. We need to ensure that, if we must leave Euratom, we have bilateral agreements beyond the EU. Foreign investment and knowledge are fundamental to the continued use and development of modern nuclear power plants. We need only look at Hinkley Point C to see an example of international knowledge and skill-sharing and, of course, an example of foreign investment. Any investor or developer requires confidence and continuity, particularly when the stakes are high. As a member of Euratom, the UK enjoys the benefits of several nuclear co-operation agreements, negotiated by Euratom on behalf of its member states. Trade agreements with many countries including Japan, South Africa and the USA allow the sharing of knowledge, personnel and components. We must not allow ourselves to lose that international co-operation.
Although the Bill is a good and necessary first step, even as a precautionary measure, more needs to be done to address and replicate the other aspects of Euratom, and to determine how we can ensure continuity in all the areas for which Euratom membership currently provides. While the transfer of responsibility from Euratom to the ONR seems logical, it is essential to ensure that the ONR has the necessary budget and is able to recruit appropriately skilled staff within the required timescales. I remain concerned about the Government’s intention to reduce the grant for the ONR. I fear that that would have a serious impact on the organisation’s ability to complete its current tasks, let alone perform its increased duties after Euratom withdrawal. That needs to be addressed.
I commend the work of the Minister and his Department. They have been very generous with their time when dealing with concerned Members such as me. The Department has obviously noted the difficulty, and the importance, of ensuring that there is a smooth transition if membership, or associate membership, of Euratom is not possible. Let me also recognise the work of the Prospect union and the Nuclear Industry Association in helping their members, and me, to understand the needs of the industry, and that of the many businesses who have contributed their concerns and suggestions in their efforts to get this right.
I must make it clear that not getting this transition right—not putting the right arrangements in place and doing so in time—would be catastrophic, in many ways, for my constituency, for the nuclear sector, for research and development, for science, industry and advanced manufacturing, for apprenticeships and our legacy of world-class skills, for jobs, for growth and for keeping our country powered up. It would be catastrophic for our country and for other countries, too. I know—this is just one example—that the skills, experience and innovative equipment of Copeland’s businesses are a vital part of the clean-up operation at Fukushima in Japan.
For decades, the thermal oxide reprocessing plant at Sellafield has processed waste from other countries, safely and efficiently. THORP is generating about £1 billion annually for the UK. The processes of separation, encapsulation, vitrification and compaction to deal with complex decommissioning challenges have been perfected at Sellafield, at the Low Level Waste Repository and throughout our supply chain, and the time is right for exporting more of those skills, the knowledge of processes and the innovation of equipment. Our future is and should be bright if we get this right, but everything depends on appropriate and timely arrangements.
Let me end on a note of caution. Like other Members who appreciate the importance of this industry to our country, I will not accept being pushed off our pedestal of internationally respected nuclear excellence. Without the replacement provisions in place, if we have to leave Euratom, we will fall not only from that pedestal, but right off the cliff in March 2019. The Bill is therefore vital, if only as a plan B. I am pleased to have been able to speak in the debate and to commend the beginning of the process. Negotiations and agreements must be made swiftly, with rigour and robustness, and with the support and agreement of Members on both sides of the House.
Layla Moran (Oxford West and Abingdon) (LD)
As many Members have already pointed out, the Bill should not be needed at all. The most sensible approach to nuclear safeguarding would be for the United Kingdom to remain a member of Euratom, rather than wasting vast amounts of time and money in setting up an alternative regime that the Government admit will be as much a replica of the original as possible. The Government have created a rod for their own back by insisting that the European Court of Justice and freedom of movement are red lines. I wish they would just admit that that is the problem, rather than hiding behind legalese and unpublished, disputed advice.
As was pointed out by the hon. Member for Leeds West (Rachel Reeves), when most people voted on 23 June 2016, the vast majority did not even know what Euratom was, let alone how to pronounce it. It remains possible that Britain could have taken the option of remaining a member, and it is a political choice to withdraw from it before that has been absolutely set as the legal position. What I am sure of is that the fallout—pun absolutely intended—of this decision leaves a huge gap not only in the country’s ability to safeguard nuclear material, but in many other areas not covered by the Bill.
We are told that the Government will seek a new treaty to replace Euratom, so the Bill is applicable only in the event of Britain’s crashing out of the EU and Euratom with no deal. No deal would be deeply disastrous for Britain, and the Government should not even be considering that option; yet here we are, about to pass a Bill to authorise spending on just that eventuality. Let us give credit where it is due. Given the importance of this issue and the Government’s own lack of confidence in themselves, the Department is doing absolutely the right thing in preparing for the worst—and yes, the Liberal Democrats would vote for the Bill on Second Reading. However, the fact that the Government have produced the Bill so early in the Brexit process shows that they must be genuinely concerned by the complexity of the task ahead and the possibility that the negotiations will fail.
By the way, as we all know, we have not even started those negotiations, and industry experts tell us that it could take up to seven years to negotiate a treaty as wide-ranging as Euratom. Although I have enjoyed listening to the jolly assurances of some Conservative Members—I, too, am an optimist by nature—I fail to see how we are going to do this in time.
Like many other Members who have spoken today, I am gravely concerned about the limited scope of the Bill and the fact that it does not cover the full range of Euratom functions. In particular, I am worried for my constituents. At one time, Abingdon had the highest number of PhDs per square kilometre in Europe, and many of the scientists still work on the Joint European Torus—JET—in Culham. The United Kingdom is world-leading in that area. Fusion technology, if achieved at scale, would be tantamount in technological terms to putting a man on a the moon—it is that revolutionary—and it would be a criminal act to put that position in jeopardy, but that is exactly what we are doing. To ensure its future, we need guarantees about the next phase of the work programme by the middle of next year, months before the Brexit negotiations are completed. This is very urgent.
This is not just about money, as we will, I am sure, be told: to fully participate, we must ensure that these scientists can move freely and collaborate fully and, furthermore, that those already here are enticed to stay. These are the best minds in the world, and I need not remind the Government how rare they are. It is all very well saying that we want them to stay, but we need to give them more certainty than that; they are already leaving.
My constituents, alongside others in the industry, are extremely concerned about the implications of Government decisions on their futures. What kind of associate membership do we want? Will the Minister publish, and consult on, proposals for dispute resolution? Will he guarantee freedom of movement of specialist and technical staff in the nuclear industry? There is far more information that we need from the Minister about these and other areas, and it is worrying that this Bill is so limited in scope.
Kwasi Kwarteng
Is the hon. Lady seriously suggesting that there would be any circumstances in which well-qualified nuclear professionals would be prevented from coming into this country? Does she think, plausibly, that that is an outcome we might get to?
Layla Moran
I absolutely do, because we have not had that absolute cast-iron guarantee. I should add that this is not just about the nuclear scientists; it is also about all the support staff who are needed.
John Woodcock
My concern is that, as we know, world-class nuclear scientists are a rare and valued commodity, and some nations might not see it as in their interests to open the doors and allow greater exits of people whom they want to keep. It suggests a potentially slightly naive view of the world to think that everyone will just say, “Yes, go to Britain; it will all be fine.”
I will be brief about this, Madam Deputy Speaker, but I forgot in my speech to ask for the leave of the House: unfortunately, a family illness means that I am not going to be present for the wind-ups—but in any case Labour does not seem to be voting against.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Mrs Eleanor Laing)
I let the hon. Gentleman make a long intervention when I realised that there was a point that he wanted to make. I just want to make the point that this does not create a precedent for long interventions, as it was a special case.
Layla Moran
On funding, the haste with which the Bill has been introduced suggests the Minister wishes to move forward quickly with recruiting and training the nuclear specialists who will be absolutely crucial in the case of no deal, and rightly so for the reasons I have just described, but can he confirm how much he anticipates being spent on implementing these measures and exactly when this spending will begin? Also, how do we know it will be a sufficient sum? The explanatory notes talk about a new IT system; I look forward to scrutinising that in the Public Accounts Committee.
Another concern is the extent to which specifics are being left to regulations, as has been said, rather than written into the Bill. We are starting to get used to that in this House, but that does not mean it is right: it reduces the level of scrutiny over Government decisions and it erodes public trust.
Given that the Minister has said that he wants associate membership of Euratom, but that formal negotiations might currently not take place, will he publish a policy statement on associate status to enable the industry to start to work around such arrangements as they might progress? Also, will these be Ukraine-style, or Switzerland-style—or, as we have heard from the Minister before, will they be even better? Without oversight of the European Court of Justice and with no freedom of movement, I am not sure we are going to achieve even that. I want to share the Minister’s degree of optimism, but I learned in my physics degree that scepticism is also a valuable approach to life.
What about transition? Have the Government given up on that idea, or will transition include continued membership of Euratom? We have heard already how wide-ranging the Euratom treaty is; I suggest that we must decouple the Euratom issue from the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill completely and stop any talk of a cliff-edge on Euratom issues once and for all.
What if this does go all wrong, however? Are the Government even considering that? If Government negotiations fail and we crash out of the EU without negotiating a new agreement with Euratom, we will need this legislation, but we will also need so much more. We keep hearing that it is going to be fine. I feel ever more that this House is being drawn into a scene from “Dr Strangelove”: “How Parliament learned to stop worrying and love Brexit.” Our relationship with Euratom is far too important to take a risk like that.
Richard Graham (Gloucester) (Con)
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Oxford West and Abingdon (Layla Moran), who confirmed that the Liberal Democrats will support the Bill tonight. Indeed, all Members worried about the possibility of the UK falling off a cliff-edge without future arrangements as a result of leaving the EU should support this Bill. It is an important step to avoiding that situation, and this plan B is precisely why the Nuclear Industry Association has described it as “a necessary legislative step.”
It is therefore not a little ironic that the party that wants to have nothing to do with nuclear power, is presumably worried about safeguards, and cannot make a speech without chanting the words “Hard Tory Brexit” appears to be against a contingency plan to prevent precisely that wild accusation from coming true for the nuclear sector. The points made against this Bill by the SNP spokesman, the hon. Member for Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey (Drew Hendry), and, indeed, by the Labour party spokesman, the hon. Member for Salford and Eccles (Rebecca Long Bailey), cannot therefore be about a lack of preparation for any possibility of disagreement about sensible third-party status with Euratom being secured by negotiation, and it must be clear that anyone voting against the Bill tonight will, indeed, be voting for a very hard Brexit for nuclear energy.
The truth is that we must leave to one side the bizarre positions adopted by the formal two leading Opposition parties, and focus on the Bill itself and the comments of individual Members of Parliament, including the hon. Members for Leeds West (Rachel Reeves) and for Barrow and Furness (John Woodcock), and my party colleagues, notably my hon. Friend the Member for Copeland (Trudy Harrison), who has worked in the nuclear industry.
This is a contingency Bill. We all want a form of associative membership with Euratom that replicates existing arrangements. That is the clear position of the entire sector, represented either by the NIA or EDF Energy, the operator of all our existing nuclear power stations, with its operational headquarters in Barnwood in my constituency. It is telling that EDF Energy has said, first, that it appreciates the Government’s “early and constructive engagement on this issue with us”, and, secondly—to deal with some elements of scaremongering —that the UK has extremely “robust” arrangements for safety and security, and, “whatever the status of our membership of Euratom, there is no question but that this will continue to be the case.”
The NIA calls this Bill a welcome first step, but it does raise some questions, and I would be grateful if the Minister, in winding up, responded to some of the following questions. First, will he confirm that a bilateral US-UK nuclear co-operation agreement would be put in place to secure US components for Sizewell B in the event of Euratom’s NCAs and common market not being available to us, presumably through a voluntary offer safeguards agreement with the IAEA? Secondly, will he confirm that our funding for the Joint European Torus—or JET—project, which continues to 2020, will be extended, assuming there is a new relationship with Euratom? Thirdly, will he clarify the contingency process for the movement of nuclear material, goods, people, information and services to be agreed with the Euratom Supply Agency? Finally, will he confirm that our preferred arrangement for the period of transition is as close as possible to the current status quo?
Two other points are worth mentioning. They are about matters that the Bill does not cover. First, the NIA has spelt out clearly that Euratom does not manage the safety of the UK’s nuclear sites, which is, and always has been, determined by the UK, overseen by the Office for Nuclear Regulation; it is important that all our constituents understand that. Secondly, as the Secretary of State spelt out earlier, the radioisotopes are not special fissile nuclear material and their availability will absolutely not be impacted by our leaving Euratom. That is incredibly important for anyone who is worried about the impact of this on our health service.
This is a contingency Bill. The Government recognise our clear goal of securing third-party status with Euratom so that we can have the continuity that is clearly being sought by the entire civil nuclear sector, but they are also putting in place legislative arrangements for the Office for Nuclear Regulation to carry out the nuclear safeguarding work currently done by Euratom if, for whatever reason, that does not happen. The arguments—that is a flattering word to use—put up by Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition were riddled with inconsistencies, as their own Members have shown. However, I would not disagree with anything said by the hon. Member for Leeds West, especially on transition and associate membership. I hope that, recognising the importance of contingency planning as she does, she and indeed all Members of this House will, like me, vote for the Bill tonight.
Patricia Gibson (North Ayrshire and Arran) (SNP)
Thank you for calling me to speak, Madam Deputy Chair. I am pleased to be speaking in the debate on the Nuclear Safeguards Bill, but what I have found, Madam Chair, I mean Madam Deputy Speaker—
Madam Deputy Speaker (Mrs Eleanor Laing)
Order. There is no need for hon. Members to contradict the hon. Lady, although I know that they are trying to be helpful. She made a slip of the tongue in referring to me as a Chair rather than as a Deputy Speaker, but I know what she meant.
Patricia Gibson
Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker.
I am pleased to be speaking in this debate. Once again, we are in a debate where we are all promised a post-Brexit world that is shinier, better and newer than anything we have witnessed up to this point. Whether we are talking about nuclear safeguards, food safety standards, consumer rights, trade with the EU, the strength of the pound, UK nationals living abroad, EU nationals living in the UK, or 30% being wiped off the bond yields leaving a £1.8 trillion black hole in our public sector pensions bill, we are told that it will be all right on the night and that everything will be wonderful.
The fact is that no state has ever left Euratom before. Despite what we have heard in the Chamber today, some legal experts—I know that we do not always like listening to experts—believe that it would be perfectly possible for the United Kingdom to leave the EU and remain a member of Euratom because, despite sharing the institutions, the two treaties are distinct and have separate legal instruments. I urge the Minister to explore that. The nuclear industry certainly believes that the UK should pursue some form of continuing membership of Euratom. We do not know what form that will take. We have no details or certainty. I think I probably speak for a large chunk of the public across the United Kingdom when I say that the UK Government’s negotiating skills have not inspired confidence.
I remember sitting in a Committee and being told by the right hon. Member for South Northamptonshire (Andrea Leadsom), who is now the Leader of the House, that it was necessary and, indeed, essential for us to fly nuclear materials across UK skies so that they could be used in a range of medical treatments at the height of their efficacy. Experts now tell us that leaving Europe’s nuclear regulator will put patients in the UK at risk of losing access to vital medical treatments, but those concerns have been dismissed by Conservative Members,. Despite what we have heard tonight, withdrawal from Euratom as part of Brexit would make it harder for the UK to access the nuclear isotopes used in cancer treatments and medical imaging. It is not me who is saying this—I confess that I do not have the medical or scientific expertise to do so—but the Royal College of Radiologists has told us that this is the case, as has Martin McKee, professor of European public health at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.
I could give the House 20 other examples of people at the top of their game who have told us this, but I fear that I lack the time to do so. Despite all that, those concerns were utterly dismissed by the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr Duncan Smith), who is no longer in his place, and the Secretary of State told us that these matters are not within the scope of the Bill. I fear that such a response is not reassuring. I am also alarmed, as I am sure many others will be, that someone who is qualified as an economist sees fit to contradict medical experts.
Euratom is responsible for co-ordinating and regulating the transport, use and disposal of nuclear materials in Europe, including many of the isotopes used in radiotherapy and some kinds of body scans. It seems that some of the most widely used medical isotopes can be produced only in specialised reactors, none of which is located in the United Kingdom. The materials currently used in Britain are mostly manufactured in the Netherlands, Belgium and France. Experts have told us that there is “no excuse” for Government Ministers failing to foresee the problems that leaving Euratom would cause. They have also indicated, given that all these matters are subject to negotiation, that although it might be possible for the UK to remain within the existing arrangements, it would be “exceptionally complicated” and that the UK’s position would “inevitably be weakened”. Those are the words of medical experts at the top of their field. Crucially, no real clarity on how any agreement might be achieved by the UK Government has been forthcoming. The Government’s position paper on Euratom published in July contained little detail even on nuclear power and it did not mention medical isotopes. Perhaps the Minister would care to mention them today. Can he also tell us whether the Secretary of State for Health has been consulted on this matter?
Ministers have absolutely no excuse for failing to anticipate this controversy. The problems were clearly highlighted in an article in the Financial Times way back in February and in briefings by nuclear industry experts. I know that we do not like experts, but occasionally it is useful to listen to them. As with all aspects of Brexit, there is little evidence of any serious planning.
Kwasi Kwarteng
The whole purpose of this Bill is to plan for the contingency where we leave Euratom, so how can the hon. Lady say that?
Patricia Gibson
We have heard repeatedly from those on the Conservative Benches about transitional arrangements and avoiding a cliff edge, but everything is subject to negotiation. As I said earlier, the negotiating and diplomatic skills of the UK Government are deeply suspect, and at worst alarming, when it comes to dealing with Europe.
Dame Sue Ion, the honorary president of the National Skills Academy for Nuclear and a former chair of the Nuclear Innovation Research Advisory Board, has pointed out that
“if suitable and robust alternatives to leaving Euratom are not in place, the potential impact”—
may mean that we—
“cannot move material or intellectual property or services or components or medical isotopes.”
That view was echoed by Rupert Cowen, a senior nuclear energy lawyer, who has been critical of Government officials, whom he called “ignorant” of the impact of leaving Euratom because they
“think it’ll be all right on the night. It won’t.”
If he is tired of hearing that it will be all right on the night with regard to Euratom, imagine what he would make of the list at the start of my speech.
Madam Deputy Speaker, may I crave the indulgence of the Chamber for a few more minutes? I cannot let this debate pass without mentioning something that is not strictly within the scope of the Bill. I fear that we cannot talk about nuclear safety and regulation without pointing to another threat that looms large.
James Cleverly
I chose not to bring this up when the Opposition Front-Bench spokesman was speaking, but the Bill has nothing to do with nuclear safety. It is about nuclear safeguarding. The words are similar, but they have a fundamentally different meaning.
Patricia Gibson
I appreciate that the hon. Gentleman is making a point about a legalistic separation, but when I speak to constituents about nuclear safeguards and nuclear safety—his experience may be different—the two things are entwined. To separate regulation and safety legally may be one thing, but to separate them when discussing them with constituents is another.
Alan Brown
My hon. Friend has already made her point perfectly, but for absolute clarity about the overlap between nuclear safeguards and nuclear safety, the House of Commons Library briefing on Euratom states that delays in making reciprocal arrangements
“would have consequences for current operation, waste and decommissioning, and to new builds such as Hinkley Point.”
If there will be an impact on nuclear decommissioning, does my hon. Friend agree that involves safety risks?
Patricia Gibson
My hon. Friend makes that point with his usual succinct articulation of the facts.
Before I conclude, it would be remiss of me not to mention something that is outside the scope of the Bill, but very much at home in any debate about nuclear safeguards, nuclear regulation or nuclear safety. Last week, I met the Civil Nuclear Police Federation and was appalled to hear of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary’s concerns. In partnership with the civil nuclear industry, national security agencies and regulatory bodies, the force works to deter any attacker whose intent is the theft or sabotage of nuclear material, whether static or in transit. Should such an attack be made, the CNC will defend that material and access to it. If such material is seized or if high-consequence facilities are compromised, the CNC will recover control of the facility and regain custody of the material. Its officers are therefore heavily armed and have high levels of physical fitness. Their retirement age has been increased to 67 or 68, and I was deeply disappointed that the Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, the hon. Member for Watford (Richard Harrington), has not met those officers, who do such an important job in guarding our safety and often work in harm’s way. I urge him to make the time to meet them.
I also urge the Minister to explore fully all legal avenues and opinions for the UK to remain a member of Euratom, which provides a framework for international nuclear safeguarding compliance and undertakes safeguards, inspections and reporting. Indeed, dispensing with the UK’s international treaty obligations on issues such as non-proliferation that are managed through Euratom will undoubtedly damage the UK’s nuclear industry, jeopardise high-quality jobs in engineering and chemistry and do much to undermine confidence in the UK’s already significantly diminishing international influence.
Drew Hendry
My hon. Friend makes a key point about the breadth of issues that are not covered by the Bill’s narrow focus. Government Members would like to separate safety issues and the unanswered questions that are legion here tonight, but that is the real problem.
Patricia Gibson
I think all Opposition Members sense the unease with which Government Members are unwilling to talk about the Bill’s narrow scope, which leaves so many uncertainties and questions. We are all rightly concerned about nuclear safety, but in our discussions let us remember to give a break to the brave officers of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, who work day in, day out to maintain nuclear safety across the UK.
Simon Hoare (North Dorset) (Con)
Realising the risk that I take by making this comparison, may I say that it is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for North Ayrshire and Arran (Patricia Gibson)? She and I served on the Procedure Committee together for some time. I listened to her speech with great attention, but I have to say in all good humour that she did a very good caricature of the P. G. Wodehouse quote that it is not very hard to distinguish between a Scotsman or Scotswoman and a ray of sunshine. Her speech was the Don Quixote speech of this debate: there is nothing good in the Bill; we are all going to go to hell in a handcart and—[Interruption.]
Simon Hoare
And we’re all doomed, as I hear my hon. Friend say from a sedentary position.
Let me start by saying what this important Bill is not about. I do not believe that it is a Brexit virility test. I happen to believe that voters on both sides in the referendum will want to see the Bill delivered and landed safely through our proper procedures. I gave my hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse) prior warning that I would challenge his assertion that one of the core reasons that motivated him to vote to leave the EU was that we would leave Euratom. I simply do not believe my hon. Friend—despite his cerebral dexterity—when he says that millions of people tootled off to the polling station in their droves to vote leave because it provided the opportunity to leave Euratom. In exactly the same way, I did not vote to remain because I thought that our membership of Euratom might be in jeopardy. I must confess to the House that I am part of probably 98% of the nation that had no clue what Euratom was or did, who was a member, that we were a member or about the excellent work that we did.
Kwasi Kwarteng
My hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse) was suggesting that he was precisely the only person in Britain who had gone to the polls in order to leave Euratom, so my hon. Friend the Member for North Dorset (Simon Hoare) is making his point for him.
Simon Hoare
I still remain to be convinced, but I will not push that particular proposition to a Division this evening.
It strikes me that the position of most speakers in this debate rather echoes what my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) said in an intervention on the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. If I heard him correctly, he said that Euratom has done nothing wrong, we are not annoyed with it, and it has not offended us in any way, but lawyers on this side of the Channel and lawyers for the European Union have said that triggering article 50 means that we will de facto leave Euratom, which requires a further and separate discussion. I say with the utmost respect to colleagues on both sides on the House who have had a legal calling in the past—[Interruption.] My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for North East Hertfordshire (Sir Oliver Heald) chunters from a sedentary position. No doubt there will be an invoice for me in the post for that chuntering.
Sir Oliver Heald (North East Hertfordshire) (Con)
Does my hon. Friend accept that it is a great pleasure for a lawyer to hear some pleasant congratulatory words from a colleague in the House? I just could not resist saying, “Hear, hear!” which I think is in order.
Simon Hoare
It is indeed, and who in their right mind would ever criticise a lawyer?
If we and the EU do not like the legal advice, and if we want somehow to disaggregate membership of the EU and of Euratom, we could possibly get some different lawyers to say something different. I must say that I am about to dash out and get myself the stiffest of stiff drinks, because I am going to do something that I never thought I would do—[Interruption.] It is interesting that the Under-Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Mr Baker), arrives in the Chamber just at this moment—his stage timing is exemplary—because I am going to pray in aid one Mr Dominic Cummings, a man I have not joined on a campaigning platform before. If even Mr Cummings, getting terribly hot under the collar, does not believe that leaving Euratom is some sort of demonstration of Brexit adherence or virility or some test to be passed, that should give us pause for thought. Because Euratom has not done anything wrong, and because it has not offended against the principles of this House or the country, I fully commend the strategy adopted by Her Majesty’s Government. We need to be pragmatic and sensible in laying the foundations for this important part of our economic life in case, at the end of the process, we find ourselves having to leave. I do not know whether we will end up like Switzerland, which has special status and is seen as an equal partner, or whether we will end up like the United States of America or Australia, which have looser agreements but are not seen as equal partners. Let us see.
Whatever we do and however we do it, I hope it will always be underpinned by the guiding principle that our decisions benefit our constituents and the country at large.
Michelle Donelan
Does my hon. Friend agree that the Bill provides a level of reassurance to the nuclear industry and its 65,000 jobs in this country?
Simon Hoare
My hon. Friend is a doughty champion of engineering, research and innovation in this place and in her constituency, and she makes an apposite point. Anyone who wants to see Brexit a success needs to understand that we will have political processes but that the regulatory and business communities want clarity and certainty at the earliest possible point. I agree with her entirely that the Bill provides that bridge, for want of a better analogy, between membership now and a regulatory regime in the future.
Kwasi Kwarteng
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for giving way once again. Is it not particularly significant that this is part of a contingency plan, in the light of the objections that we will somehow have a so-called hard Brexit?
Simon Hoare
I agree very much with my hon. Friend. It certainly shoots the fox that we will have a bonfire of regulations and a race to the bottom. I find it strange that those who have spoken against the Bill this evening have, in one breath, accused the Government of presiding over a chaotic, shambolic and uncontrolled, if not incontinent, Brexit process and have then chastised the Government for trying to ensure continuity at an early stage, as my hon. Friend and others have said. Such continuity is welcome, and we would be right to chastise the Government were we not to have it.
If the Bill is not a debate about Brexit virility, it is also certainly not about access to isotopes, and I absolutely deplore those who have tried to wave that shroud. One of my hon. Friends—I was going to say it was my hon. Friend the Member for Eastleigh (Mims Davies), but I do not think it was her—said that access to isotopes is important for a large number of our constituents who need them for medical treatment when they are unwell, and it is the worst kind of shroud waving to say that they will not have that access.
Patricia Gibson
The hon. Gentleman criticises those who have raised concerns about access to medical isotopes, who were echoing the medical experts in the field. Is he dismissing the legitimate concerns raised by those working in the medical field?
Simon Hoare
The hon. Lady falls into a classic trap. I am not one who seeks to dismiss experts—as a non-expert, I always turn to experts for advice—but a concern that is wrong in fact does not become legitimate if it is raised by an expert. A person could be concerned about all sorts of things, and they could have as many letters after their name as they like, but they are not always correct. Some Opposition Members started to fan the embers of this flame about three or four months ago, and it does not appear to have caught.
I have received a briefing note, as I am sure have other colleagues, entitled “What about medical radioisotopes?” The import or export of medical radioisotopes is not subject to any Euratom licensing requirements. Let us seek to assure the experts who have concerns—their concerns are legitimate, and the House must address them—that Euratom places no restrictions on the export of medical isotopes to countries outside the EU. These isotopes are not subject to Euratom supply agency contracts or to Euratom safeguards, which means no special arrangements need to be put in place ahead of withdrawal.
Withdrawal from Euratom will have no effect on the UK’s ability to import medical isotopes from Europe and the rest of the world. It is in everyone’s interest not to disrupt patients’ timely access to treatment, and it is in everyone’s interest to ensure that cross-border trade with the EU is as frictionless as possible. I entirely take the point raised by several hon. Members, including the hon. Member for Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey (Drew Hendry), that some of these products have a short shelf life, and clearly we cannot have these products sitting in an overheated metal container at the port of Dover or Calais.
Out of common sense I have to ask which country on God’s earth will set a tariff barrier regime and seek to take beyond its useful lifespan a vital component in the delivery of medical care. In the French Government, the German Government and the Belgian Government, we are not dealing with countries that have no interest in public health and healthcare, because of course they do, as do our Government. The idea that those countries will deliberately set up barriers that cause these products to pass their sell-by date, like a piece of chicken that has been sat too long on a supermarket shelf, is fanciful and compounds the allegation that I and several of my hon. Friends have made, that the Bill can be criticised for other reasons, but it is cruel, callous and unnecessary to criticise it at the expense of unsettling people who require medical interventions.
Jo Churchill (Bury St Edmunds) (Con)
I thank my hon. Friend for largely making my point for me. He knows my deep interest in this area, and I draw to his attention the fact that not only has the Secretary of State reiterated those points today but that the Minister for Universities, Science, Research and Innovation firmly made them back in June.
Are the expert opinions that my hon. Friend is addressing recent, or are they historical?
Simon Hoare
My hon. Friend makes a valid point. These debates often get stuck in a groove on the gramophone, the needle gets stuck and we do not knock it forward. I think it was John Maynard Keynes who said, “When the facts change, I change my mind.” A concern is raised, it is addressed, it ceases to be a concern and we move on to something else. I am not saying there will be no other concerns.
Alan Brown
Can the hon. Gentleman tell us when the Royal College of Radiologists, Dame Sue Ion or the Nuclear Industry Association changed their mind? The Nuclear Industry Association’s latest briefing came out today, and it still expresses the same concerns. Who are all these people who have suddenly changed their mind?
Simon Hoare
I apologise for seeking to remake this point for the convenience of the hon. Gentleman, Madam Deputy Speaker, but I am simply saying this: irrespective of how we might have campaigned and voted in the referendum, this is a time when we have a responsibility, as parliamentarians, to make sure that on certain key things—something as sensitive as this is a key thing—we set aside our personal beefs on whether it is a good or bad idea, in order to make sure our constituents are not alarmed. We have heard from the Secretary of State, read the briefing papers and heard from the Universities Minister, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St Edmunds (Jo Churchill) has pointed out, and that should now shoot that fox well and truly. What has been suggested is not going to be a by-product of coming out of Euratom.
Patricia Gibson
I just want to clarify this point, and I assure the hon. Gentleman that I will not try to intervene again, because I am sure he will answer it well, and I hope he understands that I have enormous respect for him. I understand that he has a background in public relations, so given his background and level of expertise in his field, is he comfortable with contradicting and dismissing as “scaremongering”, “overreacting” or whatever word he wants to use, the legitimate concerns raised by the Royal College of Radiologists?
Simon Hoare
No, this is not dismissing them either. Are Members honestly saying that when a question is asked and someone answers it, weight can only be given to that answer if it compounds the premise of the question that was raised? [Interruption.] That might be how the Scottish National party goes about doing its politics and its business, but it is not a particularly good way of doing it. People have raised a concern that leaving Euratom may well have an impact on access to this vital ingredient. As this vital ingredient is not covered by Euratom now, it goes beyond eccentricity to suggest that by coming out of this organisation some sort of control is going to be placed on this ingredient, as the organisation we are potentially leaving does not have control of its trade in the first place. I say to Opposition Members that that is a non sequitur. We have been trying to answer calmly and rationally a concern raised by serious and sensible medical practitioners, and, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St Edmunds mentioned, we have heard from our Science Minister, who is held in high regard by those in the scientific and medical research community, irrespective of any of their political affiliations. Save for slashing our wrists and writing it in our life’s blood on the wall here in the House of Commons, I am not sure what assurance SNP Members are going to accept.
Michelle Donelan
Does my hon. Friend think SNP Members will accept that it is ludicrous to imply that medical isotopes would not be able to be imported should we leave Euratom, given that countries currently not in that organisation are importing those medical isotopes at the moment?
Simon Hoare
Once again, my hon. Friend makes the point in the most telling way. If we are providing no illumination to the hon. Member for North Ayrshire and Arran (Patricia Gibson), we are obviously providing a vast amount of humorous entertainment; I am glad she sees this issue as being so hysterically funny. I do not think setting a regulatory regime to allow all of our constituents to have ready access to a medical treatment is anything particularly to laugh about. People can accuse me of being po-faced and a prig if they so wish, and I could almost hear the Twittersphere doing just that as the words left my mouth, but I do not see this as a particularly funny point. My hon. Friend has made the point tellingly: countries that are not part of Euratom are importing isotopes in due time so that their shelf life does not expire. Unless we have some peculiar, Machiavellian, under-the-counter sort of plan to deny people medical treatment by putting the largest possible tariff barriers on these things and making sure that the inventor carries them across the channel in some sort of purpose-made velvet case that has been hand-sewn by his ancient grandmother, I really do not think this is going to be the situation. Therefore, the concern raised by medics can now be set aside.
Mark Menzies (Fylde) (Con)
Does my hon. Friend accept that medical isotopes and some associated equipment are also very high value, so it is not in the interests of those who manufacture and seek to export to us to put obstacles in the way of selling high-value, highly profitable pieces of equipment or machinery, be they the isotopes or anything related to them?
Simon Hoare
My hon. Friend gets the point, because he takes a Conservative approach to the operation of the economy. People in Britain want to buy something. We do not make it, but some countries overseas do. But we have also heard this, “We make too much for our domestic market and we want to sell it overseas. We have been doing this for years, but, do you know what? Just to bite off our nose to spite our face, we’ll stop doing it.” That is the crux of the argument we have heard from the hon. Members for North Ayrshire and Arran and for Kilmarnock and Loudoun (Alan Brown). I would say it was bizarre if it were not so careless.
Let me conclude my remarks by returning to the point about the value—soft as well as hard—to UK plc of the collaborative opportunities for research that membership of an organisation such as Euratom presents. We have heard from my right hon. Friend the Member for Wantage (Mr Vaizey), my hon. Friend the Member for Copeland (Trudy Harrison) and the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness (John Woodcock) about the supply chain, the jobs and the offshoots of economic activity that flow from this. If we are talking about background research, I understand that the hon. Member for North Ayrshire and Arran has a nuclear facility in her constituency. One can only presume that she has constituents who work in it, but she said precious little about them in her speech—
Simon Hoare
Well, that did not stop the hon. Lady dilating on lots of other things that were not in the Bill. This sudden stricture of rectitude and probity that she cloaks herself in as the winter months approach is a little hard to take. We should never underestimate what that collaborative research does to advance the sum of human knowledge, and to benefit our country in hard currency terms and profile terms as a centre of excellence, expertise, professionalism and world leadership. I see this Bill as very much taking a belt-and-braces approach. I just hope that if we have to default to this, because we find that the lawyers are right or we are not allowed to remain part of Euratom as there is some conflict with the European Court of Justice or whatever, the regimes we put in place and the culture we create tell the rest of the world interested in this sector that we, too, are open for business and committed to research, and we are not turning our back on academic and, yes, medical collaboration.
Alex Chalk (Cheltenham) (Con)
What a pleasure it is to follow my hon. Friend the Member for North Dorset (Simon Hoare).
I support the Bill. The introduction of a Bill on nuclear safeguards is an entirely sensible contingency measure. It is sensible to cater for the possibility that no associate membership of Euratom can be agreed; indeed, given the importance of the matters covered by our current membership, it would be extraordinary were the Government not to do so. I have listened with interest to the Opposition speeches but, ultimately, they resulted in sound and fury signifying nothing, because it appears that no one is going to vote against the Bill’s Second Reading.
Alan Brown
Will the hon. Gentleman clarify whether the Bill is a contingency and a back-up or the bright, shining new way forward? Mixed messages are coming from Government Members.
Alex Chalk
It is a sensible contingency to deal with safeguarding. We will no doubt be able to consider other aspects in due course.
Were the Government not to introduce the Bill, they would be in complete dereliction of their duty. The background is as follows: the UK has a strong and developed nuclear sector, with 15 nuclear reactors generating 21% of our electricity; there is something in the order of 30 licensed nuclear sites; and our nuclear industry serves important civilian purposes, including medicine, transport, farming and industrial processes.
It is worth my taking a moment to reflect on the Bill’s key purpose, which is to give the Office for Nuclear Regulation—a UK body—powers to take on the roles and responsibilities required for us to meet our international safeguarding and nuclear non-proliferation obligations. What does that mean? In other words, it is to demonstrate and ensure that civil nuclear material is used only for civil purposes, not military ones.
It is also worth reflecting on what the Bill is not about. First, notwithstanding the points made by the Scottish National party spokesman, the hon. Member for Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey (Drew Hendry), it is not about security standards in the UK. The security standards relate to the physical protection measures. The UK already follows the convention on the physical protection of nuclear material, which is outwith the scope of the Bill. Indeed, the related responsibilities are already within the ambit of the ONR.
Secondly, the Bill is not about safety standards for the prevention of nuclear accidents. We will continue to observe the standards imposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency, overseen by the ONR. We have heard a bit about medical isotopes, which are not special fissile material, so I do not propose to traverse the ground that has already been ably ventilated by my hon. Friend the Member for North Dorset.
It is clear, though, that our membership of Euratom covers far more than safeguarding. I wish to develop a little the points that were helpfully set out by my right hon. Friend the Member for Wantage (Mr Vaizey). First, on research and development such as that on fusion technologies, we need to continue our collaborations. We heard a little about the JET scheme, which ends in 2018, although the Government have rightly committed funding for it in case it is extended to 2020. We want that co-operation to continue.
Secondly, there is the international thermonuclear experimental reactor project to build the world’s largest tokamak—at that point, my expertise starts to evaporate, but it is important.
Thirdly, the Government have already committed to funding the Horizon 2020 projects that were entered into before March 2019—the date of our departure—even if they continue after our departure. That is absolutely the right thing to do. All that underscores the importance of such projects to our economy and the European economy more widely.
After research and development, the second area that the Bill does not cover but in the perpetuation of which we have a strong national interest is nuclear co-operation arrangements, and we have heard a little about Australia, Japan, the United States and Canada. Those agreements matter because the United States cannot enter into trade agreements with the UK unless NCAs are in place. That is vital.
The third point that bears re-emphasis is the free movement of highly expert scientists. All three things must be secured, and the easiest and most sensible way to do so would be through associate membership of Euratom. It is worth making the point that there is no off-the-shelf solution: the Swiss associate membership relates only to scientific and technological co-operation and the Ukrainian model is even more limited.
The Bill is entirely necessary and entirely sensible, but in a way it is just the easy bit. Just as vital is that we secure co-operation in all the other areas, too. I have already said a little about associate membership, which I suspect is the most straightforward way to deliver that co-operation, but there might be others. I have every confidence that once this sensible contingency legislation on safeguarding is securely enacted, moving on to other matters is precisely what the Government will go on to do.
Gareth Johnson (Dartford) (Con)
It is a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk), and before him my hon. Friend the Member for North Dorset (Simon Hoare), who looks like he is about to leave the Chamber. It is always a pleasure to follow the latter, but although he has many qualities, brevity is perhaps not one of them.
The Bill is important, and I very much hope that its Second Reading will be unopposed. It is a crucial part of the Brexit process and I believe it will be able to operate with or without an EU deal. That flexibility is provided in the middle section of the Bill. Despite what was said by some of the Labour Back Benchers who were present earlier, it is absolutely clear that a country cannot remain a member of Euratom if it is outside the EU. It is not just the UK Government who make that point; the EU Commission makes that point. If someone says to the Government, “Let’s see your legal advice, because we don’t believe you. We have no faith in that opinion”, they should also say that to the EU Commission and ask it why it is putting out that opinion and saying that it is absolutely correct that a country cannot be in Euratom if it is outside the EU. Nevertheless, our current safeguards relate to our being members of Euratom, so it is right that we have a Bill that will enable those safeguards to be replaced when we leave the EU.
Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)
It seems to me that the Bill is not only a contingency plan but a crucial building block for our negotiation. Our negotiation requires legislation such as this Bill, so that we can get everything else sorted and get a decent agreement with Euratom.
Gareth Johnson
The Government have been absolutely clear that they must prepare for all eventualities, and that is precisely what is currently happening.
I congratulate the Minister on putting resources into the country’s nuclear industry. It is essential to ensure that British nuclear fusion research continues when we leave Euratom. We have invested a huge amount of time, resources and effort in becoming a world leader in this field, and we must not allow our status to diminish. The Culham Centre has been mentioned a few times. It is not the only centre that specialises in such work, but it is crucial and it employs many people. It is essential that the Government do all they can to protect its valuable work and keep its workers in place.
I am pleased that the Minister has found some funding for the JET project, which has massive potential in the nuclear fusion industry. It is hard to overstate just what advances can be achieved if we ensure that the investment in that project continues not just in the UK, but across the world.
All too often we are a little too apologetic about our work in this industry when, in fact, successive Governments can be incredibly proud of our work on nuclear safeguards. We have a proven track record as a nuclear weapon state; we have signed the non-proliferation treaty; we have worked at the heart of the IAEA since its inception and we will continue to work with it and uphold our international obligations. That is something about which we can hold our head high. We can be very proud of the fact that, right from the beginning, we have been one of the few countries that has said that non-nuclear countries should remain so without any assistance from nuclear countries. That is vital.
We have also worked very well with the EU over safeguarding, and can continue to do so in the future, but we will need this Bill to enable that to happen. The Bill will ensure that safeguards can continue uninterrupted and that collaboration with the EU can continue. The expertise that we have heard a lot about from both sides of the Chamber today can be shared between nations and with the EU and around the world. It is clear that the European Union and the UK have a strong mutual interest in ensuring that this close co-operation continues in the future. That was set out very clearly in the position paper of the Department for Exiting the European Union—the Government’s nuclear materials and safeguards paper—that was published in July. We have been very open in our positioning papers about our stance in negotiations, and in July we gave a clear indication of where we wanted to go with this particular issue.
There is no reason why we cannot have a safe, pioneering, co-operative and responsible nuclear industry after Brexit. Yes, decisions will have to be made and agreements reached on issues such as the ownership of property at Culham. My understanding is that Euratom owns some of the property at our centres and that there will have to be some negotiations over who should continue to own that property once Brexit takes place, but, like so many other things involving Brexit, that can be resolved through negotiation.
In conclusion, this Bill will provide continuity, reassurance, protections and safeguards for the whole of this country and the whole of the industry and therefore should be given its Second Reading today.
Several hon. Members rose—
Madam Deputy Speaker (Mrs Eleanor Laing)
Order. It will be obvious to the House that a great many Members wish to take part in this important debate and that, although all speakers from the Opposition Benches have completed their speeches, a great many Members on the Government Benches wish to speak. I am afraid that I will have to impose a time limit from now on of six minutes. I am sorry that that may come as a surprise to Mr Mark Menzies, but I am sure that he will be able to deal with the matter.
Mark Menzies (Fylde) (Con)
Madam Deputy Speaker, I am devastated by the news that I have been cut down to a mere six minutes, but I will do what I can.
This nuclear safeguard Bill is of real importance not just to me and to my constituency, but to the 1,200 people who work at Springfields nuclear fuels in my constituency. Springfields is at the heart of the British nuclear industry. We are the only site in the UK to manufacture nuclear fuel. As we have already heard this evening, 21% of the UK’s electricity production is produced from nuclear energy, and a great swathe of that is from nuclear fuel manufactured in Fylde.
Whenever I hear the phrase “northern powerhouse”, I think not just of the nuclear industry in the north-west, but of the nuclear fuel that is manufactured in my Fylde constituency. I have met both the workforce and the management in recent months. Initially, there were some real concerns over the UK’s possible exit from Euratom and what that would mean for the continuity of supply. However, in conversations with the Minister, I have been deeply reassured by the fact that this is a Government who are working towards the possibility of remaining a member of Euratom and, if we cannot do that, of ensuring that we are safeguarding Britain’s civil nuclear interests by having these measures firmly in place in this Bill.
This is not just about dealing with trade between the UK and Europe, important though that is. Springfields Fuels is owned by Westinghouse, a company with quite complex ownership—both Japanese and American footprints. Therefore, any deal or legislation must be compliant with what our Japanese and American partners have in place. I am reassured by the Minister’s words in our meeting last week and in the debate this evening that this Bill will, indeed, cover that.
The nuclear industry must be able to trade from the first post-Brexit moment. Without implementation of the safeguards in the Bill, the UK would be unable to put the nuclear co-operation agreements in place in the future. Those are currently provided under the Euratom regime and they are vital because this is about not just dealing with Europe, but all our international partnerships. We are not just talking about nuclear fuel in its completed form, but oxides, pellets and the various added-value products that a company such as Springfields Fuels puts into the nuclear supply chain. If we do not get this right, the jobs of British people could ultimately be at risk and moved elsewhere. It is not about keeping lawyers busy. I am delighted that the Minister understands that, has looked at all aspects of the UK civil nuclear industry and has made sure that the measures will protect not just the nuclear industry in the abstract sense, but real people and real jobs now and in the future. That is something for which we should be grateful.
Time is working against me, so I will move on to my final point. I ask the Minister to ensure that the measures in the Bill protect future programmes, one of the most important of which is that of small modular reactors. If the United Kingdom gets it right, we could be world leaders in this technology. That would be a game-changer for the nuclear supply chain. Fuel would be manufactured in the UK. In fact, huge proportions of everything—from research and development through to manufacture—could be done in the UK. That would become a highly exportable technology. Rather than importing much of the new nuclear technology from overseas, the United Kingdom can own it and, surely, emerging new nuclear technology must be at the forefront of shaping our post-Brexit destiny. I hope that the Minister can assure me that the Government will think about and protect SMRs in the detail of the legislation. That is also important for Moorside. My hon. Friend the Member for Copeland (Trudy Harrison), who is not currently in her place, is a passionate campaigner for Moorside, and such technology would bring jobs to Cumbria. The fuel from Moorside would also be manufactured at Springfields Fuels nuclear plant. Therefore, the measures in the Bill really are important to ensuring jobs and the futures of all our economies, particularly those in the north-west.
Jo Churchill (Bury St Edmunds) (Con)
It is a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Fylde (Mark Menzies). I join in this debate not as a Member who has a particularly close partnership with the nuclear industry, nor as someone with specific knowledge of Euratom. My hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse) says that he voted to leave because of Euratom, but, a little like my hon. Friend the Member for North Dorset (Simon Hoare), I cannot possibly say that I voted to remain because of it. However, the nuclear industry and our nuclear future in all its guises is extremely important to us all. To that end, the Bill is a necessary measure in response to the decisions taken after the referendum—a plan B, as some have referred to it. I urge everyone to join me in giving the Bill an unopposed passage through the House this evening.
Michelle Donelan
Does my hon. Friend agree that, while membership of Euratom has served the UK well, it is only prudent and simply good governance that we are prepared for every eventuality? It is common sense, which is perhaps why there are so few Opposition Members participating in and listening to this debate.
Jo Churchill
I agree wholeheartedly with my hon. Friend that this is common sense. The Opposition argue that we are being presumptive, but we are just being thoughtful by ensuring that things are in place to ensure a smooth passage.
As has been said, this is about soft collaboration. It is an important opportunity to reiterate that the Government’s aim is to ensure that collaborative research and development continues, with close working relationships between universities, both in Europe and across the world, and other organisations.
It is clear that nuclear is a global industry, given the foreign investment in the UK nuclear industry from France and China. The issue is particularly pertinent in Suffolk, with EDF and Sizewell C due to come on stream. It is for that reason that our future relationship with the European Union is so important to understanding the future of the sector in the UK, as well as what it will mean for jobs, skills and businesses.
I am reassured by the Bill’s commitment to maintaining our current safeguards and standards under Euratom. By leaving those unchanged, the UK can guarantee a close working relationship with the Euratom community and those further afield. That is a wise decision to ensure close working with our natural partners, as my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk) and others have said.
Closer to home, Sizewell C on the Suffolk coast is under consideration, having completed stage 2 of the consultation process. Its potential is huge: it could power 6 million homes with clean, affordable nuclear energy and create 26,000 jobs and apprenticeships in the region. It would be at the cutting edge of the UK nuclear industry and receive significant international investment. That point was ably made by my hon. Friends the Members for Fylde and for Copeland (Trudy Harrison), who stated that the nuclear industry gives nearly £1 billion to the UK economy. It is important that we acknowledge its monetary significance.
West Suffolk College in my constituency is a national centre for nuclear and it is preparing for Sizewell C. East Anglia is fast proving its worth as a crucial region for skills, research and innovation, with Cambridge sitting at its heart.
I appreciate that the Bill does not cover EU research funding, but given that we are discussing the UK’s nuclear industry, it would not be amiss to remind the House that the UK is a world leader in the most promising nuclear fusion technologies, which is not something on which we intend to compromise on Brexit. As my hon. Friend the Member for Fylde has said, we could be a world leader and it is important that we have the appropriate safeguards in place. That is why a smooth transition, which is contingent on continuity for the sector, is so vital.
The UK wants to explore ways in which continued collaboration, including in nuclear research and training, can be taken forward. For a vibrant region such as East Anglia, that is crucial not just for the possibility of major nuclear investment on our coast, but so that any investment opportunities are not lost on Brexit. Part of that understanding is that all our obligations on safeguards are met. We need to ensure that all systems are transparent and accountable with regard to material and how it is kept.
I will close my speech with two wider points thrown up by the Bill, and I hope the Minister will respond to them when he sums up the debate. On nuclear safeguarding in our communities, what assessment has he made of the role that my outstanding West Suffolk College and other colleges could play as centres of learning for any nuclear engineering apprentices working on my coastline and others, including Hinkley and the north-west? How will safeguards be built into that training? How will we future proof those people whom we will employ in the industry? How does the ONR cascade information through this system? Hinkley Point is a crucial model to learn from for future nuclear projects in the UK, especially in relation to its funding models.
As we leave the European Union, the need to draw skills and jobs to keep our nuclear sector vibrant becomes arguably more urgent, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton West (Chris Green) said. That includes those whose skills lie in repositories. We must ensure that we are scoping for the skills needed as we withdraw from Euratom so that we have, as this Bill states, a seamless continuation of the high standards of this industry, and the UK maximises and, as the Secretary of State said, even raises the standards within the IAEA.
James Heappey (Wells) (Con)
I am genuinely pleased that this issue has been given such importance. That is not because, as some might have suggested, it is a sort of remoaner ambush, but because it reflects the importance of our nuclear industry, which in turn reflects the importance that the Government have attached to nuclear technologies in the UK as part of our industrial strategy. The valued engagement of the industry is most welcome. It is great to hear its very legitimate concerns over Euratom. The industry would obviously want no change whatsoever: of course not; nobody can blame it for seeking certainly and therefore advocating the status quo.
Let us be clear: there is absolutely nothing wrong with Euratom. It has proven very effective at regulating the nuclear industry. If the treaty did not require us to leave after triggering article 50, I am pretty sure that we would not do so, but as it does require it, a new arrangement must be sought. I genuinely have no doubt that this new arrangement will be characterised by keen agreement and co-operation between the UK and our EU partners. The nuclear industry is, after all, international and interdependent. We have significant French ownership of our nuclear power stations, and further international ownership is promised with the remainder of the new nuclear fleet. Similarly, Germany has a great deal of nuclear waste being processed in Sellafield. With the UK, France and Germany so interdependent on one another on matters nuclear, one might expect the wind to be on our backs, not in our faces, when seeking a deal on our future relationship on nuclear matters.
An associate membership is probable—highly probable, even. For the more ardent Brexiteers among us, that should not bother us either. Euratom has been a remarkably consensual organisation—I do not believe there have been any votes—and therefore the jurisdiction of the EU Court should not be a concern for us in this case. However, regardless of that probable outcome, we need something else in case good sense deserts our EU partners and nuclear safeguarding becomes part of the wider wrangling over Brexit. That is why the Government are to be congratulated on introducing the Bill so soon. This regulation will give the nuclear industry the certainty that it so reasonably demands. Nuclear safeguarding is not something on which we take risks. Pursuing a favourable post-Brexit relationship with Euratom is important and should obviously be our preference, but legislating for increased powers in the Office for Nuclear Regulation so that Euratom’s capabilities are duplicated as being sovereign within the United Kingdom seems very prudent at this early stage.
After this debate, it is important to pause and reflect on what neither the Bill nor Euratom does. Euratom does not do nuclear safety—that is already regulated in the United Kingdom by the ONR. My constituents who live as neighbours to Hinkley Point know that the safety regulations that govern the operation of that site are entirely unaffected by the Euratom issue. Nor does the Bill affect isotopes used in medicine. The scaremongering on this has been unfortunate, and I hope that it will not continue as the Bill progresses.
Drew Hendry
I am interested in the hon. Gentleman’s comments. Does he, then, disagree with the Nuclear Industry Association? It has said:
“Leaving the Euratom Treaty without alternative arrangements in place would have a dramatic impact on the nuclear industry including the UK’s new build plans, existing operations and the waste and decommissioning sector which all depend, to some extent, on cooperation with nuclear states.”
James Heappey
I am absolutely at a lost to understand the SNP’s position on this. We have an excellent relationship with Euratom, which we want, ideally, to continue as an associate member. But, as the hon. Gentleman quite rightly points out, the nuclear industry is very concerned that, if that arrangement turns out not to be possible, we should have some sort of contingency in place to ensure that the industry can continue to operate safely and co-operate internationally. That is exactly what the Bill will do, so I do not understand why he is not welcoming it with open arms.
Drew Hendry
I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving me the opportunity to clarify. The key is in the final part of the quote, which talks about the impact on existing operations and the waste and decommissioning sectors. That cannot be carried forward by the Bill in isolation; there are many unanswered questions.
James Heappey
I am not sure that the hon. Gentleman adds anything to his earlier intervention. There is a system in place through Euratom for the regulation and safeguarding of the movement of fissile materials and other issues connected to nuclear regulation. We would ideally stay within Euratom as an associate member, but if that is not possible, we seek to legislate for a contingency, so that we have those powers sovereign. One would assume that the Government—I think that this has been made very clear in the Secretary of State’s opening remarks and all the Government’s commentary on the matter thus far—expect to continue everything exactly as it is, so that we can continue to operate seamlessly internationally. The Bill will provide a contingency plan to avoid the hard exit or cliff edge that so many in this place and in the media seem so vexed about. I just do not understand why the SNP does not welcome the Bill, when it appears to give the party exactly what it wants by delivering certainty post Brexit.
There are two issues that the Bill does not cover, quite understandably, but that are worth discussing. First, nuclear technology, materials and engineers need to be able to move freely, so we must achieve a quick and lasting agreement with other countries. Our nuclear programme is international, and we must recognise that in the arrangements that we make. I have every confidence that we will, and that the countries with which we seek to work will warmly welcome our approaches.
Secondly, there is the matter of funding for research and development. As we decarbonise our heating and transport systems, our demand for electricity will rise sharply. Renewables and our new nuclear programme are the answer for now, but the prize that we have all been looking for, for half a century, is fusion power. That has been eight to 15 years away for a very long time, and quite possibly it is still eight to 15 years away. When the Select Committee on Energy and Climate Change went to the United States last year, however, it was clear that progress is starting to be made quickly on that side of the Atlantic. When we returned home, we were pleased to find after further inquiries that progress on this side of the Atlantic has been even quicker still. The UK, with our European partners, is ahead on the matter. It is absolutely vital that the Government commit, as they have done, to continuing to fund the research and development of fusion power. The opportunities are huge, and it is a prize on which the Government should keep their eyes.
In conclusion, I absolutely understand the concerns that nuclear industry representatives have raised with me, and I understand why they want certainty. They work in an industry in which there is absolutely no appetite or tolerance for risk, so it is entirely understandable that they seek the certainty of continued membership of Euratom. They should be reassured that the Government’s first preference is associate membership of Euratom, as a result of which nothing would change. If that is not possible, how prudent it is for the Government to seek, at the very first opportunity, to legislate to provide a contingency to assure the UK nuclear industry that safeguarding regulations are firmly in hand. Those regulations will be familiar to the industry, because they will look remarkably similar to the ones that we have now.
James Cleverly (Braintree) (Con)
I rise to support the Bill, unsurprisingly, because as colleagues well know, the decision to leave the European Union also meant, by extension, a decision to leave Euratom. This issue has been debated on the Floor of the House, but that is the position of both the UK Government and the EU27. The Government have therefore made it clear that they intend to honour their commitment to the International Atomic Energy Agency by setting up a domestic safeguarding regime. The regime will ensure that there is no interruption to the British civil nuclear industry and, indeed, that the production of nuclear energy and the various other workings enabled by Euratom will continue without pause.
It would be unacceptable for the UK not to have a safeguarding regime in place on its exit from the European Union. Although it is absolutely appropriate for colleagues and Opposition Members to scrutinise and perhaps amend the Bill during its passage, it would be foolhardy in the extreme—in fact, deeply inappropriate—to try in any way to prevent it from ultimately making its way through the House. That is why I am very pleased that the Labour party made it clear, after what I must say was an elegant period of anticipation-building delay by the hon. Member for Salford and Eccles (Rebecca Long Bailey)—she teased us about the position of Her Majesty’s loyal Opposition until the ultimate line of her speech—that it will let the Bill progress, so that any such concerns are alleviated.
I have listened with interest to a number of speeches—no, to them all—and I was particularly exercised by some of the points made in interventions by SNP Members. As I said in an intervention and will now repeat—this has been highlighted by the Nuclear Industry Association, on its Twitter feed during the debate—there is not just a semantic difference but a fundamental difference between nuclear safeguarding and nuclear safety. I will give SNP Members the benefit of the doubt and say that the subtlety of that difference was perhaps lost on them, because the alternative assumption I would have to make is that they intentionally blurred the distinction between the two to scare the British people on what this is about, and I am certain that they would not do so intentionally.
SNP Members also placed great store on the supposed risks to medical radioisotopes. Again, I took the time, while keeping one ear on the speeches, to look at the briefing paper from the Nuclear Industry Association that they mentioned. It makes reference to concerns about radioisotopes, but when I followed the links I found a circuit of links using basically the same phrase on the concern about five radioisotopes. I finally got to what I think was the end of the chain, and I discovered that, in response to the squeezing of the supply of medical radioisotopes, Euratom and other agencies had set up the European Observatory on the Supply of Medical Radioisotopes. That body has worked in the intervening years to ensure that there is a timely supply of medical radioisotopes. That goes to the heart of showing that the concerns raised—again, inadvertently, I suspect—by SNP Members and others about the diagnostic ability of the NHS somehow being compromised by a lack of radioisotopes is in fact a fallacy.
James Cleverly
No, I will not give way, because a number of Members still wish to speak. I apologise; I would normally give way, but I am about to conclude because I know we are short of time.
The Bill will give the Office for Nuclear Regulation additional powers. It will give the Government the opportunity to use limited powers to amend the Nuclear Safeguards and Electricity (Finance) Act 1978, the Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000 and the Nuclear Safeguards (Notification) Regulations 2004, so that references in legislation to existing international agreements can be updated. I appreciate that Opposition Front Benchers have concerns about that, but it strikes me as a remarkably pragmatic attempt to get important business through the House in a timely manner, so that our important nuclear industries are not compromised. I commend the measure to the House.
Kwasi Kwarteng (Spelthorne) (Con)
My only regret in speaking is that, given the constraints on our time, you have imposed a six-minute limit on our speeches, Madam Deputy Speaker, and I feel that I could speak for a long time on the important subject of our debate.
The Bill is precisely the sort of responsible measure that a good, decent, forward-looking Government would introduce to avoid the cliff edge that we are told is a problem with so-called hard Brexit. The debate is serious, but the Opposition are clearly not taking it seriously. I am disappointed that so few of our Opposition colleagues participated. I am surprised that we have had a string of Conservative speakers, without even a bat squeak from the Opposition in response.
From the speeches of members of the Opposition parties, one would think that we faced disaster if we left Euratom. We will not face disaster precisely because of the Bill. The hon. Member for Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey (Drew Hendry) quoted a nuclear expert and used the phrase, to which he did not return, “without alternative arrangements”. That is key. The expert said that, if we left Euratom “without alternative arrangements”, there would be a problem, but the whole point of the Bill is to set up those alternative arrangements, without which we would face a more difficult situation. The hon. Gentleman could not have made a more ridiculous point.
Drew Hendry
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for allowing me to respond. Does he accept that the industry would prefer to stay in Euratom or have an associate membership to “alternative arrangements”?
Kwasi Kwarteng
I know that the hon. Gentleman has been listening to the debate with rapt attention, and he will have noticed in the course of several hours of discussion that we are leaving Euratom because, if he remembers, we voted to leave the EU last year. It was not the British Government who said we had to leave Euratom, but the Commission. The EU itself said that, as a consequence of voting to leave the EU, we had to leave Euratom, and we have taken it at its word. Perhaps we should not have done; perhaps the hon. Gentleman has intelligence that we do not possess, but we took it at its word and, consequently, it is quite proper to seek, through the Bill, to provide the “alternative arrangements” that industry experts have suggested are necessary to smooth the transition process.
I also wish to point out how depressingly gloomy a lot of the SNP’s language has been. We have been told that we are useless negotiators and that the state of Britain’s diplomacy is woefully inadequate. We have been told all sorts of things about how bad things are going, and of course nothing could be further from the truth. It is a complete fantasy. In fact, our diplomacy is widely respected throughout the world. We have a highly effective, well trained force and a disciplined, professional cadre of people. It is nauseating to hear SNP Members decry and denigrate our civil service in that way, and it is indicative of their lack of seriousness that only two Members from that particular party are gracing us with their presence in the Chamber.
With a couple of minutes to spare, I want to talk briefly about Britain’s traditions in nuclear power. I know it was uncomfortable to hear, but my hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse) was right that we are leaving Euratom at a moment when the countries of Europe, such as Germany, Italy and even Austria, are retreating from civil nuclear power. It is not something they want in their energy mix. The response of the German Chancellor to the Fukushima disaster in 2011 was to suggest that Germany would not pursue nuclear power and would shut down its nuclear power plants. Indeed, it is revealing that Frau Merkel is now in conversation with the Green party in Germany. Her coalition is dependent on Green party co-operation, and those of us who follow these things will know that the Green party is singularly opposed to nuclear power. It is the one thing that will not happen if it enters the Government in Germany, once the Government have been constituted, so there is no way that the Germans will develop this line of research. Similarly, we understand that Austria has banned the transfer of nuclear material.
Drew Hendry
The hon. Gentleman rightly points out where he disagrees with politicians of other places or has criticisms of them, but will he withdraw his earlier remark about the SNP criticising civil servants, which we have never done? All we have done is criticise the failure of this Government.
Kwasi Kwarteng
Forgive me, but one of the hon. Gentleman’s colleagues mentioned—we can all look at Hansard tomorrow—that our diplomacy was being ridiculed and was somehow deficient. If someone says that diplomacy is deficient, they are criticising the diplomats who are conducting that diplomacy, and I am afraid that most of those diplomats are indeed civil servants, so that was criticism of our civil servants, with no cause whatever—it was just a form of abuse. I know that SNP Members get caught up in their rhetorical exercises and like to make a big splash in the House of Commons, but I thought that was completely unnecessary.
Lastly, when it comes to freedom of access and foreign scientists and nuclear power experts coming to Britain, there is no country that is more open, from the academic point of view, to foreign talent and ingenuity than Great Britain. We have dozens of Nobel prize winners, many of whom came from outside the United Kingdom. We also have a great record in practical science and in businesses that have developed from the fruits of that practical science, so again this scaremongering and project fear is completely misplaced. I suggest to those hon. Members that they just move on.
Tom Pursglove (Corby) (Con)
It is a pleasure to follow the many thoughtful and informed speeches we have heard this evening, and it is always a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne (Kwasi Kwarteng), who speaks with great passion on these matters—and always manages to do so without many notes, which I for one find very impressive.
I am regularly asked by constituents what progress is being made on Brexit, and tonight’s Bill represents perhaps our first substantive policy debate at Second Reading on an issue that matters to our constituents on a day-to-day basis as we chart our exit from the EU. It is disappointing, therefore, after all the bluster at the start of the debate, when Labour Members had a lot to say for themselves, that we have such barren Benches opposite now. I would be happy to take an intervention from one of them on this important issue, but unfortunately they are not here.
This issue affects all our constituents. The civil nuclear industry is very important and affects every person in the country. It is relevant to keeping the lights on and to the jobs of thousands of people directly employed in the nuclear sector. My hon. Friend the Member for Fylde (Mark Menzies) was right to highlight how this was not just an abstract issue but one that affected people’s lives and livelihoods. It is also relevant, however, in the context of supply chains—tons of steel is used in nuclear projects, for example. We should not forget, therefore, that this affects not only jobs directly involved in the industry but many jobs throughout the supply chain.
I listened carefully to what my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State said during his remarks. I thought he put his case eloquently and set out his rationale brilliantly. I noted down a few of the key points he raised. The first was that we had to go down this route because of the article 50 requirements. That is very simple. Opposition Members are often keen to cosy up to the European Commission, and often think the Commission is absolutely right, so I have to ask myself why they do not believe it on this occasion. The position has been made very clear, by both the UK Government and the Commission, so perhaps Opposition Members need to go away and have a look at that.
I was also pleased to hear that we must and will live up to our obligations, as we would all expect. Of course, businesses and the sector want as much certainty and continuity as possible, and that is exactly what the Bill seeks to achieve. It is also possible to deliver the benefits of Euratom membership through other means. We want to continue to adhere to the standards set down and therefore we fully support their replication. My constituents would expect us to replicate them. We hear about lots of different policy areas in the House—international trade, for example. What point would there be in our watering down the standards we adhere to at present? I have heard no logical argument for why we as a country would want to do that. It just is not in our interests as we look to go out into the world and make a success of Brexit. It is also in our national interest to have sensible strategic co-operation into the future. It is the responsible, right and logical thing to do. That good will was demonstrated by the commitment to underwrite the UK’s share of the EU joint European torus project.
The Bill will ensure that the UK continues to meet its international obligations on nuclear safeguards as they apply to civil nuclear material through the International Atomic Energy Agency; to maintain the UK’s reputation as a responsible nuclear state that supports international nuclear non-proliferation; and to protect UK electricity supplied by nuclear power. Who could argue with any of that? The Bill is one of contingency, certainty and reassurance, so I am surprised that the Opposition are not more enthusiastic, not least because we so frequently hear from them about how we are not making sufficient progress. When we try to make progress, they criticise us for it. It makes no sense. They cannot have it both ways. They cannot continue using such issues—important technical issues—as a proxy for something else.
It was very disappointing to hear the reckless scaremongering about isotopes for medical uses. People will have heard those claims and been concerned. We should not do that. The House has a responsibility to be honest. We need to be truthful about the issue, and I am very pleased that the Secretary of State was able to provide the reassurance that people sought.
Let us not forget that there is still a very long way to go in the negotiations that lie ahead of us. I believe that we have a great deal to offer as a country in relation to nuclear. We lead on research, we lead on innovation and we lead on science, so we bring a lot to the table. As I have said, there is a long way to go in the negotiations; let us see what can be agreed.
Ben Bradley (Mansfield) (Con)
It is, perhaps, less pleasurable than it should be to follow so many of my colleagues, because it means that no one on the Opposition Benches is bothering to speak, which is very disappointing. [Hon. Members: “There are some Scottish National party Members here.”] You guys are very committed: well done.
It is absolutely understandable that there is concern about the approach that the United Kingdom will take to nuclear safeguarding when we leave the European Union and Euratom in 2019. That is why the Bill is so important. It is about ensuring that we maintain our current high standard of safeguarding, and ensuring that the Government are able to develop any future obligations that are placed on the UK by the international community.
The hysteria with which the Bill has been met by Opposition Members is bemusing. They seem adamant and convinced that the Government plan to rip up all their international obligations post-Brexit, although what is on paper in the Bill is the exact opposite: it represents a commitment to continuity, and is vital to our wider negotiating position in Europe. As for the concerns raised about the industry itself, there is absolutely no reason why new and possibly more favourable trade agreements cannot be struck with the countries that supply the UK once we leave the EU. In talks with the Government, many of those nations have been effusive about establishing post-Brexit trade deals. This summer the Prime Minister secured a pledge from Japan, which currently supplies Oldbury nuclear power station, to commit itself to a trade deal when Britain leaves the EU.
Given those positive soundings, I think that the move away from the EU has the potential to spawn more fruitful international relationships for the UK nuclear industry. My hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse) made it clear that the EU’s interest in nuclear power is waning. Countries are rowing back on their nuclear commitments, setting time limits on when they want to get out of nuclear power, so perhaps we are better off out of it.
It cannot be denied that the EU’s support for research and development in this field has been instrumental in driving innovation. As Opposition Members have been keen to point out, we have received money and support from the EU, but they often forget that it does not come free of charge, and that we pay for our membership of that club.
Chris Green
Does my hon. Friend agree that as we look towards moving from Horizon 2020 to framework programme 9, there is a strong possibility that the European Union will emphasise a move away from cutting-edge research to capacity building? Will that not cause us a problem?
Ben Bradley
I entirely agree. It is vital for us to be able to safeguard our national interests and the skills that we have in great numbers, so that we can support the industry and continue to go from strength to strength in the UK, regardless of what the Germans tell us we should be doing.
The Joint European Torus programme in Oxfordshire is a key example of the positive support that we have received. The Government have pledged to underwrite the UK’s share of the cost of the project until 2020 to meet our international obligations and ensure the success of the project. The same applies to Horizon 2020. That willingness to participate in such projects is a clear indication that the UK will not turn its back on commitments with the EU at the expense of scientific progress. The desire to support the sciences domestically will also filter down into immigration policy. The Government have already made it clear that they are keen for the brightest and best people from the world of science to continue to come and work in the UK, and that is not going to change.
The simple fact is that the UK is leaving the EU and, necessarily, Euratom. The European Commission has made that pretty clear. There can be no watered-down half-membership, as Euratom comes with commitments to the European courts and free movement that my constituents would never go for. While the Bill does raise questions about the future of the nuclear industry—all things are uncertain when it comes to a huge negotiation on the scale of Brexit—it is clear that its intention is to promote continuity and ensure that Britain’s high standards of nuclear safeguarding are maintained after we leave. It is a vital contingency plan to ensure that if we do end up with no deal—which no one wants, blah blah blah—[Laughter]—we are ready for that eventuality. That was not meant as a “filler”, but there is no point in going over the same old argument again.
As many of my colleagues have said over many months, we are leaving the EU. That is right and necessary, and it has to be a clean break, but we are not leaving Europe, and we want to continue to co-operate on many aspects that are beneficial to the UK.
It appears that the Opposition are not even going to vote against the Bill. They are playing a dangerous political game with an important decision—talking about the nuclear Armageddon that will inevitably come from the passing of the Bill yet not bothering to vote against it. I am not quite sure where they are coming from. It seemed clear even from the opening statement from the shadow Front Bench that this is not about the content of the Bill; it is an attempt to refight the referendum over and over again, and to talk about how they did not want to leave the EU at all.
The scaremongering about how this might affect medical isotopes or safety and numerous other aspects during the lengthy discussion of this Bill bears no resemblance to what is down on paper. The Bill is about delivering continuity for the industry in the UK and giving us the opportunity to forge ahead in this field in the future.
Mims Davies (Eastleigh) (Con)
It is a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Mansfield (Ben Bradley), and to be called to participate in this fascinating and wide-ranging debate. We have heard tonight about gramophones, “Dr Strangelove”, beefing up, belts and braces, “blah blah blah”, and the “neverendum”, but we did hear a lot of sense in the contributions of my hon. Friends the Members for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse) and for Copeland (Trudy Harrison).
Security of our energy is paramount—on a daily basis in our lives, for every one of us in our hospitals and schools, and in terms of our daily safety. Securing the position of the UK as an international nuclear state is therefore vital as we pave our way out of the EU.
As we heard from the Secretary of State at the start of the debate, this is a simple and prudent Bill whose message is timely. This evening, the fact that the Government are actively working through this Bill to ensure that the UK continues to meet our international obligations for nuclear safeguards while also continuing the UK’s reputation as a responsible nuclear state has been warmly welcomed. Let us be clear: the UK will continue to support Euratom, and in the meantime we will seek, through this Bill, continuity on co-operation and standards.
I believe the Bill will bolster the roles and responsibilities of the UK’s existing nuclear regulator, the Office for Nuclear Regulation, once we leave Euratom. Despite “Project Fear”, which we have heard a lot about tonight, the collaboration between scientists and those in the nuclear sector is vitally important to all aspects of our co-operation. The Government want, and, more importantly, intend, to see this continue. It is clear at the outset that the industrial strategy includes nuclear and supports the scientific community through this, and builds on that through Brexit. While the Opposition refuse to accept the public’s decision to leave the European Union, the Government continue to get on with the job of ensuring a responsible withdrawal.
Julian Knight (Solihull) (Con)
Does my hon. Friend agree that it is highly appropriate that this should be the first piece of oven-ready Brexit legislation, as that shows the importance of this industry and of safeguards in it?
Mims Davies
So we can add “oven-ready” to “boil in the bag” Brexit, perhaps; yes, it is the latest example of that important vote. As we heard this evening from my hon. Friend the Member for Corby (Tom Pursglove), what we are doing as we leave the EU really matters in terms of the message we give to our constituents. Those on both sides of the argument are seeing us preparing for what is going to happen.
Let us make no mistake about this: the Opposition have no care for the nuclear industry, they do not support the vital role that it plays within our energy mix, and they do not respect the jobs and communities that rely on it. We heard that this evening from my hon. Friend the Member for Copeland: in an excellent and rounded speech on the industry and what it means to her constituency, we heard a lot about what the impact on her community would be if we got this wrong, and that applies across the UK. In stark contrast to the Opposition, the Government stand ready to take up the important role of protecting our world-leading nuclear industry during and before Brexit, so we can enable the UK to continue to meet its international nuclear obligations as it leaves Euratom.
I will therefore be strongly supporting this Bill this evening, and hope that all Opposition Members will follow Conservatives in doing so.
Kevin Hollinrake (Thirsk and Malton) (Con)
It is a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Eastleigh (Mims Davies). The Hansard editors will now have to work out how to spell “blah blah blah” as well as “blah-di-blah”.
I am a natural optimist, but if the House will allow me I want to strike a slightly cautionary note at the beginning of my speech. Leaving the European Union was always going to be difficult. We have been members of the EU, and of Euratom, for 44 years and these are some of the complexities that we will have to deal with over the coming years if we are to make a success of leaving the European Union. Additionally, the European Union was always going to be difficult about this because it does not want us to leave. The negotiations will be difficult. It is also quite clear from their recent remarks that most Opposition Members—not many of whom are present at this time of the evening—are going to be difficult and try to frustrate the process.
However, difficult and impossible are two different things. I believe that the Prime Minister is taking the right approach in her negotiations with the European Union. On the one hand, she made a conciliatory and generous speech in Florence in setting out the terms that we were prepared to work on; on the other hand, she has stated clearly and quite rightly that we will prepare for no deal. The Bill is about preparing for no deal on Euratom, although Members across the House clearly want us to strike such a deal. It is no wonder that the Opposition do not think that this is necessary. We know from the shadow Chancellor’s comments yesterday on “The Andrew Marr Show” that Labour would not accept no deal in any circumstances. That means that they would accept the worst possible deal if that was the only deal on the table. It was also made clear in Labour’s manifesto that it would accept the worst possible deal rather than walk away with no deal. That is the most naive negotiating stance I have ever heard of. The shadow Business Secretary must agree that that is not the right approach to take in any negotiations.
It is absolutely right that we should make provision in the Bill for the nuclear industry, which is very important for the UK’s economy and for our energy needs. Nuclear already supplies around 21% of our electricity, and that will grow to around 42% by 2050. As some Members will know, I have shale gas in my constituency and I am often lobbied by shale gas protesters who say that we do not have an appropriate policy on energy and renewables. I want to pay tribute to the strategic approach that the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy is taking to meeting the energy needs of this country. We absolutely have a future in renewables, and nuclear will play a key part in that.
Kevin Foster (Torbay) (Con)
Does my hon. Friend agree that the Bill is also about building public confidence, and that developing civil nuclear power is separate from anything being used for military purposes? That is why these safeguards are absolutely right. They make it clear that civil nuclear is completely separate from any other objectives.
Kevin Hollinrake
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Civil nuclear is a key part of our energy requirements and, in turn, of our economy.
It might surprise Members—and certainly members of the wider public—to learn that the UK is the third best performing nation on the planet in the international climate change performance index. We are ahead of every country you could name apart from France and Germany. We have a strategic policy around nuclear and renewables that will continue to put this country at the forefront of the green energy industry. We are also investing in other important areas in relation to nuclear power.
The Minister recently said that the Government would continue to support the Taurus fusion project. As my hon. Friend the Member for Wells (James Heappey) said, the future capability of fusion has been talked about for some time. Indeed, when I was studying physics at Sheffield Polytechnic, which is now Sheffield Hallam University, a limitless supply of clean energy from fusion was talked about as the future. The nuclear industry of course also provides many jobs in the supply chain. My constituency—the bucolic rural idyll of Thirsk and Malton—has James Fisher Nuclear, the Derwent Training Association, which trains new generations of engineers for the sector, and many other such jobs.
All the Bill does is add a safeguarding responsibility to the safety responsibilities of the Office for Nuclear Regulation to ensure that we make good on our commitments under non-proliferation treaties. It will also implement our voluntary commitments with the IAEA. People may ask, “Can the UK have its own policy? Will it be too difficult for the UK to manage its own nuclear responsibilities or put the necessary regulations in place?” Clearly not. The Euratom countries obviously use that body to look after its nuclear interests, but most other countries do that independently. The UK has a long history of nuclear energy dating back to 1956, so we clearly have the experience and knowledge. We can, if necessary, place the current Euratom provisions under the Office for Nuclear Regulation to continue the quality, safe and robust regulations that we have been used to in this country. I commend the Bill to the House.
Wendy Morton (Aldridge-Brownhills) (Con)
I may be the last speaker before the wind-ups, but it is none the less a pleasure to contribute to this debate and to follow the eloquent speeches and learned contributions that we have heard. In particular, my hon. Friend the Member for Wells (James Heappey) spoke with such knowledge of the nuclear industry—far more than many of us.
This afternoon has demonstrated the importance of the nuclear industry, which we should not underestimate in our deliberations. Not only is it important to the UK economy, to jobs and the local supply chain and to our nation’s security, but at its heart is the security of the UK’s energy supplies. As we have heard, the UK’s first commercial nuclear power station opened back in 1956. Today, 15 reactors generate a not insignificant 21% of our electricity, so nuclear is a vital source of energy in the UK. Aside from power stations, the civilian uses of nuclear materials extend to medicine, farming, transport and other industrial processes. Nuclear is a key strategic industry that affects us all, including each and every one of my constituents. This Government’s commitment to electric vehicles means that nuclear will have a further strategic importance in the UK. As someone whose household has recently purchased its first electric vehicle, we have an added interest in this field, including in making note of where the UK’s charging points are and are not.
However, this is a serious, specific debate about safeguards. It is not, as we have heard, about safety. The Bill was first announced in the Queen’s Speech to establish a UK nuclear safeguards regime as we leave the EU and Euratom, ensuring that the UK continues to meet international standards for nuclear safeguards while—this is important—continuing the UK’s reputation as a responsible nuclear state.
In this place we are understandably focused on Brexit. We are ensuring that we get the best deal for our country in the withdrawal process, and the Bill is a key part of that process. We often talk about the need to maintain stability and avoid the cliff edge we hear about as we exit the EU, and this is a prime example of legislation that is about preparedness and doing the ground work in readiness for when we leave the EU.
The Government have made it clear that future safeguard arrangements will continue to provide the safety, quality and robustness that currently exist under Euratom. The Secretary of State set out clearly that the EU and Euratom are uniquely legally joined, to which some Opposition Members take exception, and it means that when we formally notified the EU of our intention to leave, we also commenced the process of leaving Euratom.
Put simply, this contingency Bill is intrinsically and uniquely linked to the result of the referendum on 23 June 2016. I will be voting for the Bill this evening. My constituents and the country voted in the referendum, and we voted to leave the EU. The Bill will help ensure that the UK remains committed to having nuclear safeguards by enabling the UK to set up a domestic safeguard regime so that we continue to meet international safeguard and nuclear non-proliferation standards.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne (Kwasi Kwarteng) said, this is a responsible Bill from a responsible Government who are delivering a responsible Brexit.
Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)
The hon. Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Wendy Morton) struck the right note when she said this is a serious debate. We have to discuss these issues with due seriousness, and my hon. Friend the Member for Salford and Eccles (Rebecca Long Bailey) clearly set out our serious concerns about the Bill in her opening contribution.
The Bill should be unnecessary, and the Opposition hope it may yet be so. What the Government should be doing is setting their goal as the UK’s continued participation in Euratom as a member, if possible, or as close to that relationship as we can get. There is a lot of cross-party agreement on that goal—I exempt the hon. Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse), who extravagantly celebrated our crashing out of Euratom—but in the Westminster Hall debate on the issue back in July, ably led by my hon. Friend the Member for Ynys Môn (Albert Owen), who is a champion of this sector, even the hon. Member for Stone (Sir William Cash), who was here earlier and who is not a noted dove on these issues, said that we should be working
“towards something like associate membership.”—[Official Report, 12 July 2017; Vol. 627, c. 96WH.]
It appeared then that the barrier to that relationship was the role of the European Court of Justice, as the hon. Member for Oxford West and Abingdon (Layla Moran) pointed out. Indeed, the former chief of staff to the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union and the former Chancellor of the Exchequer have both suggested that that is why Euratom was linked to the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017, and the responsibility for that lies with the Prime Minister. It is deeply irresponsible to put our nuclear industry at risk because of a reckless and ideological decision to make the future role of the ECJ a red line in all matters relating to Brexit.
As hon. Members have pointed out, and as the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy said in his opening remarks, the Bill provides for safeguarding arrangements for all civilian nuclear facilities in the UK, which is clearly needed if we leave Euratom, but that is only one part of what is at risk. The wider issues were exercised in the Government’s own position paper, which was issued over the summer. As my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds West (Rachel Reeves) pointed out, Euratom oversees the transport of nuclear fuel across the EU and enables vital co-operation on information, infrastructure and funding of nuclear energy. It is the legal owner of all nuclear material, and the legal purchaser, certifier and guarantor of any nuclear materials and technologies that the UK purchases. That includes, for example, our nuclear trade with the United States.
Euratom has helped us become a world leader in nuclear research and development. In their position paper on the issue, the Government rightly said that they want a “close and working relationship” with Euratom, and we welcome that. That position paper set out six high-level principles for nuclear materials and safeguards that would frame their approach to the issue. So may I ask the Minister to explain why the Bill fails to address five of those six high-level principles, which are the Government’s own objectives?
Why is the Bill so limited in its scope? Is that because the Government aim to secure ongoing membership and have just brought this Bill forward as a contingency? Will the Minister confirm the answer that I understood the Secretary of State to give to the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill): that it is the Government’s intention to seek associate membership? Is it because their thinking has not advanced sufficiently on all the other issues connected with our membership of Euratom? Or is it, as was said by some of the more excitable Conservative Members, such as the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake), that they are looking forward to crashing out of Euratom—[Interruption.] Perhaps “excitable” was not quite the right word, but he was working towards it. Given that the Prime Minister has talked it up, will the Minister say what work has been done on a no-deal scenario in the event that we leave Euratom in the way that some Conservative Members would seem to like?
Tom Pursglove
Is not the whole purpose of a Bill such as this to stop anybody crashing out? The hon. Gentleman is using totally irresponsible language.
Paul Blomfield
I agree that it is irresponsible language and I am sorry to have heard it from some Conservative Members during this debate.
This is an important issue and the sector is hugely important, as the hon. Member for Copeland (Trudy Harrison) pointed out in a thoughtful and informed contribution when she said that it is important that we get this right. The Government therefore need to answer some key questions. The ONR cannot exercise these new powers until it has a voluntary offer agreement and additional protocol from the IAEA for a UK safeguards regime. What work has been done on that and when do the Government anticipate that will be ratified? What have the Government done to ensure that the ONR has the necessary skills to take on the safeguarding of nuclear material? Euratom employs 160 people on safeguarding, 25% of whom work on UK installations, whereas the ONR currently employs eight staff. I understand that it takes five years to train a nuclear safeguards inspector. Two years will not be long enough to reskill the necessary number of inspectors. Are plans under way to re-employ the current Euratom officials or do the Government have another contingency up their sleeve?
Paul Blomfield
My hon. Friend makes a valid point, which I am coming straight to. As a number of Members have mentioned, it is planned to halve the current Government grant to the ONR by 2020. I recognise that this is only one part of the ONR’s funding, but can the Minister confirm that that is no longer the Government’s intention? Will he outline what their new funding plans would be, given the additional responsibilities they are seeking to place on the ONR?
An important point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Barrow and Furness (John Woodcock), and echoed by some others, was that outside Euratom the Government would have to negotiate individual nuclear collaboration agreements not simply with Euratom, but with every country outside of the EU with which we currently co-operate through our membership, including the US, China, Canada, Australia, Kazakhstan and South Korea. The right hon. Member for Wantage (Mr Vaizey) mentioned the example of the United States. A section 123 agreement with the US—a legal necessity if we are to trade nuclear goods with the US—would have to go through the Senate and the House of Representatives, with final sign-off needed from the President. Does the Minister really believe it is possible to achieve that in the time we have left?
What provisions have been put in place to ensure that normal business in the UK is not disrupted? As the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk) pointed out, an important part of that will be ensuring that the UK has the right skills to build, operate and decommission nuclear power stations. What will be the Government’s migration policy for the nuclear worker who previously enjoyed free movement under the provision of the Euratom treaty?
A key benefit of the UK’s involvement in Euratom has been our participation in R and D programmes. The Government have given limited commitments on Culham, but what are their wider intentions on the full Euratom work programme from 2019-20 onward?
Seventeen months does not give us much time to resolve such a huge number of issues. The paralysis at the heart of the negotiations, created by the divisions at the heart of the Government, do not give us much confidence that the issues can be resolved within the time available. One further key question: will the Government seek to continue membership of Euratom—or to come to an arrangement that replicates the benefits and responsibilities of that membership—for a transitional period after we leave the EU in March 2019?
The Bill is inadequate. It fails to address so many of the vital questions that the Government themselves raised in their own position paper. It gives the Secretary of State powers to amend legislation without reference to the House—powers that, although narrower in scope, in many ways go further than those in the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill. For these reasons, we cannot support it. Nevertheless, we recognise that, if the worst comes to the worst—as some Government Members seem to anticipate—and we crash out without agreement, we would be in breach of our international responsibilities under the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons if we do not have a safeguarding regime in place. For that reason, we will seek to amend the Bill significantly in Committee, but we will not oppose it tonight.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Richard Harrington)
I apologise, Mr Speaker, because I nearly called you Madam Deputy Speaker. I turned around and you were there, and I feel a lot better knowing that you are at the helm.
I have listened carefully to the arguments in this debate about our country’s future nuclear safeguards regime. I thank Members from all parties for their contributions, but particularly my right hon. and hon. Friends, so many of whom spoke. I am encouraged by the general consensus in the House on one fundamental point: the UK nuclear industry and nuclear research community—both of which have an excellent global reputation—are key assets and must be supported. I promise that we will do nothing to endanger that.
Regardless of where Members stand on membership, associate membership, transition or departure from Euratom—people have used various pronunciations today—I hope we can all agree that it is sensible and prudent to take the powers contained in the Bill, as they are necessary to set up our domestic nuclear safeguards regime. However, there has been a lot of scaremongering—that word has been used. I hope that Opposition Members did not intend to frighten people unnecessarily with certain comments, because I would have to call that “Project Fear”.
I can state categorically that, first, the Bill is nothing to do with medical isotopes and fissile materials are excluded; secondly, we are not going to crash out with no arrangements; and thirdly, important though nuclear safety is, it is nothing to do with nuclear safeguards. The Bill is the Nuclear Safeguards Bill. We have consistently repeated that, but unfortunately—[Interruption.] I was going to say that unfortunately the shadow Minister is nodding, but I know he is nodding because he knows. Other Members, particularly those on the SNP Benches, have confused the two.
On the triggering of article 50—this has been mentioned several times—the European Commission stated very clearly to the European Parliament:
“It is recalled that in accordance with Article 106(a) of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union applies also to the European Atomic Energy Community.”
Given that article 50 has been triggered and that the European Commission has said that that was the right decision, we believe that it is absolutely essential that we have a constructive and co-operative relationship with our European partners.
Richard Harrington
I would love to give way to the Chair of the BEIS Select Committee, but I have very little time. I do hope that she will understand—[Interruption.] Oh, all right.
Rachel Reeves
What a gentleman! Thank you very much.
The Minister is setting out two alternatives: the ONR taking responsibility or our staying in Euratom. However, there is a third way forward—a third way—which is to seek a transition period in which we remain in Euratom and then go for some sort of associate membership of Euratom. Are the Government exploring that opportunity, which would best serve our industry and those jobs?
Richard Harrington
Well, I do know that the Chair of the Select Committee is a well-known Blairite, but actually to quote Mr Blair is very impressive. We leave Euratom at the same time as we leave the European Union.
Richard Harrington
I really must make some progress.
As we have heard, there are other issues of great importance, such as access to skilled workers and continued R and D collaboration, on which we are focused as we seek to establish our new relationship with Europe’s nuclear community. The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Sheffield Central (Paul Blomfield), asked me why those points are not included in the Bill. It was a fair question, but let me tell him that they are part of Euratom’s activities that are subject to negotiation but do not require legislation.
I was not surprised to hear all of the concerns expressed today—I would be astonished if the House did not have concerns and questions given the novel circumstances that we now find ourselves in. No country has ever left the EU or Euratom before. Let me explain for the avoidance of doubt that this is not an alternative. This is not because we do not want to maintain our successful civil nuclear co-operation with Euratom. We must set our own nuclear safeguards regime. It would be irresponsible for us not to do so. We are using the body that already regulates nuclear security and safety—the ONR. The shadow Minister said that it has only eight suitable employees at the moment. That is why we are here today—we need to ensure that the Bill has all the provisions both in terms of IT and infrastructure, and we need to recruit all the necessary people. That is why we are taking the powers, why they are so important and why the Bill is so vital and deserves support from across the House. We want to have—and we will have—a domestic nuclear safeguards regime that will enable the UK to meet international safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation standards after we withdraw from Euratom.
The intention is for the new domestic regime to exceed the standard that the international community would expect from the UK as a member of the IAEA. As my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State pointed out, we are aiming to establish a robust regime as comprehensive as that currently provided by Euratom.
Some hon. Members have asked why the Bill has been introduced and brought to its Second Reading so quickly—in fact, within a few days. That is because we know how important it is to have a nuclear safeguards regime for the UK. The ONR is key to that, and it needs the time to carry out both the recruitment and the planning. The international community, which we deal with all the time, wants to know that the safeguards regime will be established well before March 2019. I wish to thank EDF Energy, which is constructing our new Hinkley Point nuclear power station, and all of the other people in the nuclear industry, whom I briefed just before introducing this Bill last week, for their support in what we are doing here. The Bill is absolutely critical.
The Opposition have raised some issues about the powers in the Bill and the way in which we have approached the measures. The shadow Secretary of State said that there were too many delegated powers, Henry VIII provisions and all those sorts of thing. In fact, there is one Henry VIII power, which is limited and necessary because it enables us to alter references to the United Kingdom’s agreements with the IAEA. We would not be able to license the inspectors, for example, without concluding these negotiations, which are currently trilateral between the UK, Euratom and the agency.
The bulk of discussions with the European Union are ongoing. We are exploring a number of options for smooth transition from the currently regime to a domestic one. The negotiations are going well. We have found a spirit of co-operation because the officials in Europe and ourselves have a big mutuality of interests, but we have to plan just in case suitable arrangements are not worked out. Shared interests are important and we know that we will provide the best possible basis for continued close co-operation with Euratom, although we cannot say exactly how that will be. It will be similar when we negotiate our bilateral nuclear co-operation agreements, about which my right hon. Friend the Member for Wantage (Mr Vaizey) made a rather excellent speech. He actually thanked me for harassing him in the Tea Room, which I will now always try to do. He mentioned the importance of and concerns about the bilateral nuclear co-operation agreements, which are already in place with several countries and will continue. My officials have been to the other countries concerned and I am certain that talks will progress well.
I am happy to meet the representative from the Royal College of Radiologists to discuss the concerns of the hon. Member for Oxford West and Abingdon (Layla Moran). I had hoped that I had reassured her, but I perfectly understand her point and am happy to meet the relevant people. My hon. Friend the Member for Copeland (Trudy Harrison) made an excellent speech. The ONR has already started building processes and systems and recruiting inspectors, and the essential funding will be in place to do that.
I have heard many considered views from both sides of the House, but I hope that the House will unite in recognition of the special contribution of the nuclear industry. The Opposition have said that they will not vote against Second Reading, which is responsible, but I look forward to a lengthy and constructive discussion in Committee and on Report. I can tell from the polite smiles from the Opposition Front Benchers that they will be raring to go and I welcome that. Quite apart from in Committee, I am happy to sit down and discuss the Bill with anybody on an individual basis. I am passionate about it because we really need this domestic nuclear safeguards regime, regulated by the regulator here. It should be as robust and comprehensive as that provided by Euratom or by any international operation. I am sorry that I have not been able to take every intervention, but my door is always open. I very much look forward to the remaining stages of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read a Second time.
Nuclear Safeguards Bill (First sitting)
Tuesday 31st October 2017
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 31 October 2017 - (31 Oct 2017)
The Chair
Before we begin, I have a few little parish notices. First, for all the activities that we indulge in when considering the Bill, both here and in the Committee Room, the orders of procedure are precisely the same as in the main Chamber—for example, no eating and drinking; preferably jackets on, unless it is extremely warm, in which case Members may consider taking them off; ties, of course, are now optional, but I always wear mine; and I tend to be a little on the conservative side and maintain standards. Time Witness Until no later than 10.00 am Office for Nuclear Regulation Until no later than 11.25 am Nuclear Industry Association; Prospect Law Until no later than 2.30 pm EDF Energy Until no later than 3.00 pm Prospect; Unite Until no later than 3.30 pm Professor Juan Matthews, Visiting Professor, Dalton Nuclear Institute
We will talk through the procedure later. This stage, for those who have not done it before, is rather like a Select Committee. You are bringing witnesses in front of you to inquire of them their expert knowledge about what is in the Bill. It is different from a Select Committee in the sense that you are not quizzing them, holding them to account or giving them a tough time; you are seeking to extract the maximum benefit from their evidence. This is not party political; it is like a consensual Select Committee.
The Bill is very narrowly drafted. It is about a particular subject, not the entire spectrum of what Euratom does or stands for. We will be reasonably strict about trying to keep people within the terms of the Bill, so that they do not ramble widely. We now have a couple of formalities to deal with.
Ordered,
That—
(1) the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 9.25 am on Tuesday 31 October) meet—
(a) at 2.00 pm on Tuesday 31 October;
(b) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 2 November;
(c) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 7 November;
(d) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 14 November;
(e) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 16 November;
(2) the Committee shall hear oral evidence on Tuesday 31 October in accordance with the following Table:
TABLE
(3) proceedings on consideration of the Bill in Committee shall be taken in the following order: Clause 1; the Schedule; Clauses 2 to 5; new Clauses; new Schedules; remaining proceedings on the Bill;
(4) the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 5.00 pm on Thursday 16 November. —(Richard Harrington.)
Ordered,
That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for publication.—(Richard Harrington.)
The Chair
Copies of written evidence that the Committee receives will be made available in the Committee Room, and all the papers are on the table behind you.
Ordered,
That, at this and any subsequent meeting at which oral evidence is to be heard, the Committee shall sit in private until the witnesses are admitted.—(Richard Harrington.)
The Chair
We will now discuss the general line of questioning during this sitting. Let us try to do that reasonably briefly, because we do not have much time. As soon as we have agreed what questions we want to ask, we will have the witnesses and the public in to start the sitting.
The Chair
If Members of the Committee have interests to declare, they should please do so now.
Trudy Harrison (Copeland) (Con)
My husband, father and brother work at Sellafield, as well as many other family members.
Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)
I am a member of Unite.
Examination of Witness
Dr Mina Golshan gave evidence.
The Chair
Q
Dr Golshan: Thank you for that introduction. I am director and deputy chief inspector at the Office for Nuclear Regulation. My main responsibilities are Sellafield, decommissioning fuel and waste, but I am also senior responsible owner for ONR’s work in relation to establishing a state system of nuclear materials accounting and control.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Richard Harrington)
Q
Dr Golshan: Establishing a domestic safeguards regime, now that the policy decision has been made that the UK will be leaving the Euratom treaty, is fundamental to the industry in the UK. It is the cornerstone of establishing nuclear co-operation agreements. It is essential for the industry to operate. Without a domestic safeguards regime in the UK that works in line with the International Atomic Energy Agency requirements, the industry simply will not be able to operate.
Paul Blomfield
Q
Dr Golshan: Perhaps I should start by saying that, given our membership of Euratom, it has not been necessary for the UK and ONR to build capacity and resilience in this area. Now that we are in a different position, we have started to recruit. The first phase of recruitment is complete. We successfully recruited four individuals, three of whom have already started with us. An area of shortage for us was subject matter expertise. That was a worry for me, but I am pleased to say that we will hopefully be in a position to rectify that by the middle of this month.
Broadly, we need to continue with our recruitment if we are to staff ourselves in order to deliver the new safeguards function. In the first instance we need an additional 10 to 12 inspectors, which will bring us to a level that allows the UK to fulfil its international obligations, but we have already heard from the Secretary of State that the intention is to put in place a regime that is equivalent to Euratom. That will require ONR to recruit further and will mean around 20 additional inspectors. We know that we are dealing with a limited pool of expertise, and our success so far, although encouraging, is by no means the end of the story.
The Chair
Dr Golshan, can I ask you to speak up slightly, because this is a very large room and we are having trouble hearing you. I am getting older—you know how it is.
Trudy Harrison
Q
Dr Golshan: May I start by saying that we do not have the responsibility for CNC; we regulate civil nuclear security. We currently have a safeguards function, as set out in the Energy Act 2013, but it is not a regulatory function. The main purpose of that function is to facilitate the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency and Euratom in the UK, among other things. The Bill will give us the powers, on a par with safety and security, to regulate nuclear safeguards on civil nuclear sites.
Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)
Q
Dr Golshan: We have a small project team that helps us deliver this function. I have a project manager and a project lead, and we have interactions with our human resources department and our IT department, which in itself is a small group. We need to grow this project team in the first instance to enable the project to deliver and go forward. All in all, we have five key people in the project team—project manager, delivery lead, policy lead, myself and a subject matter expert—and the team overall has links with the HR department and so on, as I described. We will need to grow this project team to help us deliver when we come to 29 March 2019, and we are in the process of doing so.
Ben Bradley (Mansfield) (Con)
Q
Dr Golshan: It is fair to say that this is unprecedented territory for us as far as the size of the job is concerned. In the past we have not had to establish a new function from afresh to this extent, but we have got experience of setting out and working with officials from the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy—and previously the Department for Energy and Climate Change—to bring forward new regulation.
We are working closely with officials at the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and we have engaged with the industry—I have had a number of meetings with the industry. We are explaining what we are doing, how far we have gone down this route and what there is left to do. We are working with all our stakeholders to make a success of this.
Paul Blomfield
Q
Dr Golshan: Let me break it into two bits. Our intention is to start recruiting in the new year for the additional 10 to 12 people we will require. The reason is that we were waiting for the Second Reading of the Bill to give us some certainty in relation to the people we are going to take on permanently. That process will start. In relation to your next question, on Euratom’s numbers, for its own purposes, Euratom carries out activities in the UK that, as a state delivering an equivalent regime, we would not need to deliver. The order of 20 to 25 is not far from what we need to staff ourselves to deliver this function.
Paul Blomfield
Q
Paul Blomfield
Can you give us a little more understanding of the talent pool from which you are drawing, the recruitment opportunities and the training needs there might be to fulfil the skills needs you anticipate?
Dr Golshan: As I mentioned at the beginning, although these do not seem like large numbers, we are dealing with a limited talent pool here: the expertise is unique. As I said, the UK as a whole has not had to focus on developing resilience in this area, so we are limited in what and who we can recruit.
The next step, if we are getting the right expertise in these people, is to turn them into regulators and inspectors. That means that our training function—training materials and expertise in training these individuals—needs to develop. We have started that process, but it is a long road and I am not going to sit here and pretend that it is all going to be a smooth run.
Paul Blomfield
Q
Dr Golshan: Our aim, currently, is to have a system in place that enables the UK to fulfil its international obligations by March 2019, which is when we intend to leave Euratom. I have been very clear in the past—I will repeat it here—that we will not be able to replicate Euratom standards on day one. That is unrealistic, and given the scale of what needs to be put in place, I fear that if we go that way, the best will become the enemy of the good. So it is important that we focus our efforts on delivering a regime that enables the UK to meet its international obligations.
Mary Robinson (Cheadle) (Con)
Q
Dr Golshan: There are a number of aspects. The first one is to ensure that the secondary legislation is in place at the right time, because that provides us with the mechanisms to exercise our powers. The Bill itself is an enabling part—it gives us the fundamental powers—and the secondary legislation gives us the mechanisms to deliver. Secondary legislation will also give us some certainty in relation to what guidance and standards we need to develop to make this happen.
For us, we need to have an IT system; a safeguards information management system. It is a live system that enables us to get data from our licensees, to process those data and to put them into a reporting format that the IAEA currently receives from Euratom. We are working on that; it is at proof of concept stage at the moment. Once we have established that we are able to do it, we will need to move into a phase that determines whether we are going to do it in-house, tender it out, or have a combination of the two.
Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)
Q
Dr Golshan: I should say that, on negotiating nuclear co-operation agreements and completing the discussions with IAEA and Euratom, although we provide advice to the Government, it is not for me to sit here and determine or estimate a timetable. It is really strictly for the Government to conduct those negotiations, and I think that it is perhaps a question better answered by them.
Dr Whitehead
Q
Dr Golshan: It is fundamental to it. We need to have a basic safeguards regime—a domestic safeguards regime—in place that enables the UK to demonstrate that it is fulfilling its international obligations under various treaties. Once that is in place we will be able to demonstrate that we have a rectified domestic safeguard arrangement in place.
Dr Whitehead
Q
Dr Golshan: Yes.
Dr Whitehead
In order to demonstrate to the IAEA that we are able to fulfil a function relating to nuclear safeguards outside Euratom.
Dr Golshan: Absolutely.
Dr Whitehead
And those discussions, I understand, are proceeding at the moment but have by no means reached any conclusion. Are you confident that in terms of replicating the UK’s safeguarding function, the basic structure you have outlined to us this morning that needs to be in place will be able to fulfil its functions and, in particular, assure and satisfy the IAEA that it can safely proceed with new treaty arrangements with the UK?
Dr Golshan: Yes is the short answer. We do not have to have a regime equivalent to Euratom in order to be able to proceed with concluding those agreements and negotiations, so what the IAEA needs the UK to have in place is a domestic safeguards regime that meets its international obligations under the non-proliferation treaty and others. So although there are risks here for us to complete the work we are doing, I think it is a much more achievable objective for us to aim for, rather than replicating Euratom in the first instance. I should again emphasise that having a regime that is equivalent to Euratom is not a prerequisite to complete those agreements and negotiations.
Trudy Harrison
Q
Dr Golshan: The Bill is an enabling Bill. It gives us the broad powers in parallel with nuclear safety and security. It gives the Secretary of State the powers to make nuclear safeguards regulations. That is the secondary legislation that I referred to. In relation to what is possible at our nuclear sites—
Trudy Harrison
Q
Dr Golshan: There is a nuclear co-operation agreement and there are a number of states that, as a matter of policy, will not engage with a third country that does not have a safeguards regime in place. So our aim, and the Government’s aim, is to establish a nuclear co-operation agreement with these states as a matter of priority. We are advising the Government and providing subject matter expertise. As to what will be possible on nuclear sites, we will continue to provide reports to the IAEA; that is a fundamental aspect of what a safeguards regime needs to deliver. As I said, the safeguards information management system that we will be putting in place is fundamental to achieve that.
Trudy Harrison
Q
Dr Golshan: I cannot comment on how long it should be; I think that depends on the scope of the negotiations and what can be achieved within the timescales we have left. From our perspective, a transitional arrangement will be extremely helpful. It will enable us to have parallel working arrangements in place with Euratom to conclude the discussions that we need to have with it, first, to understand what activities it currently undertakes on nuclear sites, but also the Secretary of State has mentioned that there should not be any weakening of standards in the UK following our departure from Euratom. The transitional period, as I see it, will seek to achieve that.
Dan Carden
Q
The Chair
As a very tough Chairman, I am going to say that we are not allowed to discuss things that are not in the Bill; we can only discuss those things that are in the Bill. Therefore, no matter what your thoughts on that subject may be, I am very sorry, but you will have to raise them in another Bill Committee at some other time. I am sorry—I hope people do not mind—but we have got to keep to what is actually in the Bill itself.
Andrew Lewer (Northampton South) (Con)
Q
Dr Golshan: Numerous examples—a Canadian regulator, the US regulator, the Swiss regulator, and even though Finland is out of the European Union and part of the Euratom treaty, given that safeguarding is the responsibility of state, the Finnish regulator sees itself as being responsible for providing assurance to the state in that regard.
Dr Whitehead
Q
Dr Golshan: I think that is probably a question better answered by our legal colleagues, but that aside, I am aware that the Euratom treaty provides for associate memberships, either as a whole or in particular aspects, and that article 206 of the treaty in particular facilitates that. However, I am not an expert on that and I think it would be inappropriate to comment as to whether an association membership is possible or on how it would be possible.
Dr Whitehead
Q
Dr Golshan: I think that is primarily probably a question for those individuals, and more broadly for the Government, to negotiate with Euratom. As far as I understand it, however, the number of these inspectors is no more than a handful and we will need significantly more than that, as I explained earlier. It is a matter of choice for them. If they wish to join the regulator—ONR—then I am sure that we will be more than happy to absorb them.
The Chair
Unless there are further questions from colleagues, I thank you very much, Dr Golshan, for your excellent and most interesting information, and indeed for expressing it in such careful, precise and brief terms, which gives us an extra five or 10 minutes for the following panel. So thank you very much indeed for coming.
Dr Golshan: It was a pleasure to be here. Thank you.
Examination of Witnesses
Tom Greatrex, Jonathan Leech and Rupert Cowan gave evidence.
The Chair
I welcome the next panel to give evidence, and—without meaning any disrespect to the other two gentlemen—I particularly welcome back our former colleague, Tom Greatrex. Good to see you back here. You probably remember the tough time that you gave me at various times—you are going to get a tough time, too. Welcome to the other members of the panel, from Prospect Law. We have until 11.25 am, which is a reasonable time; but we will have to stop at 11.25 even if we are speaking, so I will try to wrap up a little bit before. First, I ask the three witnesses to introduce yourselves and, if you wish, to give a brief introduction to your thoughts on the Bill.
Rupert Cowan: I am Rupert Cowan, with Prospect Law. My background is advising, as a lawyer, the nuclear industry, providers of services, operators and generators. I am a very worried lawyer at the moment, having seen the Second Reading debate, and I am concerned that, despite the obvious excellent progress that ONR is making towards introducing a safeguards regime, that regime on its own will not enable the industry to continue to operate without interruption.
Jonathan Leech: I am also a lawyer specialising in nuclear law and regulation, working with industry. In terms of my initial views on the Bill, as far as it goes it is, of course, merely an enabling power. One thing I did want to lay out, though, is that it is emphatically not a contingency. Unless we have a radical change in direction of travel now, we will need it; it is not something that can be set aside. I am sure we will come back to discuss that in further detail. I also have some views on the scope of the powers that the Bill confers. But the real task will lie in the secondary legislation, how that is implemented, and how that relates to the nuclear co-operation agreements that we will need before any exit from Euratom, if we are not to disrupt the industry.
Tom Greatrex: Tom Greatrex. I am not a lawyer; I am the chief executive of the Nuclear Industry Association, which is the trade body for the UK civil nuclear industry, representing 260-plus companies across the supply chain. The industry concern is very similar to that just expressed by my two colleagues—namely, that the Bill does one small part of a whole range of things that need to be done to ensure there is not disruption as a process of leaving Euratom. I am, similarly, intrigued by the ministerial comments in the Second Reading debate, particularly around this being a contingency, because that is something different from what we have been discussing to date. My overall concern is that we need to do a whole range of different things, not just what is in the Bill, to ensure that we have a position that avoids any disruption to activity in the civil nuclear industry.
Richard Harrington
Q
Tom Greatrex: If we are to have a domestic safeguarding arrangement and system, we will need to have the power conveyed to the ONR to undertake that role. I have described the Bill before as being a necessary legislative step. It is; but obviously, a whole range of other steps need to come after that, which are contingent upon it. That is where the majority of the concern lies.
Rupert Cowan: May I add to that? Emphatically yes, it is necessary to pass a Bill that puts in place a domestic safeguards regime. The Bill is a step towards achieving that. But what needs not to be lost is that the terms of that Bill, and the secondary legislation that it creates the opportunity to provide, must also be in terms that do not prevent those that we currently have nuclear co-operation agreements with courtesy of Euratom, continuing to co-operate with us. There is a very substantial concern among those that want to be our friends and continue to co-operate with us, and those that may not—who, for slightly more opaque reasons, do not want to make it easy to continue to co-operate with us—that the Bill, as it stands, will not allow a safeguards regime that is neutral in its application to the commercial parties that are participating in the industry. We have given you a note; if you read the end of it you will see that, although we are not entitled to, we are suggesting a possible amendment that you might consider to achieve that neutrality. It is in paragraph 4.
The Chair
Q
Jonathan Leech: Obviously, the Government’s stated intent appears to be to replicate, as far as possible, the current safeguarding regulatory regime that we have in place with Euratom. In a sense, all we should be looking for in the Bill, as a piece of enabling legislation, is to see wording that allows that to happen. Our concern around the way that power is expressed is that it appears currently to be written more from the perspective of the IAEA voluntary offer safeguarding agreement text than the Euratom treaty text. You might argue it is a fairly subtle distinction, but if we are seeking to replicate what we have, I would suggest that a good place to start is the high-level requirements of the treaty, which talk in terms of not diverting from declared use, and those at least should be considered as an additional scope that would be brought within the power, rather than purely focusing on material being diverted from civil activities. Hence the wording that we have proposed in the note is rooted in the treaty and would not take anything away from current scope, but would merely ensure that it is within the power to replicate.
Alex Norris
Q
Jonathan Leech: No.
Rupert Cowan: Absolutely not.
Jonathan Leech: There are obviously links between the two. There are statements in the treaty that article 50 does apply to the Euratom treaty, but there are sound legal arguments available that it is not an automatic consequence and in fact you have to follow a separate but similar process to exit Euratom. In a sense we have moved beyond that, to the extent that the withdrawal notice makes express reference to Euratom, so to the extent that there are two separate processes, we have already triggered both of them. That has maybe put us in a more difficult position in negotiating a potential extension period or remainder within Euratom, which would alleviate a lot of the concerns around the current two-year timetable, which creates some serious problems for the industry. The advice would be that you do not have to accept this and it may not be in your interests to do so.
Rupert Cowan: I would add, the Minister has made statements—
The Chair
Briefly, as we are starting to get outside the scope of the Bill.
Rupert Cowan: Fair enough.
The Chair
By all means comment briefly if you wish to—I would not want to be declared a tyrant—but I would stick to the terms of the Bill, which is nuclear safeguards, rather than the extempore bits.
Rupert Cowan: Fine. The point that lies within the Bill and should be connected to the question is that the next step chronologically is to renegotiate the nuclear co-operation agreements. Unless the Bill provides a basis for safeguards, which gives reasons to those that do not wish to co-operate easily with us to co-operate, then you will find renegotiation very difficult.
The Chair
That will be a matter for another day. I tend to be quite strict with the Committee because it is a topic that can spread its wings in a whole variety of different areas. We are tasked by the House of Commons simply with discussing the terms and the wording of the Bill, rather than the wider consequences or circumstances.
Trudy Harrison
Q
Rupert Cowan: Not necessarily.
Jonathan Leech: There is no question of that material being sent back.
Trudy Harrison
Q
Jonathan Leech: It is the UK’s responsibility.
Trudy Harrison
Q
Jonathan Leech: Ownership will transfer to the UK on exit from Euratom.
Trudy Harrison
Q
Jonathan Leech: I think technically that material belongs to Euratom at the moment.
Trudy Harrison
Q
Rupert Cowan: That is the effect of the treaty.
Trudy Harrison
Q
Rupert Cowan: It is difficult to answer that question and remain entirely within the Bill, so I expect that James Gray will jump at me.
The Chair
You may digress very slightly, but don’t get too carried away.
Rupert Cowan: Essentially, the safeguards regime is the first step. The second step is the replacement of the existing nuclear co-operation agreements with the jurisdictions that have them with us, notably the European Union, the United States, Korea and Japan. If Euratom is no longer included in our safeguards regime, each of those agreements must be renegotiated, and each of them will require a substantial resource to achieve that. For example, America requires a section 123 agreement under the US Atomic Energy Act. If there are any members that—for their own reasons—do not immediately wish to agree, they can rely on the fact that the safeguards are different from the Euratom safeguards, and say, “We are not able to agree a nuclear co-operation agreement with you yet,” or “in the future,” depending on what is driving them.
Trudy Harrison
Q
Rupert Cowan: Absolutely.
Trudy Harrison
Q
Rupert Cowan: Correct, and nothing that we are saying suggests that this Bill should not go forward, save for the amendment we suggested, which would make those negotiations more straightforward.
Dr Whitehead
Q
Jonathan Leech: May I first go back to the point about the Bill being a contingency? It is very important that the Bill is no sense a contingency.
The Chair
Perhaps you could speak up a little. We are having slight difficulty hearing you.
Jonathan Leech: The Bill is in no sense a contingency, unless we get into a position where we simply do not need our own domestic safeguards regime. Otherwise, it is necessary—it is essential. We have to have it, and we have to have it now. We need the secondary legislation on the table as soon as possible, if not now, and then we need the resource within ONR that we heard about earlier. Critically, it is not just that we need all that in place at the end of the two-year period; we also need to be able to demonstrate that to all those we seek to negotiate replacement nuclear co-operation agreements with, so that we can also have those agreements in place seamlessly at the end of the two-year period.
There is another point to clarify in relation to the role of the IAEA. We are not negotiating nuclear co-operation agreements with the IAEA; we have to negotiate with them on the voluntary offer agreement. Those negotiations are progressing, but I suspect that they are not negotiations that will be critical from a time perspective; it will be the negotiations of the nuclear co-operation agreements, and there we are at the mercy of political will in any number of counterpart states. That is where it becomes extremely uncertain as to whether it is even possible to have those things in place within that timescale. Certainly, to stand any chance of that, we should be in a position today to say, “These are our proposed regulations, this is our resource, this is where we are with IAEA. Can we start talking to you seriously about an NCA?” It is not enough to be able to say, “This is our enabling legislation.” We need to be a long way ahead of this if we are going to have any chance of meeting that two-year timescale.
Dr Whitehead
Q
Tom Greatrex: It could do. You heard from the ONR earlier about the attractiveness of having a period of parallel working. That is in relation to the safeguarding activity and carrying out that function. It is a similar position with relation to co-operation agreements which currently exist under the Euratom umbrella. So the nuclear co-operation agreement we currently have with the US is as a member of Euratom. We will need to have a bilaterally negotiated nuclear co-operation agreement in the future, because it is a legislative requirement in the US and I am sure you will hear from others in evidence about why that is so critically important to particular power stations and projects. Enabling there to be a position where you are covered by the Euratom nuclear co-operation agreement while a bilateral nuclear co-operation agreement is finalised, agreed and put in place is exactly the kind of transitional arrangement or contingency or parallel working—whichever choice of words you want to use for broadly the same thing—is something that the industry has said is very desirable. You have also heard from the ONR that this will help them in the work they will be tasked to do as a result of the provisions of this Bill.
Jonathan Leech: May I add a thought on the concept of associate membership and the extent to which we can rely on that? Of course, the nuclear co-operation agreements we are talking about are agreements with Euratom for the benefit of Euratom members, who are fully subscribed to all the obligations and commitments that entails, including acceptance of all Euratom regulation, including acceptance of European Court of Justice jurisdiction. When we come to look at the transitional phase, we should certainly not assume that all counterparts of those co-operation agreements with Euratom would accept that they should somehow continue to apply to the UK if the UK is something other than a fully subscribed Euratom member. So when we talk about associate membership or a third state of some sort and other examples around, that we can see where others have relationships with Euratom, that in itself would not solve the immediate need to ensure that we have the co-operation agreements in place that we need.
Dr Whitehead
Q
Secondly, we might move down the line of a transitional arrangement, in order to get to the position—not at a more leisurely pace, but at a rather more possible pace —of possible complete rupture with Euratom, but in circumstances in which we might have got NCAs in place in a reasonably orderly way. What, in your view, are the realistic prospects of going down one or other of those routes in the sort of time that we have in front of us?
The Chair
Again, we need a brief answer, because we are drifting slightly wide of the terms of the Bill. We have plenty of time, but even so.
Rupert Cowan: Let me bring it within the terms of the Bill, to make you feel happy, Mr Gray. Obviously the Bill enables those discussions, as has been described, but the chances of being able to follow either of those routes successfully before March 2018 are zero. The possibility of associate membership is not zero but that possibility, having been fulfilled if counterparties are willing to allow it, would not allow us either the opportunity or the time to negotiate the necessary co-operation agreements with the important counterparty jurisdictions that we need.
The second alternative that you suggest is of maintaining full membership for a period, so maybe it could be extended by two years with a sudden cut-off being agreed, and being able during that two-year extension to renegotiate NCAs. That is probably the most practical and preferable solution, but whether or not members of Euratom would be prepared to allow the UK to do that is a very different question.
Unfortunately, it is inevitable that we will be faced with discussions about renegotiating our NCAs with key counterparties who are neither motivated to agree quickly nor able to, because of their own international obligations of recognising the adequacy of our safeguarding arrangements, and there will be a point at which they cease to apply under Euratom, with consequences that remain to be seen.
I mean, I cannot imagine the United States immediately withdrawing its expertise from the various sites, but it may choose to. Similarly, Korea is a very important counterparty. Once the agreement comes to an end, the opportunity of persuading Korea to invest in Moorside goes away from us.
Mary Robinson
Q
Rupert Cowan: In terms of research, which is a separate issue, it is fundamental. All the joint research—the Joint European Torus and so forth—is predicated on membership of Euratom, and the funding arrangements are a subset of the arrangements of the Euratom members. At the moment, it will stop, and unless central Government funding is made available people will return home.
Dr Whitehead
Q
Rupert Cowan: Well, it is the article 50 notice. [Interruption.] Did I say 2018? I meant 2019—apologies.
Dr Whitehead
Okay. Assuming we did mean 2019, if we are not in a position—even if we are reasonably close to a position—where we have done all the secondary legislation arrangements for nuclear safeguarding, but we have not made too much progress in a number of other areas relating to transposing Euratom responsibilities to the UK, and/or a number of those NCAs are in a difficult position as far as their conclusion is concerned, what would be the effect on the nuclear industry at that point?
Rupert Cowan: It is very difficult to project, but it does mean that, unlike other industries, trade has to stop—trade in materials, in intellectual property and in people, as in intellectual property. For example, you can imagine that the French, if they were in a bad mood, might choose to drag their feet, because in consequence they would be able to take a monopoly of fuel retreatment from Japan, which currently sends some to the UK and some to France. Who is to know that that will not happen? The European Union will not see us as friends and will not seek to bend over backwards to find accommodation for a nuclear co-operation agreement. It is probably going to be a very slow and difficult arrangement.
One thing that needs to be in place to achieve any progress is a safeguards arrangement that is at least as good as Euratom’s. Currently, the Bill as drafted insinuates that there is a window for it to be less than Euratom, because it goes to IAEA rather than Euratom guidance. Hence the words that we are offering for someone to propose as an amendment, so that in those negotiations you can say, hand on heart, that there will be no dilution, and therefore no commercial advantage to the UK, as a result of our having a domestic safeguards arrangement rather than a Euratom safeguards arrangement.
Tom Greatrex: Let me add that if, as has been stated, the Government’s intention is to replicate the Euratom standards and arrangements, you will have heard from the ONR earlier that it will not be possible to implement that at the end of March 2019. That is the crux of the industry’s concern about there being sufficient time to enable the new UK regime to be in place. The Bill does just the very first part of enabling that to start to happen. It does not solve the issue; there are a whole range of things that have to happen as a consequence of the Bill and other remits that need to be struck, which is why people are concerned about a very real-time pressure.
Jonathan Leech: The very first step would be to make absolutely certain that the Bill gives the power to create the regulatory regime that is equivalent to Euratom. The second step, which needs to follow that very closely, is to ensure, by whatever means necessary, that ONR is given the resource to do what needs to be done, so that we do not face any hiatus, if indeed that is possible.
Rupert Cowan: In the safeguards regime.
Jonathan Leech: Yes, in the safeguards regime.
Rupert Cowan: Which then allows the discussions to go forward from a position of fairness and honesty; that we are not trying to dilute or change the obligations we have under Euratom, which is what others might suspect.
Jonathan Leech: When you have both of those things, you can go and speak to counterparties to the co-operation agreements you need and say, “This is what we are doing. We can lay it out on the table for you. This is the investment we are making and these are the regulations we will have in place.” If we cannot do that, they simply will not take us seriously.
Dr Whitehead
Q
Jonathan Leech: As a matter of general political process, yes, there needs to be scrutiny so that these regulations are developed now—not over the next two years, but over the next month—so that we are then in a position to take the steps that follow. In terms of the broader position, if what we are seeking to do is to replicate and preserve what is, at the moment, effectively EU regulation, then that is but one of many areas where a similar approach may be taken. It is a little more complex here because you have to untangle it from the resource of Euratom and the enforcement processes and the ECJ jurisdiction. Nevertheless, if the statement is that it is to replicate, then the objective should be just that.
In terms of the fine detail of the regulation, it is an intensely technical thing, and some sort of secondary legislation is probably the right place for it. My biggest concern would be around scrutiny of the timetable to ensure that it is not delayed in any way that will jeopardise our position at the end of the two-year process.
Tom Greatrex: I would have thought that, as Members of Parliament, you would want to be satisfied and confident that everything is in place in the timeframe in which it needs to be in place. It is obviously open to you to seek to amend the Bill in order to put that to the test.
A subsequent related point is that the industry also thinks that it is important that the Bill could be amended to ensure that the nuclear sector is consulted on the detail of that new regulation. You have to bear in mind that there will be people who will need to make sure that they can comply with that regulation, so understanding its content is vital. Getting that right—given the timeframe and the time pressures we face—is going to be critical. So there is another route to pursue to ensure not only that Parliament is satisfied, but that the industry has an opportunity to be consulted on the detail of that new regulation so that it is right first time.
Jonathan Leech: In a sense what is needed is the highest degree of openness and the widest consultation possible in the development of that regulation.
Dr Whitehead
Q
Rupert Cowan: Completely seriously. The reason for that is that each of the counterparties with whom we trade in fissile material, components, or anything else listed as sensitive and nuclear, have their own international treaty obligations. One of those obligations is that they should not trade with people who do not have safeguard arrangements in place that are at least equal to the IAEA safeguards. Unless that is complete and in place, we will not trade, and so they will not be able to continue business with us—full stop. If any members will be participating tomorrow in the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee on the economic implications for the industry, that is what will be said to you.
Richard Harrington
Q
Rupert Cowan: We support the Bill completely. We suggest the amendments for the reasons described.
Paul Blomfield
Q
Tom Greatrex: As the ONR said earlier this morning, it will not be possible to replicate the safeguarding regime on day one. If the Government have said that they intend to replicate the standards that we currently have as a member of Euratom, there is obviously a concern that we will not be in the position where we will be meeting the same standards at the point at which we leave Euratom. That is the crucial point about the need for a transitional arrangement or parallel working—there are different ways of describing what is broadly the same thing—which is to avoid that gap.
If you do not have the correct arrangements in place, as you have heard from others on the panel, the series of other arrangements that are effectively contingent on the safeguarding regime will not be able to be in place. That is why it affects absolutely everything to do with the functioning of the industry as it currently functions and has functioned for the past 40 years or more.
We can take a practical example. Because of the international nature of the nuclear industry, the Sizewell reactor currently generating power in Suffolk is based on Westinghouse technology. That technology is therefore US technology. Because of the legal requirement to have a nuclear co-operation agreement in place, there are very real—these are not scare stories—and legitimate concerns that even the ability to exchange information between the operators of the site, EDF and where the technology originates from will potentially be illegal at the point when we come out of Euratom, if we do not have successor arrangements in place or a period of time to enable the transition to be finalised and for the new regime to be put in the place.
It is not about being against the Bill. The Bill does the first step, but there are many more subsequent steps that have to be taken. The ability to do that in a very limited timeframe is the cause of the majority of the concern.
The Chair
We will discuss that in this room when we are considering subsequent Bills, no doubt.
Trudy Harrison
Q
Tom Greatrex: The question is probably better addressed to the ONR, but I think the skillsets that would give the ability to move between those different things may be limited to some extent. However, as you heard earlier, it is not unusual for domestic regulators to have responsibilities for safeguarding inspection. That happens in a number of different countries already, but Euratom effectively does that on our behalf. I do not think that in itself is particularly an issue. It is about the process of being able to move from the current situation to the new one.
In the fullness of time, if we get all these arrangements in place and there is not an interruption, and all those concerns are addressed, I do not think there is anything to suggest that the ONR would not be fully capable of doing this alongside the other things it is currently required to do. I am not sure to what extent there would be the economies of scale benefits that you suggest, because the skills involved in safeguarding inspections are quite different from assessing new reactor designs or the routine safety inspections that happen at sites around the country, such as Sellafield and others.
Trudy Harrison
Q
Rupert Cowan: They rub their hands with glee and say, “You keep it; your problem.”
Trudy Harrison
But it already is our problem.
Rupert Cowan: No, because it goes back to Japan when it has been re-cleaned. They will just say it is our problem, and that they cannot take it because they are not allowed to. You should not get the impression from what we are saying that we are in any way opposed to the Bill. It is probably correct that, ultimately, ONR being responsible for safeguarding is a positive outcome. It is the disruption that frightens us. That disruption is not a scare story, it is a very real possibility in terms of electricity generation and the ownership, safeguarding and storage of spent fuels, which would be going back to their home base—or not, depending on the particular arrangement; it is all going to stop if we do not get this organised. That is the danger.
I am not saying that we will not have resolved it in 10 years’ time, but the next two or three years look pretty bleak. That is the worry.
Jonathan Leech: We have to keep in mind that international nuclear trade depends upon international acceptability; it is very much a compliance-driven culture. It is not the case that there is a fall-back that might involve a higher tariff or whatever; it would simply be unlawful, so it would simply stop until such time as we have resolved the impasse.
The Chair
We are testing the edges of the Bill. Maybe because I want to say “sir”, I call Sir Robert Syms.
Sir Robert Syms
Q
Jonathan Leech: Correct. We should see those published as soon as possible and consulted on as widely and as soon as possible. That should happen alongside the development of the resource to deliver them.
The Chair
I am being fairly relaxed, but I want to bring it back to what is in the Bill, rather than what is not. With that in mind, I call Dr Whitehead.
Dr Whitehead
Q
Jonathan Leech: You are right into the detail of the technical regulation there. The first thing is that you need to expand the scope of those powers within the legislation, and the Bill seeks to do that. Then you need the regulation to set out exactly what is to be done, how and where, and take into account the point, which we have not really gone into, about the outcomes-based approach that the rest of our domestic nuclear regulation is based on. That will present a challenge in transcribing the regulations for use in UK law. We are probably straying from the Bill there. However, provided that we set out in the Bill an expansion of those enforcement powers, which will be an essential component of the expansion of ONR’s role, we are starting to put in place what we need to have. We need the regulation to go with it.
Dr Whitehead
Q
Jonathan Leech: In terms of how it is presented, I suggest that it is preferable to have our law on this matter collected together in one place and so to proceed by amendment, rather than by replication. If we create a whole new regime in the Bill, then we introduce the possibility of discrepancies between two similar but possibly slightly different regimes, that is generally unhelpful. To proceed by amendment to and expansion of the Energy Act 2013 is probably the right way to go.
Rupert Cowan: I see the people who are negotiating the nuclear co-operation agreements. They want to be able to refer to a clear set of guidelines, which is clearly at least as effective in safeguarding, and therefore allowing the counterparty to fulfil its international obligation, as the existing Euratom system. It needs to be easily referable to, so that you can sell it and get your deal as quickly as possible, without them taking points about the way your safeguards are drafted or presented. That should be very much in the minds of the draftsmen—that there is a commercial and pressing need to get this agreed with seven or eight foreign jurisdictions as quickly as possible, some of whom will be willing, and some of whom will be less willing, to agree your safeguards regime as adequate to fulfil their obligations. It needs to be clear, clean and saleable. That is the secondary legislation that follows from the Bill, which is why we have suggested only one amendment. The objective of the amendment is to do that, so you can go and talk to somebody in Korea or the United States and say, “This works,” and they cannot see a reason quickly why it should not. You are resourced, the regulations are clear, they apply and you can have your discussion over in months, rather than years.
The Chair
My instinct is that the Committee has found your evidence extremely useful. Unless there are any further questions, I thank you all for your extremely helpful, useful, well-informed and wide-ranging evidence. We are most grateful to you.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Rebecca Harris.)
Nuclear Safeguards Bill (Second sitting)
Tuesday 31st October 2017
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 31 October 2017 - (31 Oct 2017)
The Chair
I welcome our witness for the first session this afternoon, which can last for half an hour. Angela Hepworth is the corporate policy and regulation director at EDF. Perhaps, for the record, you would be kind enough to introduce yourself. If you want to say anything about the Bill by way of introductory remarks, please do so.
Angela Hepworth: I am Angela Hepworth. I am the corporate policy and regulation director for EDF Energy. I look after our interaction with Government and with regulators in the UK, and I am also managing the company’s work on Brexit, and in particular Euratom.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Richard Harrington)
Q
Angela Hepworth: I do agree. Maybe I can say something about our industrial perspective and what it means to us in the UK.
As I am sure you know, we own and operate the eight existing nuclear power stations in the UK, which provide 20% of the UK’s electricity-generating capacity. We also have plans to build a new nuclear power station at Hinkley Point C and then follow-on nuclear power stations. As part of that, it is vital for the existing nuclear fleet and for our new build projects that we are able to import fuel, components, services and information for the nuclear power stations. That is absolutely essential. We have a supply chain that depends on having access to those things from Europe and further afield.
In order to do that, it is essential that there is a functioning safeguards regime in place that is approved by the International Atomic Energy Agency. At the moment, as you know, that is provided by Euratom. When Euratom is no longer providing that, it is essential that we have a domestic regime that will support our ability to import those things. We see it as essential to have a safeguarding regime and therefore essential to have the Bill, to give the necessary powers to put that regime in place.
Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)
Q
Angela Hepworth: In terms of our UK operations, we will be operating within a UK safeguarding regime. We understand that the Government’s intention is to keep the arrangements from an industry perspective quite similar to the existing arrangements that apply with Euratom. The Bill provides powers to put that regime in place. We have not seen the detail of how those arrangements will operate, but we are very keen to. We are happy, in principle, working under a domestic safeguards regime in the UK, as we have been happy working under a Euratom safeguards regime.
Mary Robinson (Cheadle) (Con)
Q
Angela Hepworth: On the safeguards regime first, our concern is about the amount that has to be done to have the safeguarding regime in place in time. As I say, in principle we are very happy with the idea that a domestic regime should be established, rather than the Euratom safeguards regime, but we are conscious that there is a lot to do in the time available to get that regime in place. It is not the principle of it; it is the timing and the implementation.
Likewise, we are conscious that the other key components that we need to have in place include a replacement agreement with Euratom, which would cover issues relating to the ownership of nuclear material, and our future trading relations with Europe for nuclear materials. Obviously, that is subject to the negotiations that are going on in Brussels at the moment. I have regular contact with the officials who are leading those negotiations, and we are fully aligned with the objectives they are perusing. Again, it is subject to the success of those negotiations.
There are other key things that have to be put in place. We will need nuclear co-operation agreements with key third countries. I have been told that the negotiations are under way and are progressing well. Again, our concern is the timing and how it fits with the timing of putting a safeguards regime in place. Those agreements cannot be finalised until there is certainty about the domestic safeguards regime, so it is about the timing of getting all of that done.
The other key issue for us is the movement of people. We are an international business, and the nuclear industry is an international industry. We rely on having access to experts from Europe and further afield. The roles in the company that most draw on skills from overseas are engineering roles—we are reliant on being able to draw in engineers. Building Hinkley Point will require a workforce of 25,000 people. We are doing an awful lot to try to build up skills in the UK, but we expect that, to deliver Hinkley, we will need to be able to draw on workers from overseas. I would not expect that to be solved within the Euratom arena, but that is a key issue for us as a nuclear operator.
We also have to ensure that we have got an export control regime in place and support for nuclear R and D. Those are the key issues for us relating to Euratom.
Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)
May I ask you about the Euratom costs relating to safeguarding, which may not go to Euratom but to the Office for Nuclear Regulation as a result of the transfer of responsibility for safeguarding from Euratom to ONR? I understand that EDF Energy already pays into ONR as a contribution to its general costs, but does not pay anything to Euratom for safeguarding. Is that right?
Angela Hepworth: That is right. We have to distinguish what we pay for from the ONR at the moment. As a nuclear operator, we are required to comply with certain safety and security regulations, and we pay for the ONR’s role in inspecting our stations to ensure we comply with our obligations. That is absolutely right, and we expect that to continue. There is a distinction to be drawn between that and compliance with the safeguarding regime, which is the responsibility of a member state. At the moment, the UK Government pays for that to be done via its contributions to the EU budget. As that is a member state responsibility, it is clear to us that it should be the UK Government who meet those costs in the future, rather than look to the industry to cover them.
Dr Whitehead
Q
Angela Hepworth: As I understand it, it is funded via the EU budget contribution. That is how it is funded at the moment.
Dr Whitehead
Q
Angela Hepworth: I think the cost should be met by the UK Government, given that it is discharging a UK Government responsibility.
Dr Whitehead
Q
Angela Hepworth: I think we would welcome the assurance; whether that is provided on the face of the Bill or separately is less of a concern to us.
Rachel Maclean (Redditch) (Con)
Q
Angela Hepworth: It would be first and foremost the responsibility of the ONR to put the safeguarding arrangements in place—if that is the element that you are particularly concerned about. I know that one of the early activities they are undertaking is recruitment of the experts that they need in order to do that. They need to be able to do that and to put in place the processes and systems that they need to be able to discharge those responsibilities. What we would welcome as an operator is a timetable from the Government and the ONR that sets out exactly what steps need to be taken and when, in order to have a regime operational at the point where the UK leaves Euratom.
Drew Hendry (Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey) (SNP)
Q
Angela Hepworth: I think it is really a process of increasing confidence. It is not so much that there is a particular date where you need to have everything signed and sealed, but we need to have a process between now and the exit date where we have confidence about the regime that will be in place at that date. We would very much support having a transitional or implementation phase, with as much continuity in the existing arrangements as possible. If that could be confirmed early, that would be a great benefit to the nuclear industry, to give them the confidence that they will have continuity in the existing arrangements for a period after the exit date.
Drew Hendry
Q
Angela Hepworth: I do not think that is a question I can answer. We would like a period of transition. I think that is probably a question for the Government—what they think is appropriate in the circumstances, given what needs to be done within that timeframe.
Drew Hendry
I am surprised that you do not have an idea of what you might require as part of the industry—that you might not have an idea of how long you might need as a run-in time to adjust to new regulations.
Angela Hepworth: I think it is more a question of understanding the timeline from the Government and the ONR that they need to have these arrangements in place. Speaking from an industry perspective, we welcome certainty and stability. An early signal that there would be a period of continuity after the Euratom exit date where the arrangements for trade would continue to apply would be very reassuring.
Trudy Harrison (Copeland) (Con)
Q
Angela Hepworth: If we are thinking about countries outside the EU, there are a number of countries where it is either illegal or a policy requirement that they have a nuclear co-operation agreement in place if they are going to export nuclear material. The countries that the UK Government have rightly prioritised for negotiating agreements are the US, Canada, Japan and Australia. In each case the UK Government will need to negotiate a nuclear co-operation agreement with that country to enable the trade.
Why does it matter? For example, our Sizewell B power station relies on Westinghouse technology, so we rely on our links with the US in order to be able to operate and maintain that power station. If we wanted to import a part from America, or to draw on expertise and services from America for that power station, there has to be a nuclear co-operation agreement in place between the UK and the US in order to do that. As we understand it, the US will not agree a nuclear co-operation agreement unless the UK has a safeguards regime in place, which is one reason we see the Nuclear Safeguards Bill as a key priority, to put that in place. Each of those countries will have its own internal processes in order to agree nuclear co-operation agreements.
As I understand it, for example, in the US it will have to be agreed by the President and it will have to go through Congress. We have been telling Government we would like to see, as an industry, a timeline that sets out for our benefit the steps that need to be taken in order to put a safeguards regime in place, to get it approved by the IAEA, to conclude the negotiations with third countries, but also the ratification processes for those countries, in order to understand the end-to-end process and how those various components interact, so that we can have the safeguards regime in place and also the nuclear co-operation agreements with those third countries. Then, as I said, we need a future agreement with Euratom: there needs to be an agreement in place, negotiated between the UK and Euratom, which explains the framework for nuclear trade going forward once we have left Euratom.
Trudy Harrison
Q
Angela Hepworth: Yes; there is a nuclear supply chain across the EU and the UK is a great opportunity for those countries. For example, two-thirds of the value of the construction of Hinkley Point will go to companies in the UK but that leaves one-third of the value of the construction going to countries from further afield. Many of those are companies in Europe but, for example, there are companies in the US and Japan which are also involved in the Hinkley Point supply chain. It is in the interests of those companies and countries to have future co-operation agreements which enable them to participate in the supply chain. The UK has great opportunities for international companies: there is supporting the operation of the existing nuclear fleet; there is the nuclear new build programme; there is decommissioning coming up. So there should be real opportunities for other companies to be involved in the UK supply chain if we can get those agreements in place.
Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)
Q
Angela Hepworth: I am not saying it is not doable; I am saying it is challenging. You heard first-hand from Dr Mina Golshan of the ONR this morning about the practical steps that need to be taken. There is an awful lot that it needs to do in terms of recruitment and having systems and processes set up. We are mindful of the fact that that is a challenge in the time available. That is one reason we support an implementation or transitional phase.
Paul Blomfield
Q
Angela Hepworth: Again, we are looking for assurance and clarity. I am less concerned about whether that is set out in the Bill or not; it is assurance and clarity that the industry is looking for.
Dr Whitehead
Q
Angela Hepworth: In terms of a future relationship, EDF Energy has been clear from the outset that far and away the best outcome for the UK nuclear industry would be to remain in Euratom. That remains, we think, the right answer for the UK nuclear industry. Assuming that that is not possible and that we have to look at a future agreement, the models of association agreements in place now are limited to engagement in research and development programmes. That is valuable, but it does not address the key issue that we are concerned about, which is the movement of nuclear materials. What we are most concerned about in all of this is our ability to move nuclear fuel, nuclear components, information and services. The current framework of association agreements would not meet that need. If that were going to solve the key issues, we would need to think of some different model of association.
Preet Kaur Gill (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab/Co-op)
Q
“The UK Safeguards Bill says little about what a new regime will look like.”
You also say that if there were any changes or amendments to regulation,
“Neither EDF nor the wider UK nuclear industry are…included as statutory consultees”.
Do you think that the current consultees include the wider sector, or are they quite limited?
Angela Hepworth: As I understand it, the Bill says that the ONR and such other people as are deemed appropriate must be consulted. We would welcome consultation with the broader nuclear industry.
The Chair
Unless there are any other questions from colleagues, I will say thank you very much indeed for your time. You have been extremely helpful and clear, and have added a lot to our deliberations over the next couple of weeks.
Examination of Witnesses
Sue Ferns and Kevin Coyne gave evidence.
The Chair
Q
Sue Ferns: I am Sue Ferns. I work for Prospect, a politically independent trade union representing thousands of members across the nuclear industry, from research to generation and decommissioning. We also represent members who work at the Joint European Torus facility in Culham.
We have set out our key concerns about the Bill, one of which is to ensure that the powers of the inspectors are included in the Bill, consistent with the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 and the Energy Act 2013. We would also like to see in the Bill a consultation on what associate membership of Euratom would look like, because we feel that that would be better than exiting Euratom. From the discussion that has just taken place I understand, and agree, that there is no off-the-peg answer to that, and that we would have to write something specifically for the UK’s circumstances. Those are a couple of our key concerns.
The Chair
Q
Kevin Coyne: What a pity. I am Kevin Coyne, national officer for Unite. Unite represents skilled workers in the nuclear industry, from decommissioning and generation to huge swathes of the electricity industry. Our position on the Bill, and I understand that you will be asking supplementary questions about whether we support it, is that we have concerns, principally about the impact on workers in the industry, as you would expect from us. We also have concerns about the timescale, and whether that will be in place and have ramifications for jobs in the future. We have concerns about JET in particular, the jobs based at JET, and the freedom of movement of those jobs throughout Europe and the attention to detail in the Bill about that. Those are our three main concerns.
Richard Harrington
Welcome this afternoon. I accept your point, Kevin, and the Chair has quite rightly ruled about our discussing what is in the Bill, but my door is always open to both you and Sue to discuss other matters on another occasion.
Kevin Coyne: That is very kind of you.
Richard Harrington
Q
I would like to ask you a leading question—something which of course we do. I understand your views on Euratom and what Sue said about associate membership. She is quite right that there is no actual definition of associate membership. However, given that the Government decided to serve the article 50 notice on Euratom and we are leaving subject to negotiations, which is a statement of fact, would you accept that we are doing the right thing in having nuclear safeguards built? I accept that you do not think that the Bill covers everything, but would you still support it?
Kevin Coyne: The important point is that there is a safeguarding mechanism in place by 2019. You have seen my paper, in which we indicate as a union that we wished that Euratom had been left in place for a series of reasons, including the continuity of various bits at a high level. We do not believe that we can hope to progress to that level by 2019, so we believe that the safeguarding mechanisms outlined in the Bill are important to safeguard the industry as it goes into a phase which we do not yet know about.
Sue Ferns: Just to add to that, having read the Second Reading debate, there was a lot of talk about this being a contingency measure. I would agree; it is an essential contingency measure. It is not our first preference, but it needs to be there as a contingency.
Dr Whitehead
Q
I wonder if you might briefly share with us what you think might be possible so that the Bill is not a contingency, and whether you think the timescale that we have in front of us over the next period is sufficient to bring in either associate membership, perhaps, or similar arrangements with Euratom. Alternatively, if the Bill is to be used as a contingency, do you think that the timescale in front of us—bearing in mind all the detail of the secondary legislation that we need to get through as far as the Bill is concerned—will be sufficient to make that happen?
Sue Ferns: I think the answer is that we do not feel confident that the timescale is sufficient. From speaking to members in the ONR who essentially have to deliver the key provisions of the Bill, it is clear that they need to build an IT system to log the data properly. They need to have resources to deliver what is required, bearing in mind that we are a heavy utiliser of Euratom resources in the UK. As the previous witness said, we need to make sure that there are inspectors in place to be able to police the regime.
It is easy to say that; it is much more difficult to deliver it. Nuclear inspectors are thin on the ground at the best of times. Absolutely, ONR is doing its very best to try to ensure that it can expand its inspector resources, but I think even ONR feels that it is a challenge. The question is where will these people come from? The only obvious source is from elsewhere in the industry, because there are not qualified nuclear inspectors who are currently out of the labour market. That is absolutely a major challenge. The honest answer to the question is that I do not know whether the timescale is sufficient, but at this stage we certainly do not feel confident about it.
Kevin Coyne: I would answer that question with two responses. First, as I said, we as a union hoped that we would have remained in Euratom. We do that because we believe there is not a necessity to leave Euratom in effecting Brexit under article 50 and through article 160a. It was possible, I understand, to remain. That is important, because of the uncertainty that we now believe is cast over that.
As I said before, our concern is mainly with our members’ interests and with jobs. Sizewell B, for instance, will be in operation until 2034, and it relies extensively on components from the United States. It is very important that the co-operation agreements that the previous witness talked about are in place by 2019, and there must be serious doubt with the inspectorate in its current state. I believe that the numbers are 160 inspectors, and the ONR has fewer than 10 in place currently. So, there is the training and the programme and—importantly—all of that must cast doubt upon our ability, and if that is the case it will affect the smooth operation of nuclear plants in future, until there is a regime in place that equally matches the plants.
Secondly, I would argue that there is an impact on new nuclear development for the regime. For instance, there is the whole fuel cycle in Britain, which is gearing up to be a serious and important new operator of new nuclear build. We want within that the whole fuel cycle—the whole of the nuclear operation. As you know, in Preston we have a factory—Springfields—that produces fuel, which is wholly dependent on mixed fuels from other nations, co-operation agreements and the operation of Euratom in ensuring that that fuel supply is there and available.
There is a real threat, because of the problems with Westinghouse, that that plant in Preston would suffer as a result of the safeguards not being in place in time. That would result not only in the loss of jobs but in issues for the fuel cycle itself, for Britain’s ability to recreate the whole of the nuclear cycle for the export orders for the industry, and for the jobs that that entails.
Eleanor Smith (Wolverhampton South West) (Lab)
Q
Kevin Coyne: I will defer to my colleague, who is from the union that represents these people.
Sue Ferns: How long to train a nuclear inspector?
Eleanor Smith
Q
Sue Ferns: It takes quite a number of years to train a nuclear inspector. Obviously, if you get people from the industry, they have a level of experience, but not in that context. I believe that ONR is considering whether it can provide additional training to some of its other staff, to enable them to take this role. They are people who inspect, but don’t inspect for safeguarding. However, none of that happens overnight. This is a highly skilled, very specialist area, which is why there is such a premium on this source of labour, so it will take a period of time to be able to do that.
Kevin Coyne: The reputation of the UK nuclear industry and its attendant skills and safety record are things that we, including the trade unions, are very proud of. I would argue that it is important that Euratom inspectors are highly regarded and renowned throughout the world, but that takes time. It is very important to have that reputation, so that people in the rest of the world believe the reports and the regulations that emanate from that.
Trudy Harrison
Q
Sue Ferns: I think that there are a couple of things. First, as the previous witness said, there should be a clearer timetable for various steps. At the moment there is a deadline and then there are two years. How will we get there? The path is unclear.
Trudy Harrison
Q
Sue Ferns: Indeed, and what the risks are at each stage, so that they can be known and are transparent. I am sure that various stakeholders are working on them at the moment, but I do not think that the critical path with the risks at each stage is a transparent timeline at the moment.
Another thing that would build confidence is making it clear that everyone will work to achieve this, but if we do not achieve it, we must have a longer transition period. For the sake of the industry, we absolutely cannot afford to step out of the regime that we have now until it is absolutely clear that there are equivalent standards in place and that they are operating. It is quite difficult to impose an arbitrary timescale on that because, as I said, there are a number of risk factors: specifying, procuring and getting new IT systems up and running—there is not always a great track record on that—and making sure that we have appropriately qualified and skilled inspectors.
Reflecting on the previous question, Kevin is absolutely right: the UK has a first-class reputation. We all know how easily reputations can be lost. They take years to win, but they do not take years to lose. There should be a combination of having the critical path, which is transparent about the risks at each stage, and being clear that if we need a longer transition in this sphere, we should have a longer transition because that is in the interests of the industry.
Paul Blomfield
Q
Sue Ferns: I think that that is a reasonable assumption. The reason I said I was a bit uncertain is that it depends on where you get these people from and what their previous experience is. A reasonable approximation is several years—it is not a matter of months but years for people to be able to do that job. Yes, it is about knowledge and skills—and there are a lot of knowledge and skills in the industry—but there are specific aspects of an inspector’s role. This is a warranted role; this is not just working in the industry. It is not just about knowledge, but experience and commanding the confidence of the companies and the organisations that you deal with, so there are very specific aspects to that role. I think that it is a period of years. Of all the things that worry ONR, this is probably one of the key ones, if not the key one. As I say, I think it is doing the absolute best it can, but this is one of the things that keeps them awake at night.
Paul Blomfield
Q
Sue Ferns: Absolutely. It is a small talent pool, and it is a challenging talent pool even in the best of times. To use what may or may not be an appropriate analogy, it is fishing in a defined and restricted pool, and we are now saying it has to increase its catch from that pool. That is a hard and really difficult thing to do. Also bear in mind that ONR is subject to public sector constraints in its recruitment and payment practices. If it has to compete with the commercial sector, something will have to give in that regard. How can the catch from that limited pool be increased under the constraints it is operating in? The job is getting tougher and bigger, and there are multiple challenges.
Paul Blomfield
Q
Sue Ferns: The concerns are set out in our evidence. If you look at sections 20 to 22 of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 and schedule 8 to the Energy Act 2013, they set out in some detail what the powers of the inspectors will be. I know there is reference to that in the schedule to the Bill. These concerns come directly from people who will have to do this job. As warranted inspectors, they feel that it is important to have those powers in the Bill. It is important for purposes of parity, to ensure continuity—these things should not be left to the discretion of future Ministers—and also, as we have discussed, for external confidence in the way the job will be done. That is why we believe very strongly that those powers should be specified. I have not heard an argument to say why, if it is good enough for the 1974 Act and the 2013 Act, we should contemplate a change in practice for this piece of legislation.
Dr Whitehead
Q
Sue Ferns: I think achieving that would be an important step forward. However, as we have set out in our evidence, we have identified three other matters, because you would then have to be clear about what safeguarding means in law. The three bullet points in paragraph 5 of our evidence are points where we think that specific clarity is required in relation to what that would mean in a safeguarding regime. Is that clear?
Dr Whitehead
Q
Sue Ferns: I am not an expert on how to draft legislation, but I understand you are asking whether we should take the schedule from the Energy Act 2013 and put it in the Bill, along with any other points that may need to be included. That is certainly our preference, and it is certainly the preference of the members we represent in these roles.
Kevin Coyne: In addition, we would indicate that your knowledge is greater than ours at the moment on the 2013 Act. The importance of the inspectorate is its neutrality and independence. If you are saying that there is an element in there that is currently switched off that can be switched on, that would be an important contribution, but you must ensure that it has that neutrality and independence, because that is what gives status and quality to the current inspectorate through Euratom. I do not go to bed at night reading the 2013 Act, but I cannot remember it addressing the independence issue, which I think would be an important element.
Dr Whitehead
Q
Sue Ferns: My understanding is that the IAEA will require certain standards to have been met before anything else can happen. What I understand, though, is that during the Second Reading debate on the Bill, there was a lot of talk about replicating the Euratom powers. My understanding is that that is not necessarily the IAEA hurdle, because I think the IAEA hurdle is slightly lower than replicating the Euratom powers. Certainly, there will be a requirement to meet IAEA standards.
Trudy Harrison
Q
Kevin Coyne: I think that is an area which is of serious consequence. I think it is generally not well known—the fact that Euratom covers the transportation of materials—or that isotopes that are used in the NHS, for instance, come from Holland and other countries. We do not have the reactors in this country to produce them. I understand what you say about the registration. We highlighted that as a concern because there is a two-day, three-day shelf-life; this comes from us as a union that operates within the NHS at quite an extensive level. In terms of the delivery and transportation of that, there are sometimes delays. So our point is that the change of regimes and the difference in what might occur may cause that to be delayed even further and therefore impact upon the NHS itself. We make no stronger point than that we ought to look at the impact upon isotopes in hospitals.
Richard Harrington
Q
Kevin Coyne: A Euratom point—and you think I am mistaken about that?
Richard Harrington
Well, because I can quite understand the point that they have got to be overnight, or very quickly, and all that kind of thing—would that be affected by a change of law when we Brexit. My advice, though, is very clear; I have asked a lot of people, as you might imagine. It is very much Trudy’s point, which is that, whatever one thinks about Euratom and so on, the medical isotopes are not covered within the fissile definition of Euratom. Do you feel that we are wrong on that, or was your point, “Yes, we’ve got to get them quickly and without paperwork and all that kind of delay”—which may or may not happen afterwards?
Kevin Coyne: Our information, as I said, was simply that upon the basis of the delays in transportation, due to the change in regime, we thought we ought to have in place a cast-iron security, as we do now, to make sure that those delays do not unnecessarily happen.
Alex Norris
Q
Kevin Coyne: Generally, among staff in the nuclear industry?
Alex Norris
Yes.
Kevin Coyne: If the truth be said, I would imagine that a majority of staff still are not aware of the massive ramifications—certainly among my members. Sue is much closer to the issues in terms of the roles that they take. It is becoming more widely known. That certainly was not an issue, as you recall, within the Brexit discussions, so the general knowledge of it is not that great. What is important is that those organisations that do know—you heard from EDF earlier—are now briefing very widely on the impact that it may have, particularly in terms of the items I listed. For instance, the people at Springfields are acutely aware, because of the impact upon that nuclear new build and on nuclear new build projects for the future. There is concern—it is important to say that—but as for whether it is widespread across all the staff, I do not think I could lead you to that view currently, but clearly it will affect all staff that work within the nuclear industry.
Sue Ferns: Among our members there is quite an awareness of this now. We recently did a survey of all our members in the industry, and well over 80% wanted either to stay in Euratom or in some form of associate membership of Euratom because of the concerns or the uncertainty they had about leaving. I would say that in the research areas, concerns are very high. JET, for example, is already finding it more difficult to recruit because of the uncertainty about the future of the organisation. Of course, the issue there is very much one of the free movement of people. It has a workforce that is 60% EU nationals, so it is a major priority, but across the rest of the industry there are levels of 80% or more expressing a preference for an alternative future.
The Chair
On behalf of the entire Committee, I thank both our witnesses, Kevin Coyne and Sue Ferns, for their extremely interesting and useful evidence, which added to our understanding and will be useful in the debates that lie ahead in the next couple of weeks. The Committee will know that there is to be a vote which has to be by 3 pm. Rather than starting the next session, I think we should stop now and do our best to get back by 3.10 pm.
The Chair
I welcome Professor Juan Matthews, a visiting professor at the Dalton Nuclear Institute. I am told that another Division is due within half an hour, so I would like to conclude our discussions by that time and keep remarks brief. Will you start, Professor, by introducing yourself and giving some brief comments on the Bill?
Professor Matthews: My name is Juan Matthews. I currently work with the Dalton Nuclear Institute of the University of Manchester as a postgraduate teacher of nuclear technology, and I also advise on government and international relations. My previous role was with UK Trade and Investment, which is now the Department for International Trade, where I was a nuclear specialist for a number of years. Prior to that I had a very long career in the nuclear industry, starting as a laboratory assistant in 1962 at the age of 16, working in a fuel development lab, so I have practical experience of coming up against nuclear safeguards.
As far as I am concerned, the Bill is very clear and uncontroversial. The things associated with the Bill are more problematic, as several people who are much better qualified than me have already commented. I would like to point out a couple of things that came up in the recent discussion.
The term “inspector” as it is being used is not clear, in the respect that nuclear inspectors are normally people who look at the safety of facilities; nuclear safeguards are quite different because they require a different set of skills and a different stance. The personnel cannot be interchanged; one cannot just take staff from the Office for Nuclear Regulation and say, “Next week you start doing nuclear safeguards.” It is not as easy as that. There was also a brief mention of isotopes. Of course, that is not at all relevant to the Nuclear Safeguards Bill, but I point out that chapter 9 of the Euratom treaty guarantees the unimpeded transport and tariff-free trade not only of nuclear materials but also of radioactive isotopes used in medicine and industry.
The Chair
As you correctly say, that is beyond the scope of the Bill. I did not interrupt earlier but if it comes up again, I will.
Professor Matthews: I thought I would clarify.
The Chair
It is most kind of you. The Minister may want to clarify the difference between inspectors and safeguarders.
Richard Harrington
I do not feel able fully to clarify the point at this juncture, Mr Gray. Usually the mistake is made—not that Professor Matthews would—between safety and safeguarders, but we are looking at the safeguards regime here, which includes physical inspection, mentioned today by quite a few of the people giving evidence, and, though I do not quite know how to use the expression, remote inspection by cameras and other sets of kit, which at the moment belong to Euratom but I am sure will be part of the new safeguards regime.
Professor Matthews: There are three components in nuclear safeguards. One is nuclear materials accountancy— that is, keeping track of nuclear materials. Then there are two skills that go along with that. One is assaying, determining the amount of nuclear materials—
Richard Harrington
That is laboratory testing the quality and the content.
Professor Matthews: And observing and recording movements of nuclear materials, without both of which you cannot do the accountancy.
Richard Harrington
I would accept that.
Professor Matthews: That is quite different from proving a safety case for the operation of a nuclear installation.
The Chair
Exceeding my role as Chairman, it might be something you would ask your officials to look into for later consideration during the Bill?
Trudy Harrison
Q
Richard Harrington
Why not? I am quite happy to. That function, currently done by Euratom, will be done by the new safeguards regime. It will be responsible for examination and testing and making sure there are suitably qualified inspectors, in the same way that Euratom does now.
Dr Whitehead
Q
Professor Matthews: Clearly, the operation of the Office for Nuclear Regulation requires a range of different roles. I would see no problem with adding an additional role to the range of roles that are already in the organisation. It is just the physical people are different people who do these different things. Indeed, nuclear inspectors themselves have different backgrounds and specialisations, and diverse education as well. I suppose it is extending the range of what the Office for Nuclear Regulation does.
Dr Whitehead
Q
Professor Matthews: I would have to look at the documents and examine them in detail to be able to answer that question fully. It is a different role. I would expect it not to be covered within the current definitions in the documents, but I do not have access to them and cannot check that now. But I would be very surprised if it was covered. It would need something added.
Alex Norris
Q
Professor Matthews: The young people that I am encountering in my current activities are ready to take on responsibility and do things. I am very impressed by them. I am sure there are people who are capable of taking on these roles. The only problem is that there is competition. Those same people are valuable and can be used in all sorts of ways. Whether it is possible to assemble the right people quickly to be able to avoid any hiatus in the operation of our industry is another matter. Certainly, at the moment, the people that we train have no problems finding jobs.
Alex Norris
Q
Professor Matthews: There are two main programmes I teach on. One is the new generation centre for doctoral training. That is a collaboration between five universities in the north of England and we have a cohort of about 25 a year. That has been going on for the last five years. Almost all of them are British nationals from diverse backgrounds. We have one or two foreign nationals in there, but they are the exception. The other programme I teach on is the nuclear professional development programme, which is a master’s degree for people working part time who are managers in the nuclear industry in the UK. We have had one or two foreign students on that—I even had a commander in the Brazilian navy—but most of the people are British nationals working in our nuclear industry.
Mary Robinson
Q
Professor Matthews: It has been a difficult time for us, because there was such a long delay in the announcement of the final investment decision for Hinkley Point C. That made people relax, so it has proved easier to recruit good engineers to join our nuclear programmes at the university as a result. Certainly, the prospect of building 16 GW of nuclear reactors is stimulating the people moving into the industry. But it is not only that. We have to cope with the problems of legacy, decommissioning and radwaste management. There are nuclear fuel cycle industries, very likely with both fuel manufacture and enrichment. All these things require the nuclear safeguards to be operating, and any interruption in that—we are talking about something like £10 billion a year in UK activity that would be interrupted.
Mary Robinson (Cheadle) (Con)
Q
Professor Matthews: That is related to the operation of nuclear power stations in the fuel cycle industry, which consists of processing and manufacturing nuclear fuels, manufacturing the nuclear fuel elements, and enrichment of uranium. The work still going on at Sellafield on reprocessing will stop shortly, but there is the handling of materials from Sellafield for decommissioning and radwaste management, all of which contain higher actinides and uranium, which are covered by the Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000. We need to know what is going into the waste to ensure that we are not making a plutonium mine or something that someone could tap in the future.
Mary Robinson
Q
Professor Matthews: Yes, but it is not enough, even at the rate that we are going. We have two major doctoral programmes in the UK that we co-operate with—one in the south with Imperial College, Cambridge, and the Open University, and one that we have with five universities in the north. That is only about 50 students a year. We need to bring into the industry hundreds of students a year, which means that we must be able to bring in people from around the world, mainly from Europe, but also from more widely around the world.
There is an opportunity from Germany at the moment—its industry is contracting because it is shutting down plants. It does not seem to be managing the decommissioning problem very well, so people are leaving Germany very rapidly.
Mary Robinson
Q
Professor Matthews: They were, but they are not any more.
Paul Blomfield
Q
Professor Matthews: I heard the recording this morning of the ONR representative. It looks unlikely that it will be fully functioning by March in two years’ time. The question is: how can we bridge the gap until everything is working properly?
Paul Blomfield
Q
Professor Matthews: Springfields, which produces nuclear fuel, will stop working. The Urenco plant at Capenhurst, which is part of three plants in the Netherlands, Germany and the UK, will stop working because it will not be able to move uranium around. We in the UK no longer do conversion, which is changing uranium into uranium hexafluoride, which then goes to the enrichment plant and is converted back to oxide or metal for application. That requires movement, and all of that would stop.
It would be difficult for Sellafield and other decommissioning sites, such as the old research sites at Dounreay, Harwell or Winfrith; some of the work there would grind to a halt as well. Eventually, when the fuel charges were removed from reactors operating in EDF Energy’s plant, those would all stop, which would take something like 9 GW of power out of our network at a time when we are perilously close to blackouts. It would be a very serious measure indeed if there was a hiatus.
Richard Harrington
Thank you for that, Professor Matthews. You are of course using my argument for why we need the Bill; thank you for supporting it. Dr Mina Golshan, whose organisation is responsible for recruiting the 15 people we are talking about, said that recruitment had already started. Once the Bill proceeded beyond Second Reading—I thank everyone, including Opposition Members, for voting for that—it meant that the financial resources needed for the IT and recruitment are provided. We are very well aware of that.
I thank you for your de facto support for the Bill. I have of course noted the points you have made, and I will be very happy to chat about them on another occasion. The purpose of the Bill is precisely to get over some of the obstacles that you are talking about and prevent what you have explained would happen—as we accept would happen—if we did not have a safeguards regime in place.
Dr Whitehead
Q
Secondly, I understand that the Torus fusion project at Culham will be a subject of safeguarding inspection. Will that be financed, subsequent to our leaving Euratom, in a way that is commensurate with its present level of assistance, which largely comes, as you are aware, from EU funding? Do you have any comment on that?
Professor Matthews: There is a difficulty here and I do not know if it is recognised in the Bill; it perhaps needs scrutinising. The only mention in the Bill and in these discussions is of our fissile materials. We are talking about uranium, plutonium and other axinite isotopes, and precursors such as thorium, which can be converted into fissile materials. In the case of Culham and the fusion programme, they use tritium. Tritium is a material that comes under safeguards, which is not a fissile material. It is a material that is a component in hydrogen bombs, and it is controlled. I remember getting into trouble as a young scientist. I was asked to assess the use of lithium-6 as an absorber for a fast reactor project. I phoned up a French supplier of lithium-6, and next thing I had security down on me, because tritium is produced from lithium-6 and is a controlled material. I do not know whether any consideration is being made of the control of tritium with respect to Culham and nuclear safeguards.
Dr Whitehead
Would there be other materials that are not fissile but would also be controlled and inspected under safeguards?
Professor Matthews: We are getting into areas that we cannot really discuss here.
Richard Harrington
That is beyond the scope of the Bill, but perhaps we could discuss it, although not necessarily now, in the evidence session. I am happy to discuss it, but I suspect that your interpretation is correct, Mr Gray, and it is beyond the narrower scope of the Bill. I am happy to discuss it with the Shadow Minister.
Dr Whitehead
One might argue that the scope of the Bill is too narrow for the safeguarding that we need to undertake.
The Chair
It does not matter. The scope of the Bill is the scope of the Bill. Let us not get into a chat among ourselves. The reality is that the Bill is as printed, and it is the Bill as printed that we have to discuss, under the long title and the short title. Of course, within that we can amend it as much as we like. My instinct is that the Committee have done our work for the day. Thank you very much, Professor Matthews, for your very useful evidence, both written and in person. I assure you that it will be taken note of in the discussions that lie ahead, starting on Thursday, when my colleague Mr McCabe will be in the Chair. The Committee will see me again, assuming that we sit—we will no doubt sort that out—next Tuesday.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Rebecca Harris.)
Nuclear Safeguards Bill (Third sitting)
Thursday 2nd November 2017
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 2 November 2017 - (2 Nov 2017)
The Chair
I remind Members that they are welcome to remove their jackets during the sitting if they wish to do so. I also ask Members to ensure that their electronic devices are turned off or to silent mode. We do not normally allow tea or coffee to be consumed during sittings. The first order of business is an amendment to the programme motion.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Richard Harrington)
I beg to move a manuscript amendment,
That the Order of the Committee of 31 October be varied, by leaving out line 6.
It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe—Mr Gray is a hard act to follow, but I am sure that you will do it well. Perhaps I could take the liberty of explaining the amendment. If accepted, it will mean that the Committee will not sit on 7 November. Everything else will remain the same.
Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe. My function at this point is merely to concur with the Minister’s suggestion that we leave out line 6.
Manuscript amendment agreed to.
The Chair
We now begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection list for today’s sittings is available in the room and shows how the selected amendments have been grouped. Amendments grouped together are generally on the same issue. Please note that decisions on amendments take place not in the order in which they are debated but the order in which they appear on the amendment paper. The selection list shows the order of debate. Decisions on each amendment are taken when we come to the clause that the amendment affects. I will do my best to use my discretion to decide whether to allow a separate stand part debate on individual clauses and schedules following debates on the relevant amendments.
Clause 1
Nuclear safeguards
Dr Whitehead
I beg to move amendment 2, in clause 1, page 1, line 22, at end insert
“which has been approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament”.
This amendment would prevent the Government from using powers under Clause 1 to implement an international agreement without the agreement having first been approved by both Houses of Parliament.
It might be a good idea, before proceeding to detailed examination, to say a few words—for the benefit and satisfaction of all hon. Members, I hope—about what we are trying to do with the amendments we have tabled. Members who have had a chance to peruse the amendment paper in some detail will see that all the amendments tabled by Labour Members are entirely consistent with the speedy and successful translation of our present arrangements with Euratom into UK law. I want to emphasise at the outset that the Opposition concur completely that we need a new set of nuclear safeguard regulations and arrangements, contingent upon other actions that may take place as far as the present arrangements with Euratom are concerned. We certainly do not wish in any way to impede the process of achieving that new set of arrangements.
What we do want to do, however, is to put on the face of the Bill a number of safeguards, understandings and clarifications about how that process will come about. That will therefore be the content of this debate. The Committee might find it helpful and of some comfort to learn that that is how we intend to proceed. Should Divisions occur, they will be about particular issues that we want the Bill to address; they will not be an attack on the Bill’s fundamental purpose. We want to clarify that point by including a purpose clause setting out what the Bill is intended to do when it becomes law.
The amendment relates to agreements not with Euratom but, we hope, with the International Atomic Energy Agency. The UK had safeguarding agreements with the IAEA before it joined Euratom, and they were effectively taken over by the UK’s accession to Euratom by virtue of the European Communities Act 1972, under which that translation was undertaken without the need for further domestic implementing legislation. The safeguarding agreements with the IAEA therefore have to be untangled from Euratom and made anew in the event that we complete the process of leaving the EU. It will be necessary to negotiate effective new safeguarding treaties with the IAEA, and that will depend to a considerable extent on what the UK does to put in place effective measures, contingently or otherwise.
What we do in this Committee today will be a material issue for the eventual treaties with the IAEA. I am sure that the IAEA will want to see that the UK has an effective safeguarding regime in place as a successor to what is presently done under the auspices of Euratom, and that it is as good as or better than what is presently operating in the UK on the IAEA’s behalf through Euratom. A starting point for the completion of those negotiations will be that we have something in place that works, is sufficient for the IAEA’s purposes and can be the basis for an assurance that those arrangements will be in place for any treaty we make with the IAEA to get us back to the pre-1972 position.
The explanatory notes state:
“The consequential amendments necessary to these pieces of legislation will depend on new safeguards agreements between the United Kingdom and the IAEA that are currently being negotiated; as such the United Kingdom will need to maintain flexibility to ensure these future agreements can be implemented in domestic legislation. A power to allow this legislation to be amended in this way is taken in clause 2 of the Bill.”
Not only will the Bill allow that arrangement to take place, but the IAEA will shine a light on the outcome of our proceedings, at the point at which those treaties—those new arrangements—will be concluded and put in place.
I am not clear exactly what sequence of events will be necessary to secure the circumstances under which a new treaty arrangement with the IAEA will come into effect, so perhaps the Minister could help us with that. Negotiations on a new treaty arrangement with the IAEA cannot reach a conclusion, or indeed start, before a satisfactory regime is in place. Does that mean, as I take it to in this instance, the establishment of the possibility of such a regime through the passing of this Bill into law, or the actual establishment of such a regime, which would require the completion of secondary legislation, proper funding, the establishment of facilities through the Office for Nuclear Regulation and all the other things that go with the full roll-out of a new treaty arrangement? If it is the latter case, we might be much further down the line before an agreement with the IAEA can come to pass, and it is conceivable that there might be a cliff edge at that point.
If the full secondary legislation and all the other elements of the new safeguarding arrangement set out in the Bill have not been completed, the IAEA might say to the United Kingdom, “Well, you haven’t got a regime in place yet, so we can’t complete the new treaty agreement that we have to undertake.” It is conceivable that at that point there would be a hiatus, because we would have exited the protection agreement for safeguarding through Euratom but we would not have a new agreement in place with the IAEA, even though we would be substantially further down the road of translating the purview of Euratom into domestic legislation.
I would be grateful to know the Minister’s understanding of the IAEA’s position. I am aware that at least informal discussions are already taking place with the IAEA, and presumably they will shape the eventual outcome of the treaty arrangement. In any event, the Bill will have to be passed before any agreement with the IAEA is reached—that is the minimal provision. Whether anything else has to be done is a matter for further consideration, but the Bill at least has to be passed.
I think that it is germane to speculate a little on what the treaty might look like. Will it be sufficient to replace the function previously held by Euratom? If it is sufficient effectively to make our previous treaty anew, what additional obligations might its establishment place upon the UK? Of course, we do not yet know the answers to any of these questions, because we are not in a position to conclude the negotiations. Indeed, we are in the foothills of what I imagine will be a substantial mountain of discussion and negotiation with the IAEA before reaching a conclusion.
Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)
This is the first time I have served under your chairmanship in Committee, Mr McCabe. This is an important Bill and an important amendment. One of the joys of being a new Member is that friends and family members get in touch on an almost daily basis to ask what I am doing, perhaps imagining that it is all glamour and television. When I tell them that I will be attending the Nuclear Safeguards Bill Committee, they say, “Oh, that doesn’t sound like much fun—it sounds quite dry. Do you know anything about nuclear safeguards?” I have therefore been spending my evenings explaining why the Bill is so important.
During the oral evidence sessions, the hon. Member for Copeland spoke eloquently about the impact of the civil nuclear industry on her community, and that supply chain runs up and down the country. Similarly, we should all be concerned, as legislators and as citizens, about energy security. There is also the issue of public safety. Those are incredibly important matters. We hope that they will never make a visible difference to people’s lives, but were they to, we would know about it.
I support the amendment because we cannot wholly subcontract those matters to Ministers. My hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test has promoted the Minister once already in this sitting, and that may happen again. Although we can be sure of an individual’s knowledge and commitment, we cannot commit in a vacuum to an agreement that we know nothing about and that Ministers would be able to enact without recourse to our parliamentary democracy. We are a parliamentary democracy and Parliament is sovereign.
The amendment is inexorably linked to last June’s vote. I represent a leave constituency and I have spent a lot of time talking to people about their reasons for voting leave when I was voting to remain. Those conversations were illustrative. It will not surprise any Members, or indeed anyone watching, to hear that not once did someone say, “I am really concerned that our safeguarding procedures in the nuclear industry are too closely entwined with those of our European neighbours. We really ought to take back control and stand alone on that issue.” Of course that never came into it, and I do not believe that is what people voted for. If we stood in the middle of the market square in Bulwell, as I often do, and tried to explain to people that, as an inevitable part of the referendum decision, we will now have to do this—despite the at least mixed legal argument publicly in favour of whether we have to—that would be quite a difficult conversation.
Richard Harrington
I thank hon. Members for their positive contributions, and for their speculation about my possible promotion—I hope that the Prime Minister manages to take some time today to read the Hansard report of our proceedings.
I thought that the contributions were very positive. Although the hon. Member for Southampton, Test was gracious in saying that his concerns related not to me but to what happens in future, he is absolutely right, and that is a reflection of Government policy. I hope I will be here to see this through, but none of us ever knows. I am honoured to have two shadow Ministers in this Committee. It is not often that one is graced with two—or even three, if I may include the Opposition Whip, the hon. Member for Bristol West. I have read all the amendments carefully. I do not want this to be one of those Bill Committees in which nobody takes any notice and everyone votes as their Whip tells them; I hope that we can find a much more positive way of dealing with this.
To the best of my knowledge, all of us want the same thing. I do not know to what extent the Opposition have volunteers to be on Bill Committees. I am told that some Bill Committees involve press-ganging hon. Members, as the Royal Navy used to do. However, I think that the members of this Committee are interested in the subject, and not just because of direct constituency interests, such as those of my hon. Friend the Member for Copeland. That is the right thing, because our constituents do not typically think about this subject, but it is our job. If there are issues, we can discuss them at length here and also afterwards. I hope that both shadow Ministers know that we would all much rather there was consensus, because we are trying to reach the same objective.
Given that this is my first contribution in our line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill, I feel it necessary to lay out the broader context for hon. Members, as the debate is on the record and will be read by the industry and anyone else who is interested. I will then turn strictly to the amendment. The Bill is required to establish a domestic nuclear safeguards regime that will enable the UK to meet international safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation standards after we withdraw from Euratom. We all know—I hope the country generally knows—that the nuclear industry is of key strategic importance to the United Kingdom. We are committed to our industry maintaining its world-leading status. We are determined that our nuclear industry should continue to flourish in trade, regulation and innovative research. We must ensure that our withdrawal from Euratom will in no way diminish our nuclear ambitions.
The Secretary of State, the Government and I share the views of many in this room about the importance of having a constructive, collaborative relationship with Euratom and all other international partners. I will set out briefly why we must act. We have emphasised our continued commitment to the IAEA and to international standards for nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation. Nuclear safeguards are reporting and verification processes by which states demonstrate to the international community that civil nuclear material is not diverted into military or weapons programmes. Under the Euratom treaty, the civil nuclear material and facilities in member states are subject to nuclear safeguards measures conducted by Euratom, which also provides reporting on member state’s safeguards to the IAEA. That three-way link allows global oversight of nuclear safeguards.
It is clear that the existence of a UK nuclear safeguards regime is a prerequisite for the movement of certain nuclear materials called special fissile materials in and out of the UK. It underpins our international commitment to the IAEA and our nuclear co-operation agreements. As we heard in evidence on Tuesday, without a regime in place, nuclear operators in the UK will be unable to import fuel or do anything necessary for their business. The Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, which I and some of the same witnesses appeared before yesterday, heard likewise.
Dr Whitehead
I thank the Minister for his comprehensive, though not entirely conclusive, explanation of where we are, so far as international agreements and parliamentary scrutiny are concerned. I would appreciate it if he could give a brief thought to the question of the point at which the IAEA will conclude that we have transposed the Euratom responsibilities to the ONR. Will that be when we have passed the enabling legislation, or when the process is completed and can therefore be presented in a box, as it were, to the IAEA saying all is done? That itself is likely to slow up the negotiation process with the IAEA, which I appreciate the Minister said he considers will be complete by exit day.
Richard Harrington
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that valid point, which requires both a simple and a complex answer. The simple answer is that there is a sequence, and the agreements have to be ready but will not come into force until after we leave Euratom. The IAEA has a ratification procedure, which I intend to come to. The agreements have to be ratified by its board. The bilateral agreements referred to have to be ratified by the Parliaments of each country involved. I am not led to believe that that will be a problem, because I am pleased to say that these negotiations are more in the form of constructive discussions than one side wanting one thing and another side wanting another. What I am about to say will hopefully answer the hon. Gentleman’s questions. If not, I am sure that he will say so, and I am happy to meet him any time to discuss that.
I understand that hon. Members are concerned to ensure that there is parliamentary scrutiny. I have covered that, but I must stress that the measures in the amendment would be a significant departure from the usual position on the ratification of treaties, and I do not consider it appropriate in the context of the Bill. As Members will be aware, the UK Government are responsible for negotiating and signing international treaties involving the UK and always have been. The ratification of international treaties is covered in legislation, as the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 provides a ratification process that requires treaties to be laid before Parliament prior to ratification, except in exceptional circumstances—I do not know what the exceptional circumstances are, but I imagine they would be a war or something like that.
The Government have the power to conclude international treaties under their prerogative powers. Of course, that cannot automatically change domestic law or rights and cannot make major changes to the UK’s constitutional arrangements without parliamentary authority. That remains the case for international agreements relating to safeguards that are currently under negotiation—for example, the nuclear co-operation agreements currently being negotiated with the US, Canada, Japan and Australia, and the new safeguards agreements with the IAEA. Parliament will therefore have the opportunity to consider those agreements before they come into force.
We have been open and honest with Parliament about ongoing negotiations and will continue to do so. The intention is for those agreements to be presented to Parliament before ratification, ahead of the UK’s withdrawal from Euratom, and they will come into force immediately upon our exit. I therefore hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw the amendment.
Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mr McCabe. I hope to respond to the Minister with the same collaborative approach he has tried to set for the Committee, and I hope all our discussions will be along those lines.
It is worth saying at the outset that I do not doubt for one moment—I do not think any Opposition Members do—the Minister’s good intent in seeking to reassure us on this issue. However, it is also important to recognise in not only this discussion but the wider discussions we will have in our remaining sittings just what is at stake. On a number of issues relating to our negotiations on exiting the European Union, Departments have shown good intention, but because there has been insufficient follow-through, that intention has not necessarily produced the outcomes to reassure other sectors.
It might be in some other areas possible to blur things a little bit at the edges, but we need to remind ourselves of the evidence we had from Professor Matthews on Tuesday. Nothing can be left to chance here. Professor Matthews outlined that if we do not get the safeguarding regime right, the consequences are that,
“Springfields, which produces nuclear fuel, will stop working. The Urenco plant at Capenhurst…will stop working because it will not be able to move uranium around.”
He went on to say:
“It would be difficult for Sellafield and other decommissioning sites, such as the old research sites at Dounreay, Harwell or Winfrith; some of the work there would grind to a halt as well.”––[Official Report, Nuclear Safeguards Public Bill Committee, 31 October 2017; c. 43, Q88.]
There is a lot at stake in ensuring we get this not just more or less right, but precisely right. That is one of the key factors behind our amendment. We must not simply be reassured in the Committee; Parliament needs to be reassured and to have the opportunity to express its view on this before we face the sort of consequences that Professor Matthews talked about.
The Minister has reassured us—again, I do not doubt his intention—on the full parliamentary scrutiny through the affirmative process. My reading of the clauses suggests that there is a bit more ambiguity. New paragraph (1B), which he referred to, says that the Secretary of State will not necessarily provide regulations but “may by regulations”, which gives quite a significant grey area. If the Minister is as sure as he indicated that there will be full parliamentary scrutiny by the affirmative process, the simplest thing to do would be to accept our amendment, which seeks nothing less.
Dr Whitehead
I am grateful to the Minister for setting out in some detail the path by which he considers Parliament would have some scrutiny of the arrangements with the IAEA when they come about. However, I am concerned, as is my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central (Paul Blomfield), about whether what the Minister points to in the Bill actually does the job he thinks it does.
In new subsection (1)(1A) and (1B), inserted by clause 1(3), there is a curious circularity. I will not go through the whole thing, but new paragraph (1B) states:
“The Secretary of State may by regulations specify agreements for the purposes of subsection (1A)(b).”
If we then look at paragraph (1A)(b), it says:
“is specified in regulations under subsection (1B)”.
We then go back to paragraph (1B), and the regulations specified there are the regulations that the Secretary of State may make—that is it. We do not get very far in what I consider real parliamentary scrutiny by that semi-circular argument.
It appears that a relevant international agreement is as specified under new paragraph (1B), and a relevant agreement can be specified by regulations that the Secretary of State may make. If the Secretary of State does not pass regulations specifying those agreements, that is not the case, and the relevant international agreement then does not apply for the purposes of the legislation.
I suggest it would be far simpler to accept our amendment in view of the unique circumstances we are in at the moment. We are having to make treaties anew, and we need to be satisfied that they fully replace what we previously had for a number of years through Euratom. I appreciate that that is a voluntary agreement that has been entered into, and I appreciate that that agreement will undoubtedly be pursued in the light of co-operation, because of the voluntary nature of the agreements being entered into by the IAEA.
The central fact of the matter is that that is being undertaken not only while the Committee considers what it is going to do, but is actually tucked into the legislation as something that will remain outside what the Committee considers, because we have to take decisions about what we want to make our safeguarding regime look like when we do not know what those agreements will consist of. Having this particular system in place, which I accept is not the case for all international treaties, as far as the Bill is concerned, appears to close the circle, as far as the relationship between what the Committee is doing and what the treaty will look like when it comes out is concerned.
As I said, unless someone explains to me that I have completely misread new paragraphs (1A) and (1B), and that there is something else there that does not actually do what I think it says it does, I cannot take full reassurance from those clauses in the way the Minister suggests.
Richard Harrington
I have a suggestion for how we can progress, but I will just say that new paragraph (1B) provides the power to specify agreements for the purpose of the definition but the regulations are always subject to the affirmative procedure, so I argue that the hon. Gentleman’s object has already been achieved.
My suggestion, if it is acceptable—I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman intends to press his amendment to a vote—is that I am happy to sit down with him and discuss this in detail before Report. He has made quite technical, legal points, so I offer to meet him, if that is acceptable. Obviously, it is up to him to decide whether he wishes to press his amendment to a vote. I would have to oppose the vote, simply because I believe we want the same object, but my view is that the Government have clearly covered his rightful concerns about parliamentary scrutiny in our drafting of this.
Dr Whitehead
I am grateful to the Minister for that clarification and for that kind offer, which is quite important for the way that we proceed. I think that the Minister, while he indicates that everything will be done under the affirmative procedure, has still not overcome the circularity in this particular part of the legislation, where the word “may” could derail the whole process of getting us to a position where those international agreements can be determined to be relevant.
Richard Harrington
Any piece of any statute is capable of being changed by Parliament in a new Bill anyway, but on the “may” and “must” argument, the hon. Gentleman will find that “may” is generally the terminology used in these things. There “may” be—oh dear; there might be reasons where a Secretary of State might quite rationally decide not to do something. A purely speculative and hypothetical example would be if something changed and this piece of legislation was genuinely not needed. I do not quite know what could happen, but hon. Members might speculate. The shadow Minister is nodding and smiling; I think he knows what I mean. There may, or must, be other reasons why. It would be strange to impose on a Secretary of State, saying that he or she “must” do something, if it was not necessary. If the Secretary of State did not do it, there could easily be an Act of Parliament or something else to reverse it. It is very normal procedure to say “may” in most Bills. The wording is not meant as a possible way of trapping a mad Secretary of State—I hope no one in this Room or anywhere else would suggest such a thing of the current one—who lost their head and said, “Oh, I’ve got the power; it doesn’t say I must, so I won’t do it, because it says I may.”
Dr Whitehead
I thank the Minister for that further clarification and of course accept that the usual procedure in such circumstances is for the word “may” to be placed before the power of the Secretary of State to cast secondary legislation, whether affirmative or negative. Of course, the Bill is not being dealt with in normal circumstances because, as we shall argue on a later amendment, the normal circumstances for secondary legislation are that there is a change—positive, one would hope—to the previous situation, but that it is built on something pre-existing that will continue to take place even if the regulations are not laid.
As I am sure the Minister is aware, this place is littered with cases where a power to enact secondary legislation has simply not been used. He suggested that there might be circumstances in which it would be perfectly rational not to do so. There are instances in the history of the House where Governments have decided to put new measures before the House, eclipsing previous legislation. That previous legislation, including its secondary provisions, stays on the statute book, but the secondary legislation is not enacted, as it has been superseded.
At either end, that means that “may” is protected either because a new measure has come along, making it redundant to enact secondary legislation; or because, if the Minister decides not to enact the secondary legislation, the status quo ante prevails. However, that is not so in this case, because there will be no status quo ante should we exit Euratom without an associate arrangement. There would be nothing, and the circumstances attached to “may” take on a different colour, under that new and unique circumstance. That is why I am concerned that if we legislate using the wording that we often use in different circumstances, we may fall short of our duty, given that there is no status quo ante, to get things right in relation to subsequent proceedings.
Richard Harrington
I am trying, as always, to think carefully about what the hon. Gentleman is saying; but let us say there was a Secretary of State who was misguided or mad enough to say, “Actually, I am not going to do this because I do not want a nuclear safeguards regime. I want this country to be like North Korea”—or wherever. I think North Korea is the only country without a nuclear safeguards regime. If the Secretary of State desired to take that approach, there would be a lot more tools available for not having a nuclear safeguards regime than the interpretation of “may” or “must”. I am not making light of the point—it is dead serious.
No one has suggested any possibility that we should not have a nuclear safeguards regime, and wrong interpretation of the “may” or “must” point would mean that someone—a Secretary of State or a Government—had decided to do that. If a Government had decided to do that—I know it would not be the Opposition or anyone in any normal form of politics—such a change of policy would not just rely on an interpretation of “may” or “must”.
Dr Whitehead
I understand that point well. Of course we have to squeeze our brains enormously to think about the circumstances under which that set of events would come to pass, but that is not what we are talking about in this clause of the Bill. We are talking about relevant—or otherwise—international agreements. As far as I understand it, in this clause the Secretary of State effectively has the power to declare something a relevant international agreement or not, and to set down what is and what is not relevant in secondary legislation. That does not affect the agreement, but it affects whether that international agreement is deemed to be relevant, and hence whether it comes under the purview of the arrangements that the Minister said were in place to ensure parliamentary scrutiny on those agreements. It is not about whether we design a nuclear safeguards regime, but whether an agreement reached subsequent to our setting out our safeguarding procedure is deemed to be relevant for the purposes of parliamentary discussion when that treaty has come about. That is what I understand this clause to be about. I am grateful to the Minister for his kind offer to lay this clause on the table, although there is not procedure to do that exactly, and discuss what may or may not happen on Report.
Dr Whitehead
It must happen—well, we must consider the Bill on Report, but things may or may not take place on Report that we would be entirely happy with. I take that offer as suggesting that if there is confusion in Committee about what the wording means, our minds can be put at rest at that point, and if not it may be necessary to produce some kind of wording, perhaps on Report, that gets us to the position we both want to be in, so that we are in the same place on this legislation. That is my understanding of what the Minister has said. If that is the case, I am happy to take up that offer—provided a cup of coffee is involved as well—and we will not press for a Division on this clause.
Richard Harrington
The hon. Gentleman is being a little modest about his beverage requirements, as I happen to know that he does not have caffeine in his coffee.
Richard Harrington
Otherwise, I would put extra caffeine in the coffee. The serious point is that I do not accept the fundamental point of the amendments and I do not want the hon. Gentleman to think that I do. He has brought up some serious points, some of which are legal and technical. I would like to take the opportunity to sit down in a non-confrontational way with him and any colleagues who wish to come to drill down on those points. I do not want him to think that I suddenly agree that we do not have enough scrutiny in the Bill, but he made some good and technical points about the interpretation of clauses. I hope we can do exactly as he said: sit down and reach a wording that is acceptable to us all, given that we have the same objective. If not, we can always consider it on Report. That would be the correct way to progress, if that is satisfactory.
Dr Whitehead
In that case, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Dr Whitehead
I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 1, page 2, line 14, at end insert—
“(3A) No regulations may be made under this section unless the Secretary of State has laid before both Houses of Parliament a statement certifying that, in his or her opinion, it is no longer possible to retain membership of EURATOM or establish an association with EURATOM that permits the operation of nuclear safeguarding activity through its administrative arrangements.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to certify, before making any regulations to provide for nuclear safeguarding regulations, that it was not possible to remain a member of EURATOM or have an association with it.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 3, in clause 1, page 3, line 3, at end insert—
“(11) Regulations may not be made under this section unless the Secretary of State has laid before both Houses of Parliament a report detailing his strategy for seeking associate membership of EURATOM or setting out his reasons for choosing to make nuclear safeguards regulations under this Act rather than seeking associate membership of EURATOM.”
This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from using the powers under Clause 1 to set out a nuclear safeguards regime through regulations until a report has been laid before each House setting out a strategy for seeking associate membership of EURATOM or explaining why we cannot seek associate membership of EURATOM.
Amendment 8, in clause 4, page 5, line 6, at end add—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until—
(a) the Government has laid before Parliament a strategy for maintaining those protections, safeguards, programmes for participation in nuclear research and development, and trading or other arrangements which will lapse as a result of the UK’s withdrawal from membership of and participation in EURATOM, and
(b) the strategy has been considered by both Houses of Parliament.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to lay a report before Parliament on the protection and trading arrangements that arise from membership of EURATOM, and his strategy for maintaining them prior to making regulations concerning nuclear safeguarding.
New clause 1—Purpose—
“The purpose of this Act is to provide for a contingent arrangement for nuclear safeguarding arrangements under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the event that the United Kingdom no longer has membership or associate membership of EURATOM, to ensure that qualifying nuclear material, facilities or equipment are only available for use for civil activities (whether in the United Kingdom or elsewhere).”
This new clause would be a purpose clause, to establish that the provisions of the Bill are contingency arrangements if it proves impossible to establish an association with EURATOM after the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.
Dr Whitehead
The new clause and amendments that we are debating in this group go to the heart of the Bill, and I shall explain why. I thank you, Mr McCabe, for ensuring that new clause 1 was in this group, rather than at the end of proceedings, as it would be normally, because that allows us to discuss in some detail, around both the amendments and the clause, what goes in at the beginning of the Bill and what the Bill is about.
Our new clause 1, the essential part of this group, seeks to place a purpose clause at the beginning of the Bill. Hon. Members who have studied the history of purpose clauses in some depth may say, “That’s not usual; most Bills don’t have purpose clauses,” and it is true that most do not, but it is not the case that they never do; and I suggest, given what we have discussed on Second Reading and in Committee today, that to establish a purpose clause for this Bill would seem very sound and wise. For the record, a number of Acts of Parliament do have purpose clauses. For example, both the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 and the Education Act 2002 have substantial purpose clauses, setting out what the Act is about.
In this instance, the key issue about this Bill is that it is a contingent Bill. It is not like a number of other pieces of legislation, which simply require that we undertake certain actions to achieve a certain end. This Bill will not come into operation, should other circumstances take place. Indeed, on Second Reading the Secretary of State made it clear how the Bill had been prepared. He said:
“I can confirm that the Bill has been prepared on a contingency basis. The discussions around our continued arrangements with Euratom and with the rest of the European Union have not been concluded, but it is right to put in place in good time any commitments that are needed in primary legislation. Euratom has served the United Kingdom and our nuclear industries well, so we want to see maximum continuity of those arrangements.”—[Official Report, 16 October 2017; Vol. 629, c. 617.]
I think the Secretary of State, in addition to making it clear that the Bill could be described as a contingent piece of legislation, was alluding to the fact that there are a number of sets of circumstances, which we do not yet know about but might in the fullness of time, that would effectively cause the Bill not to be operational although it remained on the statute book. Harking briefly back to our previous discussions, the Bill might conceivably be in the position that I described of other pieces of legislation that are full of provisions for secondary legislation—Acts that, because something else has happened that causes that Act and those provisions to become effectively redundant, stay on the statute book but are not further enacted. A purpose clause to make that clear at the beginning of this piece of legislation seems quite important, given the fairly unique status that this piece of legislation holds.
The Chair
Actually, you will not be able to carry on after lunch, because you cannot resume your speech after you have taken your seat.
Dr Whitehead
Perhaps someone else will enlighten the Committee about our other amendments after lunch, then. I know hon. Members will be devastated, but I shall take your ruling firmly to heart and sit down.
Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Rebecca Harris.)
Nuclear Safeguards Bill (Fourth sitting)
Thursday 2nd November 2017
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 2 November 2017 - (2 Nov 2017)
The Chair
Before we resume, I should explain that I asked the Clerk for some further advice during the break. We were in a slightly unusual set of circumstances before lunch because I was anxious that you got an opportunity to break for lunch but I was also very conscious that Dr Whitehead was part-way through his remarks. He had spoken about the new clause but had not referred properly to the amendments. As I explained before lunch, normally, when a Member sits down, they would not be able to resume. However, I have had some further advice. There are no objections from the Minister. I think it is important in this Committee that people get a chance to hear what is being debated and what is the substance of the issue. With that in mind, I invite Dr Whitehead to make some concluding remarks that he was not able to make just before one o’clock.
Clause 1
Nuclear safeguards
Amendment moved (this day): 1, in clause 1, page 2, line 14, at end insert—
“(3A) No regulations may be made under this section unless the Secretary of State has laid before both Houses of Parliament a statement certifying that, in his or her opinion, it is no longer possible to retain membership of EURATOM or establish an association with EURATOM that permits the operation of nuclear safeguarding activity through its administrative arrangements.”—(Dr Whitehead.)
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to certify, before making any regulations to provide for nuclear safeguarding regulations, that it was not possible to remain a member of EURATOM or have an association with it.
The Chair
I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
Amendment 3, in clause 1, page 3, line 3, at end insert—
“(11) Regulations may not be made under this section unless the Secretary of State has laid before both Houses of Parliament a report detailing his strategy for seeking associate membership of EURATOM or setting out his reasons for choosing to make nuclear safeguards regulations under this Act rather than seeking associate membership of EURATOM.”
This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from using the powers under Clause 1 to set out a nuclear safeguards regime through regulations until a report has been laid before each House setting out a strategy for seeking associate membership of EURATOM or explaining why we cannot seek associate membership of EURATOM.
Amendment 8, in clause 4, page 5, line 6, at end add—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until—
(a) the Government has laid before Parliament a strategy for maintaining those protections, safeguards, programmes for participation in nuclear research and development, and trading or other arrangements which will lapse as a result of the UK’s withdrawal from membership of and participation in EURATOM, and
(b) the strategy has been considered by both Houses of Parliament.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to lay a report before Parliament on the protection and trading arrangements that arise from membership of EURATOM, and his strategy for maintaining them prior to making regulations concerning nuclear safeguarding.
New clause 1— Purpose—
The purpose of this Act is to provide for a contingent arrangement for nuclear safeguarding arrangements under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the event that the United Kingdom no longer has membership or associate membership of EURATOM, to ensure that qualifying nuclear material, facilities or equipment are only available for use for civil activities (whether in the United Kingdom or elsewhere).
This new clause would be a purpose clause, to establish that the provisions of the Bill are contingency arrangements if it proves impossible to establish an association with EURATOM after the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.
Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)
Thank you very much, Mr McCabe. I am obliged to you for your kind thoughts in that respect. I guess it is a good thing, as it transpires, that I did not tear up my notes at lunchtime after all.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Richard Harrington)
You do not need notes.
Dr Whitehead
We will see.
I want to draw briefish attention to the three amendments that are in this group, in addition to new clause 1, which I have already spoken about and which would be a purpose clause at the front of the Bill. The three amendments effectively follow on from that purpose clause. Amendment 1 would require the Secretary of State, before regulations are made under clause 1—what is done under secondary legislation after we pass the Bill through the House—to produce a statement certifying that, in his opinion, it is no longer possible either to retain membership of Euratom or to establish an association with Euratom that permits the operation of nuclear safeguarding activity in the way that I described in my remarks on the purpose clause.
The amendment is important because we are in such uncharted waters as far as the demise of our arrangements with Euratom and what we will put in to replace them are concerned. Assuming the Bill comes to pass as a contingency, it is important that we know between us what has been done in respect of possible continued Euratom membership, and what has been done in respect of possible association with Euratom. Even after those things have been done, it will perhaps turn out that no progress has been possible on those particular areas. The Secretary of State should report to the House that that is the case—that the time for negotiations and discussions is over, that there is no prospect of going down that route and that therefore this Bill, as a contingency, comes into operation.
Were it to be passed today, the amendment would mark an important juncture in the Bill coming into play. Essentially, it would draw the line and, publicly by reference to Parliament through a report from the Secretary of State, show that matters have been explored and avenues gone down but those avenues have now closed to us. That may be just because the time for making those arrangements has run out, or it may be because it is difficult to secure associated status with Euratom similar to that of Ukraine or to that envisaged by the Spaak report in 1956.
If the amendment is passed, such a certification would be put before the House so it can see that efforts have been made, what the situation is and what we can expect, as far as the legislation is concerned. That should be in the Bill because, as everyone agrees, this is contingent legislation. It is contingent on certain actions. The legislation will either be placed aside or work fully as an alternative to the Euratom safeguarding regime.
Amendment 3 follows on from that. It requires the Secretary of State, before that process, to place before Parliament his or her strategy for seeking associate membership or another form of association with Euratom. That is important. There is a number of possible routes by which an association with Euratom could be achieved. Clearly, as we said this morning, the ideal route is to seek full membership of Euratom after the UK leaves the EU. As the Minister said previously, and I am sure will say today, there is a considerable difference of opinion about whether a full membership arrangement is possible or whether our notification to leave the EU has already closed that door. A strategy for seeking associate membership—or, indeed, full membership—would securely lay that argument to rest one way or the other. If the advice the Government receive suggests that certain doors are closed, I anticipate that the strategy would reflect that and the kind of associate status the country might expect to undertake. The Government would report on what strategy would be used to achieve that and whether that kind of status would be sufficient to cover the question of nuclear safeguards. In Switzerland, that appears not to be the case, but in Ukraine it appears possible.
I am sure that the Minister agrees that any such associated status would have to be stitched carefully to reflect the particular circumstances of the relationship between the UK and Euratom. It would probably not be taken off a shelf. That is an additional reason for some kind of report—outlining the strategy, the possible arrangements, and the kind of outcome envisaged were the strategy to succeed—being laid before Parliament. That is what we seek to achieve with the amendment. It is not in any way intended to delay or alter how the Bill works; it is simply to achieve greater clarity about what we are doing, given the contingent nature of the Bill.
Amendment 8 concerns the fact that today we are only discussing one of Euratom’s many functions in relation to UK nuclear activity. Euratom has a range of functions, concerning nuclear research and development, transport of nuclear and fissile materials, arrangements for making sure that nuclear materials are in the right place and in the right hands, and arrangements regarding who owns what when Euratom is or is not involved. Those are all essential functions of Euratom—functions in which the UK has participated wholeheartedly over many years. They will all have to be brought into national arrangements, but are not subject to the provisions of the Bill.
We are saying that we are in circumstances where we think that we have to leave Euratom as a whole and not just part of it, as part of the process of leaving the EU, so it is right that the Government should have available to it and indeed should publish a strategy regarding how Euratom’s other functions will be properly incorporated into the UK’s activities after we have left. The amendment is essentially about laying a strategy before Parliament for maintaining the wider range of protections and facilitations that are within our present Euratom arrangements.
As the Minister himself has made clear, the Bill is about nuclear safeguarding—not nuclear safety, the transport of nuclear materials or any of those other things. Nevertheless, those things are an essential element of Euratom activity. We think it is important to take that into account—not to delay the Bill, but to ensure that a strategy for maintaining those elements is laid before Parliament and is considered by both Houses of Parliament before the regulations are made under this clause.
I commend those amendments. I think they are sensible additions to the Bill, not only in terms of Parliament considering these issues, but in terms of considering all the circumstances under which we will potentially leave Euratom and what kind of regime will be in place once we have left it and replicated, as well as we can, what happens now, for the future of the country. I hope that the Minister will, by acclamation, be able to accept the amendments or, at the very least, accept their bona fide purpose, which is to strengthen the Bill as it goes through the House.
Patricia Gibson (North Ayrshire and Arran) (SNP)
I want to speak in support of amendments 1, 3 and 8 and new clause 1. The Minister knows, as certainly it is no secret, that the Scottish National party absolutely does not support the decision to leave Euratom. We have been told that it is essential and a requirement that we do so, and that we are where we are, but I urge the Minister—as I have before—to explore to the fullest possible extent the legal advice that is, at best, differing and conflicting, as that may be the best way to go.
The Prime Minister has told us, and the Minister has reiterated it, that the UK Government seek a close relationship with Euratom. I suggest that the closest relationship would be to remain a member, but if we cannot and if the Minister stretches every sinew, explores every avenue and finds that we cannot remain a member of Euratom, we want to remain an associate member, as has been pointed out. We have heard that Switzerland became an associate member of Euratom in 2014, under article 206. That arrangement could be a way in which we can continue to access funding for nuclear research.
Although safeguard regulations are certainly reserved to the UK Parliament, the Minister will know that there are areas of regulation that are devolved to the Scottish Government, for example the regulation of waste and emissions from nuclear sites. When talking about nuclear safeguards I do not feel that we can properly and safely artificially separate those areas, so I hope that the Minister will involve the Scottish Government at every stage of the Euratom negotiation process to ensure, whatever the deal, outcome or final situation, that the deal also works for Scotland.
With regard to amendment 8, we must be mindful—I am sure that the Minister is—that critical pillars of scientific research and medicine must be considered as an important part of the Bill. Following our departure from Euratom—if that happens—the UK will have to strike new regulatory agreements with the EU and other trading partners, to continue to import nuclear materials. That will only be possible with a new regulatory system. I am tempted to quote the expert advice from Tom Greatrex, the chief executive of the Nuclear Industry Association, and of course a former Member of Parliament. He points out that:
“While medical isotopes are not classed as special fissile material and so not subject to safeguarding provisions, it is not accurate to say that Euratom has no impact. They are subject”
to the treaty.
He is echoed by the president-elect of the European Association of Nuclear Medicine, who tells us:
“The transport of isotopes across borders is regulated so it is not something you can send in a package”.
There is room for question and to search for more clarity, which I hope the Minister can provide. We need to know the strategy for the trading and transportation of nuclear materials, such as fuel for reactors and isotopes. EU officials and independent experts have stated that
“these isotopes would be subject to wider Euratom rules on the trade and transportation of nuclear materials after Brexit.”
I hope that the Minister will take the concerns addressed in the amendments on board. I am very interested to hear what he has to say.
Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)
I said earlier that I do not think there is public energy behind us not participating in Euratom in some way. Similarly, in our discussions, neither the experts we had in front of us nor hon. Members said that leaving Euratom is desirable and that we should actively choose to do it. Rather, it is a necessity of circumstance, and this Bill is a contingency to cover such an event.
I am in favour of this cluster of amendments and the new clause, because it is important that we provide evidence that we have taken every step to try to maintain what is currently a successful relationship. In doing so, we will resolve the debilitating difference of legal opinion on this matter, as my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test characterised it.
The Minister said clearly that we are leaving Euratom, but on Second Reading of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, the right hon. Member for Clwyd West (Mr Jones), who at that point was a member of the ministerial team for the Department for Exiting the European Union, said:
“Triggering article 50 therefore also entails giving notice to leave Euratom.”—[Official Report, 1 February 2017; Vol. 620, c. 1131.]
I believe there is a difference between saying we are leaving and saying we have to leave, as, in effect, the right hon. Gentleman said. The Minister may say that that is a distinction without a difference. However, in the first sitting of this Committee, we took evidence from two senior lawyers in this area—Jonathan Leech and Rupert Cowan from Prospect Law—and I asked them whether triggering article 50 necessitated, as the right hon. Gentleman suggested, leaving Euratom as well. Jonathan Leech said, “No”, and Rupert Cowan said, “Absolutely not.” Jonathan Leech continued to say:
“The advice would be that you do not have to accept this and it may not be in your interests to do so.”––[Official Report, Nuclear Safeguards Public Bill Committee, 31 October 2017; c. 12, Q23.]
This is clearly contested space.
We subsequently heard, as my hon. Friend said, that perhaps it is something to do with the Government’s preferred future approach to the European Court of Justice. Perhaps they think we ought to escape immediately anything that seems to have some sort of tie to the ECJ. That may well be the view of the Prime Minister and No. 10, but it is considerably different from what was said on Second Reading of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, which is that we have to do it.
Leaving Euratom is a political choice and, as such, ought to be debated in the usual way. We should make a democratic decision about it. The best way for us to do that, as Members across the Committee have said, is to carry on with this contingency Bill, but in doing so prove the case either way. I am perfectly willing to accept that there will be conflicting legal advice. A Minister has been very clear in this place that he believes it to be absolutely one way, and this Committee has heard evidence to the complete contrary. The best way to resolve that is for us to see the information and talk about it. Critically, as these amendments require, future Ministers should lay before both Houses of Parliament what advice they have taken, what course they have chosen and why they have had to do that. If they do that, I believe that both the House and the public will have confidence that that very difficult, possibly traumatic, decision is the only one that could have been taken.
Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)
Unsurprisingly, I rise to speak in favour of this cluster of amendments and the new clause, which gets to the very heart of our purpose here. We should be at one—I am sure we are—with the Minister, who described the Bill as a contingency. We should see it as a safety net, but the overriding ambition should be to stay within Euratom.
All the witnesses we heard in our evidence session on Tuesday said, when the Minister pressed them on it, that they support the Bill, but only if we cannot remain in Euratom, which would be a far more preferable option. My hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test set out the case very well in his opening remarks. There is a strong case for having a purpose clause that frames the Bill, because of its unique characteristics. The other amendments will fall into place. If that is the position, we need to say that full membership is our negotiating purpose in the Brexit talks. If that proves not to be possible, we need to set out, as amendment 3 suggests, a strategy for seeking associate membership, recognising that the current examples of associate membership fall short of what we would hope to achieve. However, we are in unknown territory in all these negotiations over our departure from the European Union.
Amendment 1 sets out that, if this is a safety net, what are the conditions under which we have to open it? That should be in the form of a report from the Secretary of State. Amendment 8 clearly sets out the requirement for Parliament to fully explore the many other benefits of Euratom membership, whether in relation to medical isotopes or to the research work in nuclear fusion at Culham, which we lead the world in. This is an important cluster of proposals from Labour and we hope they are all helpful.
The contribution my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham North made a moment ago brings us to a central political issue: why are we in this position when there appears to be such unanimity about wishing to remain in Euratom? He made a point about the discussion on Second Reading. As far back as February I challenged the then Minister of State at the Department for Exiting the European Union, the right hon. Member for Clwyd West, about suggestions that it was the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice that had led the Government to issue a notice to withdraw from Euratom. In response, he told the House:
“it would not be possible for the UK to leave the EU and continue its current membership of Euratom.”—[Official Report, 8 February 2017; Vol. 621, c. 523.]
However, as we know, there are conflicting legal views on that. The Government have, apparently at the desire of No. 10, chosen to take one set of views, which is why they decided to trigger the departure from Euratom alongside the article 50 proposals. I am sure that the former Chancellor of the Exchequer is highly regarded by hon. Members on the Government Benches. In his new role he wrote, on 10 July, that the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union
“was open to Britain remaining party to the Euratom Treaty…It was Mrs May who overruled Mr Davis and others in the Cabinet, such as Greg Clarke, to insist that we sacrifice those sensible international arrangements on the altar of the dogmatic purity of Brexit.”
I would not want to disagree with the former Chancellor of the Exchequer on this point.
Here we see a Bill that has been introduced partly because there has been an apparent surrender of the real negotiating ambition that we should have of remaining within Euratom, simply because of the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. That dogmatic red line, as the former Chancellor of the Exchequer describes it, is something we should be concerned about, because remaining in Euratom makes such overwhelming sense to everybody involved in the industry and to Members on both sides of the House. It was interesting when we had the debate on Euratom in Westminster Hall in July that the hon. Member for Stone (Sir William Cash), who is not a noted dove on issues relating to the European Union, said that we should surely explore some closer form of co-operation and that we should not rule out some form of associate membership of Euratom. There is a huge consensus on this issue. It is unfortunate that this red line about the ECJ has got in the way of what is transparently in the interest of not only the industry but our country. It is all the more ludicrous when we recognise that in all the period the ECJ has been the arbitration body in relation to the European Atomic Energy Community, the Minister would find it hard to identify a single ruling—there have not been many—that we have not supported.
Richard Harrington
I thank hon. Members for their contributions. I sympathise with the Opposition’s general aim, but I disagree with how they are going about it. I also disagree with the definition of “membership”, but I will come on to that in a minute.
I think the Opposition would accept that the Government would be reckless to do anything other than start what we are doing now, irrespective of the views of Members on both sides of the Committee about whether we should have membership, whether to call it associate membership, which I argue it is not, and whether it is a looser arrangement or a closer one. Contingency means that we are in the process of setting up a regulatory regime.
The amendments cover the fundamental issue of the UK’s future relationship with Euratom, which I understand. I think most commentators, experts and Members would accept that we have had many benefits from Euratom. As I said yesterday at the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, we could not find any ECJ judgments that we have been involved in. There may be some, but the hon. Member for Oxford West and Abingdon (Layla Moran), who is probably a lot cleverer than me in many ways—she is a physicist—could not find any, and we have not found any. In practice, this has not been an appellate jurisdiction issue at all. It has been providing a set of rules that we have all abided by. As far as I can see, it has gone pretty well.
Paul Blomfield
This seems to be an appropriate opportunity for the Minister to confirm that he agrees with us that the Government’s negotiating ambition should be that we remain a member of Euratom.
Richard Harrington
I cannot, unfortunately, confirm that, but I can confirm that it is our intention to have as close a relationship as possible with Euratom, to cover the areas that Euratom covers with us at the moment.
The Government decided to serve the article 50 notice to leave the European Union. I am not a lawyer, but I accept the legal advice on both sides and have read a lot of the commentary around it. Whatever our views on that, it has been done, and it is our job as a Government to set up a suitable regulatory regime and negotiate with Euratom the closest possible relationship.
I would like to deal with the question of associate membership. It has been used in amendments to the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, which will come before the House, and it has been mentioned a lot in conversation. I have had conversations with the Chair of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, the hon. Member for Leeds West (Rachel Reeves), and with my right hon. Friend the Member for Wantage (Mr Vaizey).
Associate membership implies a form of membership that I am sure one would have at the finer gentlemen’s clubs in London—not that I belong to any—where someone can be a member or an associate member. It is not like that, as I am sure hon. Members accept. I do not want to make too much of the terminology, because there is not an off-the-peg associate membership. There are agreements with two countries, which have been mentioned—Switzerland and Ukraine, with Ukraine being the most recent. I could go into more detail, and I am happy to if there are further questions.
Switzerland’s agreement is purely for research and development—I do not make light of that; it is a really good thing—and Ukraine’s is that and a little bit more, but neither is actually akin to Euratom membership. Those are a close form of association in their fields, but we are looking for a close form of association in every single field that Euratom covers, of which the nuclear safeguards is one element, although there are important others.
Paul Blomfield
The Minister will have noted that I pointed out in my remarks that both existing forms of associate membership—for Switzerland and Ukraine—would not meet the requirements to which we aspire. However, the difference there is surely that neither of those were formerly full members of Euratom. We are in the unique position of withdrawing from Euratom, and the negotiations therefore put us in a different sort of place, as other Ministers have argued in relation to other aspects of the negotiations.
Richard Harrington
I fully accept the hon. Gentleman’s point. I only mentioned Ukraine and Switzerland because they were mentioned by the hon. Member for Southampton, Test in terms of associate membership. I accept that they are different; in fact, that would be one of my main points were I reading my notes, but I am not, because I am trying to respond to the question.
Article 206 of the Euratom treaty deals with association. I quote from it:
“The Community may conclude with one or more States or international organisations agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedures.”
It may seem pedantic but I think it is an important point: it is an association, not membership. However, what is in a name? I accept that we or any country can try to negotiate any kind of arrangement it wants with Euratom or anyone else; it takes two sides and a lot of goodwill.
However, I feel that the coverage sometimes gives the impression to my constituents who take an interest in this—I accept, as colleagues have said before, that very few actually do—but who are not studying it in detail that there is an open option for associate membership or for rejoining after we leave. I am sure that anything is on the table with Euratom, but our negotiations are entirely on the basis that we will leave Euratom on the same date as we leave the European Union, and that we are negotiating for ourselves the closest possible agreements for all of the activities.
We have mentioned safeguards, but for the record—I know hon. Members are probably aware of this—I will briefly mention the other important activities: research and development, which we have discussed; the Common Market trade arrangements for nuclear goods or products—let us call it free movement of goods and products; free movement of nuclear workers, which we discussed the importance of yesterday, in the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, and the day before; and the setting of safety standards through regulations and directives, even if they are not carried out directly by Euratom, as we discussed this morning. In many ways, the R and D side is the easiest of them. We briefly discussed Ukraine and we certainly discussed Switzerland. I believe that progress can be made quickly on those things.
On the second article, article 101 gives the power to conclude various types of agreements with third countries. It is worth the Committee noting that the current “association” enjoyed by Switzerland, which, as I have said, specifically relates to research, was made under this narrow article—101—and not under the wider article 206, which I just quoted.
So, when hon. Members cite this “association” as a precedent that can be followed, I do not disagree—as I say, it is very encouraging—but I do point out the narrow scope and limited power under which it is achieved. It does not amount to what people would generally refer to as “associate membership”—not by a long way.
However, I must make it clear that nothing is off the table in discussions with the EU—nothing—because those discussions have not actually started yet. The preliminary discussions have, as has been well discussed before. They are what is called the “separation arrangements” and hon. Members will know, from discussions concerning the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, the difference between the two types of discussions. We are in phase 1 of the negotiations, but the future relationship between the UK and the EU, and the details of any implementation period, are for the next phase of negotiations.
I accept that some areas of Euratom are linked to much wider issues, such as the free movement of goods and services. That must be linked to the general negotiations on the free movement of—well, materials that are not non-Euratom-compliant in every other sector, and very important they are. I do not underestimate the challenge that we face, in this area and in the wider negotiations.
However, given the uncertainty about the outcome of all the negotiations, it is absolutely vital that we continue to press ahead with work to set up an internationally approved safeguards regime and to put in place the nuclear co-operation agreements we will need. So, I am happy with the word “contingency”, which has been used, but “contingency” has to start now; it cannot start after all else has not succeeded. It is as much a logistical operation as anything else, but it would send a signal to our partners that we are serious, and we would be very negligent in our duties if we did not start it. I know that Her Majesty’s loyal Opposition are not negligent in their duties; I am not saying that we are “holier than thou” and the other side could not care less; of course we are all very concerned, but we would be very negligent in our duties if we did not start on this “contingency” work now.
I know—well, I hope and I believe—that I have full cross-party support on that point, even from Members who do not believe at all in nuclear generally; it has been well publicised about Scotland. However, the safeguards regime element of nuclear, given that we have got nuclear, is as important to the Scottish Government as it is to the UK generally. I mean, it would be impractical and not right—and I would like to say that that is not believed at all by the Scottish National party or indeed any other mainstream party in Scotland.
I also acknowledge that the hon. Members who tabled this group of amendments are not trying to wreck the Bill at all. Their actions are not irresponsible; I hope that we are having an informed and intelligent discussion on what to do, as we try to achieve the same object. I say that because amendments are always regarded in a partisan way. The Government put something forward; the Opposition, if you like, try to ruin it. However, that is certainly not the case in this instance and I would not like anyone to think so. There are quite a few experienced Members here—both Government Members and Opposition Members.
We must introduce the Bill to ensure that we meet international safeguards. This is to do with non-proliferation issues after we withdraw from Euratom. I would like to put it on the record that we are making very constructive progress in negotiations on the bilateral agreement with the IAEA and on the agreements with key partners such as the United States, Canada, Australia and Japan. They will all require—I say “will” because, obviously, they are not yet signed and finalised—or are contingent on our having the domestic safeguards regime in place on exit day.
We have to maintain the momentum and reassure the international community that the UK remains committed to nuclear non-proliferation and will provide clarity to the industry, which is very important. Tomorrow, I am meeting—possibly in this room but certainly on this floor—representatives of the nuclear sector, to discuss the nuclear sector deal. The industry wants to know that it can move vital materials, parts and expertise after exit day. Whatever word we use for our relationship—membership, associate membership, close association—the industry needs to know that it will be able to perform those functions.
Paul Blomfield
The Minister told me in answer to a previous intervention that he was unable to commit fully to our negotiating ambitions in relation to membership. I hear what he says, but I am sure that what the sector wants to hear tomorrow is clarity. In a different context, the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union has said that the Government intend to seek from our future trading relationship “the exact same benefits” that we currently enjoy from membership of the single market and the customs union. Is it, then, the Government’s ambition to seek in our future relationship the exact same benefits that we currently enjoy as members of Euratom? I am sure that the sector will be keen to hear that tomorrow.
Richard Harrington
I could not have put it better myself. I am sure my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union will be delighted to have been quoted. But it is a serious point and I would confirm seriously that it is our intention to achieve exactly the same terms and conditions in this sector as we have enjoyed with the benefits of Euratom. I will make that clear tomorrow to the industry, as I have done before; I do not think that the industry would say otherwise.
We have to ensure that we are committed to nuclear co-operation. I would never joke about North Korea, but I cannot imagine that any responsible person in this Committee Room or in the whole Palace of Westminster could ever think that we could leave ourselves without nuclear safeguards, because then we would be like North Korea. We must be able to compete internationally and do the things that decent countries do in this field. Euratom has provided that ability, and it is our full intention to ensure that that continues.
I hope that the hon. Members for Southampton, Test, for Sheffield Central and for Bristol West will withdraw their amendments. To summarise my argument, I would say that each of them would complicate or delay—in my view, to no good effect—the vital process of preparation that we are now embarking on. We are already committed to the path down which the amendments are trying to push us, so although I am sympathetic to them, I argue that they are not necessary.
New clause 1 would undermine our position in our negotiations with international partners beyond the EU. It would change the purpose of the Bill to permit arrangements for a safeguards regime to be put in place only in the wake of failure of the discussions with the EU. We need to pursue discussions bilaterally and with the IAEA now, while we await the start of negotiations with the EU on our future relationship. In fact, as I said, those discussions are well advanced. Over the past few days, several hon. Members from various parties have asked the Government in various forums how confident we are that new bilateral arrangements can be put in place in time. Our answer is that we are indeed confident, but only as long as we can continue to push at full speed; we cannot afford to await the outcome of our discussions in Brussels.
Amendments 1, 3 and 8 would risk delaying the legislation necessary to implement the domestic safeguards regime; I do not believe that that is their intention, but that would be their effect. I will address the transition period when we consider new clause 2.
The Government’s strategy is to progress the Bill; to continue to negotiate with the EU to achieve the closest possible future association with Euratom; to continue to negotiate an agreement with the IAEA, the importance of which I cannot overstate; to continue to negotiate nuclear co-operation agreements with our key trading partners; to increase the capabilities of the Office for Nuclear Regulation to deliver a robust domestic civil nuclear safeguards regime; and to push for research and training partnership, having committed to delivering the UK share of the Joint European Torus project after withdrawal from Euratom. I hope that after hearing those arguments, Opposition Members will feel able to withdraw their amendments.
Dr Whitehead
I am sorry if what I am about to say brings forth an uncomfortable image in hon. Members’ heads, but I cannot help thinking that the Minister has been dancing adroitly on the head of a very small pin. I say that because it is extremely difficult to conceive of circumstances where we would have the closest possible relationship with Euratom after we have left it or “the exact same benefits” as we would have as members but where that would not consist of an association with Euratom that one might call associate membership.
That association could not be the same as existing associations with Euratom; it would have to be a close association that was tailor-made for UK circumstances. My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central made the important point that our circumstances are not moving us towards Euratom, so the association might be a preliminary status that could be added to later. That association carries on from a helpful, mutually satisfactory, long-term working relationship with Euratom that has served the UK, Euratom and the wider international community tremendously well over a long period.
The circumstances of the closest possible relationship, as set out by the Minister, and of the “exact same benefits”, as the Minister set out in agreement with my hon. Friend’s statement, almost have to be—I cannot think how they could not, in fact—a close associate membership of Euratom that would enable the nuclear safeguarding part of Euratom that we are talking about to be undertaken. The Minister, in dancing so well on the head of this particular pin, has underlined why the close relationship would manifest itself in that way. If the Minister is saying that we must have the closest possible relationship but that we cannot or will not define what that should be because—I am not quite sure of the line of logic here—that might in some way impede the progress of our future negotiations, I should have thought that the opposite would be the case. It would be rather good for future negotiations if we had an idea of what we wanted to negotiate about at an early stage.
Richard Harrington
I have been listening carefully to the hon. Gentleman. For the sake of this question, let us say that our negotiating ploy was to go to Euratom and say that we want full membership—the same as before. Its answer would surely be either yes or no. The Government want to replicate the five areas that Euratom covers and for those to be as close as possible to membership.
The hon. Gentleman accuses me of dancing on the head of a pin. The thought of me dancing on anything is a dreadful one, which I ask hon. Members to put out of their minds.
Richard Harrington
Heaven forbid—although think about some of the people who have done it.
I am afraid that such a restriction invites a yes or no answer. The Government are saying, “We want the closest possible relationship on these different headings,” which may amount to what the hon. Gentleman says, but everything is in the negotiations. This is not a yes or no matter; these are complex negotiations. I cannot speak for him, but I believe that by using the wording we have—what I have put on the record about how close we want everything to be—we may well be asking for a series of arrangements that amount to what he wants.
Dr Whitehead
I thank the Minister for that clarification, which takes us a little further to the centre of the pin. The point is that the Bill clearly is not considered, has not been worked on and does not have its full set of secondary legislation attached, but it will practically come into force when the results of the discussion about the closest possible relationship are known. Let us say that, despite the Minister’s best endeavours to get the closest possible relationship, Euratom says no to everything—“You’re on your own; you’re out.” The provisions of the Bill must then come into place to get us a fully functioning nuclear safeguards regime that seamlessly takes over from the point at which Euratom says no. That is my understanding of the contingent nature of the Bill.
That does not mean—and it should not be taken to mean—that the Opposition are in any way trying to impede the work that needs to be done to get the Bill in place in order to fulfil that function. Of course that work needs to be done now and not at a future date. However, it would be really good, for the purposes of framing the Bill properly—in the way I have described—to know what the Government will seek as far as associate membership or the closest possible working relationship are concerned. I am considerably reassured by what the Minister says about the Government’s intentions in that respect, but it would be really useful to have that clear and in front of us.
I do not think that would in any way cause Euratom to say yes or no. Indeed, I would have thought that having a strategy in front of us that says what we want to achieve would be positive as far as Euratom is concerned, because it would then know exactly where we stood and exactly the limits of the closest possible working relationship we wanted, and it would be reassured to negotiate accordingly.
Richard Harrington
I worry that the shadow Minister and I are doing a duet on the head of this pin, because we are more or less in agreement about what we want. I thank him for his reassurances that he understands the need for the safeguards regime, which is the entire purpose of the Bill—it says so in the title. The Bill is not vague; it is deliberately precise, because we need to set up a safeguards regime.
I hope that I have made our strategy very clear, as I have on other occasions. Given that we have exactly the same intention, I ask the hon. Gentleman not to invite the answer yes or no, and to leave our negotiators to achieve the closest possible arrangement. That is what they are doing now, as confirmed at the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee yesterday.
This was supposed to be an intervention and it has turned into a speech, so I apologise for that, Mr McCabe. We need the Bill, and we need the Bill as it is, because in the doomsday scenario that the hon. Gentleman mentioned, where Euratom turns around and says, “Non,” or, “Nein,” we would still have a safeguards regime—not that any of us think that scenario will happen.
Dr Whitehead
That is absolutely right; that is the process by which the Bill comes into place, and that is the whole intent behind the trajectory of the Bill and the discussions ahead of it.
Sir Robert Syms (Poole) (Con)
Getting an agreement with Euratom might well be one of the easier things, but it will get caught up in all the other negotiations, which means the EU might not say yes until the other things are considered. Even if there is an agreement before March 2019, it might not be ratified by the EU for some months—perhaps years—because the whole process could take a while. That leaves a gap in which we need a regime that the world has confidence in, so that we can continue to have a nuclear industry. If we simply put our eggs in one basket by waiting for an agreement with Euratom, the risk is that we will be sitting around, unable to import, export or employ people. This is simply the Government’s straightforward backstop position, which I think is sensible.
Dr Whitehead
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention, but I cannot help feeling that there is some degree of misunderstanding going on here, for two reasons. First, it is not the case, and never has been, that the Opposition understand the process of moving from Euratom to our own arrangements—parallel to, and as close as possible to, Euratom—as involving any gap at all. Clearly, we need to have a regime in place to deal with whatever contingent circumstances take place; we are completely at one with the Government on that. We do not know exactly what those circumstances will be, so we need to be ahead of the game and have those contingent arrangements in place. Everybody, on both sides of the Committee, is in complete agreement on that point.
Secondly, however, it is not necessarily the case that the close association that we might want to seek will get embroiled in the rest of the EU withdrawal negotiations, because the Euratom treaty is separate from the EU treaty. Even if one considers them to be conjoined, it is more than possible—in fact, highly probable—that the actual negotiations will proceed on the basis of those two separate treaty arrangements, and therefore will not get entangled in those overall negotiations.
We are seeking clarity on what those arrangements might be; arrangements that would not stop the Bill from happening but might be there in place of the Bill, circumstances permitting. One builds the house and the roof hoping that it will not rain—at least not while one is still building—but clearly one has to proceed in all circumstances. That seems to me to be essentially what we are doing today in Committee. It is a separate point from what we might to seek to achieve in terms of our future relationship with Euratom, and that is what the amendments are about.
To end the suspense for the Committee, if it is still wide enough awake to be in suspense—I am sorry if I have gone on for rather a long time on this point—we particularly want to press for the purpose clause, because we think that would clarify a number of the other intentions. I understand that the new clause has essentially been moved up in the order of consideration and is being debated today, but nevertheless as a new clause it will be voted on at the end of our proceedings, so it is not a question of asking whether we want a Division on it, because that will not happen this afternoon. The new clause has been moved into this debate, absolutely rightly, and has served its purpose well in framing the debate in the proper place; and because the amendments are contingent, in effect, on that clause, it is not our intention to divide the Committee on those individual measures this afternoon. However, depending on what happens with the vote on the purpose clause at the end, it is conceivable that we would return to them on Report. However, for this afternoon’s purposes, we do not intend to divide the Committee. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Dr Whitehead
I beg to move amendment 4, in clause 1, page 2, line 41, leave out from “must” to the end of line 44 and insert—
“(a) publish an impact assessment;
(b) consult—
(i) the ONR,
(ii) the National Audit Office, and
(iii) such other persons (if any) as the Secretary of State considers it appropriate to consult; and
(c) lay before Parliament a statement declaring that he or she is satisfied that the staffing and financial resource available to the ONR is sufficient for the purpose of assuming responsibility for nuclear safeguarding in the United Kingdom.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to declare that the ONR has the resources necessary to take on extra responsibilities for nuclear safeguarding in the UK.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 12, in clause 1, page 2, line 44, at end add
“and must publish the consultation and any written submissions”.
This amendment would require the Government to publish any consultation carried out before this Act is passed which could be relied upon to satisfy subsection 4 of Clause 1.
Amendment 13, in clause 1, page 4, line 5, after “carried out” insert “and published”.
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish any consultation on the regulations which will create a nuclear safeguards regime.
Dr Whitehead
This group of amendments revolves around the question of the staffing, the preparations and the enabling activities that need to take place to ensure that the nuclear safeguards regime being run entirely in this country can take place properly, smoothly and immediately, as we have already discussed. Amendment 4 sets out pretty exactly what we want to achieve in relation to an understanding of the preparedness for the new regime. It would require a number of things to happen before the legislation is fully in place. First, an impact assessment would have to be published—I hope that is on its way anyway. One has not been published yet, but I would welcome an indication from the Minister on what is in the pipeline in that respect.
Secondly, there should be consultation with the ONR, the National Audit Office and such other persons as the Secretary of State considers it appropriate to consult. Following that consultation, the Secretary of State should lay before Parliament
“a statement declaring that he or she is satisfied that the staffing and financial resource available to the ONR is sufficient for the purpose of assuming responsibility for nuclear safeguarding in the United Kingdom.”
The amendment would require the Secretary of State to set before Parliament, following consultation, a clear statement that he was assured—there would be information in the statement to underline that assurance—that it really is reliably likely that the ONR will be able to take up the mantle of nuclear safeguarding from day one, when we are no longer in a position to do that through Euratom.
The reason I think that is important arises from what we know about the present position of the ONR and, indeed, what we heard in oral evidence. We know that the ONR is mainly funded through charges to the nuclear industry at present; it recovers the money for its operations generally from a charge on the nuclear industry. However, it also receives some grant funding, which essentially pays for the nuclear safeguarding work, while the charges on the nuclear industry essentially pay for the ONR’s other functions, which are not the subject of the Bill.
That distinction is important, because the Government intend to halve the grant to the ONR in the period up to 2020. At the outset of these negotiations we face the prospect of the ONR actually being able to do less work than at the moment. If it is to continue to do the amount it does at the moment, it will probably have to levy substantially more charges on the industry in order to make up for the loss of grant up to 2020. At the same time, however, this Committee is saying that the ONR will have to undertake a whole lot of new work that it had not previously budgeted for, that has not been in its terms of reference for a very long time and that will clearly require a lot more resource. As we heard in oral evidence, that is no mean amount of additional work for it to undertake.
We know that Euratom employs about 160 staff for all its functions, 25% of whom focus on UK installations. It does not take a great deal of maths to conclude that some 40-odd employees are pretty much focused on the UK. One can reasonably assume that it would be necessary to add that sort of level to the ONR’s complement in order to allow it to take on the work that Euratom currently does on nuclear safeguarding.
At the moment the safeguards unit within the ONR comprises eight professional staff. Between now and March 2019 the ONR will have to find from somewhere roughly 32 staff—qualified, highly skilled and trained nuclear inspectors able to take over that responsibility. That is in addition to all the other things ONR has to put in place, such as additional IT systems and a whole lot of additional administration and resources, in order to allow it to take on board that nuclear safeguarding role.
Trudy Harrison (Copeland) (Con)
Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the current safeguarding inspectors are members of the Prospect union? I have had sight of the job specification for our new nuclear safeguards workers. They require a degree, knowledge of nuclear material and potentially developed vetting clearance. Much of that is already present among the staff at Sellafield and across the 17 Nuclear Decommissioning Authority sites. They are already compliant.
Dr Whitehead
Indeed. My point was that, if we had to train nuclear inspectors from scratch, that would take about five years. As the hon. Lady rightly says, a number of people are already familiar with the necessary areas in order to get a position as a nuclear safeguard inspector, but those people have not all had experience of nuclear safeguarding issues; they have not had to because Euratom has carried out that role.
I asked Dr Golshan whether we could steal Euratom inspectors who might want to remain in this country, assuming they were allowed to do so, when the Euratom inspection regime comes to an end and ours starts. The answer was, “Maybe, that depends.” We cannot rely on that, so we have to get inspectors from somewhere else. It may well be that we can shorten the training period considerably by converting to nuclear safeguarding people who already work in the nuclear industry and are well versed in a number of general areas, but we should not underestimate the time that that would take to get right. It is not just a simple question of going along and saying, “You’ll do, you’ll do, you’ll do. There you are. You are now nuclear safeguarding inspectors.” As I am sure the hon. Lady is aware, that is not going to work. There will be a lot of work involved in getting the inspectors in place.
Sue Ferns said that there are specific aspects of an inspector’s role to be considered:
“This is a warranted role; this is not just working in the industry. It is not just about knowledge, but experience and commanding the confidence of the companies and the organisations that you deal with, so there are very specific aspects to that role.”––[Official Report, Nuclear Safeguards Public Bill Committee, 31 October 2017; c. 35, Q69.]
She also alluded to the relatively small pool in which we are fishing. We have not just to fish in the pool; we have to fish very accurately and attract a good proportion of the people in the pool, in order to suddenly fill the gap. Consequently, she put a considerable question mark against whether it was possible for the ONR to be as ready as we would like for the tasks that we are going to give it.
I sincerely hope, as I am sure we all do, that those matters can be resolved. It may be a question of making sure that the ONR is funded to the extent that it can properly undertake the activity of fishing in a small pool, perhaps with pound notes attached to the end of the fishing line. There may be a number of other factors relating to nuclear inspection coming in. Euratom may be prepared as part of an associate agreement to lend the UK safeguarding inspectors. A number of different courses could be pursued. There is, nevertheless, a big question mark against the capacity and ability of the ONR, even with all best endeavours in place, to be properly ready in time, given its present circumstances, its possible future circumstances and how it will address those.
For that reason, it is important at the appropriate time to have a sign-off from the Secretary of State that we really have not just a regime in place, but the resources available to carry out that regime in the new circumstances it will bring up. That appropriate time would be when all the different possibilities have been explored and the different ways of doing it have been looked at. Amendment 4 essentially requires the Secretary of State to lay a statement before Parliament that he or she is satisfied at that point—not a hope that it is going to be all right, but a statement saying, “Yes, it looks like it is all right now and we can safely proceed on the basis that we know we have not only the powers in place, but the people to subsequently carry out those powers.”
Amendments 12 and 13 are associated with amendment 4. They deal with the consultations that the Bill sets out will take place and are in respect of those activities, nuclear safeguarding in general and payments towards compliance costs. I have mentioned that the Secretary of State provides some money for ONR and that some money for ONR comes from the levies it places on the nuclear industry. The Bill makes provision for the Secretary of State, by regulation, to authorise and require the ONR to make payments towards compliance costs. It states that compliance costs mean
“costs of complying with nuclear safeguards regulations or with specified provisions of nuclear safeguards regulations.”
To make those payments, the ONR must obviously get the money from somewhere, either from grants or from a levy. As the clause says, there will be consultation on that, but the clause does not say that any of those consultations should be published. Therefore, we may not know what the consultations are about, what they say or when they are completed. The amendments are both minor, but they tie the process up properly with a little bit of ribbon, to ensure that those consultations are published and in the public domain. Then we will know what has happened in those consultations, which are potentially very important, given everything that we have said about ONR’s readiness for its purpose. The amendments ensure that the consultations are in the public domain and are properly reported and discussed.
I believe that these amendments are helpful in terms of what we know is the task in front of us, and how certain we want to be in this Committee that we are able to do what we want to do. I will go beyond calling them helpful and say that it would be irresponsible to proceed to the end of this legislation without some method of ensuring that we can deliver on what this House will have decided. I think that all hon. Members would agree that it would not be the first occasion on which this House legislated on something without securing the means to ensure it happened. In this instance it is not just a money resolution at the end of the legislation, but ensuring that an industry is equipped to do the different things that we want it to do and that it previously was not carrying out.
Again, we are in new territory, and we need particular measures in this legislation to reflect that fact. We also need to be sure, in making our way through that new territory, that we are doing so as safely and securely as possible.
Alex Norris
I rise to support the amendment. I will start by stating something that is possibly a considerable understatement as well as possibly a major statement of the obvious. It is important that the arrangements that follow from the legislation work—that the arrangements that the Office for Nuclear Regulation puts in place to transition us from Euratom as the safeguard in our British law work. It is important for the jobs involved in the supply chain, for energy security and public safety. Although that may be an understatement and a statement of the very obvious, it is not inevitable that that is the case.
My hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test referred to Dr Golshan, who is leading for the ONR, and her oral evidence to the Committee on Tuesday. I want to pull a few paragraphs out of it. The most striking was when she said:
“Our aim, currently, is to have a system in place that enables the UK to fulfil its international obligations by March 2019, which is when we intend to leave Euratom. I have been very clear in the past—I will repeat it here—that we will not be able to replicate Euratom standards on day one.”––[Official Report, Nuclear Safeguards Public Bill Committee, 31 October 2017; c. 7, Q9.]
So things will get worse before they return at some point to parity. I do not think anything in that is revelatory. The ONR and the Government have not got long to prepare. This will lead inevitably to conversations in future sittings of this Committee about what transition periods may or may not be available to the ONR for it to continue its work. Nevertheless, at its root, we need to understand that things are likely to be challenging for the ONR and for the regime that it puts in place.
As a result, it is absolutely imperative that we understand the extent of that, how we might be able to mitigate that and what support could be given from across the House. The best way to do that is through amendment 4, by fully publishing the impact assessment and by showing the evidence from the consultation with the ONR. The amendment is supportive and Ministers will be able to be clear that the ONR had the right resources.
I know we are on a budget at the moment. I was a member of the executive board of my council in my six years before coming to this place, which was obviously on a much smaller scale than here, but I know that at budget time there can be a bit of an arm-wrestle where even close friends have disagreements about priorities. It will be no surprise to hear me say I suspect that even happens at the highest level of Government. The amendment would strengthen the hand of Ministers to make sure that the ONR is properly equipped so that on day one the standards are as good and safe as they can be, and so that the gap that Dr Golshan talked about is closed as quickly as possible.
I will try not to duplicate anything quoted by my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test, but forgive me if I do. There were clear warning signs in the oral evidence about how difficult it will be to get the basic personnel who will be so important. My hon. Friend touched on this, but Dr Golshan said that
“it has not been necessary for the UK and ONR to build capacity and resilience in this area.”
We have unwittingly deskilled ourselves over previous decades, so we are having to break that very quickly. She mentioned the success in recruiting so far:
“We know that we are dealing with a limited pool of expertise, and our success so far, although encouraging, is by no means the end of the story.”––[Official Report, Nuclear Safeguards Public Bill Committee, 31 October 2017; c. 5, Q3.]
She continues that theme later on. Although they are not looking for large numbers, she states:
“we are dealing with a limited talent pool...the expertise is unique...the UK as a whole has not had to focus on developing resilience in this area, so we are limited in what and who we can recruit.”––[Official Report, Nuclear Safeguards Public Bill Committee, 31 October 2017; c. 7, Q8.]
So the ONR has a real job on. Having talked to her, that was very clear. I have no doubt we will play this out when we return to future clauses that talk about transition. It means that two things are imperative: first, that Ministers and we, as legislators, are assured that those day-one safeguards will be the best they can be; and secondly, that the ONR is being properly resourced to do this job. The best way to do that is to lay before Parliament a statement, as referenced in amendment 4.
Yesterday was a significant day in Parliament. We had an Opposition day debate, to which my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central contributed skilfully, about precisely this issue. The hon. Member for Poole said that this will inevitably get wrapped up in the wider conversation about leaving the EU, which I think is reasonable. We know that nuclear is one of the sectors on the list of impact assessments. The debate yesterday and the comprehensive vote showed the settled will of Parliament for those assessments to be revealed. Nowhere is that more important than in this area, because people need that assurance. That needs to be triangulated, too, not only by the Government’s own sense of impact but by sharing the full consultation. We more than dipped our toe into this—we had a day’s worth of experience—on Tuesday, when we talked to people with a variety of interests in the sector. We heard a lot of very important, and in some cases quite concerning, messages. We need to see the whole consultation, as the Bill continues its passage.
The issue came up at the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee yesterday. People need to know that they will be kept safe; that is obvious. They also need to know what this will mean in pounds and pence and what resources the ONR will need, compared with the resources that go into Euratom. People would then have a full understanding of what has happened and why, and whether that has been a good thing.
Anything that involves leaving the EU is necessarily hotly contested space. The things we talk about are not necessarily so hotly contested politically. I think Members across the House would want to have a sensible conversation about this, as we have done today, and I do not think it offers much political opportunity or that there are votes in it in our constituencies—certainly not for me. People need to know that they are safe, and they need to know the financial consequences for them of the legislation. The only way to do that is to accept amendment 4, which is very helpful, and underpin it with amendments 12 and 13, to ensure we have full transparency.
Eleanor Smith (Wolverhampton South West) (Lab)
I support the amendment on the impact assessment.
In my previous life, before coming into Parliament, I was a nurse, and part of my role was to look at patient safety and, of course, staff safety. We always had an impact assessment. Any new policies introduced by our trust were given a risk assessment to make sure the patients we were looking after and the staff working in that environment were safe. I have now come into Parliament and seen the different structures here and how it works, particularly through this Bill Committee.
I have to break it down to understand it. I see this as similar to what I would do if I was working in a hospital, looking at the safety of our patients. The only difference is that this is nuclear, which strikes me as really important. I would look for 100% safety for my patients, and I certainly would look for 100% safety within the nuclear power industry.
We heard from different witnesses, and from what I gathered, they agreed with the Bill. The one thing they want is the resources they need. To do that I want to see, as it says in the amendment, an “impact assessment” published, so that we can see for ourselves that everything put in place is 100% guaranteed safe—not 99%. I asked Sue Fern about training, because in hospitals they always say, “You’ll be able to do this and you’ve got the nurses required to do it.” But unfortunately, we never have the experienced nurses that we want. That takes time. I am sure that that will be same for inspectors, because it takes time to gather the experience—they cannot just be found. If those experienced people are not out there, the risk is that things will not be as safe as they should be.
I support the amendment so that we can have the impact assessment to see for ourselves that the ONR has the resources it needs to guarantee—that is the important point—the safety of members of the public. My constituency is not in a nuclear area but people work in those establishments and we have to guarantee their safety as well.
Richard Harrington
I thank hon. Members for their contributions on amendments 4, 12 and 13. I accept that the amendments try to address consultation on the implementation of the nuclear safeguards regime that the Bill will establish. I will come to that shortly.
I would like to address the consultation in respect of the ONR’s capacity, raised in amendment 4. I understand that hon. Members seek confirmation that the ONR, which will be the regulator, has the resources necessary to take on extra responsibility for civil nuclear safeguards in addition to all its other functions, and that sufficient assessments have been made of the impact of the new regime.
In response to the original question put by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Southampton, Test, I can put his mind at rest and confirm that a full impact assessment is being undertaken and will be published in the coming weeks, certainly well before Report stage. I accept everything that the hon. Member for Wolverhampton South West said, with her interesting comparisons to her previous occupation. I remind her that we are not talking about safety—that does not make it less important—as that is covered by a completely different regime, but her points are well taken; particularly about the impact assessment.
The impact assessment will assess the main options for implementation of a domestic nuclear safeguards regime, which would happen after withdrawal from Euratom.
Patricia Gibson
Does the Minister have any concerns that nuclear regulation in the United Kingdom will face a post-Brexit skills crisis, as it prepares to take on extra responsibilities that it currently shares with its European partners at the same time that many of its current inspectors are ageing and approaching retirement?
Richard Harrington
The retirement of current inspectors—obviously not in safeguards—happens all the time and it is part of the general recruitment process. As for new inspectors for the new safeguards regime, the Department has regular and extensive discussions with the ONR, as one might imagine given the context. The recruitment process is initially for about 15 people; I accept that including other staff that comes to 32. I cannot quite remember the shadow Minister’s words, but I accept the fact that recruitment does not happen by just saying, “You, you and you.” That may be done in certain political parties’ recruitment process for prospective candidates, but I accept the fact that something like this requires a very serious, qualified person.
I am pleased to hear from my hon. Friend the Member for Copeland that she believes there is a pool of people that is, at least partially, already working in the nuclear industry, but the Office for Nuclear Regulation are far from fools when it comes to this sort of thing. They have started phase one of their recruitment process and will continue that process. They needed the financial clearance, which came according to the rules after Second Reading, and I thank all hon. Members here and in the House generally for their support for that. The budget and everything is agreed with the ONR. As has been mentioned, it is not simply a question of recruitment, although that is important, but IT, premises and all the other infrastructure that goes with that.
I hope I have dealt with the impact assessment question.
Alex Norris
On the impact assessment, I am heartened to hear that. Given what Dr Golshan said about us not being able to replicate the benefits of Euratom on day one, will that impact assessment state what we currently have the benefit of that we will not have on day one of the new regime?
Richard Harrington
It will not do that, because it is impossible to forecast how the recruitment and everything will go. I am not trying to dodge the hon. Gentleman’s very legitimate question, but in recruitment at its most basic, when placing a job advert, it is unknown how many people are going to reply. I am not dodging his question, but the impact assessment cannot specifically say that.
I accept the quality of Dr Golshan’s evidence. She spoke again yesterday at the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee and she meets regularly with all my colleagues in the Department.
Eleanor Smith
The Minister said that there will not be enough, but does that not have an effect on the safety? If there are not enough people to do the inspection, does that not compromise the safety?
Richard Harrington
I am sorry to be pedantic in front of the hon. Lady. It might affect the safeguards, which are to do with non-proliferation and so on, not the safety. If there were not enough inspectors to do safety, it would have the effect the hon. Lady mentioned, but this particular Bill it is to do with safeguards. I know that sounds like one word against the other, but it is a different regime—albeit a very good one, and it also has skill recruitment issues, just like any other. I am not making light of her comment, but in this case it is not safety in the sense of health and safety— people getting hurt or leaks—important though that is, but it would certainly affect the safeguards regime if the recruitment and other things were not done properly, which is why we have started this straightaway.
Paul Blomfield
Could the Minister clarify a little more the scope of the impact assessment in relation to staffing provision, because in response to concerns raised on this side of the House he suggested that it would address our concerns that we will not have an adequate safeguarding regime in place for March 2019, and then in response to an intervention from my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton South West he said that it will be impossible to assess? What exactly will we get from this impact assessment in relation to the staffing needs and the ability of the ONR to address them, accepting that while Dr Golshan was a very impressive witness, representing what is clearly an impressive organisation, there are a number of factors beyond her control?
Richard Harrington
Dr Golshan is a very impressive person. I think in my answer to the hon. Member for, pardon me—
Richard Harrington
I was brought up in Sheffield so it is all the south of England to me. Maybe I misunderstood the question asked by the hon. Member for Nottingham North, but I thought he was asking whether there would be enough staff in place, as opposed to whether we would have a suitable regime ready by the end of it. If I misunderstood him, I did not mean to. That is why I made the point that it is impossible to tell—because it is a recruitment programme.
When I said the word “hope” to the hon. Member for Leeds West (Rachel Reeves), the Chair of the Select Committee on Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, she said that when she buys a lottery ticket she hopes she will win. I had to point out that it was not that kind of hope but an informed hope based on a proper recruitment and resources plan, which will be in the assessment that is wanted. However, that has to be based on assumptions. Everything has to be based on assumptions.
Although I do not make light of the number of people involved—be it 15, 30 or whatever—it is not hundreds or thousands of people. It is in the ONR’s sphere of what it estimates. To return to the example from my hon. Friend the Member for Copeland about Sellafield, it could be that a lot of people apply for these jobs and they are partly qualified because of their degrees and other experiences, so the recruitment could go more quickly than expected. Like in any forecast, we need to make assessments, but I have no reason to believe that there will be a problem with recruitment. The first phase has already started. In January 2018 it goes on to the next phase, and that has been planned for properly.
Dr Whitehead
Does the Minister not agree that because we are in a position where not enormous numbers but unprecedented recruitment will be going on in the ONR, as he has said, we cannot be absolutely certain that everything will go right and we cannot predict the future with certainty? Surely that is why we need some kind of report and statement towards the end of the process—whether it is in the form of the amendment or another form that the Minister might like to offer—to see we really are in a position where our hope has been realised, things can happen as hoped, and they are going well and will do so subsequently. It may not be necessary for that to be in the Bill, but some kind of assurance that the Minister would bring such a report to the House in particular to allow us to examine the proposition would be helpful.
Richard Harrington
That is a typically sensible suggestion from the hon. Gentleman. I will give that some consideration as to form or whatever, if he will bear with me. I remind hon. Members that the Bill already requires the Government to consult with the ONR and other persons that the Secretary of State considers appropriate. I know it may or must seem appropriate, but the intention is to consult widely.
On ONR capacity, which is the core of many of the amendments, I recognise the importance of transparency and the need for Parliament to be assured that the ONR is adequately resourced to set up the absolutely critical domestic civil nuclear safeguards regime. I have continually stated that we will allocate to the ONR the funding necessary to set up the regime. We have been transparent about the costs and resources of setting up the regime. Current estimates of the set-up costs are set out in the explanatory notes to the Bill. They are under my file, but from memory they are about £10 million in set-up costs and about that annually, which is roughly the cost of Euratom at the moment to perform the same function. I know the figures are approximate, but they give hon. Members a perception of the scale.
The relevant section is “Financial implications of the Bill”, which I will read now, in case hon. Members do not have it in front of them—they will not have to scurry around for it. It says:
“The public expenditure resulting from the Bill are the cost of the establishment and operation of the new regime by the ONR in line with the regulations that will be made under the powers in the Bill.”
That is the £10 million. It continues:
“The costs to set up a UK domestic safeguards regime (which remain subject to further analysis) are potentially up to £10m. This would include procurement of a new IT system, recruitment and training of…inspectors and strengthening institutional capacity to deliver the project. This cost can be met from within BEIS’s Spending Review allocations. The cost of any equipment currently in the United Kingdom but belonging to Euratom is a matter currently under negotiation with the European Union.”
Ideally, we will want to purchase the kit: the cameras, recording equipment and other electronic surveillance equipment and so on. It continues:
“The regime is also likely to involve an ongoing cost of around £10m a year—
sorry, I have said this before, but just to confirm—
“which is in line with the United Kingdom’s current cost of Euratom safeguards activity in the United Kingdom.”
The Office for Nuclear Regulation has also been clear, in evidence to the Committee, and to the Department, about the resources required. The amount has not just come out of the blue. We are working closely together to ensure that the needs of the ONR are met. My Department has already agreed to provide funding for initial work undertaken by the ONR on scoping and additional recruitment.
The ONR currently anticipates that the next tranche of recruitment will be in 2017. To correct myself, when I previously referred to the beginning of 2017 I was mixing it up with the current round; it will be at the end of 2017. That is what it has asked us for; it is not the Government imposing anything or saying we think it is how it should proceed. It is committed to doing whatever recruitment is necessary for what it knows it has to do. I hope that I have assured hon. Members that we are working closely with ONR to ensure that sufficient resource and capacity will be in place to carry out the work needed. It is unnecessary to add to the Bill the level of detail in the amendment. It would not make any difference to a programme that is already costed and proceeding.
On amendments 12 and 13 and the issue of consultation more broadly, the Opposition made some valid points, and I agree wholeheartedly that, as was said on Second Reading as well as today in Committee, consultation is vital in the development of any regulatory system—and even more so when it concerns something of such national importance. As the hon. Member for Nottingham North said, what is important may not be the thing that makes newspaper headlines; the general public may not realise something is important, but here we can all agree that this matter is critical.
I hope that Members on both sides of the Committee will agree that there have been great improvements in recent history in the working relationship between all Governments—I am not making a point just about the present Government—and the nuclear industry regulator, as well as with a wide range of stakeholders across the industry. Probably the main stakeholder, of course, is Lord Hutton, the former Secretary of State in the precursor Department to mine—and, in fact, nearly every other Department; it is very much a cross-party kind of industry. People listening to our proceedings might have felt that the Government had a disagreement with the two unions that gave evidence, but in reality there is far more in common between us—as there is in Committee today—than there are differences.
A good relationship is important, but I accept that that does not stand in the place of appropriate legislative mechanisms for consultation: I do not think that it is just a question of a few people getting around a table and having a meeting. I accept that consultation must be statutory; and, quite properly, it is. Future regimes or Governments, and future stakeholders, might have different views about each other. A Government who did not want a nuclear industry might behave differently, and so might a nuclear industry that did not want such a Government. I accept that things must be formalised.
The Bill therefore places clear requirements on the Government to consult. We have already made it clear that the development of the regulations that underpin the Bill will be subject to detailed consultation with the regulator and industry. Hon. Members will be aware that it is policy for such consultations to be made public, and we intend to do so in this case.
Patricia Gibson
What kind of consultation will the Minister undertake with the Scottish Government, and how inclusive will the process be, given that, as I have said before, with regard to regulation, waste and emissions are the responsibility of the Scottish Government?
Richard Harrington
If the hon. Lady will bear with me, I would much rather write to her on that subject, because the point is very specific and I do not have the answer to hand. It is a valid question, and she is perfectly entitled to ask it. If the Committee will bear with me, I can perhaps drop her a line or, if she would prefer, have a meeting with her on it. I know the point is important, but it is one point of many. It is not unreasonable, and I am sure she will chase me up on it if I have not responded by Monday, but I promise to do my best.
Dr Whitehead
The Minister is such a reasonable chap that it is fairly difficult to get too excited about some of the potentially contentious issues before us. This afternoon, we have made our points as strongly as we can about our concerns about what one might call the do-ability of the process over the next period.
The Minister said to me this afternoon that he is willing to consider a method by which it would be possible to report to the House what is happening towards the end of the process of recruitment and the shaping up of the ONR to put itself in a position to be able to undertake the duties that we hope it will undertake. If the Minister can devise a method whereby some kind of report to the House may be made, or an opportunity provided to examine the process in front of the House, as far as we are concerned it need not necessarily be on the face of the Bill. For that reason, we do not want to divide the Committee on the amendment.
Richard Harrington
I am perfectly prepared to give that undertaking. I cannot think quite how to do that at the moment, but I will give it a bit of thought. What the hon. Gentleman is suggesting is very reasonable.
Dr Whitehead
I thank the Minister for that statement.
On the other amendments and the publication of the results of the consultation, I am almost a little disappointed that such an extremely modest suggestion could not be taken on board by the Government, but I hear what the Minister says about the intention to ensure that there is full publication and knowledge of the matters to do with the consultation. Therefore, we will not proceed to a vote on those amendments.
I have, however, one note not of complete concord to strike. An impact assessment should really have been available to the Committee before we started proceedings on the Bill. The Minister said that one will be available before Report, but that means that a lot of the information will not be available to us while we are undertaking our deliberations in Committee. I am glad that an impact assessment will come out, and I appreciate that the Bill was introduced considerably ahead of its anticipated time, but it is essential that impact assessments are available in Committee to inform the decision making of the members. I am sorry that one was not available on this occasion, although I understand the position in which the Minister found himself.
Richard Harrington
The hon. Gentleman’s explanation for the lack of an impact assessment is correct. I would have liked to have had it in Committee, but I am much more happy to have made the progress we have. When I say “before Report”, I do not mean the day before Report or something like that. I hope the impact assessment will be more imminently available than that and I fully intend it to be so, but Government procedures have to be gone through. My priority was to get the Bill through, not to stop any form of discussion of the impact assessment or anything like that. I thank him for his good grace and understanding—the position he stated was correct.
Paul Blomfield
The Minister is talking about a very specific impact assessment on the work of the ONR, but a wider impact assessment has been completed of the impact of the withdrawal from the European Union on the nuclear industry. It was one of the 58 sectoral assessments that we debated in the House yesterday, when I made the point that it would help the work of this Committee if that assessment were made available to us. Does my hon. Friend agree that the Minister might be able to give a commitment on that point too?
Dr Whitehead
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. That assessment would inform this Committee considerably and, since we are not meeting for a few days now, it might be possible for it to be available to us when we come back from the recess. If the Minister can use his good offices to make that available, that would be considerably appreciated by Members on both sides of the Committee.
Richard Harrington
I cannot comment on that—not because I do not want to, but simply because it is not within my Department’s regime. I will obviously look into the subject, and we are happy to provide whatever information we have. I was not present in Parliament at the time of the debate—I think it clashed with my Select Committee evidence—so I do not know what was said. The impact assessment, which is directly in my control, will be ready imminently for the hon. Gentleman’s reading. It will not be this weekend—I know he enjoys reading such things over the weekend—but I am sure I can fill one of his weekends very soon.
Dr Whitehead
So that we do not finish on an intervention, that is my lot. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
The Chair
We have had a pretty extensive debate, and I can see the Whip indicating to me. I do not think there is need for a clause stand part debate, unless anyone is absolutely desperate to have one. I am conscious, Minister, that there are a couple of points at the top of page 2 to which specific reference has not been made. I do not know whether hon. Members want a very short clause stand part debate. If they do not, I am more than happy to move on. I am going to assume that hon. Members feel we have done sufficient duty to this subject.
Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Rebecca Harris.)
Nuclear Safeguards Bill (Fifth sitting)
Tuesday 14th November 2017
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 14 November 2017 - (14 Nov 2017)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
Welcome back to the Committee stage of the Nuclear Safeguards Bill. I am a very old-fashioned sort of Chairman, but in the old days we did not bring coats, bags and things into the Room, and if we did we secreted them away in such a manner as not to make it obvious that we did not know where the cloakroom was. That is just for the future. It is a very small matter of no significance.
Schedule
Minor and consequential amendments
Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 9, in schedule, page 6, line 37, leave out subparagraph (2)(a).
This amendment, together with 10 and 11, would change the Parliamentary procedure for regulations made under Clause 1 to come into force. Currently regulations under this section are only subject to the affirmative procedure on first use. This amendment would ensure this is the case upon every use.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 10, in schedule, page 7, line 3, at beginning insert—
“(zaa) nuclear safeguards regulations under section 76A(1)”.
This amendment, together with amendments 9 and 11, would change the Parliamentary procedure for regulations made under Clause 1 to come into force. Currently regulations under this section are only subject to the affirmative procedure on first use. This amendment would ensure this is the case upon every use.
Amendment 11, in schedule, page 7, line 6, leave out subparagraph (3).
This amendment, together with amendments 9 and 10, would change the Parliamentary procedure for regulations made under Clause 1 to come into force. Currently regulations under this section are only subject to the affirmative procedure on first use. This amendment would ensure this is the case upon every use.
Dr Whitehead
If I do have a bag on me this morning, it is very well secreted. You would expect nothing less, Mr Gray.
These amendments are essentially combined amendments, inasmuch as their effect—although it is achieved in slightly different ways—is to ensure that the regulations are made effective by the affirmative procedure on all occasions, so that they can be discussed. At the moment, through various measures in the Bill, regulations will be agreed by the affirmative procedure in the first instance only. Should further regulations be introduced, they will not be agreed by the affirmative procedure.
Hon. Members may think that is not a particularly important distinction. The “Memorandum concerning the Delegated Powers in the Nuclear Safeguards Bill for the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee” —the departmental memo—says:
“The first set of regulations made under this power will be subject to the draft affirmative procedure in order to allow both Houses of Parliament to debate the technical details of the new regime in full.”
In other words, new regulations will be introduced to bring into being a new regime, as we recall from our previous discussions in this Committee, to replace that which was previously undertaken through Euratom’s oversight.
“Subsequent regulations will be subject to the negative resolution procedure unless they create new criminal offences or they include any provision amending or repealing the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 or Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000, in which case the draft affirmative procedure will apply (pursuant to section 113(3) of the 2013 Act).”
That is so. There is an exception to using the negative procedure for subsequent regulations in those instances, but the impression that one gets from the memorandum is that the difference, other than on the matter of repealing the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 or the Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000, is very slight.
I suggest to the Committee that the significance of subsequent regulations can be considerable, inasmuch as they are new regulations that will replace Euratom’s regulations, and will not necessarily be fully formed in the first instance. As far as I can see, it is not the case that they are likely to be minor tidy-ups that are of no consequence and therefore can safely be provided for under negative resolution.
Dan Carden (Liverpool, Walton) (Lab)
With the affirmative procedure, it is not as if we have any great scrutiny power, but it at least allows us to have a debate in a Committee Room such as this. Has my hon. Friend had any indication that the Minister is opposed to debates about future regulations relating to nuclear safeguards?
Dr Whitehead
My hon. Friend makes an important point: the affirmative procedure is actually fairly limited. What we discuss in Committee is unamendable and our scrutiny is often pretty perfunctory. Nevertheless, it at least guarantees that something will be brought to somewhere in Parliament, and the opportunity to discuss it is not dependent on the Government’s largesse. It is at least a minimal protection, as far as Parliament is concerned, and it guarantees that something will be brought to the Floor of the House. Importantly, the negative procedure does not do that.
I hope the Minister will reflect on the fact that, because we are introducing such a wide-ranging enabling Bill, it is important that the regulations have proper scrutiny subsequently. We must not simply sign a blank cheque for the future and allow anyone making the regulations to do what they want. It is an important principle in this House that we do not do that under anything but the most minimal circumstances, and in this instance I suggest that those minimal circumstances do not exist.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Richard Harrington)
Good morning, everybody. I thank the hon. Member for Southampton, Test for his contribution relating to amendments 9, 10 and 11. I have spent quite a lot of time thinking about them and about how practical his suggestion is.
I apologise to the hon. Gentleman and the Committee as I do not have the draft regulations for the Committee. We discussed them the week before last, but I was eager to secure this slot so that the Bill could progress. Discussions with the Office for Nuclear Regulation are well advanced, and I hope that, before we discuss the Bill further—definitely by January—they will be published for all hon. Members and a wider audience to see. They are not secret regulations or anything particularly devious. It is simply because of the logistics of organising them along with the Bill that we have not published them in time.
I should set out this provision in the same way as the hon. Gentleman did. Clause 1(2) creates new powers to enable the Secretary of State to make regulations for the purpose of ensuring that qualifying nuclear material, facilities or equipment are available only for the use for civil activities. To do that, clause 1(2) inserts new section 76A into the Energy Act 2013. Section 76A provides the Secretary of State with new regulation-making powers relating to nuclear safeguards. The regulations will set out the detail of the domestic regime for civil nuclear safeguards.
It is appropriate to make provision for a nuclear safeguards regime in delegated legislation, simply because the subject matter is highly technical and the substantive provisions necessary to give effect to the regime will be very detailed. That is why we believe that it has to be in secondary legislation.
Dr Whitehead
I am not sure that we are able to withdraw them. The Minister has helpfully set out the line of thinking behind putting in place affirmative procedure the first time round, and negative procedure subsequently, but he has not departed in any way from the memorandum that was set out in the first instance, from which I quoted this morning. Therefore, no reassurance has been given that the Opposition have wrongly interpreted particular procedures, or that the regulations that the Minister has talked about really will be of the very minor nature that he suggested. He has not addressed that point at all.
Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)
Having listened to the discussion on affirmative procedure, does my hon. Friend agree that it is not inevitable—indeed, given the complications, it is quite unlikely—that every subsequent decision would be merely technical, and could be safely dealt with under negative procedure?
Dr Whitehead
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. That is underlined by the fact that, as has been alluded to on several occasions, we are not talking about a common or garden piece of legislation that simply places something on top of something else and thereby moves us forward. We are talking about a complete replacement for something that existed previously and will no longer exist. It will have no back-up or reference if we have not got everything in new regulations, replacing the previous regulations that no longer exist or have any currency as far as the UK is concerned.
With this legislation, we would be placing it on trust that everyone had got everything right first time as far as the new regulations were concerned, yet it has been stated in Committee that it is quite possible that there will be further amendments to those regulations, because we will need to be ready on exit day for the basic provision—
Drew Hendry (Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey) (SNP)
Is it not true that the aspects of the Bill that the Minister described as “non-controversial” would be so were we staying in Euratom? However, because we will have to move to a new system and there can be no guarantee, as the Minister himself said, of having the professionals in place to deliver the regulations, there are likely to be new regulations. We must therefore have these protections in order to scrutinise them.
Dr Whitehead
The hon. Gentleman is quite right. The procedure that we are looking at is very likely, in my view, to lead to far more than technical changes. Because there is a body of existing legislation, technical changes can be made, and to some extent I agree with that, because that is how the House works on occasion. If the Government are considering minor or technical changes, simply updating legislation to make it compatible with other pieces of legislation, or proposing to make the regulations in one Bill compatible with new regulations in another, that goes through under the negative procedure, and everyone accepts in the House that that is how we do it.
Lots of things go through in that non-controversial nature. I accept that, but it is not the case here. That is not what we are doing. As the hon. Member for Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey said, we are not tweaking or amending something, but providing something absolutely new. We hope it will be okay, but I think we freely agree that there will be a number of occasions when quite important subsequent regulations will need to be made to beef up the procedure, because even though it is on the road on day one, it is not necessarily as good as it might be. Indeed, the Committee heard that in evidence. We have not had any assurances this morning that we have misunderstood how the new regulations will work or that guarantees can be given that they will be of the technical nature we are more used to in ordinary dealings.
Dan Carden
Will people outside not be slightly surprised that we are leaving Euratom because of a Brexit decision? The leading lights of that campaign told us it was all about parliamentary sovereignty—
Dr Whitehead
Perhaps I could deal with my hon. Friend’s intervention, and then I am happy to give way again.
Dr Whitehead
Of course, Mr Gray. Within the context of the Bill, an associated issue is the extent to which Parliament has a hand in ensuring that the regulations are as good as they should be. In taking this grave step by reinventing a complete set of regulations, a complete regime and a complete landscape, parliamentary sovereignty has to be respected. It is important that we get that right in the legislation, and it is important that we get the regulations right subsequently.
Richard Harrington
The hon. Gentleman is perfectly at liberty, as he knows, to press this to a vote. I have tried, as he has, to find common ground, but obviously he feels that I have not done so in this case. It is true that our positions are much the same as they were before we stood up to speak today. Although he has the ability to press this to a vote, I wonder if he would be interested instead in talking about this in other discussions before Report to see if there is common ground. I feel that the majority of the regulations are technical, and the affirmative procedure is perfectly acceptable, but if there were a way of separating the two issues so that he and I could discuss it with colleagues, I would be very happy to.
Dr Whitehead
I thank the Minister for that intervention and for what I think—I am reading the tea leaves a little bit here—is a slight softening of the position that it is all okay and there is nothing to worry about.
Richard Harrington
This is not a softening of the position. I am genuinely trying to explore whether there is a way of separating the vast majority of technical regulations, for which it would be very impractical to do what the hon. Gentleman wants, from things he has mentioned that may be of a different nature. My position remains the same. As I say, he is perfectly at liberty to press this to a vote, but I am happy to talk with him at one of the meetings we are having on other matters so that he can explain further his position and we can see if we can reach an agreement.
Dr Whitehead
Well, let us see whether we can talk about a mellowing of the position rather than a softening of the position.
What the Minister has importantly alluded to is the fact that if subsequent amendments to the regulations that we have highlighted are really just issues of a wholly technical nature and are, as I have described them, part of the bread and butter machinery of this House in terms of undertaking things by negative resolution, Members can simply say, “Yes, that is fine. Provided they are published and one sees them, one has the opportunity, perhaps informally, to say, ‘Well, actually, maybe these are not drafted as well as they should be, but in general there is no controversy attached to those technical changes.’”
However, if subsequent changes to these regulations are clearly not of a wholly technical nature, perhaps they could be flagged in the Bill as being an exception to those arrangements of a purely technical nature, as indeed there already are in the Bill two instances where negative resolution procedure does not apply. So, it is not the case that there is no precedent for this change, because it has already been envisaged that there are circumstances under which the negative resolution procedure will not apply.
If, let us say, on Report it might be possible to add a line to those particular exceptions, then we might have the basis for something we could discuss further. If that is the sort of thing that is possibly in the Minister’s mind, I would be happy to discuss it further with him, to see whether something could be drafted in the Bill that is able to make the distinction that he quite rightly and properly made between what is technical and what is not technical, subsequent to the first regulations being laid.
Richard Harrington
I would like to confirm to the hon. Gentleman that I do not want to make him an undertaking that I cannot carry through, because I would like to discuss this matter further with him, but in good faith I am perfectly prepared to—I would not really use the word “mellowing”. I cannot think of another word at this time of the morning. However, in the spirit that he knows, I am happy to fully explore the matter. Perhaps lawyers might say, “without prejudice” or “subject to contract”, but it just seems to me that there might be a way in which we could be in agreement.
Dr Whitehead
On that basis—and clearly we need a lexicographer here this morning as we discuss these circumstances—I am happy not to press the amendment to a vote, and I hope that we can discuss these issues during the passage of the Bill, to see whether we can make any progress.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Dr Whitehead
I beg to move amendment 14, page 7, line 13, leave out from “provisions” to end of line 16
Paragraph 3(5) of Schedule 8 to the Energy Act 2013 exempts inspectors’ powers from provisions related to nuclear safeguards. This amendment includes nuclear safeguards in inspectors’ powers.
This amendment looks like a tiny amendment, but I will suggest that in practice it is a substantial amendment, and I will spend a little time explaining why.
The amendment is about the paragraph in the schedule where amendments are made to schedule 8 to the Energy Act 2013 concerning the powers and duties of inspectors. We will all recall that we have already talked about inspectors at some length in this Committee, but what we have talked about is their existence, their skills, their training and their appropriateness for undertaking inspection on nuclear safeguards in replacement of the inspections by inspectors under the auspices of Euratom.
At the moment, the vast majority of inspectors involved in nuclear safeguarding in this country are not under the auspices of the ONR. A small number of people are involved in that process, but the majority work under Euratom and Commission Regulation (Euratom) 302/2005, which, among many other things, sets out the terms under which inspectors work as far as Euratom is concerned. Inspectors go into establishments for the purposes of safeguarding, and they have a number of powers regarding what they can do, look at, and require to be provided, and what changes they can make. All that is done under the auspices of Euratom. The Bill effectively proposes that all those powers, and the authority of inspectors to undertake those inspections, is transferred bodily from Euratom to the oversight of the ONR, and that the ONR will subsequently be responsible for the exercise of those powers and the supervisions of the inspectors as they go about their business.
In every area other than nuclear safeguarding, the powers, duties and responsibilities of inspectors are laid out as far as the ONR is concerned in schedule 8 of the Energy Act 2013. Paragraph 2(1) of schedule 8 contains a brief description of how those powers are organised and invested in the inspectors, and how they are carried out. It states:
“An inspector’s instrument of appointment may authorise the inspector to exercise any relevant power.
Authority to exercise a relevant power may be given—
(a) without restriction, or
(b) only to a limited extent or for limited purposes.”
It then states:
“For the purposes of this Schedule, an inspector is ‘authorised’, in relation to a power, if and so far as the inspector is authorised by the instrument of appointment to exercise the power.”
An instrument of appointment must be provided by, in this instance, the ONR, and as far as I can see—[Interruption.] I am so sorry, Mr Gray. That was a phone-a-friend moment—I was short of inspiration. The instrument of appointment is, in the provisions for inspectors in the Energy Act, more like a passport held by the inspector. The Act states:
“When exercising or seeking to exercise any relevant power, an inspector must, if asked, produce the instrument of appointment (including any instrument varying it) or a duly authenticated copy.”
An inspector has an instrument of appointment that is proof that they have all the powers, duties and responsibilities set out in the legislation. Those duties, powers and responsibilities are also set out in subsequent legislation. An inspector can authorise the issuing of improvement notices or issue prohibition notices. An inspector in pursuit of those notices has a power of entry. They have a power to take persons and equipment into premises. They have powers to cause articles or substances to be dismantled or tested and they have powers to take possession of any article or substance. They have powers to require information and to receive accounts and various other things.
Inspectors therefore have fairly extensive powers authorised under the legislation, except that all those powers, as currently set out, do not apply to nuclear safeguarding. They do not apply to nuclear safeguarding because they were specifically excluded, certainly as far as issuing prohibition notices and having the power to issue improvement notices are concerned, in paragraph 3(5) of schedule 8 to the 2013 legislation.
Paragraph (5)(a) states:
“In this paragraph “applicable provision” means—
(a) any of the relevant statutory provisions other than—
(i) a provision of the Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000, or
(ii) any provision of nuclear regulations identified in accordance with section 74(9) (requirement for provisions made for nuclear security purposes or nuclear safeguards purposes, or both, to be identified as such),”.
So it is quite clear that, as far as a substantial part of the work of nuclear inspectors is concerned, the intention of the 2013 Act was specifically to exclude any concerns about nuclear safeguarding from those inspectors’ powers and responsibilities. That is quite reasonable, because those powers and responsibilities were carried out by Euratom inspectors. A clear distinction was therefore made that ONR-based inspectors would not have any jurisdiction over nuclear safeguarding.
Now all that is going to change and there are two big questions in front of us. First, is it reasonably possible to translate those powers and responsibilities of inspectors which at present do not refer to nuclear safeguarding into a position where they do refer to nuclear safeguarding? Secondly, is it the case that if we simply hand over en bloc to nuclear inspectors who are undertaking nuclear safeguarding activities, the powers and responsibilities that are set out for purposes other than nuclear safeguarding in the 2013 legislation—which set up the ONR in the first place—those provisions will be wholly adequate for that purpose? Those are the two big questions about nuclear inspectors that we need to ask ourselves.
Would it be desirable, as was the case with the 2013 legislation, that the powers of the inspectors were laid out fully in the Bill? They were not set out in subsequent regulations, because they are such important powers and limitations of powers that it was clearly felt in the 2013 legislation that they should be set out in a separate schedule. It was not something that would be looked at in a Committee Room, subsequent to legislation being passed.
The first question that might arise after addressing how we translate the powers of inspectors into UK legislation is whether we should be conducting an exercise similar to that carried out in the 2013 Bill—that is, whether the legislation should include a schedule that contains the powers of the new inspectors who are carrying out their duties in respect of nuclear safeguarding.
The Chair
Order. While the hon. Gentleman is finding that page, I will interrupt for a second. I think it is the will and flavour of the Committee that we are seeking to make good progress on consideration of the Bill today and, if necessary, Thursday. I hope hon. Members will take note of the fact that we are seeking to do so. Maybe that has given the shadow Minister a moment to find his reference.
Dr Whitehead
It has not, actually, Mr Gray. Because I was listening so carefully to you, I did not entirely get my reference sorted out. I have now found it, so I am grateful for your admonition. I am hopeful that we will make speedy progress in Committee today.
However, I am sure we need to pay attention to this section because it is important in getting the regime right for the wholesale change that we are making to how the provisions for nuclear inspection will be carried out.
The deflection that the Government make in their amending of the 2013 Act relates to section 74(9). I would be pleased if anyone could clarify this for me.
“Nuclear regulations which include any provisions to which any paragraph of subsection (10) applies must identify those provisions as such.”
As in the honoured Marx Brothers “tootsie-frootsie ice cream” sketch, with different form guides and various other things, one must now look at subsection (10).
“This subsection applies to any provisions of nuclear regulations which are made for—
(a) the nuclear security purposes,
(b) the nuclear safeguards purposes, or
(c) both of those purposes,
and for no other purpose.”
They appear to half switch off the prohibition of inspectors from undertaking activities for nuclear safeguarding as well as for non-nuclear safeguarding. They apparently refer not to regulations but to provisions of nuclear regulations. I am not sure whether, by deflecting to that paragraph, the responsibilities of nuclear inspectors are wholly translated into what is in the Energy Act 2013. I would appreciate clarification about whether, in the Minister’s opinion, the Government’s proposed amendment to the 2013 Act actually does that. Is there a clear line that shows that everything that is there is what a nuclear safeguards inspector has the power to do as a result of the deflection to that clause? It is by no means clear that that is the case.
With our amendment, we are trying to do that by means of a much simpler procedure. Instead of deflecting it to another clause, the amendment simply states that the inspectors’ powers relate to any of the relevant statutory provisions, and excises the rest of the paragraph. The relevant statutory provisions include nuclear safeguards, and therefore what was there previously would be fully translated into what a nuclear inspector pursuing nuclear safeguards can do. My view is that that is a simpler, more straightforward and clearer way of ensuring that the powers are fully translated.
The second point I alluded to is the question whether, even if one did that, there would be a complete transfer of powers and authorities from what was previously done under Euratom to what is done under ONR. The current Euratom treaty—the 2005 regulations—which I am sorry to admit I have actually looked at, appears to talk about more extensive powers and responsibilities than those in the 2013 Act. Although they are not set out in the same way, there appear to be various things in the Commission regulation that are not mentioned in the powers of inspectors in the 2013 Act, such as the requirement for inspectors to install and maintain equipment, an offence of interfering with equipment, special reports on unusual circumstances and special reports on inventory change.
I am very keen to hear from the Minister—I am sure he has had a good look at the Euratom regulations, too—whether he thinks that, even if he were minded to accept our amendment, the process of translating what is in the 2013 Act to ONR-supervised inspection really does the job, in respect of giving inspectors the safeguarding powers and responsibilities they had under Euratom and those that they need under ONR supervision. I am sure that the Department has looked at that closely. Is he completely satisfied that that is the case, or might he look at that again to see whether the moment of transmission set out in the Bill really does the business in respect of both making the nuclear safeguarding regime secure and the powers of inspectors for the future?
Richard Harrington
I shall do my best to implement the wise advice you gave us, Mr Gray.
In summary, I believe that the intentions behind amendment 14 are entirely good, but I would argue that it is defective because it would turn on the improvement notice power for nuclear security. That does not need to be turned on because there are existing, stronger direction-making powers. I shall briefly try to make that argument—hopefully with some success—to the Committee. Of course, I share the hon. Gentleman’s concern to ensure that the ONR inspectors have the right powers to fulfil their responsibilities. That is the whole purpose of the Bill.
This issue was raised by the Prospect union. As a result of its evidence, I asked it for a meeting, which I have arranged for the next couple of weeks, to discuss all the issues it raised, together with the other union that gave evidence at the same time.
Paragraph 11(2) of the schedule to the Bill amends paragraph 3(5) of schedule 8 to the Energy Act 2013, extending the power to inspectors who are appointed. That is important so that inspectors can issue improvement notices for non-compliance in relation to nuclear safeguards. Therefore, I would argue that the Bill already achieves the purpose of the amendment.
Paragraph 4 of the schedule amends section 82 of the 2013 Act such that relevant statutory provisions will include nuclear safeguards. That is the key to switching on the ONR power. I hope that that reassures the hon. Gentleman, and colleagues on both sides of the Committee, that the Bill achieves the purpose of the amendment.
I shall leave it at that, Mr Gray, in keeping with the advice you gave. I would like to discuss this matter in greater detail, but that was the sentiment of your instructions to us.
The Chair
Before the hon. Gentleman speaks, I should perhaps remind him that he may not withdraw the amendment, even if he wishes to. That must be done by the Member who proposed the amendment. He may, by all means, speak to it.
Paul Blomfield
Thank you for that clarity. Do not worry, Mr Gray, I was intending not to usurp my colleague’s role, but simply to underline the point that the Minister made.
An important part of our proceedings are the public evidence sessions that precede consideration of the Bill. Speaking on behalf of inspectors, Sue Ferns gave powerful evidence on a range of issues, but she was very clear on this one, as the Minister mentioned. She stated:
“As warranted inspectors, they feel that it is important to have those powers in the Bill. It is important for purposes of parity, to ensure continuity”—
and this is a crucial point in relation to safeguarding—
“also, as we have discussed, for external confidence in the way the job will be done.”
She went on to say that she had heard no argument to say
“why, if it is good enough for the 1974 Act”—
the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act—
“and the 2013 Act, we should contemplate a change in practice for this piece of legislation.”––[Official Report, Nuclear Safeguards Public Bill Committee, 31 October 2017; c. 35, Q71.]
That was powerful evidence on behalf of warranted inspectors that should lead the Government to think again. The Minister has been very accommodating and positive in trying to achieve consensus and agreement on issues where we share common concerns. I wonder whether he is able to reach out in the way that he did on earlier amendments to see whether an accommodation can be reached.
Dr Whitehead
I appreciate the Minister’s wish for brevity on these occasions, but I do not think that this is an issue on which we can be completely brief. By the way, there is plenty of time for the Committee to get the rest of its business through, so I am not concerned that by having a proper debate on this clause we will run out of time—I am certain about that.
I have not heard anything about the second point that I made in my contribution. My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central emphasised that point. Indeed, the evidence from Sue Ferns and Prospect emphasised the question of whether the inspectors will have the powers, through straight translation into oversight by the ONR of what is presently oversight by Euratom, that they actually need.
I mentioned comparing and contrasting what was in Euratom and what is in the Energy Act 2013. The Minister may well be right that although the translation of the requirements in the Energy Act 2013 into nuclear safeguarding may not be as elegant, it does the job. However, that does not at all address the point of what is going to be translated and whether that is fully fit for purpose as far as the new inspection regime is concerned. Will the Minister give an assurance that he has looked at this matter carefully and is completely assured that that is the case? Has he considered, or might he consider, whether combing through the material that was there previously might lead to anything further being added to inspectors’ powers and responsibilities, either by regulation or by further legislation, perhaps on Report? [Interruption.]
Dr Whitehead
I was seeking to tempt the Minister into standing up and saying a few more things.
Richard Harrington
I was not quite sure whether the hon. Gentleman had finished his comments. I stick to my point that this is obviously a complex area and I think that the Bill does exactly what he wants. I will consider his points carefully and, if further drafting is necessary, will bring forward proposals on that subject.
Dr Whitehead
This is going quite well. I thank the Minister for that consideration and it meets our concerns that, although I have not yet been able to spell them out, additional powers may be needed. If the Minister looked at that I would be very grateful. I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Schedule agreed to.
Clause 2
Power to amend legislation relating to nuclear safeguards
Dr Whitehead
I beg to move amendment 5, in clause 2, page 4, line 8, leave out
“may by regulations amend any of”
and insert
“must by regulations amend relevant provisions of”.
This amendment would require, rather than enable, the Secretary of State to make regulations in consequence of a relevant safeguards agreement.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 6, in clause 2, page 4, line 13, at end insert—
“(1A) The Secretary of State may only exercise powers under this section at the point at which amendment of any of the legislation in subsection (1) becomes necessary in order to complete the process of transposition of responsibility for nuclear safeguarding from EURATOM to the Office for Nuclear Regulation, and for no other purpose.
(1B) Upon exercising the power set out in subsection (1) the Secretary of State shall report its operation by means of a report laid before both Houses of Parliament.”
This amendment limits circumstances under which the Secretary of State may exercise certain powers in this section and requires a report to be laid before Parliament.
Dr Whitehead
This proposal is serious and requires substantial discussion in Committee. Amendments 5 and 6 address a particularly egregious part of the Bill: clause 2, which provides the power to amend legislation relating to nuclear safeguards.
As I am sure hon. Members are aware, the clause suggests that we amend not only secondary legislation relating to nuclear safeguards but a series of other pieces of legislation: the Nuclear Safeguards and Electricity (Finance) Act 1978, the Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000 and the Nuclear Safeguards (Notification) Regulations 2004. Two of those are pieces of primary legislation that have gone through the whole parliamentary procedure on the Floor of the House, received Royal Assent and become legislation. The clause suggests that those pieces of legislation should not only be amended by regulation but be amended on the basis of discussions about an agreement with the IAEA that we know nothing about at the moment and have not agreed.
One might think that these are not Henry VIII clauses but Henry IX clauses. I think there was a Henry IX in France, so it is possible to make that point without too much interruption in history. These powers are very substantial and exceptional and, to my mind, run wholly counter to what we should be doing in the House as far as legislation is concerned.
I will come to what the Government have to say about the particular circumstances in a moment. Henry VIII powers were obviously used substantially during the reign of Henry VIII, but subsequently have not been used quite so frequently. Although they have been used a little more frequently in recent years, the idea that the Executive—by Executive action, effectively—can overturn, amend or take in a different direction what Parliament has decided through legislation is something the House has fought against for many years. When such powers have been sought in the past, they have been in some instances successfully challenged, and on many occasions strongly challenged on both sides of the House.
We want to make an initial statement of principle that the Opposition do not like Henry VIII clauses. We think they are an overturning of the sovereignty of Parliament in dealing with these issues and that they give powers to the Executive that are unwarranted on virtually all occasions. A piece of legislation should be written in this form only in a dire emergency, where a calamity will befall the nation if that action is not taken. In all other circumstances, the idea is that legislation should properly appear before Parliament to be debated. If it is legislation replacing or substantially amending primary legislation, that process should be one of primary legislation as well.
In this instance, what might be envisaged as far as primary legislation is concerned would not detain the House forever or be particularly complex or difficult to achieve. Yesterday in the Chamber, we saw how it is possible to take a Bill through in an afternoon. Where changes are made with a consensus in the House, the procedure is pretty rapid, straightforward and achievable. Why can that procedure not be adopted for these pieces of legislation? Is it because there is a national emergency or the sky will fall in if we do not make the amendments? Is it because it has not been possible to find parliamentary time to undertake what would be neat and precise Bills to make the amendments? Indeed, on the basis of what has previously been achieved, would not a brief piece of primary legislation on the Floor of the House have agreement from all parts of the House?
I am not persuaded, nor do I think I will be persuaded easily, that that is not possible in these circumstances. The clause as drafted is therefore not something that has to be done, but something the Government have chosen to do in support of their legislation. It may well be that the Minister will say, “Yes, we have chosen to do this because, as far as we are concerned, these things have to be done.” As far as previous legislation is concerned—let me find a copy of the document that I just gave to the Clerks.
The Department’s delegated powers document on legislation, to which I have referred, states at paragraph 78:
“It is essential that the specified safeguards legislation is amended to make correct reference to the new agreements that the UK envisages concluding with the IAEA”.
Furthermore, paragraph 79 states:
“Without amendment, the existing provisions will become ineffective”.
The Henry VIII clause emergency is simply that any legislation that has not been amended after an IAEA agreement has been decided—we would enter a different arrangement from the one we had with Euratom—would render the new procedure ineffective. The relevant Acts therefore need to be changed. However, that is not the case with secondary legislation; it is only the case with those Acts, which I think we can all agree need to be amended. Of course, when all those proceedings have concluded, legislation will need to be in line with new procedures elsewhere on the statute book. That is not an issue at all. The issue is whether, in order to bring those bits of legislation in line with whatever we have agreed, we effectively declare a national emergency and say that we have to adopt Henry VIII clauses to do it. That is quite wrong, both for this piece of legislation and indeed for most other pieces of legislation that try to include those Henry VIII clauses.
Drew Hendry
I will make a few short comments to indicate Scottish National party support for the amendment. The shadow Minister referred to our being in new times; indeed, we are in uncharted territory. The SNP has great concerns about the possible use of Executive powers, particularly the prospect of a lack of scrutiny. Let us consider how the decision to leave Euratom came about: representatives found out about the decisions via a bit of small print in the Bill. That does not give the Government a good track record in how transparent they are willing to be. No warning was provided and no indication was given of the impact. Frankly, there was a blatant lack of transparency.
We call on the UK Government to ensure that future decisions are taken in a transparent and consultative way and in an inclusive manner. At the moment, the set-up does not give anyone reassurance that that will happen, so we support the amendment.
Richard Harrington
I have been very interested in our tour around Henry VIII and the French royal family and its possible member, Henry IX, which you did not rule outside the scope of discussions, Mr Gray, but you are entitled to use your judgment. However, neither Henry VIII nor Henry IX had to come up with a nuclear safeguards regime; I wonder what would have happened if they had.
In all seriousness—[Interruption.] The hon. Member for Southampton, Test is on great, humorous form, as well as making serious points, which I will try to answer, I hope, in a suitably serious manner. The fundamental difference between us, forgetting the “may” and “must” difference for the moment—we will come on to that—is about the actual powers and why we need them. I find the Henry VIII expression a bit misleading—not that the hon. Member for Southampton, Test is trying to mislead the House—given the way it is always referred to in the press and so on. We are talking about very limited non-primary legislation here.
Changing minor references, whether saying that that calls for Henry VIII powers or not, would not be a good use of parliamentary time, given that Governments have to govern and Parliament must in some way ration its time so that it can deal with the fundamental matters that it has to deal with. I know the Opposition’s view generally on Henry VIII powers, but I think there should be some leeway within that for what genuinely needs to be delegated, and which is comparatively minor in nature, so that we can act quickly. I am sure the hon. Gentleman and the Opposition Front Bench recognise that in practice. Sometimes principle is a great thing in life, but it has to be adapted pragmatically to deal with circumstances. I will park that for the moment.
As it stands, clause 2 will create a limited power, enabling regulations to amend the Nuclear Safeguards and Electricity (Finance) Act 1978, the Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000 and the Nuclear Safeguards (Notification) Regulations 2004. It will be a narrow power to amend references in those laws to provisions of the existing agreements with the IAEA. Those references enable the IAEA to carry out its activities in the UK, including, importantly, by providing legal cover for the UK activities of its inspectors. The references and the legal cover they have will need to be updated after the new agreements have been concluded with the IAEA; it cannot be done before.
At present, our nuclear safeguards regime complies with international safeguards and non-proliferation standards agreed between the three parties—ourselves, Euratom and the IAEA. The UK applies those standards primarily through its membership of Euratom. They are set out in two tripartite safeguards agreements between the UK, the IAEA and Euratom: the voluntary offer agreement and the additional protocol. At the moment, they rely on the UK’s membership of Euratom. Following our withdrawal from the European Union and Euratom, these agreements will become ineffective. That is why the Bill has to ensure that a domestic civil nuclear safeguards regime is put in place. The UK will need to conclude new agreements with the IAEA to detail the international safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation standards with which the UK agrees to comply. Without those, no regime we could have will be recognised by the international community.
Amendment 5, as tabled and eloquently articulated by the hon. Member for Southampton, Test, intends to require—rather than enable—the Secretary of State to make regulations under clause 2. I welcome the Opposition’s change of position on clause 2 since Second Reading. Amendment 5 clearly recognises the need to have the power in clause 2 to ensure the necessary legislative amendments are made in time to give effect to the new IAEA agreements, and to therefore ensure that the UK has a civil nuclear safeguards regime that gives effect to international standards on the UK’s withdrawal from the Euratom treaty.
However, making the Secretary of State’s power in clause 2 mandatory does not provide any additional value. Following the negotiation of the new agreements, the references to the old agreements in the legislation mentioned in this power automatically become ineffective —they will not work. The inspection of UK facilities by IAEA inspectors is a vital part of our agreement with the IAEA. It is not in anyone’s interest to fail to make the necessary consequential amendments to existing safeguards once new agreements with the IAEA are agreed. Requiring the exercise of the power in the Bill is therefore unnecessary.
I want to assure hon. Members that we are currently negotiating new agreements with the IAEA on the same principles as the existing agreements and that the consequential changes are expected to be minor. That will ensure that the IAEA retains its right to inspect all civil nuclear facilities and continues to receive all current safeguards reporting, ensuring that international verification of our safeguards activity continues to be robust.
Dr Whitehead
I am disappointed by the Minister’s response to the amendments this morning. He is right to point out that they in some ways represent what might be construed as a little bit of a change, perhaps a mellowing, from our position on Second Reading on the Floor of the House. It is not that we have changed our positions on Henry VIII clauses, but that addressing what is in the Bill is the important thing to do in Committee. We need to decide whether to amend it rather than try to chuck the whole thing out. That is the difference in our discussion this morning. I thought the amendments were constructive.
Although the Minister has mentioned that Government changes to these pieces of legislation would have to be reported to Parliament, that is a very different procedure from the procedure being suggested this morning.
Drew Hendry
The Minister himself has said that principles sometimes have to be adjusted pragmatically. The problem is that the Minister cannot tell us at the moment which principles and for whom they would have to be pragmatically adjusted.
Dr Whitehead
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right because we are in the dark as far as what is going to come out and the IAEA are concerned. We think that an agreement will be reached and that there will be a new voluntary treaty arrangement. We think that when that new arrangement has been reached, it will be suitable for the purposes for which we have made all these legislative changes. Indeed, the legislative changes will be scrutinised effectively by the IAEA before that treaty can come about. The IAEA wants to be sure that we have put a regime in place that does the job in changing the relationship of this country as far as nuclear safeguarding is concerned from Euratom to ONR.
Richard Harrington
Does the hon. Gentleman agree—and I am also trying to answer the Scottish National party’s spokesman about the principle and the way it might be changed—in practical terms, forgetting principle for the moment, that we cannot be sure exactly when the agreements with the IAEA will be finalised? Certainly, it is in our gift but it is also with the IAEA. We may well be under great time pressure to make sure that the new inspectors—who might even be the same inspectors—have the legal cover to maintain the safeguards we all want. There are times when some things have to be delegated and moved very quickly to deal with an expediency. I felt that was an example.
Dr Whitehead
I appreciate what the Minister says, but that does not knock away the fundamental principle that, except under very exceptional circumstances of national emergency, things that amend primary legislation by secondary legislation should not be before this House. Essentially, the Minister has summed up the case from his point of view that he thinks this is essential. It is just that there could be some time constraints.
Drew Hendry
On time constraints, as the Minister has just said, is it not the fact that when Governments have to act in haste, it is even more important to have the scrutiny of the decision they are taking?
Dr Whitehead
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. I accept that in cases of dire emergency, where the enemy is about to invade or some such, action needs to be taken that may not necessarily carry out the full intent of the parliamentary procedure. We are not in that position. As the Minister has said—he put it very well—there could be time constraints, that’s all. The limited time available for us to get this done could be problematic.
Richard Harrington
I do not want to be dramatic, but not having a nuclear safeguards regime because of the lack of an inspector’s legal power to inspect, as far as we are concerned, would be pretty much a national emergency.
Dr Whitehead
Indeed, the Minister is right, in principle. That may be something we might address with one of the amendments we may discuss this afternoon.
The fact of the matter is that putting something in this legislation simply because it might be a little inconvenient to have it any other way, given time constraints, is not a justification for using Henry VIII clauses. As I have mentioned, it is not beyond the wit of Government under those circumstances to introduce primary legislation that can be carried through this House very quickly indeed. If the Minister is so concerned about time constraints, he should also understand that other people will be concerned about time constraints as well and would be willing to make sure that that kind of legislation went through speedily.
This morning, he is giving assurances that this will all be done in the proper way and that it will be okay. We can give assurances on the other side that yes, if he did it in a proper way, we would make sure that this was done properly. Those assurances are of about equal weight. He simply has not made the case that the arrangements are necessary for the purpose of translating all the stuff in question into UK law. I remind the Committee that the Department, setting out the context and purpose of the clauses, has emphasised that it is necessary to take the action in question, but there is no mention in the document of the necessity to do it in time that is not otherwise available to Parliament. The document does not make that argument.
Because we have tried to be so reasonable and careful in our approach, but have not received anything coming the other way—
Richard Harrington
I remind the Committee that the changes under the Henry VIII power are about changing references to specific articles in the existing legislation. They are not changes to substance or principle.
Dr Whitehead
Indeed, which is why it would be easy to take a new Bill through the House, to make that evident with respect to the relevant provisions. Everyone would agree that that Bill should move through the House quickly. I think I could get an absolute assurance of that from the Opposition. For that reason, it is not necessary to cast the measure in its present form.
Richard Harrington
Is the hon. Gentleman saying that he would rather there was a brief period with no safeguards regime because there were no inspectors with the legal cover to inspect, so that the Bill could be brought through the House under an emergency procedure?
Dr Whitehead
No. I should rather that the Government organised their business so that it could be done properly in the time available, and that we could then carry out proper parliamentary procedure, to make sure that the power of Parliament was behind whatever was agreed.
Richard Harrington
But the hon. Gentleman would accept that, as it takes two to tango, a lot depends on timing with the IAEA, which is another organisation.
Dr Whitehead
Yes, indeed. The Minister is straying slightly, I think, into concerns that we may well address this afternoon: it is true that there are time constraints, and there are ways to sort that out.
Paul Blomfield
My hon. Friend is right to underline the importance of the point. I am sure that he, like me, would accept the Minister’s point about urgency in good faith, but is not there a problem in that the provision could apply to a range of issues? It is central to the Government’s argument about Henry VIII powers in general—
The Chair
Order. That is going well beyond the scope of the Bill. Mr Whitehead is, I think, about to wind up.
Dr Whitehead
I could have said, Mr Gray, that he makes an entirely out-of-order but nevertheless strong point.
The bottom line is that we have not received this morning the assurances that we hoped we might, about the circumstances in which we could move ahead with the amendments, rather than simply sitting on our hands and demanding that the Henry VIII clauses be struck out. Therefore I think we are going to have to divide the Committee on both amendments this morning. I hope that we can proceed to do that.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Nuclear Safeguards Bill (Sixth sitting)
Tuesday 14th November 2017
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 14 November 2017 - (14 Nov 2017)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 7 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 7 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 7 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 7, in clause 4, page 5, line 6, at end add—
“(5) Regulations under subsection (2) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”
This amendment would prevent the commencement of clauses 1 and 2 without the regulations made under this section being subject to the affirmative procedure.
This is a simple amendment that repeats the requirement suggested in other amendments for secondary legislation to be subject to the affirmative, rather than negative, procedure. I made the case this morning for the power of the affirmative procedure. As hon. Members can see, the amendment would ensure that regulations under subsection (2) could not be made unless a draft instrument were laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House—that means an affirmative resolution.
I do not think we need go over the difference between an affirmative and a negative resolution and why we think affirmative resolutions are always better. Through the amendment, we simply seek to ensure that regulations made under subsection (2) are subject to the affirmative procedure. I do not think we need to detain the Committee too much further with detailed discussion. We think this is important and consider that it should be included in the Bill, to ensure that matters properly come before the House when these issues are discussed.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Richard Harrington)
Good afternoon, everybody. I thank the hon. Gentleman for not repeating what he said about affirmative and negative procedure, because those points were well made this morning. I have sympathy, of course, with his broad aims of strengthening parliamentary scrutiny, but I argue that this is not an appropriate process to put in place. Parliament will have already passed the Bill and approved the legislation. I am confident that there are appropriate processes in place to ensure proper parliamentary scrutiny of the substantive powers in the Bill.
Clause 4 contains a commencement power. It is entirely conventional for the commencement power not to be subject to any parliamentary procedure because, as I say, it brings into force law that Parliament has already enacted. Clauses 1 and 2 contain delegated powers that must—I know “must” is one of the hon. Gentleman’s favourite words in the English language—be exercised before the UK’s new nuclear safeguards regime can be brought into effect. The regulations necessary to do so will be subject to the draft affirmative procedure. It would serve no useful purpose, in the Government’s view, to make the power to commence those delegated powers subject to the draft affirmative procedure.
I would like to reassure hon. Members that draft nuclear safeguard regulations are currently being worked on in close collaboration with the Office for Nuclear Regulation, and we will provide drafts during the passage of the legislation. The precise arrangements for the future safeguards regime and the details of the regulations will be subject to further consideration and detailed consultation with the regulator, industry and other interested parties.
Dr Whitehead
I am grateful to the Minister for mentioning that detailed regulations will be available during the Bill’s passage. Would he perhaps be more specific about that and say when those draft regulations might appear? I assume it will not be in Committee, but it should certainly be before Report.
Richard Harrington
As I said, my hope is that that will happen soon. I cannot confirm that it will be before Report, because I do not know when that will be—unless the hon. Gentleman has any information. I certainly hope that it will happen by the end of this year or very early in January, but that is allowing myself a bit of wiggle room. There is no great secret going on; we are just ensuring that all the detail and everything is in place. With that in mind, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will feel able to withdraw the amendment.
Dr Whitehead
I thank the Minister for his explanation of the circumstances under which commencement would take place, and what regulations would proceed under that. Although I am not completely convinced that it provides exactly the safeguards that we require, it does go a long way towards reassuring us on the status of the Bill, so we will not press the amendment to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
The Chair
Amendment 8 was debated previously, but I do not think that the hon. Gentleman seeks to divide the Committee—I think not, from his lack of response.
Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
New Clause 1
Purpose
“The purpose of this Act is to provide for a contingent arrangement for nuclear safeguarding arrangements under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the event that the United Kingdom no longer has membership or associate membership of EURATOM, to ensure that qualifying nuclear material, facilities or equipment are only available for use for civil activities (whether in the United Kingdom or elsewhere).” —(Dr Whitehead.)
This new clause would be a purpose clause, to establish that the provisions of the Bill are contingency arrangements if it proves impossible to establish an association with EURATOM after the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, that the clause be read a Second time.
Dr Whitehead
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause refers to the possibility of seeking a transition period prior to the UK leaving Euratom of not less than two years. It states that during that transition period,
“conditions under which the UK is a member of EURATOM before exit day shall continue to apply…obligations upon the UK which derive from membership of EURATOM before exit day shall continue to apply…structures for UK participation in EURATOM that are in place before exit day shall be maintained”—
and most importantly—
“financial commitment to EURATOM made by the UK during the course of UK membership of EURATOM before exit day shall be honoured.”
Nothing in the new clause suggests that we shall be members of Euratom in perpetuity.
Sir Robert Syms (Poole) (Con)
As I understand it, the hon. Gentleman is suggesting that we continue to be a member of Euratom for two years, during which time we would presumably continue to pay our contribution, while at the same time employing inspectors in the UK— we are actually trying to recruit people at the moment. Would it not impose additional costs on the industry if we are both recruiting inspectors and staying in Euratom? Is that not double jeopardy?
Dr Whitehead
No, because the idea of a transition period would be, among other things, to give greater scope for precisely that sort of recruitment, training and other arrangements to take place, so that the new regime is assuredly in place by the time we leave Euratom—assuming we do. There would not be any duplication because the positions after Euratom would be fully in place.
The transitional period would be used for the purpose of making sure those final arrangements were in place. Unless a series of magical events occur and everything is completely and easily in place before March 2019, I cannot see anything other than good things coming out of a transition period, including the things we have discussed in making a transition from Euratom to a nationally determined inspection regime complete, waterproof and fully operational.
In that sense, the Bill is straightforward:
“It ensures that, when the United Kingdom is no longer a member of…Euratom…we will have in place a legal framework that meets our future international obligations on nuclear safeguarding. Nuclear safeguards demonstrate to the international community that civil nuclear material is not diverted into military or weapons programmes…Our current nuclear safeguards obligations arise from our voluntary offer agreement…with the International Atomic Energy Agency”—
which I will come on to—
“The IAEA is the UN-associated body responsible for the oversight of the global non-proliferation regime. The first requirement flowing from the UK’s commitments on safeguards is to have a domestic system that allows the state to know what civil nuclear material it has, where it is and whether any has been withdrawn from civil activities.”
As we have discussed,
“the Bill has been prepared on a contingency basis. The discussions around our continued arrangements with Euratom and with the rest of the European Union have not been concluded, but it is right to put in place in good time any commitments that are needed in primary legislation. Euratom has served the United Kingdom and our nuclear industries well, so we want to see maximum continuity in those arrangements.”—[Official Report, 16 October 2017; Vol. 629, c. 617.]
I cannot keep this up any longer; those are the words of the Secretary of State on Second Reading.
It appears that the Secretary of State at least is pretty much onside with the idea of wanting maximum continuity of the arrangements with Euratom, that Euratom has served us well, and that we have no objections in this country in the past to the working of Euratom, what it does and how it works. For “maximum continuity” of those arrangements, as the Secretary of State clearly wants, seeking associate membership or arrangements with Euratom under article 206 of the existing Euratom treaty—the Secretary of State was pressed on that on Second Reading—is something we would positively seek as an alternative to the contingency that the Bill represents.
From what the Secretary of State stated on Second Reading and from his introduction to the Bill, it does not seem to require a great deal of construction to conclude that that is something that the Government have in mind and would like to achieve.
Drew Hendry
We support the new clause, which would put in place a transition period during which the UK would have the option to seek and secure an association with Euratom. The Scottish National party does not support the decision to exit Euratom, and the Bill continues to fall significantly short of answering vital questions about the UK’s nuclear future, particularly given the fact that the skilled and trained inspectors are at best unlikely to be in place in time. This Government have put nuclear energy at the heart of their energy strategy, and yet they are leaving the agency that oversees the security of markets, businesses and workers in that sector. Given that the UK Government have poured resources into costly and ineffective nuclear power projects such as Hinkley C, the Euratom divorce leaves questions unanswered and threatens to prove highly complex. That is why a transition deal is not only desirable but may turn out to be essential, and we will be supporting the amendment.
Preet Kaur Gill (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab/Co-op)
I just want to make some suggestions. The concern is that to import fuel and parts from existing nuclear reactors into the UK—as we have already heard—we shall need to have established a regulatory and inspection structure, obtain approval from the International Energy Atomic Agency and then negotiate and ratify nuclear co-operation agreements with a number of Governments. There is an assumption that we should not make: we cannot be sure that nuclear co-operation agreements will just be nodded through, because we know some of the complexities that we already have with other countries, such as the USA. Therefore, I do not think it is sensible to leave Euratom until these agreements are actually in place, and that is why I support these amendments.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Richard Harrington)
I thank hon. Members for their contributions. I am particularly speechless at the shadow Minister’s widespread quotation of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State; were he here today, I am sure he would personally thank him. The truth behind it—I was obviously making a flippant comment—is that most of us actually agree on most of the things the Secretary of State said. I would endorse them and I thank him for formally doing so. However, the Secretary of State also said—I think I am correct in saying it was in his evidence in the Select Committee—that article 50 for the main exit from the European Union and for Euratom were interleaved together and therefore we have served the article 50 notice. That was yesterday’s argument, but it was obviously something the Secretary of State was well questioned on at the time. I mention that because the hon. Members spoke of their desire to ensure that the current position remains for as long as possible, but maximum continuity, which is what we have said we are aiming for, and which was quoted by the shadow Minister, is not the same as pretending that article 50 has not been triggered. It has and we are leaving, so the debate is really about what is next rather than turning back the clock. I have said this repeatedly, and I hope everybody accepts the fact that it is our intention to have a regime as robust and as comprehensive as that provided by Euratom.
Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)
Speaking of that collective desire, I am sure the Minister will recall Dr Golshan from the ONR saying that we will not be able to replicate those same Euratom standards on day one. Does that not make a compelling case for a transition period?
Richard Harrington
I do remember the evidence and Dr Golshan spoke also to Select Committees that I have appeared before, but she did make it clear that while she could not guarantee that we could exactly replicate, we could have a safeguards regime that was very serviceable in working very quickly towards what Euratom is. I do respect her and the institution she works for, but there is no precedent for this.
I accept the gist of what the hon. Gentleman is saying, but the same argument might be as true at the end of the transition period as it would be at the beginning of it. However, I am certain and satisfied that we can do the necessary recruitment and make the necessary agreements—which the hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston mentioned in her contribution—but actually within the time period required. I am sure that if we are not able to do that, I will be hauled before the Select Committee, the Chamber and everything else, and quite rightly. It is the job of Government to make decisions and it is our full intention and belief that we will be able to achieve that. I accept the fact that there is no precedent; I accept that people are entitled to their expert opinions. I do not at all deny that she said it, because I was here and it is on the record, and anyway I respect her too much to say that she is not correct in her view. I suppose I can say that, not being an expert, but my colleagues at the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy spend a lot of time with all her colleagues, and it is our job to ensure that it does happen.
Dr Whitehead
I am not sure that, for the sake of the apparent administrative convenience of leaving the two institutions on the same day, everything will be better served. We have discussed in this Committee precisely why things probably would not be better served regarding the process of ensuring that we have everything in place to replace what we acknowledge that we have received well from Euratom in the past. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston, in a brief but important contribution, raised the question of how likely it is that the various bilateral deals that we will have to make with various states around the world will be concluded in a timely fashion. Indeed, I suggest that the opposite is the case—they are not likely to be concluded in a timely fashion, not least because, for example, agreements with the United States would have to go through both Houses of Congress.
It is unlikely that there will be anything other than a rather messy tail hanging around for quite a long while if we stated that we were leaving Euratom on the same exit day the Prime Minister is suggesting in amendment 381 to the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill. I do not know whether this piece of advice will be welcome, but if that is what the Prime Minister wishes to do, I think it might be a good idea for her to add the words “and Euratom” to that amendment. I say that because although Euratom and the EU are effectively conjoined, Euratom did not come into being at the same time as the European Union, and therefore it is not necessarily the case that if one puts in place an exit day for the EU, one automatically transfers that exit day to exit from Euratom. That may well be what the Government want to do, but it is by no means clear that that is what would actually have to happen.
It is possible to consider, without in any way undermining the idea that we leave Euratom, a different form of leaving day from that from the EU, in my opinion. That has not particularly been tested in terms of the arguments about whether the Euratom treaty was separate from the EU. The Minister may well be getting wise advice that that is not the case, but it seems at least arguable that there is nothing in stone, and nothing in the amendments tabled to the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, that points in the direction of having to leave Euratom at the same time as leaving the EU.
If it were possible to negotiate an arrangement whereby the aim was associate status of some description and the means were a transitional period, with the clear aim that that associate status would be in place at the end of it, that would seem to be a prudent thing to do, as far as our future relationship with Euratom is concerned, bearing in mind all the things we have said about how it has served us and what we could get from it during that transitional period, with that eventual aim in mind.
It would be not only desirable but very wise, in the present circumstances, to state on the face of the Bill that that is what we will try to do, and to require the Secretary of State to try to ensure that it happens. That does not undermine our future relationship with Euratom or with the EU; it merely puts in place something that is possible to achieve and that could be of considerable benefit to this country and to our partners in the nuclear community around the world.
It would enhance considerably the value of the Bill if that transitional arrangement did not succeed, because it would, among other things, show our partners in Euratom and the wider international community that we were intent and absolutely serious about wanting the best possible regime for the future. That surely would be a considerable boost to the idea that we can survive well in an international and closely conjoined nuclear community while not being a member of Euratom in the long term. If the Minister is not prepared to accept the amendment, I would like it on the record that we tried to divide the Committee this afternoon.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Dr Whitehead
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. The clause reflects what we have discussed in Committee about the process of securing an agreement that is voluntarily entered into with the IAEA to replace the previous agreement that was essentially mediated by Euratom, and hence has to be replaced.
One might think that the agreement should, in principle, be reasonably easy to arrive at. If we have a contingency nuclear safeguarding regime in place that we can demonstrate to IAEA fits the bill as a replacement for Euratom, the new voluntary agreement with IAEA should proceed reasonably straightforwardly. My understanding is that it is a voluntary agreement made by nuclear-possessing powers, and this is clearly about entering into an agreement as a nuclear-possessing power alongside other individual nuclear-possessing powers outside the ambit of Euratom. This would be something that we and the IAEA would want to conclude.
As we have heard, that agreement is still some way off being concluded. We are effectively in a position of preliminary discussions with the IAEA about what an agreement might look like, and how it should proceed. As we have heard, we are being asked to agree to put legislation on the statute book as if that agreement had been concluded. We are to take on trust the fact that the agreement can be concluded in reasonably good time, so that the Henry VIII clauses we discussed this morning could be put in place. We discussed those clauses without knowing when or whether an agreement with the IAEA would be forthcoming, what stage of negotiation we were at, and whether there were particular obstacles in the road, or whether indeed those obstacles had been substantially resolved. It does not look as if we are going to hear anything about the agreement until its conclusion. However, we are part of a Parliament that is putting legislation in place as if we had heard about it.
Richard Harrington
I hope I can help the hon. Gentleman in his quest to answer his grandchildren’s questions about what he did during Brexit and the great time when we were leaving Europe and so on. We all hope that for ourselves and our grandchildren. I completely understand the sentiments behind his new clause, which is reasoned and well argued. I intend to consider it carefully, and will come on to that in a moment.
For the record, new clause 4 seeks to require quarterly updates detailing the progress towards the conclusion of “relevant international agreements”, which is a defined term set out in the Bill. As he said, it means an agreement, whether ratified or not, to which the United Kingdom is a party, which relates to nuclear safeguards and is specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State. I appreciate the objective of the new clause is for hon. Members, both on the Committee and generally within the House, to receive frequent updates on the status of international negotiations in this area. I will begin providing an immediate update on our international agreements relating to safeguards.
The hon. Gentleman said that he had been briefed informally, hopefully by me and others as part of general communications, but I would like to place it on record that the UK has begun formal negotiations with the IAEA on the future voluntary agreements for the application of civil nuclear safeguards in the UK, so that they are ready to be put in place by the time of our withdrawal from Euratom. We are seeking to conclude a new voluntary offer agreement and a new additional protocol on a bilateral basis with the agency. Our intention is that those agreements should follow exactly the same principles as the current ones. The discussions that began last September have been constructive and fruitful, and substantial progress has been made. I fully expect that the new agreements will be put to the IAEA board of governors for ratification in 2018. They will be subject to the usual ratification procedures, including parliamentary consideration.
As hon. Members will be aware, our aim is to maintain our mutually successful civil nuclear co-operation with the rest of the world, and we are working to ensure that arrangements are in place to allow that. Where action is required to ensure that civil nuclear trade and co-operation with non-European partners are not disrupted by our exit from Euratom, the Government are already entering into negotiations to ensure that nuclear co-operation agreements will be in place. Our team are in negotiations with key partners such as the USA, Canada, Australia and Japan. I met Ministers from those countries in Paris last week. The UK has a range of bilateral nuclear co-operation agreements in place with several countries, and we expect those to continue. The work highlights our commitment to ensuring that all arrangements are in place to allow our mutually successful civil nuclear co-operation to continue.
Turning to the specific requirements imposed by new clause 4, as I said, although I appreciate the sentiments behind the clause, I cannot agree to the proposal. As I have just explained, “relevant international agreement” is a defined term referring to agreements already negotiated, and the specification of an agreement as a relevant international agreement is subject to a clear and open process. I fully appreciate the important role that parliamentary scrutiny plays. We have been and will continue to be open and honest with Parliament about ongoing negotiations.
Negotiations on international agreements relating to safeguards are progressing well, and the intention is to present those agreements to Parliament before ratification, before the UK’s withdrawal from Euratom, so that they will come into force immediately on our exit. Incidentally —as I know you will be aware, Mr Gray—international treaties are already subject to the ratification processes laid out in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010.
Richard Harrington
Thank you, Mr Gray. I note that, in accordance with provisions in the Bill, an international agreement may be defined as a relevant international agreement for the purpose of Bill only if the Secretary of State specifies that agreement in regulations. The Bill provides that such regulations will always be subject to the draft affirmative procedure, providing the opportunity for parliamentary scrutiny of whether an agreement should be a relevant international agreements as defined by the Bill.
As I have established, relevant international agreements are already subject to an open and transparent process. My fear is that imposing an additional reporting requirement would provide little added value and might hinder negotiations, which I know the hon. Gentleman would not want. Indeed, requiring such frequent updates on negotiations could risk weakening our position and might compromise our ability to build rapport and trust with our negotiating partners. I am concerned that that should not happen, but I recognise fully the importance of transparency and the need for Parliament to be able to provide input into the negotiations, so I am sympathetic to the sentiment underpinning the new clause. If the hon. Gentleman is prepared not to press this to a vote—in fact, even if he does—I would like to give the matter some further thought, because I think I can come up with a proposal that strikes the right balance and maximises the transparency that he wants and that I am not afraid of at all. I do not want to impede the progress of these time-sensitive and vital negotiations, which of course involve other parties.
Dr Whitehead
I thank the Minister for giving a constructive response to the new clause without going quite as far as saying that he agrees with it. I hope that he will be able to come up with something that, while not necessarily this proposal, maximises the transparency of the process. We are not only talking about the outcome and a report of the outcome that will come to Parliament. Because of the unique circumstances in which we are legislating while the treaty is being discussed and legislating for something that is quite central to that treaty coming about, it is important we have transparency on the journey as well as the conclusion. If the Minister can work out a device that allows that to happen, which I think he indicated he wishes to think about seriously, we would be happy not to press this. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 5
International agreements: devolved authorities
“(1) The Secretary of State must consult the persons or bodies listed in subsection (2) before concluding—
(a) a relevant international agreement, or
(b) any agreement with EU Member States relating to nuclear safeguarding.
(2) The persons or bodies are—
(a) Scottish Ministers,
(b) Welsh Ministers, and
(c) a Northern Ireland devolved authority.”—(Drew Hendry.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Drew Hendry
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 5 states that the Secretary of State must consult certain persons or bodies—the Scottish Ministers, Welsh Ministers or a Northern Ireland devolved authority —before agreement with EU member states relating to nuclear safeguarding.
As mentioned earlier, without confirmation of a transitionary deal, the Government leave a host of unanswered questions about nuclear safeguards. Falling back on World Trade Organisation rules risks the UK breaking international law. As a nuclear weapons state, the UK currently meets some of its safeguards obligations under international nuclear law through a voluntary offer agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, to which the Euratom community is also a signatory.
A report by the Nuclear Industry Association UK found:
“Falling back on World Trade Organisation (WTO) arrangements in the absence of a replacement safeguards agreement with the IAEA and/or an implementation period with Euratom risks putting the UK in breach of its obligations under international nuclear law and would have a significant impact on the UK nuclear sector.”
Those unanswered questions are big issues. Will the UK Government ensure that the UK’s nuclear facilities are subject to Euratom’s safeguards regime? If they are not to be monitored by Euratom’s inspectors, will the UK negotiate a replacement for the voluntary offer agreement with the IAEA to remain in compliance with international law? How will the UK Government design, resource and implement new UK safeguarding arrangements in line with accepted international standards?
We have already heard that the Minister cannot guarantee that fully trained, certified professionals will be available. What good are safeguards if there is nobody qualified to implement them? While safeguards and safety are reserved, areas of regulation such as waste and emissions from nuclear sites are devolved.
In the light of the Minister’s earlier comments on issues of national security that could arise, the Scottish Government must be involved in the negotiations regarding nuclear safeguards, and the UK Government must involve the Scottish Government at every stage of the negotiation process to ensure that the deal reached works for the people of Scotland. That is equally important for the other devolved Administrations in Wales and Northern Ireland.
Conservative Governments have a poor track record on Scotland and nuclear programmes. They must ensure that Scotland is not turned into a dumping ground for nuclear waste. I say to the Minister that as matters proceed in the House, there is an opportunity for his Scottish colleagues in the Tory party to help us stand up for Scotland’s interests. We look forward to seeing what they do. I hope the Minister accepts that it is only sensible and proper that the Scottish Government and the other devolved authorities are involved in this process in a meaningful way and involved in the negotiations, particularly given that the stakes are so high.
Richard Harrington
I thank the hon. Gentleman for contributing new clause 5. It might surprise him that although I cannot accept what he asks for, I have a proposal for him and the Committee to consider. The new clause addresses the issue of consultation with the devolved Administrations on new international agreements relating to nuclear safeguards. As hon. Members will be aware, the UK Government are responsible for negotiating and signing these international treaties. The ratification of treaties is subject to the Act I mentioned before, the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, which requires them to be laid before Parliament.
The Government have the power to conclude international treaties under prerogative powers but cannot automatically change domestic law or rights and cannot make major changes to constitutional arrangements without parliamentary authority. That will remain the case for international agreements relating to safeguards that are currently under negotiation, such as the new nuclear co-operation agreements with the US, Canada, Japan, Australia and so on that we have mentioned, and the agreements with the IAEA.
The measures put forward in the hon. Gentleman’s new clause would be a significant departure from the usual position—I know he knows that; it is why he proposed it and it is the policy of his party—and I do not consider it appropriate to accept them. As I said, nuclear safeguards are not a devolved matter, but I nevertheless reassure hon. Members that the Bill already ensures an appropriate level of transparency and scrutiny in respect of international agreements relating to nuclear safeguards, which I have been through before.
New clause 5 refers to “relevant international agreements”, which is a defined term as set out in the Bill. The existing drafting of Bill allows for the inclusion of any relevant international agreements as designated by the Secretary of State, so it is unnecessary to detail individual agreements in the Bill. While I appreciate the sentiment of the new clause, the role of relevant international agreements is already subject to a clear and open process under the Bill. I have explained that before and I do not intend to repeat it all again, unless any members of the Committee wish me to. It is a clear and open process.
On the specific focus of the new clause—consultation with the devolved Administrations, which I know is the hon. Gentleman’s main interest—it appears to require formal consultation with the devolved Administrations prior to our concluding international agreements relating to nuclear safeguards or any agreement with EU member states relating to nuclear safeguards. As I am sure hon. Members are aware, the Bill extends to and applies to England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, and in the case of amendments, to the same extent as the provision amended.
As I have said, nuclear safeguards are not a devolved matter. Despite the responsibility legally being the UK Government’s, I hope that our general approach of having an open and transparent process, which is evolving, would be described as reassuring. The Government are acutely aware of the value of consultation in developing this new regulatory regime—obviously with the ONR, but also with the industry generally and formally and informally with parliamentary colleagues. As I have explained before, the nuclear safeguards regime regulations will be subject to detailed consultations with the regulator and industry. Industry stakeholders across the UK, which of course includes Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, will be widely encouraged to take part in that consultation. The outcome of the consultation will then be made public, in line with the Government’s general policy on consultations.
The public consultation on the draft regulations will not be the first or only opportunity for stakeholders to be made aware of our intentions, and it will not be their only opportunity to provide the Government with their views. We have had detailed discussions with the nuclear industry since the referendum, and we will continue to work closely with it and other stakeholders when taking the development of the new regime forward, including the development of regulations. My officials have already been in discussions with colleagues from across the devolved Administrations and the relevant environment agencies, such as the Scottish Environment Protection Agency, Natural Resources Wales and so on, to ensure effective collaborations on key Euratom-related policy areas—including the domestic nuclear safeguards regime—and will continue to do so.
I have been clear that the relevant international agreements will be subject to a clear, open and transparent process involving a high degree of consideration, scrutiny and external engagement. However, I do appreciate the concern behind new clause 5, which is why I already committed to the hon. Member for North Ayrshire and Arran to address her query on consultation with the Scottish Government by writing to her on the subject. I would therefore propose instead, if it will be satisfactory to the hon. Member for Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey, to write directly to Scottish Ministers, Welsh Ministers and the Northern Ireland devolved authority on the subject for consultation. In the light of these explanations, I hope the hon. Gentleman feels able to withdraw his amendment.
Drew Hendry
I thank the Minister for his attempts at reassurance. I know that the Minister is genuinely trying to concede some ground and I appreciate that. However, his attempts at reassurance do not really hit the mark. There should be negotiations with the Scottish Government and the other devolved authorities in the light of the devolved responsibilities. It just is not good enough that after the deal is done a consolation might be undertaken with Ministers. That is not the way that this should happen at all. There are significant impacts on the nuclear industry and those devolved responsibilities.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Richard Harrington
On a point of order, Mr Gray—it is the first point of order I have ever raised. I want to thank you as Chair, and Mr McCabe, who is not here today. I would like to thank the Clerks. I would like to thank hon. Members on both sides of the Committee for their patience, time and valuable contributions. I look forward to seeing the Bill progress in terms of the discussions we shall have before Report and then on Report and beyond. I hope the Bill’s progress continues to be characterised by the spirit of co-operation and conciliation that we have enjoyed. I particularly thank the shadow Minister for that, but also everybody else who contributed.
Dr Whitehead
On a point of order, Mr Gray. I join the Minister in thanking you for your exemplary chairing of our sessions. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”] I thank Mr McCabe, too, for his assistance with chairing.
I would also like to thank all Committee members for the constructive and helpful way that we managed to proceed. We had our disagreements. We put those squarely in the open and discussed them, and as a result of those discussions we had a number of exchanges that look to be constructive for the future. I am grateful for the spirit in which Committee stage has been conducted, and I look forward to Report and to the stages that follow with some optimism for the Bill. I am pleased to have taken part in such a constructive endeavour on all our parts.
Drew Hendry
On a point of order, Mr Gray. May I, very simply, associate myself with the remarks made by the Minister and the shadow Minister?
The Chair
All three points of order are of course entirely bogus and out of order, but they are none the less very welcome.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill to be reported, without amendment.
Nuclear Safeguards Bill
Tuesday 23rd January 2018
(6 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 23 January 2018 - (23 Jan 2018)
15:52 - The House divided: - Ayes: 255 / Noes: 294 - Question accordingly negatived.
16:59 - The House divided: - Ayes: 254 / Noes: 295 - Question accordingly negatived.
Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 2—Purpose—
“The purpose of this Act is to provide for a contingent arrangement for nuclear safeguarding arrangements under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the event that the United Kingdom no longer has membership or associate membership of EURATOM, to ensure that qualifying nuclear material, facilities or equipment are only available for use for civil activities (whether in the United Kingdom or elsewhere).”
This new clause would be a purpose clause, to establish that the provisions of the Bill are contingency arrangements if it proves impossible to establish an association with EURATOM after the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.
New clause 3—EURATOM: maintenance of nuclear safeguarding arrangements—
“No power to make regulations under this Act shall be exercised until the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament a report on his or her efforts to—
(a) seek associate membership of EURATOM, or
(b) otherwise maintain the implementation of nuclear safeguarding arrangements in the UK through EURATOM
after the UK has left the European Union.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to report to Parliament on his or her efforts to maintain the implementation of nuclear safeguarding arrangements through EURATOM after the UK has left the EU.
Amendment 3, in clause 1, page 2, line 14, at end insert—
“(3A) No regulations may be made under this section unless the Secretary of State has laid before both Houses of Parliament a statement certifying that, in his or her opinion, it is no longer possible to retain membership of EURATOM or establish an association with EURATOM that permits the operation of nuclear safeguarding activity through its administrative arrangements.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to certify, before making any regulations to provide for nuclear safeguarding regulations, that it was not possible to remain a member of EURATOM or have an association with it.
Amendment 2, page 3, line 3, at end insert—
“(11) Regulations may not be made under this section unless the Secretary of State has laid before both Houses of Parliament a report detailing his strategy for seeking associate membership of EURATOM or setting out his reasons for choosing to make nuclear safeguards regulations under this Act rather than seeking associate membership of EURATOM.”
This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from using the powers under Clause 1 to set out a nuclear safeguards regime through regulations until a report has been laid before each House setting out a strategy for seeking associate membership of EURATOM or explaining why the UK cannot seek associate membership of EURATOM.
Amendment 7, in clause 4, page 5, line 6, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until—
(a) the Government has laid before Parliament a strategy for maintaining those protections, safeguards, programmes for participation in nuclear research and development, and trading or other arrangements which will lapse as a result of the UK’s withdrawal from membership of and participation in EURATOM, and
(b) the strategy has been considered by both Houses of Parliament.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to lay a report before Parliament on the protection and trading arrangements that arise from membership of EURATOM, and his strategy for maintaining them prior to making regulations concerning nuclear safeguarding.
Dr Whitehead
The proposed new clauses and amendments appear in my name and those of my hon. Friends the Members for Salford and Eccles (Rebecca Long Bailey), who is the shadow Secretary of State, and for Sheffield Central (Paul Blomfield) and others.
First and foremost, I want to set down a marker on new clause 2, because it represents the dividing line between us and the Government on membership, associate or otherwise, of Euratom. This purpose clause makes explicit that this is a contingency Bill. In other words, it is being enacted to deal with circumstances that may never arise—namely, that we as a country have no future association or membership with Euratom that would enable us to continue to reap the benefits of association or membership in a way that I think is almost universally agreed.
I think that it is agreed—the Minister has stated as much during the passage of this Bill—that Euratom has served well our purposes as a nuclear nation over the past 40 years, and nuclear safeguarding has worked very well in inspecting and representing our obligations to international agencies such as the International Atomic Energy Authority.
It is clear that our interests as a country would be best served by continuing our membership of Euratom, which was founded by a different treaty from that which brought about the EU. Indeed, during evidence to the Public Bill Committee, we heard strong arguments along those lines from eminent lawyers who had been called as witnesses. However, we appear to be in the position of assuming that our future membership of Euratom is not possible, because essentially the Prime Minister, as a matter of choice, included exit from Euratom in her letter to the Commission informing it that we were invoking article 50.
Stephen Kerr (Stirling) (Con)
The treaty on Euratom membership is part of the set of treaties described in the treaty of Lisbon. Therefore, as we leave the European Union, we will, de facto, leave our membership of Euratom. It is as simple as that.
Dr Whitehead
I am afraid that it is not as simple as that. A considerable body of legal opinion states that, because Euratom was founded by a treaty other than the treaty of Rome—it was, in fact, founded before the EU came together—it can and should be dealt with separately. Although arrangements relating to association with and membership of various EU bodies have changed over time as a result of changes in EU regulations, that has not been the case with Euratom. The articles relating to associate membership and arrangements are identical to those that were in place when Euratom was founded. There is no case to answer as far as separate arrangements for Euratom are concerned.
Albert Owen (Ynys Môn) (Lab)
My hon. Friend is making a strong case for associate membership. He will recall a Westminster Hall debate that I held only last year, during which there was broad consensus on the issue, including among Conservative Members. I think that the Minister was the only Member who did not agree. The only reasons the Government have given relate to the legal position and the European Court of Justice. If Conservative Members were not whipped, they would understand the logic of the very sensible new clause.
Dr Whitehead
I thank my hon. Friend for making that strong point. I recall that even the hon. Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) suggested during that debate that associate membership of Euratom could be effective in continuing those arrangements, which have served us so well over many years.
Rebecca Pow (Taunton Deane) (Con)
The hon. Gentleman has referred to the International Atomic Energy Authority. The Government have made it clear that we will be seeking new arrangements with it and that they will follow exactly the same principles as the current arrangements—that is, the right to inspect civil nuclear facilities and to continue to receive all the safeguards and reports. We should be confident that this Government are going about the issue in a serious, sensible and meticulous way.
Dr Whitehead
The hon. Lady makes the case for our new clause. If the Government are going about their business in a sensible and coherent way—I note the Secretary of State’s statement on 11 January on how the Government intend to go about conducting relationships with Euratom—it would be a good idea to place that procedure into the Bill, so that we can be clear about what we are about, what we want to achieve and how we will do so.
After all, it has been stated that this is a contingency Bill. We want to know what it is a contingency against and therefore how it should be framed in terms of what we should be doing in contemplating whether to bring it into operation. If we had either membership of Euratom or an associate form of membership, which might be fairly similar to that enjoyed currently by Ukraine but with a number of additional factors, this Bill would not be needed. The arrangements with Euratom would continue to be in place, rendering the Bill superfluous. We need to be clear about what we are debating.
James Heappey (Wells) (Con)
The shadow Minister knows that he and I often agree on stuff, but I wonder whether today he might concede this point. At worst, his new clauses would merely render the Bill superfluous if we manage to achieve associate membership of Euratom, but at best we are providing the contingency plan that gives industry the certainty that it says that it so much wants. The Bill is therefore relevant and necessary in that sense, even if it may ultimately prove to be superfluous because we achieve Euratom membership.
Dr Whitehead
Yes, indeed. I suspect that the hon. Gentleman and I are going to agree substantially on this. We regard the Bill as necessary in the context of the possibility that, after Brexit, no arrangements can be brought about with Euratom, either associate membership or full membership. The Bill will then ensure that the nuclear industry is clear about its future and that the arrangements for our international obligations can be properly carried out in the absence of those arrangements. We have indeed been constructive and helpful during the Bill’s whole passage through Parliament. However, that does not detract from our thinking that a number of its procedural elements should be strengthened in relation to what we do while it is gestating and coming to potential fruition after the point at which the things that we are doing may not have had any success.
The hon. Gentleman will see that in some of our amendments we are also trying to make sure that Parliament is fully informed of what processes are under way while we get to the position that the Bill could, or could not, come into operation. That is important for Parliament’s sake. After all, we are in new territory with regard to this Bill, and we therefore have to do a number of new things in legislation that fit the bill for our future arrangements. That is essentially the beginning and end of what we are trying to do through this group of amendments.
Richard Graham (Gloucester) (Con)
I am puzzled why new clause 1 is necessary. All its ingredients are issues that form part of the transition negotiations that our country is going through with the European Commission. It therefore seems bizarre to try to legislate that
“conditions under which the UK is a member of EURATOM before exit day shall continue to apply”
during the transition. On that basis, we would be legislating for all sorts of things that form part of the negotiations to continue during the transition. What would the hon. Gentleman say to that?
Dr Whitehead
The hon. Gentleman has slightly got ahead of me, because I started by talking about new clause 2, and I am about to start talking about new clause 1. He thinks that new clause 1 may be superfluous. I would suggest that because this Bill is about procedure as much as fact, the new clause sets out a procedure that we need to undertake in the event of certain things not happening, and it is important that a number of those possible events are covered in the Bill. Should it not prove possible to remain a member of Euratom, for various reasons, it is important to consider the idea of a transition period after which we would then be in a position to fully carry out our obligations to the IAEA and other agencies separate from Euratom. That, indeed, is what the Bill is essentially trying to bring about. The Bill is predicated on the notion that membership or association with Euratom will not be possible, and it is therefore necessary to recreate the arrangements for nuclear safeguarding that have served us so well in a solely domestic form and thereby enabled us to negotiate separate voluntary arrangements with the IAEA and, indeed, separate bilateral agreements with a number of other countries, including the United States, Australia, Japan, and Canada.
Rachel Maclean (Redditch) (Con)
I accept that there was a vast amount of legal argument on our membership, or not, of Euratom. Indeed, it is not a simple point. However, we have now triggered our leaving Euratom. The treaties are uniquely joined, so it is a fact that we have left Euratom and will no longer be members. As we go forward with negotiations, putting the word “contingent” into the Bill would create uncertainty for our partners in the EU, given that the negotiations are two-sided. Those negotiations have yet to progress, so we need this Bill to be a clear signal or statement to our EU partners to achieve what we want. I fear that having the word “contingent” in the Bill will muddy the waters in our negotiations with our partners. Does the hon. Gentleman agree?
Dr Whitehead
I would have thought that the Bill, in whatever form it eventually emerges, demonstrates the opposite. Yes, there are a number of negotiations to be undertaken. We do not yet know the results of those negotiations. We have not left Euratom, which, it is generally agreed, has served our purposes very well. The new clause would enable us to signal, in the event of all those negotiations not working, that we are nevertheless still able to fulfil our obligations to the IAEA and to show it that we have a regime in place that does the business with regard to nuclear safeguarding from the point of view of the IAEA’s concerns. Putting forward this Bill as a contingency measure, as the Secretary of State said was the case, is important in the uncertain position we are in at the moment. Nevertheless, we will need certainty, over a relatively short period, with the bodies that are responsible for policing and organising the nuclear non-proliferation treaties and the whole arrangements relating to nuclear safeguarding. I think, if I may say so, that that is the right way to do it as far as putting a Bill before the House is concerned. The Opposition do not dispute that: we think it is right to have the Bill as a contingency. Our concern, however, is whether there are sufficient elements to the process part of the Bill to ensure that it works as well as it could. That is really the point of difference on the Bill at the moment.
Richard Graham
The hon. Gentleman knows that this is incredibly important to him and several of his colleagues, and it is incredibly important to me, with EDF Energy’s operational headquarters for nuclear in my constituency and Horizon just down the road, so we are all coming from the same point. His specific proposal—I am talking about new clause 1 again—is very specific. It even mentions a period of two years, although the transition period that is being negotiated may well come to an end at the end of 2020. In effect, he is asking the Government to legislate on something over which they do not have control. Surely the better approach is to plan for the contingency, as he has already agreed, and recognise that the other elements—Euratom and other agencies—are all subject to a negotiation that this House cannot, by its nature, control.
Dr Whitehead
That is a little strange in that the Prime Minister referred to transition periods for the overall EU negotiations in her Florence speech, and the Secretary of State did so strongly in his written statement on 11 January. If the hon. Gentleman wants to be assured, as far as the nuclear industry is concerned, that there will be a seamless transition at the point at which we are no longer a member of Euratom, I would have thought he ought to be strongly in favour of aspiring to a transition period. As he knows and we know, the process of recreating in the UK all the things that have been done by Euratom for 40 years—we will discuss that later—will be extremely difficult, lengthy and problematic. It will certainly, in the opinion of many people, be extremely difficult to achieve in the period ahead if we corral those negotiations and are to complete them by March 2019. If he thought about it for a moment, he would recognise that the last thing we could conceivably want is a period of, in effect, nuclear shutdown, or of defaulting on our international obligations because we are not ready to carry them out on Brexit. That is why a transition period may be so important.
Richard Graham
Yes, of course we all want a transition period, which is precisely a part of the negotiations. What I struggle to understand is that the scenario the hon. Gentleman describes is in effect not within our control. The transition we are seeking is being negotiated—in fact, the Minister and other Front Benchers have made it absolutely clear several times that we want to continue the relationship with Euratom as deeply as possible—but I cannot see the need, in a legislative context, for his proposed new clause 1. In fact, I do not believe it would be possible for any Government conceivably to agree to it.
Dr Whitehead
I repeat my suggestion that, because the Bill is about process as much as content, it is important that it is guided by the sort of considerations we want to take place in order to achieve, as we are all agreed, the best outcome—[Interruption.] Indeed, yes, the best outcome. We must make sure that the negotiations not only proceed with the best outcome in mind, but cover the fact that it may be the case—again, this is out of our control—that if we stick to a position, with the provisions of the Bill, in which everything essentially stops in March 2019, that would be just catastrophic for our nuclear industry and our international nuclear safeguarding obligations. We must get this right, and we must have continuity of arrangements inside or outside Euratom. It is in those circumstances that a transition period is suggested.
The arrangements for the founding of Euratom and its articles suggest that a period of transition for negotiating our way out of Euratom may not be identical to the period for the arrangements for negotiating our way out of the EU as a whole. It is quite possible to conceive the circumstances in which we do not have a transition period beyond March 2019 for negotiating our general withdrawal from the EU, but we do have a transition period for negotiating our way out of Euratom. It is at the least strongly arguable that that may be the case in the future, and it is another reason why such a provision should be in the Bill.
Trudy Harrison (Copeland) (Con)
I feel I must pull up the hon. Gentleman because he has twice referred to Euratom having been around for 40 years, but it began in 1957. It was born out of the civil nuclear industry that began in my constituency of Copeland when Calder Hall was first constructed. I thought that I should make it clear that this was from Britain and by Britain back in 1957. We have actually had it for 70 years, although there was the merger in 1967.
Dr Whitehead
I was referring to the length of time that we have been a member of Euratom, not the length of time that Euratom has been around. Indeed, the hon. Lady will know that when Euratom was founded, the UK was not a member of it. I am sure she will also know that the founders of Euratom, particularly one of them—Mr Spaak—wrote a substantial report at the time of the founding of Euratom that strongly envisaged, setting out in chapter and verse, how an associate relationship of Euratom with the UK could come about. The arrangements that Mr Spaak considered in the report for associate membership are identical to those that exist today. I thank the hon. Lady for reminding us that Euratom has been around a lot longer than the period during which the UK’s relationship with Euratom has existed, but I am sure she will agree that even at the outset of Euratom, an association with the UK was envisaged before the UK joined to facilitate nuclear exchange, nuclear development and—although the nuclear non-proliferation treaty was not around at the time—joint endeavours in civil and defence nuclear work.
I fear, Madam Deputy Speaker, that I have tested the patience of the House, particularly, given the number of interventions I have taken, because of the necessity of ensuring that I responded to them fully. I will end by telling the House that we need to remember that this Bill covers just one aspect of our relationship with Euratom over the period during which we have been a member of it. Our relationship with Euratom also includes participation in nuclear research, the transportation of nuclear materials, the development of nuclear arrangements, the trading of nuclear materials and a number of other arrangements, all of which will lapse on our exit from participation in Euratom and all of which will need to be secured for the future. They are not the subject of the Bill, but they will have to be dealt with at some stage if we are not to have a close association with Euratom after Brexit. Amendment 7 would provide for at least an understanding that we will move forward to secure working arrangements for a future outside Euratom, not just making provision for our treaty obligations concerning nuclear safeguarding.
The Opposition think that the suite of connected amendments to the Bill will strengthen it enormously so that it is a fully fit-for-purpose contingency arrangement. I therefore commend these new clauses and amendments to the House.
Trudy Harrison
New clause 1 concerns me, because it seems to me to be a delaying tactic. As I have mentioned, Euratom and the IAEA were really formed in 1957, when Calder Hall was built in my constituency. There are now 70-something businesses operating in the nuclear industry in my constituency alone. I have spoken to each and every one of them, as well as to Sellafield, the Low Level Waste Repository and the National Nuclear Laboratory. They all say that it is absolutely critical that we get on with the job swiftly and provide certainty so that when we leave the European Union on 29 March 2019, we know exactly where we are.
I come back to the point that Euratom was formed in 1957, and I find it somewhat disappointing that Opposition Members are not crediting our country with the ability to do what is necessary. I have been reassured by the Minister on several occasions about the timescales, and about the process that is already in place for recruiting new safeguards inspectors to the Office for Nuclear Regulation. There are clear synergies inherent in having the ONR, which is the overarching umbrella organisation, working on safeguarding, security and safety.
When it comes to the transition, the Prime Minister has already said that there will be a transition arrangement after we leave the European Union on 29 March 2019. Therefore, the most important thing is to get on with the job, and the Bill enables us to do just that.
Stephen Kerr
Does my hon. Friend agree that in the new clause, great uncertainty is built into the very thing—the contingency—that was intended to give certainty to people such as those in her constituency?
Trudy Harrison
That is exactly my point. This is about certainty and getting on with the job. Not having the Bill in place would be absolutely catastrophic for my constituency and the whole county of Cumbria.
Rachel Reeves (Leeds West) (Lab)
I know that the hon. Lady cares hugely about this issue, because it matters a great deal for her constituency. She and I have been in meetings with the Office for Nuclear Regulation, in which it has said very clearly that it will not be able to meet Euratom standards for safety inspections by March 2019. Indeed, even to meet IAEA standards will be very challenging. Does she not agree that new clause 1 would provide certainty, rather than the other way around, because it would ensure that in March 2019 we were in a transition period in which we could still rely on Euratom to perform the inspections that are so crucial in her constituency?
Trudy Harrison
It is not just my constituency, though; this is about the whole country. Today, more than 20% of our electricity is provided by nuclear power stations. The hon. Lady is not quite correct. My memory of the meeting she mentions is that we were told we would have sufficient aspects in place to be able to have the regime, there or thereabouts, to continue with our existing—[Interruption.]
Rachel Maclean
As the hon. Member for Leeds West (Rachel Reeves) will know, Dr Golshan said in evidence to the Select Committee:
“My current project plan is that we establish a regime that intends to meet UK international obligations when we leave”.
That is achievable. She said that there were challenges, but not that they were insurmountable. She added that she intended to
“build upon that to achieve a system that is equivalent to Euratom.”
So my hon. Friend is correct.
Trudy Harrison
I thank my hon. Friend. It is important that we hold the Minister and the Department to account, and that we focus on the critical path of recruiting the right number of staff into the ONR and ensuring that the regime is in place when we leave. We need to get on with the job, and the 70-something businesses in my constituency absolutely want us to do that.
Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)
The hon. Lady and I were both in the evidence-gathering sitting of the Bill Committee, in which Dr Golshan said that
“we will not be able to replicate Euratom standards on day one.”––[Official Report, Nuclear Safeguards Public Bill Committee, 31 October 2017; c. 7, Q9.]
Is this perhaps a matter of fact, rather than a question of confidence in Britain? In taking this course of action without the safeguard that my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test (Dr Whitehead) has proposed, we will leave ourselves without the coverage that we need.
Trudy Harrison
I have already said that I believe the transition period will happen, as the Prime Minister has indicated. New clause 1 is a delaying tactic, and that is absolutely not what the industry needs. We need certainty, and we need it today. I am pleased that the Department is already acting to recruit to the ONR safeguarding inspectors, who will also have responsibility for safety and security. That seems to me to provide vital synergies of shared knowledge and shared experience across the board in the nuclear sector.
Albert Owen
I want to speak briefly in support of new clause 1. We have debated whether there will be negotiations during the transition period, but I hope that the Minister will respond to this question when he winds up: does he intend to negotiate associate membership of Euratom? We are asking for associate membership, but we have been given no clear idea of whether he intends to seek such membership. We all want the safeguards to be in place from day one. Negotiating over Euratom standards is not in our gift, but we now have in place the highest standards in the world and co-operation with other world leaders.
Stephen Kerr
Having sat through a number of evidence sessions with me, as a fellow member of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, the hon. Gentleman well knows that there is no such thing as associate membership of Euratom. The Minister has repeatedly said that the Government intend to seek some form of close association with Euratom—I do not want to dwell on the semantics, but that is obviously a different thing—and to maintain a continuity of relationship with it. The new clause is therefore totally unnecessary, given the Prime Minister’s commitment to a two-year implementation period.
Albert Owen
I often agreed with the hon. Gentleman in Committee, but I think that he is completely wrong on that point. There is such a thing as associate membership—of Euratom, and of the European Union—and there are different levels of membership.
Albert Owen
Yes, there is. We need to negotiate from a position of clarity and strength, and I do not see us doing so. Without the proposed commitment in the Bill, I do not see the Government saying that they intend to go for third-party or associate membership of Euratom. We have not even seen the legal opinion that the Government were given about the need to leave Euratom in the first place. I support the need for nuclear safeguarding, and I will support the Bill on Third Reading, but new clause 1 is sensible, because it suggests that the Government should approach Euratom members and ask for associate membership, to give us the continuity and certainty that we want.
Ben Bradley (Mansfield) (Con)
The hon. Gentleman says that he wants continuity and certainty, but can he not understand the difficulty involved in writing into the Bill the outcome of negotiations that have not yet happened? How can Parliament effectively write into law that we are going to have a transitional period when the negotiations have not yet happened?
Albert Owen
The Government say that we need a transitional period for EU withdrawal, and it is obvious to me that we also need one for Euratom. The Government have said that we need to leave Euratom at the same time as we leave the European Union, but I stress again—I hope that the Minister will clarify the position—that nobody other than the Government has seen the legal advice that tells us that we need to exit Euratom. My hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test (Dr Whitehead) was absolutely right to say that there is universal support for the idea of our having associate membership. I have not met anyone who works in the industry who says that we should move away from Euratom. If we do, they—the workers; Prospect, the union; many of the experts who gave evidence to us; and the Nuclear Industry Association, which is the umbrella body—feel that we should have associate membership. The new clause therefore speaks on behalf of the industry in the first instance, and we as legislators should listen to what the industry is saying; we should not listen to the Government’s ideological grounds. The only reason why the Government want to leave Euratom is that they do not want to be under the European Court of Justice—that is the crux of it.
James Heappey
The hon. Gentleman, like me, will have received the briefing from the Nuclear Industry Association. Paragraph 5, on legal implications, clearly says that the treaties are entwined—that is the EU’s position and the UK Government’s position—and that it is not possible to remain a member of Euratom while leaving the EU.
Albert Owen
Well, let us clear this up now. I invite the Minister to say on behalf of the Government whether it is his intention—or their intention, if he is not in his post at the time—to negotiate associate membership. Yes or no? Otherwise, we are just guessing that the Government will negotiate some form of associate or third-party membership. I need to know these things from the Government, because we do not have anything in front of us. What we have today is a group of new clauses and amendments that would give us the certainty that we need. The industry is crying out for that, so I want to hear from the Minister.
Albert Owen
I am sure that the hon. Gentleman cannot speak on behalf of the Minister, but I will be interested to hear what he has to say.
Richard Graham
It strikes me as bizarre that the hon. Gentleman and his colleagues are taking their current line. I can only assume that that is either because they want to try to make the political point that the Government and the Conservative party do not want to have a future relationship with Euratom, which is clearly wrong—the Minister will confirm that when he speaks—or because the hon. Gentleman wants to score a political point with an industry that I know is dear to his heart by suggesting that, somehow, he is being more supportive by trying to write into law something that cannot be written into law. What is needed today—we will hear this from the Minister—is absolute confirmation of the Government’s intention to continue to have as close a relationship with Euratom as possible. That is what will be negotiated. It cannot be legislated for, otherwise we would do the same thing for all the many other organisations in Europe with which we might want to have a future relationship. All of that will be covered in the transition talks in Brussels.
Albert Owen
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. He knows me quite well, and I do not think he would accuse me of scoring political points. I have said consistently since before the Bill was introduced that we need clarity, whether we have full membership of Euratom, associate membership, or a third-party agreement.
Albert Owen
At this stage, I do not know what will happen, but I am going to find out from the Minister now.
Richard Harrington
I must apologise for my hesitancy when the hon. Gentleman asked me a question. I was not sure whether I was allowed to intervene on him, so I had intended to reply in my speech. Just to make matters clear, however, it is a statement of fact that the Government have served the article 50 notice to leave Euratom, the argument being that the two treaties were so interleaved that we had to. Secondly, there is no such thing as associate membership. Some countries have agreements on certain matters—associate membership on research and development, for example, in the case of Ukraine—but there is no legal category of associate membership. Thirdly, the Government intend to seek as close an association with Euratom as is possible. If it is acceptable to the hon. Gentleman—I attended his Westminster Hall debate, and I have listened very carefully to what he has said today—I will continue my remarks at the end of this debate.
Albert Owen
I am grateful, because that is helpful, but there is associate membership—it is just in different sections, whether that is research and development or various other—[Laughter.] There is. Conservative Members laugh, but when we had a debate in Westminster Hall, both sides were in agreement that we needed to strengthen our relationship through an associate or alternative membership.
Rachel Reeves
Like other hon. Members, my hon. Friend has a close constituency interest in this issue. Ukraine has associate membership for the research and development programme. One thing my hon. Friend and I are particularly interested in is whether we are seeking to have what Ukraine has: associate membership specifically for research and development.
Albert Owen
That is an important point. However, let me repeat that it is not Labour Back Benchers who are asking for this; it is the industry itself. We need to listen to the industry. Its members are not stupid. They know the technical and legal differences between associate membership and part-associate membership. What they want is certainty. If someone is in a position of strength, they do not go into negotiations, one against the rest, and say, “What are you going to give us?” We have to go to the negotiations with a firm belief that we want a strong associate membership, but I have not heard the Government say that, even in the Minister’s intervention.
James Heappey
I think that we are all pulling in the same direction, but we need to be careful about the language. There is not an on-the-shelf associate membership that we can just pick up and run with. There are associated countries, and there are countries that have associate arrangements, but those are bespoke, and thus far all of them have required the free movement of people and a contribution to the EU budget. It is therefore likely that whatever our associated membership might be, it will be different from that of countries that already have an associated membership. However, those countries are not “associate members”, in the sense that there is an associate membership class.
Albert Owen
I think the hon. Gentleman is agreeing with me, but we do not know our position or what our starting point is.
I would like to hear from the Minister—he will have enough time—that the British Government, on behalf of the nuclear industry, are looking for certainty. To say that they are looking for something as close as associate membership is not good enough. Are we looking for a specific British agreement with the rest of Euratom that gives us the same certainty as we have now? If so, we should support the new clause, because it strengthens the hand of the Government, rather than weakens it.
We should look at the comparison with the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill and phase 1, at the 11th hour waiting for the Irish to reach some sort of agreement. We cannot do that with Euratom and nuclear, because of its nature. Let us be absolutely firm. We are all pulling in the same direction. We want the best for the British nuclear industry. The nuclear industry wants an associate membership, so let us fight for it.
Mr Ranil Jayawardena (North East Hampshire) (Con)
Although I have not spoken on the Bill to date, I have been following its progress from afar. I rise, unsurprisingly perhaps, in opposition to the proposals that have been tabled by the hon. Member for Southampton, Test (Dr Whitehead). As his county colleague, I have a great deal of time for him, but on this occasion I have to say, with regret, that I believe that the measures would delay the implementation of the vital nuclear safeguarding measures that are facilitated by the Bill and extend lobbying for associate membership of Euratom.
Notwithstanding the uncertainty, instability and safeguarding risks that these new clauses and amendments implicitly condone, the association they appear to grasp at seems to be ideologically driven. Those who still worship membership of the customs union or the single market above all else should see the impossible implications of the measures.
Euratom, which was established by the Euratom treaty, as we have already heard, is uniquely joined to the European Union. It has the same membership. Its budget is part of the general budget of the EU. Importantly, it also makes use of the same institutions and entities: the Commission, the Council and, contrary to everything that we voted leave for—to take back control—the European Court of Justice. That is why this Bill, which will create our own version of things, is so crucial. Providing certainty as we leave is crucial, whatever the deal.
I note that the measures seek some association, but that is no silver bullet. As we have heard already, there is no such thing as associate membership, and hon. Members do not have to trust me on that. If we cannot trust the views of a former president of the Union of European Federalists, who can we trust? I speak, of course, of the former Liberal Democrat MEP, Andrew Duff, and he wrote:
“Euratom is therefore a fundamental building block of the European Union and not an accessory. It cannot be separated out from the rest of the Union. Joining the EU means joining Euratom; leaving the EU means leaving Euratom…There is no such thing as associate membership of Euratom.”
Layla Moran (Oxford West and Abingdon) (LD)
I simply say that that is not the Liberal Democrat party’s position, even though Andrew Duff may indeed at one point have been a Liberal Democrat MEP.
Mr Jayawardena
My life is greatly enhanced by that clarification. Let me turn to another source that the hon. Lady might put greater trust in—Professor David Phinnemore of Queen’s University Belfast. He agreed with the former Liberal Democrat MEP:
“Andrew Duff has been quick to point out, correctly, that there is in fact no such thing as ‘associate membership’ of Euratom or, indeed, of the EU for that matter. Non-member states can only be ‘associates’ of the EU.”
That is an academic’s view, as well as an MEP’s view.
The hon. Member for Ynys Môn (Albert Owen), in an exchange with my hon. Friend the Member for Wells (James Heappey), considered the notion of associated country status. Switzerland has associated country status. That is different from associate membership; it covers only research and development, and as my hon. Friend made clear, it is contingent on free movement. People in this country have said in a referendum that free movement must be controlled. Given the impossibility of the deal that the new clauses seek time to negotiate—to say nothing of its undesirability—it is pure folly to mandate years of uncertainty in a nuclear safeguarding transition period. I contend, rather, that the safeguards, inspections of nuclear facilities and monitoring that the amendments purport to support would be harmed more by a safeguarding transition period—especially since, once we have left the European Union, our Euratom membership cannot apply—than by moving forward immediately to new safeguards.
Albert Owen
Is the hon. Gentleman honestly telling the House that the British public do not want experts from other countries to move freely in the nuclear industry? We are talking about not just nuclear installations but research centres in this country that need international co-operation.
Mr Jayawardena
Although I like the hon. Gentleman very much and value his contributions to the House, I think he is missing the point and trying to undermine what the British people have clearly told us politicians. It is uncontrolled immigration that they seek to remedy.
Mr Edward Vaizey (Wantage) (Con)
I hate to rise to disagree with my hon. Friend, but the British people did not vote to leave Euratom. It is a separate treaty and it was not on the ballot paper. We are aware that we are leaving Euratom because of a technicality. I am also aware that if the Government Front-Bench team could wave a magic wand, they would remain in Euratom. Can we please not wrap up our departure from Euratom into some kind of Brexit dream of sticking it to the continent? We want free movement of our nuclear workers, not least because we are building a multibillion-pound nuclear power station at Hinkley Point.
Mr Jayawardena
In disagreeing with me, my right hon. Friend has made my point: specific deals can be done to make sure that the people that this country needs and wants to see here in Britain can come here.
Mr Jayawardena
I will make some progress first.
The people we want to see in Britain—those who can contribute to our society, our economy and our communities—should be able to come here and contribute to our national life and national industries. Indeed, that is how we will continue to make sure that our nuclear industry goes from strength to strength.
Rebecca Pow
I knew he would, because my hon. Friend knows that my constituency is adjacent to the enormous new nuclear power station that is being built. We will get a large knock-on effect on employment, and indeed we have the first nuclear degree at the University Centre Somerset, which is in my constituency and the adjacent constituency. Does he agree that we need to keep these brains coming and ensure that this industry is growing and booming as we go forward? We are encouraging young people to go into it, and they want to know that there is a safe future.
Mr Jayawardena
My hon. Friend has guessed what is coming later in my remarks. I will come on to the future, but I want to focus now on the importance of nuclear, which I think everyone agrees is of key strategic importance to the United Kingdom. I am therefore pleased that Her Majesty’s Government have been clear that they aim to seek to maintain close and effective arrangements for civil nuclear co-operation with Europe and the rest of the world.
As we leave the European Union and enter, in my view—I accept that it might not be everyone’s view—an exciting and prosperous new phase in our kingdom’s history, where we are free to do what we need to do to put our people first and seek trade deals with friends around the world, it is through the cultivation of open, willing and free global markets, interested in innovation from Britain and the revenues that that trade will bring, that we will help to stabilise and boost the UK economy. In this new industrial revolution—perhaps the fourth industrial revolution, as has been championed by my hon. Friend the Member for Havant (Alan Mak)—nuclear power will form a vital part of the UK’s long-term energy mix.
In that context, I want to inform the House of how little of our energy comes from nuclear. Some 72.3% of France’s energy comes from nuclear, compared with 54.1% of Slovakia’s, 51.7% of Belgium’s, 51.3% of Hungary’s and 40% of Sweden’s. We are at less than half that percentage. I would be delighted to be told that I am wrong—I would be delighted if it were higher—but I am informed that it is less than 20%. Nuclear power, as a source of electricity to power millions of homes and businesses for decades to come, is not only clean, low-carbon energy, but reliable. It will also secure our energy, environmental and economic futures. It is therefore absolutely critical to get the regulation of it right.
We have heard about the deal to secure our first new nuclear power station for a generation. It will be built without resort to the public purse and will mean the creation of 26,000 new jobs. It is the sort of industry we want to incentivise in this country to create good new jobs for young people now and in the future. It will also mean energy security, as I have said, which is absolutely critical for our kingdom’s future prosperity, so it is critical that the right safeguards are in place.
It is important that the nuclear safeguards provided under the Bill are distinct from both nuclear safety measures and nuclear security measures. Those measures, which are respectively intended to prevent accidents and to put in place physical protection measures at nuclear sites—are not under the purview of the Bill. They are unaffected by our leaving the EU, because they are not responsibilities provided primarily by Euratom. Euratom has no role in setting security standards or in regulating or inspecting security arrangements in our civil nuclear sector.
Nuclear safety and security are regulated by the Office for Nuclear Regulation—very effectively to date, I might add—and it is the ONR that will assume responsibility for running our effectively equivalent domestic nuclear safeguards regime created under the Bill. That is why, again, I believe that the Bill should stand unamended. Furthermore—international safety and security considerations have been mentioned— the UK will remain a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency, of which we were one of the founding members in July 1957 and remain one of the board members. Our leading role in the IAEA, our work developing and complying fully with international standards and obligations on nuclear safety and security, and our commitment to responsible nuclear non-proliferation thus demonstrate that the UK has no intention of retreating from international standards in our new domestic safeguards regime.
Rachel Reeves
I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is aware of this, but I clarify to the House that IAEA standards are not as high as Euratom’s. The Office for Nuclear Regulation has said that it will not be able to meet Euratom’s standards on day one of our exit from the European Union, so that would mean a dilution of the standards that we have today. Does the hon. Gentleman understand and acknowledge that?
Mr Jayawardena
My point about the IEA—I mean the IAEA; what a tongue-twister!—was not about the standards it provides. It was that we will remain part of the IAEA and will continue to comply fully with the international standards set out and our obligations in relation to nuclear safety and security.
Layla Moran
My constituency lies on the boundary of the Culham centre. The point the staff there are making to me is that this is about not just funding but being able to access the crucial networks of researchers and get the right talent in the right places. Does the hon. Gentleman concede that this will suffer in the short term, unless we get certainty now?
Mr Jayawardena
I will perhaps answer the hon. Lady’s point in a roundabout way. When I visited Switzerland—I should refer Members to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests—I was impressed to understand that Switzerland, despite having never been part of the EU, was one of the largest recipients of joint funding, because it had the brains to excel at driving technological innovation forward. One of the other biggest recipients of such funding was the UK. A third was Israel, which has never been part of the EU and has very few agreements of the sort that Switzerland has with the EU. Switzerland has some agreements with the EU, and we are leaving the EU. All three nations have great expertise and should continue to strive to ensure access to the networks that this technology and these innovations rely on.
Another such project is the international thermonuclear experimental reactor, a project to build a magnetic fusion device. The agreement was signed multilaterally by China, the EU, India, Japan, South Korea, Russia and the US. It is absolutely right that the UK continues to support such projects. I also understand that the Government have announced an £86 million investment to establish a nuclear fusion technology platform with the aim of supporting UK industry in obtaining contracts for just such projects.
We need to underpin that commitment and funding with some clarity today, however, which is why an additional transition period would be the worst of both worlds. The unique legal status of the EU and Euratom during that period would mean we would not be part of Euratom but would simply be seeking an association with it, or indeed an R&D-only association contingent on free movement and the European Court of Justice—if we are to base our position on Switzerland and refer to it in the wrong terms, as some Opposition Members have done. At the same time, however, we would be unable to enact our own safeguarding measures to underpin all that is good about our nuclear industry—the innovation we have supported and the jobs our young people deserve. I do not believe the new clause stacks up, and I will not be supporting it today.
John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness) (Lab/Co-op)
It is a pleasure to rise to speak in favour of new clause 1. As far as I could follow the argument of the hon. Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Jayawardena) at the end there, he was saying that it would create instability to have an increased transition period for a treaty that has served the UK well for 40 years and that we want to replicate in as much detail as possible in the future arrangements. That is Alice in Wonderland logic and not the kind of rigour we ought to bring to this incredibly serious debate.
This fellow Andrew Duff, a former Liberal Democrat MEP, has been mentioned several times in the Chamber. It is, to my mind, the first time a former Liberal Democrat MEP has been taken as a great authority on any matter by Conservative Members, and possibly by his own party as well. I want to briefly and gently warn Conservative Members on the wisdom of taking former leaders’ pronouncements as general facts. For obvious reasons, I do not seek to dwell on my own party’s predicament on the matter, or that of the Liberal Democrats, given the recent well-publicised difficulties of their former leader in matters of faith. Are we to agree, however, with every pronouncement from Lord Hague, a former leader of the Conservative party, on issues on which he remains an expert? Are we to agree without question that Brexit will undoubtedly diminish Britain’s influence on the world stage, as he has made clear? No, of course we are not, so can we please put that argument to one side and move on to the substance of the debate.
John Woodcock
The hon. Gentleman bored the Chamber senseless for three times as long—by my count—as was necessary.
John Woodcock
Of course I will give way, as long as the hon. Gentleman does not go on for quite as long as he did last time.
Mr Jayawardena
I am sorry if I bored the hon. Gentleman, but he might not have been listening fully.
John Woodcock
I did try.
I would never accuse the Minister of complacency—he is not a complacent man—and I know that as Energy Minister he is giving much time to this matter, but although I do not think there is complacency from Ministers themselves, I am profoundly worried about the capacity in the system to deliver the new arrangements by the time set out. I agree with my neighbour, the hon. Member for Copeland (Trudy Harrison), on so much and we have worked together, but the idea that it is okay to be there or thereabouts in March 2019, at the time of transfer, is, I am afraid, bunkum. A level of certainty has to be written into our nuclear safeguarding regulatory arrangements.
Many Labour Members want our membership of Euratom to continue, howsoever it might be delivered in the future. The alternative at the moment is to rely on a Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy that is bursting at the seams with all the things it has to deliver on Britain’s exit from the EU. I had a conversation a few months ago with someone whom I knew from my time as an adviser and who remains in the system. What he had to say about the number of staff looking at the Euratom issue in particular was frightening. There is not remotely the level of assurance that the House ought to expect if it is to give its blessing to the Government and not seek to write into the Bill a commitment to a transition period, which is eminently sensible while we try to work out whether we can stay for good.
Some Members have said that there is no certainty because a negotiation is in progress, but the new clause gives a degree of strength to Ministers, enabling them to say, “Parliament has willed that there needs to be a transition arrangement. Our Act—which is, of course, a contingency Act—makes clear that there must be contingency arrangements, and that is what we require from these negotiations.”
Rebecca Pow
Might I suggest that the new clause actually seeks to confuse? It appears to specify what should happen during the transition period, but it is unclear whether it is specifying what the United Kingdom should seek to be negotiating, or whether it is attempting to mandate the terms. It seems to be the opposite of what the Prime Minister set out in her excellent Florence speech. All the Opposition are doing is confusing the issue, which is leading to a lack of clarification for the nuclear industry which wants, needs and deserves it.
John Woodcock
The hon. Lady may be confused, but we are not, and the industry is not. The industry is strongly urging the Government—as they will know, if they are listening—and all Members to get behind a transition period while we examine the position, to decide whether we can reverse the wrongheaded decision to leave Euratom that was made—in all probability, unnecessarily—when article 50 was served. The alternative is to face a dire cliff edge that could do deep damage to civil nuclear production throughout the United Kingdom. I understand that the Minister is due to visit Sellafield for the first time later this week—
John Woodcock
Well, I hope that when the Minister does come up to Sellafield, he will put his voice and the full voice of his Department behind the campaign that the hon. Member for Copeland (Trudy Harrison) and I are shaping to improve our transport infrastructure. It will take him an absolute age to get there, but I hope that when he is there, he will listen closely to what people say. I hope that he will listen to those in my constituency and that of the hon. Lady who will be relying on the new civil nuclear jobs that will come through the NuGen project in Moorside and think again about how our Parliament can strengthen his hand in creating a seamless transition from the existing arrangements to something which we strongly believe needs to look identical. New clause 1 would do that and, even at this late stage, Members in all parts of the House ought to support it.
Rachel Maclean
I rise to speak on this Third Reading debate in the full knowledge that I am not a nuclear expert; nor do I have a considerable nuclear presence in my constituency. However, like millions of other people up and down the country, I rely on nuclear energy to keep my lights on.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)
Order. I should point out to the hon. Lady that this is not the Third Reading debate. We are dealing with the new clauses and amendments.
Rachel Maclean
Thank you for that clarification, Madam Deputy Speaker. I shall turn directly to new clause 1. I do not support the new clause, because it seeks to introduce a transition period to delay the UK’s departure from Euratom. When the proposal was tabled in Committee as new clause 2, we engaged in detailed scrutiny. I applaud the forensic questioning by the hon. Members for Southampton, Test (Dr Whitehead) and for Sheffield Central (Paul Blomfield), who probed the Minister in great detail. We heard numerous lengthy arguments about why the new clause was unnecessary.
Drew Hendry (Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey) (SNP)
I am delighted to be here with the Minister, who is a genial and hard-working man. I know that he will try to answer some of my questions, and I hope his answers are clear.
When the Secretary of State launched the Bill, he said it was “straightforward”, but the amendments are required because there is nothing straightforward about leaving Euratom. The Scottish National party is concerned about the whole process. The hon. Member for Copeland (Trudy Harrison) talked about us being “there or thereabouts”, but that is not good enough when it comes to nuclear safeguards. As it stands, the Bill is a safeguards Bill without any safeguards; there is no contingency for anything going wrong, yet Ministers have failed to convince not just hon. Members in this Chamber, but industry and the people. Leaving Euratom will result in more cost and less value, and the opinion of many in the industry is that it will be impossible to set up an equivalent UK authority within the timescales outlined. That is the view of industry, the Office for Nuclear Regulation, the Nuclear Industry Association and the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, all of which gave evidence to the BEIS Committee. I was delighted to hear the Chair of that Committee, the hon. Member for Leeds West (Rachel Reeves), point out the great concern about the Government’s ability to do as they propose. All the nuclear industry and all those bodies do not want us to leave Euratom; either they see no benefit in our doing so, or they are actively concerned about the consequences.
Ministers have simply ignored the difficulties and the overwhelming evidence before them. They have plodded ahead, and when asked “How?” they use their favourite word: hope. They hope that things will be in place—that agreements, funding and people will be available. Despite the impending loss of influence in developing policy in Europe on future nuclear decisions, the unanswered questions about cost, the difficulties in training or even recruiting replacement inspectors, they plod ahead. As the Minister said in response to questions on these matters in the Select Committee, “They don’t really know and we don’t really know.”
There are a lot of unknowns in the Bill, which is why it is imperative to amend it. The ONR says plainly that it might need more than a two-year transition period after 2019, yet the Government still provide no assurance.
Stephen Kerr
The hon. Gentleman says the Government give no assurance, but the Prime Minister, in her Florence speech, was explicit about the Government’s agenda in respect of a two-year implementation period. I cannot help concluding that the reason the hon. Gentleman advances this line of argument is that he has a destructive attitude toward the whole process, and his ultimate aim is to create a constitutional and ongoing sense of crisis. In fact, the Bill guarantees some continuity, including the two-year period.
Drew Hendry
The hon. Gentleman, like many of his colleagues in Scotland, likes to try to go to a happy place when faced with harsh realities. The fact is that a two-year transition period is viewed by virtually nobody as a responsible timescale in which to get up and running.
Drew Hendry
No, I am going to make some progress.
The UK, as it presses ahead with the folly of Hinckley C, will need thousands of workers, many skilled in the nuclear industries.
Drew Hendry
No, I am going to make some progress. I may come back to the hon. Lady, but we will have to see.
Many of those workers will need to be skilled in the nuclear industries, yet current policy does not support the ability to get those workers if there is no concession on the movement of people, but achieving even that is put into a harsh light when it comes to getting highly specialist staff to meet the new safeguarding functions. Those positions are already challenging to fill. Nuclear inspectors do not live on every street—in fact, they are very rare—and they are in global demand. The Minister says that such staff are required only in the tens, but can he tell me today how many are in place? I offer him the opportunity to intervene. He was asked in November about recruitment. I am trying to get his attention, Madam Deputy Speaker. Will he tell us how the first phase has gone? I will offer him another opportunity to intervene and tell us how many recruits are in place. Is it 15? Is it 10? Is it five? Is it one? Is it none? How many nuclear safeguard inspectors have been set up?
Prospect and Unite the union have given evidence, and Ms Ferns from Prospect said:
“A reasonable approximation is several years—it is not a matter of months but years for people to be able to do that job…It is a small talent pool…even in the best of times.”
Many Members today have cited the testimony of Dr Mina Golshan, the deputy chief inspector and the director of the Sellafield decommissioning, fuel and waste division in the Office for Nuclear Regulation. She has said:
“I have been very clear from the outset in previous evidence sessions, and in discussions with industry as well as BEIS, that it would be unrealistic for us to expect to achieve an equivalent regime to what is in place currently by the time we officially leave Euratom, and that is March 2019.”
The BEIS Committee report, “Leaving the EU: implications for the civil nuclear sector”, states:
“To deliver the new domestic regime the ONR will need to double the number of its inspectors by 2019, and triple its numbers by 2021. Skilling-up the new recruits on time will present additional challenges, as even existing specialists will require 12-18 months of training to become an inspector, and generalists may need five years.”
Those are hefty timescales.
Let us look at the cost. So far, the Government have earmarked £10 million for all the operations in Euratom, yet we can already see that there are going to be much more expensive consequences for the UK. That £10 million figure is dwarfed by the £50 million of Euratom funding that the UK receives for the Joint European Torus project—JET—so it will be interesting to hear from the Minister how that funding is going to be replaced. Leaving Euratom and the JET project has been described as “bonkers” by Steven Cowley, a physicist at the University of Oxford and a former director of the Culham centre for fusion energy, which hosts JET. He is absolutely right. Can the Minister tell us how that funding will be maintained?
Can the Minister also tell us about our future in ITER, the project to build the world’s largest tokamak? The ITER agreement was signed in 2006 by China, the EU, India, Japan, South Korea, Russia and the US, and the building of the tokamak has been under way in France since 2010. The official start of ITER’s operation is scheduled for December 2025. Euratom also funds DEMO, a demonstration fusion power reactor planned to follow ITER by 2050. The UK is a key participant in ITER and sends information, results and design studies from its JET programme to the French site. This co-operation will continue throughout the Brexit process, but it is unclear what the impact of Brexit will be on this co-operation and the continuation of these programmes. Perhaps the Minister can advise us on that. We need to know all this information. Without it, we will need safeguards in place.
The hon. Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Jayawardena), who is no longer in its place, mentioned medical isotopes. He said that it was scaremongering to say that they would no longer be available, and that treaties would be in place to allow access to them. However, the critical point is not whether people can get the isotopes; it is that they have a very short half-life. Sometimes they have to be used within hours of being produced in order to maintain their effectiveness. If they are sitting at a border point because there is no customs agreement, they will be completely useless. Will the Minister tell us how we are going to put in place the necessary customs arrangements to prevent that from happening?
Layla Moran
The issue is that we are leaving the single market and the customs union. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that, even if we have a customs arrangement, the fact that we are leaving the single market is what will cause the delays? As he rightly points out, the half-life of those radioisotopes will mean that fewer people will be able to be treated by them.
Drew Hendry
Without alternative arrangements to allow the free movement of such goods across borders, there will be considerable complication and delay, which could affect patients.
As it stands, it is a risk too far to leave Euratom without cast-iron guarantees. I respect the Minister and heard his messages of hope about having people in place. I heard him say that he would like to ensure that that will happen, but we have had no guarantees about the set-up or whether it will be in place. There are no figures and no definite timescales, and we have heard nothing from the industry to suggest that it is satisfied. Without cast-iron guarantees to protect such things, we know that the new arrangement will cost us more, deliver less and diminish our influence. Given the evidence, it is hard to see even how it could be delivered.
Ben Bradley
I am again a bit disappointed to hear wildly misleading statements from those on the Opposition Benches, including the hon. Member for Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey (Drew Hendry), about medical isotopes, which are nothing to do with this Bill.
Stephen Kerr
The hon. Member for Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey (Drew Hendry) accused Government Members, and Scottish Conservatives in particular, of seeking to find a happy place. Does my hon. Friend agree that that could never be said of the hon. Member for Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey? He is more inclined to find a depressing place, which I do not recognise in my native land of Scotland.
Ben Bradley
I thank my hon. Friend, who will know much more than me about SNP Members and their outlook on life.
Our relationship with Euratom is a subject for negotiation. The Government have been clear that they will seek continuity, and they obviously want standards to remain as high as possible. How that connects directly with Euratom is not for this Bill; it is for negotiation directly with the EU. The exact nature of the relationship will of course be closely connected to trade, customs and countless other arrangements.
In Committee, we saw Labour’s attempts to get either a commitment to Euratom, which cannot be given in this Bill, or associate membership, which does not exist and this Bill cannot create. We need to build our own framework so that we are prepared to incorporate whatever kind of relationship with Euratom results from the negotiation. The Government have been clear that that is the most helpful and connected relationship that we can have, so we cannot lay out in this forum what that will look like. We need certainty and structure and to have our own plans in place—not just on paper, but well developed and physically in place—so that we can have continuity regardless of what happens further down the line, meaning that we need to crack on with things now to be ready in time. We heard evidence in Committee about the time needed to put things in place, so we need to crack on now.
I do not understand where the hon. Member for Ynys Môn (Albert Owen) was coming from in his speech. While very eloquent, he did not seem to grasp that we cannot write into the Bill things that have not yet happened or are not yet agreed. We cannot include a transitional period, and the Government cannot accept an amendment that foresees a future negotiation with another party, the result of which we just do not know. We need to be ready on exit day. We need to ensure that we cannot be taken by surprise and that continuity is ensured.
Albert Owen
I understand that the hon. Gentleman is on message, but the message is wrong. The words that I used in my contribution, which was echoed by SNP Members, were not mine, but those of the industry and the experts within it. For once, will the Government start listening to those who understand the industry, rather than bantering about who on which side of the House might be wrong?
Ben Bradley
I am sure the Minister will agree that we need to support the industry and that we need to do what the industry asks. My point is nothing other than that. My point is that we cannot make that decision in this Bill. It is for the negotiation to decide at a later date.
New clause 1 neglects to recognise that an implementation period is subject to negotiation and must be agreed directly with the EU—we cannot do it unilaterally. The idea of implementation before withdrawal also does not fit with broader plans and discussions that have been mooted for transition out of the EU after withdrawal in March 2019. It simply does not fit. The Government clearly cannot include in a Bill the outcome of a discussion that has not happened.
We need to decide the basic framework now and act accordingly.
Mr Jim Cunningham (Coventry South) (Lab)
We understand that there are certain things the Government cannot say about the negotiations, but ultimately we want to know the outcome of those negotiations before withdrawal so that Parliament can have a view on it, rather than the Government operating a Henry VIII clause.
Ben Bradley
I do not know the hon. Gentleman’s background, but I guess, by the sounds of it, it probably is not business.
We cannot fix the plan for withdrawal and implementation in stone now. The Labour party wants to build into the Bill a clause saying that the Bill is contingency only. Our relationship with Euratom is subject to negotiation. No one has written anything off. We want a positive relationship, but we might have to develop and rely on our own framework, and the work to put it in place needs to happen now. An amendment to say that the Bill is merely a contingency would achieve the opposite of its intention by reducing impetus and leading to delays in the process of getting our safeguards in place, which is only bad for the industry and for all the things the hon. Member for Southampton, Test (Dr Whitehead) tried to raise.
That is why I oppose new clause 1, and I hope to speak later about my support for the Bill more broadly.
Alex Norris
I enjoyed serving on the Public Bill Committee, and I rise to speak in support of new clauses 1 and 2, and amendment 3.
On new clause 1, while I have slightly buried the lead by referencing this earlier, it needs full consideration in this place. Members need to know the judgment of Dr Golshan, who is responsible at the ONR for recreating Euratom in this country:
“Our aim, currently, is to have a system in place that enables the UK to fulfil its international obligations by March 2019, which is when we intend to leave Euratom. I have been very clear in the past—I will repeat it here—that we will not be able to replicate Euratom standards on day one.”––[Official Report, Nuclear Safeguards Public Bill Committee, 31 October 2017; c. 7, Q9.]
Members should reflect on that, whatever the political knockabout, because it makes a compelling case for a transition period. Otherwise we will be saying that our nuclear safeguards regime should not be as good as it is today, and I have not heard anyone suggesting that—I do not believe that it would be tolerable.
A week is a long time in politics, and three months is a lifetime in the Brexit process—perhaps it just feels like that—but over that period we have seen the Government move on this point. Conservative Members asked how we can talk about this hypothetical idea. Well, the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy himself said less than two weeks ago that the Government want Euratom to be involved in the implementation period. Now is the time to make good on that.
In a similar vein, on new clause 2, if I had £1 for every time someone mentioned in Committee that this is a contingency Bill, I would be able to meet the Foreign Secretary’s new financial commitment to the NHS. The Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, the hon. Member for Watford (Richard Harrington), would be a particularly significant donor, having mentioned that many times.
If this is a contingency Bill, we really should say what it is contingent on, and we should say that in the Bill. Otherwise it is not a contingency Bill, but a Bill that will be law until the Minister decides on the 19.52 train home that it is not law any more. That is not a satisfactory way to legislate.
Finally, on amendment 3, one issue that has developed since Second Reading is whether we actually have to do any of this. Ministers clearly said on Second Reading that leaving Euratom is legally necessary as part of leaving the EU. We tested that in Committee. I asked two senior lawyers in this area, Jonathan Leech and Rupert Cowan from Prospect Law, whether triggering article 50 necessitates leaving Euratom and if they would have advised the Government to follow this path. To the first question they answered “No” and “Absolutely not” respectively. Jonathan Leech’s answer to the second question was:
“The advice would be that you do not have to accept this and it may not be in your interests to do so.”––[Official Report, Nuclear Safeguards Public Bill Committee, 31 October 2017; c. 12, Q23.]
That is significant, and it is a departure from where we were on Second Reading.
I represent a leave constituency, and I am always mindful of that when dealing with anything relating to Brexit. I have spent a lot of time knocking on doors and have heard every conceivable argument for remaining or leaving. Funnily enough, I never heard the argument—I suspect no one in this Chamber did—that our membership of Euratom is undesirable, or that there is a desire for a diminution of our nuclear safeguards regime. There is not much of a case for doing this if we do not have to. If we are doing it only because of an arbitrary red line drawn up in Downing Street that we could cross while still delivering Brexit, we are fools to do so. Either way, as amendment 3 states, Ministers ought to come to this place to justify their approach, because once again this is not a decision for the 19.52 train.
Lots of work has gone into the Bill and I have enjoyed participating in its consideration. I believe that we should all support the Opposition proposals, because they would make the Bill better and then we might not need it at all.
Richard Harrington
I thank all Members who have contributed to the debate. Those who have heard our consideration of the Bill for the first time today will not realise, given that most of our discussion has been about one or two new clauses, that many other aspects were discussed in Committee. I pay tribute to the Opposition Members who have participated, as well Government Members, and particularly the hon. Members for Southampton, Test (Dr Whitehead), for Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey (Drew Hendry), and for Sheffield Central (Paul Blomfield), whose cameo Brexit role has been well appreciated. Many points were dealt with by consensus in Committee and in our discussions afterwards. Today’s debate has focused on new clause 1, but I will also speak to the other new clauses and amendments in the group.
The overall strategy for withdrawal from Euratom, and our ambitions for our future relationship with it, were the subject of a comprehensive written statement made by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State on 11 January. I think that most Members on both sides of the House would agree that, as I have stated publicly in Committee and privately afterwards, we are seeking the closest and most effective association with Euratom. We are therefore putting in place all the measures necessary to ensure that the UK can operate as an independent and responsible nuclear state from day one.
As Members will be fully aware, the nature of our future relationship with Euratom is part of the next phase of negotiations, which is yet to start. The written statement set out the principles upon which our strategy is based, many of which have been discussed today: to aim for continuity with current relevant Euratom arrangements; to ensure that the UK maintains its leading role in European nuclear research; and to ensure that the nuclear industry in the UK has the necessary skilled workforce. We will be seeking: a close association with Euratom’s research and training programme, which includes the JET project and the international thermonuclear experimental reactor project; continuity of open trade arrangements to ensure that the nuclear industry can continue to trade across EU borders; and maintenance of close and effective co-operation with Euratom on nuclear safety.
Richard Harrington
It is a pleasure to give way to the Chair of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee.
Rachel Reeves
I thank the Minister and particularly the Secretary of State for the written ministerial statement published on 11 January, which gave much more clarity on the Government’s aims and ambitions in this area. On the seventh day of consideration of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill by the Committee of the whole House, Ministers gave a commitment to publish a timetable with milestones that the Government will need to achieve to meet the objectives set out in the written statement. When does the Department plan to publish that timetable, because I really think it is crucial? Can we also have an update on progress towards a voluntary agreement with the IAEA for safeguarding inspections, and on how discussions are going regarding the nuclear co-operation agreements, which are crucial to getting the association we need?
Richard Harrington
If the hon. Lady will have a bit of patience, I will come to those points, all of which are valid, later in my speech. Progress on many of those points will be included in the quarterly statements, which are the result of discussions in Committee.
I have been through the important points covered in the written statement, so let me turn to the point about associate membership made by the hon. Member for Ynys Môn (Albert Owen)—I learned how to pronounce his constituency in the Westminster Hall debate; I hope he realises that I am showing off now—and others. As I have already stated at the Dispatch Box, we cannot be an associate member of Euratom because there is no such concept in the treaty as it stands. We have had a lot of discussions about whether we could. The hon. Member for Leeds East—
Richard Harrington
I am sorry; I come from Leeds, so I should have known the difference.
The hon. Member for Leeds West (Rachel Reeves) mentioned Ukraine, which has been mentioned many times. Ukraine has association agreements on specific parts of Euratom’s activities, with research and development being the classic one. We must work within the existing legal framework, which allows for close association but not this theoretical category of associate membership.
Albert Owen
I am grateful to the Minister and the Secretary of State for the clarifications they have given today and previously in writing. I understand what the Minister is saying, but my point is that we are in uncharted waters. We need to get on the front foot, and the best way to do that is by acting on behalf of the UK nuclear industry, which is asking for associate membership. Will the Minister therefore please assure us that he will fight for an associate type of membership?
Richard Harrington
With all due respect to the hon. Gentleman, this quite amuses me, because last week I was berated for being a mouthpiece for the nuclear industry—something with which I was pleased to agree, by the way. The important point is that the language of whether we can have associate membership or not is not important; the important thing is what we come up with. People inside and outside the House can call it what they want, but effectively we all want the same thing. It is just not correct to call it associate membership, however, because there is no such thing. I have made that clear absolutely beyond doubt, as has the Secretary of State.
Dr Whitehead
In the light of what the Minister has just said, will he confirm that in his view an associated status in relation to nuclear safeguards would be distinctly possible?
Richard Harrington
I hope and believe that a very close association to do with nuclear safeguards absolutely will be possible, but I do not think it helps just to bandy language between one side and the other. We all know what we want, and I am delighted that everybody—it seems to me—on the Opposition and Government Benches wants exactly the same thing. We have all made our points about the language, but I think we all want the same thing. That is very unusual in this House and it really is a credit to everybody.
It is essential that projects and investments are not adversely affected by our withdrawal from the EU and can continue to operate in the certainty that nuclear safeguards arrangements will be in place. That is why we are putting in place arrangements for a new domestic nuclear safeguards regime, regulated by the Office for Nuclear Regulation, as well as negotiating new bilateral agreements with the IAEA and nuclear co-operation agreements with priority third countries. Those arrangements are not dependent on the EU negotiations and the UK Government’s work is well advanced.
The Bill and the regulations that will be made under its powers are crucial. They will enable us to establish a domestic nuclear safeguards regime to meet international safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation standards when Euratom safeguards arrangements no longer apply in the UK. As Members have noted, it will take time to develop and implement the new regime, so it is absolutely imperative that we maintain the momentum of the work needed to deliver it in the timescale required. However well meaning the new clauses and amendments are—I accept in good faith the reasons why they were tabled—the reality is that they could delay our domestic preparations and lead to uncertainty in our discussions with international partners. There can be no question of our waiting until we know the outcome of negotiations before we put in place our own arrangements. The implications of not having the right systems operating from when Euratom safeguards arrangements no longer apply are too serious for the industry and for our position in the international safeguards regime.
On the implementation period, we intend to ensure continuity for the nuclear industry and to avoid the possibility of a cliff edge for the industry on the date of exit. Members will be aware—if they were not listening at the time, this has been mentioned several times already today, so they will be aware now—that the Prime Minister set out in her Florence speech her desire for an implementation period after the UK ceases to be a member of the EU. If the European Commission agrees to an implementation period of around two years, the UK will not be a member state of the European Union during that period. None the less, the acquis will continue to apply, which means that, for the duration of that implementation period, the UK will expect to continue to pay into the EU, to be bound by its rules and to benefit from access to its market. The European Commission’s draft guidelines are explicit that, in its view, this acquis would include Euratom matters. The implication of that—I accept that it is an implication because it has to be tested in negotiations—is that the current Euratom regime could continue to apply during any transition period.
I have to reiterate that a transition period prior to our withdrawal, as proposed by new clause 1, is not a situation envisaged in the proposals for the implementation period. Both parties to the discussions agree that it would helpful to have the matter agreed as speedily as possible—again, there is no disagreement over that—so as to provide the certainty that we need. Whatever the outcome of the talks about an implementation period, let me emphasise that the UK’s overarching objective remains to maintain as close and effective an association with Euratom for the long term as possible.
New clause 1, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Southampton, Test, proposes not an implementation period after exit, but a transitional period before exit. That would delay the UK’s exit from Euratom, but that situation is not envisaged in the proposals for the implementation period, or in the article 50 notification that has already been passed by Parliament.
Let me briefly raise quarterly reporting, which I mentioned in reply to the question asked by the hon. Member for Leeds West. It is very important to give Parliament clarity about the progress that the Government are making. That was why my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State made a commitment in the written statement to provide quarterly updates on progress, which will include updates on the negotiations and progress made by the ONR on establishing the UK’s domestic safeguard regime.
I hope that those arguments will persuade Opposition Members not to press the amendments and new clauses to a Division.
Dr Whitehead
We will not be pressing any measure to a vote, except for new clause 1, which has been debated in a very unsatisfactory way this afternoon. We are not convinced by the responses that we have received, so we will be pressing it to a Division.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Dr Whitehead
I beg to move amendment 1, page 1, line 22, at end insert—
“(c) ensuring that inspections of nuclear facilities and materials for the purpose of nuclear safeguards continue at the level previously established by UK membership of EURATOM.”
This amendment would aim to ensure that nuclear safeguarding inspections continue at the same level subsequent to leaving EURATOM as they were when the UK was a member of EURATOM.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 4, page 2, line 41, leave out from “must” to the end of line 44 and insert—
“(a) consult—
(i) the ONR,
(ii) the National Audit Office, and
(iii) such other persons (if any) as the Secretary of State considers it appropriate to consult, and
(b) lay before Parliament a statement declaring that he or she is satisfied that the staffing and financial resource available to the ONR is sufficient for the purpose of assuming responsibility for nuclear safeguarding in the United Kingdom.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to declare that the ONR has the resources necessary to take on extra responsibilities for nuclear safeguarding in the UK.
Amendment 5, in clause 2, page 4, line 13, at end insert—
“(1A) The Secretary of State may only exercise powers under this section at the point at which amendment of any of the legislation in subsection (1) becomes necessary in order to complete the process of transposition of responsibility for nuclear safeguarding from EURATOM to the Office for Nuclear Regulation, and for no other purpose.
(1B) Upon exercising the power set out in subsection (1), the Secretary of State shall lay before both Houses of Parliament a report on the operation of the power.”
This amendment would limit circumstances under which the Secretary of State may exercise certain powers in this section and requires a report to be laid before Parliament.
Amendment 6, in clause 4, page 4, line 41, at end insert
“, but not before the Secretary of State has published draft regulations relating to each of the other provisions of this Act under which the Secretary of State may make regulations.”
This amendment would ensure that draft regulations specified in the Bill are published before the provisions of the Act come into force.
Dr Whitehead
In speaking to these amendments, I want to draw attention to further events that have taken place between the end of the Committee stage and today’s Report stage. I say “further events” because they are separate from the very welcome statement that the Secretary of State has made on what we may do about negotiating an association with Euratom, which I think has helped our proceedings considerably. Another matter that might have helped proceedings considerably had it taken place a little earlier was our having the impact assessment on the Bill that we have now received.
As I am sure hon. Members know, impact assessments should, under Cabinet Office rules, ideally be produced before Bills are discussed. To be honest, it is pretty bad that it has taken so long for the impact assessment to arrive, particularly as it arrived after our deliberations in Committee had concluded. I would say that it is particularly bad following an examination of what the impact assessment actually says—it might have helped our proceedings in Committee had we been able to look at it at that time.
Predominantly, the assessment works on the basis of costing various options relating to what a future inspection regime would look like. Indeed, there are or could be choices, as we have heard, about that inspection regime, which is, after all, at the heart of the Bill. How are we going to replicate in the closest possible detail the inspection arrangements that franked our probity as a nuclear nation in international agreements on non-proliferation and nuclear safeguarding? We have been signed up to those arrangements all these years, but we have hitherto engaged with them through the agency of Euratom, rather than independently. As we know, duties in relation to safeguarding ultimately end in agreements made between nuclear states and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The inspection regime we envisage for the future could vary, because the level of inspection—such as the number of inspections and the depth of inspection needed to satisfy the minimum criteria of the IAEA—could be at a lower level than we have been used to under the Euratom regime. We might envisage a bronze standard inspection regime whereby we scrape by in our future relationship with the IAEA, or we could ensure that the inspection regime, overseen by the ONR, will be as good and as thorough as that carried out by Euratom inspectors in the past. As the impact assessment says, that would be marginally more expensive.
I am pleased that the latter option is strongly advocated in the impact assessment, because it seems to me that we should not seek in future to get by on the lowest level we can get away with. Instead, we should assure ourselves of our own integrity on the matter, and assure others likewise—both the IAEA and the countries with which we will be making bilateral agreements—that we are doing it absolutely properly. That will entail seeking to continue with inspections at the high level laid down in Euratom’s arrangements. That is what amendment 1 is about. It is designed to place in the Bill exactly what the impact assessment states we should do—to ensure that we will go forward at that level.
The Minister may well say—I hope he does—that we are committed to maintaining that level of inspection regardless of whether it is written in the Bill. But there is a problem with that: when we go independent, will we have the resources to carry out inspections to that level, or will we need an extended period in which we are allowed to scrape by with the minimum, because that is all we will be able to do?
At the beginning of the Bill Committee we heard from an excellent witness, Dr Golshan, the deputy chief inspector at the ONR. She gave us a fairly stark statement of reality, which members of the Committee have shared this afternoon. Those hon. Members will all recall Dr Golshan indicating clearly that when we leave Euratom,
“we will not be able to replicate Euratom standards on day one.”––[Official Report, Nuclear Safeguards Public Bill Committee, 31 October 2017; c. 7, Q9.]
In amendment 1, we set out an aim for the Bill: that we cleave to the Euratom standards as soon as possible and assure ourselves that we have the resources to do so.
There is a wider context. What resources will the ONR have to enable it to carry out the substantial new tasks that we set it in this legislation? The ONR is mainly funded through charges to the nuclear industry. That is how it generally recovers the money for its operations, but it also receives some grant funding. Essentially, that funding pays for the nuclear safeguarding work, while the charges on the nuclear industry pay for the ONR’s other functions, which are not the subject of this Bill.
That distinction is important, because the Government intend to halve the grant to the ONR in the period to 2020. At the outset of the negotiations, we face the prospect of the ONR being able to do less work than it does at the moment. If it is to continue to do as much as it does now, it will probably have to levy substantially higher charges on the industry to make up for the loss of the grant up to 2020. At the same time, if the Bill progresses, we are plainly saying that the ONR will have to undertake a whole lot of new work that it has not budgeted for, that has not been in its terms of reference for a long time and that will clearly require a lot more resource. As we heard in oral evidence to the Committee, that is no mean amount of additional work for the ONR to undertake.
To enable it to carry out all its functions, Euratom employs about 160 staff, 25%—or 40—of whom focus on UK installations. One can reasonably assume that the ONR would have to add a similar number of people to its complement of staff if it were to take on the work done by Euratom on nuclear safeguarding. The safeguards unit in the ONR comprises eight professional staff. Between now and March 2019, therefore, the ONR will have to find roughly 32 staff—qualified, highly skilled and trained nuclear inspectors—from somewhere to take over that responsibility. That is in addition to all the other things that the ONR will have to put in place, such as IT systems and administration resources, to allow it to take on that role.
Another excellent witness who contributed to our proceedings in Committee was Sue Ferns, from the union Prospect. She stated that training safeguards inspectors could take up to five years. We are faced with the prospect of needing 32 such people within 18 months. She said, of the role of an inspector:
“This is a warranted role; this is not just working in the industry. It is not just about knowledge, but experience and commanding the confidence of the companies and the organisations that you deal with, so there are very specific aspects to that role.”––[Official Report, Nuclear Safeguards Public Bill Committee, 31 October 2017; c. 35, Q69.]
She also alluded to the relatively small pool in which we are fishing. Not only do we have to fish in the pool, but we have to do so accurately, and we have to attract a good proportion of those people if we are to fill the gap. Consequently, she put a considerable question mark against whether it is possible for the ONR to be ready, as we would like it to be, for the tasks that we are going to give it.
I accept that a number of people in the nuclear industry have many of the qualities that could make them nuclear inspectors—indeed, as the hon. Member for Copeland (Trudy Harrison) said in Committee, there are many such people in the industry—so it may not be necessary to fully train everybody for five years. Nevertheless, it will be a very steep cliff to climb to get those 32 inspectors, at least, in place for whenever we take over inspections from Euratom. I sincerely hope, as I am sure all Members do, that those matters can be resolved. It may be a question of making sure that the ONR is funded to the extent that it can properly undertake that activity of fishing in a small pool—perhaps, as I mentioned in Committee, with pound notes attached to the end of its fishing line.
Stephen Kerr
I begin by paying tribute to the hon. Member for Southampton, Test (Dr Whitehead). I still consider myself to be a relatively new Member, but I had the privilege to serve on the Public Bill Committee. It was a masterclass in how to oppose constructively, so I pay tribute to him and the skillset that he undoubtedly brings to his portfolio and to the added value that he brings to the legislative process. I am glad to say that because it is meant genuinely and sincerely. I understand from his comments that he will not press amendment 6 to a vote. On amendment 1, however, we have heard it repeated ad nauseam that there will be no reduction in or diminution of standards for the inspection criteria on nuclear safeguards. I am disposed to believe these commitments, which have been given in all manner of forums and contexts.
Amendment 4 deals with the allocation of resources to ensure that the ONR can meet its extra responsibilities for nuclear safeguarding in the UK. I believe, having listened to the Minister’s undertakings and to the witnesses from the ONR both in Committee and before the BEIS Select Committee, that there is more than adequate evidence of the Government’s commitment to ensuring that the inspectorate is appropriately resourced and has the required staffing levels and so forth.
Trudy Harrison
Does my hon. Friend know that the ONR has already begun the process of recruiting safeguarding inspectors?
Stephen Kerr
I am grateful for that information.
One of the many highlights of the first three months I have enjoyed as a member of the Select Committee was our visit to the Hinkley Point C project, an immensely impressive project that I would encourage Members on both sides to witness. It is an incredible undertaking—nothing short of a feat of modern engineering—and something we should all take great pride in. I was disappointed to hear the rather flippant comments about it from the hon. Member for Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey (Drew Hendry). It is a vital strategic project that will safeguard our nuclear security, so it was disappointing to hear him dismiss it, although I understand that SNP Members, as committed nationalists, are against all things nuclear, which is much to be regretted, particularly from a Scottish viewpoint.
One of the highlights of the trip was our visit to Bridgwater and Taunton College to see the partnering there on nuclear skills, whether nuclear construction or engineering. It was immensely encouraging to see so many young workers—men and women—preparing through apprenticeships for a career in nuclear. One of the most upsetting things about hearing Members speak negatively about such a vital and strategically important industry is the impact it has on young people. We had an excellent debate in the House just over a week ago on space. We talked about the space programme in the UK being recognised and understood—we learned it was worth about £16 billion and that 6% of the global spend on space was in the UK—and what a spaceport in Scotland, in Ayrshire, would do to excite the imaginations of our young men and women in relation to the possibilities of a career in that area.
The same is true of nuclear. We need young men and women to see nuclear as a viable career, and there, at Bridgwater and Taunton College, we saw the evidence of the investment in skills and capabilities that is essential for the future of the UK’s nuclear industry. There are very exciting career prospects for those who commit themselves to a career in the nuclear industry, and that is to be encouraged; we need those skills. I am confident that the immediate provisions are being made, in the short term but also in the intermediate term, to ensure that those skills and capabilities will exist, and we shall be able to staff the ONR with an inspectorate and all the other skilled specialists we will need over time, although, on the basis of the evidence we received, I admit that that would not be completely in place by the date of departure.
Drew Hendry
I am delighted to have given the hon. Gentleman so much material today. He seems to be fascinated by my words. He will concede, however, that I was talking in the context of our being foolish and reckless enough to leave both the EU and Euratom.
Stephen Kerr
That is interesting editing. I cannot recall word for word exactly what was said before and immediately after what the hon. Gentleman said, but I think that I clearly heard him say that it was possible, in these new circumstances, to negotiate new arrangements. We must indeed accept that we will need new arrangements, and that they will need to be negotiated. As was said earlier, we cannot take something like associate membership off the shelf—I think Members will have to accept that such an arrangement does not currently exist—but I agree with him that anything is negotiable. I come from a background of sales negotiation, and that was one of the mantras by which we lived: “everything is negotiable”.
I think that when wise adult heads are brought to bear, definite win-win outcomes are possible, as they are in the context of the Bill and its subject matter. I hope very much that the Government will use their powers under the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill and the powers that this Bill will confer on them to bring the appropriate measures to life at the right time, so that we can secure the continuity and the prosperity of the UK’s nuclear energy business.
Drew Hendry
As we have heard many times, and as the evidence has borne out, the industry is clearly desperate for the standards that we currently enjoy through Euratom to be maintained. We have heard time and again that the industry would prefer us to remain in Euratom or to have associate membership, but if that does not happen, which seems to be the direction in which we are going today, it has said that it would like the new standards to be the same as those of Euratom.
It is vital for us to secure a commitment that the UK agency will be able not only to cope with the new work but to obtain the necessary resources, at the levels that are required through Euratom. However, as I said earlier, I do not believe that that is achievable, given the challenges. Crucially, there are still not enough people with enough experience. No matter how much the hon. Member for Stirling (Stephen Kerr) wants to persuade children that science is a good idea, I do not think we have yet found a way to compress five years into two, and it will not be possible in that period to gain the experience nuclear inspectors require.
Two requirements still need to be met: one is for complete transparency in the process, so that those who have expressed concern and the industry can know what is happening; the other is, through the amendments, to get a guarantee that arrangements will be in place that ensure that nuclear safeguards are operated to the same standards as now. I am anti-nuclear and proud that my party is, too, but we have to protect people’s interests where the nuclear industry is concerned. Too many of us in the highlands remember the mess left at Dounreay. Anyone who wants to know what can go wrong in the nuclear industry should go up there and learn about what was left on the beaches and the radioactive material moved about in welly boots because the equipment had rusted, before the correct standards were put in place through Euratom.
Mr Vaizey
I cannot support the amendments, although I have a great deal of sympathy with the position set out by the hon. Member for Southampton, Test (Dr Whitehead). The amendment I tabled with colleagues from both sides of the House to the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill sought to ensure that the Government consulted fully on implementing a Euratom-like regime after we left, so I understand why he has tabled amendments to ensure that the Government are transparent in their dealings. I did not press my amendment to a vote because the Secretary of State and his very able Minister were clear about their responsibilities to keep the House informed about the arrangements being put in place to replicate what we have in Euratom; indeed, they published a written statement shortly after that debate and before the debate on Report, and they have committed to come to the House quarterly to make clear the progress being made. None the less, as I say, I have a great deal of sympathy for the Opposition’s argument.
I support the Bill because it puts in place some of the structures we will need to replace the arrangements we had as a member of Euratom. I have listened to much of the debate and heard some fine speeches, but however brilliant the speeches, I cannot help thinking that the entire debate takes place in a slightly Alice in Wonderland world. Over many months, I have made no secret of the fact that it is a source of deep and profound frustration for me and many colleagues that we are leaving Euratom. As I said in an intervention, we are leaving Euratom on a technicality. I urge any colleagues who are passionate about Brexit and the apparent freedom and greatness that it will bring back to this country not to try to wrap Euratom up in that thesis.
Euratom is a treaty that works extremely well. The UK is one of the world’s leading civil nuclear powers. Our industry is highly respected and essential to the development not only of current nuclear power, but of nuclear fusion, which is where my interest comes in, owing to the research institute at Culham. Under the Bill, we will engage over the next 18 months in a simple exercise of replicating almost as exactly as we can the arrangements we now enjoy under Euratom. We are not taking back control. We are not regaining sovereignty. We are not going out into the world as a global power. We are simply going to replicate perfectly serviceable arrangements that already exist, and we are doing so on a technicality. I am not making any particular criticism. This is simply an observation of the collateral damage that Brexit has caused to a particular sector. It will be expensive and time-consuming.
As I have said, I wanted to speak to the amendments to make it clear why I was not supporting them and to take the opportunity to thank Secretary of State and the Minister for all their work. They have been candid and open with me and the Chairman of the BEIS Committee and with other concerned hon. Members on both sides of the House about the work they are doing to try to limit any damage to our nuclear industry. They really have worked tirelessly on this issue. From my perspective—other Members might not agree—I think that they have listened and taken on board our concerns.
Antoinette Sandbach (Eddisbury) (Con)
Does my right hon. Friend agree that, if there were an opportunity for us to seek some sort of associate membership of Euratom once we have left, we should attempt to do that? That would minimise the cost to the UK taxpayer, unlike having to completely replicate the regime over here. I also echo his thanks to the Secretary of State and his ministerial team for the way in which they have approached this matter.
Mr Vaizey
I understand what my hon. Friend is seeking, but the point has already been made that there is in effect no real associate membership of Euratom at the moment. Ukraine and Switzerland have what is described as associate membership, but it is certainly nowhere close to the kind of arrangements that we have with Euratom now. The Government intend to have as close a relationship as possible with Euratom, whether we call it associate membership or anything else, and we will have to put in place our agreements with the other nuclear states with which we currently enjoy a relationship under Euratom—notably Australia, Canada, Japan and the United States of America. That work is under way, although the timing of the implementation of those agreements is unfortunately not in our gift. It is in the gift of other legislatures that might not be as efficient as this august legislature, but I know that we want to replicate those agreements.
I am particularly pleased that the Prime Minister did not follow the example of Watford, the football team of my hon. Friend the Minister, and change the manager unnecessarily in the past two weeks. I am extremely pleased that he remains in his place scoring goals for the nuclear industry, and I look forward to co-operating with him for many years to come.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Mrs Eleanor Laing)
Does no one else wish to speak? I call the Minister.
Richard Harrington
I am as speechless as you are on this occasion, Madam Deputy Speaker. Maybe hon. Members on both sides of the House said all that they wanted to say on the first group of amendments. I was also speechless at the compliments that have been paid to me very justifiably—[Laughter.] The compliments were justifiable in the case of the Secretary of State, although they were rather exaggerated in my case. I do hope that the Hansard reporters can sort out my language on that; otherwise the Watford Observer will be interested not just in the comments on the Watford football team’s change of management but in what could be distortions of what I have just said about the compliments paid to the Secretary of State.
I should like to move on. I seriously thank hon. Members for their amendments in this group. They address a range of practical issues around the Bill and the implementation of the nuclear safeguards regime. I shall turn first to amendment 1, which is a very good place to start, as the famous song says. It is important that we have made a commitment to this effect on several occasions. As I have said, and as the Secretary of State has said in his written statement, the Government are committed to ensuring that the new regime
“is as comprehensive and robust as that currently provided by Euratom.”
It will not be a light version of it.
On inspections, the Nuclear Safeguards Bill is the essential first step in setting up a domestic nuclear safeguards regime. The detail of the regime, including further details in respect of the powers for safeguard inspectors, will be provided in the regulations that underpin the Bill. The pre-consultation draft regulations that were published on Friday provided details of the ONR’s role in respect of nuclear safeguards, and it is important to note that the inspections only form one part of the overall safeguard regime.
Drew Hendry
I am grateful to the Minister for pointing that out, but can he give us an indication of what proportion of experienced staff, versus trainees, he intends to have within two years?
Richard Harrington
I am afraid I cannot give the hon. Gentleman that information, not because I do not want to give it to him, but because I do not want inadvertently to mislead him. If I may, I will drop him a line over the next couple of days with the exact information, as I have just done on the number of people recruited to date, as mentioned in the first group of amendments—I think the figure was 11. I do not want to give a rough estimate on such an important question.
The recruitment campaign has been launched and will continue throughout this year.
I will briefly address the issue of timing, not of this speech, but of the assessment of readiness to implement a domestic safeguards regime on withdrawal, because it has been raised by several hon. Members. I have made it clear on several occasions that the Government are committed to establishing a robust domestic nuclear safeguards regime of a standard broadly equivalent to Euratom standards in order to retain public and trading partner confidence in the nuclear industry, about which we are very proud. We are working closely with the ONR to ensure it will be in a position to regulate this new regime.
Based on current progress, I believe we will be in a position to deliver a domestic regime to international standards by March 2019, if required, and that such a regime will be able to satisfy the International Atomic Energy Agency and our international trading partners.
John Woodcock
I listened carefully to what the Minister has just said, and he seems to be setting up the UK to follow a minimum of the IAEA standards, and not necessarily the higher Euratom standards. Is that the case?
Richard Harrington
No. I do not accept the hon. Gentleman’s version of what I have said. We want a Rolls-Royce standard, the best possible standard we can have.
The negotiations on implementation are due to begin in the spring and, as hon. Members know, we will be reporting to the House regularly on progress.
Let me turn to the Henry VIII power. The hon. Member for Southampton, Test (Dr Whitehead) has mentioned his dislike for Henry VIII powers. This is a tiny Henry VIII power—a Henry VIII who has been on a diet for a long time—that is limited to amending references in the Nuclear Safeguards and Electricity (Finance) Act 1978, the Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000 and the Nuclear Safeguards (Notification) Regulations 2004 in order to accommodate safeguards agreements with the IAEA. Those amended references will enable the IAEA to carry out its activities in the UK, including by providing legal cover for the UK activities of its inspectors. We have to be able to update that legislation so that it contains the correct references for new safeguards arrangements with the IAEA, which have not yet been made but will be in the near future. Without amendment, the existing provisions will become ineffective when the current agreements no longer apply, which would leave us in breach of any new international safeguards regime.
The detailed amendments will not be known until the agreements are in place, so the power that we are asking for is essential if we are to ensure that the UK has a safeguards regime that complies with its future international obligations when Euratom’s safeguards arrangements no longer apply. It is a very narrow power and I do not think that it is relevant to the general discussions that the House has had on Henry VIII powers. I hope that Members on both sides of the House are satisfied and that they will not seek to press their amendments.
Dr Whitehead
I have listened carefully to the Minister this afternoon and would like to thank him for the constructive way he took the Bill through Committee. My personal view is that that is how we should legislate in practice. He has played a substantial part in making the process as good as it could be. However, just as I do not blame him personally for the fact that his football team recently scored a completely illegal goal—it was hand-balled—against my team and deprived it of two points, I do not blame him for the way the Bill has been constructed. He has attempted to justify parts of it that he is unable to amend, but nevertheless their construction, in my view, remains deeply unsatisfactory.
I am happy to withdraw amendment 1 and not to press the amendments that relate to the staffing and funding of the ONS—the Secretary of State has committed himself to reporting quarterly on progress with Euratom, which was the subject of one of our amendments in Committee, for which I am grateful—but I will press amendment 5 to a vote, because it relates to the Henry VIII clauses, which are a fundamental defect in the structure of the Bill. We wish to put it on the record that we would not wish such arrangements to be proceeded with under other circumstances. I beg to ask leave to withdraw amendment 1.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 2
Power to amend legislation relating to nuclear safeguards
Amendment proposed: 5, page 4, line 13, at end insert—
‘(1A) The Secretary of State may only exercise powers under this section at the point at which amendment of any of the legislation in subsection (1) becomes necessary in order to complete the process of transposition of responsibility for nuclear safeguarding from EURATOM to the Office for Nuclear Regulation, and for no other purpose.
(1B) Upon exercising the power set out in subsection (1), the Secretary of State shall lay before both Houses of Parliament a report on the operation of the power.”—(Dr Whitehead.)
This amendment would limit circumstances under which the Secretary of State may exercise certain powers in this section and requires a report to be laid before Parliament.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Greg Clark)
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
May I begin by thanking right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the House for their constructive contributions during the Bill’s parliamentary stages to date? I thank everyone who has worked on it, including those who served on the Bill Committee, the House authorities, the experts who gave oral evidence in Committee, my indefatigable officials, who have worked very hard and effectively on the Bill, and the organisations that took the time to provide expert written evidence.
May I also thank and commend the Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, my hon. Friend the Member for Watford (Richard Harrington), for his skill and application in steering the Bill through the House? There is no need for him to sing his own praises; they should be sung loudly and clearly from this Front Bench, and I think that that sentiment is shared by Members on both sides of the House.
May I also join in the commendation of the efforts of the hon. Members for Southampton, Test (Dr Whitehead) and for Sheffield Central (Paul Blomfield), who have been thoughtful and insightful, and who helped to improve the Bill during the Committee stage? As my hon. Friend the Minister said, they have applied the principles of constructive opposition to their scrutiny of this very important Bill, and that has helped to bring it to this stage in our proceedings.
Let me briefly remind the House why the Bill is so necessary and firmly in the national interest. The nuclear sector is not only important to the future of energy in this country, but has important applications in research and industry. My Department has been working very closely with the industry to make sure that our shared interests are reflected in arrangements as we leave Euratom. The Bill helps to provide the required certainty and clarity to support our ambitions.
As I said on Second Reading, the Bill ensures that when the United Kingdom is no longer a member of Euratom, we will have in place a legal framework that enables us to establish a domestic nuclear safeguards regime that meets international nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation standards. Nuclear safeguards, as the House now well knows, are the reporting and verification processes that nuclear states use to demonstrate to the international community that civil nuclear material is not diverted into military or weapons programmes. The Bill ensures that the United Kingdom can put in place the regime to enable the Office for Nuclear Regulation to oversee nuclear safeguards following withdrawal from Euratom.
To ensure continued international verification and oversight of our safeguards, we are, as my hon. Friend the Minister made clear throughout our proceedings, in discussions with the International Atomic Energy Agency to agree replacement voluntary safeguards agreements that reflect the UK’s withdrawal from Euratom. The Bill gives us the ability to implement those new safeguards and the domestic regime that underpins them.
John Woodcock
Following the Minister’s earlier answer, I was not entirely clear whether the Government are committed to Euratom standards from day one of this new regime, or looking at the de minimis of the International Atomic Energy Agency?
Greg Clark
We have been very clear. We see no problem with the standards that have obtained in Euratom, so our aim is to have complete continuity with those standards. I hope that the hon. Gentleman welcomes that.
Our intention is that the new regime should reflect the high standards that we expect. We want to establish a robust regime that provides coverage and effectiveness equivalent to that currently provided by Euratom. That is our objective. It is clear that we need continuity and that we must work to avoid any break in our civil nuclear safeguards regime if we want to continue the success and prosperity of our industry.
As has been evidenced in today’s proceedings, we have listened to concerns raised throughout the passage of the Bill in the House. In the context of both this Bill and the EU (Withdrawal) Bill, we responded to a number of questions by publishing on 11 January a written statement that outlines the Government’s strategy and objectives in relation to Euratom. Our strategy is twofold: first, to seek through our negotiations with the European Commission a close association with Euratom; and, secondly and simultaneously, to put in place all necessary measures to ensure that the UK can operate as an independent and responsible nuclear state from day one.
After hearing the concerns raised in Committee by the hon. Member for Southampton, Test and the hon. Member for Sheffield Central about enhancing parliamentary scrutiny, I have made a commitment to report back to Parliament every three months by way of further written statements about overall progress on Euratom, including in respect of negotiations. As we indicated in Committee, we remain committed to the open and transparent approach that has characterised our discussions on the Bill so far, including when we developed the regulations that set out the detail of the domestic civil nuclear safeguards regime.
In response to various amendments tabled in Committee, we have committed to continuing dialogue with the industry, the devolved Administrations and civil society. A series of stakeholder events and workshops will take place, in addition to the public consultation on the regulations that we intend will take place later in the year. Working closely with the ONR, we are in the process of producing two sets of draft regulations. In response to suggestions in Committee that the House would benefit from early scrutiny of the regulations, a pre-consultation draft of the regulations, with an explanatory covering note, was provided to Parliament, as the hon. Member for Southampton, Test said. The draft regulations will go through a full consultation so that they can be exhaustively examined, so we expect them to continue to evolve in response to comment from, and consideration by, stakeholders and, of course, Parliament itself. We make a commitment to work with Members on both sides of the House and people outside Parliament to make sure that the regulations reflect the best possible advice.
The swift progress of the Bill, and the supportive discussions in the House about it, have aided our negotiations with the EU, the IAEA and third countries. We have already held several rounds of discussions on Euratom issues in the first phase of the negotiations with the EU, and there has been good progress. Negotiations with the IAEA on future voluntary agreements for the application of civil nuclear safeguards have also been constructive, and substantial progress has been made. It is expected that these new agreements will be put to the IAEA board of governors for ratification later this year. Negotiations on nuclear co-operation agreements have also proceeded significantly. In particular, constructive progress has already been made in negotiations with key partners, such as the United States, Canada, Australia and Japan.
In the light of all this, I am grateful to the House for the scrutiny it has given to the Bill and the expert eye it has cast over it. The broad cross-party consensus that we have seen sends an important signal to our international partners that the United Kingdom will absolutely remain a leading and responsible nuclear state. It allows us to reassure the United Kingdom’s very important nuclear industry and the nuclear research community that we absolutely remain committed to supporting them to maintain the United Kingdom’s status as a world leader. Taking early action to have ready a domestic civil nuclear safeguards regime is both responsible and in the national interest, and I therefore commend the Bill to the House.
Rebecca Long Bailey (Salford and Eccles) (Lab)
This is an important and necessary Bill, as the Secretary of State confirmed, to ensure that a contingency is available should the Government’s negotiations with the European Union and Euratom fail. That was why we did not oppose it on Second Reading, and it is why we will not oppose it on Third Reading tonight.
That does not mean, however, that we do not continue to have concerns about the Government’s approach and about whether there was any necessity at all for the Bill. On Second Reading, I made the case that it should be possible—or would have been possible—to retain the UK’s membership, or to secure a close association with Euratom that would allow the continuation of nuclear safeguarding. The Opposition still think that continued membership of Euratom or a close associate status is both achievable and necessary for the most efficient continued working of a whole raft of procedures relating to the nuclear industry, not just to safeguarding.
I am pleased that the Government seem to have acknowledged that negotiating a close association would be the best outcome for our nuclear industry and that Bill does not constitute a replacement for all Euratom’s functions. The Secretary of State’s written statement on 11 January set out that the Government’s strategy was to
“seek a close association with Euratom and to include Euratom in any implementation period negotiated as part of our wider exit discussions”.
It went on to say that the
“exact nature of the period will be subject to forthcoming negotiations”.—[Official Report, 11 January 2018; Vol. 634, c. 9-10WS.]
Given that statement, I wonder why the Government did not accept a number of Labour’s proposals: new clause 1, which would simply have asked the Secretary of State to “seek to secure” a transition period during which the UK could secure an association with Euratom, or indeed build any domestic capability; and new clause 2, which would have established that the provisions of the Bill are contingency arrangements if it proves impossible to establish an association with Euratom.
I point out that we could have been more legally robust in our language, especially in new clause 1. We could, for example, have used the words “best endeavours”, but we appreciate the issues that the Secretary of State faces and would have given him the opportunity simply of saying that he would try to secure a transitional period. We are sad that new clause 1 was not accepted today, but none the less I appreciate that the Secretary of State has listened somewhat to Labour’s concerns and promised to report back every three months about overall progress on Euratom in the EU negotiations. As three months from the first statement will be 11 April, which is in the middle of the Easter recess, I look forward to receiving an update on 29 March.
My Front-Bench colleagues have argued that a transitional agreement is vital if we are to ensure that the UK is physically able to provide a functioning domestic safeguarding regime. The evidence taken by the Public Bill Committee highlighted that particular concern of the industry. Dr Golshan of the ONR said:
“given our membership of Euratom, it has not been necessary for the UK and ONR to build capacity and resilience in this area.”
She added:
“a transitional arrangement will be extremely helpful.”
That is not least because the training of inspectors takes several years, as outlined by the representatives of Prospect and Unite the union. Indeed, when she was asked about training, Dr Golshan said:
“We have started that process, but it is a long road and I am not going to sit here and pretend that it is all going to be a smooth run.”––[Official Report, Nuclear Safeguards Public Bill Committee, 31 October 2017; c. 5-9, Q3, 8 and 16.]
We have ongoing concerns about the timely replacement of inspectors, so we urge Ministers to agree a transitional arrangement to prevent full obligations from being placed on an unready ONR. The Government did not see fit to accept amendment 4, which would have required the Secretary of State to declare that the ONR had the resources necessary to take on extra responsibilities for nuclear safeguarding in the UK, but I hope they will listen to this plea.
I will say a little word on the powers that the Bill will hand to the Government—the very small Henry VIII provisions, as they were referred to previously. The Minister did not see fit to accept our amendments that attempted to curtail the executive powers conferred by the Bill, but he promised to publish regulations ahead of Report. He did indeed publish those regulations, but not until Friday afternoon—beyond the deadline to table any further amendments to the Bill. I would just like to put on record that although I welcome the publication of the regulations, the timing was rather cheeky and not altogether in the spirit of the constructive approach that both sides have taken to the Bill.
I associate myself with the words of the Secretary of State in thanking all who have spoken throughout our consideration of the Bill, as well as all members of the Public Bill Committee. I want to thank the Front-Bench teams, including the Secretary of State and the Minister. I think it is fair to say that they have been in listening mode. I especially thank my Labour colleagues, not least my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test (Dr Whitehead), who have worked diligently on the finer details of all things relating to nuclear safeguarding. Finally, I want to thank the Public Bill Office and the Clerks for all their tremendous support, as ever.
James Heappey
I sense that the Bill is accelerating towards the other place, so I will not speak for long. I congratulate Front Benchers on both sides of the House and all who have spoken in our debates. As with so many debates on energy in this place, there has been broad consensus, with disagreement about small details around the edges. It is pleasing to be part of such a constructive approach to an important area of policy without partisan divides getting in the way, as they sometimes do in other areas of policy.
The nuclear industry has cultivated a small but perfectly formed and enthusiastic band of representatives in this place. Colleagues on both sides of the House have enjoyed the industry’s hospitality and benefited from its briefing in order that we might understand the issue, which is important for the industry, and have scrutinised the legislation in the House to ensure that it meets the industry’s aims.
I am glad that the Bill has not been amended today, because I think it does exactly what it should be doing in the first place. It is vital that we maintain the safeguards and reputation of the nuclear industry. It is an industry in which even the smallest mistake is unacceptable, and we in this country have a fine reputation for delivering almost immaculate standards of safety, so it is right that Members on both sides of the House want to be reassured that, when dealing with the important issue of our membership of Euratom, absolutely no compromises are made over safeguarding and the safety of the industry.
The Government have been clear, as has the EU, that the treaties of the EU and Euratom are so intertwined that it is impossible to remain a member of Euratom while leaving the EU. Some Opposition Members, who are no longer in their places, made the point earlier that we should at least seek to remain in Euratom. I do not disagree—I think that would be the best possible outcome—but what I do disagree with is the idea that, in amending the Bill to secure that commitment, we should take a bit of a long shot on what has been unachievable for many other countries that are not within the EU, at the cost of providing the industry with what it has been so clear with us that it wants. I am glad that we have not done that, and I have every confidence that the Secretary of State and his team will seek, if not full membership, the closest possible thing to it that is allowable while meeting the terms of our wider Brexit ambitions. I am also glad that, since I spoke on Second Reading, when there was a great deal of rather unfortunate debate about things such as medical isotopes, such fake news has disappeared from the debate and we are all now much clearer about what the Bill does and does not impact on.
The nuclear industry is of huge importance to this country and my constituency. My hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Jayawardena), in his lengthy remarks earlier, mentioned the importance of nuclear to our energy mix. He is not in the Chamber to hear the answer to his question, but I believe that about 25% of our energy needs today are provided by nuclear, either within the United Kingdom or through our interconnection with France. That is an important contribution, and until we can fully unlock the potential of energy storage, demand response and other flexibility measures, that provision of base-load is absolutely essential to the industrial powerhouse of our nation, so we should support the industry.
We must also ensure—this is the one constituency point I want to cheekily make on Third Reading, Madam Deputy Speaker—that the industrial opportunity of the new nuclear programme genuinely benefits the places in which that nuclear fleet is being built. We must ensure that not just things such as catering companies, accommodation and transport, but meaningful engineering, technology and high skills-based industries, are included in the supply chain for the construction of the new nuclear fleet. Somerset needs more than a fantastic caterer as a legacy of the construction of Hinkley.
The only other point that has come out today that needs to be underlined is that the chairwoman of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee and other Opposition Members said that there was some debate about whether the ONR would be ready on day one to deliver the standards that Euratom has required of our industry. My response to their concern is not that we should legislate to mitigate the threat, but that we should encourage those on the Front Bench to lean on the ONR and support it in every way possible to ensure that it has the capacity to deliver such safeguarding on the first day of its responsibilities.
That is all that I wish to say, apart from congratulating Ministers on their stewardship of the Bill. The Secretary of State, who I am delighted is still in the Chamber, the Minister for Energy and Clean Growth and the Under-Secretary are enthusiastic fellow travellers on our route to a zero-carbon energy system. I am glad that they have brought this important piece of legislation through the House, and I am glad that it will not be opposed on Third Reading. I look forward to working with Front Benchers and colleagues on both sides of the House on other energy policy Bills in the future.
Drew Hendry
If power over these issues, as they affect Scotland, were in the purview of the Scottish Parliament, I am certain that Scotland would be staying within Euratom. However, here we are, and this Bill is going through this House. The Minister knows that I respect him on this issue; he has tried to engage with me very positively, and I thank him for doing that.
I would like to say that the Government and the Secretary of State have written in some checks, but I see no evidence of any. However, I do see hopes, promises and assurances. In the fullness of time, the Government will be judged on what happens to nuclear safeguards when their agency is set up and on how well it performs. For the sake of the industry, the safeguards and the people involved in it, I hope that it is a success.
Trudy Harrison
The Bill is absolutely essential to the nuclear industry. Without it, after we leave the European Union, our nuclear industry would collapse. As I said earlier, it would be economically crushing not to have a safeguards regime in place. That would have catastrophic implications for every part of the country, which would be felt across the whole sector.
Following the construction and successful commissioning of the world’s first nuclear power station—Calder Hall, in my constituency, back in 1957—Euratom was formed by the Euratom treaty. It was as important then as it is now to apply civil nuclear safeguards in the UK. The UK has committed, as a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to have nuclear safeguards in place—a clear demonstration to the international community that civil nuclear material is used only for civil activities.
The Bill enables the UK to set up a domestic safeguards regime to meet our international commitments on safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation standards. Without the Bill, the movement of materials, fuel—including spent fuel—and components, and even the conversations about materials, fuel and components, could not take place.
Euratom provides the basis for the regulation of civilian nuclear activity in the UK, including fuel supply, waste management and co-operation between nuclear states. It implements a system of safeguards, controls the supply of fissile materials in Euratom member states, guarantees high safety standards and funds international research into nuclear fission and fusion. It is also critical for nuclear co-operation across the world.
In a community such as mine, where the income of 55% of the population depends directly or indirectly on work in the nuclear industry, and in our country, where more than 20% of energy is generated by nuclear power plants, not having measures in place as we leave the EU and Euratom would be unthinkable. An effective safeguards regime is necessary for Sellafield’s operations, for the low level waste repository’s business, for the national nuclear laboratory’s research and for the development of Moorside, the new-build nuclear power plant that is expected to be constructed adjacent to Sellafield. All of that is in Copeland.
I have visited 70-something businesses in my constituency, including large global operations now based in Copeland—some of the biggest names in international industry—and our many small and medium-sized enterprises to listen to their concerns and ambitions for the future. Each and every one is wholly dependent on being able to trade globally. Those businesses are not just critical to that sector, but integral to the socioeconomic fabric of daily life. Of the 1,020 apprenticeships that were started last year, the vast majority were in industry and engineering connected with our nuclear sector. But it goes further: those companies are proud, passionate parts of our society, donating to charities, supporting local organisations and providing enormous socioeconomic benefits. I am proud to say that tomorrow, Sellafield is sponsoring “A Taste of Cumbria” in the Jubilee Room here in Parliament, such is its commitment to its community and county.
I cannot emphasise sufficiently strongly how vital the Bill is for Copeland and Cumbria, and indeed for the whole country. I was delighted that the Government committed further to the Joint European Torus and the international thermonuclear experimental reactor projects. The Bill is equally necessary for research and development and for science and innovation.
Our nuclear industry is an international marketplace, which means that we need in place not only domestic regulations but bilateral agreements with countries such as the US, Japan, Kazakhstan and Canada—the list goes on. We cannot even begin to discuss bilateral agreements without there being a domestic safeguards regime in place. We need one to carry out decommissioning work across the country and to consider exporting the skills and products being developed. It is estimated that overseas reactor decommissioning will total £250 billion over coming decades, according to the Government’s “The UK’s Nuclear Future” document.
The Calder Hall reactor I referred to earlier now requires decommissioning. This is a fantastic opportunity for the sector not just to benefit from the skills and experience gained from decommissioning but to leverage wider UK, European and worldwide decommissioning. The iconic golf ball structure at Sellafield, the Windscale advanced gas-cooled reactor, was the prototype power reactor for the 14 EDF Energy AGRs, which currently supply about one fifth of the UK’s electricity. Its core heat exchangers and associated equipment have all been safely decommissioned and removed, thanks to Government-funded projects, demonstrating that a power reactor can be successfully decommissioned.
I hope that Calder Hall can be decommissioned as a priority and a new breed of small modular reactors installed in its place to ensure that we are at the forefront of nuclear technological developments once again. Small modular reactors and advanced modular reactors offer the chance for UK nuclear expertise and manufacturing to lead the world, but we need the Bill to ensure that we are globally compliant with safeguarding, in addition to security and safety.
On the role of the ONR, it is important to understand the differences between safeguarding, security and safety, all of which are critical to the secure and compliant running of our civil nuclear industry. Currently, the ONR has responsibility for safety and oversees the civil nuclear constabulary with regard to security. Bringing responsibility for safeguarding under this one organisation would seem to bring benefits of shared knowledge and skills and combined experience. The ONR is an independent regulator that was made a statutory public body under the Energy Act 2013, which sets out its role, functions and powers.
International oversight will be a key part of the future regime, so I am pleased that the UK is seeking to conclude new arrangements with the IAEA. It is absolutely vital that the IAEA retain its right to inspect all civil nuclear facilities and continue to receive all current safeguards reporting. That will ensure that international verification of our safeguards activity continues to be robust. We must retain our reputation for excellence to ensure that companies in other countries, such as KEPCO in South Korea, which we anticipate will become the new owner of NuGen, want to do business with us.
Our country is a pioneer and global leader in this area and has an enviable safety record. The Centre of Nuclear Excellence in my constituency and all the businesses and livelihoods that are utterly reliant upon an effective safeguarding regime need this Bill. I hope that the UK will continue to play a leading role in the development of international nuclear security and safety standards, including through the IAEA, and I commend the Government’s work thus far. In particular, I would like to thank the Secretary of State, the Minister and his team for answering questions put to me by my community and businesses, including some that have trained up Euratom safeguards inspectors—such is the level of expertise in Copeland. I commend the Bill and I thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker, for the opportunity to speak.
Layla Moran
I find it hard to believe that we have finally got to this point, having attended every sitting on the Bill, apart from the Public Bill Committee. As a former physics teacher, I must say that it has been wonderful to hear so many Members talk about all things physics. That is always a pleasure.
The Liberal Democrats and I will, of course, be supporting the Bill, but I do have some questions that I hope the Minister will answer. I echo what has been said across the House about the constructive way in which the Bill has gone through. I appreciate that. As a relatively new Member, this is how I imagined Bills would pass—with lots of conversations, concessions and so forth—so I thank him for that.
It seems to me that the House has achieved broad consensus on most parts of the Bill, and that the Bill is necessary as a contingency measure. I am all for having a contingency planning mechanism to deal with matters that are out of our control, but I think it worth my saying again that we did not have to be in this position. We did not have to leave Euratom—or, at least, the legal case is still being contested. If the Government have been told otherwise and it is set in stone, I ask them to release the legal advice, which would put that argument to bed.
My constituents, many of whom work in the industry, are still crying out for certainty and clarity, but time is running out. I know that the Minister disagrees with the Liberal Democrats’ position of wishing to stay in Euratom, but I urge him to reconsider. So much about the Brexit process seems to be groupthink at its worst. We can still change our mind, but if we are not going to do that, we should at the very least make the crucial admission that this is about the red line of the European Court of Justice. That is the critical issue: that is the main red line that we are not allowed to cross. It was a choice, not a fact, that that was a consequence of the referendum.
If the Government cannot or will not change their mind, I am reassured by what the Secretary of State said in a written statement earlier this month about seeking the closest possible associate membership, and by his warm words about the Joint European Torus and the international thermonuclear experimental reactor—not least because those contracts will be worth billions to the UK over the next few decades and are vital to the local economy, particularly in the Abingdon area of my constituency. He also seeks
“open trade arrangements for nuclear goods”,
the ability to ensure that materials cross borders “without disruption”, and
“maintaining close…cooperation…on nuclear safety.”
It is true that Euratom does not directly govern the issue of radioisotopes, but the Minister will be well aware that I am still deeply concerned about the issue. The institution of “a” customs union, rather than “the” customs union, will put blocks at the border, and, because of the short half-lives involved, there will be disruption unless we are very clear about how we will mitigate it.
I look forward to the regular updates that the Minister has said he will give, but has he considered increasing their frequency, at least to begin with? One of my main concerns is that while the Brexit negotiations will continue until the start of next year, Austria will take over the presidency of Euratom very soon, and the heavy lifting really ought to be done before it takes the helm, because there will some problems for us. Will the Minister consider giving more frequent, earlier updates to let us know how the negotiations are going before Austria takes over? The issue is causing a huge amount of consternation throughout the industry, and throughout the House.
As the Minister knows, to ensure that the JET has a future we need to guarantee the 2018-19 work programme by the middle of this year. Again, I should like some updates on how we are to achieve that. It is not just about the money; it is also about ensuring that nuclear scientists have full access to the schemes in the future, not just in the next two years but in the next five and 10. We also need some assurances, albeit not from the Minister’s Department, about the movement of nuclear scientists. Those assurances are not yet written in stone, but this matters to the scientists, because they are extremely saleable.
I accept that the Bill is needed, because it is better for us to be safe than sorry, but I wish that we did not have to do this at all.
Maggie Throup (Erewash) (Con)
I congratulate the ministerial team on their successful navigation, which has allowed the Bill to reach this stage. It is a key piece of legislation that will safeguard Britain’s international reputation as a responsible nuclear state once we have left Euratom. I believe that there is potential for significant inward investment in the UK in the post-Brexit era. We heard from my hon. Friend the Member for Copeland (Trudy Harrison) about the impacts that the nuclear industry already has in this country, but I think that we can do more.
The Government have been clear throughout the passage of the Bill that they will work to establish a close and effective working relationship with Euratom once the UK leaves the organisation, including close association on matters such as research, training and trade. Ministers have made no secret of their ambitions for the nuclear sector, and I support those ambitions. We have an opportunity for some of the UK’s leading companies to be at the forefront of world-leading new nuclear technology.
During the Bill’s passage, Ministers have been consistent in reassuring the House that leaving Euratom in no way diminishes the UK’s nuclear ambition. The announcement by the Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, my hon. Friend the Member for Watford (Richard Harrington), in December of a new £86 million fund to establish a national fusion technology platform demonstrates the Government’s continued commitment to nuclear research and development, which will be welcomed by a number of my constituents who work in the nuclear sector.
The launch of the small modular reactor competition in 2016 is another example of the importance the Government attach to the UK’s civil nuclear industry to provide a secure, clean and affordable source of domestic electricity that can also be exported overseas. The UK small modular reactor consortium, led by Rolls-Royce, estimates that the design, development and production of a fleet of small modular reactors would create up to 40,000 skilled nuclear supply chain jobs and add over £100 billion to our economy. As my hon. Friend the Member for Taunton Deane (Rebecca Pow) said, our young people need to know that there is a future in the industry; they need that certainty to start on their career pathway. As the centre of Rolls-Royce’s nuclear operation in the UK, Derby has the potential to become a world leader in new nuclear technology, with the potential benefits extending across the wider region, including to my constituency. I will therefore follow closely the progress of the small modular reactor competition in the coming weeks and months.
The Bill will strengthen the UK as an independent global nuclear power, reflecting the Government’s ambitions for the sector.
Rebecca Pow
I am pleased to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Erewash (Maggie Throup) and all other colleagues who have spoken today in what I am sure everyone agrees has been a fascinating cross-party discussion. I want to contribute to debate because the Bill deals with a crucial issue that affects every single one of us and the safety of our nation. Getting the agenda and the legal framework right as we take the historic step of exiting the EU is imperative, because leaving the EU means also leaving Euratom—the European Atomic Energy Community—the body that sets the nuclear safeguards regime.
The Bill gives us the tools to ensure that an effective nuclear safeguards regime is established, enabling us to continue to meet international standards for nuclear safety, while maintaining the UK’s reputation as a responsible nuclear state. I have raised the question how we cope with leaving Euratom since the start of the discussions on EU withdrawal, always stressing that leaving the EU must not result in a weakening of our nuclear safeguards, on which we all rely and which are instantly recognisable on the global stage. I have often referred to the matter in wider speeches on the environment, because it is all related to the environment and is so important to us all.
I am confident that the Government have made it clear that future nuclear safeguards arrangements will continue to provide the quality, safety and robustness provided under Euratom and that we will continue to co-operate on standards. Our domestic regime will meet our international commitments on safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation standards. It is clear that the amendments proposed today—I listened carefully to the speeches made—would add nothing and lead only to delay and even obfuscation, especially the amendments relating to the transition period and an association with Euratom, which, as many colleagues have pointed out, simply is not possible.
The ONR, which already regulates nuclear safety and security, is the obvious route. It is also important to keep legislation relating to nuclear safeguards updated as they change on the international stage. The Bill will give the Secretary of State powers to do just that by updating existing international agreements once new agreements are reached.
Our nuclear industry is second to none on the world stage. It has a fine reputation, which we must maintain. Our standards have been a major draw in attracting investors to the nuclear industry in this country. Obviously, I am going to cite the Hinkley Point example, with its Chinese investment. One of the reasons that the Chinese want to engage with us is that we have very high standards on nuclear. That shows us off well on the wider stage and reflects well on us. Hinkley Point is the largest development site in the whole of Europe. I liken it to a James Bond film set. It is absolutely unbelievable how huge the development is. It needs to be seen to be believed. In energy terms, the power station will deliver 7% of our baseload energy, and it is low carbon, which is exactly the kind of energy that we are promoting, alongside all the other renewables. It is a clean source of energy.
Hinkley Point is not in my constituency but adjacent to it, and it has a massive knock-on effect for the people in Taunton Deane, from managers to engineers and from bus drivers to the caterers mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Wells (James Heappey). Ultimately, 26,000 people will be employed on the site. The industry is spawning many other jobs and creating a whole generation of nuclear businesses. My hon. Friend the Member for Erewash mentioned that she had a similar situation in her constituency with her micro-nuclear plants.
The first nuclear degree is operating partly from University Centre Somerset, which is in Taunton in my constituency. It is sponsored by EDF and the Ministry of Defence. It is critical that the industry should grow and enable all the young people who are doing this training to have a future. That is why the Bill is so important. We need the right checks and balances, so that we can go forward into a really positive future and be a world-leading industry. In mirroring Euratom, we are going to regulate civilian nuclear activity in the UK, including fuel supply, waste management—mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Copeland (Trudy Harrison)—and co-operation between nuclear states, which will be essential. I am confident that, through the ONR, we will achieve that, as well as new agreements with the IAEA.
I want briefly to touch on the subject of radioisotopes, because it has been raised with me by constituents. I welcome the cross-party work that is going on to ensure that there is no interruption in the continuity of supply of radioisotopes as we exit the EU. The Government are rightly listening on this. There seems to have been a lot of scaremongering, which is frankly not helpful. On nuclear research, the UK is a world leader in promising nuclear fusion technologies and we must maintain that lead. We must have the arrangements that the Government are negotiating, so that we can continue to participate on the world stage and attract the right nuclear brains to this country. I fully support the Bill. Nuclear safety and security are issues that deserve the utmost attention, and I am sure that the Bill will achieve its aims and set the Rolls-Royce standards mentioned by the Minister. I am optimistic that we will get the right system in place to keep us all safe.
Stephen Kerr
I shall make just a few brief comments. I paid my compliments earlier to the hon. Member for Southampton, Test (Dr Whitehead), and I also want to pay tribute to the Minister, who has conducted the passage of this Bill with great aplomb, dignity and good humour. That has been much appreciated. Like the hon. Member for Oxford West and Abingdon (Layla Moran), I have attended all the debates on the Bill in the Chamber and in Committee. As a member of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, under the very able chairmanship of the hon. Member for Leeds West (Rachel Reeves), I have also had the benefit of attending several hearings at which we received evidence on this subject.
Leaving Euratom is actually a matter of some regret for me and probably for many Members on both sides of the House. I am not one of those people who supports the Government’s programme of leaving the European Union without appreciating that some aspects of being part of the EU have been intensely beneficial to the United Kingdom, and nuclear safeguarding is without question one of those areas. I therefore hope that Members will recognise that the Bill is a plan B in case we are unable to remain in some way associated with Euratom.
Euratom is at the heart of our nuclear industry and has not only the skills and expertise but the experience to be of service to our nuclear industry, which is a complex field. Nuclear energy is a vital part of our energy mix, offering baseload capacity for the energy market. As such, the Bill is vital to ensure that we meet our international obligations as we leave the EU. Although such things form a vital part of the reasoning behind safeguarding in this industry, it is not a luxury; nor is it simply a health and safety matter. Our international obligations under non-proliferation treaties make our leadership in this area as a world power a significant issue, and as a leader, the UK must meet its obligations. We secure the moral authority to stand up to rogue states and to nations that have a different view of non-proliferation through our safeguarding regime. We must not forget just how much safety concerns matter in this sector. The consequences of getting something wrong would have ramifications not only for us, but perhaps for generations to come. Having a strong safeguarding regime in place, which is what the Bill provides, is absolutely vital for the health and prosperity of the industry and of our economy. I therefore unreservedly support the Bill on Third Reading.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed.
Telecommunications Infrastructure (Relief from Non-Domestic Rates) Bill (Programme) (No. 2)
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),
That the following provisions shall apply to the Telecommunications Infrastructure (Relief from Non-Domestic Rates) Bill for the purpose of supplementing the Order of 10 July 2017 (Telecommunications Infrastructure (Relief from Non-Domestic Rates) Bill (Programme)):
Consideration of Lords Amendments
(1) Proceedings on consideration of Lords Amendments shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour after their commencement at today's sitting.
Subsequent stages
(2) Any further Message from the Lords may be considered forthwith without any Question being put.
(3) The proceedings on any further Message from the Lords shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour after their commencement.—(Jo Churchill.)
Question agreed to.
Nuclear Safeguards Bill
Wednesday 24th January 2018
(6 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 23 January 2018 - (23 Jan 2018)
Nuclear Safeguards Bill
Wednesday 7th February 2018
(6 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 23 January 2018 - (23 Jan 2018)
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Lord Henley) (Con)
My Lords, before I set out the context surrounding, and the key features of, the Nuclear Safeguards Bill, I think it would be helpful to explain again the meaning of nuclear safeguards. Investing a little time in this will, I believe, help with our discussion of this important but rather technical issue.
Nuclear safeguards are about non-proliferation and demonstrating that the United Kingdom is a responsible nuclear power. Nuclear safeguards are the reporting and verification processes that nuclear states use to demonstrate to the international community that civil nuclear material is not diverted into military or weapons programmes. The Bill has a very specific purpose in a very technical area: it ensures that the United Kingdom can put a domestic civil nuclear safeguards regime in place.
It is important to make clear at the outset, as it is key to understanding the subject matter covered by the Bill, that civil nuclear safeguards are entirely distinct from nuclear safety and nuclear security. Nuclear safety concerns the prevention of nuclear accidents, and nuclear security concerns physical protection measures. Both nuclear safety and nuclear security are already the responsibility of the Office for Nuclear Regulation and are unaffected by the Bill.
As a responsible nuclear state, the United Kingdom is a committed member of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which provides international oversight of civil nuclear safeguards. The United Kingdom has voluntarily accepted the application of international safeguards through agreements with the agency and is seeking to conclude new agreements with the agency that follow the same principles as our current agreements. We were a founder member of the IAEA back in 1957 and we continue to be at the forefront of its activities. Leaving Euratom will not change that.
The United Kingdom’s nuclear safeguards regime is currently provided primarily by Euratom with some support from the Office for Nuclear Regulation. The European Union and Euratom are uniquely legally joined, so when the Prime Minister formally notified our intention to leave the European Union, she also commenced the process for leaving Euratom. The United Kingdom therefore served notice of its intention to withdraw from Euratom at the same time as withdrawing from the European Union. The Bill therefore enables the United Kingdom to ensure that a domestic nuclear safeguards regime can be put in place when Euratom safeguards arrangements no longer apply to the UK.
The United Kingdom’s withdrawal from Euratom will in no way diminish our nuclear ambitions. Maintaining the continuity of our mutually successful civil nuclear co-operation with Euratom and international partners is a key priority for us. We remain absolutely committed to the highest standards of nuclear non-proliferation, including safeguards, and the United Kingdom will remain a committed member of the global architecture that provides the framework for non-proliferation.
Civil nuclear safeguards and reporting, by assuring the international community about the proper use of certain nuclear materials, underpin international civil nuclear trade. Alongside the consideration of this Bill in the House of Commons, the Government have been engaging in negotiations with the European Union, the IAEA and third countries. The United Kingdom has held several rounds of discussions with the European Union in the first phase of negotiations and there has been good progress on Euratom issues.
Negotiations with the IAEA on future voluntary agreements for the application of civil nuclear safeguards in the United Kingdom have been constructive and fruitful, and substantial progress has been made. Substantial progress has also been made in negotiations to put in place new nuclear co-operation agreements. In particular, constructive progress has already been made in discussions with key partners such as the United States, Canada, Australia and Japan.
It is clear that we need continuity and must work to avoid any break in our civil nuclear safeguards regime if we wish to support the United Kingdom’s nuclear industry and its nuclear research community. A civil nuclear safeguards regime and safeguards agreements with the IAEA are critical for the continued operation of our civil nuclear industry and research. As set out in the Written Statement laid on 11 January, our strategy for withdrawal and our future relationship with Euratom is two-fold: first, to seek, through our negotiations with the European Commission, a close association with Euratom; secondly, and simultaneously, to put in place all the necessary measures to ensure that the United Kingdom can operate as an independent and responsible nuclear state from day one. This is vital to ensure continuity for industry, whatever the outcome of negotiations.
We will also seek to include Euratom matters within any negotiated implementation period. The Government also made the commitment to report back to Parliament every three months, by way of further Written Statements, about overall progress on this strategy, including in respect of negotiations. We have been working closely with the Office for Nuclear Regulation to ensure that it can be ready to take on new responsibilities for a domestic safeguards regime, in place of Euratom’s current regime.
As my predecessor, my noble friend Lord Prior, set out in a Written Statement on 14 September 2017, our intention is for the new domestic regime to exceed the standard the international community would expect from the United Kingdom as a member of the IAEA. The Government are aiming to establish as soon as possible after the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union a robust regime that is as comprehensive as that currently provided by Euratom.
Lord Rooker (Lab)
I am sorry to interrupt the Minister, but this issue was raised recently in the EU Energy and Environment Sub-Committee inquiry into energy security. The ONR cannot be independent in the same way that Euratom was. The accounting officer is appointed by the DWP accounting officer. The chair of the ONR is appraised by the DWP. How can it be sold to the IAEA that the ONR is as independent as Euratom?
Lord Henley
My Lords, I will take advice but my understanding is that the IAEA does not have concerns about this issue, which is part of the ongoing discussions with that body. As I said, discussions have taken place and they will continue. The Bill will be considered in this House for some weeks and in due course, I will give a further reassurance to the noble Lord to make sure that he and others are satisfied that the ONR can perform this role.
Perhaps I may continue with my remarks. Currently, under the Euratom treaty, all members including the United Kingdom subject their civil nuclear material and facilities to nuclear safeguards inspections and assurance which is carried out by Euratom. Euratom then reports specific information on member states to the IAEA, which has international oversight for those nuclear safeguards. The Nuclear Safeguards Bill ensures that the United Kingdom can put this domestic regime in place and it will enable the ONR to oversee nuclear safeguards when Euratom safeguards arrangements no longer apply to this country.
To ensure continued international verification and oversight of the United Kingdom’s safeguards, as I have said to the noble Lord, we will continue in our discussions with the IAEA to agree replacement voluntary safeguards agreements that reflect the fact that the Euratom arrangements no longer apply to the United Kingdom. This Bill provides us with the ability to implement those new agreements as well as the new domestic regime that underpins them.
Lord Lea of Crondall (Lab)
This part of the noble Lord’s speech suggests that it is a given that we are leaving Euratom, and the noble Lord is nodding in assent. Is he not aware that leaving the European Union does not necessitate leaving Euratom? If we were to stay in the European Economic Area by switching to being a member of EFTA, there is a whole raft of EU agencies which people can still belong to. Are the Government, even at this late stage in the negotiations, not clear about that?
Lord Henley
My Lords, I do not think that the noble Lord has been following what has been happening in this House and in the other place. We have the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill going through at the moment and last year we had the Bill which in a sense set off Article 50, which has gone through. By those means we are committed to leaving the EU and for that reason—
Lord Henley
Yes, my Lords, we are leaving Euratom. That is the case, and the simple fact is that we have to make provisions for leaving Euratom and that is why we are doing this.
Lord Henley
The noble Lord says that what I have said is not true. I would ask that he withdraw that remark. We are leaving Euratom and that has been made clear.
Lord Lea of Crondall
I will withdraw that particular remark which used the words, “not true”, but if we stay in the European Economic Area, we would have withdrawn from the European Union but would still be able to be part of these agencies.
Lord Henley
My Lords, Euratom consists of the 28 members of the EU and no others. There are two countries which have some sort of associate membership, but that would not be appropriate for us. Being members of EFTA would not do that. The noble Lord will have to accept that we are leaving Euratom. That is the case and we therefore need to make provisions. If the noble Lord will bear with me, I will now tell him about the Bill.
Clause 1 will amend the Energy Act 2013 to replace the Office for Nuclear Regulation’s existing nuclear safeguards purposes with new nuclear safeguards purposes which reflect the nature of the new regime. The ONR will reflect the new nuclear safeguards regime primarily using its existing relevant functions and powers. Clause 1 will also amend the Act by inserting new powers so we can set out in regulations the detail of the domestic safeguards regime, such as accounting, reporting, control and inspection arrangements.
Clause 2 will create a limited power—I stress limited power—enabling consequential amendments to be made to the Nuclear Safeguards and Electricity (Finance) Act 1978, the Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000, and the Nuclear Safeguards (Notification) Regulations 2004. It is a very narrow power that will mean that references in that legislation to existing agreements with the IAEA can be updated once international agreements have been reached.
In addition, in January we published two sets of pre-consultation draft regulations to support consideration of the powers in the Bill, on which we have been working closely with the ONR. The Government are committed to an open and transparent approach as they continue to develop these regulations, which set out the detail of the domestic civil nuclear safeguards regime. We expect these draft regulations to continue to evolve in response to comments from and consideration by noble Lords and other stakeholders. To that end, the department is planning a series of stakeholder events and workshops in addition to the public consultation on the regulations, which we intend to take place later in the year. The drafts we eventually consult on will, of course, in certain respects differ from the working drafts that we have provided for the benefit of Parliament.
I now turn to one final issue that is not strictly relevant to the subject of the Bill but has been raised in another place and in meetings that I and others have had with noble Lords. It is the question of medical radioisotopes. I appreciate that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, has tabled an amendment to the EU withdrawal Bill on this very issue. It might be that that would be a better place to discuss these matters in due course rather than here. I could not possibly comment on what might be the appropriate Bill, other than to say that I do not think that it is, strictly speaking, relevant to this Bill, but because of the concerns that been expressed on this issue, it would be right for me to make a few points and give assurances to the House that the supply of medical radioisotopes is, and will continue to be, a very high priority for the Government. We share that concern about the well-being of patients receiving such treatment that results from being able to import such materials in good time, bearing in mind the relatively short lives that medical radioisotopes have.
We have made it clear that Euratom currently does not place any restrictions on the export of medical radioisotopes to countries outside the European Union. As they are not classified as special fissile material they are not subject to the international safeguards regime or to the approval of the Euratom Supply Agency, which governs the supply of special fissile materials. Although its role does not extend to ensuring the supply of medical radioisotopes, the Euratom Supply Agency established in response to the last shortage crisis in 2012 the European Observatory on the Supply of Medical Radioisotopes. The observatory aims to consolidate and share information between the EU, European Union member states, international partners, the medical community and industry stakeholders on supply, but crucially it does not have a decision-making or executive role in responding to shortages.
However, the Government recognise the concerns that changes to our customs arrangements after our withdrawal from the European Union could potentially affect the timely supply of medical radioisotopes. Therefore I offer an assurance to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and other noble Lords who have raised this point that the Government are committed to minimising any impact such changes might have. I have had meetings with counterparts in the Department of Health and Social Care and Her Majesty’s Treasury to step up our work in this area. We are working across government to prepare domestically and to negotiate a future customs arrangement with the European Union that ensures cross-border trade in this area is as frictionless as possible.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)
I am grateful to the noble Lord for what he has just said, but are we to take it that the sentence in the factsheet on the Bill that was given to your Lordships’ House at some very useful meetings still applies in relation to radioisotopes:
“This will be part of the broader negotiations of the UK’s future with the EU”?
If so, will he tell us what that means?
Lord Henley
My Lords, it is exactly the same as what I have said—as part of our broader negotiations we will obviously want to ensure that, in the words I think I used, a future customs arrangement with the European Union is as frictionless as possible. We understand the importance of these matters. It is as frictionless as it can be at the moment; we want to make sure that that continues. I do not believe that it is strictly relevant to the Bill but it was important to bring the matter up. I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, for tabling an amendment, which will be discussed, to another Bill, but I want to give assurances that the Government are doing everything we can to make sure that such imports are frictionless, just as their export from Europe will be frictionless and just as they are frictionless in their export from Europe to non-EU countries at the moment. It is a matter of giving assurances as to what the Government can do and I hope that that will help to reassure noble Lords.
Lord Warner (CB)
I did not quite understand what the noble Lord was saying in his attempts to reassure us about Euratom’s observatory. As I understand it, the observatory was an important part of smoothing out problems when there were supply issues around radioactive isotopes. Is he saying that the observatory will continue for all those who have the benefit of being in Euratom but those who leave will not have any equivalent benefits and it is impossible for the UK to achieve such access to those benefits?
Lord Henley
It is a body set up by Euratom for Euratom, therefore it has an interest in ensuring safe export from the EU. There is no problem of the export of radioisotopes from the EU to non-EU countries. We want to make sure that when we are no longer part of Euratom that continues to be the case. That is why I am trying to give assurances based not only on what is coming out but on what the United Kingdom Government can do at our end. I hope that that will deal with the noble Lord’s problem.
Lord Warner
I do not think that that answers the point. The noble Lord is saying that they will go on helping to smooth out the supply to EU countries, but the UK will be left over here somewhere, unable to benefit from that if there is a world shortage of radioactive isotopes. That seems to me to be what he is saying: will he just confirm that that is what he is saying?
Lord Henley
I have a sneaking suspicion that the noble Lord is deliberately misunderstanding me. What I am trying to make clear is that we have to deal with not only what we want to import but obviously what is being exported from Europe. Euratom has an interest in what is being exported. Euratom is quite able, through the advice offered by the European Observatory on the Supply of Medical Radioisotopes, to look after the export of such radioisotopes. We have an interest in their export because we will be importing them as a non-EU country in the future. What I wanted to do is to give the noble Lord, if he will accept it, and other noble Lords an assurance that everything that can be done by the Government, and everything that is relevant in the negotiations, is being done to ensure a continued supply from European countries, just as there will continue to be supply from countries such as South Africa, from which we also import medical radioisotopes. I hope I have given sufficient assurance to the noble Lord, Lord Warner, that he will accept that we are doing what we can. As I made clear earlier, I do not think it is relevant to this Bill but I wanted to deal with the concerns raised by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and others during the passage of the EU withdrawal Bill.
The powers in the Bill give the existing independent nuclear regulator—the ONR—a new role to regulate nuclear safeguards, alongside its existing role, which it performs very well, regulating the United Kingdom’s nuclear safety and security. The Bill sits alongside other work around our future relationship with Euratom, the IAEA and third countries. Of course, we do not know what the final arrangements will be so we are doing what any responsible Government would do by being ready to put in place a civil nuclear safeguards regime for the United Kingdom through the Bill. I reiterate that although the United Kingdom is leaving Euratom, we will continue to support Euratom and want to see continuity of co-operation and standards and a close future partnership with it. I beg to move.
Lord Grantchester (Lab)
My Lords, there are indeed many concerns. I have yet to hear any principled criticisms regarding the objectives, operations and outcomes of the EU’s civil nuclear organisation and the framework around Euratom. Indeed, widespread dismay was expressed when it was announced that, in consequence of the leave vote, the UK must leave Euratom. The Bill sets up a parallel inspection, monitoring and regulatory regime as robust as that which exists under Euratom, to be the responsibility of the ONR.
The Euratom treaty is legally distinct from the EU treaty but it shares the same constitutional oversight as the EU: the European Commission, the Council and the European Court of Justice. Although the decision that the UK should leave Euratom is contested by some expert legal advice—and my noble friend Lord Lea—the Government have chosen to do so because of the technical jurisdiction of the ECJ, even though I understand that there has never been a case referred to it. The Government wish to replicate Euratom’s functions and the Bill is confined to the safeguarding functions.
The International Atomic Energy Agency—IAEA—was set up also in 1957 to be the world’s intergovernmental forum for scientific and technical co-operation in the civil nuclear sector. It was set up under the non-proliferation treaty to safeguard nuclear material. Euratom also provides information on member states’ safeguards to the IAEA. Euratom and the IAEA carry out joint inspections of nuclear sites in the UK and endeavour to avoid duplication. There are, therefore, tripartite agreements the UK’s fulfilment of which relies on the UK’s membership of Euratom. The Government intend to replace these tripartite agreements with bilateral commitments whose robustness we will need to examine as the Bill progresses. Perhaps the Minister will say at this stage whether, under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, he expects that Parliament will need to ratify these arrangements.
Leaving Euratom without the correct policy, regulatory and research framework in place will have significant implications for the UK’s nuclear and radioactive waste industries, as well as the health industry through radioisotopes, as we have just been discussing. Euratom undertakes supervision of nuclear safety, nuclear fuel supply security, radiation protection through the proper use of materials and safeguards, and research and development in nuclear fusion, as well as radioactive waste and decommissioning. As such, it impacts on many sectors of the economy, including construction and the necessary skills, manufacturing of parts, technical expertise and research.
On the Government’s insistence that leaving Euratom is included in the Article 50 letter and Bill, we agree that this Bill is necessary and that the UK must have a robust safeguarding system in place to meet our obligations. The new arrangements need to be as comprehensive as the current Euratom regime to enable public confidence in continuing high standards, to give international partners confidence in engaging in civil nuclear trade, to support the UK’s ongoing commitment to the global non-proliferation treaties and to demonstrate that the UK is a responsible nuclear state. On all these parameters, there must be severe doubt that the Government can meet these challenges in the timeframe required.
The proceedings in the other place demonstrated that the ONR could not maintain a regime equivalent to the standard set by Euratom from day one. Dr Golshan of the ONR made clear that the aim to have a system in place by March 2019 was unrealistic. The quality and quantity of inspectors required could not be recruited in time. Instead, it is likely that the UK could meet the lower standards set by the IAEA. The Government therefore need to clarify whether they are prepared to start the inspections at a lower level before increasing them to Euratom standards.
The Government recognised the issue with a ministerial Statement on 11 January which stated:
“We will seek a close association with Euratom and to include Euratom in any implementation period”.
“Any implementation period” gives the Government a further two years in which to put in place all the necessary measures. In so far as leaving Euratom has additional and separate wording in the Article 50 letter, will the Minister confirm that this gives the Government the opportunity to secure an implementation arrangement unique to that sector, should the more general and wider exit discussions prove less fruitful? It is imperative for this Bill. There are two treaties. Can the Government clarify that the implementation period acts in relation to this situation?
The ministerial Statement stated that the intention was,
“to ensure a future safeguards regime that will be equivalent in effectiveness and coverage as that currently provided by Euratom, including consideration of any potential role for Euratom in helping to establish the UK’s own domestic safeguards regime”.
We need to explore that potential role for Euratom during the implementation period and whether this Bill needs strengthening in that regard. For example, I imagine that the Minister will confirm today that the UK could subcontract inspectors from Euratom to continue monitoring UK facilities. Practicalities must help shape the architecture necessary for Brexit, and this Bill fits into the wider Brexit discussions.
The ministerial Statement continued by stating that,
“it is vital that Government pursues all options for providing certainty for the civil nuclear industry”.—[Official Report, Commons, 11/1/17; col. 399WS.]
Our amendments in Committee will have this in mind. During the passage of the Bill through the other place, it was proposed that this close association could take the form of an associate membership—a status that is allowable under Euratom’s constitution. The reports are that this week the Government are trying to determine what they want in their future relationship with the EU. The Minister has the opportunity today. There would be little advantage to be gained from regulatory divergence for the nuclear industry outside Euratom. It is hardly a worthy answer to repeat that there is no associate membership class at present under Euratom.
Reconciling legal certainty with flexibility to negotiate presents challenges. The answer cannot include unfettered use of unconstitutional Henry VIII powers under Clause 2 to amend primary legislation. In the other place amendments to constrain those powers were proposed. We also have concerns about the use of those powers. Your Lordships’ Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has yet to report on this Bill. We await the committee’s report with interest and will consider appropriate amendments for Committee.
The Bill is drawn up to be narrow in scope. Nevertheless, we need to be aware of all Euratom’s functions and to explore all of its facets, so that the Government can assure the industry that it will continue without disruption post Brexit. Part of the safeguarding regime will include nuclear co-operation agreements. The UK currently utilises Euratom’s NCAs to facilitate trade. Euratom has nine NCAs at present. Although there are requirements for some countries and not others, the UK will need to agree many bilateral NCAs within the necessary timeframes. Can the Minister commit to bringing these to Parliament and confirm the procedure that the Government will utilise?
It is vital that the Government make progress on developing new NCAs quickly. Given that these can only begin after the UK has satisfied the IAEA with regard to its safeguarding regime, it is essential that the UK implements its safeguarding protocols as soon as possible. The ONR has already suffered funding cuts. Under the impact assessment recently published, it is clear that the ONR must be given all the resources it needs to take up the responsibilities included in the Bill. Can the Minister assure the House that the Government will not only commit to providing resources but will not be calling on the industry to co-fund the inspection regime through cost recovery? At present it is funded through the UK’s contribution to the EU budget.
The immediate disquiet around the announcement that the UK will be leaving Euratom focused on two clear concerns: the valuable R&D facility of the Joint European Torus—JET—programme at Culham in Oxfordshire and the supply and maintenance of medical isotopes vital to the health service. The fusion research programme supports 1,300 jobs in the UK and is instrumental in attracting the expertise the UK needs in the nuclear industry. The EU currently provides 88% of JET running costs. Given Switzerland and Ukraine’s association status with Euratom, it is imperative that the Government examine the scope of this associated membership, even if it is limited to research and development facilities. Given how much of the Brexit process will involve the UK and EU navigating an implementation period, trade and the movement of product and expertise—and seeking unprecedented solutions—should not the Government be seeking agreement on a form of association?
The continuing supply of isotopes in medicines has also been subject to questions and debates, and even today has needed extra explanatory exchanges. The UK’s regulatory regime for setting and enforcing standards for the safe use, disposal and transportation of medical isotopes is based on international regulatory requirements informed by the IAEA. The supply has implications for cross-border EU negotiations and trading, and as such merits further investigation. The issue and how relevant it is will certainly need to be examined as the Bill progresses.
Regarding radiation protection, the UK is currently implementing the Euratom basic safety standards directive, which updates the UK’s radiation protection standards. Euratom also underpins trade in nuclear materials, and this will impact on the UK’s security of supply. The replacement arrangements with Euratom will need to cover the ownership of nuclear material. I understand that Euratom appears to be seeking to retain rights over uranic material on UK territory which EU customers have the right to use.
It is a complex task to follow up on all these issues through the various framework architectures. In a briefing the Nuclear Industry Association submitted, in conclusion to its analysis of requirements for the UK withdrawal from Euratom, it drew up a checklist highlighting five actions for the Government. The first is to agree the replacement voluntary offer safeguards agreement with the IAEA and to refund and resource the ONR to establish the UK’s safeguards regime. The second is to negotiate and conclude NCAs with nuclear materials. The third is to clarify the validity of the UK’s current bilateral NCAs with Japan and other nuclear states. The fourth is to set out the process for the movement of nuclear material, goods, people, information, services and protection, to be agreed with the Euratom supply agency. The fifth is to agree the new funding arrangements for the UK’s involvement in fusion for energy and the wider EU nuclear R&D programme. Perhaps the Minister could undertake to map out during the passage of the Bill the Government’s own plans across the field and to clarify in one place the various interlocking arms of the regulatory framework, highlighting the various measures to be enacted under various Brexit Bills to come. I am sure that would be very helpful to all noble Lords.
Labour believes that the best way to maintain nuclear safeguards and protect the nuclear industry is to achieve an equivalent arrangement with Euratom, at least in the implementation period. The Government were reckless to rule out continuing Euratom membership, making the ECJ a defining characteristic.
The Bill is only one small part of the picture. Clarity and certainty for the industry are still missing. I have outlined our five key concerns. We will seek to address them all during consideration of the Bill.
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his very tolerant and understanding introduction. I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, on a comprehensive assessment of the situation, with much of which I associate this party.
Judging from the debate in the other place, I expected to be told that this was a narrow technical Bill and that it was about safeguarding, not safety—and so we were. Like the Minister, though, I have sneaking suspicions too: I suspect that by narrowing the focus of the Bill and the debate, the Government were hoping to avoid having to debate many of the other issues. I am afraid that, as we have already seen and as the Minister has experienced, that will not be the case. There are important issues in addition to safeguarding—which is of course important—such as providing the nuclear single market for goods and services, and providing funding for nuclear fusion research.
How did it come to this? Not even the most ardent no voter in the referendum was aware that a vote against the EU was going to turn into a vote against Euratom. I have not met anyone who voted against Euratom in the referendum. I agree with the honourable Member for Oxford West and Abingdon in the other place when she said:
“The most sensible approach to nuclear safeguarding would be for the United Kingdom to remain a member of Euratom”,—[Official Report, Commons, 16/10/17; col. 648.]
rather than having to go through this process. This view has been supported by the Nuclear Industry Association, as we have heard, but the Government have produced and waved around legal advice to say that that is not possible. With all due respect to some members of the legal profession in this House, my experience is that the answer you get is only sometimes associated with the question you asked in the first place. I believe some others had a legal opinion that points in the other direction. The NIA also states that leaving Euratom without having replicated and replaced the current arrangements could impact on the supply of electricity and medical isotopes. That is why your Lordships are right to be concerned about this. The NIA calls for a transitional period to guarantee continuity and avoid a cliff edge in March 2019. Can the Minister outline the Government’s position regarding transition?
As the Minister outlined, the first clause is about creating powers for the ONR and the second is one of the now-traditional Henry VIII powers that seem to pop up in every piece of legislation that comes before your Lordships’ House. I shall leave the Clause 2 debate for Committee stage, except to reiterate the concerns that the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, has already expressed. I will dwell on Clause 1 and the aim of reforming existing legislation to ensure that the ONR is able to pick up its important safeguarding role next spring, in the event that the Government continue to press on with departing from Euratom.
The legislation appears to be the easy bit. The challenge is the scramble to get all the pieces in place in the event of the metaphorical cliff edge arriving. The Bill fails to make any clearer how the Government will address the practical challenge of setting up this regime. It is a hands-off approach. At the moment, as the Minister knows, Euratom employs about 160 staff, a quarter of whom focus on UK installations. We are told that the ONR is recruiting and training people to replace the 40 Euratom safeguarding staff. Can the Minister tell us how that is going and by how much the ONR budget is being and has been increased to facilitate this up-skilling?
There is the issue of facilities. Will the ONR be taking over existing Euratom equipment and facilities in the UK? If so, have the Government given thought to the liability it is taking on? Will taking ownership make the ONR or BEIS liable for the decommissioning, removal and disposal of any equipment taken on as a result of the transfer? Again, what is the projected cost of liability?
Those are just a couple of issues. There is so much to do and so little time to do it. Does the Minister agree with the senior ONR official cited by the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, who told the Commons BEIS Select Committee that the timescale for adding safeguarding responsibilities to the ONR is very challenging?
Looking beyond our shores for a moment and turning to the wider proliferation landscape, my noble friend Lord Teverson will pick up on the international and institutional issues. I just note that to cover for our Euratom departure, the UK will need to complete international agreements with a wide range of non-EU countries. Once again, this is a formidable to-do list, especially given that there are one or two other things to do associated with the whole Brexit process. It relies on an enormous groundswell of good will from the global nuclear community. Let us hope that this is forthcoming.
Briefly, I turn to the two areas of Euratom actively ignored by the Bill: the nuclear single market and nuclear fusion research. The Minister has already tried to bat those to one side as irrelevant to the Bill, but he should recognise the legitimate concerns of noble Lords about these issues and that, unless there is another forum for us to debate the wider nuclear agenda, this is the only game in town. For that reason, he should take these issues seriously and engage with this debate.
The focal point of the free market issue has been and is radioactive isotopes for medical and scientific use. The concern is not trumped up by politicians; it has come from radiologists, scientists and practitioners in the industry. It is a genuine concern and legitimate issue that the Government have to address.
If it is not this Bill and if it is not BEIS, can the Minister tell us which department and who in that department is now working on this process, who will be accountable and when we will have the opportunity to discuss that on the Floor of the House? As the Member for Wantage so compellingly put it in the other place, we need to replicate the nuclear common market that exists because of our membership of Euratom. I would add that because the Prime Minister has now said that we will not have a customs union, this becomes much harder. During the course of the Bill, the Minister must explain how this common market will be achieved. It is not just about radioisotopes. Post exit, if a nuclear component is sourced outside the UK for a project to build or maintain a nuclear power station, it could no longer be seamlessly imported. Delay in such matters is critical.
This is not theoretical. As EDF has pointed out, the Sizewell B plant breakdown in 2010 was handled using the nuclear market arrangements. They will not be available in future.
The Commons BEIS Select Committee views withdrawal from Euratom as having a considerable impact on the UK civil nuclear sector. Having listened to the Minister’s opening comments, he seems to be accepting that there will be more friction than there is now—“as frictionless as possible” is an acknowledgement that friction will exist. He said that everything that could be done will be done, and “We are doing what we can”. If the Minister is a betting man, would he put it at 70:30 that he will do as much as can be done, or is it a 60:40 chance that we will succeed in this negotiation?
Another area on which noble Lords will talk in detail is nuclear research. As the Minister knows, the UK is home to JET. The Government have underwritten Culham, I believe to 2020, which the Minister will realise is not very far away. People working there need certainty and to know what is happening beyond 2020. The UK has benefited in the long term from fusion projects, and I believe that the Government want that to continue. Membership of the Fusion For Energy programmes has led to at least £500 million of contracts for UK concerns, but there needs to be long-term security for this research, and 2020 does not constitute long term. Perhaps the Minister can help with this. This is not just about the prospects for the projects; brilliant researchers and engineers have gathered here from across the whole of Europe, and they need to know the status of their project as well as the status of their passport.
By hiding behind the narrow remit of this Bill we are not addressing these important issues, which we look forward to hearing more about. My party will work to help improve the Bill, but we are disappointed that it deliberately ignores some very important issues and concerns of this House. Given that this is the only chance to air them, the onus is on the Minister to come to the Dispatch Box with a broad mind and a full set of answers to this wider set of issues. We await his answers with interest.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I welcome this Bill, and I am glad that it is shorter and clearer than most other comparable Bills. As this is the Second Reading debate, I will touch on three areas: EU aspects of what is planned; prospects for nuclear; and then I will ask some detailed questions about the Bill itself.
I resisted the temptation to add to the enormous numbers speaking last week on the withdrawal Bill. I should, however, state clearly that I am in the camp of those who voted remain, but unlike the noble Lord, Lord Fox, now believe that, following the democratic vote in the referendum, we should get on with Brexit. Given the attitude of the EU negotiators, I am, sadly, increasingly doubtful about the prospect of reaching a broad-based deal with the EU. The clearly expressed attitude of the EU negotiators that the UK’s preferred outcome is not possible for them needs to be reflected in a more realistic UK position in the negotiations, based on the fact that our future is outside the EU, not half inside it. But that is, in the main, for another day. However, it means that, as a contingency, we need to work very hard now to be ready for a bare-bones deal, which will keep the aeroplanes flying, the interconnectors working, and so on.
Turning to the nuclear area, as a former Energy Minister, my judgment is that we need to pass this Bill quickly and get on with the negotiations with the IAEA and other nuclear powers. Moreover, I would not yet completely rule out the possibility of extending Article 50 in the case of Euratom if unforeseen problems arise. My view is that this would have no real implications for Brexit overall. I would be amazed, indeed, if the EU would have a problem, given the potential dangers of nuclear material and the mutuality of interest in proper nuclear safeguards across Europe.
I turn to the prospects for the nuclear industry, and endorse what was said by the noble Lords, Lord Grantchester and Lord Fox, about the importance of nuclear fusion research. I speak today partly because of my support for nuclear power, which of course started in this country in the 1950s at Calder Hall, another British innovation. Nuclear is still responsible for more than one-fifth of UK electricity generation, and we know that most of this is produced in reactors whose life will probably be over by the 2030s. Renewable energy has been growing, but in some weeks we produce tiny amounts of energy from wind and solar because of the intermittency problem—blame the UK weather.
I am therefore a believer in what I like to describe as a portfolio approach to energy. Security of supply is vital, and diversification is as important for energy as it is for financial investment if we are to avoid disasters in future generations. Nuclear, which is virtually zero carbon, has to play a key part internationally and in the UK, which is why the safeguards against proliferation, which are at the heart of today’s Bill, are so important. I take this opportunity to ask the Minister to update us very soon on nuclear investments that secure a baseload capacity for the future. What is the state of play on Hinkley? Have we found a way of securing investment in the other five power stations for which we have proposals across the UK? What has happened to the plans for small modular reactors? We know they work technically, as they have been used by the Royal Navy for years. To my mind, they offer export potential in a post-Brexit world, especially given our strong record on nuclear safeguards and security—the subject of today’s Bill. The Government have rightly earmarked substantial funds for UK infrastructure. I believe that some of this should go to securing nuclear investment as part of a sustainable energy portfolio and to ensure that power cuts do not blight our old age.
I am supportive of the Bill, and glad to see the use of affirmative resolution SIs in key areas. It is helpful that we have been given sight of the regulations in draft that will be made under the Act later this year. That inspires real confidence. I commend the Minister and his colleague in the other place, Richard Harrington, for this, and indeed for the briefing meetings that have been arranged to get us all up to speed. This making available of draft regulations early could usefully be adopted more widely in the Brexit context. That could increase understanding in a complex and difficult area, and I shall come back to it as an idea on another day.
There are, however, some questions which I hope to explore in Committee, if today’s debate does not assuage my concerns. First, I would like to understand how the proposals relate to nuclear waste. This is an important UK operation, with Sellafield pioneering innovation in safe disposal to the benefit of its large Cumbrian workforce, and government plans, out for consultation, for a new geological disposal facility. The government memorandum on delegated powers says that there are about 100 UK facilities or other duty holders subject to Euratom standards and safeguards. What and where are these? I also associate myself with the questions about the movement of medical isotopes raised by the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, and others. This issue must be addressed here, or in another Brexit Bill— and it is good to hear the Minister saying that he is focusing on the issue.
Secondly, on resourcing, according to the memorandum ONR has five areas of responsibility; it looks after safety, site health and safety, security, safeguards and transport, following its separation from the Health and Safety Executive in 2014. I would like to understand how well that change has worked and be reassured that the resourcing is adequate for the future, with enough expertise and enough money, and without over-the-top fees on nuclear operators. It is a tight timeframe, so this issue of resourcing matters a lot.
Thirdly, is the ONR geared up for a crisis? We would not want to find out that it was not after the event. Learning from Grenfell, can the ONR secure rapid back-up help from the Government, the police and security services and other agencies?
Finally, I note that there is no review clause in the Bill. Given that, what are the arrangements for reporting to Parliament on an area of such importance, both within and beyond the Brexit period? The Bill does not provide for an annual report. Is this provided for elsewhere? Perhaps the Minister can reassure us and agree that the safeguards work will be properly covered in any annual report.
Lord O'Neill of Clackmannan (Lab)
My Lords, the purpose of this Bill, Brexit notwithstanding, is to try to sustain the confidence of the public in the nuclear industry in the United Kingdom. It is fair to say that, since the non-proliferation treaty of 1968, there has been a growing awareness of the split between civil and military nuclear activity. Indeed, the opposition to nuclear power had begun to dip—although there have been periods of increased popularity—and, since 1968, a lot of the misgivings about nuclear power have been reduced. This is because there have been, in varying forms, regimes that would look after civil nuclear power in its various manifestations.
Prior to Euratom, that was done by the IAEA, which in those days was probably not the most rigorous of organisations. Indeed, when one looks at the record of the nuclear industry—for example, the way in which it stored and dealt with nuclear waste for many years—it was somewhat haphazard. However, this is now very rigorously addressed and it is fairly successful, although the enormity of the task at Sellafield means that it is slow and, by necessity, exceedingly fine in the manner in which it is dealt with.
When we are confronted with the departure from a regulatory organisation such as Euratom, we have to cast around to find a means to deal with it in a way that will not undermine public confidence. It is significant that we no longer refer to the Office for Nuclear Regulation as the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, because it is now a somewhat different organisation and enjoys a degree of financial independence, which enables it to employ and retain an inspectorate. Prior to the changes, the old inspectorate had terrible leakage problems. It had some of the most capable nuclear physicists in the country, but for understandable reasons they went elsewhere to work—they were paid far more by the private nuclear companies. Without Euratom, the work of the Office for Nuclear Regulation will become that much more critical.
It would be wrong to suggest that we can just stand by and take the IAEA standards. The IAEA covers the whole of the world’s nuclear-generating capability. Not all countries that are members of the IAEA have the capability, or indeed the desire, to achieve the standards of performance that we regard as essential for the safety of our public and for the acceptance of nuclear power.
In examining the Bill, we must first look at the capability of the Office for Nuclear Regulation to replace the staff who will be lost because of the absence of Euratom’s officials. That is probably the first priority. We have to make sure that the necessary money and resources will be made available, and that it is not done at the expense of an industry undergoing a lot of difficulty one way or another.
Secondly, we have to explore how we can realistically maintain a relationship with Euratom that is capable of sustaining those high levels of safety. Euratom will have the means to explore what is required in a way that an individual country cannot do. If we are talking about an organisation that sits alongside Japan and Canada, we need to be in that kind of position. In a number of areas our withdrawal from Euratom may not be quite the national tragedy that some people suggest, but we need to work a bit harder at getting that brought across. So far, the Government have not given a convincing explanation of our future relationship with Euratom.
On the medical issues and whether they could be the subject of an additional clause, I think that would probably be difficult, given the Long Title. However, those issues need to be addressed for obvious reasons.
Lastly, one of the problems faced by the nuclear industry in the round—that is, civil and defence—is that there has been a tradition of secrecy and a desire not to let anybody know what is going on. As regards health and safety, one could argue that in the civil field people should not necessarily have to be preoccupied or concerned with what is going on within the industry. However, I am not certain about that argument. I tend towards the view that transparency can be a high-risk issue but it is one that we need to address. I am not sure whether the Clause 2 provisions, which are drifting towards the character of Henry VIII provisions, are necessarily the kinds of things that need to be hidden away or carried out by executive order. Beyond this legislation, when reporting is carried out and changes are proposed, the widest possible consultation should be available and the opportunity for this House and the House of Commons to debate any changes should be made available.
I recognise that this legislation is, unfortunately, necessary. If we were not in Brexit mode, we would probably not need to have it. However, I would like to think that it is one of those pieces of legislation that could become irrelevant because we could stay on. But until such time as we know that for sure, it is essential that we give the Bill the closest attention. I hope that we can produce something a wee bit better than what we have. It is not a terrible Bill that we will spend our nights awake over the Recess worrying about. However, there is scope for improvement, and it is incumbent upon us to improve it when we get the opportunity to do so.
Lord Teverson (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister, particularly for his explanation at the beginning, not least that the Nuclear Safeguards Bill is not about safety but about security. I look forward to the Government’s nuclear security Bill, which will look after safety in due course—the whole of this area is perhaps a little confusing.
On the intervention made by the noble Lord, Lord Warner, I am relatively relaxed about the Bill and the transfer of medical isotopes. However, he pinpoints the right issue with the Bill, which is that out of Euratom we are then out of the observatory, which is there for emergencies when supplies of these difficult commodities are short. That itself is probably a key area as regards the Euratom aspect.
I welcome a number of things from the Government on the Bill. The Government, unlike with the shambles of the EU negotiation, are getting on with it, and I give them credit for that. In comparison with the other negotiating stream, they are positively better. I also welcome the Minister’s undertaking in his opening remarks that we would go not for IAEA standards but for the continuity of Euratom standards. That is an important point—if only we had that guarantee of alignment elsewhere, perhaps in the negotiations. I also welcome, as did the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, the advance publication of the draft regulations. Therefore, it is good from all those points of view.
As my noble friend Lord Fox mentioned, the Euratom treaty and organisation is around research projects. I was privileged to visit Culham a couple of weeks ago with the other members of the EU Energy and Environment Sub-Committee that I have the privilege to chair. It is important that the work that is going on there—the co-operation, future planning and the promise that we hopefully have from the project as it moves on to ITER, into France and then on to a demonstration project—is here in the United Kingdom and co-operates on research projects as part of Euratom.
The Euratom treaty is also around the movement of materials, which I will come back to later on, and, as my noble friend Lord Fox said, around freedom of movement for individuals. When we remove ourselves from the Euratom treaty, we will then stop those freedoms that come with the treaty, and I very much hope that the Home Office will take note of the fact that we need to have that freedom of movement for nuclear experience to continue. That is not just about the most professionally advanced people but about people at all levels. For instance, I know that one area that EDF has been particularly concerned about at Hinkley Point is steel fixers, as the lack of that key skill could stop that project going ahead. So it is not just the PhDs and the nuclear fusion research; we need to keep that freedom of movement right the way through the nuclear chain.
However, the thing that really concerns me, which has been mentioned by other noble Lords, is timing. The deputy director of the Office for Nuclear Regulation has already been quoted a number of times. I find it very difficult indeed, from both her evidence and that of others, to see that we can have an approved organisation—the technical term for what we need is a voluntary offer agreement—with the IAEA by the time we leave Euratom on 29 March next year. It seems that there is a high risk that we will not meet that. That has a number of implications for our international relations. It particularly means that, if that is not the case, we will be unable to fulfil our obligations under international treaties and the legislation of other countries with which we deal.
If the Minister answers one question I ask today, this is the one I would most like him to answer. Let us suppose that we get to 29 March next year and do not have the voluntary offer agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. If we manage to get an agreement with Euratom that we can subcontract and still work those safeguarding arrangements through Euratom, will the IAEA agree to that? I would be interested to understand from the Minister whether we have an agreement with the IAEA on that, because it seems fundamental.
We cannot guarantee that we will have that agreement with Euratom, however. Why? Again, I share the view of the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, about extending our membership of Euratom instead of having a transitional agreement; it would make everything so much easier. The referendum did not cover Euratom, so politically it is not an issue. It is not a given, however; the situation could be more sensitive than we might think, because Germany and Austria are often difficult about the Euratom treaty in areas including future agreements.
Finally, on nuclear co-operation agreements, I went through the Commission’s website earlier today to see how many such agreements Euratom had to which we were privileged to be party. The list covers Australia, the Russian Federation, Japan, Canada, the United States of America, Switzerland, South Korea—strangely, it was described as the Korean peninsula—Argentina, South Africa, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and, of course, the International Atomic Energy Agency itself. To continue the 20% of generation that we already have and complete the construction of Hinkley Point and the remainder of a new nuclear programme if we have it, we need to replace significant numbers of those nuclear co-operation agreements very quickly, before we actually leave the Euratom treaty. That seems an extremely tall order, and I would be interested to hear from the Minister exactly how we intend to achieve it.
Lord Carlile of Berriew
My Lords, given that I intend to address my remarks to the issue of medical isotopes, I am grateful to the Minister for talking about it so fully in his introduction to the debate. Like all your Lordships, I trust implicitly his integrity and intentions; that goes without saying. However, I have some misgivings about the lexicon that he has been given, which led to his using particular words in his opening remarks. Having said that, I express my thanks to him, to his colleague in the other place and to the Bill team, which has worked hard to inform noble Lords about the Bill.
I have heard more often than I can remember—it is merely a mantra—that this Bill is about nuclear safeguards, not nuclear safety. If you say it often enough you may well come to believe it, but I suspect that we would all believe something quite different when we did so. I understand the reason for that distinction: it is entirely political, of course, because it gives the Government the excuse for leaving a significant section of the industry out of the Bill. I am afraid that it is no more than a semantic explanation, and I am sure that the distinction would be totally lost on the broader public. For example, if significant detriment were caused to staff and patients because of a problem with radio- pharmaceuticals brought into a hospital from a European Union country, I doubt that the distinction that we have been given would be regarded as mitigation in the public inquiry that would ensue following such an accident. Concern, which I share, has been expressed strongly among professionals, including the Society for Radiological Protection—the SRP—of which I have the honour to be patron. It says that the supply of imported radiopharmaceuticals is implicitly part of the Euratom arrangements that have been reached over years, as I shall explain.
I am advised that the isotopes used for the treatment of cancer are not produced in the UK at present. That means that we rely on imports from the European Union and elsewhere. I think that the Minister mentioned South Africa. My understanding is that the supply from South Africa is currently not available because of safety issues there, although supplies are being brought in from Australia and America, as well as from the EU. However, the important point is that those products have a half-life of around three days. As your Lordships will know, that means that the effective radioactivity in the product falls by a half in about three days. As a consequence, the intended effectiveness of the medication is reduced and indeed in many cases destroyed.
The industry believes—and I support it—that the continued availability of such medical isotopes in the best condition should be encompassed in this Bill. It is just not good enough to say that this will be part of the broader negotiations about the UK’s future relationship with the European Union. That is uncertainty on toast and it is not acceptable. Although the Minister has said—I have heard this in meetings—that this issue has nothing to do with the Bill before us, I am told, and accept, that it does. For example, a shipment of isotopes falls within Council Regulation (Euratom) No. 1493/93 as amended—it is still in force as amended. This regulation is designed to safeguard health workers and the general public against ionising radiation, and that is stated as its purpose in the recital of the regulation.
Although that regulation recognises the removal of border controls within the EU, in order to protect the public, including those who receive medical isotopes, it provides a notification system. Not only has it become a safeguarding system but it is a system that has been used to ensure the regular and steady supply of fresh medical isotopes. It provides for the safe and speedy transfer of the products concerned. It involves so-called “competent authorities” in each country—in the UK the main authority is the Office for Nuclear Regulation—which devolve responsibilities to others, such as the Environment Agency, and, importantly, its counterparts in Scotland and Wales. There is a devolution issue here too, although that seems to have been overlooked.
The Government say that this part of Euratom’s statutory activity can be consigned to those later and general negotiations about the transfer of goods and services between the UK and the EU—the same category as applies to, for example, the importation of processed croques-monsieur into the United Kingdom. I do not accept that; it is much too important. That promise—if it be a promise—provides no assurance whatever for continuity. Indeed, it raises the prospect of UK patients, if they can afford it, having to travel for this kind of treatment to France and Germany, where such isotopes are manufactured. I suppose that it also provides the insurance industry with a potential bonanza, cashing in on a new form of insurance that enables those who take private medical insurance to buy treatment in countries abroad as part of their policy.
Major suppliers of radiopharmaceuticals in the European Union have confirmed that the current arrangements, which are made, so they tell us via Euratom, ensure the timely supply of material from the point of manufacture to patients in the UK. That includes such urgency that the product can be delivered and then reporting arrangements can be used retrospectively in cases of urgency. It is a very important part of medical treatment.
There is also the issue of resilience of supply of medical isotopes. The UK, due to the work of the European observatory, is in a better position to be able to rely on a fair share of radiopharmaceuticals from Europe without fear of loss of supply. But the continuation of these advantageous arrangements—they benefit hospitals such as the Royal Free, University College Hospital, London and other places where important cancer treatments are carried out or clinical trials are being performed—is critical for such places, given that we manufacture none in the UK and suppliers in South Africa, as I said earlier, and also in Canada have major production issues.
There are issues that worry the industry around three other matters. First, the potential uncertainty of UK participation in future Euratom research projects that engage British academics and others will either reduce UK-based expertise or, worse, drive most nuclear physicists to go and work in other countries. Secondly, there is the designation of professionals as medical physicists. The recognised standards entitling scientists to be designated as medical physicists are arranged under the umbrella of Euratom, with a requirement for all relevant clinics to employ such a person. Thirdly, standard designations apply to medical isotopes just as they apply to any other goods. Those are currently agreed on an EU basis, which is based on conversations within Euratom.
There is an overwhelming case for provision in the Bill for the medical isotope matters to be the subject of assurance for the future. They should be included, and I look forward to debates in Committee on that subject.
Lord Whitty (Lab)
My Lords, my noble friend Lord O’Neill referred to the Bill as an unfortunate necessity, but it is only necessary because of choices the Government have already made. We could have remained in Euratom while leaving the other institutions of the EU. Euratom was originally in a separate treaty and remained a discrete part of the consolidated treaty. It would not have been cherry-picking for us to remain. The EU would not have objected. There is admittedly a role for the ECJ in Euratom’s institutional structure, but that has never been used. It would have been a sensible and safe thing to do to say at the beginning of the post-referendum process or at the point of triggering Article 50 that we were withdrawing from the other institutions but wished to remain within Euratom. It would have been the logical thing to do, and it would also have been by far the safest thing to do.
In the Bill, we are dealing with the rules that govern the use and proliferation of what is probably the most dangerous material handled by mankind, and their enforcement. Frankly, the boundaries between civil and potential military use need always to be absolutely clear and shared within and between nations. That has not always been the case in the history of the nuclear industry, nuclear power and military hardware.
The global system under the auspices of the IAEA is vital but is not watertight. Over the years there have been a number of reports about fissile materials going missing in the sense that they have been unaccounted for. Usually, the authorities have reassured us that it was an administrative glitch and not a real diversion of these vital materials to North Korea, to terrorist organisations or to other countries wishing to join the nuclear powers. But that has not always been certain. The role of the Euratom operation in preventing proliferation has been vital and is one of the tightest parts of the global system. Under Euratom, the tightness of the safeguards has been maintained. It has monitored nuclear sites and trade to ensure security of operations and transfers within and beyond Europe, and as the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, said, it has also been responsible for the third party treaties. We will have to replicate those treaties post our leaving the EU.
It is true that the Minister has distinguished between safety and safeguards, but as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has just implied, it is not always a clear distinction and not a clear one in the minds of the public. It would certainly not be a clear distinction if an incident actually happened. By and large the HSE and latterly the ONR, along with the organisations in this country to which they have delegated powers, have enforced that safety. However, we also need international and particularly cross-European co-ordination. Hitherto, Euratom has helped to ensure that co-ordination and indeed the UK’s own compliance with the various international conventions governing nuclear materials, nuclear safety and non-proliferation.
Under the Bill it is true that the UK through the ONR will continue to meet IAEA standards, but the reporting and monitoring standards of the IAEA are different and on the face of it less rigorous than those of Euratom. I was grateful to hear what the Minister said about maintaining Euratom rather than IAEA standards and I hope that somehow appears in the final version of the Bill. However, all of this will place severe pressures on the ONR, an organisation that has performed well but, frankly, has had its resources cut by more than two thirds in the current spending round up to 2020 for its existing responsibilities.
I would be grateful if the Minister set out clearly, before the Bill completes its passage through this House, the resources, staffing and level of qualifications of staff for the ONR that will be needed for it to carry out its new obligations. I understand that currently, 40 Euratom safeguarding staff are based in the UK and focused on UK nuclear institutions while at the moment only eight ONR staff have professional safeguarding qualifications. How many extra staff will the ONR need, or will it sub-contract the work back to Euratom? I hope that any new migration package will not stop those staff coming in. These questions are vital if we are to establish that the ONR will be in a position to carry out these new duties. There are also duties relating to what is currently Euratom equipment. Are the Government going to acquire that equipment for the ONR, and will it be a cost to the ONR and the Exchequer? What will be the future cost of its decommissioning and replacement? How will all this be taken into account on the basis of a significantly reduced ONR budget and a shrinking expertise base, which is what we are inheriting?
The phrase “Euratom equivalence” requires some further explanation in the context of the regulations, as does the ONR’s independence. The UK Government, via the ONR, will be inspecting their own provisions regarding the civil and military interface, for example. I think I can say without severely breaching the Official Secrets Act that when I worked for the Atomic Energy Authority, well before Euratom, those interfaces were not always clear. I shall say no more. ONR independence from government is absolutely essential; otherwise, the Government will effectively be marking their own homework in this vital area.
The Bill does not cover all the other functions of Euratom, but even the safeguarding provisions stray into other areas. For example, another key Euratom function has been the facilitation of cross-border supply chains. Since much of the UK nuclear industry is owned overseas and certainly has overseas suppliers, primarily French, these international supply chains are key. I, and I expect other noble Lords, have received evidence from EDF that spells out how important this seamless supply chain was in dealing with a very dangerous emergency situation at Sizewell B a few years ago, and now in fulfilling the effective delivery of the new Hinkley Point station. If we are absent from not only Euratom itself but its agencies—the observatory referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, and its supply agency—the monitoring and support for these supply chains will inevitably diminish.
The Minister might say that this is irrelevant to the direct subject of the Bill, but others have already mentioned the R&D provisions under Euratom, which spill over into safeguarding. I recognise that much R&D is international. I have probably related this in the House previously, but in my early youth in the 1960s—prior to Euratom even being invented, or certainly the UK being a member of it—I worked at Harwell and Culham. Noble Lords might find it difficult to believe, but I received security clearance to the highest level. It took about three passes to get to my office. But one morning I was in early and I heard this babble outside in the corridor, which was all in Russian. Harwell had invited a whole crowd of Russian experts and scientists, because science is international. This was at the height of the Cold War.
Some international collaboration is open, but Euratom has channelled expertise and money into projects that have already been referred to, which include the important work on fusion technology. The Minister may try to downplay the importance of Euratom in this, but it is all part of the picture of European co-operation. Before we finish with the Bill, we need to get a clear indication of the Minister’s understanding of and position on the JET and Torus fusion projects, and other R&D programmes, when we leave the EU and Euratom.
The noble Lord referred to progress being made on Euratom in the Brexit negotiations. I would be grateful if he could expand on this and how, in agreement with our European ex-partners, we will liaise in future. Are the Government at least seeking associate membership of Euratom and its agencies? I assume from what the Minister said that the answer to that is no, but it is possible. Norway is party to some of these.
The recent EU document suggests that we will be absent from the agencies as well as the institutions of the EU, not only after the end of the transition period but from the beginning of it. That means that by March 2019, we must beef up the operation of the ONR, reach an understanding with the EU and ensure that an adequate alternative UK regime is recognised internationally and co-ordinated in new bilateral treaties replacing those currently covered by the EU. That stretches credibility. While there are aspects of the Bill that I welcome, the Government need to stop pretending that all of this can be done. We need to ensure that the endpoint of this process, if we are leaving Euratom, is at least the endpoint of the transition period. There is no chance of us meeting it by what is effectively October, or even by March 2019.
I recognise that, in the circumstances, the Government have created the need for the Bill, but there are many queries still to be faced. In particular, I would like a justification for what appears to be an impossible timetable.
Lord Broers (CB)
My Lords, I realised when I saw my position in the batting order here that most of what I was going to say would have already been said, although I am somewhat astounded by what is coming out just now—what the noble Lords, Lord Whitty, Lord O’Neill and Lord Carlile, said—that we may not have had to get into this mess. I had thought that our membership of Euratom was, legally, tightly linked to our membership of the EU and that it was inevitable that we would have to leave Euratom. If that is not the case then somebody has made a very major blunder. I hope the Minister will be able to sort out for us whether we needed to leave Euratom, because I cannot imagine anybody supporting that.
I decided to speak today because I am convinced that nuclear power is going to be essential if we are to meet our carbon targets, and to sustain our nuclear power in the long term we are going to need a nuclear R&D programme. To explain my interest, I have spent a lot of time supporting nuclear R&D in this House as a past member and chairman of the Science and Technology Select Committee. I am therefore well aware of the importance of our membership of Euratom and of the need, after Brexit, to find the means to sustain what that membership provides. Related to that, I also retain the hope that the challenges of harnessing fusion power will in the end be met, and our membership of the international projects driving fusion forward also depend on our membership of Euratom. Both the future of nuclear R&D and fusion research are closely related to our membership of Euratom.
I realise that the Bill addresses only the issue of nuclear safeguards. I found this early in my reading, in a simple paragraph entitled, “What the Bill doesn’t cover”:
“The Nuclear Safeguards Bill only makes provisions for Euratom’s role on nuclear safeguards. Euratom however has a number of functions including regulating the civil nuclear industry, disposal of nuclear waste, ownership of nuclear fuel, and research and development”.
I would rate those things as outranking our safeguards by about 10 to one, but the Bill dodges them. It is being thrown into that overall confusion of what we are doing to negotiate our position in the EU.
Getting back to the Bill, I support the Government’s two-track approach to providing safeguards for our nuclear plants, but I naturally hope that we can follow the first track and find a way to remain a member of Euratom, rather than having to rely on the alternative of providing the capabilities ourselves. The Bill provides the means of establishing our own capabilities in the area of safeguards. This is going to be expensive—even this, as has been realised—and I believe that new inspectors are already being hired and trained. However, it is not going to be possible to train the inspectors to the level that they can maintain the current high standards in the long term without maintaining a competitive and up-to-date research and development programme. Nuclear technologies, along with all other high technologies, are going to continue to change rapidly. Advanced reactor designs are already being worked on, as are small modular reactors, and the knowledge of how to maintain safeguards for these new systems will require an up-to-date understanding of their operation. This can be obtained only through direct involvement with the engineers who actually design and build these systems. Either we have these engineers working on our projects, or we are members of the international community—presumably Euratom and perhaps the IAEA—and have access to the latest data from other countries.
As I have mentioned, there is also the vital issue of nuclear fusion. As we all know, we are leaders in this technology through our work on the Joint European Torus at Culham. For more than three decades we have maintained world leadership in this research. In addition, we have been major partners in ITER, the large international project in the south of France, where a fusion reactor capable of generating electricity is being built. At Culham we have also pursued research into new, smaller fusion reactors. These are known as spherical tokamaks, where the reactor chamber is not a torus, or doughnut, but spherical. This geometry has been shown to be three times more efficient and there are hopes that this may make smaller reactors than ITER feasible. There is also a commercial company in the UK developing this type of reactor. If we are forced to leave Euratom, we will lose the funds necessary to continue all this vital fusion energy research, which would be a major tragedy, perhaps not in the “dagger in the heart” category but almost there. We lead the world in precious few scientific or technological fields but this is one of them. It would be a complete tragedy if we jeopardised this project in any way.
In conclusion, I ask the Minister to reassure us that the Government will give the same priority to maintaining a competitive nuclear R&D programme as to establishing our own ability to provide the safeguards necessary to maintain our existing and already planned nuclear plants. This will be essential if we are to be able to assess our own power plants in the long term and to remain competitive in fusion research, which has the potential to solve many of the world’s energy problems.
Lord Lea of Crondall
My Lords, first, I will refer again briefly to the question I raised in my earlier intervention about the umbilical—or otherwise—relationship between EU membership and Euratom membership. I am endeavouring merely to ascertain the objective truth about this matter. It cannot be a matter of opinion; it must be somehow a matter of fact. I hope that the Minister, if he cannot give a more definitive answer today, will put a letter in the Library giving the facts of the matter, because I think it may be more complicated than either he or I have stated, but it needs to be clarified.
I will mention just one relevant anecdote. I happened to chair a meeting in 1961 at the Cambridge Union for Seán Lemass, the Taoiseach—the Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland—and he took the opportunity to announce to Irish TV Ireland’s accession to Euratom. Of course, it was not until 1973, 12 years later, that Ireland, along with the UK and one or two others, actually joined the EEC. So there was no umbilical connection at that time and I think the degree of umbilical-ness is perhaps being exaggerated. The registration regulations may well have changed since then but I am not sure how umbilical it is—or the opposite. Unless I am totally wrong, I suspect that I am following a train of thought which the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, was hunting for on the same point.
It is clear from the debate that there is a strong feeling in both Houses that we should be seeking as a minimum some form of associate membership of Euratom. I do not know whether there is such a thing. My view is that there is a clear option in principle if we stay in the EEA.
Another point that I would like to mention which has not yet been raised, but been implied by many, is that there is a very strong multinational dimension to all aspects of this, not only in the scientific co-operation but in the generation of power. We only have to think of EDF, the Chinese, the Japanese and so on. We are inevitably under the umbrella, and one of the strongest umbrellas for technical co-operation on standards is Euratom. As many noble Lords have said, the Office for Nuclear Regulation will do its best but, according to the note that I have, the Government have cut the grant to the ONR between 2015-16 and 2019-20 by 70%. How can it deal with all this extra work?
I shall not go into any more detail about the red lines on the European Court of Justice, because they are very tangential to this decision. However, if the UK were to leave Euratom, we would need to have a properly resourced regulatory framework in place by exit day. Everybody has pointed out the difficulty of doing that. Euratom currently employs about 160 staff, 25% of whom focus on UK installations. Without Euratom’s infrastructure and resources that work is likely to fall to the Office for Nuclear Regulation, which currently employs eight professional staff. Those are relevant numbers. We are placing extra responsibilities on the ONR but are not providing extra resources to fulfil them or, as far as I know, holding any open conversations, certainly with the trade unions, about how the regime would be funded.
I have a couple of specific points to put to the Minister, perhaps for response later. First, have the Government given any thought to the liability that they are taking on with regard to purchasing or obtaining existing Euratom equipment in UK facilities? By taking ownership, would that then make the ONR and/or BEIS liable to facilities for the decommissioning, removal and disposal of that equipment were it not to be used or replaced? The decommissioning, removal and disposal of contaminated equipment is not easy and will come with a price tag. Secondly, what is the purpose behind Euratom equivalence, which my noble friend Lord Whitty mentioned? Who will the ONR be expected to satisfy by performing Euratom-style inspections using video surveillance and equipment to verify that nuclear material has not been diverted from peaceful purposes? It is already known that the UK has a weapons programme, and we already have security cameras and portal monitors mounted on our sites to protect against theft and neutron monitors to provide a safety function. What benefit is there to the UK in providing our own internal verification of our own UK declarations? Those measures will not be recognised by bodies external to the UK as we are self-verifying, therefore not providing any independent verification.
Lord Warner
My Lords, I have been around government as a civil servant, special adviser, Minister and parliamentarian for about 50 years, and during that time I have been involved in a lot of legislation. I cannot recollect a Bill so reckless and so alienating to a major UK industry as this one. The briefing from the Nuclear Industry Association, representing 260 companies, is damning. It does not agree with the Government’s position that in law we have to leave Euratom on exit from the EU in March 2019, which probably rather annoys the Minister, and it does not believe that this Bill will have us ready to do so in time. It wants a transition period if the Government insist on leaving Euratom, and if we cease to be a member of Euratom it wants some form of continuing relationship. As other noble Lords have said, there is a real risk that our role in international R&D in this industrial sector will be seriously damaged by leaving Euratom, and how do we participate in the international nuclear market outside Euratom? These are big questions which the Minister and the Government do not seem to have considered.
The Government virtually ignored the NIA’s views and advice during the Bill’s passage through the Commons. To add insult to injury, the Government have not come clean on how the new UK safeguarding arrangements will be funded. In these circumstances, most normal Governments would not plough on with legislation against a major industry’s advice, especially when that advice is supported by a major overseas company—EDF—with which the Government have recently contracted to deliver a major nuclear infrastructure project at Hinkley Point.
But then they are no ordinary Government. They are, as the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, memorably described an earlier Conservative Government,
“in office but not in power”.—[Official Report, Commons, 9/6/93; col. 285.]
We have this Bill because the Prime Minister cannot face down that sect within the Conservative Party which was rather entertainingly described by the noble Lord, Lord Macpherson, in a newspaper article this week as “latter-day Jacobins”. I thought that was a bit unkind to the Jacobins, because some of them were quite entertaining. This sect goes into spasm at the very mention of the European Court of Justice, and Euratom is just unlucky enough to be within the jurisdiction of the ECJ.
So, according to the Bill, we have to leave Euratom at 11 pm on 29 March 2019, ready or not—no matter that the ECJ appears never to have pronounced on any aspect of Euratom’s activities since the UK joined; no matter that the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill provides for UK courts after exit day to take account of ECJ jurisprudence in making their judgements; no matter that we have not yet fully implemented the latest EU directive on nuclear safety standards, which we were involved in negotiating; and no matter that we cannot discharge the standards for nuclear safeguarding to the same level as Euratom before the currently specified exit date.
Last September, in her Florence speech, the Prime Minister said that the status quo should continue for what she called,
“an implementation period of around two years”.
Yet when the Opposition tried to amend the Bill in the Commons to give effect to this approach by staying in Euratom after March 2019 for a transition period of up to two years, the Government marshalled their forces to vote it down. This is despite the fact that the Government will not be operating at the same safeguarding standards as Euratom because they will not have sufficient inspectors in post. I shall be putting down an amendment at the close of this debate to reintroduce a transition period for this sector, irrespective of what happens on wider Brexit issues. I hope that others across the House will support such an amendment.
I turn now to the subject of medical radioisotopes, which others have discussed and which, it is important to emphasise, are vital for NHS diagnosis, treatment and research. I have been seeking clarification on the role of Euratom in regulating the use and disposal of these isotopes from Ministers. In parliamentary replies from the Health Minister, it is clear that the use and disposal of these materials are governed by a set of standards that,
“have in some cases been informed by Euratom standards”.
Despite my best efforts, it is far from clear what happens to these safeguarding standards for NHS patients and staff when we leave Euratom. As I understand it from the Minister, the Bill will not cover medical isotopes—nor, as I also understand it, will the ONR have any responsibility for them. So, as things stand, at 11 pm on 29 March 2019, the overarching Euratom framework of safeguards that seems to have some relevance to the use and disposal of medical isotopes will simply disappear. In its place, a mishmash of UK agencies will be involved. This seems to be a diminution in the safety reassurances for NHS patients and staff that exist now. If I have got this wrong, I should be grateful if the Minister and his health colleagues would explain to us all in writing why it is not so before Committee.
Despite the Minister’s attempt at reassurance, I want to return to the issue of security of supply of medical isotopes, which the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, elegantly exposed. Noble Lords know that these isotopes have a very short effective life—a matter of a few hours, in some cases—so they have to be delivered to the end user very quickly. They are critical to many treatments of serious conditions, to diagnostic applications and to furthering research into new treatments. Their importance is growing for use in medical advances at a time when the sources of supply of the raw material—ageing nuclear power stations—are diminishing.
The UK has no domestic supplier. About 60% of our supply comes from the EU, and the remaining 40% comes from elsewhere but may arrive in the UK via an EU supplier. We know from past experience that there can be supply problems with these isotopes. That is why the Euratom observatory was set up—to help with supply problems for EU members when they arise. My understanding is that we lose that help when we lose Euratom and, as far as I can see, there is no game plan for replacing it. Moreover, being in the EU customs union makes it easier to ensure a “frictionless” —to use that phrase—passage of isotopes from supplier to UK end user. However, the Government have rejected being in either “a” or “the” customs union with the EU from exit day next March. Michel Barnier has made it clear that the Government’s current Brexit plans would create “unavoidable” barriers to goods and services. I suggest that this is seriously bad news for the supply of medical isotopes.
In the last few days the Government have published what I can only describe as a somewhat fanciful partnership paper on future customs arrangements. Even if the proposals were a practicable basis for an agreement with the EU, which they are not, they certainly could not be put in place by next March across 28 countries. So my question for the Minister is: how are the Government going to safeguard the timely access of NHS patients to medical isotopes after next March? Again, perhaps he could write to us with an explanation before Committee, as I shall certainly be tabling an amendment on this issue as well.
This is an inadequate and ideologically driven Bill that damages established safeguarding processes and procedures that we were involved in shaping and keeping up to date. Even if it were justified, it should not be implemented in such a rapid timetable. Moreover, because of the Government’s totally misguided and fantasy approach to the future customs relationship with the EU, the timely supply of medical radioisotopes to the NHS and its patients will be put in great jeopardy. If the Government are not going to listen to industry’s serious concerns about the Bill, I suggest that it is up to this House to do the job for them.
Lord Judd (Lab)
My Lords, I should declare a couple of interests. I am a member of the Cumbria Trust, which has considerable concerns about some of the issues being discussed today. I also live 12 miles north-east of Sellafield, which always reminds me that at school I was taught that the prevailing winds were south-west.
The Minister was very firm at the briefing meeting that he kindly arranged before the Bill was under consideration here—and that meeting really was very much appreciated—that the Bill was about safeguards, not safety. The Minister has a style about him, and he was at his firmest in saying that. I have a great affection and considerable regard for the Minister. I have more respect for him perhaps in the sphere of marmalade than in political matters.
It just will not wash. There are no dividing lines: civil, military, safeguards and safety all overlap. They all have implications for each other. To think that one can take part of this and put it in a watertight compartment is, if the Minister will forgive me, nonsense.
We are all pretty disturbed—that has come across clearly in the debate—that we are dealing with a situation that is apparently an incidental consequence of deciding to leave the European Union. We are dealing with the utmost grave issues here—issues which affect not only current society but will affect men, women and children for thousands of years to come. They are profoundly grave and significant issues. To think that we can somehow rush this thing through in legislation is a betrayal of future generations. We must put it under very firm scrutiny, and we must be satisfied.
As if that were not enough, the fact that we are a nuclear power with our own nuclear deterrent again puts a heavy responsibility on us. When the non-proliferation treaty was secured, we gave the most solemn undertakings about our responsibilities in these spheres. We therefore have a duty to fulfil them.
I share with those who have spoken deep anxiety about the belief that national arrangements for inspection can in any way be a convincing substitute for international arrangements. It is crucial for the world—and for our own people—to see the independent judgments and assessments that come from international arrangements. It will become a cosy, closed circle in which things may tend to slip. So we must do our best to ensure that whatever is put in place is not open to any kind of doubt. Personally, I do not see how we can do that, but we must try.
It is also clear from what has been said in the debate that, because of what I just said and for other reasons, we should remain as close to Euratom as possible. We should not be defeatist about associate membership of Euratom, and I would like to think that the best legal brains available to the Government are working on how we do this, as distinct from why we cannot. In my experience of responsibility in organisations, it is crucial to find the lawyers who can help you to do what you want to, as distinct from those who tell you why it cannot be done.
The time available is clearly ludicrous, and some special arrangements will have to be made. But, if we are to have special arrangements with IAEA and voluntary agreements, as has been mentioned, we need to be clear about how they will be effective in this transitional phase, because I do not believe that the deadlines we have been asked to accept are feasible.
At the moment, there are eight professional safeguarding staff employed by ONR, compared with 40 at Euratom, focused on UK issues. We are asking for this to be undertaken with our British arrangements at a time when there has been a 70% cut in government grants to ONR from 2015-16 to 2019-20. There is also the issue of whether we have the necessary expertise. I recall that, some time back, when we were considering new legislation on nuclear power, the Government’s argument was that one of the reasons we needed to have foreign interests coming into the process was that we simply did not have the expertise that was available to those foreign experts. If that is real—it is a very worrying thought—and if it applies to the generation of nuclear energy, how much more real does that argument become to monitor effectively what we are ourselves doing? Parliament simply has to be satisfied that arrangements involving the IAEA, voluntary agreements and the additional protocol are as fool-proof as they can be—although I remain sceptical as to whether that is possible.
The noble Lord, Lord Fox, spoke about the costs and consequences of taking over the ownership of Euratom facilities and the subsequent costs of decommissioning. We really will need very convincing arguments from the Minister on all that. I particularly appreciated the speech of my noble friend Lord O’Neill of Clackmannan. In this context, I am interested that the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy has itself produced a number of—intended to be, I think—helpful factsheets. They have been produced in the context of our deliberations. I see that one on transport and waste states:
“The UK will continue to uphold its responsibilities in respect of spent fuel and radioactive waste. Appropriate arrangements will need to be agreed between the UK and the EU in relation to the status of radioactive waste and spent fuel generated by the UK but currently situated on EU 27 territory and spent fuel and radioactive waste generated by the EU 27 but currently situated on UK territory. UK legislation and standards in this area will continue to be informed by recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection, the Joint Convention on Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste, and the safety standards of the International Atomic Energy Authority”.
These are vital considerations. But, in dealing with waste, let us please remember that there are two categories of waste at least. There is the existing waste, which is a time-bomb ticking away, and there is future waste, which has implications for thousands of years ahead. We are involved in a situation that is not only grave but is of immense, incalculable historical significance for the future. We cannot rush it or botch it, and it will need a great deal of careful scrutiny by this House.
Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist (Con)
My Lords, I actually find it encouraging to see this important Bill arriving in your Lordship’s House so early in the year. In the informative briefing given to us by the Ministers and officials last week, we were told that many issues identified in the position papers published last summer are well on the way to being resolved, and this has to be good news. It is most important that there is a seamless transfer in safeguarding arrangements for the non-proliferation of nuclear materials, as well as for continued co-operation in nuclear research and the mobility of workers and trade in this important sector. Obviously, there are two remaining political issues which are material—namely, those that relate to a transition period or, even better, an extension of our membership of Euratom, as suggested by my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe, and the Henry VIII powers in Clause 2, which will allow the Secretary of State to amend existing Acts as new international agreements are negotiated. But other issues, such as the transfer of Euratom-owned equipment, the status of existing contracts between member states and the UK, and the presence of fissile material in the UK which is owned by another member state, are, we hear, well under way, and I am sure that we all look forward to being updated on their status.
We leave Euratom on 29 March next year, and it is essential that new reporting and verification processes are in place on the date. We need to have the correct number of inspectors recruited and trained by the Office for Nuclear Regulation, and I understand that we already have half the number in training and a further recruitment round is under way. Again, I look forward to my noble friend the Minister updating us on this issue and its impact on the budget for the ONR.
Of course, while we may no longer be a member of Euratom, many of the standards it sets are legally binding and arise from obligations to which the UK is in any event committed under the International Atomic Energy Agency, of which we were a founder member in 1957. But I welcome my noble friend’s commitment to adhere to the higher standards of Euratom. The UK must continue its leading role in the development of international security and safety standards, irrespective of our future relationship with Euratom. For this industry is extremely important to the UK; it employs 66,000 people, and we are a world leader in nuclear fusion technologies and are committed to maintaining this position. I strongly believe that putting our regulatory house in order at an early stage will generate the confidence necessary to attract further investment in the industry. I am reassured that the pace of negotiations with other member states will enable this to happen, for we need to see advances in nuclear technology—for example, into a new generation of small modular nuclear reactors, which may represent a cheaper and quicker way to generate the new, low-carbon power that the country needs.
Finally, I understand entirely that this Bill is concerned with safeguarding, not safety arrangements, and with a new legal and regulatory framework. Medical isotopes do not fall within the scope of the Bill, nor indeed of this department. However, practical arrangements for their continued import to the UK do not appear to be covered anywhere. Most are imported from eastern Europe and many have a shelf life of only two weeks. The potential disruption to their supply is causing concern to cancer sufferers and to the medical profession generally. I take this opportunity to thank the Minister for suggesting that he arrange a meeting between BEIS, the Treasury and interested parties to discuss this important area of real concern.
Viscount Hanworth (Lab)
My Lords, the Nuclear Safeguards Bill is slim by the standards of Brexit Bills, but this belies the importance of the issues it addresses. The Bill makes provisions for the eventuality that the UK will leave the European Atomic Energy Community, or Euratom, to give its common name. In its place, we should have to establish a new safeguards regime to oversee the security of our nuclear materials. Euratom has provided much more for us than an inspection regime for ensuring that radioactive material does not fall into the wrong hands. It governs the supply of fuel and all the nuclear engineering materials and equipment that come to us from abroad. It facilitates international exchanges of personnel trained in nuclear technology. It governs the acquisition and supply of medical radioactive isotopes and it funds an extensive nuclear research and development programme.
Euratom is governed by the International Atomic Energy Agency—the IAEA—which is an organisation affiliated to the United Nations. It mediates our relationships with third-party countries. On leaving Euratom, we should have to establish individual nuclear treaties with each of those nations. Even now, there remains doubt as to whether it is necessary, in any case, for the UK to sever its connection with Euratom. The legal opinions on the matter have been divided. It is clear that the Ministers most closely involved are far from enthusiastic about the prospect of this divorce.
The die was cast at the beginning of 2017 when, in a flurry of Written and Oral Statements, the Government asserted that there would be no room for compromise in exiting the European Union. Thus, in a speech on 17 January, the Prime Minister asserted that there is to be no,
“partial membership of the European Union, associate membership … or anything that leaves us half-in, half-out …We do not seek to hold on to bits of membership as we leave”.
Euratom is an international organisation founded in 1957, as we have heard, and is legally distinct from the European Union. However, since the European Court of Justice plays a marginal role in its affairs, Euratom was judged to be half in the European Union and, therefore, an organisation that the UK is bound to leave.
During Second Reading of the Nuclear Safeguards Bill in the Commons on 16 October 2017, the Minister Greg Clark emphasised:
“Triggering article 50 of the treaty on European Union also requires triggering article 50 on membership of Euratom”.
He also asserted:
“That is not just the Government’s view; it is the European Commission’s view, too”.—[Official Report, Commons, 16/10/17; col. 618.]
He proceeded to quote a declaration to this effect that had been made in the European Parliament. It appears that the European Commission and the European Parliament have been happy to go along with the view of the UK Government. The Government’s insistence on a clean break from European institutions has led to a perverse outcome that we are now coming to regret. It is arguable that, had we taken a different approach at the outset, we would not now be faced with the need to enact the present Bill. The trouble that is entailed in leaving Euratom might be mitigated by the proposed two-year transition period after our formal departure from the European Union in March 2019.
Leaving Euratom imposes tasks that would be impossible to accomplish by that date of departure. There have been numerous testimonies regarding the expense and the damage that will result from leaving Euratom, and they bear some repeating. In the UK, more than 100 facilities and locations are currently subject to Euratom safeguards and inspections. The Office for Nuclear Regulation—the ONR—which is the UK’s nuclear regulatory agency, has repeatedly asserted that it will be unable to implement equivalent safeguarding standards by March 2019. To deliver the new domestic regime, the ONR will need to double the number of its inspectors by 2019 and triple the number by 2021. The costs of purchasing and installing replacement equipment would, in its testimony,
“likely be well in excess of £150m”.
Once established, the regime is expected to involve an ongoing cost of £10 million per annum. Without safeguards and nuclear co-operation agreements, critical areas of nuclear trade and research collaboration would cease. The United States, on which we depend for nuclear equipment, will not trade with us unless a regime is in place. Moreover, a new safeguards regime will need to be implemented before any nuclear co-operation agreements can be concluded and ratified. That is to say, none of the necessary third-party nuclear co-operation agreements, or NCAs, can be negotiated in advance of a settled regime.
At present, in excess of 20% of our power is provided by nuclear energy. The flow of nuclear goods and services that are required to sustain this output cannot continue without a safeguards regime. The construction of new nuclear power stations requires the importation of specialised equipment and personnel that is regulated by the codes of the IAEA. EDF, which is overseeing the construction of a nuclear power station at Hinkley Point, has expressed grave anxieties in this connection. In a very telling memorandum, it has revealed the extent of the international co-operation that was required to overcome a seemingly minor operational problem affecting the Sizewell B reactor, which arose when a seal on one of the heating elements failed. The supply chain involved France and the USA as well as the UK. Its point is that an impaired access to the international supply chain is bound to prejudice the safe and reliable operation of our nuclear power stations.
The UK hosts important nuclear research facilities, including the Joint European Torus at Culham, which is currently funded largely by Euratom. The Government have undertaken to meet the costs of JET until 2020. Thereafter, the future of the Culham enterprise is in doubt.
The next phase of the international fusion programme entails the construction of the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor, which is being constructed in Provence, France. ITER, which will exploit the developments at Culham, is one step away from an operational power plant. If we cease to be fully involved in this enterprise, we will squander our intellectual capital and forgo some significant business opportunities for British enterprises.
These troubles, and more besides, are the consequence of an ill-considered and intransigent attitude on the part of the Government in pursuit of their Brexit agenda. These difficulties could be mitigated to some extent if we were prepared to contract the delivery of our safeguards regime to Euratom, while maintaining our overall responsibility. In fact, this has been proposed in a recent report of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee of the House of Commons. There is no other reasonable course of action.
Lord Inglewood (Con)
My Lords, I speak briefly in the gap as some months ago I advocated, rather along the lines of some of the speeches we have heard this afternoon, that we ought to remain in Euratom. The response I received then is consistent with the introduction of the Bill we are discussing. Therefore, the most sensible course of action is to implement a seamless transition from the Euratom regime to a national regime. If I have understood my noble friend the Minister correctly, the national regime will be at least as rigorous as the Euratom arrangements now in place. That would be satisfactory to not merely Cumbrians like myself, a number of whom are in the Chamber, but to the rest of the country.
Noble Lords will remember that last week we discussed the withdrawal Bill. On that occasion a large number of strictures, based on the work of the Constitution Committee, were made about the way in which that process was being taken forward. I would like to incorporate by reference—I think that was the term used when I read law—those strictures into this debate as they are as relevant to this matter as they were on that occasion.
Baroness Featherstone (LD)
My Lords, this has been a very interesting debate, somewhat more interesting than I expected given the spat with the Minister. I think that arose because the Government have focused this Bill too narrowly, and arguments have been advanced as a consequence of that.
It was impossible to listen to this debate and that in the other place and not recognise the scale of the folly that leaving the EU forces upon us, not just because we are leaving but because the room for common sense and compromise has gone out of the window. As the noble Lord, Lord Warner, said, that has arisen because the ruling party is terrified of the split riven in its own ranks by Brexit. One of the most confounding aspects of leaving the EU, which leaving Euratom evidences, is the need to set up and replicate so much that already functions so well for us as is. Perhaps we should have a maxim: if it ain’t broke and it is doing the job, surely the British people did not mean us to fix it by taking action that will do us harm or cost us a fortune.
There are aspects of the Nuclear Safeguards Bill that clearly cause concern, not just among those who have participated in this debate but well beyond. There are concerns about what is in the Bill, and what is not in the Bill but needs to be tied down and delivered before our departure from the EU next year. As we have heard from all sides, they fall into defined areas: the ONR’s capacity; the transition period; issues that need dealing with such as the nuclear single market, raised by my noble friend Lord Fox, and nuclear fusion research, which many noble Lords mentioned; radioisotopes; concerns over JET, which was mentioned by my noble friend Lord Teverson and other noble Lords; our ability to negotiate new nuclear co-operation agreements with international partners beyond the EU in a timely way; delegated powers—and, in an overarching sense, that the Bill should not have been necessary in the first place.
We heard from all parts of the House, as was the case in the other place, that we do not need to leave Euratom. Sadly, the Government are not prepared to fight that one out with the EU—as was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, my noble friend Lord Fox, the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, the noble Viscount, Lord Hanworth, and other noble Lords. One wonders why the Government are so reluctant. It is a matter of legal dispute—I and others do not believe that we need to leave Euratom—and it strikes at the heart of the stupidity of so much of this. Is it ideological? Yes. Is it simply that if we remained in Euratom, we would have to continue to be subject to the jurisdiction of the ECJ concerning nuclear safeguards? If so, what a performance just to adhere to ideological red lines. Surely the Government see that all this—all the change, the angst, the cost and the effort in this so-called contingency Bill—might be avoided if it were not for obdurate ideological dogma.
However, as we are to leave Euratom, a better answer would be associate membership. As the Government believe that we can have a bespoke deal with the EU on the single market, I hope they feel that we could have bespoke associate membership of Euratom. Does not Article 206 of the Euratom treaty facilitate associate membership? That is what we should be pursuing. I am aware that the Secretary of State, who was at the Bar earlier, made a Written Ministerial Statement saying that there will be quarterly updates on associate membership, but I put it on the record to indicate the importance we place on this issue.
Ministers reassure us that arrangements will be in place and negotiations are going well; that we will have the closest of associations with Euratom; that discussions on customs and borders have to sort out only a couple of minor things such as the transfer of Euratom-owned equipment and special fissile material in the UK owned by other EU states—that it is all nearly sorted out and everything will be all right. That is not good enough. However, assuming from the passage of the Bill in the other place and the debate today that we are going ahead—fingers crossed—and we have associate membership or equivalent, we still have to ensure that there is no gap between the end of Euratom and the beginning of the ONR taking on that role, and that all that was associated with our membership of Euratom is in place.
It was clear from the evidence given in Committee in the other place that the likelihood of the ONR being up to the same standards as Euratom in March 2019 is zero. Many Members across the House have raised the need for a transition period to tide us over from our protections in Euratom to a place where we are self-sufficient. We cannot leave ourselves exposed by coming out of Euratom when our safeguards are incomplete.
I was interested in the suggestion made by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, that Article 50 could be extended in regard to Euratom if need be; that seems reasonable. We on these Benches will be happy to put our names to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Warner, on transition.
There is a litany of things that are not in the Bill but which need to be in place and sorted. As a couple of noble Lords said, the CEO of the Nuclear Industry Association, the trade body for the UK civil nuclear industry—which we should be listening to—that represents 260-plus companies across the supply chain and thus is in the front line of this legislation, stated that the Bill does only one of a whole range of things that need to be done to prevent disruption on leaving Euratom. We agree. That includes the transportation of overseas nuclear fuel across the EU; co-operation on information, infrastructure and funding of nuclear energy; clarity on who owns all the nuclear material, currently and going forward; the legal purchase, certifier and guarantor of any nuclear materials and technologies that the UK purchases; and, more than anything, bilateral agreements with other countries on nuclear safeguarding. As my noble friend Lord Fox made clear, the Prime Minister’s statement—that definitely, absolutely and with no equivocation we are leaving the customs union—will not be very helpful.
As we heard from all sides with great passion, another issue not covered in the Bill is medical radioisotopes. Ed Vaizey in the other place pointed out that the Euratom Supply Agency specifically extended its remit to cover the supply of isotopes because we do not create any in this country. The Government assure us that the movement or supply of isotopes is not pertinent to the Bill, and that negotiations to remain as close as possible to the conditions that we currently experience are going very well. However, surely we must have it written in the Bill that unless and until such arrangements are in place we will not and must not leave Euratom. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, made a powerful case on the faux distinction made by the Minister and the Government between safeguard and safety. He made an unarguable case for the inclusion of isotopes in the Bill.
The ONR was mentioned by many Members across the House. The Bill transfers authority for nuclear safeguarding from Euratom to the ONR. Although it is making heroic efforts to recruit and train the 30-plus additional inspectors needed to meet these extra responsibilities, it is clear that the ONR will not make the finishing line by March 2019. In Committee, Dr Golshan of the ONR said that:
“It is fair to say that this is unprecedented territory … and … that we will not be able to replicate Euratom standards on day one”.—[Official Report, Commons, Nuclear Safeguards Bill Committee, 31/10/17; cols. 6-7.]
It needs a number of skilled staff, proper training, specialist equipment in place with trained operators, and 12 to 18 months to train a single inspector. Another requirement is a new IT system. If any of your Lordships have ever tried to commission a bespoke IT system, they will look at this timetable in horror and recognise the huge challenge of that deadline. That is not to mention the free movement of scientists; perhaps the Minister can give some assurance on that issue of vital importance. We also need sign-off by the IAEA. I am delighted that the Government are having “very positive conversations”, but that is not enough and is not tied down. It is not sufficient to say that everything is in hand and will be all right on the night. We need it to be stated that unless and until certain things are in place, the Bill cannot be enacted. We need a contingency upon this contingency Bill.
The noble Lord, Lord Whitty, observed the need for the ONR to be independent, otherwise the Government will be marking their own homework; that is an important point.
Suffice it to say that not all doubts have been assuaged and not all aspects have been addressed by the Bill, as your Lordships’ House requires. We look forward to Committee, where we hope to develop further the safeguards that we need and to address the issues that remain of grave concern.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)
My Lords, in one sense the Minister was right when he described this as a technical Bill. Something of the sort is clearly needed. However, it is of course highly regrettable that he has had to bring the Bill to your Lordships’ House as a consequence of what can be described only as the perverse decision to leave Euratom. My noble friend Lord Lea was right to press that point. Euratom predates the EU and comes under a separate legal treaty. The issue might be the ECJ, but it has never made a ruling in respect of any matter relating to Euratom. And Euratom works well—so well that the Government have decided that we are going to leave Euratom only to set up our own new regulator to meet Euratom standards. You could not make it up.
A number of key concerns have come from this debate. The first is that, although the Government are intending to meet Euratom standards, on their own admission they cannot do this by March 2019. That then leads to the ONR. I hold it in high respect but I am concerned about its capacity, funding and governance—the point about the independence of the ONR in the future is very important—as well as the question of time. When one thinks of the scale of the task, one has to ask whether it has the time, capacity and funding to do the job that is required, alongside the establishment of the new regulatory function. The international bilateral agreements—the NCAs—that have to be negotiated in a matter of months are also a cause for some concern.
The second area of concern is around the transition. It is not clear to me exactly what the Government are aiming for and what the fallback position will be. If the fallback plan is to say that by March 2019 we can guarantee only IAEA standards, that will certainly be unacceptable, and I think that the House will wish to amend the Bill to make sure that that cannot happen.
Many noble Lords have commented on the narrowness of the Bill. Clearly the Euratom decision goes much wider in three areas in particular. One is medical isotopes. Another is the international supply chain, which applies as much to new nuclear as it does to the decommissioning of our old stock, with all that that implies. As a former Minister for Energy who has visited Sellafield on a number of occasions, I am only too well aware of the challenges there.
There are also questions about responsibility for setting standards. If in the future that is not done by Euratom, will it be done by the UK Government? It is one thing to say that we are going to aspire to meet current Euratom standards, but life moves on and standards will evolve. The question of which standards we will meet in the future is a very important one. Are we going to set our own standards within the sphere of the IAEA, or are we going to follow Euratom standards without having any influence over them? Those are the things that we want to know. The Official Opposition do not support leaving Euratom. Failing that, we believe that there must be an equivalence, and that that equivalence must be in place by March 2019.
Looking at some of the questions in more detail, perhaps I may ask the noble Lord about the transition. First, the impression that I got from his opening remarks is that he sees this issue as being fully a part of the transition that we are negotiating with the EU, and therefore that Euratom matters cannot be considered as a separate point. The noble Baroness asked whether Article 50 could be suspended in relation to Euratom. From what the Minister said, my impression is that that is not possible because this is simply a part of the more general discussions. It would be good to know whether my assumption is right.
Secondly, what does “close association” mean? There has been a lot of discussion here and in the other place about whether, certainly during the transition period but beyond it as well, we could subcontract back the Euratom staff to continue doing what they do while, I imagine, being duly accountable to Euratom and to the ONR. That would seem to be a straightforward way of doing it. Or, could we be an associate member? What does close association mean? We are right to ask what that entails.
That brings us to what the Government seek to do. We all read the evidence given in the Public Bill Committee from the ONR itself and I pay tribute to the work that it has done, but I understand from what was said that it recruited four new people and reckoned it needed another 10 or 12 in order to make IAEA standards by 2019 and another 20 following that to meet Euratom standards. So there are two questions. If another 20 are needed over what was thought could be achieved by 2019, what is the difference in real terms between Euratom standards and IAEA standards? In other words, what is the impact of having fewer inspections of less intensity? If the Government say, “Actually, there is very little difference at all”, I would ask them why they are sticking to Euratom standards. If, actually, this is significant, it is clearly unacceptable that we allow the Bill to go through without having some guarantee that in March 2019 we will abide by Euratom standards.
On finance, a number of noble Lords expressed concern, particularly my noble friend Lord O’Neill, about the cuts to the ONR budget and whether that will impact on its capacity to carry out these new roles. I also think that there is an issue that the industry has raised. Who will pay the cost of the new regime? At the moment, it is paid out of the UK contributions to EU budgets. I suspect that the Government have in mind to make industry pay the cost in the future. We ought to know.
On current activities, on the whole issue of the international supply chain and on the question of decommissioning, clearly, as my noble friends Lord O’Neill and Lord Judd said, maintaining public confidence is crucial. As someone who very much supports the industry, who works to bring new nuclear back to the UK, it is vitally important to make sure that there are no hiccups in the international supply chain because we need the support of people, companies and goods and services from other countries. It is also important in relation to decommissioning.
A number of noble Lords mentioned research. It is clearly important. We get a lot of money through Euratom to invest in our research projects. We have a great deal of collaboration. The Government have to set out a strategy about how to ensure that we do not lose that collaboration and investment in the future.
I do not need to say very much about radioisotopes because a number of noble Lords, especially the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, went into that in great detail. I am grateful to the Minister for focusing on this, but in his opening remarks he said that he hoped that we would be reassured, because he recognised concerns, and he talked about customs arrangements being able to minimise any impact. The problem we have is that a significant part of the Conservative Party in the other place do not want customs arrangements as far as I can see. Lord knows what they want. They seem to want to take this country down to economic ruin, but the fact is that no one sitting here today could have any reassurance that the noble Lord is right about those customs arrangements. The most likely outcome at the moment is that we will walk away from those talks. What guarantees can be made about those custom arrangements? The point that noble Lords made about continuing access to the Euratom observatory was very important.
Finally, rather remarkably, I do not think that Henry VIII powers have had much of an outing here, although, as the noble Lord knows, there are a lot of regulations in the Bill, and one or two Henry VIII ones at that. Of course I understand that there does need to be some flexibility in this area, but there might be a case for looking at whether we can constrain the use of the Henry VIII powers. There is also the suggestion of a sunset clause, and I warm to the suggestion by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, of reviews and annual reports, which might be another way of dealing with those issues.
Overall, this is a highly interesting technical Bill. Whether two days in Committee will be enough, I rather doubt. We are looking to seriously change the Bill to provide reassurance that, in March 2019, we will continue to have Euratom standards.
Lord Henley
My Lords, I will come to the Henry VIII powers later, and I am grateful that the noble Lord feels that he does not want to discuss them in much detail at this stage. I believe that only this evening the Delegated Powers Committee has been looking at them. I hope that, on this one occasion, we will get a clean bill of health. But I think that noble Lords opposite who have been Ministers will know that there are occasions when Henry VIII powers are necessary. Moreover, all of them have probably been guilty at one time or other of having introduced legislation containing a Henry VIII power. However, I shall get to that later and touch on it briefly.
The noble Lord, Lord Fox, and the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, both wanted a much wider debate. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Fox, suggested that I was hiding behind the narrow remit of this Bill. That is not so. He wanted me to join in a wider debate on the nuclear industry, nuclear research and development and all those matters. I have given assurances about our commitment to the nuclear industry because they are important in relation to the Bill. I have also given assurances about how we will continue to invest in research and development, and I hope that my noble friends Lady Neville-Rolfe, Lord Inglewood and Lady Bloomfield will accept them. We are committed and, again, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Broers, will accept that. But now is the not the time to be debating the wider issues. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, who acts as if he is some simple ingénue and cannot find ways of getting these matters debated knows perfectly well that there are plenty of means of securing a full debate on the nuclear industry, and no doubt he will institute one in due course.
The important matter at the moment is to debate this Bill at its Second Reading because it deals with a crucial point; namely, that we are leaving Euratom. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, for saying that although he regretted the fact that we will be leaving Euratom, he accepted that since we are doing so, there is a need for the Bill and, as I understand him, it is not the job of the Official Opposition to prevent it getting on to the statute book. What he wanted to ensure is not only proper scrutiny, but that we should provide the appropriate assurances that in a year’s time the ONR will be in the right place to take on the new responsibilities that it will have. I hope that I can deal with those points in the course of my remarks.
I shall start with the need to leave Euratom and repeat once again the point I have made that the Euratom treaty is legally distinct from the European Union treaty, but it has the same membership of all 28 states and makes use of the same institutions. Noble Lords will recall that the decision to leave Euratom formed part of the consideration by both Houses of the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill, which is now the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017. It is a done deal and we are leaving. It therefore behoves this House and another place to make sure that in a year’s time we are in the right place; that is, where the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, wishes us to be.
It is important to say, in particular in response to the questions put by the noble Lord, Lord O’Neill, about maintaining public confidence because it is so important to the nuclear industry as a whole—here we are going wider than the question of safeguards—that this does not mean that we should not continue to have a relationship of some kind with Euratom, and we shall continue to discuss these matters. Our withdrawal will in no way diminish our nuclear ambitions or, I believe, our high international standing on nuclear matters. Maintaining the continuity of our mutually successful civil nuclear co-operation with Euratom and with international partners is a key priority. We will continue to have a constructive, collaborative relationship with Euratom. The United Kingdom is a great supporter of it. We have been working on its standards and we will continue to do so.
Our strategy is to continue to seek a close association with Euratom while putting in place all the necessary measures to ensure we can operate as an independent and responsible nuclear state from day one.
Lord Henley
Just before I give way to the noble Lord, I remind the House that I gave way six times in the course of my introduction. One of the six who intervened, the noble Lord’s noble friend Lord Rooker, has not felt it fit to stay, but I give way to the noble Lord, Lord Lea.
Lord Lea of Crondall
I was going to pick up a totally fresh point that has just been made, but if the noble Lord does not want to deal with it I will leave it. I am sure he will write a letter on many of these points.
Lord Henley
My Lords, I am always more than happy to take interventions. As I said, I took a total of six in the course of my earlier speech. I will of course write to the noble Lord and others on points that I cannot manage, particularly on points that are relevant to the Bill. Some of the interventions, when we got a bit confused about nuclear safeguards and nuclear safety, went somewhere beyond the Bill’s scope.
Lord Lea of Crondall
It is a very simple point. The noble Lord has made a fresh point along the lines that we have no basis on which we can do other than be a rule-taker. I thought that most people who are adamant that we must leave the European Union and all of its manifestations object to anything that leaves them in the position of rule-taker instead of rule-maker. The noble Lord is now saying, “Let’s keep being a rule-taker from Euratom”.
Lord Henley
I said nothing of the sort. I hope that the noble Lord will look very carefully at what I said. I said that we want to continue to develop our relationship with Euratom but that, of course, we will not be in it. Therefore, it is important for us to set up alternative arrangements, which is what this Bill is about, so that we can have the appropriate nuclear safeguards regime in place. Similarly—this point was made by the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, and others—we want to make it clear that we will have nuclear co-operation agreements with other countries around the world. We already have some, but our officials are engaging with some key international partners, including the United States, Canada, Japan and Australia, to ensure that we have essential nuclear co-operation agreements in place to ensure uninterrupted co-operation in trade and the civil nuclear sector. I confirm to the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, on his questions on how we want to develop any further nuclear co-operation agreements, that our intention would be to present any new agreements to Parliament, as is appropriate, prior to the Government’s ratification, as provided for in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010.
I turn to medical radioisotopes, which have exercised a great many noble Lords. This is important. I am not sure that I can add much to what I said at the beginning, other than to stress how important the Government consider this issue. We will continue to make sure that appropriate arrangements are in place at our borders to allow their seamless import into this country. When I talked about customs arrangements I was not talking—if the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, will bear with me—about a customs union but just about the usual arrangements that HMRC is responsible for, to make sure that things can come through quickly, particularly things that have a very short life, as the noble Lord, Lord Warner, and others reminded us, and as I think I reminded the House at the beginning. The important point to get over is that we take this very seriously, we will continue to discuss it and I will certainly write to all noble Lords, and in particular to the noble Lord, Lord Warner, to make it quite clear what we are doing. I will write before Committee and will probably continue to write on other occasions throughout the course of the Bill.
I turn to the role of the ONR and whether it feels that it can implement the necessary changes in the timescale that is before it. The first point to get over is the simple question of funding. I can give an assurance to the House that the Government are making another £10 million available to set up the new regime. When noble Lords talk about cuts to the funding that has been available to the ONR in the past one should remember—I think that there has been a degree of “economy with the actualité”, as someone once put it—that the ONR is actually very well funded and that changes to the level of the grant it gets from government are only a very small part of the overall ONR budget, which is actually growing and not shrinking. More than 90% of the ONR’s budget is recovered from industry; it is not coming from government. The safeguards work is being paid to ONR directly from BEIS’s budget, so I can again give the assurance to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, that there will be no charge on industry to pay for safeguarding work. The charges to industry are to cover other matters and, as I said, more than 90% of its budget comes from those sources.
It is important to get over just what the ONR is doing and the Government’s commitment to make sure that we have a robust regime that is as comprehensive as that currently provided by Euratom. Euratom standards, as has been made quite clear by me, by other Ministers and by many speakers in this debate, are considerably higher than those that other bodies would achieve. Achieving such international standards will allow the UK to discharge its international commitments and will underpin international nuclear trade arrangements with countries such as the United States, Canada, Japan and Australia.
The ONR is in the process of developing an expanded safeguards function by recruiting and training additional inspectors, building additional institutional capacity and developing necessary IT systems. It is aiming to have in place sufficient staff, including inspectors, from 29 March 2019 to meet international standards as applied by the IAEA. Current estimates suggest that the ONR would require a team of some 20 to 25 staff, which would include up to 17 safeguards inspectors. It already has 11 safeguards officers in post who are all in training to become safeguards inspectors by 29 March 2019. The ONR estimates that, to be able to deliver its functions to a standard broadly equivalent to Euratom standards, it may require a team of around 30 to 35 staff, which would include around 20 safeguards inspectors. It is actively recruiting and interviewing further candidates. The first phase of recruitment last year was successful: four individuals were recruited and are currently in training to become safeguards inspectors. A further recruitment campaign is under way. Successful candidates will join the ONR’s training programme and the ONR assesses that it will take a further 12 months or so to upskill new recruits to inspector level. So we have confidence that the ONR will be able to get up to the appropriate level. We also have confidence that, if necessary, it will be able to recruit from abroad. We are working with the Home Office to make sure that whatever happens with our future immigration system, that will be set out shortly and we will be able to ensure that the right people can get in at the right time.
The final matter raised by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, was the Henry VIII power. I admit that it is a Henry VIII power. It is quite clear that it is a Henry VIII power. I cannot remember who very politely said—I think it was the noble Lord, Lord O’Neill—that it was just drifting into being a Henry VIII power. It is a classic Henry VIII power—it is seeking to amend primary legislation by means of secondary legislation—but it is as limited as it can be. Clause 2 can amend any of the three Acts that I mentioned in my introduction,
“in consequence of a relevant safeguards agreement”;
in other words, it is limited to changes as a result of the safeguards agreement and can be only in consequence of that. It cannot be used in any other way. It is very specifically drawn. It is limited to those consequential changes and sets out the three pieces of legislation that may be amended. I look forward to hearing a little more about the views of the Delegated Powers Committee and I hope that it will, for once, give the Government a clean bill of health.
I hope I have dealt with most of the points that are relevant to the Bill but obviously I will write to noble Lords in due course, as is appropriate. In the meantime it behoves me only to beg to move that the Bill be now read a second time.
Nuclear Safeguards Bill
Thursday 22nd February 2018
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 81-I Marshalled list for Committee (PDF, 86KB) - (20 Feb 2018)
Baroness Featherstone
“Associate membership of Euratom
(1) In negotiating and concluding an agreement in accordance with Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union on the future of nuclear safeguards in the United Kingdom, Ministers of the Crown must have regard to the desirability of becoming an associate member of Euratom.(2) The Secretary of State must lay before both Houses of Parliament a written statement detailing the progress towards achieving the negotiating objective under subsection (1)—(a) one month,(b) five months, and(c) nine months,after the passing of this Act.(3) In the event that the United Kingdom becomes an associate member of Euratom, sections 1 and 2 of this Act cease to have effect.”
Baroness Featherstone (LD)
My Lords, I am sure that the Minister, in listening to the Second Reading debate in this House, could not have failed to get the message that leaving Euratom, necessitating the re-creation of its safeguarding capabilities and duties in another body set up to mimic it exactly, is an absurdity and a folly. If he were in any doubt, around 11 pm last night a number of noble Lords—among them, my noble friend Lord Teverson and the noble Lords, Lord Hunt, Lord Warner and Lord Carlile—let him know their opinion of this matter, too.
There was no vote to leave Euratom. Euratom is separate from the EU. Of course, we benefit from our membership, with Euratom regulating the civil nuclear industry, including safeguards for nuclear materials and technology, disposal of nuclear waste, ownership of nuclear fuel, and research and development. Despite our disputing the actual legal necessity of leaving Euratom, the Government are going ahead with the Bill as a failsafe. Amendment 1 seeks to attain associate membership of Euratom. We sought in our original amendment to retain full membership, but, sadly, this was deemed out of scope.
In the Written Statement that the Government laid on 11 January, they said that they want,
“a close association with Euratom”.
But the Government wanting a close association and having one in place are not the same thing, nor have they yet defined what they mean by an association that is “as close as possible”. It would be very helpful if the Minister could indicate what has been said so far about associate membership, and what the answer was during negotiations to date when the suggestion was first put on the table that we want a close association with Euratom, if indeed it was put on the table at all. Was there any problem? It is unimaginable to me that anyone on the other side of the negotiating table would have any problem with us staying in Euratom or, if we are not doing so, having an associate membership. Has the European Commission given its view on this to date?
Our problem with the good intentions of the Government in this regard is that they are undefined, so we want clarity and certainty on this important matter. We want an associate membership that replicates exactly our membership of Euratom—nothing more, nothing less. So what will be required of us in order to have an associate membership? Is it a matter of cost? What would be asked of us, above and beyond what is required now? Amendment 1 has been laid to ensure that the Government, in their negotiations and agreements in accordance with Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union, on the future of nuclear safeguards in the United Kingdom must have regard to the desirability of becoming an associate member of Euratom. I am sure—at least, I very much hope and expect—that this will be pretty much at the top of the Government’s list of things to do, if only to avoid the extra works, cost, aggravation and uncertainty in recreating what we have already as a member of Euratom.
So that we can be sure that the Secretary of State is carrying out this duty, the amendment requires that he must lay before both Houses a Written Statement informing us of the progress he is making towards achieving that negotiated outcome. Our preference would be to forestall actually leaving Euratom at all, unless and until such an associate membership is in place. However, as that is apparently not possible, the amendment asks that Statements be made at particular intervals post the Act receiving Royal Assent. If we were to succeed in negotiating an associate membership and effectively remain in Euratom, the rest of the Bill need not apply. I beg to move.
Lord Warner (CB)
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 2, 12 and 16, which are in my name in this group. We had a good warm-up late last night for this first day in Committee on this Bill, with the Minister’s colleague doing what I thought was a rather good imitation of Geoffrey Boycott: occupying the crease but not showing much flair in his run gathering. In that debate on withdrawal from Euratom that we had in Committee on the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, it was clear that the mood of the House was that this was a rash and ill-considered action by the Government, and that the Government would do well to reconsider their position on withdrawing from Euratom in the interests of the future of the nuclear industry in the UK. I have little doubt that we will return to this issue during our later consideration of the withdrawal Bill and I do not intend to traverse that ground again today, although I still consider that cancelling the withdrawal from Euratom membership would be the best course of action in the public interest.
Today, I want to focus on two issues that continue to cause concern in the industry and among many of us in this House: first, whether the Government have a credible plan for putting in place an internationally acceptable nuclear safeguarding regime in the UK in time for our departure from Euratom; and, secondly, whether this can be done by EU exit day on 29 March 2019. These two issues are inextricably linked in my view, and that is why I have grouped my Amendments 2, 12 and 16 with the related amendments in this first group. I have to say to the Minister that how the Government respond to amendments on these concerns in this Bill will, I suspect, determine how the House deals with the Euratom issue in the withdrawal Bill. I assure the Minister that that is not a threat but a piece of friendly advice.
Viscount Trenchard (Con)
My Lords, I shall refer to the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, and the noble Lord, Lord Warner. The noble Baroness would like us to remain a full member of Euratom but, failing that, her amendment seeks to ensure that, as far as possible, we become an associate member of Euratom on exactly the same basis as we are a member. It seems to me that in that case we might as well remain a member. However, given that the treaties seem to be so mixed up with those of the EU, I understand that the Government are in receipt of legal advice that that is not a possible option.
However, it is not accurate to say that our continued associate membership of Euratom is essential for us to adopt and have approved by our nuclear partners a proper accredited safeguards regime. An accredited nuclear safeguards regime does not depend on meeting Euratom standards, it depends on meeting standards set by the IAEA. Euratom standards are thought to be less robust on process, procedures and controls than those set by the IAEA, which concentrate more heavily on verification processes, which is one reason why you need so many inspectors.
Lord Teverson (LD)
I thank the noble Viscount for letting me intervene, but I honestly do not understand that. If Euratom procedures were not up to IAEA standards, it would not be approved as a safeguarding authority by the International Atomic Energy Agency itself.
Viscount Trenchard
Euratom is certainly approved by the IAEA as having adequate standards. My point is that Euratom has standards that go beyond the level required by other international nuclear partners, including Japan, the United States and Australia. My point is that it is therefore not necessary to comply with Euratom standards to comply fully with the safeguards regime—
Viscount Trenchard
Could I not continue, because I have just been interrupted? I will perhaps give way to the noble Lord in a minute.
I turn to Amendment 2, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Warner. He refers to the supply to the United Kingdom of medical radioisotopes and their use and disposal, so far as this depends on UK membership of Euratom. My understanding is that it does not depend on UK membership of Euratom. Sixty per cent of the United Kingdom’s isotope supply comes from the EU and 40% from non-EU countries—predominantly South Africa, I think. Both are imported into the UK under fast-track procedures, and there seems no reason why that should change, whether or not we are a member of Euratom.
It is clearly essential that we avoid a cliff edge in this field, and for that reason, I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say about the Government’s intention to avoid one. Clearly, something which replicates the effect of continued membership of Euratom during a transition period would be the easiest way to achieve that, because it will not be possible in the time available before March 2019 to negotiate and have ratified by their legislatures the four essential nuclear co-operation agreements with the United States, Australia, Japan and Canada that are our minimum requirement.
I am now happy to give way to the noble Lord.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
I just want to come back to the noble Viscount’s key point, which is that IAEA standards are less than those of Euratom. In evidence to the Public Bill Committee in the other place, the deputy chief inspector of the Office for Nuclear Regulation, which will be taking over the non-proliferation safeguarding role from Euratom under government plans, said that the result in March 2019 will be that we move from Euratom standards to standards that will mean fewer inspections and less intensity of inspections. That is surely the argument—I think the noble Viscount was hinting at this when we debated this last night—for not insisting that we establish our own regulatory function in March 2019 but carry on in some kind of relationship with Euratom. Whether it is transition, associate membership or alignment—whatever you want to call it—we should essentially continue to use Euratom until, if we insist on leaving Euratom in the end, the ONR can signify that it is up to Euratom standards.
Viscount Trenchard
I wholly agree, as I think I said, that the right way is to continue to rely on Euratom until such time as the ONR can apply a UK-specific safeguards standards regime approved by the IAEA. My point is that it is not necessary and might not be desirable. On that, I am particularly interested in the submissions made by the Nuclear Industry Association, on which perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Hutton, will make an intervention, which I would look forward to hearing with great interest. We do not necessarily need to follow Euratom; I am not saying that Euratom standards are not at least as good as IAEA’s required standards but, in so far as they go further, it does not necessarily mean that they are safer. It may mean that they are more cumbersome or that the frequency of verifications is more—
Baroness Featherstone
I thank the noble Viscount for giving way. Is he aware that the Government’s declared intention is to reach the Euratom standard, regardless of this debate?
Viscount Trenchard
I am well aware that the Government have explained that their policy is to meet Euratom standards, and I am not saying that that would be in any way a bad thing, but I understand that there is a problem over the timescale it would take to reach Euratom standards. Nevertheless, I question whether it is necessary or desirable to meet Euratom standards in full because, as I said, many in the industry consider the IAEA standards better as far as process, procedures and controls are concerned. I think I have now concluded my remarks.
Lord Warner
Well, I am sure the noble Viscount is in the Prime Minister’s thoughts for ministerial office. I am a bit confused about where he is on completing either IAEA-acceptable standards or Euratom standards by 29 March 2019. Is he saying that he accepts that neither of those standards will be met by March 2019, therefore we need a transition period and therefore he supports my amendment on a transition period?
Viscount Trenchard
I am saying that I believe it is not possible by March 2019 to achieve the necessary nuclear co-operation agreements with our four key partners, principally, and that therefore we will not be in a position to operate our own nuclear safeguards regime. I believe the ONR could manage to establish recognition of its own nuclear safeguards regime in that timescale, but—because we will not have the NCAs or an agreement with the EU on nuclear in that timescale—I look forward to hearing from the Minister how the Government propose to avoid a cliff edge in the nuclear industry.
Lord O'Neill of Clackmannan (Lab)
Before the noble Viscount sits down, will he clarify something? He sought to give us reassurance on medical isotopes and made the point that 40% of them come from South Africa and 60% from the Netherlands and France. Can he tell us whether they are all the same, because the logistical implications of transportation from South Africa are rather different than coming from the Low Countries and north-west France? Are all isotopes the same? I do not think that they are. Which ones come from which places? Is the reassurance that he is giving us quite as robust as he would like it to be?
Viscount Trenchard
My Lords, I am not sufficiently aware of the detail of the proportions of different types of isotopes that come from the European Union—the Netherlands, France and Germany—but the 60% from the EU comes mainly through the Channel Tunnel, as I understand. The 40% from non-EU countries, comes through Heathrow in the main and is subject to the fast-track customs clearance procedure. That is absolutely necessary given the 66-hour half-life that applies to quite a proportion of these isotopes.
Lord Teverson
My Lords, I think we should allow the noble Viscount to sit down, and remind ourselves that he is not the Minister. To go back to something that the noble Lord, Lord Warner, said, in a way, none of the amendments in this group is perfect. Why are they not perfect? It is because we have given our notice to withdraw from Euratom, yet we all know that that was not the greatest thing to do. So we are now trying to claw our way back to the status quo, having given notification under Article 106a of the Euratom treaty. We are trying to find a way to get back to where we want to be, but we are not allowed to withdraw our notification under the treaty. We certainly cannot within the scope of this Bill, but perhaps under the EU withdrawal Bill there is more scope. Who knows? It does not seem so long ago that we were debating that.
I presume the Minister will confirm that we do want to achieve Euratom standards, not bargain-basement, superstore value in terms of just the IAEA standards, although those are important. Can the Minister confirm that a transitional agreement is possible and would work, and that the EU 27 are up for this? Certainly in the publication on transitional arrangements, which was published last month, Euratom is a footnote on a couple of occasions, so I presume that it is in the mix in terms of the continuing acquis during the transition period.
What concerns me most about this is the need—as the noble Viscount has said, and he is quite right—to avoid this rather more precipitous cliff edge than there is even in the other areas of transitional commercial arrangements. When the break from the treaty happens, are we certain that the International Atomic Energy Agency would be prepared to have Euratom act as our safeguarding authority during a transitional period even though we are not legally a member of Euratom? That is a fundamental question. An answer would provide a lot more clarity and perhaps enable us to come back on Report with a suitable amendment which might actually work. We are not in a position to do that at the moment because we do not have that information.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)
My Lords, after the excellent introduction by the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, and the excellent speech by the noble Lord, Lord Warner, I listened with great attention to what was said by the noble Viscount. My conclusion, after he sat down, was that I should take a deep breath, count to three and then try to analyse where we are up to in this debate. My conclusions are: first, we have at the moment a very satisfactory set of standards; secondly, what we are offered as an alternative is a set of good intentions. We know about good intentions; they do not always lead to good standards, or even any standards being adopted at all. I say to the Minister that what persuades those of us who are taking part in this important debate, and who took part in yesterday’s analogous debates, is real anxiety about the standards this country will have in the future, and about whether we will be recognised as coming up to world standards in relation to nuclear safeguards. It was partly with that in mind that I went to look at the EU exit analysis papers at 100 Parliament Street the day before yesterday, which were referred to extensively in the night shift before we signed up to today’s morning shift. I looked in those papers for a single sentence or word about the future of nuclear safety and Euratom. I was only there for three-quarters of an hour so I only had time to read the documents twice, but I do not recall, and did not note, a single word on this issue. It worries me that it was not there because this is a key issue that should have been addressed in the advice given to Ministers, which is what those papers really are.
Therefore, I repeat a question I asked of the Minister’s colleague last night: how many meetings have so far taken place on this issue with European negotiating counterparts? Can we be given a number please? Next question: how many meetings of that kind have taken place on this issue with counterparts in the IAEA? Please can we have numbers because they will give us at least an indication of how far down the road we are towards turning the good intentions into a set of future standards? I am not wholly opposed to leaving Euratom: we may be able to do at least as well or better under other arrangements, but we have to do at least as well or better, otherwise we will serve the country ill.
Lord Hutton of Furness (Lab)
I will intervene very briefly to express my support for the amendments that my noble friend Lord Warner has tabled, and the spirit behind the amendments that the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, has tabled.
We have analysed this problem pretty astutely and know exactly where we are. I declare an interest as chairman of the Nuclear Industry Association. The industry wants to avoid the cataclysmic consequence of exiting the European Union in March 2019 without an effective arrangement in place that will oversee nuclear safeguards in the UK. It is impossible to exaggerate the significance of getting to that point. If that is where we get to and there are no arrangements in place with Euratom at that point, I think, as the noble Viscount and others said, that it is highly unlikely that we will have a compliant safeguarding regime applying to the United Kingdom civil nuclear industry. That would be a terrible event, and I cannot exaggerate the significance or consequence of that.
My understanding, therefore, is that it is the Government’s policy to try to reach an association agreement with Euratom that will cover this transitional period of at least two years. That, I believe, is absolutely essential—because, as the noble Viscount and the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, made clear, we will not be in a position to operate an independent UK arrangement that meets international standards by March 2019. The Minister may well correct me and tell me that I am wrong about that, but I think that it is highly improbable. So it seems to me that the issue behind all these amendments is essentially one of timing. If it is the Government’s stated intention to reach an association agreement with Euratom to preserve the existing internationally recognised arrangements that apply to the UK, it is very hard to imagine why we will need this Bill to be implemented at all. If it is possible to reach an agreement under Article 206, I think, of the Euratom treaty, which specifically refers to reciprocal rights and obligations, it is certainly broad enough as a treaty provision—as I believe, the industry believes and our advisers believe—to cover the full spectrum of safeguarding arrangements covered by the Euratom treaty and we will not need the ONR to be given these new additional powers. If we can reach an agreement for a transitional period, I do not understand why that transitional arrangement cannot continue for longer, specifically in this regard in relation to the civil nuclear industry.
Lord Broers (CB)
My Lords, I compliment the noble Lord, Lord Hutton, on making clear from the industry’s point of view the importance of this continuity.
I will make a simple and perhaps naive and impractical point in a couple of minutes. I support Amendment 1 and the other amendments because, as I said at Second Reading and again last night when the situation with Euratom arose in Committee on the EU (Withdrawal) Bill, my interests are centred on sustaining our research and development in support of nuclear power projects. The noble Lord, Lord Hutton, just pointed out the overall importance of sustaining our interest in the nuclear industry. This topic has been followed with some concern by the Science and Technology Select Committee for many years, including during the period when I chaired that committee. I have one reservation with Amendment 1, which I will get to in a minute.
We have sustained world-competitive expertise in many areas of nuclear technology, such as waste disposal, but have relied on collaboration, especially through our membership of Euratom, in keeping up with the development of new types of reactors and of course with nuclear fusion. Research and development of this type is carried out by large teams of research engineers and scientists coming from a broad range of disciplines, and advances emerge through frequent and continuous interactions that occur when researchers get together at symposia and workshops. An idea can come from anywhere in the world. These are team projects, where advances are made through the exchange of information and close collaboration.
I recall when I first took responsibility for a large group of research engineers and scientists developing the advanced electronics for IBM’s new computers in the United States in the early 1980s. A senior engineer with decades of experience pioneering the development of computers took me aside and gave me a lecture about morale. He emphasised the importance of maintaining high morale in managing large teams of researchers working on difficult projects. The fusion project is an extremely difficult project. I was discussing this with a previous Chancellor of the Exchequer just now, who said that the results with fusion were very disappointing. Of course, it is an extraordinarily difficult project. You are trying to maintain extremely high temperatures, higher than on the sun, and trying to contain plasma in a container and then have it survive severe bombardment from neutrons. Why are we doing this project? Because it offers the ultimate solution to our energy problems. We pursue much larger scientific projects—CERN spent orders of magnitude more than we are spending on the ITER project. We have played a key role in that project and we can continue to contribute to it, but we must feel part of the team.
My point is that morale is maintained by feeling part of a team. It is very much like the Olympics. I went back home last night at midnight, and the one good thing about staying up that late was that the slalom was still on the television. We have a very fine slalom skier who trained on a plastic slope—that is a bit of technology for you. He skied brilliantly and got into the top 10, but he had one disadvantage. He did not have the other three members of the team that the Austrians, the French and the Swiss had, who radioed back the moment they got to the bottom to say, “Watch turns five, seven and nine because of the rut there”. He had to do it all on his own.
We do not want to be on our own in our nuclear endeavours: we want to be part of the team but a full member of it, not an associate member. So my unrealistic suggestion is that we go for full membership of the team and not associate membership.
Lord O'Neill of Clackmannan
I am very pleased to follow the last two speakers, because I have had associations with both of them. In the case of my noble friend Lord Hutton, I was his predecessor as chair of the Nuclear Industry Association.
In supporting Amendments 2, 12 and 17, particularly Amendment 2, I draw attention to the fact that the Bill is about reassuring the industry and the British people that we will have safeguarding regimes of a quality and a standard that will enable there to be continuing public support for civil nuclear in the United Kingdom. This is not a matter of holding the Government’s feet to the fire—although, as an Opposition Member, I largely approve of such an approach—but to make it clear that it is essential that we get reports back. The fact is that, so far—as has been evidenced by the appearance of the word “Euratom” in the withdrawal papers—that has been a pretty low priority for the Government. Frankly, we cannot trust them without something in the Bill to require there to be a report, albeit an interim one, by Christmas. That is where both the Liberal amendment and the amendment from my colleagues come in. That is not unreasonable, because the record is pretty feeble so far. At worst, we have heard platitudinous nonsense from the Government on many of these issues. We want there to be a requirement that means that their attention is focused on a particular time and date so that, before Christmas of this year, we will have an interim report on the progress that has been made. The areas covered are quite clear.
It is also fair to say that we need a transition period. The noble Lord, Lord Broers, has been riding the horse that he usually rides in respect of research and development, on which he has become an acknowledged expert. I just make the point that there is a lot more to the nuclear industry than research and development and the generation of power. We have considerable expertise in safety matters as consultants in United Kingdom companies and internationally. Our record on the decommissioning of power stations is probably second to none because we have been at it longer than anyone else and because we started building them long before most other people. However, if we are not able to keep abreast of improvements and developments, we will not be able to continue that kind of work.
As I said, the nuclear cycle involves more than just research and the generation of power, and at the moment we enjoy a pretty good position. As my noble friend Lord Hutton said, it is a not insignificant contributor to the engineering and manufacturing side of the British economy, so it is economically important. Politically, it is also important that in this House there is a consensus that then breeds confidence in the country as a whole.
These amendments will have their deficiencies. At this stage in legislation it is the stuff of ministerial responses to say that the amendments are not quite good enough, but when the case is strong enough—I think we all believe that it is—it is the responsibility of government to accept the spirit of the amendments and to go away and consult the Front Benches and interested parties to secure wording which we consider to be appropriate for the scale of the challenge that has to be met to sustain the confidence of the nuclear industry, the confidence of this House and, ultimately, the confidence of the country as a whole in the civil nuclear project in which we are currently engaged.
I will be very disappointed if the Minister tries to duck and dive on this issue. If he does, I suspect that he will get bruised when we come to consider it at the next stage. I think that there is a strong feeling about this on pretty well all sides of the House. Even the noble Viscount was somewhat half-hearted in his backing of the Government and made the point that transitional arrangements are necessary. However, for transitional arrangements to be effective, we must have reports at every stage of the process. Frankly, nine months on is not an unreasonable point at which to ask for such a report. It is not enough for Ministers simply to say, “Yes, we will come back and address the House”. We need something more concrete than that. We also need assurances that, before any further action is taken, we are given clear indications of matters relating to finance and future developments so that we can avoid the charge that we have given the Government a blank cheque in relation to a piece of our national economy which is essential to the future energy needs of our country.
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, noble Lords have heard about the scale of the risk of not achieving the objective of the Bill. If you were doing a classic risk analysis in the private sector—the sort of thing that, under corporate governance, the Minister’s department requires every board to observe—you would say that there was a very high risk of not achieving that objective. Even if the Minister thought that there was only a very small chance of not doing so, if we were a board of directors he would be required to mitigate that risk. These amendments provide a pathway to mitigation—a pathway to a plan B. It is the sort of medicine that, quite rightly, the department supplies for all business and enterprise across the United Kingdom—that is, understanding the risks that they are undergoing and seeking a way to mitigate them. That is exactly what the Government and the Minister should be doing, and it is why, between now and Report, the Government have to embrace the messages that they have heard today.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I have some sympathy for the questions raised in this debate and I start by associating myself with support for the nuclear industry and for nuclear R&D. As the noble Lord, Lord O’Neill, said, the nuclear industry was founded in this country.
I support the Bill, as I think that we need to plan for the withdrawal from Euratom in a responsible way. The Bill is relatively clear, and we have seen the draft implementing regulations, which are very helpful—I thank the Minister for that. As in other Brexit areas, the Government need to put EU provisions into UK law because many people in this country have told us that that is what they want. I believe that, as a scrutinising Chamber, we need to progress matters technically and that we should provide the powers that the Energy Ministers need to negotiate the necessary nuclear agreements and to strengthen the ONR.
However, I want to make one point which perhaps builds a little on what has been said by my noble friend Lord Trenchard. If we crash out of the EU in March 2019 or, alternatively, at the end of an agreed implementation period, will the Minister consider informing the EU at that point that we would like to reverse the bespoke Article 50 for Euratom and put up with a little bit of potential ECJ involvement—at least until an association agreement with Euratom is arranged or a relevant trade agreement with the EU is finalised? Once the air clears, the two sides will be bound to return to the negotiating table and will no doubt start to agree things on important areas such as nuclear.
I am not sure that my concern calls for an amendment to the Bill but we must avoid any risk of enhanced nuclear non-proliferation and the industry disruption and damage that would go with it. Therefore, if we could find a way of retaining some flexibility in the event of a bad outcome, that could be helpful, and I shall be grateful if the Minister has anything to say by way of reassurance. I had thought that perhaps we should not go ahead with this Bill but, by looking at it carefully, I have been persuaded that we need to get on with it.
Viscount Hanworth (Lab)
My Lords, these amendments propose an associate membership of Euratom. In effect, they propose a deferment of our severance from Euratom and possibly even an indefinite deferment.
There is a marked contrast between the bland assurances we have received from the Government that everything regarding nuclear safeguards will be in place by March 2019 and the anxieties expressed by other parties, including, in a professionally restrained manner, the ONR, which is due to assume the duties of nuclear safeguarding. It has indicated that it is struggling to meet the deadline. The regime that it might have in place by March will be decidedly understaffed, and surely the danger that the deadline will be missed fully justifies the provisions of these amendments.
There are also anxieties regarding the ability to establish the necessary nuclear co-operation agreements with third parties in a timely manner. Such agreements depend on the existence of a nuclear safeguarding regime that is compliant with the requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and it will take some time to achieve this. We are fearful that the requirement that a nuclear co-operation agreement with the USA be ratified by the Senate will give rise to a lengthy hiatus during which our nuclear industry may be deprived of some essential supplies.
There is also the matter of medical isotopes, which it is appropriate to raise at this juncture. The Minister has told us that the Government take their continued availability most seriously and assures us that this issue is quite distinct from nuclear safeguarding. Well, it is not a matter that is separate from our membership of Euratom. Euratom appears to have played a significant role in ensuring their continued and timely availability when they have been extremely scarce. By leaving Euratom prematurely we shall be prejudicing the security of our supplies, and this is a good reason for deferring our departure.
Lord Northbrook (Con)
My Lords, I apologise to the House for not being able to take part at Second Reading. I have some sympathy with the intent behind these amendments. I will not go over the very interesting responses last night to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath; I would just like to make a few brief comments.
A report from the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee in other place states:
“We conclude the Government should seek to retain as close as possible a relationship with Euratom, and that this should include accepting its delivery of existing safeguards requirements in the UK”.
The MPs on the committee warned that the impacts of leaving Euratom would be “profound”, putting the UK in,
“a much weaker position to drive regulatory standards”,
at an EU level.
Last week, the EDF corporate policy and regulation director said:
“The UK still lacks the replacement rules needed to fuel its nuclear reactors after”,
the country quits the EU. EDF also told the House of Lords EU Energy and Environment Sub-Committee:
“The Euratom Treaty is currently vital to the functioning of nuclear energy generation in the UK. Failure to replace its provisions by the point of withdrawal could result in the UK being unable to import nuclear materials, and have severe consequences for the UK’s energy security”.
The UK’s Nuclear Industry Association, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Hutton, said that,
“the Bill does not provide enough certainty for the industry and the government should be pushing for a transitional agreement”.
Finally, according to City A.M., Vote Leave campaign director Dominic Cummings, in rather colourful language, lambasted government plans to leave the European nuclear agency as “near-retarded”.
Lord Rooker (Lab)
My Lords, I have a couple of questions for the Minister before he replies. First, will he answer the question that the noble Lord, Lord Warner, asked about the recently published—on 29 January—report of the EU committee of this House? It is hot off the press, full of information and all the substantial written evidence is available to noble Lords. Although we were covering energy security, we spent considerable time on Euratom, and there was evidence from the industry and from the ONR. Did the Minister look at any of the evidence and the report before he wrote his letter to noble Lords following Second Reading, which contradicts the evidence provided to the Select Committee?
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
We had an extensive debate on the principle of Euratom last night and I shall not repeat what I said then, but I shall speak in support of my own amendments and the others in this group. They are not perfect, as the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, said: they are substitutes, because most noble Lords in most parts of the House think it is a mistake to withdraw from Euratom and, even now, we hope to persuade the Government, one way or another, to reverse that decision.
However, the problem, which my noble friends have highlighted, is that the very integrity of this crucial industry is now at stake. Essentially, the Government want to find some way of continuing with Euratom, although they cannot spell out to us exactly what that means. This Bill is an understandable backstop so that, if they cannot agree one way or another with Euratom to continue its work, the ONR can be established as a separate nuclear safeguards regulator. Essentially, we are being asked to take this on trust.
My problem is that, first, I have no confidence whatever in the Government’s ability to negotiate a deal with Euratom. I do not know what it must be like to be a member of the Conservative Party or, indeed, the Government, but what we see is utter chaos and disagreement. For instance, the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, said that about 60% of medical isotopes come from the EU and 40% from outside. Last night, he suggested that leaving the EU should not impact at all on the transfer of medical isotopes from the EU. But we have not yet agreed a frictionless customs arrangement with the EU and I am not sure that, at this stage, one would bet anything at all on our seeing that negotiated—and it is but one uncertainty about what will emerge.
The letter sent by Mr Rees-Mogg and his group says, essentially, that this country must have “full regulatory autonomy” by March 2019—it must have the ability to change British rules and laws once we leave, without being a “rule taker”. But what arrangements are we then going to reach with Euratom that do not transgress the red line laid down by Mr Rees-Mogg? The Minister may say that Mr Rees-Mogg is but a Back-Bencher in the other place, but he seems to hold sway over government negotiating positions. That is why we have to assume that, actually, the Government are not going to be able to negotiate a sensible agreement with Euratom. Within government collectively, it transgresses so many of the red lines that have been laid down, one way or another, that if we are not careful, we will have to fall back on the ONR picking up this responsibility.
I respect the ONR and the evidence it gave to the Commons Public Bill Committee, which was everything you would expect of a robust regulator. My reading is that by March 2019, it could just about have enough people to do the inspections according to IAEA standards, but not to Euratom standards. But the other question is: what about the agreements that have to be reached with a number of very powerful countries? There are no guarantees at all that we could do that.
The reason we are debating and struggling with these amendments is that there is a real concern that not only the legality of the industry post-2019 is at stake here, but public confidence too. The noble Earl, Lord Selborne, who made a very good speech yesterday, talked about confidence in the industry. I am a passionate believer in this industry and I take my noble friend’s point that it is about not just research, but the fact that we have a highly skilled group of people working in it. Yes, we are experienced in decommissioning, but we now have the possibility of a renaissance in new nuclear. After having thrown away the lead we had, we can get some of that back, develop a supply chain and use the skills of our people, but we need public confidence to do that. The problem is that the Government’s position is putting that at risk because there is no confidence whatever that they can reach an agreement with Euratom and none that they can reach Euratom standards in March 2019. That is a very serious position to be in.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Lord Henley) (Con)
My Lords, I am not sure whether I heard the noble Lord set out his own party’s policy more widely on Brexit, but perhaps that will be for another day. He can then assist the Committee, but I leave that with him. I offer my congratulations and thanks to him, to the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, and the noble Lord, Lord Warner, for introducing their amendments. I think that it was the noble Lord, Lord Warner, who compared the response last night by my noble friend Lord Callanan to a Geoffrey Boycott innings. For those of my age and beyond, I will go for a sort of Ken Barrington type of response, so it will be long and slow. However, it is important that I get it all in to make sure that we have a proper response to the debate so that we can consider these amendments again on Report. It is also important for noble Lords to understand in this sort of Ken Barrington response that I am going to give—
Lord Henley
The noble Lord knows that he always gets wisdom from me. I want also to say that I am not necessarily going to respond to all the points in the course of this debate because an awful lot of them apply to later amendments. Nevertheless I will give a fairly full response, but I shall start by making a pretty fundamental point, made by my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe. It is that we are where we are. My noble friend supports this Bill because, as she said, it is very important that we have plans in place for when we leave Euratom. We are going to leave Euratom at the same time as we leave the European Union in March of next year. That was dealt with in the notice of withdrawal Bill, now the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017. The legislation has been through both Houses of Parliament and has the support of the party opposite and others.
What I want to make clear to the Committee is that we are determined to continue to have a constructive and collaborative relationship with Euratom and with all our other international partners. The withdrawal of the United Kingdom from Euratom will in no way diminish our nuclear ambitions, and I make that clear to the noble Lord, Lord Broers, and others. Maintaining the continuity of our mutually successful civil nuclear co-operation with Euratom and international partners is going to be a key priority for us. As a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency, we are committed to have in place nuclear safeguards. I should remind the Committee that these have nothing to do with safety. Nuclear safeguards are reporting and verification processes by which states demonstrate to the international community that civil nuclear material is not being diverted into military or weapons programmes. The United Kingdom has been a member of the IAEA since its formation back in 1957.
Under the Euratom treaty, the civil nuclear material and facilities within member states are subject to nuclear safeguards measures conducted by the European Commission on behalf of Euratom. Euratom also provides reporting on member states’ safeguards to the International Atomic Energy Agency, which conducts nuclear safeguards globally. Nuclear safeguards measures include reporting on civil nuclear material holdings and development plans, inspections of nuclear facilities by international inspectors, and monitoring, including cameras in selected facilities. I repeat that nuclear safeguards are distinct from nuclear safety, which covers the prevention of nuclear accidents, and nuclear security, which covers physical protection measures. Those are the subject of independent regulatory provisions and we shall move on to them in due course.
As was made clear by my noble friend last night and I make clear again today, the European Union and Euratom are uniquely legally joined. Euratom shares a common institutional framework, making use of the same institutions; namely, the Council, the Commission, the European Parliament and the ECJ. For example, the European Commission has an active role in shaping and enforcing Euratom rules and it currently plays a central operational role on safeguards in the UK. As was further made clear by my noble friend last night, Euratom is also subject to the jurisdiction of the ECJ.
When the Prime Minister formally notified our intention to leave the European Union in June, she also commenced the process for leaving Euratom. That notification was debated and authorised by Parliament through the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017 which, as I have said, had the full support of both Houses of Parliament. The United Kingdom will therefore withdraw from Euratom in 2019 at the same time as withdrawing from the European Union. That is why we need the legislation before us now to be in place.
The United Kingdom’s current nuclear safeguards regime operated by Euratom will cease to function in the United Kingdom as a result of our withdrawal from Euratom. The Nuclear Safeguards Bill will ensure that we have the right regime in place for the Office for Nuclear Regulation to regulate nuclear safeguards. I reassure the Committee that the Government are meeting the challenges that clearly lie before us. We have already made great progress in the work that we are doing to secure continuity for our nuclear industry by establishing long-term arrangements to secure nuclear safeguards. The Queen’s Speech on 21 June last year included our intention to take up the powers that will set up a domestic nuclear safeguards regime, and that is what this Bill seeks to do.
Lord Henley
My Lords, will the noble Lord bear with me? I said that I was going to play a fairly long innings and I want to explain these matters in full. There is no point in the noble Lord interrupting at this stage. I am going through this carefully and slowly in order to explain what we are going to do to make sure that we have the right things in place for when we leave Euratom and the EU in March of next year.
Our intention is for the new domestic regime to exceed the standard that the international community would require from the United Kingdom as a member of the IAEA. It will be run by the Office for Nuclear Regulation which, as the Committee will know, already regulates nuclear safety and nuclear security. We will also be agreeing a new voluntary offer agreement with the IAEA. I believe that we all recognise the special contribution—
Lord Warner
I am sorry to interrupt the Minister, but can he say what discussions have actually taken place with the IAEA to get to that point of an agreement before March 2019? What is the plan of meetings for those discussions that have taken place and are planned to take place?
Lord Henley
My Lords, discussions have already taken place with the IAEA. We will continue with those discussions to make sure that we are in the right place at the right time. If the noble Lord will bear with me, I will continue with my speech and set these things out in the proper manner.
Lord Warner
I understand what the Minister is saying, but none of us has moved amendments this morning that in any way suggest that we would not be leaving Euratom by next year. We have accepted that for the purposes of this debate. We are not slow learners: we do not need to be taken rather slowly through the arguments that we went through last night.
Lord Henley
My Lords, I am sorry if the noble Lord feels that he is not a slow learner. At times, I have felt that he and other noble Lords have been a bit slow on these things. That is why I am trying to spell it out very carefully and very slowly and I will continue to do so. I hope to make it clear so that the Committee and the House will understand that we will have the appropriate civil nuclear safeguards regime in place by next year, which is of paramount importance for us at that stage. We have had already considerable discussions with Euratom. There will be further discussions with the IAEA. I will not go into the details but I can no doubt write to the noble Lord in due course.
In a sense, this is an amending Bill. As noble Lords will be aware, it will amend the Energy Act 2013 by creating new powers so that we can put in place regulations that offer detail on the domestic safeguards regime, such as accounting, reporting, control and inspection arrangements. It also creates the limited power that I referred to earlier which we will get to in later amendments, allowing us to amend the Nuclear Safeguards and Electricity (Finance) Act 1978 and others. That power will mean that references in that legislation to existing international agreements can be updated once new international agreements have been reached. We will discuss that in greater detail later on.
I have listened carefully to what has been said on the agreements that we have before us on Amendments 1, 2, 12, 16 and 17. These amendments taken as a group cover the fundamental issue of the United Kingdom’s future relationship with Euratom and our strategy pertaining to this. I fully appreciate the sentiment and the intention behind these amendments. I shall try to address them all.
On Amendment 1, the new clause proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, would require Ministers, when negotiating and concluding the withdrawal agreement, to have regard to the desirability of associate membership of Euratom, and require the Government to report periodically to Parliament the progress to that end. Noble Lords will have heard many times before that there is no such thing as associate membership of Euratom. I made that clear at Second Reading. It is important that discussions on this matter focus on the actual treaty. The concept of associate membership does not exist in the treaty. Given the frequency with which the point comes up, I start my response by reading out exactly what the Government said to the BEIS Select Committee on this point in the autumn:
“There are two different articles in the treaty that deal with the relationship between Euratom and third countries. One of them is Article 101, which enables the community to enter into agreements with third states. That is the one that has been used in the research and training context with Switzerland. That requires a qualified majority vote. The other one is Article 206, which enables the community to conclude an agreement establishing a formal association involving reciprocal rights and obligations. That is the ‘association with’ part, not being an associate member. That requires unanimity.”
It is indeed the case that the Ukraine and Switzerland each have a form of association agreement with Euratom, but those agreements cover only research and training activities. Neither covers nuclear safeguards activities. These countries are not associate members of Euratom. Wanting to maintain a close relationship with Euratom is this Government’s stated objective so we need no persuading on that point. We have already stated very clearly in Statements to the House that the Government will be seeking a close and effective association with Euratom as part of the next phase of negotiations with the EU. We have made clear the desirability of this aim and that it forms part of our negotiation strategy.
I fully recognise the importance of providing clarity on the progress of the Government’s plans for withdrawing from Euratom and our ambitions in respect of a future relationship with Euratom, which the noble Lord, Lord Warner, asked about earlier; it is relevant to Amendments 2 and 16, which I will deal with later.
Lord O'Neill of Clackmannan
The Minister referred to Article 206 and the agreement that has been arrived at with Switzerland and Ukraine in respect of training and research. Does that provision afford any opportunity for other areas to be incorporated in an agreement with Euratom? Could it be the portal for enabling us to be alongside Euratom in the way that the Ukrainians and the Swiss have been able to obtain for their preoccupations with training and research?
Lord Henley
My understanding is that it will allow them to do that. I am not aware that Article 206 could be used further as the noble Lord suggests. If I am wrong, of course I will write to him, but it might be a matter of interpretation. I should remind him in respect of Article 206 that I stressed when I read out the Government’s response to the Select Committee that any agreement required unanimity. That is obviously quite a big “if” in these matters. If there is anything further I can add, I will write to the noble Lord.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
The Minister is being very helpful. It is the first explanation we have had as to why the Government are leaving. He talked a lot about the influence of the EU over Euratom’s activities, which is no doubt something that we can test and explore. But I do not understand what “close association” means. The Government clearly could not go for a formal association because the relationship would be one in which the EU would set the rules, and we know that the Government have drawn a red line against that. Does “close association” mean that we would basically subcontract the inspectorate from Euratom to work under the auspices of the ONR, with the ONR as the regulator? Does it mean that, despite everything that the Government have said, we hope that we can simply replicate Euratom rules and that it will somehow oversee it, which seems unlikely? Until we know what the Government want to get out of Euratom, it is difficult to know whether the Bill will meet the circumstances if no close association at all is agreed.
Lord Warner
Can I amplify something from what the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, said? If the Minister looks at my Amendment 2, he will see that the suggested new subsection (1)(a) refers to,
“a report on the progress of discussions with Euratom on the scope and conditions for a form of association with Euratom”.
It does not talk about associate membership. Listening to what he said about what the Government aspire to sounded remarkably like seeking,
“a form of association with Euratom”.
In clarifying the Government’s intentions for the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, will the Minister explain the difference between what the Government want and the wording in my amendment? I am quite happy to change the wording if it helps the Minister.
Lord Henley
I was coming to the noble Lord’s amendment to make quite clear our ambitions for that future relationship and how we see it developing, before I was interrupted first by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and then by his noble friend Lord Warner interrupting him. I will now deal with how we want to ensure proper clarity on where we are going. The information I will provide to the Committee particularly relates to Amendments 2 and 16 from the noble Lord, Lord Warner.
The noble Lord will remember that we made a Written Ministerial Statement on 11 January. I am sure that he knows it off by heart by now. It included a commitment to continue to provide quarterly updates—it is information that noble Lords particularly want in this matter—addressing the progress on the wide range of issues relating to Euratom exit. That will include progress on those negotiations, but also on how they will develop into our future relationship with Euratom, as well as progress made by the ONR on establishing the United Kingdom’s domestic safeguards regime. I cannot tell where those negotiations will take place. The noble Lord will have to bear with me. What he wants, as far as I understand it from his Amendment 2 and the other amendments, is a guarantee that information will be provided by the Government. All I am saying is that we have made one Written Ministerial Statement—actually, we have made more than one—and we will continue to do so. That reporting commitment goes far further than the proposed amendment, by keeping Parliament regularly updated on the key issues that have been raised. I hope the Committee will welcome the fact that we will continue to provide further updates on those. The noble Lord, Lord O’Neill, asked for one. There will certainly be one before the Easter Recess.
I turn to Amendment 12 on our future relationship with Euratom. The Committee will be aware that in her speech on 22 September 2017 in Florence my right honourable friend the Prime Minister set out her desire for an implementation period after the United Kingdom has ceased to be a member of the EU. This is now well understood in the EU and I do not think that the amendment is consistent with this position. It remains the Government’s intention to ensure continuity for the nuclear industry and to avoid the possibility of the cliff edge that noble Lords referred to for the industry on exit day.
I hope that the Committee will not need to be reminded that the UK will not be a member after 29 March next year, whether an implementation period can be agreed with the Commission or not. That much is clear. If it is not, I will repeat from page 1 of the letter that the Prime Minister sent to President Tusk:
“I hereby notify the European Council in accordance with Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union of the United Kingdom’s intention to withdraw from the European Union. In addition, in accordance with … Article 50(2) as applied by Article 106a of the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, I hereby notify the European Council of the United Kingdom’s intention to withdraw from the European Atomic Energy Community. References in this letter to the European Union should therefore be taken to include a reference to the European Atomic Energy Community”.
In other words, there can be no question of separately attempting to prolong our membership of Euratom beyond the point at which we leave the EU. That is a very different matter from having an implementation period, which is something we are aiming at. That is a period after we have left the EU and Euratom, during which we continue to be covered by the EU acquis. By “acquis” we mean the regulatory framework that applies to EU member states. In exchange, the Government expect that the United Kingdom would be able to continue to benefit from its current access to the EU’s markets for the duration of the implementation period.
Again, I must emphasise that any agreed implementation period is not a way of delaying our departure from Euratom. It is a way of making the transition smooth, rather than sudden. My reason for asking noble Lords not to press their amendments is simple: the amendment does not seek to establish an implementation period after exit; it seeks a transitional period before exit. My honourable friend the Minister for Business and Energy set out on 7 February that there can be no question of separating the situation for Euratom from that of the wider EU. The two are, as we know, uniquely and legally bound. Again, I made that clear at earlier stages.
Finally, I turn to Amendment 17, which seeks to require the Government to lay a strategy for maintaining existing arrangements once the UK withdraws from Euratom and for this to be considered by both Houses before the main substantive provisions of the Bill can be brought into force. As I have said, the Government have made it absolutely clear that they will seek a close and effective association with Euratom in the future. As was mentioned in the Written Ministerial Statement, the Government set out the principles on which our Euratom strategy is based, including to aim for continuity with current relevant Euratom arrangements, to ensure that the United Kingdom maintains its leading role in European nuclear research, to ensure that the nuclear industry in the UK has the necessary skilled workforce, and to ensure that on 29 March 2019 the United Kingdom has the necessary measures in place to ensure that the nuclear industry can continue to operate. In respect of our future relationship with Euratom, we will also seek a close association with Euratom’s research and training programme, including the Joint European Torus and the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor projects. We will also want continuity of trade arrangements to ensure the nuclear industry can continue to trade across EU borders, and to maintain close and effective co-operation with Euratom on nuclear safety.
The Committee will be fully aware that the nature of our future relationship with Euratom is part of the next stage of negotiations, which is yet to begin. An implementation period may well be agreed and we hope that it is, but there are no guarantees. In any case, without such a period the United Kingdom will legally leave the EU and Euratom in March 2019. The Bill and the regulations made under it are crucial to make sure that we can establish that domestic nuclear safeguards regime to meet international safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation standards when Euratom’s safeguarding arrangements no longer apply in the United Kingdom. From that point, the United Kingdom will be responsible for its safeguards, including having its own state system of accounting and control.
Lord Rooker
In that case, are we not all wasting our time? Could the Minister say whether the International Atomic Energy Agency has already agreed in the discussions that have taken place that the contents of the Bill lead it to believe that the safeguards office will be able to demonstrate the independence it requires? If not, we are wasting our time.
Lord Henley
The noble Lord never wastes his time, nor does he waste the time of the Committee, but I can give an assurance that discussions continue with the IAEA, which is perfectly happy that we will be able to meet the appropriate safeguards regime to meet its standards by March next year. We will discuss that on later amendments. Processes have taken place in the ONR and it is engaged in recruitment. We will meet its standards—standards similar to those met by the Americans as fellow members of the IAEA. All that will be in place; that is the point behind the Bill. It is why I do not think these amendments are necessary—we will no doubt discuss them in much greater detail on Report. I hope that the noble Lord and the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, who is about to respond, will be happy and feel able not to press their amendments.
Baroness Featherstone
I thank the Minister. I listened carefully to his arguments in response to the amendments. I think that our work is not done; I did not hear a meeting of minds at this point. What I did hear was a universal view from across the Committee that surety and certainty are not there. We will probably want to come back on this on Report. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Warner
“Review of withdrawal from Euratom
(1) The Secretary of State must, in consultation with relevant interests, by 31 December 2018, lay before both Houses of Parliament—(a) a report on the progress of discussions with Euratom on the scope and conditions for a form of association with Euratom that does not extend to full membership but which minimises the changes to current arrangements for nuclear safeguards; and(b) a report on the legislative changes that would be necessary to introduce arrangements described in paragraph (a).(2) The report under paragraph (1)(a) must cover—(a) the future application of Euratom safeguarding standards;(b) the future of nuclear research and development activities within a Euratom framework;(c) aspects of future working with Euratom members in relation to the civil nuclear supply chain so far as this depends on UK membership of Euratom;(d) the supply to the United Kingdom of medical radioisotopes and their use and disposal so far as this depends on UK membership of Euratom.”
Lord Warner
I listened carefully to what the Minister said. I did not hear anything which suggested that there was not still an existential threat to the UK civil nuclear industry. There were some useful nuggets to help me redraft my amendment to make it more compliant with the language that the Government seem to be using—so I shall read Hansard carefully—but I can promise the Minister that I shall be back on Report with an alternative amendment.
Nuclear Safeguards Bill
Thursday 22nd February 2018
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 81-I Marshalled list for Committee (PDF, 86KB) - (20 Feb 2018)
Lord Grantchester
“(c) ensuring that inspections of nuclear material, facilities and equipment for the purpose of nuclear safeguards continue at the frequency and standard established by UK membership of Euratom.”
Lord Grantchester (Lab)
My Lords, Amendment 3 would amend Clause 1 by adding the requirement that the UK’s nuclear safeguards regime must continue to the standards set by Euratom. Your Lordships’ House heard throughout Second Reading that the inspections undertaken by Euratom were to a higher standard than those set by the IAEA, and it was the Government’s intention that the ONR would be facilitated to continue the UK’s safeguarding and monitoring at this level. The Minister stated that the UK’s nuclear safeguards regime is currently provided primarily by Euratom and that there has been good progress in discussions with the EU about Euratom. Negotiations with the IAEA have similarly been constructive, and progress made with key partners such as the United States, Canada, Australia and Japan. The Minister stated that the UK needs continuity and must work to avoid any break in our civil nuclear safeguards regime to support the nuclear industry. This regime and the safeguards and agreements with the IAEA are critical for the continued operation of our civil nuclear industry. The UK’s new domestic regime must be as robust as that currently provided by Euratom, and the Minister contended that it would exceed the standards that the international community expected of the IAEA.
The Government’s intentions need to be fulfilled. Guarantees need to be kept and ambitions need to be achieved. The amendment would strengthen the Bill to ensure that the only standard under which the UK regime will operate will be consistent with the Minister’s statements—that is, Euratom. The trouble is that we heard from the other place during its examination of the Bill that there is considerable risk that the UK’s regime will not be able to operate at this standard from day one, from the date of March 2019, when the UK will leave the EU. The Minister contended that those standards were needed to ensure that the UK could have the essential nuclear co-operation agreements with key international partners already mentioned, to ensure uninterrupted co-operation in trade and the civil nuclear sector. The UK standards must be as comprehensive as the current Euratom regime to enable public confidence in continuing high standards.
Lord Judd (Lab)
My Lords, I strongly support my noble friend and the amendment that he has moved. As I said in our deliberations last night, we must never forget that the issues with which we are dealing have implications not just for us, our children and immediate future generations, but for hundreds and perhaps thousands of years ahead. We have to get it right. There can be no confusion or compromise; there has to be fool-proof action right through, with continuity. There can be no gaps. We must have from the Minister categorical assurances that the Government have in place arrangements that will ensure that continuity when we leave. If we cannot have those assurances, the situation is impossibly grave, because anything can happen in even a short time if the adequate provisions are not there.
One very specific issue on this is that we know, from the Government’s own statements, that for our next generation of nuclear energy we are highly dependent upon expertise from outside the UK, because we do not have the expertise ourselves. What I do not understand is how we can have adequate—indeed, fool-proof—inspection teams working, and how we can have the quality and experience necessary for those teams, if we do not have that quality and experience available to develop our own energy. There seems to be an illogicality here. This is why it is crucial that the Government again have absolutely watertight arrangements about which they can tell the House to cover what happens if we foolishly come out of Euratom.
I have not heard those absolute, categorical assurances, or even begun to hear what the real arrangements will be. This matter is deeply grave. I have great respect for the Minister; I know he is a thoughtful man who will take on board the point being made. It is therefore crucial that this afternoon we have cast-iron evidence that the Government really have the situation under control.
Lord Warner (CB)
My Lords, I rise to support this amendment and congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, on his drafting skill in producing words that will not inflame the Government or, in particular, the—misnamed—European Research Group and its red lines. The amendment in no way implies that we, the UK, will go back into Euratom, however much most people in this Chamber wish we would. The noble Lord has kept clear of that dangerous territory and I congratulate him on that.
Indeed, there is nothing in the amendment that goes against government policy. The Government say that they aspire to achieving the safeguarding standards of Euratom but by another method than the current set of arrangements. That is all that the amendment tries to do. Indeed, it may help the Government in securing accreditation by the IAEA when it comes to the ONR being recognised as up to snuff in its standards. That accreditation is essential, as many people have said today, for us as a country to secure nuclear co-operation agreements. This is a helpful and well-constructed amendment, which the Government would be well advised to accept.
Lord O’Neill of Clackmannan (Lab)
My Lords, I support this amendment. It is not just a question of maintaining the standards that have been established but of putting us in a position where we will be able to meet and address new challenges. I happened to be in Tokyo on the day of the Fukushima disaster and tsunami. I was in the company of a group of nuclear engineers and no sooner had the messages come over the television than they were on their BlackBerrys, communicating with their international colleagues—because there is an international nuclear community—and working out the extent of the damage.
It was shortly after that, on our return, that the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate leadership was appointed to lead the international examination of the Japanese nuclear capability. We were seen to be at the forefront of that. That is a heritage that we want to maintain, and this amendment very succinctly addresses that challenge. It is important, therefore, that the ONR—the successor to the NII—is able to do that. We know that this will have implications for staffing, salaries and for the general financing—which we will come to later—but the point is that it would be desirable to have in the Bill a commitment to maintaining our current position, which is partly due to our membership of Euratom and partly due to the excellence of our inspection and monitoring capabilities.
It is incumbent on the Government, therefore, to give a commitment that they will seek to maintain the quality and standards that we currently enjoy and our capability in contributing to international nuclear safety. This is not something that should be in any way antithetical to what the Government seek to do; the amendment is no reflection on their commitment but it would enhance the Bill and I see no reason why, if not the wording, the spirit of this amendment could not be addressed. As I said in an earlier intervention, the point of Committee stage is to indicate areas of concern and, if the Government are prepared to accept the consensus around this Chamber on the matter, it is incumbent on them to return with the appropriate wording that enables us to proceed. In this instance, we have a very good blueprint from my noble friend Lord Grantchester, as my friend the noble Lord, Lord Warner, has said, for what is required. I do not think the Minister really has anywhere to hide on this issue and I would like to think he will be able to co-operate with us in enhancing the Bill to take account of the dynamic challenges that nuclear safeguards in the future will require.
Baroness Featherstone (LD)
I rise from these Benches to support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester. Given the amount of discussion across the Committee about uncertainty and concern, this well-worded amendment gives the opportunity to reassure the Committee on standards and nuclear safeguards. I hope the Minister will feel able either to use these words or to simply accept this as a drafting amendment and return on Report with new government words.
Lord Rooker (Lab)
My Lords, the amendment can only be delivered by people, and it is the issue of people that I want to raise with the Minister, because I think that his letter is in fact quite worrying. I first go back to the evidence taken by the Lords EU Energy and Environment Sub-Committee on energy security on 13 September. We had two groups of witnesses, and the second group was essentially on Euratom, with witnesses from the Institution of Mechanical Engineers and EDF—which of course runs most of the nuclear power stations and is building one—and Dr Golshan, the deputy chief inspector at the Office for Nuclear Regulation.
Having been asked how we were going to be able to deliver what is needed by the IAEA, Dr Golshan, in answer to Question 37 asked by the noble Viscount, Lord Hanworth, said:
“I started off by saying that we are building capability and capacity and we are recruiting experts in the safeguards area … the extent to which we can equip ourselves depends on the scope of the safeguards arrangements that the Government are working towards. That, in turn, depends on the outcome of the negotiations with both IAEA and Euratom. We are working towards having a regime in place that enables the UK to fulfil its international reporting obligations to the IAEA and to meet the reporting requirements of our nuclear co-operation agreements. We see that as a much more realistic starting point that we can build upon and build in additional layers of assurance as currently provided by Euratom”.
That was basically telling us, “We are not going to deliver”. That is what that means. Dr Golshan concluded her answer to that question:
“To seek to replicate Euratom standards arrangements by the end of March 2019 will be highly challenging and, while we would work towards that, we want a starting point that allows the UK to meet its obligations”.
Later on, in answering another question, Dr Golshan said:
“We currently have 10 staff in our safeguards function. I should not call it an inspectorate. We need another 12 to get to a level where we are able to provide the required reporting arrangements. If additional assurance layers are required we will need to staff to a higher level. Currently what we have, as I said, is based on the fact that we have been a member state of Euratom”.
She went on to alert us to what would need to be put in place to meet the roles and responsibilities that will be placed on the ONR. In answering a question from the chairman, the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, she said:
“The first one is to have an IT system that allows us to collect and process data and then provide a report to the IAEA”.
I have seen nothing about that because clearly a new IT system is required. Dr Golshan continued:
“That means the UK would meet its international obligations as part of the non-proliferation treaty. The second element is that we should be able to facilitate IAEA’s activities in the UK. The third element is that we should have suitably experienced staff to undertake verification activities”.
In a later question, Dr Golshan was asked about the staff and she said:
“The biggest risk that I see is our ability to recruit”.
Of course, there has been free movement while we have been in Euratom and recruitment has not been a problem. Not everybody that is needed in the nuclear industry fulfils the Home Office requirement for getting into the country. We are not going to be able to build Hinkley, for a start, because we cannot get the steel erectors into the country. We need half the country’s steel erectors on Hinkley at one point. We will not be able to get them in. They are not qualified in terms that allow the Home Office to let them in.
I am sticking to the point of what will happen about the staff because we were then told in the report, which was published only a few weeks ago, that the training programme to train people to become fully trained new inspectors lasted between 12 and 24 months. Therefore, my first question is: why have six months been lopped off that figure in the Minister’s letter? What has happened to change that timescale between now and when the committee received the evidence? Have more resources been put in? Have the criteria changed? That is quite a big change, bearing in mind the timescales we are working to. We do not have a lot of time. In addition to the training lasting from 12 to 24 months, the committee was told that we need more staff anyway because the existing staff are not inspectors. The Minister’s letter flags that up and refers to 11 safeguards officers, all of whom will undertake training to become inspectors by March. The Minister then chose to put the next sentence in bold type. I assume that that was his choice to reinforce his assessment that the ONR will be in a position to deliver the international standards. The international standards mean lower standards than we have now. That is the assumption because they are not the Euratom standards.
The Minister went on to say that the ONR will require a team of 30 to 35 people, which was implied in the answer given by Dr Golshan that I cited earlier when she said that the ONR would need more staff. The ONR is recruiting but the fact of the matter is that a far more interesting choice of jobs in this industry is available in the rest of Europe than in the United Kingdom, notwithstanding the fact that I understand that a quarter of Euratom’s inspections take place in the UK, so there is quite a big capacity there. But, of course, we have not been doing that. We did not need to recruit or train people because we are members of Euratom.
The Minister went on to tell us that since the evidence was taken back in September and October—the report says the end of October—the ONR has managed to recruit the princely sum of four individuals. Where did they come from? I would like to know. Are they from the UK? Some 98% of its staff were from the UK or had dual nationality when the evidence was given. Where did the four come from? Why is it only four? If this matter is being dealt with urgently does that figure reflect salary levels or other matters relating to the job such as promotion prospects or seniority? Can the training programme cope with upskilling the safeguards officers to become safeguards inspectors?
The issue here concerns the staff but the Minister’s letter did not really address that issue. First, we are told there are only four. That is not enough. They cannot be trained in time, and in the Minister’s letter someone has lopped six months off the period given to the Lords Select Committee. Why is that? There must be a reason for it. I presume that someone reads the evidence given to your Lordships’ Select Committees from representatives of industry and other sectors. I would like to know the answers to those questions because if there is confusion about the number of staff, their training and recruitment at this point in time, we are heading for real trouble. That is clearly the case. Therefore, I hope the Minister has come to this debate prepared. I know that we are in Committee, so I apologise for the detail of my questions, but that is what this stage is for. We need some answers on this issue before we move on to the next stage.
Lord Teverson (LD)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, for having gone through all that. That session of the committee which I chair was an eye-opener. That is why I tabled my Amendment 10, which we will consider in the next sitting of the Committee. The amendment is about labour mobility, which is an absolutely key factor in terms of not just safeguarding but the nuclear industry as a whole. I look forward to continuing that debate on that occasion and very much agree with the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Rooker.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Lord Henley) (Con)
My Lords, I hope that I can respond to and deal with the various points that have been made. I am very grateful for all the contributions that have been made, particularly from my former noble friend, the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, who stressed that she wanted reassurances. I think that was the gist of what the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, said as well. He was seeking reassurances on when the ONR would be ready and whether we would meet the appropriate standards under the IAEA and so on.
I will refer back to the letter that I sent to all noble Lords, to which the noble Lord referred, and remind them of that. I also remind the Committee that we have committed to a domestic nuclear safeguards regime that is equivalent in effectiveness and coverage to that currently provided by Euratom. That is the commitment that we have made and I repeat it to the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester. That means a level of inspections and other regulatory arrangements—it is not just inspections—that goes beyond the normal international standards as applied by the IAEA that would be expected from the United Kingdom: for example, additional assurance and verification activities at additional facilities.
It is crucial that we meet all those international standards following our withdrawal from Euratom. Compliance enables the United Kingdom to discharge international commitments and would also underpin international nuclear trade arrangements with key partners such as the US, Canada, Japan and Australia. It is right therefore that the ONR focuses its efforts on ensuring that the United Kingdom is able to meet those standards immediately on withdrawal from Euratom and seeks to move to Euratom standards as soon as possible thereafter. The important thing is that we get to the IAEA—I hope I have got the letters in the right order; it is difficult to remember sometimes—as soon as possible thereafter.
Lord Henley
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, and I will not refer to his socks, which might have been distracting me.
I also say to the noble Lord that we will be ready; the ONR is sure that it will be ready and we are working closely with it to ensure that it will be in a position to regulate the new civil nuclear safeguards regime following our withdrawal from Euratom. The ONR is in the process of expanding its safeguards function by recruiting and training additional inspectors, building additional institutional capacity and developing necessary IT systems.
The ONR requires a multidisciplinary team to be able to deliver safeguards responsibilities. The staff essential to its safeguards function include safeguards inspectors as well as nuclear material accountants and information management and reporting specialists—so a whole range of different specialists. Current estimates—I set this out in my letter—suggest that the ONR would require a team of 20 to 25 staff, which would include at least nine safeguards inspectors, with the precise number depending on the exact requirements of the domestic regime set out in regulations. I remind the Committee again that we have made the regulations available to the House, and I am sure that noble Lords are studying them in some detail.
The ONR already has 11 safeguards officers in post, who are all in training to become safeguards inspectors by 29 March 2019. It is my assessment, and that of my honourable and right honourable friends in the department who have specific responsibility for this as the Ministers responsible, that, based on current progress, the ONR will be in a position to deliver to international standards on withdrawal from Euratom.
However, the speed with which the ONR is able to move from international standards to a domestic nuclear safeguards regime that is precisely equivalent in coverage and effectiveness to Euratom standards obviously depends on a wide range of factors. In particular, timing will depend on negotiations with the EU and negotiations on future co-operation with Euratom and the level of its involvement in the United Kingdom’s safeguards. The ONR estimates that, to be able to deliver its functions—I emphasise its independence—to a standard equivalent in effectiveness and coverage to Euratom, it may require a team of around 30 to 35 staff, which would include around 20 safeguards inspectors.
The ONR is already—again, as I made clear in the letter—actively recruiting and interviewing further candidates to meet this level. I cannot give precise levels as to exactly where it is at this moment, but it is actively recruiting and interviewing. The first phase of recruitment last year was successful: four individuals were recruited and are currently in training to become safeguards inspectors. A further recruitment campaign is under way. Successful candidates will join the ONR’s training programme, and ONR assesses—again, this is its assessment—that it will take 12 to 18 months to upskill new recruits to inspector level.
I hope that the publication of preconsultation versions of draft regulations in January, which set out more detail on the proposed domestic safeguards regime, indicates our genuine intention to deliver standards that are broadly equivalent to the Euratom regime as quickly and effectively as possible. However, the important point to get over to the Committee—
Lord Henley
Can I just complete a sentence before the noble Lord intervenes? The important point is that it will be able to deliver the standards that are broadly equivalent to the Euratom regime as quickly and effectively as possible. I give way now.
Lord Henley
As I think I made clear at Second Reading, I am not quite sure whether the noble Lord, Lord Judd, has fully grasped the difference between safeguarding and safety. On safeguarding, the important point is that we meet our commitments to the IEA—
Lord Henley
I will try to get it right. We will meet those without any problem at all. Those are the same as the commitments that the United States and other weapon states—an expression that the noble Lord probably does not like—have to meet, and we will meet them. Euratom’s commitments are slightly different, and so that applies to ourselves and the French as the two weapon states within Euratom. They are marginally different. We will get to those in due course, but we will meet the appropriate standards under the IAEA by next year, just as we do now.
Lord Judd
Again, I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. Can he clarify one point? He said that he is not sure that I have grasped the difference between safety and safeguards. He is quite correct because I simply do not understand how there is a dividing line between the two. I just do not accept that that is the situation—the two are intimately related.
Lord Henley
My Lords, I could go back but I think that I would try the patience of the Committee if I repeated a great deal of what I said at Second Reading and at other points about safety. The ONR has been dealing with safety for many years and it will continue to do so. Safeguards are another matter. In effect, they relate to the transference of certain things, ensuring that they cannot be used for nuclear warheads or whatever. Safeguards are different from safety. This Bill relates to safeguards and that is what we are trying to get over to the noble Lord. We will meet our IAEA standards on safeguards under this Bill once we have the powers so to do.
I hope that that provides noble Lords—with the possible exception of the noble Lord, Lord Judd—with the appropriate assurances. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, will feel that the information I have provided is sufficient in stressing that we will have a domestic nuclear safeguards regime equivalent in effectiveness and coverage to that currently provided by Euratom. That is what the Bill is intended to do. We are leaving Euratom. We have to make sure that we have the appropriate safeguards regime in place, and that is what the Bill tries to do.
Lord Rooker
Perhaps I may come back on that point. We are in a very vulnerable position, are we not? As a country, we have not been in charge of safeguarding; Euratom has been doing that. It is quite clear that international staff, with free movement under Euratom, have been doing the work. We are hoping to create a cadre of inspectors who will upskill people from various offices, but I have no idea of the industry salaries and so on. We have recruited only four inspectors. Are they UK or EU citizens? I am curious and would like to know that. Are we applying any contractual arrangements to people once they have been upskilled?
Once they have been upskilled to carry out safeguarding, Euratom will be their world—not the UK. The career or job enhancement opportunities and so on will be marvellous for the individuals in question, but I am concerned about my country. Are we placing any restrictions on them? Are we going to say, “We’ll upskill you and get you trained but, by gum, you’ll have to work in the UK for five years”? I do not know whether that will be the case but if we do not do something like that, we will be laying ourselves open to the vagaries of the market. We are entering a completely new area here. We cannot recruit fast enough—we have only four inspectors so far. Upskilling these people places them in a very advantageous position. I am really supportive of that—I want them to be upskilled and better qualified, and to have the freedom to move to better jobs if they do not like what is on offer in the UK. Presumably they will not all be British. They might take advantage of getting skilled and then, because of how we have treated foreigners since the referendum, say, “Right, we’re off to the rest of Europe”. Therefore, are any restrictions being placed on upskilling and training these people?
Lord Henley
The noble Lord is enjoying himself, although I do not know why.
Lord Henley
I am answering the question but the noble Lord is enjoying himself. The ONR is recruiting and will make sure that it has the right people to provide the appropriate safeguards regime on 29 March next year to meet IAEA standards. Obviously we are not going to impose restrictions on where employees go thereafter. Is this a new policy being developed by the party opposite, that once people are trained in any job, they cannot move on and have to stay? These people will be employed by the ONR, and it is then a matter for the ONR to make sure that they have an attractive career and wish to continue working for the ONR. I am sure they will find that it is an attractive career and will want to stay
I am equally sure that they will do the job very effectively and that the ONR will feel confident that, with its recruitment processes, it can provide the appropriate safeguarding regime to make sure that we meet IAEA standards by 29 March next year.
Lord Teverson
My Lords, I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, who mentioned the requirement for information technology systems, which is always the other area that needs to be looked at. When we get to my amendment in the next Committee sitting, I will certainly come back on the points that the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, raised about churn, as that is important. However, are we also confident that we will have information technology systems in place? What nature will they take, in a very broad sense? Will they be Excel spreadsheets or something more involved?
Lord Teverson
It is amazing what you can do with Excel spreadsheets, and I suspect that most systems are based on something like that. I would be reassured if that were the case, but if it is rather more sophisticated, I start to get concerned.
Lord Henley
I know that Liberal Democrats live and die for Excel spreadsheets. They find them enormously exciting, although I do not understand that. However, the noble Lord makes a very good and serious point. This is not just about the appropriate individuals to be trained; it is also about equipment. Yes, again, the ONR is happy that it will have the appropriate equipment and IT systems in place for 29 March. The ONR has given a commitment that it will be ready to provide the right service, so that we can meet those IAEA commitments next year. It is very easy just to talk in shorthand about the number of people on the ground, but as the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, says, spreadsheets, which Liberals find very exciting, and other equipment are probably also involved. Yes, all of that will be ready—I can give those commitments.
Lord Judd
There is one other matter. Of course, one of the results of what has been in place, very successfully, under Euratom is the international nature of the inspection. We have to recognise that the implications of something going seriously wrong are not confined to British frontiers; there are implications for people—men, women and children—beyond our frontiers. How are we going to ensure that in the arrangements we make, we retain international confidence that we are taking, and are seen to be taking, that responsibility seriously, and are not judges in our own courts?
Lord Henley
The noble Lord talks about international obligations. The important thing to remember about the initials IAEA is that the first letter stands for “International”. It is an international body, we have been signed up to it since 1957 and we continue to be so. It will offer those guarantees.
Lord Grantchester
I hesitated to respond to the Minister because I was not quite sure what he was saying. Is he saying he accepts our amendment, because he seems to be saying that we will maintain our standards to the Euratom standards?
Lord Henley
As all noble Lords will know—particularly those who have been on the Front Bench in government from time immemorial—the lovely word “resist” appears at the top of the brief. No, I am not accepting the amendment. It does not add anything to the Bill. All I am doing is providing the appropriate commitment that we will meet the right standards at the right time.
Lord Grantchester
My Lords, I am still confused by the way the Minister goes from one stance to another, saying that he will meet these standards but somehow feels it is inappropriate to have that on the face of the Bill.
I am not satisfied with the Minister’s responses and I do not think the rest of the Committee is either. This is the key challenge to the Government—that they can and will do what they propose in order for there to be a credible nuclear industry in the UK, operating to Euratom standards. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, made a compelling remark earlier, saying that the Government have not appreciated the situation and undertaken a risk assessment of their handling of Euratom issues. On a corporate risk register—one axis being low and high impact, and the other axis being high and low probability—leaving Euratom must be placed at the worst quartile: high probability of an unsatisfactory outcome, coupled with high impact.
We will certainly be appreciating the Government’s response across all the Committee’s amendments, in order to determine the best framework to propose on Report. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Warner
“(3A) No regulations may be made under this section unless the Secretary of State has laid before both Houses of Parliament a statement certifying that, in his or her opinion, it is no longer possible to retain membership of Euratom or establish an association with Euratom that permits the operation of nuclear safeguarding activity through its administrative arrangements.”
Lord Warner
My Lords, I hope this next amendment will not ensure that we descend into the “end-of-the-pier show”, as we seem to be in danger of doing from time to time. I am very sorry that the Minister has taken the line he has on Amendment 3, and I have no expectations whatsoever that I will get a sympathetic response to Amendment 4.
I want to say a little about why I tabled this amendment. I am genuinely confused as to what the Government want their future relationship with Euratom to be—I simply do not understand. I understand that they want to withdraw from membership, but the Minister talks quite warmly from time to time about having some future relationship. I think “relationship” is probably a safe term to use: we do not talk about “associate membership” or “association”, but a “relationship”. He seems to want that relationship because Euratom provides a comfort blanket in all this. Many in this House are rather desperately looking for some kind of comfort blanket regarding what the situation may be at about 11 pm on 29 March 2019.
The Government’s position is very odd. They are staunchly determined to say that they expect the ONR to be up to meeting the IAEA accreditation standards by that date. However, they are singularly silent about whether that accreditation will actually be achieved in time for us as a country to put in place a series of nuclear co-operation agreements by 29 March 2019. I hope that I can tempt the Minister to say something about that.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)
My Lords, I would like to speak to Amendments 14 and 15 tabled in my name, and in particular to the proposed new clause set out in Amendment 14. I would never insult the Minister by accusing him of being overly sensitive; nevertheless, he will have realised that there is a great deal of genuine concern about what is going to be delivered in relation to Euratom on 29 March 2019. I support what the noble Lord, Lord Warner, just said, which was in the same vein.
My suggested new clause would require the Government to answer certain criteria by that date. The criteria are set out clearly and they have been shown, in the debates on this Bill and on the withdrawal Bill yesterday, to be the ones that cause concern around the House and which the Minister has heard repeated time and again. In debating terms, this has basically been a one-horse race in relation to concern about Euratom.
Yesterday—and I will not repeat them—I cited some answers that had helpfully been supplied by the Minister to questions raised by the Society for Radiological Protection and by me as a result of that society’s representations. What was clear from those answers was that the Government do not know what will be delivered or when. This afternoon, I will cite another piece of evidence that draws the same conclusions. On 12 February, just over a week ago, there was a meeting between 10 officials—nine from the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, one from Public Health England and the two senior relevant officers of the Society for Radiological Protection. I have in my hand a record of that meeting, which I feel sure is accurate.
In that meeting, there was what was described as a “Euratom exit update”. One of the officials, who was clearly a senior and responsible official—it is invidious to name officials, so I will not name him or her—noted that the Nuclear Safeguards Bill is currently going through the House of Lords. The official noted that,
“at current there has been minimal industry engagement, due to the short timescales to pass the bill. However”—
the official—
“did note that the bill is a skeleton, and more detailed consultation with industry and professional bodies would take place as the regulations are developed”.
All I am asking for, in my new clause suggested in Amendment 14, is the key to the skeleton or the cupboard where the skeleton is kept.
The official noted that,
“discussions are going well internationally”,
which is very welcome,
“with progress being made on bi-lateral agreements with the US, Australia, Canada and Japan”.
We would certainly like to know more about that. The official then explained—and this is very important—that,
“as part of the EU exit process they”—
the 10 officials—
“are unable to pursue agreements with the various EU countries”—
I think “pursue” means seek—
“till the exit process is complete”.
If that is right, it is extremely worrying. I am sure that the Minister can be supplied with a copy of the minutes of that meeting.
It was also noted that,
“there have been wider EU civil nuclear issues around legal ownership of fissile material and radioactive waste”.
Contained in that single sentence is a host of problems that will have to be unravelled in great detail if there is to be proper nuclear safeguarding.
Having read those notes, with the welcome support of the noble Lord, Lord Fox, I tabled Amendment 14. It requires the Secretary of State to publish a report setting out the answers to all these questions before 29 March 2019. It requires the making of,
“regulations providing for the implementation of any agreements covered”,
by the clause and a statutory instrument which should be approved by each House of Parliament.
There is an evidence base for the kind of quality assurance that any responsible Government would demand of any contractor to which they were letting a contract. As a Parliament, we are entitled to demand, respectfully but necessarily, a similar level of quality control for the Government before we lose the legislative opportunities available to us and throw this enormously important issue to the wolves—or to a skeleton.
Lord Teverson
My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 9. One of the things I have tried to do in this amendment—I could not do it completely satisfactorily because of where we are in the Bill—is to ask what are the key things we need in place before it is safe and practical for us to leave Euratom and the system we have. There were three specific areas that we needed to cross that finishing line before we entered out into this brave new world. They are listed and they are very clear.
The first is that we should have an agreement from the International Atomic Energy Agency that our safeguarding procedures and the body that we are talking about in the Bill are approved. We need that; without it, we are unable to move forward. Secondly, because we are one of the few nuclear weapon states in the world, we need a voluntary offer agreement with the IAEA that relates to our new status outside Euratom. Thirdly and very practically—we have had a description of the difficulties around this—we need active nuclear co-operation agreements that have been confirmed or agreed by the other side. Whether we can get grandfathering rights on them is very difficult in some instances—the one with the United States has been particularly highlighted in that degree—but we also need to have those in place for those nations where we have active nuclear trading of the type of products listed in the schedules of the Euratom treaty and under the international agreements of the IAEA.
The difficulty in drafting this amendment was that if we do not have these in place, what do we do? My solution to that was very simple: that we should seek temporarily—as the Minister said, we have already gone through the process of agreeing withdrawal from Euratom, rightly or wrongly—to withdraw the notice under Article 106a until we have those three areas of agreement in place and we can be certain that we can go ahead. It is my opinion that we can do that ourselves unilaterally. More certainly we would need to get the agreement of the 27 other member states. That would clearly be the right answer, in that we would continue to be a member until we had those in place.
I was unable to put that in the amendment because it was out of the scope of the Bill, apparently, so I have looked to move on. What we would have to do here is, effectively, to have a transition period. On that, I come back to my question to the Minister that I raised in the first grouping of amendments: do we know that there will be a transition period with Euratom, the negotiation on which, as I see it, is going ahead and will have to be agreed or not on 22 March—it is only a month away—and that we can indeed somehow satisfactorily subcontract all these responsibilities to Euratom and to the international agencies should one of these vital areas go wrong? That is an entirely reasonable question for which I would expect us to have a workable strategy to avoid that cliff edge, if that should happen for all sorts of reasons that, quite clearly, are not totally in the Government’s control. From that point of view we need contingency and to understand the route map if those three areas are not fulfilled. I look forward to the Minister’s response on them.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, underline the desirability of an implementation period in this area as in other Brexit areas. For clarity, I want to ask a question arising from what the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said. Are energy officials and Energy Ministers able to get on with this? The assumption that I have been working on is that the timetable is tight in this nuclear area and that discussions therefore need to go ahead with the IAEA, Euratom and the other nuclear states. Is that work in hand? Is there a plan for it? It would be helpful if the Minister were able to respond on that.
Lord Fox (LD)
I want briefly to speak in support of Amendment 14, which bears my name. While avoiding repeating what the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has said, I want to pick out subsection (2)(c) of the proposed new clause, which refers to, “relevant research projects”. The noble Lord, Lord Broers, spoke eloquently in a previous debate about the importance of research in this area. As your Lordships and, I am sure, the Minister know, the UK benefits enormously from the long-term research funding and its membership of the Fusion for Energy programme, which flow through the Euratom relationship. I think the supply chain has been awarded some £0.5 billion to date and expects more, and the UK Atomic Energy Authority receives significant sums—around £50 million. On a broader level, as a leading participant in Euratom and the research element of it, the United Kingdom has been able authoritatively to drive research priorities. What does the Minister envisage our authority being following this process? Will it have risen or sunk as a result of our ability to drive and influence research in the nuclear field?
My noble friend Lord Teverson illustrated how hard and tough the Table Office has been on the wording of the amendments. In many cases—certainly, in other conversations—the Minister has ruled out of order a lot of what we have talked about. However, on Amendment 14, which covers some of these areas, the Table Office has been clear that this is in spec with the Bill and our debate today.
Lord Grantchester
My Lords, we have added our names to Amendment 4 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Warner. It is Labour policy to remain a member of Euratom or to continue equivalent arrangements with it. The Conservative Government have been reckless to reject immediately the UK’s membership of Euratom. Your Lordships’ discussion in Committee last night on the withdrawal Bill highlighted how the Euratom treaty is distinct from the EU treaty. The Government state that, because there is an overlap of membership, with the same nation states as are in the EU, it is part of the same organisation. However, the two treaties are legally distinct, which has not been contradicted by the Government.
The Minister said this morning that both organisations are uniquely and legally joined. He needs to explain how they are so legally. It is reckless to make the theoretical and technical oversight of the European Court of Justice a defining reason, when the UK is far from ready to undertake its own safeguards regimes to the standard maintained by Euratom. The ECJ has never been called on to make a ruling.
Furthermore, the Government have committed to continue as far as possible through negotiations to be in close association with Euratom. They must be exhaustive in their endeavours and report back to Parliament on the outcome. If it is no longer possible to establish an association, they must say so, with reasons.
Amendment 9, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Teverson and Lord Fox, and the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, map out further agreements to be pursued before withdrawal. It requires the Secretary of State to request “a transition period” so that the UK,
“can continue to benefit from existing nuclear safeguard agreements”,
with the approval of the IAEA, that the ONR is the approved UK safeguarding authority. My noble friend Lord Hunt of Kings Heath has spoken to Amendment 12 on the transitional period. It must be recognised that approvals of nuclear co-operation agreements are sequential to the recognition by the IAEA that the UK safeguarding standards are sufficient. Although these NCAs may be progressing, their ratification will necessarily take some time and may spill over into any transition period. We endorse the sentiments behind Amendment 9 as crucial to maintaining the UK as a credible internationally recognised nuclear state operating to international standards.
Amendment 14, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, would insert a new clause stating that before leaving Euratom the Government must publish a report detailing agreements reached with Euratom to ensure compliance with international non-proliferation agreements and lay appropriate regulations to give effect to their implementation. We understand and are in unison with the importance noble Lords on all Benches place on the highest standards, the nearest equivalence, the closest association, with any necessary transition period, to replicate the regime currently operated under Euratom. We support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Warner, that says the Government must keep Parliament informed regarding the ongoing UK status with Euratom. The noble Lord, Lord Teverson, has also said that it is far from clear where we will be in March 2019, when timing is such a critical issue.
Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for the opportunity to address this important set of issues around the UK’s future relationship with Euratom. As my noble friend Lord Henley said, the EU and Euratom are uniquely legally joined. Noble Lords will be aware that when we formally notified our intention to leave the EU, we also commenced the process of leaving Euratom. I repeat my noble friend’s assurances, however, that the Government want to maintain the continuity of our mutually successful civil nuclear co-operation with Euratom and other international parties when we leave the EU.
The first half of the proposition of Amendment 4 —that,
“it is no longer possible to retain membership of Euratom”—
has already passed. On 29 March 2017 the Prime Minister notified President Tusk of the United Kingdom’s intention to withdraw from Euratom. We are withdrawing from Euratom but we want a close relationship with it in the future. I believe that it would be deeply irresponsible of Parliament to pass an amendment which, quite explicitly, prevents us from using the powers in this Bill until we have attempted to do exactly the opposite of what the Article 50 letter says we are doing. That leaves the second half of the proposition: that we achieve, “an association with Euratom” that means that it is Euratom rather than our own regulator, the ONR, that carries out safeguarding in the UK after we leave the EU. To reiterate the point made by my noble friend, while the Euratom treaty allows for the conclusion of association agreements that allow third parties to participate in some Euratom activities, these agreements have so far been limited primarily to research and training activities.
This amendment would require us to have explored every avenue and concluded that,
“it is no longer possible”,
before we make regulations to enable the UK’s own domestic regime. That presents enormous timing difficulties and will introduce a risk of the one thing I believe everyone agrees we must avoid—being left with nothing in place from day one of Brexit. I do not believe that the industry would support such a position. We simply cannot await the outcome of the future relationship discussions before we use the regulation-making powers in the Bill. Of course, it may all happen very quickly but, then again, it may not. It would be deeply irresponsible to put ourselves in a position where we cannot exercise the powers in the Bill.
Lord Warner
I am sorry to interrupt the Minister’s debut on the Bill. I am trying to make clear that I am not asking the Government to stop proceeding with the Bill; all I am asking them to do is to set out on a piece of paper the nature of their future association and relationship. The Front Bench keeps avoiding that issue. I do not use the words “associate membership”, I use the word “association”. I am willing to change it to “relationship”. What I am trying to get the Government to do is set out how they see their relationship with Euratom—because they have acknowledged that they will have a relationship with it in some way—and what that relationship will cover. If we could get some clarity from Ministers on that, we would not be having these endless discussions about the issue.
Baroness Vere of Norbiton
I thank the noble Lord for his intervention. I am on paragraph 11. I have many more paragraphs to go and I hope that in those paragraphs I will be able to keep him very happy indeed.
I understand and share the sentiment of wanting to maintain a close relationship with Euratom. The noble Lord, Lord Warner, mentioned this relationship and it could indeed include any of the things that he mentioned, but they are subject to the negotiations. However, we have already stated very clearly that the Government will seek a close and effective association as part of phase 2 of the exit negotiations with the European Commission. What we cannot accept is that the regulations must await a definitive outcome of talks which are by their nature uncertain in both timing and result. It is therefore vital that we continue to work to enable the set-up of a domestic safeguards regime, and to have ready the bilateral safeguards and nuclear co-operation agreements that we will need to function as a responsible nuclear state from day one of exit.
This approach will reassure the international community that the UK remains committed to nuclear non-proliferation, and will provide clarity to industry that it will continue to be able to move vital materials, parts and expertise once we leave Euratom. There can be no question of waiting until we know the outcome of the negotiations on our future relationship before we can put in place our own arrangements. The implications of not having the right systems operating from when Euratom safeguards arrangements no longer apply are too serious for industry and for our position within the international civil nuclear community.
Lord Teverson
Can we actually make this clear? I have not heard anyone in this Committee saying, “Please, Her Majesty’s Government, do not do anything until this thing is finished”. We are not asking for anything to be delayed, we are saying, “Please get on with it”, but we need some information on the way; we have to have some idea of the destination, and Brussels wants some idea of the destination by 22 March and then in October. If it does not happen, what are the contingency plans? We are not asking for anything to not happen now. I do not think the Minister understands that. Did I hear anybody say that?
Lord Warner
I put in this provision about regulations only out of sheer frustration because one cannot get any information out of the Front Bench about what that relationship will be. I am not seriously going to stop the Bill proceeding but there is a very high level of frustration across the Committee that the Government cannot explain in any way what relationship they are aspiring to. For example, do the Government want to talk to Euratom about seconding some inspectors to the ONR for a period of time to get it over the hurdle of the transition to a UK regulator? That is the kind of specific thing which it would be quite sensible to discuss. No one is going to stop that. We just want to know what the Government are trying to do.
Baroness Vere of Norbiton
I thank both noble Lords for their interventions. I will make a little progress because I think I will be able to make them both a little happier—although I am fairly sure that I will not get all the way.
I recognise the importance of providing Parliament with clarity on our future relationship with Euratom. The Written Ministerial Statement of 11 January includes a commitment to provide quarterly updates on progress.
I turn now to Amendment 9, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, which would require the Secretary of State to seek a transition period in the event that the UK is unable to secure new international agreements with the IAEA and nuclear co-operation agreements—or NCAs—with key third parties by 1 March 2019. I will address NCAs first. It may be helpful for me to set out that the UK does not itself have any requirement for NCAs to be in place for trade in nuclear-related items to continue—but some of our key trading partners do. In the US it is a legal requirement; in Japan, Canada and Australia it is a very strong policy commitment. That is why those four NCAs are our priority. It is quite right to stress how important this is: an NCA must be in place before such trade with these countries can take place. Each of these four countries recognises the importance of putting in place bilateral NCAs to ensure uninterrupted co-operation and trade in the civil nuclear sector, following the UK’s withdrawal from Euratom.
There are also a number of countries, in addition to the four priority ones, with which we wish to discuss our ongoing nuclear co-operation to ensure that appropriate arrangements are in place to allow continuity of trade. But in those cases—
Lord Carlile of Berriew
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I suspect that she is now on paragraph 15, but she is not answering this debate, which is about whether Her Majesty’s Government are prepared to provide specified information to Parliament on certain criteria. What she is telling us would all be very interesting if we had not heard it many times before, but it is a dissertation on the roles of different organisations. Can we please have an answer to this debate? It is 4.32 pm on a Thursday and I would have thought that it could be answered in a few paragraphs—maybe numbers 47 to 50.
Lord Teverson
I was happy with the answer that the Minister was giving about NCAs.
Baroness Vere of Norbiton
With the greatest respect, I did not interfere in the writing of the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and I will crack on a bit further to answer the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, as I too think this bit is very interesting. We are talking about these additional countries because we are obviously going to have to set up NCAS with them, too, for trade to continue. I assure noble Lords that discussions on the four priority NCAs started a while back and are progressing well. They are on track to be completed before the UK leaves the EU. I can also assure noble Lords that this Government, as part of their planning process, have factored in the time necessary to seek parliamentary ratification of the agreements both in the UK and in third countries. This will enable the NCAs to come into force from the moment that Euratom arrangements no longer apply to the UK.
I turn now to the UK’s discussions with the IAEA. Noble Lords will be aware that the UK began formal discussions with it some months ago to conclude new safeguards agreements that would replace those between the UK, IAEA and Euratom when the Euratom arrangements are no longer applicable. These discussions, which began some months ago, as my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe mentioned, have been constructive and fruitful, and substantial progress has been made. I can be a little more specific: formal negotiations started last September and there were several rounds of preliminary meetings before that. There have been two rounds of negotiations so far, which have made substantial progress. I hope that that is helpful.
The amendment asks that the IAEA should recognise the ONR as the approved safeguards authority in the UK, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Teverson. I will make it clear that the IAEA’s focus in respect of the UK’s safeguards lies with the voluntary offer agreement and additional protocols rather than with the domestic legislation underpinning the domestic regime or the UK Government’s arrangements for fulfilling their commitments. However, as I have set out, the Government have already held productive and fruitful discussions with the IAEA on the UK’s future safeguards agreements and understand what the IAEA requires of us in setting up the system. It is not necessary to consult on the detail of legislation or on the ONR’s readiness to implement the new regime with the IAEA.
As my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy set out in his Statement to the House in September last year, the Government are seeking new agreements with the IAEA that follow exactly the same principles as the existing ones. This will ensure that the IAEA retains its right to inspect all civil nuclear facilities and to receive all current safeguards reporting, ensuring that international verification of our safeguards activity continues to be robust.
In addition to this, the Secretary of State set out on 11 January the Government’s intention to update the House on our overall progress with Euratom, including on the EU negotiations and other important matters such as international agreements. I trust that these reports, the first of which we expect to provide in a few weeks’ time—indeed, just before the Easter Recess—will reassure noble Lords that significant and substantial progress is being made. Indeed, noble Lords will be able to see it for themselves and will no doubt bring it back to the House to discuss, should they wish.
Amendment 15, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, inserts two new subsections and seeks to require that, by 29 March 2019, the Secretary of State must present to Parliament a substantially detailed report, along with draft regulations implementing any agreements reached with Euratom relating to safeguards, and have such regulations approved by both Houses. Amendment 14 seeks to prevent the substantive provisions of the Bill coming into force until regulations under Amendment 15 to implement safeguards agreements with Euratom have been approved. While I have sympathy with the noble Lord’s aim of ensuring robust parliamentary scrutiny, the process set out in Amendment 15 would not be appropriate. As we have already discussed in our deliberations on this Bill, I am confident that there are appropriate processes in place to ensure proper parliamentary scrutiny of the substantive powers in the Bill. Noble Lords can be assured that the regulations establishing a UK safeguards regime under the powers in the Bill will be subject to the draft affirmative procedure.
I turn now to the report proposed in this amendment. We have been open about our strategy for withdrawal and our future relationship with Euratom. In the Written Ministerial Statement on 11 January, we outlined a twofold approach under which we are seeking a close association with Euratom through our negotiations with the European Union. I refer noble Lords to the Written Ministerial Statement. It goes into some detail about our specific objectives in relation to a close association with research and training, continuity of open trade arrangements and close and effective co-operation on nuclear safety. This is a very broad ambition of ours, and it goes much further than the nuclear safeguards that we are specifically talking about today. Simultaneously with these discussions about our broader relationship with Euratom, on which we will report to your Lordships’ House every three months, we are putting in place measures to ensure that we can operate as an independent and responsible nuclear state from day one.
As noble Lords will be aware, we are planning negotiations on a possible implementation period. The Government have confirmed that they intend to include Euratom matters. This implementation period will start after the date that we leave the European Union. This must be taken into account. We are being open with our plans for a domestic regime, and we have been clear on our intentions for the new domestic regime. As made clear in the Written Ministerial Statement, the Government intend to be able to put in place a robust regime equivalent in coverage and effectiveness to that currently provided by Euratom. To put this more clearly, and for the avoidance of doubt, we would be meeting IAEA standards on day one and working our way to Euratom standards as soon as possible thereafter. A key but inevitable difference will be that reporting and assurance activities would be carried out by the ONR rather than Euratom.
The approach of using a domestic body rather than a supranational one to operate a domestic safeguards regime is common among other non-Euratom countries, such as the US and Canada, whose safeguards regimes consist of a state regulator, with the IAEA providing independent international verification. This approach necessitates some differences in the approach of the regime but we do not consider it to necessitate a reduction in standards. To be absolutely clear about independence, it is the international oversight provided by the IAEA and the inspections carried out by its inspectors that underpin the independence of nuclear safeguards around the world. As I have already mentioned, we have committed to providing Parliament with quarterly reports on progress from across the Euratom programme. These reports will include a section on ONR capacity and readiness as well as on research, which was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Fox.
Before I close, I want to return to the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, about the meeting that he attended with officials. I want to flesh out the Government’s consultation strategy on this because I fear he thinks it is narrower than is truly the case. The Government continue to have discussions with the nuclear industry on the future of the nuclear safeguards regime. In addition to official-level engagement, Richard Harrington, the Minister for Energy and Industry, held a representative industry stakeholder forum in September. There have been further forums since then and the next one will take place on 5 March. The Government have provided the industry with pre-consultation drafts of regulations that we propose to make, and in late February we held a technical workshop on the draft regulations with key nuclear operators.
I hope my explanations have provided sufficient reassurances to noble Lords, and that the noble Lord feels able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Broers (CB)
My Lords, I would like to catch the Minister before she sits down, if that is possible. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, and I have mentioned research and development. Resources to sustain that research and development come through Euratom. Have the Government said anything about how these resources are going to be sustained in future?
Baroness Vere of Norbiton
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Broers, for that comment. I did have a little more flesh on that particular bone so I shall share it now. On the question of research, the Government’s objectives are set out in our recent future partnership paper, Collaboration on Science and Innovation. We are seeking a close association with the Euratom research and training programme, including the Joint European Torus and International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor, or ITER, projects. The Government have already guaranteed our share of the funding for the Oxfordshire-based JET fusion reactor until the end of 2020, demonstrating our commitment to continued collaboration.
Lord Teverson
My Lords, I found part of the Minister’s statement extremely useful and I thank her for that, particularly on the NCA question.
However, there is an issue on which I would like clarity; I think it is very straightforward, and I ask this in a very positive tone. It is the Commission and the EU 27’s offer and negotiating position on transition that the whole of the Euratom acquis is also included in the broader EU transition agreement. Are the British Government in line with that, and will they go down that route as well? I do not hear that we are rejecting it. We have potential issues with the initial situation over residents and people on the EU side, but are the Government saying they are going to have the Euratom acquis as part of the transition that will be agreed, whether that is until the end of 2020 or the two years? If they were saying that, it would take a lot of pressure off what we are talking about as long as the IAEA was happy with it. That seems a very straightforward question and I presume there is a government policy on it. In the response today to Barnier’s negotiating position I did not see any contesting of the Euratom side of it, so I presume we are going ahead and agreeing that transition in March.
Baroness Vere of Norbiton
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, for that interesting question. If it is okay, I shall write to him, because I should like to find out more information about what we are allowed to say at this time.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, we come to the end of our discussion today, and I hope that the Minister will be able to accept these amendments. As the noble Lord made clear in the debate before last, nuclear safeguarding primarily involves reporting and verification processes by which we as a country demonstrate to the international community that civil nuclear material is not diverted into military weapons programmes, so the definition of what is meant by “civil activities” is rather important.
In Clause 2, page 2, new Section 76A(5) of the 2013 Act as inserted by the Bill will allow the regulations to specify what and what not are to be treated as civil activities. The memorandum that goes with the Bill explains the reason the Government think that the power is necessary to enable further clarification of the regulating power already provided. The Government say that the phrase “civil activities” has a natural meaning, but this power enables the Secretary of State to provide greater certainty about what are and what are not civil activities. This in turn refines the purpose test contained in Section 76(1)(a) and provides enhanced certainty about when nuclear safeguard regulation can be made.
This is important, and the Delegated Powers Committee described the term “civil activities” as a concept central to the nuclear safeguards regulations. However, it says that it is not convinced that the term has a natural meaning. It takes it that it refers to non-military activities and says that if that is correct, there is no reason why that should not be made clear in the Bill. It recommends that it should be defined in new Section 76A of the 2013 Act rather than leaving it to be dealt with exclusively in regulations. My Amendments 5 and 6 essentially do just that, and I hope that the Government are prepared to accept them. I beg to move.
Lord Fox
My Lords, this may be an opportunity for the Minister to play an uncharacteristic square drive. I support the amendment and, with the authority of the Delegated Powers Committee behind it, I should have thought this is an opportunity to send us away with a song in our heart before the next helping. I cannot speak for the noble Lord, but I guess that if the actual definition of civil nuclear needs amendment, there is plenty of conversation to be had. I hope that the Government are able to accept the amendment.
Lord O'Neill of Clackmannan
For someone of my age and generation, it was always fashionable to attack the Wilson Governments of 1964 and 1966. In the light of the Blair Middle Eastern excursions, which I have to say I supported at the time, history now favours Wilson on the basis that he did not send any troops to Vietnam. Equally importantly, those of us who in those days were marching against nuclear weapons often forgot that one of the great achievements of the Wilson Administrations was their sponsorship of the non-proliferation treaty. At the heart of the amendment is a degree of clarity and a redefinition of civil activities. It would be useful to have a clear and explicit definition, which is why this amendment deserves support. It is not against the Bill; it is not going to harm Brexiteers or frighten the horses. It is a straightforward amendment—and, at this late stage of the afternoon, for God’s sake give us something!
The Minister has hidden behind what are quite clearly inadequate ministerial briefs. The noble Baroness, Lady Vere, went on and on. I was reminded of the story about Lord Willie Ross, when he was shadow Secretary of State for Scotland at a time when Labour was in opposition. He dismissed the speech of the then Secretary of State for Scotland, saying that there were three things wrong with it—first, that he read it; secondly, that he read it badly; and, thirdly, it was not worth reading in the first place. I absolve the noble Baroness of the second charge, but the first and third points are still relevant. We are not on the same side as the Liberals, I have to say; it is only the Conservatives who get into bed with the Liberals. This is an amendment that we are quite happy to support, but do not let us have this obfuscatory nonsense that we have been getting. Give us something that makes today’s efforts worthwhile—if not, we will be after you at the next stage, and we will win because we have the majority in the House of Lords.
Lord Henley
We have had rather a lot of history lessons. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord O’Neill, for reminding us of the late Willie Ross. I remember his technique when in opposition of calling Divisions just for the sake of having one, so that he could go out to have a cigarette—but that was in another world and another time, and now we have to go further away to have a cigarette than is possible in the time it takes to have a Division.
The noble Lord also reminded me of the first ever committee I was on, many years ago. I remember with great pride when the Chief Whip approached me and asked me if I would go on the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments. Many noble Lords will remember being asked to go on to such a committee, either in this place or the other place, and feeling that it was a great honour and how important it was. JCSI did a very good job and was very important, but not nearly as important—and I think we are all very grateful for it—as the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which can look at the merits of the legislation. We are very grateful for its reports. We have taken note of exactly what it has said in relation to the amendment. We will look very carefully at those recommendations and I hope to be able to give a positive response in due course. I do not think that I can give that response at the moment because the words that are being queried—“civil activities”—have, as someone put it, their natural meaning, and we would accept that. But it might be that a change has to be made. I put it to the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, that we will look very carefully at this matter and between now and Report we can have further discussions and see whether amendments are needed.
With that, I hope that the noble Lord will be prepared to withdraw his amendment. At that point, going back to the cricketing analogies that we had earlier, we might at this stage draw stumps.
Lord Rooker
I want to break the rules and come to the defence of the Box. It is quite unfair to attack the briefs that Ministers have. The briefs may be poor not because of those who prepared the brief but because of the policy behind it. We should not level an attack at the civil servants in the Box.
Lord Henley
I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, for making that point. I followed the noble Lord into Defra some years ago. He and I know exactly what all those who have served us in the Civil Service do for us and how well they do it. If briefs ever fail, it is the failing of Ministers, and Ministers—including the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, and other noble Lords I see in this Chamber—know that it is our fault and we take responsibility for it. On this occasion, I think that everything we have said and done has been absolutely marvellous and wonderful and we will continue to argue our case.
May I now make my second attempt to draw stumps, if the noble Lord is prepared to withdraw his amendment?
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, it has been a long 24 hours for many of us, so I am delighted to say that is the nicest thing that the noble Lord has said to us. I take it that the Government will, in essence, be bringing an amendment back on Report. I am very grateful, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Nuclear Safeguards Bill
Thursday 1st March 2018
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 81-II Second marshalled list for Committee (PDF, 77KB) - (27 Feb 2018)
Baroness Featherstone
“(9) Before making any regulations under this section, the Secretary of State must—(a) consult —(i) the ONR,(ii) the International Atomic Energy Agency,(iii) the National Audit Office,(iv) such other persons, if any, as the Secretary of State considers it appropriate to consult, and(b) lay before Parliament a written statement declaring that, after consultation with the above parties, the Secretary of State is satisfied that the ONR—(i) has sufficient staffing and financial resources to implement nuclear safeguards regulations, and(ii) is sufficiently independent to implement nuclear safeguards regulations.(9A) The statement under subsection 9(b) must be laid before both Houses of Parliament.”
Baroness Featherstone (LD)
My Lords, there is ongoing concern over nuclear safeguard regulations—more accurately, both Houses are generally concerned at the deluge of regulations resulting from the Brexit legislation—and there has rightly been a great deal of criticism. This amendment seeks to put further protection around the regulations to give assurance. That assurance needs to take two forms. First, in advance of any regulations, the Secretary of State must seek the views on said regulations of interested parties and responsible bodies, such as the ONR, the Atomic Energy Agency and the National Audit Office among others.
Secondly, after that consultation, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a Written Statement that assures that the ONR has sufficient staffing and financial resources to implement nuclear safeguard regulations. That begets a question which I hope the Minister will answer when he responds. At the beginning of this process we need to set the benchmarks for staffing and resourcing. To do that, we need to understand, on the record, what both the IAEA standard and the Euratom standard of implementing nuclear safeguarding will require in the way of staffing and resourcing.
At Second Reading in this House and in the other place, concern was expressed about what would be achievable by 29 March 2019, and the view was expressed that the ONR would not be ready on day one. Can the Minister confirm that, on day one, the standard that the Government are expecting is that of the IAEA? Can he also put on record what the IAEA standards of nuclear safeguarding are, what staffing is needed to deliver those standards and what resource has or will be made available to the ONR to deliver those standards?
Can the Minister then confirm how long after reaching the IAEA standards he would expect the ONR to reach the Euratom standard of implementing nuclear safeguarding? Given that Euratom holds to a higher standard than the IAEA, can the Minister tell us how many more staff the Euratom standard will require? Can he also put on record what level of extra resource that will require, and can he assure the House that the extra funding between the two standards will be available on demand? The Government have made clear that Euratom is their intended standard, if not on day one then on a later date.
In his letter of 20 February the Minister makes it clear that there are currently 11 safeguards officers in post who are training to become inspectors by 29 March 2019. He also states that the ONR estimates that it will take 20 safeguard inspectors to deliver its functions to a standard equivalent in effectiveness and coverage to Euratom. As I have said, the Government have been clear that their intent is to reach the Euratom standard—but, worryingly, the Minister goes on to say in his letter that reaching the equivalent Euratom standard is dependent on a wide variety of factors. That seems very loose. Can the Minister enumerate what the “wide variety of factors” is, as it cannot be left open-ended?
Moving beyond the nuclear standard regulations and their resourcing, we are concerned that the ONR must be wholly independent of its paymasters. We cannot have a situation where the Government can influence or hold any sway over this organisation. It must be unfettered in its implementation of nuclear safeguard regulations, and the reporting structure must ensure that the Secretary of State cannot direct the ONR. Can the Minister reassure us on that point?
Finally, can the Minister assure us that the statement on these issues, as amended, will be laid before both Houses of Parliament? I beg to move.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)
My Lords, I support this and the other amendment in the group. One of the concerns we have, as expressed on the first day in Committee and at Second Reading, is about disclosure of the actions and steps that have been taken by the Government to meet the undoubtedly genuine, real and merited concerns that have been expressed about the process of leaving Euratom and this Bill.
In that context, I thank the Minister very fully for the letter he wrote to me on 28 February, which has been placed in the Library, relating to the activities that have taken place between the Government and the IAEA, the European Commission and various third countries, which he named in the letter. He has provided a wealth of information which enables us to understand more about the part of the process with which it deals. The amendments seek disclosure about other parts of the process.
Although I support the amendments, I do not regard it as necessary for statutory provisions to be created to provide the information that is set out. What I do regard as essential is a similar generous and helpful approach by the Minister in which the items set out in the two amendments are the subject of an undertaking that the Government will keep the whole of Parliament fully informed about the process and progress of discussion of the items referred to. That is not an unreasonable demand, but is the least the House can reasonably expect.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I agree about the importance of consultation, as noble Lords will know, and also about the proper resourcing of the ONR. However, I am nervous about the precedent set by proposed subsection (9)(b) in the amendment. It would be very difficult if this was established as a new approach to SIs. As the Minister knows, resources are sometimes constrained when you bring in new legislation, but that is not a reason not to proceed with regulations. I recall milk quotas, where a vast amount of administrative work was involved—but that did not mean to say that it was not right to proceed with that part of EU policy at that time.
It is also not clear how many people will need to be involved in resourcing work. I accept that this is a problem in the nuclear area, but I would guard against putting that sort of provision into legislation—although it might be that the amendment is purely exploratory. I very much agree that we need comfort on resourcing for the ONR, and I thought that the Minister gave us some comfort when he last spoke.
I have another question for the Minister about transition. The draft withdrawal agreement published yesterday covers Euratom—slightly to my surprise, because I believed and hoped it would be in a separate instrument. But that is as it is; it is in the draft document. I am interested to know, since the document also covers transition, whether that means that Euratom will be part of any transition agreement likely to be agreed in the coming weeks and months. Confirmation of that would be helpful because it bears on some of the other concerns we have had about the process of bringing nuclear safeguards into UK law—and of course the resourcing and the time for the ONR to do a proper job are critical.
Viscount Hanworth (Lab)
My Lords, I discern from the letter sent on 20 February by the Minister to the Lords who have participated in the various stages of the Bill so far that the Government intend to impose most of the costs of a nuclear safeguarding regime on the civil nuclear industry. It is clear that the regime will deal mainly with matters that are remote from the everyday concerns of the civil industry. Therefore, it seems inappropriate that it should be asked to bear most of the costs. Be that as it may, it is appropriate that it should be consulted regarding provisions of statutory regulations. This is not what is being called for directly in the amendments. However, unless the Government signal clearly that they intend to consult the industry, this is something they should be enjoined to do by an amendment to be brought forward on Report.
Viscount Trenchard (Con)
My Lords, I support what my noble friend, Lady Neville-Rolfe, just said. I would also be cautious about including in the Bill a requirement to ensure that there should be sufficient staffing, because it is not a good reason to decide whether to put in a certain control. Obviously everything the Government undertake to do must be properly staffed.
I ask the Minister to confirm whether the Government consider that a transition period will be necessary for Euratom as well as for the EU generally. I had understood that the Government expected to put in place a satisfactory accredited nuclear safeguards regime before March next year, although I understand that certain doubts have been expressed about whether that is feasible in the time available, given the necessity to obtain the consent of various other countries’ legislatures, with which we would have to establish new nuclear co-operation agreements. Could the Minister tell the Committee whether a transition period for Euratom is envisaged?
I question what the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, said about Euratom standards being better than IAEA standards. I understand that the Government’s intention and commitment is ultimately to reach Euratom standards, but I am not sure there is any evidence that Euratom’s standards are better than IAEA standards. Two weeks ago at a briefing by a representative of EDF, together with the NIA, we heard that, in his opinion, the safety standards set by the IAEA are more robust on process, procedures and controls than those set by Euratom and that Euratom concentrates heavily on verification processes that may or may not add anything to achieving a satisfactory level of safeguards. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s comments on that.
Lord Teverson (LD)
My Lords, I strongly support my noble friend’s amendment, but want to follow up what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, who made the obvious point that the more the Government keep us in touch with what is going on, the more confidence everybody, including the industry, has; we might then avoid half the debate we have every time we discuss Euratom. That is true of the whole process of EU withdrawal, but if we could just get it right in this niche area of Euratom, we could save the Government, Ministers and Parliament a whole load of time just by understanding what is going on.
To be honest, I think the Government undersell their position in this area in all sorts of ways. I thank the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, for her letter to me in response to my question at the end of the last session about the transition for Euratom, because, so far as I could see, there was no disagreement between Brussels and the UK about it. The noble Baroness’s letter effectively confirmed that. In the legal draft framework on withdrawal and transition, there is a whole area on Euratom—I read it through yesterday; I do not have it here. In terms of the EU-UK relationship, the withdrawal from Euratom, particularly in respect of the transitional period, seems fairly well agreed, and I welcome that. The difficulty I still have is around third parties. There has been good communication on where we have got to with nuclear co-operation agreements, but I am still unclear as to whether the International Atomic Energy Agency and third countries are happy to accept that, while not being a member of Euratom, we can still use all those provisions as a safeguarding regime.
I also noted in the document the expectation of the UK to come up to Euratom standards on nuclear safeguarding. I would be very interested to hear the Minister’s explanation of that and what it means for the transition and withdrawal process.
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, I do not wish to put a dampener on proceedings, as the word “transition” seems to have lifted your Lordships a little, but does the Minister agree that for there to be a transition there needs to be agreement between the United Kingdom and the European Union on the terms of leaving the European Union and that, in the event of there being no agreement, we go into a period where there is no transition? If that is true, I refer your Lordships to that little lecture I gave on risk on the previous day in Committee: there remains a finite risk that we need a safeguarding regime in March 2019. This provision does not take the pressure off us to get this sorted out and to have a process that delivers the safeguarding regime we need, whether or not the prospect of transition is increased.
Lord Grantchester (Lab)
I want to speak to Amendment 18, which is in our name, but also to respond to Amendment 7, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Fox and Teverson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, on the Liberal Democrat Benches. Amendment 7 would specify in new Section 76A(9) further consultees the Secretary of State must consult before making any regulations and add the requirement to lay before Parliament a Written Statement on the resourcing and preparedness of the ONR. In conjunction with the other amendments taken last week on Euratom and the UK’s levels of standards, we agree that this would be most useful. However, it may not go far enough, in that it would be the Secretary of State doing the interpretation of any evidence received and judging its sufficiency. Notwithstanding the comments of the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, and the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, these matters were debated last week and it would be the Government making the declaration. The Committee was not inclined to take at face value many of the Government’s assurances last week. Unfortunately, I have not seen the recent letter to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, nor the letter from the noble Baroness to the noble Lord, Lord Teverson. I request that in future the whole Committee be copied in to the letters, so that we can keep abreast. Many thanks.
Lord Teverson
My Lords, as we are in Committee, it may be helpful if I quote article 77 of the draft treaty published by the European Commission yesterday, which is specifically around nuclear safeguards. It states:
“The United Kingdom shall implement a safeguards regime applying a system offering equivalent effectiveness and coverage as that provided by the Community in the territory of the United Kingdom until the end of the transition period”.
That accepts that there is to be a transition period, as long as we are not in a no-deal situation. There is a transition period—there is no disagreement between us and the EU about that—but the EU expects that to be at Euratom standards. I cannot see that that can be any different if we remain within the acquis during that period, which I think both sides are agreed to anyway.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Lord Henley) (Con)
My Lords, I start by offering my apologies to the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, as he did not receive a copy of that letter. I will make sure that copies are made available. I thought that I had arranged for copies of all the letters—those I sent on the 20th, the one on the 28th to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and the one from my noble friend, I think again on the 28th, to the noble Lord, Lord Teverson—to be placed in the Library. After 40 years in this House, I still do not quite know exactly what that means—I think one can go along to the Library and get a copy, but I leave that to noble Lords. I will certainly make sure that copies are made available to all those who want them.
Lord Grantchester
One does not wander to the Library just in case there might be something there, so it would be useful.
Lord Henley
I fully accept that. I think the idea is to make it clear that they have been made public and are available. I will make sure copies are made available to noble Lords.
Before dealing with precise matters relating to the amendment, I shall say a word or two about the implementation period and transition because that was raised by my noble friends Lady Neville-Rolfe, who has great experience in this matter as a former Minister in the department that I have the honour to represent, my noble friend Lord Trenchard and the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, who was in receipt of a letter from my noble friend Lady Vere. The second paragraph of that letter sent on the 28th stated that details and terms of an implementation period have yet to be agreed, that it is assumed that the United Kingdom will no longer be a member state of the EU or the EEA during the implementation period, that the base case for the length of the period is around two years and that the UK will continue to mirror the EU acquis—the entire EU legal framework—during that period.
We also note that the Commission has published its draft of the withdrawal agreement. The noble Lord, Lord Teverson, referred to this. It is just a draft at the moment. The exact content of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal agreement from the EU will be a matter for negotiation, and we are working hard to deliver the best possible outcome for the UK while making good progress on negotiating our deep and special future partnership with the EU. I do not think I can take the noble Lord or the Committee any further on that matter at this stage.
Amendments 7 and 18 ask for much greater consultation to be set down in law. My noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe was rather worried by the precedent, should it be enacted, that we make a Written Ministerial Statement at certain stages. I hope I can give the appropriate assurances about what we intend to do to keep Members of the Committee and the House fully informed about what we are doing over the course of the coming year.
First, I shall clarify my Second Reading response to a question from the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, I think, about the potential cost to industry of the new regime. I referred only to the cost to the ONR of setting up the domestic regime. The department has already committed to allocate to the ONR the funding necessary to establish the new regime. In respect of ongoing funding—the matter which this amendment is aimed at addressing-–I can make a clear commitment now that a decision on cost recovery and charging arrangements will be subject to close engagement with industry and other key stakeholders, as well as public consultation.
We intend to publish a public consultation and an impact assessment on the regulations later this year. I repeat to the Committee that we have made those regulations available in draft already. It is estimated that the ongoing costs of operating a domestic safeguards regime—
Lord Davies of Stamford (Lab)
Can the noble Lord give an assurance to the Committee that the industry will not be penalised as a result of Brexit—that is to say that the contributions that will be required of it post Brexit to fund the new regulatory regime that he has been describing will not be greater than any costs that it currently incurs under the present Euratom regime?
Lord Henley
The noble Lord will obviously not expect me to give firm commitments of that sort in advance of any consultation. This is a matter for consultation, but we are talking about the need to make sure we have the appropriate safeguarding regime. We are already charging industry, as he puts it, for the cost of safety and other matters. As I said, I will not give any commitment of that sort because this is a matter for consultation, but I will say that the ongoing costs of operating a proper domestic safeguarding regime—I am not talking about safety or security, but purely about safeguarding—will be broadly in line with the current cost to Euratom of its safeguards activity in the United Kingdom. This is estimated to be about £9.5 million a year, as set out in the impact assessment for the Bill.
I turn to the outstanding issues raised in Amendment 7. As the Committee will be aware, the Bill already requires that before making regulations under new Section 76A of the Energy Act 2013, the Government must consult the ONR and any other persons the Secretary of State considers appropriate. This is consistent with the approach for making nuclear regulations under Section 74 of the 2013 Act, which the noble Baroness will be familiar with. The amendment seeks to include a duty to consult both the IAEA and the National Audit Office. I agree wholeheartedly with the importance of consultation on the new domestic regime—I stressed that at Second Reading. Consultation is of vital importance in the development of any new regulatory system and even more so with a subject of such national importance.
As I have already made clear, we have published a pre-consultation draft of the regulations and have already begun early engagement with the industry on this. Prior to this, and since the referendum, the Government have had detailed and ongoing discussions with the nuclear industry and other interested parties. We have made it clear that the development of these draft regulations establishing the new regime will be subject to detailed consultation with both the regulator and industry, with which we have already been engaging.
The Committee will be aware that it is not standard practice for the Government to consult international bodies such as the IAEA on matters of detailed domestic legislation, and for good reason. The IAEA’s focus and expertise in respect of the United Kingdom’s safeguards lies with the voluntary international agreements rather than with the domestic legislation underpinning the domestic regime. The amendment also proposes including the NAO. I believe the NAO plays an incredibly important role, but I do not think that mandatory consultation, as proposed by this amendment, is appropriate, as it already has an established process for scrutinising public spending for Parliament.
We look forward to continuing to work closely with industry and other stakeholders to take the development of the new domestic regime forward. I particularly welcome, at this stage, any comments noble Lords make on the draft regulations, which were published in January and which I imagine all those interested in the Bill have been studying with great care ever since.
Amendment 7 would also require the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament a Written Statement that the ONR has the capacity and independence to implement a new safeguards regime. Again, the Committee will be aware that the Government have already committed to provide Parliament with quarterly reports on progress from across the Euratom programme. They will include information on ONR capacity and readiness.
We accept the immediate importance of this issue; that is why I wrote to all Peers on 20 February. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, received it and I think others did as well. I wrote twice on that day to all noble Lords and I have copies of those letters, but I do not think it is necessary to refer to them. At the same time, a bit later I also wrote to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. Again, I have that letter available here and will make it available to other noble Lords if—
Lord Henley
I will make it available in the Library, as well as to other noble Lords who want copies of it.
To summarise briefly what I tried to set out in that letter, and for the benefit of the Committee, we are working closely with the ONR to ensure that it will be in a position to regulate the new safeguards regime. The ONR is in the process of expanding its safeguards function by recruiting and training additional inspectors, building additional institutional capacity and developing the necessary IT systems. I want to stress—having made a visit to Sellafield, which has two of the three sites in this country where nuclear safeguarding takes place, with a senior representative from the ONR and others—that on the information given to me it is my assessment, based on current progress, that the ONR will be in a position to deliver to the international standards as required by the IAEA on withdrawal from Euratom in a year’s time, in March 2019.
Lord Grantchester
At this stage, I intervene only to ask: is the Minister aware of the full costs of all the measures to be implemented to enable the ONR to go ahead with this regime, or is that work still in progress?
Lord Henley
As I said earlier, we think that the costs will be broadly in line with the current costs of what we pay to Euratom, which is £9.5 million a year. But there may be certain funds to pay for the changeover, which again I dealt with at Second Reading by saying that money would be made available for it. Ongoing costs will be broadly in line with where we are, and that will be satisfactory.
Lord Grantchester
I apologise for coming back to the Minister but, as I understand it, we are talking about two items. One is the ongoing cost of £9.5 million, which I quite agree is defined already by the EU’s contributions to us for the Euratom programme. I meant the full cost of the set-up, which initially had a £2.275 million contribution from the contingencies fund. What does he think the full cost will be, and is he happy and confident that it will be kept within that contingency fund? Has he now completed the inventory and can he update us on what the full cost may be of implementing all the measures necessary?
Lord Henley
I think I answered that question at Second Reading and gave a figure to the noble Lord. Rather than trying to guess or remember what I said on that occasion, I will write to him. But I am perfectly happy that we have made that commitment. There will be sufficient funds and then there will be ongoing costs—the noble Lord is right to distinguish between the two—and again, we are happy about that.
Lord Henley
Obviously the noble Lord is right that assets belonging to Euratom are in there. I do not think I am giving away any secrets if I say that on my visit I saw physical things that were Euratom assets; there will also be software and other things. I am sure that deals will be done as part of the negotiations, and some of those will be transferred over. I do not think I can go any further at the Dispatch Box and I would not want to, but if there is anything more that I can say in a letter then I shall. I will make sure that my letter goes to all noble Lords by whatever means in this inclement weather—we will get it to the noble Lord—and place copies in the Library, which is where people like to find them.
Lord Henley
My Lords, we have discovered email. I can use all possible methods.
I have given the assurance that I will ensure that noble Lords are kept informed. As I think I have made clear, I do not think the amendments are necessary or, for that matter, particularly helpful, and I hope the noble Lord will accept that we will do our bit to keep all noble Lords appropriately informed of these matters and will make the precise Written Statements that are necessary at the appropriate moment. With that, I hope the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Featherstone
Having listened to the debate across the House, I think it appropriate that I ponder what the Minister has said. For the moment, I am happy to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Grantchester
“( ) In section 156 of that Act (commencement), after subsection (3) insert—“(3A) Section 112(1B) expires at the end of the period of two years beginning with the day on which that section comes into force.””
Lord Grantchester
I shall also speak to Amendment 13 in this group. At Second Reading we on these Benches drew attention to the powers that the Government wish to confer on themselves through the Bill. At that time we signalled that we would take into consideration the views of your Lordships’ Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee on the Bill. The committee has now reported its findings in its 13th report of this Session, drawing attention to three areas of concern. My noble friend Lord Hunt highlighted the first in an amendment last week, that “civil activities” should be defined under new Section 76A(5) in Clause 1(2) of the Bill.
Amendments 8 and 13 draw attention to the other issues drawn attention to in the report. Amendment 8 concerns the definition of “relevant international agreement” in the power conferred on the Secretary of State under new Section 76A(1)(b) to give effect to any future relevant international agreement. When this happens, the functions of the ONR are extended to include taking the necessary steps to ensure compliance with that agreement. In the present situation where the Government are in negotiation with the IAEA and several key partners, the report does not find it unreasonable that the Government extend their powers in this way. However, the committee is correct when it states that this should not result in the Government having an enduring power into the future, long after the UK has withdrawn from the Euratom treaty.
Amendment 8 would set a sunset provision so that in new Section 112(1B) in the Energy Act 2013 these powers may not be exercised after a period of two years from withdrawal from Euratom. This two-year period would reflect Clause 8(4) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, where powers to amend legislation to prevent breaches of international obligations arising from the EU withdrawal will cease two years after exit day. This comfortably sits alongside any transition period that the Government are set to announce, maybe as early as tomorrow, in response to the announcement yesterday by the EU Commission.
Amendment 13 concerned the powers being conferred on Ministers under Clause 2 of the Bill to amend the legislation listed under Clause 2(1) relating to nuclear safeguards. The memorandum prepared by the department for the Delegated Powers Committee explains the provisions and agreements between the UK, the IAEA and Euratom. At Second Reading it was acknowledged that these tripartite agreements would need to be replaced. Necessarily, the voluntary offer agreement, the VOA, and additional protocol, AP, will become ineffective on the UK’s withdrawal from the Euratom treaty.
As in Amendment 8, the committee agreed that the Government may take the powers to amend both primary and secondary legislation to ensure compliance with the UK’s international obligations after withdrawal. However, once again, there is no justification in the memorandum for these powers to continue indefinitely. We agree, and therefore Amendment 13 similarly sets a sunset provision to Clause 2: that the powers to be conferred cease after two years and may not be exercised following the end of that period.
At Second Reading, the Minister replied that he would look carefully at any recommendations forthcoming from your Lordships’ Delegated Powers Committee, and I would appreciate hearing from his noble friend that they will bring forward government amendments on Report to give effect to these recommendations. I beg to move.
Lord Fox
I support Amendments 8 and 13 and do not intend to speak at length. When the Minister was responding to Amendment 6 in the Committee’s previous sitting, he expressed a high degree of approval of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, and I trust that that continues through these amendments. The case has been set out by the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, and the DPRRC, and I hope that on these two amendments the noble Baroness can give us similar encouragement to that given by the Minister on Amendment 6. We on these Benches support the restricted use of these measures to give the Government the flexibility that they need. This is a good compromise between untrammelled power and the power they need for the flexibility to ensure the necessary regime.
Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Grantchester and Lord Fox, for their contributions. The amendments apply sunset provisions to two key powers in the Bill, Amendment 8 in respect of new Section 112(1B), which enables the Secretary of State to specify in regulations international agreements relating to safeguards that should be treated as “relevant international agreements”, and Amendment 13 in respect of the Henry VIII power in Clause 2.
I am grateful to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee for its considered report on the Bill. We are considering the recommendations carefully, and my noble friend Lord Henley hopes to respond positively to many of the recommendations soon.
I welcome the principles that appear to be behind these amendments, namely those of scrutiny, certainty and restriction of powers. However, as the underlying purpose behind these powers is very different, the proposed two-year sunset clauses must be considered in each context specifically.
Lord Carlile of Berriew
The noble Baroness may accuse me of being pedantic, but she said that her noble friend “hopes” to be able to respond. Does that really mean “expects” to be able to respond, or is it merely a hope? If it is an expectation, most of us will be content; if it is merely a hope, we will be troubled.
Baroness Vere of Norbiton
My noble friend Lord Henley has just whispered “expects” to me.
Baroness Vere of Norbiton
Noble Lords will recall that I updated the House last week, during the first sitting of this Committee, on the progress the Government have made in discussions on our new agreements with the IAEA and key NCA partners. These discussions provide important context for the amendments as, despite having made significant progress, we do not expect all of them to have been concluded by the time of the Bill’s passage through Parliament.
Amendment 13 would apply a two-year sunset provision to Clause 2, which contains the power to amend the Nuclear Safeguards and Electricity (Finance) Act 1978, the Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000 and the Nuclear Safeguards (Notification) Regulations 2004. It can amend these pieces of legislation only in consequence of a relevant safeguards agreement.
Baroness Vere of Norbiton
Of course, it is very difficult to be specific on that but, as we know, we are focusing on four NCAs in the first tranche. The noble Lord will know that there are many other countries with which we would like to have an NCA in future which perhaps do not fall within the first tranche. The second thing to recognise is that this is not just about entering into new NCAs; it is whether new obligations arise as conditions change within the international community for safeguarding. This gives us the flexibility, but it is not drawn so widely that we can do whatever we like.
While we cannot accept Amendment 8, I would like to provide reassurance of the scrutiny that will be in place to ensure that there is proper oversight in the use of this power. Pursuant to the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, we would expect any new international treaties relating to safeguards to go through the ratification processes set out in that Act. Use of the power to make regulations specifying agreements as “relevant international agreements” is itself subject to the draft affirmative procedure in all cases, and any regulations made under the power that relies on these agreements must be consulted on. I am therefore confident that an appropriate level of scrutiny and restriction of powers is already in place.
I recognise the principles which lie behind the proposed amendments, and I hope that noble Lords will accept why I cannot accept them today. I therefore hope that the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, feels able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Grantchester
I thank the Minister for that very full response and am grateful, too, to hear the whispers between her and the Minister on the Front Bench. Our expectations are always full of hope, but I am rather troubled by her response to Amendment 8, and we will need to consider her reply very carefully. I am not sure that the power should be enduring. However, she said in her response to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, that it is important that there continues to be scrutiny and oversight of these agreements. We will study her response very carefully. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Teverson
“Freedom of employment for specialists
Article 2(g) of the European Atomic Energy Community Treaty, ensuring freedom of employment for specialists, continues to have effect in UK law in relation to those who work in nuclear safeguarding, after the United Kingdom leaves Euratom.”
Lord Teverson
My Lords, let me say first that the last thing that I would expect—and this will be a great relief to the Government—is for this amendment in its current state to be in the final Act as it is passed. It is in many ways a probing amendment, but an absolutely critical and important one. I quote Article 2(g) of the Euratom treaty to which this amendment relates. It says that the Community shall,
“ensure wide commercial outlets and access to the best technical facilities by the creation of a common market in specialised materials and equipment, by the free movement of capital for investment in the field of nuclear energy and by freedom of employment for specialists within the Community”.
So it is all around being able to take advantage of that freedom of movement of nuclear specialists, particularly as this amendment has to relate to safeguarding only—but really it is much more general than that, into the future and beyond our withdrawal from the Euratom treaty.
One great privilege that I have in this House is to chair one of the European Union Select Committee sub-committees, the EU Energy and Environment Sub-Committee. We have undertaken a number of Brexit reports over the last year, including on environment, energy security—from which I shall quote in a minute—agriculture and fisheries and animal welfare. We are currently looking at food security. One key theme of all those reports, very much on a cross-party basis, is the issue of supply of specialist labour after Brexit has taken place, and how a number of those sectors, from agriculture right the way through to the nuclear industry, are dependent on specialists. Those specialists are not always the great and the best and the Nobel Prize winners whom we want in this country, but they are the people who have their own specialist skills in things that you would not necessarily take degrees in—particularly in the agricultural sector—and we can take advantage of those skills because they are not available in the United Kingdom.
I just give one or two examples from our report Brexit: Energy Security, to which we are still waiting for a government response—which is not overdue at the moment, I would add. The noble Lord, Lord Rooker, quoted these examples on our previous day in Committee, but I will go back through some of them, particularly around energy security and the nuclear industry workforce. In paragraph 41 of the report, we quote EDF, which stated:
“The highest concentration of non-British nationals as a percentage of the total employed workforce is within Nuclear New Build”.
Angela Hepworth, the corporate policy and regulation director of EDF provided some detail saying, on Hinkley Point, which is new nuclear,
“we are going to need 1,400 steel fixers. At the moment, the total population of certified steel fixers in the UK is 2,700 so we would need more than half of the total”.
The Institute of Mechanical Engineers stated that,
“the nuclear sector relies heavily on skilled workers from Europe”,
as did the Centre for Nuclear Engineering at Imperial College London:
“The free movement of skilled professionals within the nuclear industry is critical to its long-term success”.
Energy & Utility Skill told us that,
“any new immigration policy must avoid arbitrary distinctions between ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ skilled jobs, based on inaccurate criteria such as whether or not it requires a degree”.
I am well aware that this is broader than safeguarding itself, but safeguarding is also a part of that nuclear skill set and this is the only way that I could really get this in the Bill, because our safeguarding regime is a key area where we have this challenge. I emphasise again that I am quite satisfied that the UK and EU 27 can come to an agreement on a transitional period that gives us extra time; I am relaxed about that, but I am not relaxed about the point made by my noble friend Lord Fox that, with the other issues that there are around the withdrawal treaty—not least around Ireland—the possibility of coming to no deal has perhaps gone up. We still need to have a strong contingency so that we are ready in this area by 29 March next year.
The only way that I can see for us to do that is to make sure that we continue freedom of movement for nuclear specialists beyond our withdrawal from the agreement. On this, I remind the Government that the nuclear industry is one of the key sectors identified in their industrial strategy and, if that is to be fulfilled, we need to make sure that freedom of movement continues in this area—and, I would say, more widely than just safeguarding.
My question to the Minister is: will BEIS have enough backbone to really confront the Home Office, and perhaps No. 10 as well, on this issue, because the Home Office is naturally resistant to anything to do with migration? Will we be able, through the discussions between BEIS, the Home Office and perhaps No. 10, to make sure that this freedom of movement within the nuclear industry, not least in the safeguarding sector, continues after Brexit? I beg to move.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)
My Lords, I commend the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, for this amendment. I also commend his sub-committee, which has done excellent work.
I looked with great interest at some pieces of evidence submitted to the committee, particularly that from Energy UK, which made the point that,
“Overall, the energy industry’s workforce is made of between one and five percent of EU/EEA employees”.
That is not a huge percentage, but Energy UK makes the point that,
“Although there are not a proportionately large number of non-UK nationals employed within the energy industry, the majority are employed in skilled roles which are difficult to fill from the UK resident workforce”.
The noble Lord, Lord Teverson, has already cited the evidence of EDF and referred to steel fixers. Interestingly, EDF examined the impact of restrictions on freedom of movement on its current workforce when thinking about what challenges might arise in the future. EDF said:
“For EDF Energy direct employees, … the majority of our current employees would meet the existing UK Points Based System requirements. The same cannot be said for our supply chain workforce, most of whom would not meet the current entrance criteria”.
This is a very important issue because, if freedom of movement is restricted, there is currently no route of entry for semi-skilled workers, such as construction workers, to enter the UK under the existing points system. I find it surprising that steel fixers are not classed as skilled workers, but the fact is they are not, so they would not be able to come in under the points-based system. Yet we have heard from EDF that we simply cannot meet the demands of constructing Hinkley C nuclear power station and other civil engineering demands with the number of steel fixers that we have.
The noble Lord, Lord Teverson, ended his remarks with an interesting question about the backbone of the Minister’s department. I do not think it has had a particularly easy ride. I know that it has done its best on visas for overseas students but has come up against an obdurate brick wall in the shape of the Prime Minister. But can we hope that there will be a positive response on this issue, as it is so crucial to our future industrial strategy?
Lord Henley
My Lords, I accept that this is a probing amendment and that the noble Lord wanted to go wider than the Bill itself and beyond safeguarding to problems facing the entire nuclear industry, and in particular the need for skilled workers. The noble Lords, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath and Lord Teverson, are worried about whether I and the department have sufficient backbone to take on the Home Office and others in these matters. I give him an assurance that we accept the importance of getting the right skilled workers in, just as we always have. I understand the importance of that because on my recent visit to Sellafield I saw some of the construction work and how very specialist it is. It is not just the skilled workers but the type of concrete that has to be used and all such matters—other noble Lords will know this far better than me. More generally on that point, BEIS knows that there are shortages in certain areas and will do its bit within government to make sure that the Home Office understands the importance of our being able to attract the right staff more generally.
On the question of having the right staff in the very specialised field of nuclear safeguarding, the amendment attempts to ensure freedom of employment for specialists employed in that area. That is obviously a matter of particular interest in the light of the Government’s preparations for establishing the domestic nuclear safeguards regime which, among other important work, means securing high-quality safeguards staff in the right quantity for the ONR.
We are working very closely with the ONR to ensure that it is in a position to regulate the UK’s new civil nuclear safeguards regime that will follow withdrawal from Euratom. That includes, among other preparations, recruiting and training additional inspectors and building additional institutional capacity. I have already outlined the ONR’s staffing numbers and estimates. I referred to that in the letters sent on 20 February—so all noble Lords should have had copies of those, even the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester.
Given the importance of attracting the right staff to work in this specialist field, the Government are committed to ensuring that the United Kingdom nuclear industry has the required skilled personnel to deliver robust regulatory regimes. The Prime Minister has been clear that we will always welcome those with the skills and the expertise that we need, whether they come from Europe or the rest of the world—as we do now. We will also ensure—if the noble Lord will bear with me—that we manage our immigration system in the way that best serves the national interest. That is why we will be using our best influence with the Home Office—and I am sure that the Home Office in due course will be able to respond. I give way now to the noble Lord.
Lord Fox
Picking on the language, the Minister talked a number of times about skilled people. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, made the point that the definition of “skilled people” is the problem. Will the Minister acknowledge that issue and carry that point in the discussions he is having with other agencies?
Lord Henley
As I said, we are in discussions with the ONR in relation to the Bill to make sure that it can get people with the appropriate very specialist skills that we need for safeguarding. That is why we are going to have the right regime in place by next year.
The noble Lord then asked me to go further on the more general point—it might be construction for the nuclear industry or a whole host of other things. Yes, BEIS will continue to operate as it always does and to offer help and guidance to the Home Office as it develops policy in this field.
Lord Fox
For information, some of the researchers who work in the nuclear fusion project, for example, are paid below the threshold that gives them the privilege to come into this country. We are not just talking about steel fixers but about quite serious researchers who, because they have taken an academic career, are not paid above the threshold. So it is a very serious issue.
Lord Henley
I am fully aware of the concerns of the noble Lord and of the industry. Obviously it is a matter for the Home Office to develop these policies, and I am very grateful that a Home Office Minister—just by chance—happens to be sitting near me; she will listen to this and take it back to her colleagues. I repeat that we are satisfied that we can deal with safeguarding. Our concerns, the noble Lord’s concerns and other concerns will be dealt with. Proposals for a future immigration system will be set out shortly. That is something that my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy will play his part in.
The noble Lord said that his amendment was a probing one. I hope that I have given the appropriate assurances for him to withdraw it.
Lord Teverson
I thank the Minister for his response. No doubt this debate will continue when we debate the Brexit and energy security report on the Floor of the House. I will just say—to all Ministers who are present—that the whole of history tells me that this is going to be a very difficult ask. It seems obvious, in terms of getting it right for the nation, that it ought to happen, but I suspect that it will be a lot more difficult than perhaps the Minister hopes. I will reflect on the answer and see whether there is anything more exacting we can say on Report—but at this stage I beg leave to withdraw.
Lord Skelmersdale (Con)
Before the noble Lord withdraws his amendment, as he said he would, I have noted that this debate has been entirely about new build, but surely one of the great problems in this area will be the experts needed for decommissioning.
Lord Teverson
I thank the noble Lord for his contribution. He is absolutely right. Experts are needed not only for decommissioning but for keeping going the existing fleet of nuclear power stations, which provide some 20% of low-carbon energy to our energy system at the moment. We also need nuclear co-operation agreements so that we have not just people but spare parts and everything else for this sector. I can see that the Minister wishes to intervene.
Lord Henley
I just want to interrupt the noble Lord to offer him one further statistic to indicate how long this will continue. Again during my trip to Sellafield, I was reminded that decommissioning there will continue well into the next century—in other words, the grandfathers of the people who will be working on it then have not yet been born.
Lord Teverson
The whole area of the financing and decommissioning of Sellafield is the subject of another debate—and a contentious one—which we will not get into. At this stage, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
“The ONR to become a Non-Ministerial Government Department
(1) The Energy Act 2013 is amended as follows.(2) In section 74, omit subsection (3)(a).(3) In section 77, after subsection (2) insert—“(2A) The functions of the ONR are performed on behalf of the Crown.(2B) In the exercise of its functions the ONR is not subject to the direction or control of any Minister of the Crown or of another government department.(2C) But subsection (2B) does not affect—(a) any provision made by or under any enactment; or(b) any administrative controls exercised over the ONR’s expenditure by the Treasury.”(4) In section 85—(a) in subsection (1), omit “with the consent of the Secretary of State”; and(b) omit subsection (3).(5) In section 86, omit subsection (6).(6) In section 89, omit subsection (6).(7) In section 92—(a) omit subsections (1) and (2); and(b) in subsection (5) omit “(1) or”.(8) In section 93—(a) omit subsection (2)(d); and(b) omit subsections (3) to (5).”
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, in moving this amendment, I want to explore the status and independence of the ONR. I have great respect for the ONR and its work, and I wish to enhance its status.
In this crucial area of nuclear safeguards, the ONR will replace Euratom in overseeing the UK’s obligations to meet international nuclear safeguard standards, ensuring that civil nuclear material is not diverted into military or weapons use. This is a distinct responsibility and is separate from the ONR’s current role in relation to nuclear safety. Essentially, the ONR will be policing the UK in respect of its international commitments, and on that basis its independent status needs to be enhanced.
A Cabinet Office memorandum of 2014 made the situation clear:
“Non-ministerial departments do not have direct ministerial accountability. Their need for independence from ministers is … greater than for NDPBs, and includes regulators and tax authorities”.
They are government departments in their own right. The memorandum continued:
“There will be a ‘sponsor minister’ who has residual policy responsibility for the continued existence of the non-ministerial department, the overall policy and statutory framework within which it operates, and represents the non-ministerial department in Parliament. However, a non-ministerial department operates independently of ministers, generally receiving funding directly from Parliament”,
negotiating with Her Majesty’s Treasury,
“and is accountable directly to Parliament”.
My argument is that the ONR should be established as a non-ministerial government department to recognise the important new responsibilities that it has been given. Some of the bodies that have that status—the Competition and Markets Authority, the Crown Prosecution Service, the Food Standards Agency, HMRC, Ofsted and Ofgem—have been considered by one Government or another to have needed that status to show that they are robustly independent. Looking at nuclear safeguard responsibilities, there is a very strong case for enhancing the status of the ONR in that way, and I hope that the Minister will be sympathetic. I beg to move.
Baroness Featherstone
I support Amendment 11. Part of Amendment 7 said something similar. It is very important that we are satisfied on this point so that we know for sure that there can be no interference and no misdoings—if that is the right word.
Lord Henley
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, knows, I am always sympathetic, particularly to his amendments. On this occasion, what he wants are some reassurances, as does the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, about the genuine independence of the ONR and, importantly, that the IAEA sees it as an independent body and accepts it as such. I hope that, quite briefly, I will be able to provide those reassurances.
We have international obligations to ensure that the regulator is effectively independent. The provisions of the 2013 Act, which created the ONR and which I am sure the noble Lord knows well, were specifically designed to ensure that the ONR had appropriate independence. Those measures to guarantee its independence include providing it with independent public corporation status; significant restrictions on the Government’s ability to direct the ONR in the exercise of its functions; constraints on the conditions for dismissing senior ONR members; and transparency obligations that act as a safeguard against powers—which are already constrained—being used in an improper manner.
Noble Lords will be aware that as a public corporation the ONR is able to set its own employment terms and conditions, affording it greater freedom and flexibility than if it were a non-ministerial government department. If it were such a department, ONR employees would be civil servants, the organisation would be part of government and the level of its independence would arguably be more limited than it is now. The noble Lord, however, obviously takes another view.
In the factsheet we published on 19 February, we made it clear that the ONR is independent from government in its regulatory functions and decisions. The most important point to stress—this deals with the entire matter and goes to the core of the amendment—is that the International Atomic Energy Agency reported in 2013 that the Energy Act 2013 would,
“provide de jure independence, which will reinforce the de facto independence that ONR (and its predecessors) have enjoyed for many years”.
It is important that we listen to what the IAEA said; I cannot stress how important this is. The amendment the Committee is considering attempts to unpick the arrangements that the IAEA—the international body responsible for nuclear safeguards worldwide—considers provide the independence necessary for an effective regulatory safeguarding regime.
Having established that the ONR is independent, I would also like to note that, as well as fulfilling international obligations and best practice, this independence is crucial for the industry. It is important that the industry has recourse to appeal ONR decisions. Attempting to fundamentally change the ONR’s relationship with the Government by explicitly providing that the ONR acts on behalf of the Crown—the effect of the amendment—risks moving away from an approach deemed appropriate by the IAEA and would undermine the industry’s ability to hold the regulator to account.
I do not think I need to go any further than that. In the interests of time, it is probably best that I end there and ask the noble Lord whether he wants at this stage to withdraw his amendment. I hope that I have given him the appropriate guarantees.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
That has been a very helpful response and I am grateful to the Minister. However, I disagree with him: it is clear from the Cabinet Office guidance that a non-ministerial government department has more independence, whatever the status of officials. But he has given me considerable reassurance, for which I am most grateful, and I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Nuclear Safeguards Bill
Tuesday 20th March 2018
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 81-R-I(a) Amendment for Report, supplementary to the marshalled list (PDF, 54KB) - (19 Mar 2018)
16:47 - Division on Amendment 3 - Ayes: 265 / Noes: 194 - Amendment 3 agreed.
17:54 - Division on Amendment 7 - Ayes: 244 / Noes: 194 - Amendment 7 agreed.
Lord Henley
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Lord Henley)
My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 2 and 12.The amendments place the definition of “civil activities” in the Bill. The House will be aware that the term “civil activities” forms a key part of the main regulation-making power set out in new Section 76A(1)(a). Regulations can be made for the purpose of ensuring that qualifying nuclear materials, facilities or equipment are available only for use for civil activities, so the meaning of “civil activities” is one of the elements that determine the scope of the safeguards regime that can be made through those regulations.
I am grateful to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee for its recommendation on this matter: that a definition of “civil activities” should be, so far as is possible, placed in the Bill, supplemented by a power where necessary to develop its meaning in regulations. Having considered the committee’s recommendation on this matter, I am pleased to have been able to table this government amendment, which places the definition of “civil activities” in the Bill. This definition takes into account the continuing work on the draft regulations which will underpin the Bill, on which we are intending to consult by June.
It is important to emphasise again the fundamentals of what safeguards actually are and what we are hoping to achieve with our new domestic regime. Safeguards are nuclear non-proliferation reporting and verification processes by which states demonstrate to the international community that civil nuclear material is not diverted into military or weapons programmes. Nuclear safeguards measures include: reporting on civil nuclear material holdings and development plans; inspections of nuclear facilities by international inspectors; and monitoring, including by cameras in selected facilities.
As the House will now be well aware, nuclear safeguards are distinct from nuclear safety, which regards the prevention of nuclear accidents, and nuclear security, which is physical protection measures. Nuclear safety and nuclear security are the subject of separate regulatory regimes operated by the ONR.
The new domestic civil nuclear safeguards regime which we are developing is designed to ensure that we can robustly demonstrate to the international community that civil nuclear material is not being diverted into military or weapons programmes. I hope that the House will therefore agree that the proposed definition of “civil activities”, which has the concept of “peaceful purposes” at its core, suitably recognises this international commitment while including helpful detail on the types of activities covered by safeguards.
Although the committee accepted that it might still be necessary to supplement this definition with a power to embellish its meaning in regulations, I have not found that to be necessary. The amendment removes the existing power to specify in regulations activities that are or are not to be treated as “civil activities” and replaces it with a definition on the face of the Bill without creating another power. It therefore reduces the number of powers created by the Bill.
I hope that the House will agree that the amendments satisfactorily address the recommendations of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. I commend them to the House and beg to move.
Lord Hutton of Furness (Lab)
My Lords, I welcome the tabling by the Minister of this amendment. It is always a good idea to see on the face of legislation the definition of terms used in it. It is helpful.
I quite understand why the Minister would want to confine the definition of “civil activities” to things carried on for peaceful purposes; for example, in relation to the production, processing and storage of nuclear material—it is within the safeguarding arrangements and makes sense; the same is true for the purposes of research and development. What I do not understand is why he has felt it necessary to use the words,
“carried on for peaceful purposes”,
in the context of generation of electricity, because I am not aware that the generation of electricity is ever for anything other than peaceful purposes.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)
My Lords, I will enjoy the Minister’s response to my noble friend’s question. I welcome the amendments brought by the Minister; they follow our discussion in Committee and the recommendation of the Delegated Powers Committee. However, on his eloquent defence of our having this Bill before us, the Bill would be quite unnecessary if the Government were to reverse their decision to leave Euratom, which remains for many of us unfathomable and unjustified.
Lord Henley
On the last point of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, it is not necessary to rehearse all the arguments that we have been through on this matter because the decision has been made to leave Euratom. As he knows, that was dealt with in the transition Bill, which received a large majority in another place and is now an Act. It is a done deal. That is where we are and we have legislated on that issue.
On the more detailed technical point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Hutton, about electricity generation carried out for non-peaceful purposes, I have not got a clue and will take advice on the matter. I am assured by those drafting the Bill that this was the appropriate and proper way to deal with this matter. We wanted to ensure that we did not need to keep a residual power so that we could come back to this and make further amendments. That would have upset the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, who would have accused me of retaining a Henry VIII power to seek further amendments to the primary legislation. By tabling this amendment and drafting it in that way, I have been able to make sure that there is not even that residual power. That is the proper way to go forward.
Having said that, I will write to the noble Lord, Lord Hutton, to give him an idea about electricity generation that is carried on for non-peaceful purposes, if such an answer can be found. I will make that information available to other noble Lords as they so wish.
Lord Henley
““civil activities” means—(a) production, processing or storage activities which are carried on for peaceful purposes;(b) electricity generation carried on for peaceful purposes;(c) decommissioning;(d) research and development carried on for peaceful purposes;(e) any other activity carried on for peaceful purposes;”
Lord Broers
“Agreements required before withdrawal
(1) In the event that any of the agreements listed in subsection (3) are not in place on 1 March 2019, a Minister of the Crown must, as part of the negotiations regarding the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Atomic Energy Community Treaty, request to suspend the United Kingdom’s withdrawal until either—(a) the agreements listed in subsection (3) are in place, or(b) other arrangements have been made to enable the United Kingdom to continue to benefit from existing nuclear safeguards arrangements until the agreements listed in subsection (3) are in place.(2) For the avoidance of doubt, a request for suspension under subsection (1) applies only to withdrawal from the European Atomic Energy Community Treaty and to no other part of the United Kingdom’s negotiations for withdrawal from the European Union.(3) The relevant agreements are—(a) an agreement between the United Kingdom and the International Atomic Energy Agency recognising the Office of Nuclear Regulation as the approved United Kingdom safeguarding authority in place of the European Atomic Energy Community;(b) a Voluntary Offer Agreement between the United Kingdom and the International Atomic Energy Agency resulting from the United Kingdom no longer being a member of the European Atomic Energy Community; and(c) relevant international agreements with those nations with which the United Kingdom has exercised rights in the last three years as a party to agreements made by the European Atomic Energy Community.”
Lord Broers (CB)
My Lords, Amendment 3 seeks to ensure that the necessary agreements to secure the safeguards for our nuclear power are in place before 1 March 2019. It does not require us to withdraw but to suspend the UK’s withdrawal from the European Atomic Energy Community treaty until the agreements are in place.
The legal relationship between Euratom and the EU is not as clear to me as it is to the Minister. I have sought the opinion of learned friends who have told me there is no binding legal agreement that obliges us to withdraw from Euratom when we withdraw from the EU. However, the Government’s position is based upon what is stated in paragraph 18(1) in the Explanatory Notes relating to the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act, which states:
“The power that is provided by clause 1(1) applies to withdrawal from the EU. This includes the European Atomic Energy Community (‘Euratom’), as the European Union (Amendment) Act 2008 sets out that the term ‘EU’ includes (as the context permits or requires) Euratom (section 3(2))”.
The situation is not straightforward. I am reminded of the words of Sir Thomas More in “A Man for All Seasons”—“I trust I make myself obscure”—which seems to be the situation.
As I have already stated, we are not asking for withdrawal but suspension of our withdrawal from the European Atomic Energy Community treaty until we have the relevant agreements described in subsections (3) (a), (b) and (c) of the proposed new clause in place to give the confidence that these agreements are complete and appropriate and will maintain the highest standards in safeguarding our nuclear power. This is essential if we are to maintain the nuclear baseload needed to underpin our intermittent renewables. As I said last night, if this fails we will almost certainly not be able to meet our reduction in emissions obligation.
Of all the world’s complex technologies, nuclear power is surely one where we must maintain collaboration with our partners, especially those in Europe, with whom we have been working so closely. To ensure that our energy strategy is secure, we must have the assurances contained in the amendment. I beg to move.
The Earl of Selborne (Con)
My Lords, in the draft transition agreement published yesterday the entry on Euratom is in green, which appears to demonstrate that there is some progress being made, apart from any legal complication which might emerge from the woodwork. The Government have committed themselves to a close association with the Euratom research and training programme. The Secretary of State has also committed to report back to Parliament every three months about overall progress on Euratom, with a first update expected before Easter. All so far so good, but this does not change the position that a default clause, such as this amendment suggests, might be sensible.
The only reason I have heard why this amendment will not or cannot be accepted is that, by our own folly, we have already given notice that we are leaving Euratom, come what may. My noble friend on the Front Bench described it as a done deal—which of course it is in terms of the Act we have already passed—but that is not the best of reasons for rejecting this amendment. After all, one Bill can amend a previous Act and if we find that the default position is needed in order to make sure that we do not fall between poles between one Bill and another, I should have thought that a fallback position such as that suggested by this rather sensible amendment would at least be worthy of serious consideration.
I recognise that the assurances given by the Government, and indeed by our Minister here, are helpful so far as they go—I have enumerated them just now—and that the disastrous decision to leave Euratom may ultimately be irreversible, but I will be listening to the Minister’s response to this debate with great care.
Lord Warner (CB)
My Lords, I strongly support this amendment. I want to focus on the one issue that will cause me to vote for this amendment if my noble friend puts it to a vote. That is the way that the Government have been playing Russian roulette with our energy security by the ill-considered and ideological rush to leave Euratom without being sure that an equivalent regime is properly in place. The jeopardy this places the UK in is well set out in the latest briefing from the Nuclear Industry Association. The Government are doing a very unusual and risky thing in ignoring the advice of the nuclear industry’s experts simply because of their obsession with the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, which, let me remind the House, has never intervened in a Euratom matter during the duration of Euratom’s life.
There is little evidence that it is possible to secure UK accreditation from the IAEA and negotiate a raft of new nuclear co-operation agreements with other countries before exit day. As the NIA briefing makes clear:
“Without access to Euratom’s NCAs and common market, the nuclear new build programme, nuclear could be seriously affected”.
Clearly, a responsible Government would stay in Euratom and not risk the disruption and uncertainty to a critical industry that departure brings, but not this Government. They claim that they will secure an equivalent alternative set of arrangements to membership of Euratom by exit day. Their backstop for failure seems to be that by the end of the transition or implementation period they are trying to negotiate with the EU. Despite yesterday’s upbeat gloss put on the negotiations of a transitional period, no such arrangements have yet been agreed by the Council of Ministers; they may well not be before the Bill leaves this House. Even if they are agreed before Royal Assent they will not provide for a transition period beyond the end of 2020. That may still not be long enough to secure all the new NCAs the UK needs, especially with the United States.
As the NIA briefing makes clear, without these agreements the trade in goods and services to maintain our existing nuclear reactors—these generate 21% of the UK’s electricity—is put in jeopardy, as is the building of new reactors. Sizewell B is particularly vulnerable because it relies on an NCA with the United States, and a new NCA is effectively a treaty, which requires congressional approval.
Lord Teverson (LD)
My Lords, I am very happy to have added my name to this amendment. I am chair of the House’s EU Energy and Environment Sub-Committee, which looked at the subject of Brexit and energy security. Regretfully to some, we did not come out with any great headlines that said that the country was going to grind to a halt on the energy side, although we did say there was probably going to be an increase in prices because of increased electricity trading inefficiency. However, we made one exception, which we thought at that time was probably unlikely, but the evidence since might push this the other way. If the UK did not manage to replicate the agreements that Euratom has with the rest of the world and the IAEA, then there was a real risk of our current fleet of nuclear power stations coming to a halt, Hinkley C not being built and various other problems in terms of our deep work in nuclear research.
That is why this amendment absolutely puts its finger on the issue. It goes through the three things that have to be agreed for the United Kingdom to be able not just to fulfil its own obligations internationally but to be able to trade in nuclear material, people and spare parts even, post Brexit. What are they? We clearly need our own Office for Nuclear Regulation to be approved as a safeguarding authority by the IAEA, which is clearly essential; we need a voluntary offer agreement with the IAEA; and we need to replicate a number of our nuclear co-operation agreements with the rest of the world. I have certainly not heard, anywhere, even any attempt to try to give confidence that we will be able to roll over any of these NCAs following Brexit. But there are a large number of hurdles to achieving these aims, and this is going to take time.
In terms of the approval by the International Atomic Energy Agency of a safeguarding regime, they include recruitment, which the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has talked about many times and was covered in the evidence that came to the House of Commons Select Committee. There is the training of those personnel. There is the retention of those personnel, which has been highlighted by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, on previous occasions, as once they are qualified, there is a very strong international demand for them. There is also the issue, which I raised in Committee, of IT systems, and I thank the Minister the noble Lord, Lord Henley, for his reply to my Written Question, which very carefully went through the new systems that are required for us to be able to function as a safeguarding authority. Those systems are quite substantial, and we will come on to that—on my Amendment 9A—later today.
Of course, we also need to negotiate an agreement with the IAEA itself. When it comes to nuclear co-operation agreements, these are absolutely essential to us for our nuclear fissile material for power stations, for repairing, for spare parts and for nuclear intellectual property. It is very difficult to replicate those agreements so, as the noble Lord, Lord Warner, absolutely showed far better than I could, two of our key nuclear co-operation agreements—one with the United States, a legal requirement, and one with Australia, as the Minister highlighted in Committee—would expect us to be full members of the IAEA and to be able to have nuclear co-operation agreements in order to trade those materials. Even just in those two countries, we have major hurdles.
Turning to the voluntary offer agreements, these agreements are only necessary—or only made—by the five nuclear weapon states, or those that have declared as such; India, Pakistan and Israel have separate arrangements. I cannot imagine, however, that as a country that is one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and that stands for the upholding of international law and for the importance of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, we would allow ourselves to go ahead without having concluded such an agreement with the IAEA.
That is why this amendment is so important. If we cannot fulfil these three criteria, then we should not go ahead: we should postpone leaving Euratom. Why is the date of 1 March 2019 there? Clearly, it is four weeks before we are set to leave the European Union. Like others, I have looked at the agreement that was made yesterday, and there is a separate article and chapter on Euratom. Paragraph 2 of Article 76 of that agreement—which is in green, meaning that it has been agreed by the European Union and ourselves in detail—says very starkly:
“The United Kingdom shall have sole responsibility for ensuring its compliance with international obligations arising as a consequence of its membership of the International Atomic Energy Agency and of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”.
When you look to the transition chapter, there is no mention of Euratom, or of paragraph 2 of Article 76 being postponed in any way. This ties up with the Government’s own view. We will be leaving Euratom on 29 March next year unless we make other arrangements, and the EU 27 and the UK are agreed on that position. That is why this is a matter not just of energy security but of national security.
Lord Hutton of Furness
I want to say a few words in support of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Broers. I draw the House’s attention to my interest in the register: I am currently the chair of the Nuclear Industry Association.
None of us in this House or outside who has been following this debate really has any doubt at all that the Government are seized of the significance of the challenge that we face. Having made the decision, which many of us regret, to leave the Euratom treaty, the Government have to do two things against a very tight deadline. The first is to replace the existing Euratom safeguarding regime, which, as other noble Lords have said, is a very important part—in fact, the central part—of one of our obligations as a nuclear weapons state: to ensure against the risk of nuclear proliferation. That is a big challenge. We have not exercised that function, which is currently done for us by Euratom, and building up the capability under the auspices of the ONR is a difficult challenge. The ONR itself has said, in evidence in another place, that it probably will not be ready to fully discharge those responsibilities by next March. So the Government—rightly, in my view—have come to the view that they need a little more time, once we have left the EU, to ensure that the ONR can step up and do that job, but it will be touch and go.
The other thing that the Government need to do, although, with respect to the Minister, they have come to this a little late, is to put in place all the machinery necessary for the continuance of the nuclear co-operation agreements that exist between ourselves and Japan, the US, Canada and Australia, our principal nuclear friends and allies, for the continuing exchange of information, goods and services in the nuclear sector. Of course, unless we are able to move seamlessly from the current NCAs to the new arrangements, the trade in goods and services will come to an end at the end of the implementation period at the end of 2020—assuming that the implementation period is agreed—unless in that period we have successfully put in place alternative nuclear co-operation agreements.
The fundamental reason why your Lordships’ House should pay close attention to the amendment is that it is good to have a default or a back-up. Suppose we do not get to the point at the end of the implementation period where these nuclear co-operation agreements have all been agreed, renegotiated and put into legal effect. The noble Lord, Lord Warner, drew our attention to some of the issues of complexity around renewing the NCAs. The process is not in our gift; we do not have control of the process whereby these replacement nuclear co-operation agreements will take legal effect, because in many of those countries they are international treaties—and will require the consent of, in the case of the US, the US Congress.
Any student of US politics knows one thing: that international treaties progress very slowly in Congress. Something that we have come to see in the US repeatedly, under both Democrat and Republican Presidents, is the extraordinary process that we in the UK do not understand at all where the US Government shut down because of, for example, a failure in Congress to agree budgets. We have no say in or control of that. Suppose there is a prolonged shutdown in the government machinery of the US at the very time when we want the US Congress to renew the nuclear co-operation agreement. What do we do then?
Fundamentally, the amendment poses that question: what do we do, all of us, if, with the very best of intentions and the absolute commitment of the Government, which I do not doubt, to renew these nuclear co-operation agreements, the implementation period comes to an end and we have not succeeded in putting into place the nuclear co-operation agreements? It seems pretty obvious that, despite all the difficulties of trying to construct a default or backstop, we have to give attention to the risk that we come to the end of that period and we have not renegotiated successfully—through no fault of our own but simply because we do not control all the processes that are involved in moving pieces of the jigsaw—and we do not find ourselves in the situation, where we all want to be, where these NCAs can be seamlessly renewed.
If we get to that point where the NCAs are not in place with our key nuclear trading allies, we have a major problem. In my view, it would become impossible for the vital exchange of goods and services in the nuclear sector to continue beyond that point legally and lawfully, and if it cannot be done legally and lawfully then it will not be done at all. The noble Lords, Lord Warner and Lord Teverson, have referred to the problem which that might create for the energy security of the UK. I am sure I cannot be the only person in this House to say, “I don’t think any of us should take a gamble or a risk with the energy security of our country”. Given the important role of the nuclear industry, that is precisely what we will be doing if we do not find the wherewithal in this Chamber today to find a way of constructing a backstop for the “What if?” moment if at the end of the day these nuclear co-operation agreements cannot be brought into effect at the time when we want them to be. That seems to be the issue that the amendment has raised, and it is not going to go away. We have to have an answer somehow to that fundamental question, and I look forward to what the Minister has to say.
Viscount Trenchard (Con)
My Lords, I very much respect the expert opinion of the noble Lords who have tabled this amendment. I share their concern about whether the ONR is going to be sufficiently staffed in time, with enough appropriately qualified experts who can quickly take up all the safeguarding duties. It is also essential that the ONR should have the necessary budgets and organisation and enough duly authorised persons in order to carry out its duties. I should like to hear from the Minister that he is satisfied that this will be the case.
I should also like to ask the Minister exactly what our status is going to be during the interim or implementation period, assuming that we have managed, before March 2019, to put in place an IAEA-approved safeguards regime. This is unlikely because I think we will need most of the implementation period till the end of 2020 to establish and enter into the new NCAs, at least with our principal nuclear trading partners. Many of them have to go through their own legislatures and we have no means of guaranteeing how smoothly this will be done. I think we can be confident that it is equally in their interests to make sure that they continue the appropriate arrangements with the United Kingdom as a major player in the nuclear sector.
I feel that the noble Lord, Lord Broers, and the other noble Lords who have tabled this amendment, fail to recognise that there is an upside from our leaving Euratom. It has been suggested that it is a mistake, and that we could have remained within Euratom but left the EU. Even if this were so—and I do not know whether I believe it or not—I think there are good reasons why we would do better to have our own safeguards regime approved by the IAEA and to escape from the rather cumbersome and onerous Euratom process.
Other noble Lords were present at the briefing given by Mr Colin Parker of EDF. I have also been told by Dr Pat Upson, former director of BNFL and Urenco and former chief executive of ETC—the joint venture between Urenco and EDF—that there could certainly be advantages to the UK in having an independent safeguards regime and not seeking to replicate Euratom safeguards which concentrate too much on complicated verification processes and are less robust than IAEA requirements on process, procedures and controls.
There are those who believe that our security in this very sensitive sector will also be enhanced if we are not obliged to share all the details of our research and development programme with the 27 members of Euratom. There is, therefore, a considerable upside. Euratom is also too expensive. To replicate Euratom’s safeguards regime does not provide extra safety or security over what is required by the IAEA. I therefore have some reservations about proposed new subsection (3)(c) of the noble Lord’s amendment regarding the necessity to continue to share research and development entirely with the Euratom community.
Viscount Hanworth (Lab)
My Lords, I am inclined to clap a hand on my head and express my utter amazement at the absurdity of this aspect of the Brexit agenda.
We are at present attempting to mitigate the deleterious consequences of a wholly unnecessary programme of the Government for leaving the Euratom consortium. The present amendment, which is supported by all other parties, foreshadows an inevitable outcome. The programme to leave Euratom will not be fulfilled by March 2019, when we shall formally leave the European Union, and the Government will have to bid for extra time. A similar amendment ought to have been brought forward by the Government. Their need to demonstrate their faith in Brexit may have prevented their doing so. Indeed, they have fostered some dangerous delusions. At the outset, the Government evinced an unreasonable optimism in the ability of the ONR to have the necessary security arrangements in place by March 2019. They have since become convinced that they will be able to negotiate a meaningful transition period thereafter from which our nuclear industry could profit. I believe that, notwithstanding recent events, it is far from certain that a workable agreement on a transition period will be reached. Certainly, a secure agreement has not yet been reached.
The Government also have an unjustified optimism regarding the likelihood that the necessary nuclear co-operation agreements, or NCAs, will be in place in time to avert a crisis in the supply of nuclear fuels and engineering materials. Without these NCAs in place, the generation of our electricity by nuclear power and the construction of the new nuclear power stations are likely to grind to a halt. Let me elaborate on these three points in the order that I have raised them, albeit that, in doing so I am conscious that I will repeat some familiar arguments. It is necessary to do so in the face of the obtuseness of the Government.
First is the question regarding the readiness of the ONR to assume the burden of nuclear safeguarding by March next year. Doubtless the Minister will attest that the ONR has declared that it is willing and able to undertake the task, and that it is working hard to meet the deadline. One is bound to retort, “It would say that, wouldn’t it?” But it has also said much else besides, which makes it abundantly clear that the best that it could achieve by that date is a threadbare organisation that would be severely understaffed. These honest admissions on the part of the ONR of its incapacity do not seem to have registered fully with the Government. However, they may have registered with other agencies that participate in the international nuclear regime. I am thinking of the foreign organisations that will require that we should have a proficient nuclear safeguarding regime in place if they are to continue to be our suppliers.
Next, there is the Government’s optimism regarding the likelihood of our being granted a lengthy transition period to ease the demands of Brexit. We have heard a statement recently from Michel Barnier to the effect that he sees a prospect for a rapid advancement of the negotiations, but he has insisted that all this depends on the precondition of an arrangement regarding the Irish border. I wonder how this sounds in the ears of the responsible government Ministers. Have they been listening more to the upbeat tone of the delivery of the message than to the preconditions that it asserts? To many listeners the message serves only to increase the anxiety that there will be no viable transitional arrangements.
The final point to make concerns the nuclear co-operation agreements or NCAs. The importance of enacting these in good time has been stressed repeatedly by EDF, which is the owner of Britain’s existing fleet of nuclear power stations and the constructor of the first of what is planned to be a new fleet. These are surely the people to whom we should be listening. The NCAs can be established only when there is a viable UK nuclear safeguarding regime in place. There is likely to be a considerable hiatus between the time when a new UK nuclear safeguarding regime is up and running and the enactment of the necessary NCAs. The Government have said nothing about how they would accommodate the inevitable delays. As many have mentioned, one is mindful of the fact that a new NCA with the United States will require to be ratified by the Senate. This could be a hazardous and lengthy process. The US has a nuclear industry of its own. Someone in the US legislature might be minded to promote the commercial interests of the American industry at the expense of ours and at the expense of the French, who own our nuclear power stations. I believe that this amendment foreshadows an inevitable outcome. The Government will be bound to take the steps proposed in the amendment.
Lord Grantchester (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Broers, for tabling this amendment, to which we have added our names. I will say again what the amendment does so that we can be clear. The amendment delays the UK’s withdrawal from Euratom until the required agreements that will allow the civil nuclear industry to continue are in place. These required agreements are listed and have been debated at length in Committee. They are not in place at the moment and there is widespread opinion that they will not be— indeed cannot be—ready before exit day in March 2019 and, in respect of the proposed new subsection (3)(c) on international agreements, before the end of any transition period yet to be fully agreed.
In saying what the amendment does, we should also be clear what it does not do. It does not stop the withdrawal of the UK from either the EU treaty or the Euratom treaty. It does not seek that the UK will remain permanently either in the EU or in Euratom. The problem in scrutinising this Bill in your Lordships’ House is that the Government have been reluctant to give clarity to their negotiations—about what is and what is not included in them and how far they apply to nuclear safeguards and the Euratom treaty. The Government have even been reluctant to spell out exactly what immediate standards will be adhered to on exit day. I thank all sides of the House for the persistent challenges that have come to the Government and for remarks made again today examining the situation. I also thank the Minister for recognising the importance of this issue and providing what further assurances the Government are prepared to give. But the risks remain.
The conclusion is that the UK cannot set up its own Euratom-standard safeguards regime in time. In this situation it is only responsible that this House should insist on a delay. The importance of maintaining the UK’s integrity to be part of an international civil nuclear order cannot be overstated. Once the vital international safeguards standards have been met and agreed, withdrawal of the UK from the Euratom treaty can proceed. This may well take longer to achieve than even the transition period may be able to offer.
The Government will want to claim that the amendment is defective. That is the default position, since the Government always state that the two treaties of the EU and Euratom are legally joined. That the two treaties share common institutions is not to be denied, but the Government have not come forward with their legal advice for the interpretation that they cannot be separated. There are two distinct treaties. As was discussed last night in amendments to the withdrawal Bill, the UK was a member of Euratom distinct from the EU treaty, because this was the case before the UK joined the EU. Furthermore, in the Prime Minister’s letter of 29 March 2017 to President Tusk, she deliberately mentions both withdrawal from Euratom under Article 106a of the treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community and withdrawal from the EU. They are, therefore, separate.
Article 106a has never been invoked and was not mentioned in the drafting of the EU (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill, which the Government insisted could not be amended. So the amendment does not try to undo anything legislatively that has already been agreed by Parliament. The Government claim that power to withdraw from the EU includes the power to withdraw from Euratom, so they make it a tautology in their opinion, and make no further reference or inclusion of Euratom. It can be argued that the noble Lord, Lord Broers, wishes to insist on the principle that leaving Euratom be delayed until the UK is ready. It is Labour policy to remain a part of agencies such as Euratom, as has been stated in the other place. The Government can perfect any drafting at Third Reading.
The Prime Minister herself, in her Mansion House speech on 2 March, stated that the Government want to explore with the EU how the UK can remain part of EU agencies. She mentioned three—namely, the European Medicines Agency, the European Chemicals Agency and the European Aviation Safety Agency—and went on to explain the reasons. By accepting this amendment, the Government can, in their determination to be in close association with Euratom, keep withdrawal from Euratom in suspense while they explore how far adherence to EU rules can still be beneficial to the UK. The Government have expressed this wish repeatedly without further definition. In a letter to my noble friend Lord O’Neill of Clackmannan dated 28 February, the Minister stated that,
“the Government’s focus is on the outcome rather than the means”.
That means that the House needs to focus on the outcome of the amendment.
Lord Henley
My Lords, I hope that I can persuade the House that it could be irresponsible and would create confusion and doubt to support this amendment in a Division, as the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, wishes to do.
The amendment seeks to require Ministers to request, as part of the negotiations with the EU, that the United Kingdom does not leave the Euratom treaty if it does not have certain agreements or arrangements in place by 1 March next year—that is, four weeks before exit day. Those agreements or arrangements are set out briefly in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of new subsection (3) proposed in the amendment, and I will deal with those in due course.
The noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, also made it clear that the amendment is not about stopping us leaving Euratom. He might give us that assurance but, listening to some of the other speeches, I am not sure that that is necessarily the wish of others, who have made it clear that they would like us to stay in Euratom—a point made in earlier interventions by the noble Lord, Lord Hutton, and others.
At this stage, it is important to remind the House that when my right honourable friend the Prime Minister gave notice last year of our intention to leave the European Union, she also commenced the process for leaving Euratom. The power to make that notification has already been debated at considerable length in both Houses of Parliament and authorised by the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017. That notification has been accepted by the European Union. The United Kingdom will therefore withdraw from Euratom at the same time as withdrawing from the European Union. That, as I put it to the noble Lord, Lord Hutton, earlier, is a done deal.
I commend all noble Lords’ commitment to ensuring that all the necessary measures are in place so that the United Kingdom can operate as an independent and responsible nuclear state upon withdrawal from Euratom. It is essential that the civil nuclear industry is not adversely affected by the UK’s withdrawal from either the EU or Euratom and that it can continue to operate with certainty. I underline the word “certainty”. That is our top priority and the reason for the Bill. It is why we are bringing forward all the regulations that sit beneath it—of which noble Lords will have seen draft versions—and the reason for the work the ONR is doing to put in place a regime, and that my department is doing to secure the agreements we need with the IAEA and key international partners. I will reiterate this point until the House understands the extent to which the UK stands ready to operate as an independent and responsible nuclear state from day one of exit.
The first quarterly update to Parliament, which will be available before the Easter break, will demonstrate our significant progress on this front, and I will share some of the details with the House shortly. Before I do so, however, I will address the crucial issue of the timing of our withdrawal from the Euratom treaty and the timings provided for in this amendment.
The amendment’s proposed suspension period for Euratom withdrawal is in conflict with the transition period already agreed by the UK and the European Union. This has been referred to by several noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, and my noble friend Lord Trenchard. The agreement is for a transition period running from 30 March 2019 to 31 December 2020 and will include all of the Euratom acquis. To be clear, the agreement reached in Brussels on 19 March is that the transition period will include the continued delivery of the Euratom safeguards regime in the UK, and the UK will continue to be covered by Euratom-level agreements with third countries during that period. Clearly, this will take effect after the UK has left Euratom, whereas this amendment refers to a period prior to the implementation of Euratom withdrawal—one of the reasons why it is not satisfactory. The amendment is, therefore, at odds with national government policy and as such mandates a request that we know is futile.
In terms of the overall principle of the amendment, I must be clear that an attempt to mandate a particular stance in negotiations, in the way that this amendment seeks to do, does not belong in primary legislation. I cannot, therefore, accept this amendment but I understand that the House will want reassurances that we have in place the international agreements that we need on safeguards.
I turn to progress on securing those new bilateral safeguard agreements. We have made very good progress in negotiating these with the IAEA, which I will simply refer to as “the agency”—I have problems with the initials, as noble Lords may have noticed. Both the UK and the agency are clear that the new agreements should follow the same principles and scope as the current trilateral agreements.
The amendment also addresses relevant international agreements with other nations—the NCAs. To be clear, the United Kingdom is not a party to nuclear co-operation agreements concluded by Euratom with other nations. These are concluded by Euratom on behalf of the member states. I understand, however, that the intention of this amendment is to cover agreements Euratom currently has in place with third countries.
As the House will be aware, the Government have prioritised putting in place nuclear co-operation agreements with those nations which have a legal or policy requirement for them to be in place as a prerequisite for civil nuclear trade. We are on track to conclude, and to secure third-country and UK ratification of, all such agreements that are essential to ensure a smooth withdrawal from Euratom in advance of 2019, in particular those with the US, Canada, Australia and Japan. We have held positive and constructive discussions with each of these four countries and remain on track to ensure that these agreements will be in place in time.
Lord Hutton of Furness
Have Her Majesty’s Government received any assurance from the Government of the United States that this legislation will be in place, having passed through both Houses of Congress, in time to ensure that there is no break in trade? Has he received that assurance?
Lord Henley
My Lords, I am not aware of any such assurances. It is important that we get this legislation in place in good time. That is why I hope that we will complete Report today and Third Reading next week, and the Bill will receive Royal Assent some time after the Easter break. I do not know what is happening in the United States but I can assure the noble Lord that negotiations continue. We believe that we are on track to achieving the NCAs which are necessary. As I said, the important NCAs that we need are with the US, Canada, Australia and Japan. The amendment seeks relevant international agreements with those nations with which we have exercised rights within the last three years, which would include others that are not relevant. The important ones are those four—the ones that we trade with—and I give an assurance that we are on track. We have held positive and constructive discussions with each of these four countries and remain on track that those agreements will be in place in time.
All sides recognise the mutual interest in having these agreements in place to replace the Euratom agreements on which the UK currently relies. As I have said, discussions have been constructive; the substance of the new agreements is planned to follow very closely what is in the existing agreements. I am confident that sufficient progress is being made in this area, including on draft texts and ensuring that respective ratification processes and timetables have been taken into account in the planning.
Our substantial progress in international negotiations, coupled with our swift action to establish a legislative and regulatory framework for a domestic safeguards regime, not least via this Bill, means that we will be ready for exiting the Euratom treaty no matter the outcome of wider government negotiations on Brexit. The core aspects of this element of Amendment 3 will therefore already be met, and are therefore unnecessary.
Crucially, I must also bring the House’s attention to the fact that the effect of this amendment would extend to covering a number of additional agreements which, de facto, are not required to ensure a smooth withdrawal from Euratom. Introducing such requirements into the Bill will unnecessarily create huge risks and uncertainties to the UK’s ability to operate as an independent nuclear state from March 2019. I refer the noble Lord, Lord Hutton, particularly to proposed new subsection (3)(c) of the amendment, which could cover NCAs that Euratom has concluded with Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Argentina, and Ukraine. As I have previously set out, none of these countries has a legal or policy requirement for an NCA to be in place to facilitate nuclear trade. Requiring us to put agreements in place with each of these countries before we withdraw from Euratom would be a fruitless exercise which could jeopardise our work to establish a civil nuclear safeguards regime for the UK with all the essential agreements in place.
Further, proposed new subsection (3)(a) refers to an agreement between the UK and the agency to recognise the Office for Nuclear Regulation as the approved UK safeguards authority. I would like to make it clear that the agency’s focus in respect of the UK’s safeguards lies with the voluntary offer agreement and additional protocol, rather than the domestic legislation underpinning the domestic regime, or the UK’s arrangements for fulfilling its commitments. It is the Government—not the ONR—who enter into these agreements, and therefore the Government who must uphold these commitments, regardless of whether or not we choose to delegate obligations to an independent domestic regulator. The additional agreement referred to in Amendment 3 as distinct from the voluntary offer agreement is therefore unnecessary, impractical, and in no way required for a smooth withdrawal from Euratom.
As I and ministerial colleagues have emphasised throughout the passage of this Bill—this has been echoed by all those taking part in this and earlier debates—certainty for the industry is essential. Creating a situation where we are compelled to secure agreements—
Lord Warner
I am sorry to interrupt the Minister as he comes to his peroration. Will he answer the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Hutton, in more detail? Can he give a categorical assurance to this House that there is no risk of Sizewell B closing down as a result of the Government’s failure to put in place all the things that he assured us of by 29 March next year? As he will know, it is of a US design and relies on imported spare parts and maintenance arrangements, and generates about 8% to 10% of the UK’s electricity.
Lord Henley
The noble Lord is asking whether that NCA with the United States will be completed. I have given all the assurances I can that it will be and I cannot go any further than what I said in response to the noble Lord, Lord Hutton. With that in mind, what I was trying to make quite clear in what the noble Lord, Lord Warner, described as my peroration was the need for certainty for the industry, and this amendment would remove that certainty. The amendment would create a situation where we are compelled to secure agreements that we do not need and it runs counter to what the Government are doing: creating certainty. Even if this amendment were technically correct, its impact would be to introduce further uncertainty and potential disruption to an industry by casting doubt over establishing the domestic safeguards regime in the long term. I do not believe that can be the intention of the noble Lords who tabled it.
I believe we are on track to provide continuity and that this amendment is not only unnecessary but exacerbates the risks that it seeks to remove. I hope with the assurances I have given, and with the explanation of the weaknesses in the amendment, that the noble Lord will withdraw it.
Lord Broers
My Lords, I very much appreciate what the Minister said with respect to the progress the Government are making to seek these agreements—it is essential that we get agreements with our major partners. I do not feel that the amendment, as it is, will put us in great danger by going beyond our major partners, but perhaps such adjustments could be made in the other place.
I do feel, however, that I have heard too many assurances that have not been fulfilled. In a case of such great importance, this amendment would secure what may be relatively straightforward, as the Minister said. We are well on the way to gaining most of these agreements already so it should not be too burdensome, but I wish to test the opinion of the House.
Baroness Vere of Norbiton
“( ) No regulations may be made under this section after the end of the period of 5 years beginning with the day on which this section comes into force.”
Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)
My Lords, Amendments 4 and 5 seek to place a time limit, also called a sunset, on use of the power in Clause 2. I would like first to explain how Clause 2 works.
Clause 2 contains the power to amend by regulation the Nuclear Safeguards and Electricity (Finance) Act 1978, the Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000 and the Nuclear Safeguards (Notification) Regulations 2004. It can amend those three pieces of legislation only, and amendments can only be those in consequence of a “relevant safeguards agreement”, that being very specifically an agreement relating to nuclear safeguards to which the UK and the International Atomic Energy Agency are parties.
This is a narrowly drawn power to enable the amendment of references in this legislation to provisions of safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency—which I shall refer to simply as the agency. This legislation enables the agency to carry out its activities in the UK, including by providing it with legal cover for activities of its inspectors in the UK. For the UK to have a domestic safeguards regime in future, it is essential that the legislation specified in Clause 2(1) can be amended to make correct reference to new safeguards agreements that the UK enters into with the agency.
The legislation cited in this clause is extremely unusual in that it makes detailed references to specific provisions of international agreements. As such, these references—for example, to articles—are likely to change as a result of any amendment of, or change to, those agreements. The power in the Bill is therefore necessary to make the changes to the relevant legislation to update those references when the new agreements are in place.
The UK’s safeguards agreements with the agency, and the agency’s ability to perform safeguards activities in the UK in accordance with those agreements, are absolutely fundamental to the agency’s application of safeguards in the UK. While the power is narrow, it is essential and underpins the entire regime. The unavoidable nature of negotiations means that we are tied to timing uncertainties and this power constitutes the only way we can address that uncertainty.
The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee agreed that the power in Clause 2 is necessary and appropriately framed. It recognised that it is intended as a way of reflecting the new agreements with the agency required to establish the UK’s civil nuclear safeguards regime, and recommended preventing the use of the power after a period of two years had expired.
The Government accept the principle of the committee’s recommendation, and of Amendment 5, that we should not retain this power for an indefinite period. However, the regime is heavily reliant on wider international negotiations and it is therefore of the utmost importance that the power is not sunsetted prematurely. Prematurely sunsetting this power could result in the relevant provisions becoming ineffective, leaving the UK without an effective domestic safeguards regime and in breach of any new international safeguards agreements put in place with the agency. The potential consequences of such failures are serious. The UK’s reputation as a responsible nuclear state would be damaged.
The international negotiations relevant to this power are unprecedented in their nature. I consider it essential to retain a provision enabling the UK to adapt to any circumstances affecting the timing of the commencement of international safeguards agreements between the agency and the UK. I hope that, in the light of my explanation, noble Lords will feel able not to press their amendment, and the House will feel able to support government Amendment 4. I beg to move.
Lord Grantchester
I speak to our Amendment 5, which is in this group. In Committee, we proposed that the power of the Secretary of State to enter into relevant international agreements without parliamentary approval be limited to a two-year period. The Government have accepted the principle but wish to extend the power to five years, as the Minister has proposed. We accept that this power is necessary and that there is oversight in its use through the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010.
However, I would like to press the Minister on why the Government think that a two-year period that coincides with any transition period could be insufficient to conclude necessary wider international agreements. We certainly do not wish to leave the UK without an effective domestic safeguards regime, in breach of any new international safeguards agreements put in place with the IAEA, but the Minister has not properly explained why she thinks it could be premature if this sunset clause were brought in at a period of two years.
The government amendments seek a further three years beyond the end of any transition period. Can the Minister clarify the kind of agreement she thinks could still be outstanding? I wonder whether included here could be the circumstances already drawn attention to in the earlier amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Broers, under proposed new subsection (3)(c), regarding international agreements with third countries, whereby the NCA agreement with, for example, the US could well take longer than any transition period. He argued for a suspension to our leaving Euratom.
Baroness Vere of Norbiton
I thank the noble Lord for his contribution. It is clear that the sunset provision we are discussing relates to the arrangement with the agency; it does not cover the nuclear co-operation agreements. Those are separate agreements.
We have thought very long and hard about the sunsetting of this—I think it falls into the territory of known unknowns—and we believe that two years is certainly too short and that five years is the right length. There may be circumstances that we cannot possibly foresee at this time that will make it necessary for the sunset clause to exist for slightly longer. We have now agreed—we hope, because nothing is agreed until everything is agreed—the implementation period. I think that noble Lords should take quite a lot of comfort in that implementation period in that, during that period, our safeguard arrangements will still be provided by Euratom. Indeed, it gives us an extra 21-month period for these arrangements to be put in place. Nevertheless, I think that the five-year period is appropriate. We have looked at the recommendations of the DPRRC and agree with them. A period of five years is the most appropriate time.
Lord Henley
“Report on nuclear safeguards
(1) The Secretary of State must, in respect of each reporting period, prepare a report containing information about nuclear safeguards.(2) Information about nuclear safeguards includes information about—(a) international arrangements relating to nuclear safeguards to which the United Kingdom is (or is proposed to be) a party, and(b) the establishment in the United Kingdom of arrangements relating to nuclear safeguards.(3) A report under this section must be laid before Parliament after the end of the reporting period to which it relates.(4) There are four successive reporting periods, each of which is a period of 3 months.(5) The first reporting period is the period of 3 months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed.”
Lord Henley
My Lords, in moving Amendment 6 I shall speak also to my Amendment 10. This group includes Amendments 7 and 9, of which Amendment 7 is an amendment to my Amendment 6. Therefore, I take it that after I have spoken the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, will move his Amendment 7, and we can then debate the general issues. At this stage I shall speak to Amendment 6, and I shall respond to the noble Lord’s words on Amendments 7 and 9 in due course.
We all agree about the importance of ensuring that the industry can continue to flourish in trade, regulation and innovative nuclear research, no matter what the outcome of negotiations with the European Union or the final terms of our withdrawal from the EU and Euratom. Whatever the outcome and terms, we obviously want to see this great industry continue to flourish. We have made substantial progress in ensuring that the United Kingdom can operate as an independent and responsible nuclear state from day one, and we are committed to being transparent to Parliament about our work in this area. We have taken seriously the requests from Members of both Houses, across all parties, for regular, detailed updates about nuclear safeguarding arrangements in this country.
I agree that it is vital that Parliament is able to assure itself that the Government are taking effective action in relation to nuclear safeguards. In order to promote a transparent system of regular information on progress, my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy committed to provide quarterly updates on overall progress on Euratom negotiations, going further than the proposed amendments at the time. The House will be aware that we plan to publish the first such update at the end of this month. This is even sooner than originally envisaged, coming three months since the publication of our January statement. As the end of the three months would fall during the Easter Recess, a decision was made to bring forward the publication of the first update so that it will be laid before Parliament rises.
Further updates will be made available every three months, with the next one scheduled for June 2018. I listened very carefully in Committee and I understand that noble Lords across the House would like something more than hopeful reassurances; for that reason Amendments 6 and 10 would place a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to provide quarterly reports on nuclear safeguards, covering both domestic and international matters, for the first year after the Bill receives Royal Assent. We will come on to the other amendments but I hope that our Amendments 6 and 10, as well as the current commitment under the Written Ministerial Statement of 11 January to report on wider matters relating to our withdrawal from Euratom, demonstrate our continuing commitment to provide information and clarity to Parliament and provide sufficient reassurances to noble Lords. I will listen very carefully to what the noble Lord says about his Amendments 7 and 9, in his name and those of a slightly varying list of supporters, and deal with them at the end of the debate. In the meantime, I beg to move.
Amendment 7 (to Amendment 6)
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
“(2A) A report under subsection (1) may include other information on future arrangements with Euratom, which may include information relating to nuclear research and development and the import and export of qualifying nuclear material.”
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Henley, for suggesting that I go next and speak to my Amendments 7 and 9. First, I welcome the Minister’s Amendment 6 and the intention that we have regular reports on nuclear safeguards; that is clearly helpful and we look forward to receiving the first report fairly soon, so I am most grateful to the Minister for his response to our debate. I hope today that we can just persuade him to go a little further.
As noble Lords will know, because some noble Lords have taken part in the debates, we have been having concurrent debates on this Bill and the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill. Last night—fairly late, although not as late as on some amendments—we had a fascinating debate, led by the noble Lord, Lord Broers, about research and development. There is an intimate connection here, and an absolute necessity for us to continue to invest in research and development, particularly in relation to the projects that the noble Lord referred to, such as JET, ITER, research into advanced nuclear fission reactors and so on, on which our decision to leave Euratom could potentially have an impact.
In addition, we discussed in Committee medical isotopes and the concerns among medical colleagues and the health service in general. The work of Euratom has no doubt led us to deal with issues of shortage of supply and some of the issues of the rapid transport that is required. There is some concern about whether we can ensure the security of those supplies, which are absolutely essential for the treatment of many patients on a daily basis, in future. So adding a further reporting requirement to the noble Lord’s own amendment would be important and would reassure noble Lords on some of the very important issues that have been debated both here and in the EU (Withdrawal) Bill.
In relation to nuclear safeguarding, we need to be clear that we are essentially taking a kind of policing role from an international agency. Nuclear safeguards make sure that nuclear materials used for peaceful purposes are not used for military ones, so this is very important in relation to nuclear proliferation and our treaty obligations. We are removing ourselves from Euratom, establishing ourselves as a single nation, with its own existing regulator being given these duties to police our responsibilities under the non-proliferation treaties, and then having a sort of backstop of doing it in accordance with the strictures of the IAEA.
So the Government themselves are taking on a very responsible duty. Although of course I would implicitly trust any report that the noble Lord presents to us on these matters, having as a backstop an independent reviewer who could report from time to time on what is happening to make sure that those safeguards are being conducted in the way that we need to do them internationally would be an important safeguard. I hope that the Minister will see that both these amendments are wholly constructive and intended to act alongside and add to the constructive nature of the noble Lord’s own amendments.
Baroness Featherstone (LD)
My Lords, I have attached my name to Amendment 7. I also support Amendment 9, which will be covered by my noble friend Lord Fox.
I totally welcome government Amendment 6, which brings in the reporting system, and hope that the Minister will take Amendment 7 really as sort of an aide memoire, as if it was something he clearly forgot to put it into Amendment 6. So many areas remain of concern about the precariousness of our exit from Euratom. We discussed many of them in Committee. As we have heard across the House already today, they include the critical issue of timing, with the industries that are directly affected and their supply chains being desperately concerned to avoid the cliff edge, unsurprisingly—and all the while the clock is ticking relentlessly towards exit day. Amendment 6 seeks to reassure us in the interim with regular reporting to Parliament on key issues. However, Amendment 7 in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, amends Amendment 6 and seeks to cover those key elements of concern that we felt were missing. These include information on progress, and the form that is taking shape, on future arrangements on research and development, the import and export of qualifying nuclear material and, of course, the nature and form of future arrangements with Euratom.
I and my party still remain hopeful—Liberal Democrats are obviously optimists—that common sense will at some point take hold between now and exit day, and that we will simply be able to remain in Euratom or a bespoke associate membership of Euratom will become possible, just as a bespoke trade agreement seems to be possible in the Government’s lexicon.
On nuclear research and development, exiting Euratom has put a number of concerns on the table. It would be really helpful in dealing with the uncertainties raised over the UK’s future contribution to nuclear research and development if this were included in the reporting regime. We have benefited from Euratom funding for research. As was mentioned in Committee and earlier today, the JET project based in Culham receives £60 million a year from Euratom, covering 88% of the running costs; it provides employment for 500 people implementing the contract. We are also concerned about the impact on the ITER project, which is a magnificent international collaboration intent on proving that fusion is a viable source of large-scale, safe and environmentally friendly energy for the planet.
However, it is far more than the money itself. What should be an ongoing discussion in the negotiations, and what I would like to see reported back on in relation to our leaving Euratom, should be the co-operation and collaboration that is such an important part of research in Europe. We will discuss the talented people who forge that research and development—and their ability to come and go and work in countries around Europe—in my noble friend Lord Teverson’s Amendment 8.
It is absolutely critical that we remain a key partner when outside Euratom if we are to be able to continue to hold EU and international regard as a key player as a nuclear nation. All the programmes demand close collaboration with the EU and the international nuclear community. We currently have access to research infrastructures and capabilities not available in the United Kingdom. We are also able to leverage UK investment for industry, national laboratories and academia.
Going forward—whatever the arrangement—we have to make sure that we can continue as a leading participant in the Euratom working groups and EU-funded research projects. We do not want our ability to influence and shape this agenda to be lost, nor our access to facilities, data, people and material that has enabled us to be at the cutting edge of developing technology and innovation. Therefore, as the Government go forward on this agenda, they are going to have to come to an arrangement over the future of JET with Euratom: we hope that it can be paid for by the Euratom framework programme after 2020 if that is still the end date for the UK Government’s commitment to its funding. The Government are also going to need to come to an agreement over F4E so that we can carry on participating in the fusion programme. Future arrangements must ensure that international collaboration is ongoing so that both contributing and gaining from world-leading research continues. That is why Parliament must be kept informed on progress on all those issues and why it is crucial that research and development are part of the reporting requirement.
I turn now to the import and export of qualifying nuclear material. Currently the Euratom Supply Agency has rights over such materials produced in its member states. This confers legal exclusive rights to contract the supply of those materials entering or leaving the European Union. Our current nuclear reactors are totally reliant on this fuel supply chain so, post Euratom, the Government will need to ensure this process in relation to the export of fissile materials from Euratom to the UK. This possibly—and probably—will in future become an export and may need to be authorised by the EU Commission’s research and development department. What I am describing is a future situation regarding the import and export of fissile material that needs to be worked through so there are no additional barriers, to ensure that trade in this essential market can continue. It is vital that Parliament is regularly updated on these important issues.
The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and I have made substantive and, I hope, persuasive arguments such that I trust the Minister can see the necessity for amending Amendment 6 with Amendment 7.
Viscount Trenchard
My Lords, I welcome Amendment 6, proposed by the Minister. It makes a lot of sense but I do not think the House would be wise to support Amendments 7 or 9. Amendment 7 is about collaboration with Euratom in future in research and development and the import and export of qualifying nuclear material. I think we will benefit from greater flexibility by making our own decisions about research and development and committing our own funds. Of course Euratom will be an important and continuing partner for us in nuclear but we will be freed of the obligation and in the position where we will own our own research material, which of course in the JET and ITER programmes we do not. We should caution against overoptimism on what ITER is likely to bring; I understand that there is considerable scepticism in the industry about whether it is really worth the massive amount of money that it costs, and that there is some chance of a demonstration operation by 2045 if all goes well. If we were to commit funds to SMR research, by contrast, in which we in this country have several notable qualified players, we would own the outcome and could get ourselves back into the lead in nuclear by selling our new technology to others. We would have greater flexibility and the freedom not to be committed—
Lord Fox (LD)
I remind the noble Viscount that the two are not mutually exclusive.
Viscount Trenchard
I accept what the noble Lord says but if you are bound to commit, through the Euratom programmes, to a greater amount of funding for the sector as a whole, that could effectively mean that you were constrained in what you do on your own. I am not saying we would not wish to contribute or to continue to participate, but it would be our decision on whether we participated or not. We would recover the right to make decisions and to apply our research and development funds, which we would then own in so far as they were invested in programmes that we were running independently.
On Amendment 9, I do not see the need for the taxpayer to have to fund a further independent reviewer. The IAEA will ensure that we follow the approved safeguarding regimes, check and verify our safeguards regime and ensure that we work only with verified customers.
Lord Warner
My Lords, I support Amendments 7 and 9, and I compliment the Government on Amendment 6. I remind the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, that scientific research, in this area or anywhere else, is now overwhelmingly collaborative. If you do not get in the game collaboratively, you find that some of your best researchers and ideas are rapidly transferred abroad to someone else who is much more interested in collaborative research. We have moved on from being a Great Britain that does all this stuff ourselves to being a collaborative, global, international participant in research, including in this area. That is one of the reasons why I support Amendment 7; I think it takes us in the right direction. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Broers, whose amendment last night I sadly missed, will want to say a bit about that.
I am really pleased that we have come back to talking about medical isotopes and having a report that keeps Parliament up to date in that area. There is huge concern outside this House about whether the supply chains around medical isotopes will be sufficient to cope with the needs and demands of NHS research and NHS patients.
On Amendment 9, after the last debate that we had before the vote, you would have to be one of life’s perennial optimists—I am not a Liberal Democrat so I do not join that particular club—to believe that everything is going to be okay by March 2019. I suggest to the Minister that he might find it useful to have an independent reviewer who can make independent reports to Parliament to convince sceptical parliamentarians such as me and, I suspect, a few others in this House that good progress is being made on some of the critical issues. That is why I support Amendments 7 and 9.
Lord Fox
My Lords, I support Amendment 9, to which my name is appended, and I commend the Government on Amendment 6 and support Amendment 7. I echo the words of the noble Lord, Lord Warner: not even the Liberal Democrats are optimistic enough to imagine that everything is going to be in place in time. That is why we believe this is a helpful amendment to the Government and to the Minister. We heard in the debate on Amendment 3 that the stakes are high in achieving what needs to be achieved in time. I believe, en passant, that for the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, to use the cost as a reason for not having something like this in place is a little like trying to save the money that is down the side of the sofa when the whole house is potentially at stake. I suggest that cost is not a reason for not doing this.
The stakes are high. I will not rehearse them again but the Committee has heard scepticism, concern and worry from a vast array of people about whether the finish line can be crossed in time. The Minister—this is in no way reflects scepticism of the Minister himself—has stood up on a number of occasions and said everything is in order and we need not worry. Almost every statement he makes begins with, “I believe”. That is the problem; at this point, to some extent it is difficult to go beyond a belief system. Amendment 9 would put in place an independent voice, someone who was marking the Government’s homework but was not the Government. This is not a question of doing the work of the IAEA; it is a question of following and tracking the Government’s progress in getting to the finish line.
I echo the noble Lord, Lord Warner: this could be very useful for the Government in helping to give reassurance. It would be another voice to prove that the Minister was correct—if he was. When the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, says that this is not an aggressive amendment and not intended to be unhelpful, I know, because I participated in the discussion around this amendment, that it is genuinely not intended to wreck or harm the Bill in any way. It is intended to give support and some further credibility to the argument that things are moving in the right direction.
Lord Broers
My Lords, I will make some brief remarks in answer to the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard. The research we are talking about here is not necessarily just in fusion—it includes fusion, but that is a great big project—but in areas that are ancillary to a certain extent but terribly important. Research is going on everywhere into radioactive waste disposal, but we happen to lead that. I do not think that this defeats the noble Viscount’s ambition—which is my ambition—that our own industry does a lot and gains a lot from that. It also gains a lot from being accepted by the community, so that when our advances come up, others will use what we did. The same is true of radiological protection, which is always a problem with workers around nuclear plants. So it is not just the new reactors, although the one gap in our knowledge is what is happening to the new generation fission reactors beyond the EPRs that people are working on. We really need international collaboration.
With respect to our own ambitions, I entirely support the noble Viscount in terms of SMRs. We are dying to get going—to be specific Rolls-Royce is dying to get going—on SMRs. In fact, Rolls-Royce tells us they are spending £1 million a month keeping that programme alive and waiting for the Government to make a decision on the competition which I hope will come.
Also, in fusion, there is Tokamak Energy. This is a very ambitious small company which feels it can contain fusion in a spherical tokamak, which is a fascinating thing. I should love to spend a lot of time talking about it. It is a very clever and effective way to up the efficiency of the use of the magnetic field to confine the plasma. So there is more to this research than just a few of the most obvious things. I think that is greatly in support of Amendment 7. I also support Amendment 6. I agree with the noble Lords, Lord Fox and Lord Hunt, who mentioned this. I think the independent review is designed to help the Government and not be a hindrance.
Lord Henley
My Lords, I want to begin by adding to something that the noble Lord, Lord Fox, said. He said that I repeatedly say, “I believe, I believe”, and that the House has to take it on trust. I hope this goes beyond me and officials within the department. We have seen what is happening when it comes to nuclear safeguards—
Lord Henley
I was not suggesting that the noble Lord was doing that in any way whatsoever.
Since Second Reading, I have visited Sellafield—well, obviously I have visited it on occasions in the past because it is in my home county, but I visited it again—just to see what nuclear safeguarding amounts to. After all, Sellafield contains two of the three sites that will be relevant in terms of nuclear safeguarding. I cannot say that a one-day visit has turned me into an expert in any way. I would not want to claim that, but I can say that I can go beyond, “I believe”, and say “I have seen”.
Lord Henley
I am amusing the clerical members of the Cross Benches and I will try to restrain from doing so. Perhaps they thought I was making some sort of evangelical speech.
Let me start by dealing with the two amendments. While expressing my deep sympathy for them, I do not think they are necessary, but I want to give some indication as to how importantly we take them. I am grateful to various noble Lords who welcomed the original amendment, which is government Amendment 6.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that full response. He expressed deep sympathy with the intent of our amendments but, alas, even with divine inspiration, he failed to go a little further. Essentially, his argument in relation to my Amendment 7 was that it was unnecessary in the light of existing commitments in the Written Ministerial Statement and what he has said today about the importance of research and development. I go back to our debate last night on the EU (Withdrawal) Bill, in which there was an overwhelming sense that this country still has a lead in some aspects of nuclear research. The noble Lord, Lord Broers, spoke about that very eloquently. This is at risk because of what is happening in relation to Brexit and our withdrawal from Euratom. It is important to have on the face of the Bill—in primary legislation—a commitment that the Government will report on research and development. I wish to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Teverson
“Freedom of employment for specialists
(1) Article 2(g) of the European Atomic Energy Community Treaty, ensuring freedom of employment for specialists, continues to have effect in UK law in relation to those who work in nuclear safeguarding, after the United Kingdom leaves Euratom.(2) In this section “specialists” includes those staff essential to the United Kingdom’s nuclear safeguarding.”
Lord Teverson
My Lords, I remind Members of what the Euratom treaty says in Article 2(g)—that, in order to perform its tasks, the community shall,
“ensure wide commercial outlets and access to the best technical facilities by the creation of a common market in specialised materials and equipment, by the free movement of capital for investment in the field of nuclear energy and by freedom of employment for specialists within the Community”.
I have not taken the whole of the article, or of part 2(g), into the amendment, but rather the important post-Brexit part, which concerns the free movement of nuclear specialists. I will not make a long speech because I believe that this is self-evident. The Government have an industrial strategy around the nuclear sector: to expand it and for it to be part of where this country goes economically.
We have heard in previous debates that our most important need in the short term is to have a functioning safeguarding authority, whether that is Euratom or—as soon as that stops—our own Office for Nuclear Regulation. We need those bodies, and that body in particular, to function. We have a shortage of qualified people in this area and a shortage of specialists in the industry more generally—although the amendment is, because of the Bill, primarily around safeguarding. Therefore, it must be in the interests of the Bill, and of the country at large, to ensure that we maintain the mobility of those specialists in the nuclear industry and the nuclear sector, so that we maintain this benefit post Brexit and post our membership of Euratom. That is why the amendment is absolutely appropriate to the Bill and is of great importance not just to this sector but to our national security.
I very much hope that the Minister will be able to give a greater reassurance—perhaps higher up on my noble friend Lord Fox’s Richter scale of assurances—than we have received so far that this area will be looked after by the Government, that we will not be browbeaten by the Home Office into having a minimal circulation of specialists, and that this country will benefit from those with the experience and skills that will enable us to perform in this sector, not just in safeguarding but in the nuclear sector more broadly. I beg to move.
Lord Warner
My Lords, I have added my name to this amendment because, like the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, I remain concerned about the industry’s access to the workforce that it will need once the UK leaves Euratom. I suggest that the free flow of essential specialist staff could well dry up unless the Government are reasonably energetic in the guarantees that they give them. As the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, said, this is not just a safeguarding workforce issue; it affects the whole sector, as was very well brought out in the Nuclear Industry Association’s briefing. I shall not go into detail on that but it is clear that we need a very skilled workforce coming to this country to help both in maintaining existing reactors and, even more significantly, in building new ones, as well as in the safeguarding area.
With regard to the regular reports that the Government will give to Parliament on progress in the safeguarding area, it is a bit disappointing that we did not manage to get into the Bill a specific reference to the need for an essential specialist workforce. I hope that the Minister will take this suggestion in the spirit in which it is offered, and perhaps he might encourage his officials, when they are producing these reports, to say something about the progress that is being made, particularly with the ONR getting the specialist staff that it needs.
The Earl of Selborne
My Lords, for at least 20 years this country allowed its specialist skills in matters nuclear to run down. There was a failure by successive Governments to address the issues and determine what our attitude was to policy on nuclear generation, medical sciences and the like. Although things have improved a little in recent years, it is certain that we will depend on specialist skills from overseas. I doubt that it is really necessary to put this amendment on the face of the Bill, but I am absolutely confident that the Minister will agree that we will indeed need specialist skills. We must give an assurance to the industry that those specialist skills will be welcomed. Therefore, I am sure that, in responding to this short debate led by the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, the Minister can assure us that the Government will give due priority to those with the relevant nuclear skills.
Lord Hunt of Chesterton (Lab)
My Lords, an important point about Euratom is that it had a research programme on connecting fusion and fission. A long-range problem in the nuclear industry is finding ways of dealing with nuclear waste. As the Euratom programme showed, one way of doing that in future would be to connect it to fusion, because fusion produces fast neutrons that can process waste and give it a shorter half-life. That is an extremely important issue, and the people who will be able to work on it will have a very broad range of specialties, not just the narrow range that experts have at the moment.
Lord Grantchester
I commend the noble Lords, Lord Teverson and Lord Warner, for bringing back this amendment on Report. It concerns an important issue: that the UK must address the skills that are needed in the UK. The problem of labour supply with the necessary skills beyond those present and available in the UK will need to be addressed by several industries—and none more crucial than the power industry, in relation not only to new build but to the continuing need for decommissioning.
EDF is certainly correct to identify the importance of the specialisms needed to deliver Hinkley Point C on time. The noble Lord, Lord Warner, drew attention to this and to the Immigration Rules. With restrictions on freedom of movement, currently no route is identified for the many categories of workers to enter the UK under the points system in order to fill the vacancies envisaged. It is crucial that the Minister’s department underlines the importance of the issue to the Home Office and comes up with a solution. It will be needed in the best interests of the UK’s civil nuclear industry.
Lord Henley
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, for moving his amendment, and for the contributions of other noble Lords. I accept that it will continue to be important to attract—as the noble Lords, Lord Hunt and Lord Warner, and my noble friend Lord Selborne put it—the brightest and the best, to ensure that we maintain our excellence in the nuclear field. This amendment, however, is somewhat more limited in scope than that. Our future immigration system will be set out shortly and it would not be right for me to go into it. As my right honourable friend made clear in his Statement on 11 January, we will ensure that businesses and communities, as well as Parliament, have the opportunity to contribute their views before any decisions are made about the future system that the Home Office will be developing.
Lord Henley
As I remember, the last time we debated this, by chance—I may be misremembering—a Home Office Minister was sitting next to me. I can confirm, however, that the Home Office is fully aware of the concerns expressed in debates of this sort, and we will make sure that it continues to be so. It is important to us that we continue to—as I put it—access the best talent. As the noble Lord will be aware, we have already doubled the number of available visas in the tier 1 exceptional talent review, and will be looking at changing Immigration Rules to enable world- leading scientists and researchers under the tier 1 route to apply for settlement after three years and to make it quicker for highly skilled students to apply for work in the United Kingdom after finishing a degree. We are, therefore, relaxing the labour market tests where appropriate.
The crux of this amendment, which relates to safeguarding staff—the Bill has been drafted in that way and so the amendment must be too—attempts to ensure the freedom of employment of specialists employed in that field. This is clearly a matter of particular interest in the light of the Government’s preparations for establishing a domestic nuclear safeguards regime, which, among other important work, means securing the right quality and quantity of appropriate safeguarding staff in the Office for Nuclear Regulation. Given the importance of attracting the right staff to work in this specialist field, the Government are committed to ensuring that the ONR has the right personnel. I can give the House a bit of information: in the most recent recruitment round for two further posts in this field there were 112 applicants for the ONR to look at. We will continue to work with the ONR to ensure that it has the right staff to regulate the UK’s new civil nuclear safeguards regime. Those figures show that there is no shortage, certainly in the world of recruiting and training the appropriate inspectors and building additional institutional capacity.
The noble Lord will not be surprised if I do not go into this, because he will then ask for further details. If I give him an assurance that the amendment is possibly itself defective and not suitable for inclusion, and he accepts that in spirit there is no need for it—since the Government are committed to ensuring that we have the right specialists and the Home Office continues to work in this field—I hope that he will feel able to withdraw Amendment 8.
Lord Teverson
I thank the Minister for his reply. It is good to have some figures: can we have more of them in these interactions around groups? I also remind the Minister that he regularly mentions the highly skilled and the talented. That may, I agree, be the case in nuclear safeguarding, but in a lot of Brexit areas, perhaps including some areas of the nuclear industry, the need is far broader. However, I take his point in regard to this Bill.
I also recognise that this issue will inevitably be fought out during the immigration Bill that we will eventually get. I am delighted that we will have another opportunity to debate Euratom in another Bill, to pursue sanity and perhaps get some change in this area. I therefore accept the noble Lord’s challenge—as it were—and his assurances about taking up these issues in the future immigration Bill, which we continue to await with interest. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Teverson
“Report on information technology systems necessary for nuclear safeguards
(1) The Secretary of State must, in respect of each reporting period, prepare a report containing information about the progress made to provide adequate information technology systems necessary for the United Kingdom to operate a nuclear safeguarding regime to international standards.(2) The report under subsection (1) must include the progress on, and the estimated cost of, developing the following systems—(a) a State System of Accountancy for and Control of Nuclear Materials;(b) a Safeguards Information Management and Reporting System; and(c) any other technology system necessary for the United Kingdom to operate an effective international nuclear safeguarding regime.(3) A report under this section must be laid before both Houses of Parliament after the end of the reporting period to which it relates.(4) There are four successive reporting periods, each of which is a period of 3 months.(5) The first reporting period is the period of 3 months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed.”
Lord Teverson
My Lords, in Committee I raised an issue that I do not think has been raised before, about the information systems required for the Office for Nuclear Regulation to perform its tasks acceptably as a safeguarding agency in the international system. I subsequently submitted a Written Question to the Government on this matter, and I thank the Minister, very genuinely, for a comprehensive and interesting reply—a very good one. In that regard, I almost feel that I have to apologise to the House for the long names in subsection (2)(a) and (b) of the amendment: the State System of Accountancy for and Control of Nuclear Materials and the Safeguards Information Management and Reporting System. The Minister informed me that these were needed to fulfil our international obligations.
I also asked what those systems would cost, less to understand the cost than the size of the task that needed to be completed within the next 12 months. I will quote from the Minister’s Written Reply:
“ONR has estimated that it will cost £10 million to establish a UK SSAC and SIMRS”—
the two systems—
“is included as a part of this overall estimate. An initial tender opportunity in relation to the SIMRS is currently being advertised on the Government Digital Marketplace and responses to that tender will provide more certainty on estimated costs”.
I do not know whether we already have the other system—I do not think so—but what concerned me particularly about that reply was that we are only tendering for one of those systems. It is clearly a significant cost—£10 million for both—but we are only just getting around to advertising them. From both my corporate career and my role in this House in scrutinising what the Government are up to, and government systems, I know that it is not the easiest thing to predict when IT systems will be ready, let alone functioning. We had a debate last week about the Smart Meters Bill and all the IT needed for that, and it is 12 years later that we have come to those particular systems.
My real question is a serious one. Clearly, from the Minister’s reply, the ONR cannot function properly without these systems, but we are only at the stage of advertising just one of them. The size of them is at least £10 million and I feel very nervous that these systems will be ready when we need them to be ready on 29 March next year. That seems to be quite an ask. Therefore, with the amendment I am looking for some substantive reassurance from the Minister that this is under control and that it will be part of the Government’s reporting mechanism between now and our leaving date for Euratom, so that we can understand the progress in this critical area—an area where, to put it lightly, the Government do not have the greatest reputation in terms of delivering such systems. I beg to move.
Lord Warner
My Lords, I support the amendment, but I do not expect us to go for our hat trick of votes on it. I speak as someone who had the misfortune to inherit the NHS IT system as a responsibility. I also had some experience in the Home Office of IT systems. Things never work out the way that noble Lords think they will. They are usually delayed and they usually malfunction a bit when they are first introduced and used. My question for the Minister is: has he got a plan B and what is it, if this IT system does not come online to time? At the end of the day, the ONR will still have some responsibilities to discharge. If it does not have the IT system, how will it go about discharging its responsibilities?
Lord Fox
Following my noble friend Lord Teverson’s excellent explanation for the reason for this amendment, on the long-named programmes and systems in proposed new subsection (2), can the Minister tell the House whether these are built on existing systems that are being adapted or will they be built from scratch? The Minister may have to write to me in answer. Also, on the nature of the IT companies delivering these, is there competition in delivering systems such as this or is this a very specialist area with a small pool to fish from and not much choice, which of course leads to price escalation?
Lord Grantchester
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, for raising the important issue of the information technology systems necessary for nuclear safeguards. I also saw the written Q&A from the noble Lord and I thank the Minister for replying so swiftly. In Committee, the importance of understanding the full inventory costs in IT management systems was debated. The Government clarified that the full implications of the mechanisms that the ONR will need to set up are matters that could be included in each report that the Government will undertake. It can only build confidence that Parliament will be reassured through any audit process that the UK’s regime will be costed, reported and certified to be robust.
Lord Henley
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, for moving his amendment. He and the House really want two things. They want substantive reassurances and details of further reporting. I asked to have this amendment grouped with Amendment 6, which to some extent deals with this matter. We propose to put such reporting on the face of the Bill, and progress with the information technology systems required for the safeguarding regime will fall within that reporting duty. I hope that the noble Lord will feel that he does in due course get sufficient information. In the meantime, I will give an update about what is happening. As the noble Lord, Lord Fox, said, I might have to write with further detail later on, but let us see how the quarterly statements take place to see whether they provide sufficient information. If not, noble Lords can come back to me.
The overall system of safeguards is generally referred to as a state system of accountancy for and control of nuclear materials. The noble Lord referred to that in my original Written Answer. That is also known as an SSAC. The last time I came across SSAC it was the Social Security Advisory Committee, but that was in another world and another place. We will not go there now. As part of this, the ONR plans to put in place an IT system which it refers to as the safeguards information management and reporting system. I do not know how you pronounce “SIMRS” so we shall refer to it by its initials. The SIMRS is aimed at enabling the ONR to obtain and process the information necessary to ensure timely submission to the International Atomic Energy Agency of the reports required by any future safeguards agreements with the agency. The SIMRS will also enable submission of any specific reports required by supplier states as part of nuclear co-operation agreements.
The ONR has estimated that it will cost some £10 million—the figure I gave some weeks ago in Committee—to establish a UK SSAC, and the SIMRS is included as a part of this overall estimate. A pre-qualification questionnaire in relation to the SIMRS was recently advertised on the Government’s digital marketplace. Sixteen suppliers responded, of which six have been invited to respond to the invitation to tender by 6 April. Responses to that tender will provide more certainty on estimated costs, and the ONR expects to let the contract in early May.
I of course take note of what the noble Lord, Lord Warner, warned about IT systems from his experience with the health service and the Home Office. We are all aware of problems that new IT systems can have. I do not think that what we are proposing here is on the scale of what the National Health Service needs, but I accept that there can be problems. We and the department have a duty to examine that as carefully as we can. I give an assurance that we will do that as far as is possible.
Put very simply, that is where we are at the moment. We will keep noble Lords updated. We have accepted my Amendment 6, as amended by the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. There is no need to further complicate the Bill’s proceedings by adding this amendment, which duplicates what we already have. Therefore, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Teverson
My Lords, I thank the Minister and welcome his undertaking that the IT systems will be included in the regular reporting. It would be useful if the Minister could answer my noble friend Lord Fox’s question about whether they are starting from zero or whether we are effectively modifying existing systems.
Lord Teverson
I welcome that and on that basis beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Henley
Lord Henley
Nuclear Safeguards Bill
Tuesday 27th March 2018
(6 years ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 81-R-I(a) Amendment for Report, supplementary to the marshalled list (PDF, 54KB) - (19 Mar 2018)
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Lord Henley) (Con)
My Lords, I have it in command from Her Majesty the Queen to acquaint the House that Her Majesty, having been informed of the purport of the Nuclear Safeguards Bill, has consented to place her interests, so far as they are affected by the Bill, at the disposal of Parliament for the purposes of the Bill.
Nuclear Safeguards Bill
Tuesday 8th May 2018
(5 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Commons Consideration of Lords Amendments as at 8 May 2018 - (8 May 2018)
20:10 - The House divided: - Ayes: 306 / Noes: 278 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Richard Harrington)
I beg to move, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 3.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)
With this it will be convenient to take the following:
Government amendment (a) in lieu of Lords amendment 3.
Lords amendments 1, 2 and 4 to 7.
Richard Harrington
Before I say a few words about the amendments, I want to reflect on the passage of the Bill. It has passed through this House in an orderly manner, with a great many thoughtful points made by Members on both sides of the House who are here today and by many who are not. I particularly pay tribute to the Opposition Front-Bench team, led by the hon. Member for Southampton, Test (Dr Whitehead)—I will never forget his constituency after this Bill. Although we have had our moments of disagreement, I have been encouraged by the strong consensus and have done my best to listen carefully to his amendments. I hope he would accept that I have given a lot of thought to them and that I have tried to accept those that I can. Lord Henley and I have made considerable efforts to listen to concerns in the other place as well, as has been seen in the amendments we have made to the Bill.
Outside the legislation, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State committed to making regular progress updates to Parliament. The first report was published on 27 March and the next will follow next month. We also provided draft regulations to support the House’s deliberations on the Bill, and I confirm today that I am placing in the Library the Department’s analysis on the application of Standing Order No. 83O, in respect of any motion relating to a Lords amendment, for Commons consideration of Lords amendments stage.
The Government opposed amendment 3 on Report in the House of Lords. I have listened carefully to the views of Members, including the Opposition spokesman, the hon. Member for Southampton, Test. The amendment would require that in a situation where particular agreements relating to nuclear safeguards are not in place, the Government would have to request that the UK’s withdrawal from Euratom be suspended until they are.
John Howell (Henley) (Con)
The Minister may be aware that in the last few hours, I have had a conversation with the head of Culham Centre for Fusion Energy, who says that the Government are moving in the right direction on this, and have already agreed to pay for an association and are moving in the right direction on that. If the Minister is going to oppose the amendment, he has my full support and that of the head of Culham.
Richard Harrington
I thank my hon. Friend for that comment, which I believe reflects the progress that we have made. He works very hard for Culham; it is an extremely impressive place and I am sure that everyone on both sides of the House supports what they do.
Sir Robert Syms (Poole) (Con)
May I be the first to congratulate the Minister on the co-operation agreement that we have signed with the United States of America? This is a very good sign. There was some concern in Committee about the progress that we had made, and I believe that the Minister is doing his utmost to make sure that we have a fit-for-purpose regime in future.
Richard Harrington
I thank my hon. Friend. I would like to say that it was because of the personal influence that I have with President Trump, but no one in this House, and particularly you, Madam Deputy Speaker, would hear that. However, it shows that we have made a lot of progress and things are going according to plan. I am grateful to the United States for that assistance it has given us, as well as that of the other countries we are dealing with and the International Atomic Energy Agency, whose initials some of us repeatedly had difficulty pronouncing—I will come to the IAEA in a moment.
As currently formulated, amendment 3 will not work. Subsection (3)(c) currently contains a broad reference to international agreements made by Euratom to which the UK is a party. First, the UK is not a party to Euratom’s nuclear co-operation agreements; Euratom concludes them on behalf of member states, and Euratom, rather than the member states, is a party to those agreements. Secondly, subsection 3(c) covers a number of international agreements that are not in fact required to ensure the continuity of nuclear trade after withdrawal from Euratom. For these reasons, the other agreements that are covered by Lords amendment 3 should be restricted to the priority nuclear co-operation agreements with Australia, Canada, Japan and the US. Although I cannot agree to Lords amendment 3 in its present form, I am tabling an amendment in lieu, which I believe will address parliamentarians’ concerns. I particularly hope that it will address the issues raised by the shadow Front-Bench team and Members on both sides of the House.
John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness) (Ind)
With respect, the Minister is doing what every single Minister will always do when faced with Opposition amendments—that is, nit-pick over the precise wording. If he is going to table his own amendment, will it clearly state that the UK will not withdraw from Euratom until the required agreements are in place so that we have a similar, commensurate level of security?
Richard Harrington
I have always listened carefully to what the hon. Gentleman says. He knows a lot about nuclear and deserves attention particularly on this Bill and every other nuclear subject that comes up. He accuses me of nit-picking—politely, as always—and then nit-picks about the language in my amendment, which I do hope he has read and which I will explain more about now. We do nit-pick in Parliament, though, because everyone is trying their best to get it right, and I accept that language can mean everything. I am sure that “nit-picking” is a parliamentary word, Madam Deputy Speaker. If it is not, I still fully accept it from him.
Alex Sobel (Leeds North West) (Lab/Co-op)
The Minister has talked about the implementation period and our ongoing relations with Euratom. What discussions has he had with the European Commission to determine whether our membership of Euratom will continue during the transition period?
Richard Harrington
My officials have had a lot of discussions with the EU on Euratom, as the hon. Gentleman might imagine, and I am very satisfied with the stage we have reached. If he will excuse me, I will try to cover that in the rest of my contribution.
Stephen Kerr (Stirling) (Con)
During the Select Committee hearings on this matter, David Wagstaff, the head of the Euratom exit negotiations at the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, indicated that progress in establishing new nuclear co-operation agreements with the USA, Canada, Japan and Australia was well advanced and that these would be completed in time for our departure. Did he mean next March or the end of the implementation period?
Richard Harrington
I can assure my hon. Friend that he meant March 2019. In answer also to the hon. Member for Leeds North West (Alex Sobel), I would like to assure the House that the UK and the EU have reached agreement on the terms of an implementation period that will run from 30 March 2019 until the end of 2020. The existing Euratom treaty arrangements will continue during this period and businesses will be able to continue to trade on the same terms as now. As part of this, the UK and the EU agreed that for the duration of the implementation period the EU’s international agreements will continue to apply to the UK. This will include Euratom’s existing nuclear co-operation agreements with the USA, Canada, Australia and Japan.
Sir Robert Syms
I presume that the objective is to sign agreements with all the countries mentioned before March 2019, but there is also a process of ratification. Is it the Government’s objective to get those ratified before the leaving date, or will some of them be ratified during the transition period?
Richard Harrington
The best example I can give is the ratification of the agreement with the US—and this will also explain the difference between signing and ratification. Now that it has been signed, it needs to be approved in accordance with the relevant constitutional requirements of the UK and the US, just as will be the case with the other bilateral agreements, but we have built into our timetable sufficient time to allow for the necessary processes in both the UK Parliament—it will come before Parliament this year—and the US Congress, which has a slightly different arrangement involving several days of congressional business. I am very confident, however, that the process will be completed. In both cases, it is unprecedented for this to be anything other than a formality. Both countries will then exchange notes to bring the agreement into force when required, which we fully expect to be at the end of the implementation period, but we have built plenty of time into the process.
John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)
This all sounds like very good progress. Is it true that the other four agreements the Minister says are necessary will be similarly available and ready by March 2019?
Richard Harrington
I have every confidence that those agreements will be ready, signed and ratified. I have no reason to believe anything other than that.
If the relevant agreements or arrangements are not in place 28 days before exit day, the amendment in lieu would impose a requirement on the Secretary of State to make a request to the European Council to continue to be covered by the corresponding Euratom agreements—the trilateral agreements between the IAEA, Euratom and the UK and the bilateral agreements between the countries I have mentioned. That request would cover only those areas for which the UK had not signed a relevant agreement or made arrangements for the corresponding Euratom agreement to continue to apply to the UK after exit. I think that answers the questions about process.
I have not mentioned the IAEA itself. We have made very good progress in negotiating with the IAEA, having held several productive rounds of discussions, and it has shared with us the draft voluntary offer agreement and additional protocol. Negotiations on these documents have made good progress, and we expect to conclude a final draft in time for them to be put to the June meeting of the board of governors. The UK has a very strong relationship with the IAEA and continues to support it across a range of nuclear non-proliferation issues—something I was able to reinforce in my meeting last week with the director general, Mr Amano.
Lords amendments 1, 2 and 7 were Government amendments placing the definition of “civil activities” in the Bill. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee recommended that a definition of “civil activities” be placed in the Bill, so far as is possible, supplemented by a power to develop, where necessary, its meaning in regulations. The definition we inserted takes into account the continuing work on the draft regulations that will underpin the Bill, on which we are intending to consult in July. Although the Committee accepted that it might still be necessary to supplement this definition with a power to embellish its meaning in regulations, I have not found that to be necessary, so the amendments remove the existing power to specify in regulations activities that are or are not to be treated as “civil activities” and replace it with a definition in the Bill without creating another power. They therefore reduce the number of powers created by the Bill.
The sunset clause discussed by the Opposition Front-Bench team places a time limit—colloquially known as a “sunset”—on the use of the power in clause 2. Hon. Members may recall that clause 2 contains the power to amend three pieces of legislation in consequence of a relevant safeguards agreement—an agreement relating to nuclear safeguards to which the UK and the agency are parties. That legislation makes detailed references to specific provisions of international safeguards agreements. Those references, including references to specific articles, are likely to change as a result of any amendment of, or change in, the agreements. We therefore believe that the power in the Bill is necessary to make the changes in the relevant legislation to update the references when the new agreements are in place. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee recommended preventing the use of the power after a period of two years had expired. The amendment addresses the principle of the Committee’s recommendation, but provides for a “sunset” period of five years to ensure that the provision can function effectively in all scenarios, including that of an implementation period with the EU.
Lords amendments 5 and 6 deal with statutory reporting. As I have said, I took very seriously the cross-party requests from parliamentarians for regular detailed updates about nuclear safeguards arrangements in this country. The amendments, as amended by the Opposition, would place a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to provide quarterly reports on nuclear safeguards, covering both domestic and international matters, for the first year after the Bill receives Royal Assent.
Jamie Stone (Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross) (LD)
This is a general point, but I should like the Minister to be mindful of it. I do not pretend to understand the morass of amendments and timings, but the nuclear site at Dounreay, in my constituency, is being decommissioned, and, thanks to the involvement of Euratom and other agencies in the past, we have achieved a standard of excellence that is second to none in the world. I am anxious to ensure that the skills that we have there are developed and exported to other countries, and to ensure that, whatever Her Majesty’s Government puts in place of Euratom—whatever systems are introduced, and whatever clauses are included in the various bits of legislation—the importance of that is remembered and the quality is retained where it should be for the future, because otherwise we will lose an opportunity.
Richard Harrington
I entirely agree with the hon. Gentleman: Dounreay has one of the finest reputations. I have not yet had the pleasure and honour of visiting it—although if I were able to visit it, I should be pleased to do so—but I have visited Sellafield, and have discussed matters extensively with all the nuclear decommissioning authorities there. Dounreay is thought of very highly, and I assure the hon. Gentleman that nothing will be done to denude it of its reputation or lower the current non-proliferation standard. I was delighted to hear that the skills to which he has referred are being exported all over the world. The last thing that this or, I hope, any Government would want to do is bring about a reduction from the gold standard that is led by his constituency. [Interruption.] I am sorry if I am nit-picking again. The hon. Member for Barrow and Furness is very alert to nit-picking, and I shall try not to do so.
I hope Members will agree that the Government have proceeded with the Bill on a consensual basis. As I have said, we have made several important concessions in both Houses. Although we have not been able to agree to Lords amendment 3, I have listened to the arguments advanced today, and I believe that the compromise amendment goes a long way to achieving what the Opposition want. It preserves the key features of their amendment by requiring the Government to write to the EU seeking support if certain agreements or alternative arrangements are not in place. I therefore hope that Members will join me in agreeing to amendments that provide important reassurance for Members of both Houses.
Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)
This is, I trust, the last occasion on which we will deal with the Bill in the House of Commons. I thank the Minister for the careful, courteous and inclusive way in which he has handled it, which I have found very helpful. We all want the Bill to be enacted, and I think that our discussions about how it should proceed have benefited from the way in which he has conducted himself and presented his side of the argument.
Stephen Kerr
Does the hon. Gentleman welcome the progress that the Government are evidently making towards the conclusion of these agreements? That is good news, is it not?
Dr Whitehead
I think the hon. Gentleman has slightly anticipated what I was about to say. It is indeed good news that progress is being made in that regard, but there is not much time left between now and March 2019, and there are still a number of treaties to go.
Lords amendment 3 addresses what is perhaps the most central point of the whole exercise. If those treaties are not securely in place before the date of withdrawal, we must have mechanisms for extending the period of coverage of Euratom, as it were—which means not just an extension during the implementation period, but an extension in its own right—until they are in place. We were told earlier in the Bill’s passage that all this was unnecessary, because everything would be put in hand before March 2019, and we have discussed the progress that has been made, but we have heard nothing about a plan B to be deployed in the event of its not being concluded. It may be that all the treaties will be in place, and we heard today that one of the bilaterals had been signed with the United States, but there are three more to be signed with major civil nuclear countries, and there is also the voluntary arrangement to be established with the IAEA. The Lords amendment gives us that fall-back protection, and a clear route towards obtaining it.
Layla Moran (Oxford West and Abingdon) (LD)
Does the hon. Gentleman agree that while some of the safeguards the Minister mentions might well work, it would be easier to stay in Euratom until such time as everything is concluded so that there is absolutely no way we would fall off any cliff edges? Does he agree that “may” is not good enough in this scenario?
Dr Whitehead
The hon. Lady makes the important point that to have the full protection of staying in Euratom would be the best thing to do, not just on nuclear safeguarding but on a range of other civil nuclear activities, until we are absolutely certain that we have ticked every box and ensured that we have alternatives that are as good as what we have under Euratom. That, very largely, is what Lords amendment 3 seeks to do. It seeks to ensure that there is recourse to the full covering arrangements of Euratom if those boxes have not been ticked.
After waiting until the very last moment to tell us that Lords amendment 3 is not needed and will be opposed, the Government have finally come up with an amendment in lieu of their own that suggests that perhaps a fall-back plan is needed after all. Its wording is, in many respects, very similar to Lords amendment 3. It places the signing of these treaties as the essential element in securing the transition to a full nuclear safeguarding role without Euratom, and specifies, as amendment 3 does, what they are. That in itself is a considerable victory for those who counselled for this over a period of time, and is a substantial turnaround from the Government’s previous position. But, at the last, the amendment falls short. It places the option to decide not on whether principal agreements have been signed—for that will be evident, or not, at the time of departure—but on what one might call an interim stage on a fall-back which provides for circumstances where, at the beginning of a period of 28 days prior to exit, agreements may not have been signed and completed, but will in the Secretary of State’s opinion have been so signed before that 28-day period is up. In other words, there is a very abbreviated, but nevertheless significant, period during which the Secretary of State will decide whether treaties are going to be signed. That will, in effect, be putting off the relevant request to the European Council for an extension of the time during which Euratom provisions hold, because the Secretary of State thinks it is, after all, going to be all right. That is a far shorter period than under the original general provisions that the Secretary of State said he would try to organise and get right in time for exit from the EU, but we are still back to that assumption that it will be “all right on the night” with no complete plan B in place. I accept that the amendment in lieu proposed by the Government comes a very long way, and that it has taken a considerable amount of U-turning, if we want to call it that, to put in place these arrangements, but in reality it is not quite far enough.
Ben Bradley (Mansfield) (Con)
It was a pleasure to serve with the hon. Gentleman on the Bill Committee. Does he agree that the Government’s new approach offering more flexibility and the ability to take a common-sense approach based on the circumstances at the time is a better approach than an inflexible decision taken now which might not fit the circumstances next year?
Dr Whitehead
I am not sure that the term “inflexible decision” can be accurately addressed to this set of circumstances, because we have a very inflexible date by which these decisions will have to be made. If we have a provision that is based on the Secretary of State deciding whether things are going better or worse, and if the House then does not have time to apply to the European Commission for an extension, an objective judgment will be made about whether to make an application to the European Commission for an extension of Euratom’s overview, particularly in relation to nuclear safeguarding activities.
That is another reason why we seek to preserve the original clause and ensure that it goes into the final Bill. My hon. Friend the Member for Barrow and Furness (John Woodcock) mentioned nit-picking in respect of some of the wording of the amendment. It would have been possible, I think, to fix that wording without diluting the effect of the clause in the way the Government have done through their amendment in lieu. It still has the flaw in it that there is a period when the Secretary of State has the option to decide whether he thinks something is going to be done, as opposed to the absolute guarantee that it will have been done at the point of departure. For that reason, we seek to preserve the original clause, if necessary by means of a vote. Depending on the result of that vote, we might then offer the amendment in lieu back to the other place for it to decide whether it thinks it comes close enough to its intention not to be sent back to this House once more.
Stephen Kerr
I do not intend to detain the House with a long speech, but I want to commend the Minister on the way in which he has guided the Bill to this point and to assure him of my support for the amendment that he has tabled. He has been, and is being, attentive and responsive to the concerns he has heard; he has listened and responded, and I believe that that is what makes for good legislation. I also wish to add to his compliments to the hon. Member for Southampton, Test (Dr Whitehead), whose positive contribution to the progress of this Bill has been greatly appreciated by us all.
To be clear, we need this Bill. Leaving the European Union creates the necessary, even if unwanted, step of leaving Euratom. The Government’s stated preference is for Euratom to continue to provide safeguarding functions in the UK. That is a laudable example of the pragmatic approach that the Government, and in particular the Prime Minister, are taking to issues surrounding our departure from the European Union. I like to think that my conservatism is based not on ideology but on pragmatism, and it is pragmatism that is going to see us through the process by which we leave the European Union. This Bill is a vital contingency plan, because if it transpires that we cannot agree with Euratom to continue with the civil nuclear safeguarding, we will need to have the regulatory framework, the infrastructure and the capabilities in place to maintain our international obligations and responsibilities as an independent and responsible nuclear state.
Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)
I was under the impression that we cannot remain in Euratom unless we are a member of the EU—we may want to, but we cannot, according to the rules.
Stephen Kerr
My hon. Friend has the power of mind-reading because the next thing I wish to say is that given that it will not be possible for us to maintain Euratom membership, the Government have taken the realistic approach of declaring through the process of the current round of negotiations that we would like to achieve an “as close as possible” relationship with Euratom, however that might ultimately be described. Although there is no such thing today as an associate membership, perhaps it is possible to become an associate of some form or another to the end of achieving that “as close as possible” relationship that we desire.
Kwasi Kwarteng (Spelthorne) (Con)
My understanding is that we as a country want to leave Euratom. Does my hon. Friend agree that opening up a suggestion that we could have associate membership muddies the waters slightly in terms of the clarity of the debate?
Stephen Kerr
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his intervention, but I do not think it does. The Minister has made it clear during the passage of the Bill that although we are leaving the European Union and our membership of Euratom will therefore end, we still want as close a relationship as possible with Euratom. The Government have been absolutely clear in their determination on this. They stated in a written statement published last September that
“it is vitally important that the new domestic nuclear safeguards regime, to be run by the Office for Nuclear Regulation, is as comprehensive and robust as that currently provided by Euratom. The government has therefore decided that it will be establishing a domestic regime which will deliver to existing Euratom standards and exceeds the standard that the international community would require from the UK as a member of the IAEA.”
I hope that the Minister will reconfirm tonight that it is still the Government’s intention to reach and maintain existing Euratom standards in respect to safeguarding. I recognise that it will take time to get to that point, but it would be useful if he indicated when he expects we will able to assume that we have everything in place to maintain the Euratom safeguarding standards, and if possible, how much that will cost.
I also commend my hon. Friend on his success in progressing towards his objective of putting in place what his amendment in lieu describes as “principal international agreements” and “corresponding Euratom arrangements”. These principal international agreements refer to and include the nuclear co-operation agreements that we will need to maintain because it is on the basis of these agreements that nuclear goods, including intellectual property, software and skills, can be moved between the UK and other countries. The Select Committee report summarised the evidence we heard and concluded that nuclear co-operation agreements were
“expected to depend on the existence of a mutually acceptable UK safeguards regime. Witnesses were concerned about any potential gap between leaving Euratom and setting up new arrangements, which would cause considerable disruption to nuclear supply chains”.
We also heard that
“nuclear cooperation agreements with the US, Canada, Japan and Australia will be crucial for maintaining existing operations and should be prioritised.”
I welcome the news that the Minister has brought to the House tonight about the IAEA, the draft voluntary offer agreement and the additional protocol. I also welcome the US-UK nuclear co-operation agreement. Perhaps he will give us more detail on how long it will take for the agreement to be ratified. I referred earlier to the optimistic note that David Wagstaff, the head of Euratom exit negotiations at the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, brought to our Committee, where he indicated that the co-operation agreements were
“well advanced and…would be completed in time for our departure.”
I have heard again tonight that that means March 2019.
With reference to the principal international agreements, perhaps the Minister will update the House on our negotiations with Canada, Japan and Australia. Will all Euratom’s existing nuclear co-operation agreements continue to apply to the United Kingdom until such time as new agreements can be established? It is vital that our civil nuclear industry can continue to operate with certainty and that there should be minimum to no disruption to the sector as we leave the European Union. Britain must be in a position to continue to honour its international obligations—
Layla Moran
Will the hon. Gentleman explain what “minimum” would be acceptable? I do not feel that any minimum disruption would be acceptable; for me, no disruption is the only possible scenario. What would his minimum be?
Stephen Kerr
The hon. Lady is right to pick me up on those words, and I am grateful for her intervention. Because the Prime Minister has successfully concluded the implementation agreement with the European Union, the minimum that we should settle for is no disruption, especially in this sector.
I was about to say that we as a country must be in a position to continue to honour our international obligations, and to be the responsible nuclear state that we are. The importance of this Bill, with this amendment, is that in the event of there being no agreement with Euratom, which is not what we want, it will enable the United Kingdom to be in a position to act as an independent and responsible nuclear state. That is why the amendment should command support on both sides of the House.
Drew Hendry (Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey) (SNP)
I should like to begin by echoing the remarks of the hon. Member for Southampton, Test (Dr Whitehead) about the Minister’s participation in the Bill so far. He has indeed been helpful, inclusive and relentlessly courteous as we have gone through the process. I welcome the progress that has been made, but that must be set against the background of what we believe to be the folly of leaving Euratom in the first instance. The last time the Bill came before us, I said that despite the Government’s ideological intention to abandon Euratom—it is ideological; there has been no attempt to challenge whether there might be a possibility to stay in it—their proposals fell short of answering vital questions on the UK’s nuclear future. Those answers have been asked for by the nuclear industry, the medical profession, our research sector and virtually everyone associated with nuclear power. Simply put, we should not be leaving Euratom.
Even with some sensible amendments from the Lords that have been accepted by the Commons, the Bill still fails to answer many critical concerns. As I have stated before, we in the Scottish National party believe that the safest nuclear power is no nuclear power. In Scotland, we have demonstrated what can be achieved by alternative renewable energy sources, and there is still a vast potential to be tapped, especially offshore, for an abundance of low-cost clean energy. In contrast, the UK Government continue to chase the folly of new nuclear, including the white elephant that is Hinckley C. That means higher costs for consumers, and technologies whose capital costs continue to skyrocket.
Kwasi Kwarteng
Does the hon. Gentleman believe that “no nuclear” can be squared with full participation in Euratom? If he had to choose one or the other, what would he decide?
Drew Hendry
I find the hon. Gentleman’s question rather odd. I shall come to the reasons that we support Euratom in a moment, but a no-nuclear future means that we still have to navigate the nuclear that we have at the moment, and the wider public need to understand the existing nuclear technology.
Drew Hendry
I want to make progress, because I am aware that Members wish to move ahead and I wish to accommodate that as much as I can.
On safeguards, at Dounreay in the highlands we have lived with the consequences of the UK’s previous regulatory regime. Decades on, we are still finding nuclear material that has simply been dumped or buried. For these reasons, and many more, while we work for a nuclear-free future, we recognise the vital need for the continuing protections and benefits that we have enjoyed through Euratom. I hope that that answers the hon. Gentleman’s question.
Turning to the Lords amendments, and the Government amendment in lieu, I should like some clarification from the Minister. On Lords amendments 1 and 2, I have said that providing clarification on the definition of “civil activities” is a sensible move, but is he in a position to enlighten us on the question put by Lord Hutton as to why the phrase, “for peaceful purposes”, has been defined in regard to electricity generation? I understand that Lord Henley, the Under-Secretary for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, was to write to Lord Hutton with a response to that question. However, I am not aware that there is anything on the public record on that issue, so I would be grateful if the Minister enlightened us.
Lords amendment 4 proposes a sunset clause, but I still do not think that the Government have fully answered the question as to why the sunset provision needed to be extended to five years from two years, so I would welcome clarification from the Minister. That being said, this is a sensible clause to add to the Bill.
I also agree with Lords amendment 5, which will mean that we receive a report for each three-month period in the years after the Bill is enacted. I note that the reports could include information on the development of the domestic operational arrangements required for the new domestic safeguards regime. Will the Minister outline what level of information he expects to provide? What information does he intend to include in the reports? For example, will they include information on the profile of ongoing costs, including any increases, on skills, on the recruitment and skills opportunities for girls and women and on gender pay? Reports should also include a rolling risk register.
I also note that we are to expect, or “may” have, a report that includes information on future arrangements with Euratom, including on nuclear research and development and on the import and export of qualifying nuclear material. I listened carefully when the Minister said that he had “every confidence” about the situation. It is good that he does, but we should have a guarantee. As was said earlier, there should be no diminution of the current protection that we enjoy under Euratom. I remain concerned about radioactive isotopes, but I do not intend to go through the rationale that I presented in the previous debate for why they are vital—although if I did, I would make no apology for doing so. The medical profession is concerned about their future availability, and even if there are agreements about access to such isotopes, the question remains unanswered about how we are supposed to obtain them in a Brexit future that means no customs union. How are they going to get across the border in time, before their limited half-life has expired? I could say much more on that, but perhaps the Minister can tell us how he intends to overcome the customs barriers and get that material here.
The Scottish National party supports Labour’s position on Lords amendment 3, and if it comes to a vote, we will vote to disagree with the disagreement that the UK Government have brought forward. If the Minister was serious about giving Parliament assurances, he would accept Lords amendment 3, which was moved by a Cross-Bench peer. The amendment quite literally does what it says on the tin: no exit from Euratom if relevant and necessary agreements are not in place. Instead, in presenting their own amendment (a), the UK Government are again asking us to take things on trust and believe that everything will be all right on the night. That is not good enough when it comes to nuclear safeguards.
Rachel Maclean (Redditch) (Con)
The hon. Gentleman talks about taking things on trust, but does he not agree that we have just heard hard evidence from the Minister of other parties coming to the table and negotiating with us to put safeguards in place?
Drew Hendry
I am delighted that the hon. Lady intervened at that point, because I was just about mention that condition 2 in amendment (a) states that
“(a) one or more of the principal international agreements have not been signed, but
(b) in respect of each agreement that has not been signed, arrangements for the corresponding Euratom arrangements to have effect in relation to the United Kingdom after exit day—
(i) have been made”—
which would be fine—
“or (ii) will, in the Secretary of State’s opinion, have been made before exit day.”
That is simply not good enough. Given that we are already seeing a lack of transparency around Hinkley Point C and rising costs, and around what is happening in Anglesey at the Hitachi plant, we cannot take such things on trust. It is vital that the Government are transparent on this issue now, because so much is at stake for people.
In conclusion, we have been advised that a deal has been struck with the USA, but will the Minister provide an update on the other agreements that need to be in place before the UK exits Euratom? After all, he expects us to take him at his word, so it should follow that we will be regularly updated on progress. In the interests of transparency, will he place the draft withdrawal agreement with Euratom in the Library? Although this is a reserved matter for the UK Government, the Scottish Government have regulatory powers on nuclear waste and emissions, so what discussions has he had with the Scottish Government to date on this issue? If he has had none, as I expect, what discussions does he intend to have?
Trudy Harrison (Copeland) (Con)
I listened with interest to my hon. Friend the Minister’s opening statement. Of the 87,000 people working in the UK’s nuclear sector today, some 27,500 people—nearly 40% of the workforce—are based in Cumbria. That is why, in Copeland and in Cumbria, we proudly call ourselves the centre of nuclear excellence, and I am so pleased to hear from the Minister that swift progress is being made.
I have said before that not to have arrangements in place would be catastrophic for my community and devastating for the nuclear sector nationally and internationally and for all who rely upon the sector for energy: low-carbon electricity, fuel, research and development, science and industry, clean-up operations, defueling, decommissioning, reprocessing, waste processing —the list goes on. There would also be wider supply-chain implications from advance manufacturing to apprenticeships and implications for ensuring that we continue the legacy of world-class skills and for the enormous number of businesses employing people right across the country in component factories and on our high streets. In my community, that means hairdressers and hardware stores, taxi firms and teashops; the nuclear industry in west Cumbria puts food on so many of our tables. Britain’s nuclear industry equals our automotive industry in terms of value to the economy. It is a vital to our economy, our environmental obligations and our society. It is therefore absolutely right that the Bill is being given the kind of priority that the ministerial team are affording it.
I thank all those who have been working so hard and so collaboratively on this important issue. The priority for me and my community is the UK being able to operate as an independent and responsible nuclear state when the Euratom arrangements no longer apply to the UK. There is a strong consensus across Parliament on the importance of ensuring that the necessary measures are in place so that the UK nuclear industry can operate with certainty while meeting all international commitments. That is clear from speaking with people working in the 70-something nuclear businesses in my constituency, including my husband, who is in the Gallery tonight and celebrating his birthday by watching this debate.
Rachel Maclean
Will my hon. Friend forgive me if I take this opportunity to wish her husband a happy birthday?
Trudy Harrison
I thank my hon. Friend.
The importance of having measures in place is clear from speaking to those working in the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority. It is also clear from reading the Minister’s report, published on 27 March—and no doubt will be from reading the next report, to be published in June—that the ministerial team is making considerable effort to address all concerns. I am grateful for the time that the Minister for Nuclear has spent with me and in my Copeland constituency. He has met many businesses in Copeland, including on his visit to Sellafield, visits to the Copeland Borough Council “Open for Business” event and to a Britain’s Energy Coast Business Cluster meeting. I know that he understands both our concerns and our capabilities.
To ensure that we will operate without interruption after the implementation period ends on 31 December 2020, the amendments introduced by the Minister will improve the transparency of negotiations and improve our understanding of the procedures being carried out. The progress being made will result in better, stronger industry confidence, and I welcome that. The definitions that will be included in the Bill are also welcome.
Amendment (a), in lieu of Lords amendment 3, will address the concerns raised in the other place. As I understand it, 28 days before exit day on 1 March 2019, if any relevant agreements are not signed and if no other equivalent arrangements have been made, the Secretary of State would have to ask the EU for corresponding Euratom arrangements to continue to have effect, providing vital secondary reassurance in the unlikely event that all measures are not fully in place.
I am pleased that the UK has now signed a bilateral nuclear co-operation agreement with the United States of America, as the agreement will allow the UK and the US to continue their mutually beneficial co-operation after the point at which Euratom arrangements cease to apply to the UK. The UK-US nuclear co-operation agreement will enter force at the end of 2020, following the conclusion of the implementation period of 21 months after the end of March 2019.
It is vital we have certainty and confidence that there will be no interruption to existing relationships that are underpinned by international agreements. I also welcome the fact that the nuclear co-operation agreement has been drafted and signed on the same principles as the current Euratom-US nuclear co-operation agreement, with the same robust assurances on safeguards, security, transfers, storage, enrichment and reprocessing in relation to the transfer of nuclear material and related items between the United Kingdom and the United States.
All that is relevant to my Copeland businesses and constituents, who rely on the nuclear industry for their livelihoods, and vital so that the country can continue to generate electricity, carry on reprocessing operations and continue with the decommissioning and legacy clean-up operations in Britain and abroad.
I urge Government officials to ensure that the same swift, smooth, effective transaction agreements are prioritised with Australia, Canada and, especially, Japan, with which my constituency businesses are working very closely. World-leading and innovative clean-up, defueling and decommissioning work must continue. Skills and products are being invented and deployed to support the Fukushima clean-up.
Companies such as React Engineering, based in Cleator Moor, have worked with Sellafield to develop brand new technologies and techniques to deal with incredibly complex situations. It is in everyone’s interest that this essential work is carried out, without interruption, as we leave the EU and Euratom. The last nuclear reactor to be constructed in Britain was Sizewell B, completed in 1995 using imported pressurised water reactor technology. Since then, no nuclear power plants have been completed. The UK’s capability to design and build a nuclear power plant has been dissipated, and the renewal of the nuclear programme has been dependent on overseas technology and nuclear systems suppliers, so it is all the more important that we ensure that the international nuclear co-operation agreements are fit for purpose and in place.
This is surely a depressing situation for a country that led the way in nuclear development. I share the widely expressed concerns about the energy trilemma: the need to keep costs down, to ensure the security of supply and to reduce carbon. There must be a concerted cost-reduction emphasis, supported financially and in policy terms, and I urge the Government to consider becoming much more directly engaged in the nuclear fleet deployment to revitalise the UK nuclear industry.
Diversification of the industry is already happening in Copeland, as companies such as Shepley Engineers, for which my husband works as a welder and which was started at Sellafield in the late 1940s, are now winning contracts across the country. Such companies are deploying their highly skilled workers, who are very experienced and competent at working safely, in highly regulated environments and in extreme conditions. As I speak, the Shepley Engineers workforce are above us fixing the roof and deploying their reverse-engineering techniques to complex and ancient systems. They are replacing the cast-iron tiles and giving the stonework a new lease of life, and they are also working at considerable height on the Elizabeth Tower, always with safety as their principal concern.
It is brilliant that those skills, that expertise and that precision working are in demand across Britain and beyond, but what I really want, and what the industry is crying out for, is for our globally envied skills in nuclear to be valued, employed and deployed, grown and exported as we develop, once again, a UK fleet of nuclear reactors of small scale, advanced breed and large scale to power the country and to export across the world—leading the way and making the most of our established and highly regarded reputation for excellence, innovation and British-built, safe reliability.
The Government’s industrial strategy speaks of grand challenges, pledging to
“put the United Kingdom at the forefront of the industries of the future”.
I agree with the statement that a truly strategic Government must do more than just fix the foundations, important as they are, and must plan for a rapidly changing future. The industrial strategy reports:
“Nuclear is a vital part of our energy mix, providing low carbon power now and into the future. The safe and efficient decommissioning of our nuclear legacy is an area of world-leading expertise.”
Let us not forget that this is our responsibility. This is not the kind of job that we should be leaving for our children and grandchildren to deal with.
We have enjoyed the power generated by nuclear, we have benefited from more than 70 years of highly skilled employment and we have learned many lessons along the way. Now, we are doing the responsible thing and cleaning up our legacy waste. Old and deteriorating storage facilities are nearing the end of their useful life at Sellafield, and it is our generation’s task to deal with this, both by prioritising safe storage and disposal and by investing in research and development to realise the full potential of the highest grade fissile material.
The research and development carried out at the national nuclear laboratory and at the Dalton nuclear institute, in partnership with universities and academia, and with the small and medium-sized enterprises in Copeland, is world leading. It is truly ground-breaking innovation that will transform the way we power our homes and businesses, our vehicles on this planet and travelling to others, and how we live our lives.
This Bill is an essential element of that work, and nothing should detract from its delivery. Today is a positive step in the right direction for our nuclear industry. I am so proud to be part of the journey, serving my community in this House. I commend this Nuclear Safeguards Bill, Lords amendments 1, 2 and 4 to 7 and amendment (a) in lieu of Lords amendment 3.
John Woodcock
I rise to speak in favour of Lords amendment 3.
It is a pleasure, as ever, to follow the hon. Member for Copeland (Trudy Harrison). She spoke powerfully about the contribution of civil nuclear power to our local economy. As she knows full well, every day several hundred people from my constituency go up that basket-case road and on that awful coastal rail line to Sellafield. I hope the Minister was not taken the long way around, and so avoided that awful bit of the A595 and that dreadful bit of the Cumbria coastline. Those routes are truly appalling, and we need his and his Department’s help in trying to unlock our dreadful logjam with the Department for Transport.
Before I reach the substance of my brief remarks, I would like to say how nice it is to hear that the husband of the hon. Member for Copeland is in the Gallery and that she has brought him to hear her speak on Lords amendment 3 to the Nuclear Safeguards Bill for his birthday. That shows, despite all the rumours to the contrary, that people from Millom really know how to have a good time. [Laughter.] I really should not say that, given that the boundaries may expand and I might end up asking for the votes of the people of Millom at the next election.
In this place and elsewhere, we often end up getting cross with the wrong people. I have a great deal of sympathy for the Minister because, as has been talked about at length in the Chamber today, he has listened. If we were to tally the people who are broadly on the right side of this debate, he would be one of them. The people we should be cross with—those who made the wrongheaded, deeply Europhobic decision to exit Euratom at the time of our leaving the European Union—are not here. We still do not accept the legal advice that he quotes. To my knowledge—he could set us straight either way—even when the Government are talking about associate Euratom status, or whatever is put in place, they will still not accept the jurisdiction of the European Court in those decisions, although I believe they have already conceded this in other areas, such as civil aviation.
Kwasi Kwarteng (Spelthorne) (Con)
I am grateful for the opportunity to speak tonight as I spoke in this important debate at an earlier stage—on Second Reading. I was pleased to hear the speech from my hon. Friend the Member for Copeland (Trudy Harrison), who gave a good, comprehensive analysis of why civil nuclear power and the nuclear industry are so important, not only to her constituency but to the country as a whole. In this debate, we tend to get forgetful about the immense contribution Britain has made to the nuclear industry and nuclear science. At the beginning of the 20th century, we had people such as Thomson and Rutherford, and others in the Cavendish laboratory at Cambridge and at other universities. They pioneered nuclear technology and advances in the nuclear industry. It is sad to hear speeches in this House that yet again undermine, frustrate or seek to question our capacity to get this right and to institute safeguards.
In that regard, the Bill is an excellent piece of legislation. It is sensible and it tries to construct a framework that will allow us to leave Euratom and go our own way. After all, we are members of the International Atomic Energy Agency—it has a structure and about 169 countries as members—and we should celebrate that. To hear people in this Chamber, one would think that without Euratom we were absolutely nothing and there would be no safeguards and no industry. We have heard the doom-mongering prophecy of thousands of job losses, to which the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness (John Woodcock) alluded in his mildly entertaining speech. We have had all these bugbears and goblins, and all this terror, held before us, but we are taking a simple step: we are going to leave Euratom and institute our own Bill, as we are doing, that will provide for safeguards in the industry. We also have the IAEA as a backstop. All this fear-mongering and these doom-laden prophecies of job losses are grossly exaggerated.
The other thing to say on the amendments is that in eight years in this House I cannot remember a Government who have been so accommodating and open to amendments as we have been on this Bill. In general, we see Governments, including the one of which I am a member, rejecting amendments; sometimes the amendments make sense and often they do not. In this instance, I have been surprised and impressed by the fact that our Front Benchers and the Government as a whole have adopted many of the amendments proposed in the Lords.
I want to talk a little about the House of Lords amendments and the processes they are going through. The job of scrutiny that the Lords are doing is good, but in the context of Euratom and debates about the EU there is a suspicion—I am not saying that all the people in the other place are influenced in this way—that a lot of these debates and institutions are being set up as straw men with which to block Brexit. When people say we should stay in this or that institution, there is always the suspicion of it being a rearguard fight to reverse the decision of the referendum of June 2016 and somehow to stay in the EU by other means. I am not suggesting the majority of their lordships are influenced by that, but in these debates there is always the suspicion that people are trying to use proxies and excuses to prolong our membership, unnecessarily, of these European institutions.
Euratom is a creature not of the EU but very much of the philosophy that was underpinning countries of western Europe coming together. I believe Euratom was established in 1957, roughly at the same time as the treaty of Rome, but we did not actually join it until 1973. To hear some of these speeches, one would think that we had no nuclear industry and no nuclear expertise before we joined Euratom. As I was trying to suggest, that is, of course, completely false.
Layla Moran
Would the hon. Gentleman perhaps concede that he has misunderstood the amendment? It says that its provisions would be invoked only if everything had not been agreed. It does not say that we would stay in Euratom in perpetuity; it simply says that we would stay in until the point at which every single i had been dotted and every single t had been crossed.
Kwasi Kwarteng
I accept that it is a clever amendment. I accept that on the face of it, it says that it is just a backstop, there purely to ensure that if we do not have the right treaties in place we get to stay in Euratom forever and ever, but the hon. Lady and I know that the people who composed the amendment do not expect all the relevant treaties to have been signed in the short timeframe available. I suggest, perhaps cynically—perhaps the hon. Lady will challenge me on this—that the clever amendment is simply a ruse to prolong our membership of Euratom. Call me an over-cynical man of superstition, but a lot of my constituents, if they pay any attention to this issue, would come to the same conclusion.
Layla Moran
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for allowing me a second go. In a sense, we are all rooting for the Minister, in the hope that he will come to a complete set of agreements in time. We all want that, and as soon as he does that, the amendment’s provisions will no longer apply. There is no issue, because if it all happens, it is fine, and even if it does not happen, the amendment will no longer apply as soon as it does happen. I do not understand the hon. Gentleman’s argument; it does not make logical sense.
Kwasi Kwarteng
I am grateful for the hon. Lady’s interventions. All I am suggesting is that what we have seen in the other House and heard in speeches there over several weeks is a consistent and concerted attempt to reverse the verdict of June 2016. I feel that this Euratom debate—I spoke on Second Reading—has been very much a proxy debate about the merits of the EU, which it should not have been. I have every confidence that the Government have the right safeguards in the Bill. I do not feel that the British civil nuclear industry is under any threat whatsoever. With the IAEA, we have in place the right structures. The scaremongering and doom-laden prophesies should be set aside, we should encourage the Government and we should reject the Lords amendments.
Question put, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 3.
Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South) (Lab)
On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. In the urgent question on the Learning Disabilities Mortality Review earlier on, which had been published at 8 am on Friday 4 May with no press releases or advance copies in the middle of the local election results, the Minister of State for Care said:
“It is an independent document and the University of Bristol decided when it was going to be published. It was published on Friday without permission from or any kind of communication with the Department of Health and Social Care.”
However, the Secretary of State had told the House in December 2016:
“As the programme develops, all learnings will be transferred to the national avoidable mortality programme. I have today asked the LeDeR programme to provide annual reports to the Department of Health on its findings”—[Official Report, 13 December 2016; Vol. 618, c. 622.]
What the Minister of State said today cuts directly across what the Secretary of State told the House, which was that he intended annual reports to be made to the Department of Health. Since our urgent question, the programme itself has clarified this on social media. It said that following claims made by the Care Minister in Parliament,
“we would like to clarify that @NHSEngland chose when to publish the #Leder report and directed all communications.”
Given that clarification from the programme itself, has the Minister of State or the Secretary of State asked to correct the record?
Madam Deputy Speaker (Mrs Eleanor Laing)
The hon. Lady wishes to put her point on the record and, by raising a point of order, she has done so. I am quite certain that the Treasury Bench will have taken note of what she has said. She, like all Members of this House, will know that it is not a matter for the Chair what an individual Minister says at the Dispatch Box. Therefore, I cannot give her any ruling on the matter, but she has sought to put her point on the record, and she has succeeded in doing so.
Business of the House (Today)
Ordered,
That, at this day’s sitting, proceedings on the Motion in the name of Jeremy Corbyn relating to Criminal Legal Aid Remuneration may continue, though opposed, for 90 minutes after the commencement of proceedings on the motion for this Order, and shall then lapse if not previously disposed of, and Standing Order No. 41A (Deferred divisions) will not apply.—(Rebecca Harris.)
Nuclear Safeguards Bill
Wednesday 6th June 2018
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 103-I Motion for consideration of Commons amendment in lieu (PDF, 67KB) - (5 Jun 2018)
Lord Henley
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 3, and do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 3A in lieu.
“Request for continuation of existing arrangements
(1) The Secretary of State must make a relevant request to the European Council if neither of conditions 1 and 2 is met at the beginning of the period of 28 days ending with exit day.
(2) Condition 1 is that all of the principal international agreements have been signed.
(3) Condition 2 is that—
(a) one or more of the principal international agreements have not been signed, but
(b) in respect of each agreement that has not been signed, arrangements for the corresponding Euratom arrangements to have effect in relation to the United Kingdom after exit day—
(i) have been made, or
(ii) will, in the Secretary of State’s opinion, have been made before exit day.
(4) A “relevant request” is a request, in relation to each principal international agreement that has not been signed and in respect of which subsection (3)(b) does not apply, for the corresponding Euratom arrangements to continue to have effect in relation to the United Kingdom after exit day until—
(a) the principal international agreement comes into force, or
(b) arrangements have been made for the corresponding Euratom arrangements to have effect in relation to the United Kingdom until further notice.
(5) The “principal international agreements” are—
(a) agreements relating to nuclear safeguards to which only the United Kingdom and the International Atomic Energy Agency are parties;
(b) agreements relating to nuclear safeguards to which the United Kingdom is a party with, respectively, the governments of Australia, Canada, Japan and the United States of America (and for this purpose “agreement” includes an agreement or other arrangement that modifies or supplements an existing agreement).
(6) A reference in this section to “the corresponding Euratom arrangements” is a reference—
(a) in the case of an agreement referred to in subsection (5)(a), to whichever of the Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol corresponds to the agreement;
(b) in the case of an agreement referred to in subsection (5)(b), to whichever of the agreements to which Euratom is a party with the government of Australia, Canada, Japan or the United States of America corresponds to the agreement (and for this purpose the reference to an agreement to which Euratom is a party includes any agreement or other arrangement that modifies or supplements the agreement).
(7) In this section—
“exit day” has the same meaning as in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (and references to before or after exit day are to be read accordingly);
“the Safeguards Agreement” and “the Additional Protocol” have the same meaning as in the Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000;
“signed”, in relation to a principal international agreement, means signed by both parties to the agreement.”
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Lord Henley) (Con)
My Lords, as the House is aware, the amendment in lieu was proposed by the Government in the House of Commons in response to Amendment 3 made on Report in this House. Although the Government opposed Amendment 3 on Report, my honourable friend Richard Harrington and I have listened very carefully to the arguments and concerns put forward in both this House and another place about ensuring continuity for the nuclear industry. I hope that this amendment in lieu exemplifies the commitment to compromise and to engaging with Parliament that I believe the Government have demonstrated throughout the passage of the Bill.
Amendment 3 would have required that, where particular agreements relating to nuclear safeguards were not in place on 1 March 2019, the Government would have to request that the UK’s withdrawal from Euratom be suspended until those agreements, or continuation arrangements, were in place. This amendment in lieu would, like Amendment 3, apply 28 days before exit day, on 1 March 2019. Under this amendment, if any principal international agreement were not signed and no other equivalent arrangements in respect of unsigned agreements had been made or would be made before exit day, the Secretary of State would have to ask the EU for,
“corresponding Euratom arrangements to continue to have effect”,
in place of the unsigned agreements. The relevant agreements are those on safeguards between the United Kingdom and the International Atomic Energy Agency—the voluntary offer agreement and the additional protocol—and the four priority nuclear co-operation agreements with the United States, Canada, Japan and Australia.
Although the Government were not able to agree to Amendment 3, the House of Commons has made this amendment in lieu, which I hope the House will agree addresses its concerns on this matter. I beg to move.
Lord Broers (CB)
My Lords, as one whose name was on Amendment 3, it gives me pleasure to support the replacement of that amendment with Commons Amendment 3A. The Commons amendment supports the basic proposals that we put forward in the Lords amendment but is more detailed and will better ensure that, if adequate agreements are not in place 28 days before exit day, the Secretary of State must request the continuation of the present Euratom arrangements. Amendment 3A more tightly defines the request that the Secretary of State must make and the relevant principal international agreements, and seeks to eliminate other possible ambiguities.
I would also like to say how much I welcome the Government’s acceptance of other Lords amendments, particularly the one that specifically points out that civil nuclear activities for peaceful purposes include production, processing or storage activities, electricity generation, decommissioning, research and development—a particular interest of mine—and any other peaceful nuclear activities.
Overall, I observe that the way this Bill has been handled is an excellent example of what can be achieved when there is constructive collaboration between the political parties, we Cross-Benchers and even between the Lords and the other place. Our parliamentary system has really worked well in this instance and it is my sincere, if naive, hope that this admirable spirit of collaboration continues throughout the consideration of all of the other Brexit-related Bills.
Lord Teverson (LD)
My Lords, I am also very pleased that we have come to a suitable arrangement. I support this amendment and reflect the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Broers. However, the challenges in achieving this are still major. We know from the leak from the risk assessment of the Office for Nuclear Regulation that we have an IT system that has only just been commissioned and timescales are very short for that £100,000 programme. We know that training has not been fast or easy in terms of recruitment or giving skills to those people to ensure that we have the right number of people in the Office for Nuclear Regulation. We have already had a concession that the standards that can be met by Brexit day are best international, rather than the Euratom standards the Government originally wished for.
Also, I understand that we have not yet had ratification of any of those nuclear co-operation agreements. Although I recognise and welcome the fact that we have agreement with the United States, agreement is not ratification. As the Minister himself said in a Written Answer to me:
“Ratification in the US requires the agreement to remain in Congress for 90 joint sitting days, whereby the US Senate and House of Representatives both sit, and the consent of two-thirds of the US Senate. Congress also has the option of adopting either a joint resolution of approval, with or without conditions, or standalone legislation that could approve the agreement. UK officials have held detailed discussions with the US and both sides are satisfied that this process can be completed ahead of the UK’s withdrawal from Euratom”.
I am glad to hear that optimism, but I still believe that that is a very difficult timetable to meet. I will be interested to hear from the Minister where we are on the other three nuclear co-operation agreements as well.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)
My Lords, as another who took part in the earlier stages of this debate, my eye joined with my noble friend Lord Broers in expressing thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Henley, for listening to the arguments that were made earlier, and to the Government for showing that the dynamic relationship that sometimes exists between your Lordships’ House and the House of Commons actually improves Bills, even in the febrile context of Brexit. I hope that this result today on Motion A, which I certainly support, will be a clear message to those who are given to say glibly that your Lordships’ House is merely trying to wreck Brexit. That is just not true. What is happening this afternoon is clear evidence, which the Government should cite, that there can be constructive work between the two Houses to improve even the legislation on this very difficult issue.
Lord Hunt of Chesterton (Lab)
My Lords, one of the features of this provision is that it does not mention the exact question of finance. Clearly, we are working on some large and expensive programmes, particularly on fusion. In replying, will the Minister comment on whether new budgets will have to be created for the new arrangements, or will they fit within the existing budgets?
Lord Inglewood (Con)
My Lords, I declare an interest that I share with my noble friend the Minister: we are both Cumbrians. Obviously, Cumbria is deeply affected by the nuclear sector, which is potentially very hazardous both to those who are engaged with it and to those living close to it. Therefore, having the strongest possible safeguards in place, which I believe that this amendment will help to bring about, is a great reassurance to those who would be affected should anything go wrong.
Just as my noble friend the Minister is absolutely certain that his house is not going to burn down, I am sure that that has not stopped him taking out an insurance policy. Equally, the Government, who are convinced that Brexit will take place, should recognise nevertheless that there is a possibility that, for various reasons, something may not happen as they hope. Having the strongest form of reassurance in the Bill in this regard is important because it is something to which those who might be affected were something to go wrong will be able to turn.
Baroness Featherstone (LD)
My Lords, to be frank, I wish that we could have just stayed in Euratom, which would be the simplest and most straightforward answer to nuclear safeguards, but I am relieved that the Government have listened to the concerns expressed on all sides of the House during the passage of the Bill, and I am very grateful that an amendment has been laid with which we can all agree. It is an important point that addresses any potential disaster, such as what if bilateral agreements were not in place, and avoids the cliff edge that we, like the Government, hope will never be reached. However, as the noble Lord opposite has just said, an insurance policy is a good thing and we now have that.
Lord Grantchester (Lab)
My Lords, it is a moment to be enjoyed when a Government Minister brings back to your Lordships’ House an amendment that all sides can resoundingly support. This amendment in lieu is in essence the amendment agreed on Report—admittedly, more deftly drafted—to ensure a responsible, less risky and more certain transition from the Euratom-monitored safeguarding regime to a uniquely robust regime operated by the ONR to full international recognition. The final version of the Bill is a vindication of the work of your Lordships’ House and the Government are to be congratulated on finally getting the legislation correct in the other place. While some noble Lords would contend that the Government had no need to trigger withdrawal from Euratom, given the difficulties around the notification letter and the Article 50 Bill, the House was right to focus this Bill on securing that the withdrawal from Euratom should proceed on a sound basis, satisfying all the contingencies that could arise during the process. This amendment in lieu allows the House to reflect on the fact that it has fulfilled its role successfully. Let us examine that in detail.
First, the Bill strengthens Parliament’s oversight and improves transparency by putting the Government’s reporting commitments on a statutory basis. Secondly, on the recommendations of your Lordships’ Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, the Bill puts a further definition of “civil activities” on the face of the Bill and sets a time limit on the Government’s use of so-called Henry VIII powers. Thirdly, the Bill provides further information to the report that the Government will be making periodically. It may include arrangements with Euratom relating to nuclear research and development, as well as the import and export of qualifying nuclear material such as medical isotopes. The facility at Culham and the JET programme will be pleased with this outcome.
Finally, in this amendment in lieu the Government are agreeing that the practical realities of the UK’s withdrawal from Euratom will need to be recognised. The Euratom arrangements will cover all the conditions and standards to allow a continuation of trade and non-proliferation certification without disruption, interruption or dilution. At all times, whether phased or not, the UK’s withdrawal will not be put at risk and will not jeopardise the present status of operating within fully recognised international IAEA standards in place. The implementation period is still to be fully agreed and put on a statutory basis. It will qualify under Section 3(b) as a corresponding Euratom arrangement. This will allow a further period in which the Government can recruit and train inspectors. In addition, from exit day, we are satisfied that, where needed, the amendment would cover the six vital agreements necessary to maintain the status quo. Two of them cover agreements with the IAEA and there is one for each of the four countries with nuclear co-operation agreements: namely, the USA, Canada, Japan and Australia.
I am grateful to the Minister for his letter following our meeting to discuss the amendment. Together with the Minister in the other place, Richard Harrington, and the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, he has put considerable effort into recognising and addressing valid concerns in both Houses throughout this process. I thank him and his team for co-operating with us on the Bill. The nuclear industry can be reassured that it may not need to face a cliff-edge moment and that the UK will continue to work constructively with Euratom. All sides recognise that the UK still has some way to go, yet we now have the right framework to bring that about.
In conclusion, I thank the House for its support and those who have participated so persistently and decisively in the Bill, namely the noble Lords, Lord Broers, Lord Warner, Lord O’Neill, Lord Carlile, Lord Teverson, Lord Hutton and Lord Fox, the noble Baronesses, Lady Featherstone and Lady Neville-Rolfe, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hanworth. I certainly cannot forget my noble friend Lord Hunt on the Front Bench, with the expert assistance of Grace Wright in Labour’s support team. This Bill has been a fusion of all the talents: it is a job well done.
Lord Henley
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Broers, for both his support for the amendment and for setting such a good and welcoming tone for the debate. I thank all other speakers for their positive remarks—although I accept that there are still challenges ahead, as the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, put it. As I made clear during the passage of the Bill, I want to continue to provide information to the House as we proceed to make sure that everyone is happy with what we are doing to ensure that the right arrangements—or the appropriate insurance policy, as my noble friend Lord Inglewood and the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, put it—are in place.
The House will be aware that the passing of this Bill is just one of the steps needed to establish new nuclear safeguards arrangements for the United Kingdom. It is only one aspect of the Government’s efforts to maintain close and effective arrangements on civil nuclear co-operation, safeguards and safety with Euratom and the rest of the world. To that end, we have made good progress both at home and abroad. The Office for Nuclear Regulation has enhanced its organisational capacity and capability to deliver the future safeguards regime. I assure the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, that we have increased its available funding to £10 million, which includes the procurement of the new IT system. I assure the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, that we will do all that we can to make sure that the system is appropriate. We are also recruiting and training a large number of new inspectors and strengthening the institutional capacity to deliver the project within budget.
We will soon consult on nuclear safeguards regulations. An early draft of that was provided to this House. The department and the Office for Nuclear Regulation will continue to engage stakeholders individually and through wider events. I assure the House that only this morning, in Vienna, the IAEA board of governors formally approved new bilateral international safeguards agreements with the United Kingdom to replace the current agreements, which include Euratom. We expect that they will be signed tomorrow. The conclusion of these agreements, which will take effect once Euratom arrangements cease to apply to the UK, once again demonstrates this Government’s sustained commitment to the civil nuclear sector, international safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation.
I can further reassure the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, that on 4 May, as I think he is aware, the Government signed a new nuclear co-operation agreement with the United States of America. That will be ratified by Congress and laid before Parliament before ratification in the UK. Again, I will make sure that the House is kept informed of that process. On further NCAs, good progress continues to be made to put in place respective arrangements with Australia, Canada and Japan ahead of March 2019. Again, I will inform the House when that happens.
As part of EU exit negotiations the UK and the EU have agreed the terms of an implementation period, as the House will be well aware, running until the end of December 2020. That means that existing Euratom arrangements, including international agreements, would continue during this period.
I hope that I have given all appropriate assurances to noble Lords who have taken part in the short debate on this Motion. I beg to move.
Royal Assent
Tuesday 26th June 2018
(5 years, 9 months ago)
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