Tuesday 14th November 2017
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesNuclear Safeguards Act 2018 View all Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018 Debates Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 14 November 2017 - (14 Nov 2017)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
Dr Whitehead
My hon. Friend makes an important point: the affirmative procedure is actually fairly limited. What we discuss in Committee is unamendable and our scrutiny is often pretty perfunctory. Nevertheless, it at least guarantees that something will be brought to somewhere in Parliament, and the opportunity to discuss it is not dependent on the Government’s largesse. It is at least a minimal protection, as far as Parliament is concerned, and it guarantees that something will be brought to the Floor of the House. Importantly, the negative procedure does not do that.
I hope the Minister will reflect on the fact that, because we are introducing such a wide-ranging enabling Bill, it is important that the regulations have proper scrutiny subsequently. We must not simply sign a blank cheque for the future and allow anyone making the regulations to do what they want. It is an important principle in this House that we do not do that under anything but the most minimal circumstances, and in this instance I suggest that those minimal circumstances do not exist.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Richard Harrington)
Good morning, everybody. I thank the hon. Member for Southampton, Test for his contribution relating to amendments 9, 10 and 11. I have spent quite a lot of time thinking about them and about how practical his suggestion is.
I apologise to the hon. Gentleman and the Committee as I do not have the draft regulations for the Committee. We discussed them the week before last, but I was eager to secure this slot so that the Bill could progress. Discussions with the Office for Nuclear Regulation are well advanced, and I hope that, before we discuss the Bill further—definitely by January—they will be published for all hon. Members and a wider audience to see. They are not secret regulations or anything particularly devious. It is simply because of the logistics of organising them along with the Bill that we have not published them in time.
I should set out this provision in the same way as the hon. Gentleman did. Clause 1(2) creates new powers to enable the Secretary of State to make regulations for the purpose of ensuring that qualifying nuclear material, facilities or equipment are available only for the use for civil activities. To do that, clause 1(2) inserts new section 76A into the Energy Act 2013. Section 76A provides the Secretary of State with new regulation-making powers relating to nuclear safeguards. The regulations will set out the detail of the domestic regime for civil nuclear safeguards.
It is appropriate to make provision for a nuclear safeguards regime in delegated legislation, simply because the subject matter is highly technical and the substantive provisions necessary to give effect to the regime will be very detailed. That is why we believe that it has to be in secondary legislation.
The Chair
Dr Whitehead
Perhaps I could deal with my hon. Friend’s intervention, and then I am happy to give way again.
Dr Whitehead
Of course, Mr Gray. Within the context of the Bill, an associated issue is the extent to which Parliament has a hand in ensuring that the regulations are as good as they should be. In taking this grave step by reinventing a complete set of regulations, a complete regime and a complete landscape, parliamentary sovereignty has to be respected. It is important that we get that right in the legislation, and it is important that we get the regulations right subsequently.
Richard Harrington
The hon. Gentleman is perfectly at liberty, as he knows, to press this to a vote. I have tried, as he has, to find common ground, but obviously he feels that I have not done so in this case. It is true that our positions are much the same as they were before we stood up to speak today. Although he has the ability to press this to a vote, I wonder if he would be interested instead in talking about this in other discussions before Report to see if there is common ground. I feel that the majority of the regulations are technical, and the affirmative procedure is perfectly acceptable, but if there were a way of separating the two issues so that he and I could discuss it with colleagues, I would be very happy to.
Dr Whitehead
I thank the Minister for that intervention and for what I think—I am reading the tea leaves a little bit here—is a slight softening of the position that it is all okay and there is nothing to worry about.
Richard Harrington
This is not a softening of the position. I am genuinely trying to explore whether there is a way of separating the vast majority of technical regulations, for which it would be very impractical to do what the hon. Gentleman wants, from things he has mentioned that may be of a different nature. My position remains the same. As I say, he is perfectly at liberty to press this to a vote, but I am happy to talk with him at one of the meetings we are having on other matters so that he can explain further his position and we can see if we can reach an agreement.
Dr Whitehead
Well, let us see whether we can talk about a mellowing of the position rather than a softening of the position.
What the Minister has importantly alluded to is the fact that if subsequent amendments to the regulations that we have highlighted are really just issues of a wholly technical nature and are, as I have described them, part of the bread and butter machinery of this House in terms of undertaking things by negative resolution, Members can simply say, “Yes, that is fine. Provided they are published and one sees them, one has the opportunity, perhaps informally, to say, ‘Well, actually, maybe these are not drafted as well as they should be, but in general there is no controversy attached to those technical changes.’”
However, if subsequent changes to these regulations are clearly not of a wholly technical nature, perhaps they could be flagged in the Bill as being an exception to those arrangements of a purely technical nature, as indeed there already are in the Bill two instances where negative resolution procedure does not apply. So, it is not the case that there is no precedent for this change, because it has already been envisaged that there are circumstances under which the negative resolution procedure will not apply.
If, let us say, on Report it might be possible to add a line to those particular exceptions, then we might have the basis for something we could discuss further. If that is the sort of thing that is possibly in the Minister’s mind, I would be happy to discuss it further with him, to see whether something could be drafted in the Bill that is able to make the distinction that he quite rightly and properly made between what is technical and what is not technical, subsequent to the first regulations being laid.
Richard Harrington
I would like to confirm to the hon. Gentleman that I do not want to make him an undertaking that I cannot carry through, because I would like to discuss this matter further with him, but in good faith I am perfectly prepared to—I would not really use the word “mellowing”. I cannot think of another word at this time of the morning. However, in the spirit that he knows, I am happy to fully explore the matter. Perhaps lawyers might say, “without prejudice” or “subject to contract”, but it just seems to me that there might be a way in which we could be in agreement.
Dr Whitehead
On that basis—and clearly we need a lexicographer here this morning as we discuss these circumstances—I am happy not to press the amendment to a vote, and I hope that we can discuss these issues during the passage of the Bill, to see whether we can make any progress.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Dr Whitehead
It has not, actually, Mr Gray. Because I was listening so carefully to you, I did not entirely get my reference sorted out. I have now found it, so I am grateful for your admonition. I am hopeful that we will make speedy progress in Committee today.
However, I am sure we need to pay attention to this section because it is important in getting the regime right for the wholesale change that we are making to how the provisions for nuclear inspection will be carried out.
The deflection that the Government make in their amending of the 2013 Act relates to section 74(9). I would be pleased if anyone could clarify this for me.
“Nuclear regulations which include any provisions to which any paragraph of subsection (10) applies must identify those provisions as such.”
As in the honoured Marx Brothers “tootsie-frootsie ice cream” sketch, with different form guides and various other things, one must now look at subsection (10).
“This subsection applies to any provisions of nuclear regulations which are made for—
(a) the nuclear security purposes,
(b) the nuclear safeguards purposes, or
(c) both of those purposes,
and for no other purpose.”
They appear to half switch off the prohibition of inspectors from undertaking activities for nuclear safeguarding as well as for non-nuclear safeguarding. They apparently refer not to regulations but to provisions of nuclear regulations. I am not sure whether, by deflecting to that paragraph, the responsibilities of nuclear inspectors are wholly translated into what is in the Energy Act 2013. I would appreciate clarification about whether, in the Minister’s opinion, the Government’s proposed amendment to the 2013 Act actually does that. Is there a clear line that shows that everything that is there is what a nuclear safeguards inspector has the power to do as a result of the deflection to that clause? It is by no means clear that that is the case.
With our amendment, we are trying to do that by means of a much simpler procedure. Instead of deflecting it to another clause, the amendment simply states that the inspectors’ powers relate to any of the relevant statutory provisions, and excises the rest of the paragraph. The relevant statutory provisions include nuclear safeguards, and therefore what was there previously would be fully translated into what a nuclear inspector pursuing nuclear safeguards can do. My view is that that is a simpler, more straightforward and clearer way of ensuring that the powers are fully translated.
The second point I alluded to is the question whether, even if one did that, there would be a complete transfer of powers and authorities from what was previously done under Euratom to what is done under ONR. The current Euratom treaty—the 2005 regulations—which I am sorry to admit I have actually looked at, appears to talk about more extensive powers and responsibilities than those in the 2013 Act. Although they are not set out in the same way, there appear to be various things in the Commission regulation that are not mentioned in the powers of inspectors in the 2013 Act, such as the requirement for inspectors to install and maintain equipment, an offence of interfering with equipment, special reports on unusual circumstances and special reports on inventory change.
I am very keen to hear from the Minister—I am sure he has had a good look at the Euratom regulations, too—whether he thinks that, even if he were minded to accept our amendment, the process of translating what is in the 2013 Act to ONR-supervised inspection really does the job, in respect of giving inspectors the safeguarding powers and responsibilities they had under Euratom and those that they need under ONR supervision. I am sure that the Department has looked at that closely. Is he completely satisfied that that is the case, or might he look at that again to see whether the moment of transmission set out in the Bill really does the business in respect of both making the nuclear safeguarding regime secure and the powers of inspectors for the future?
Richard Harrington
I shall do my best to implement the wise advice you gave us, Mr Gray.
In summary, I believe that the intentions behind amendment 14 are entirely good, but I would argue that it is defective because it would turn on the improvement notice power for nuclear security. That does not need to be turned on because there are existing, stronger direction-making powers. I shall briefly try to make that argument—hopefully with some success—to the Committee. Of course, I share the hon. Gentleman’s concern to ensure that the ONR inspectors have the right powers to fulfil their responsibilities. That is the whole purpose of the Bill.
This issue was raised by the Prospect union. As a result of its evidence, I asked it for a meeting, which I have arranged for the next couple of weeks, to discuss all the issues it raised, together with the other union that gave evidence at the same time.
Paragraph 11(2) of the schedule to the Bill amends paragraph 3(5) of schedule 8 to the Energy Act 2013, extending the power to inspectors who are appointed. That is important so that inspectors can issue improvement notices for non-compliance in relation to nuclear safeguards. Therefore, I would argue that the Bill already achieves the purpose of the amendment.
Paragraph 4 of the schedule amends section 82 of the 2013 Act such that relevant statutory provisions will include nuclear safeguards. That is the key to switching on the ONR power. I hope that that reassures the hon. Gentleman, and colleagues on both sides of the Committee, that the Bill achieves the purpose of the amendment.
I shall leave it at that, Mr Gray, in keeping with the advice you gave. I would like to discuss this matter in greater detail, but that was the sentiment of your instructions to us.
Dr Whitehead
I was seeking to tempt the Minister into standing up and saying a few more things.
Richard Harrington
I was not quite sure whether the hon. Gentleman had finished his comments. I stick to my point that this is obviously a complex area and I think that the Bill does exactly what he wants. I will consider his points carefully and, if further drafting is necessary, will bring forward proposals on that subject.
Dr Whitehead
This is going quite well. I thank the Minister for that consideration and it meets our concerns that, although I have not yet been able to spell them out, additional powers may be needed. If the Minister looked at that I would be very grateful. I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Schedule agreed to.
Clause 2
Power to amend legislation relating to nuclear safeguards
Drew Hendry
I will make a few short comments to indicate Scottish National party support for the amendment. The shadow Minister referred to our being in new times; indeed, we are in uncharted territory. The SNP has great concerns about the possible use of Executive powers, particularly the prospect of a lack of scrutiny. Let us consider how the decision to leave Euratom came about: representatives found out about the decisions via a bit of small print in the Bill. That does not give the Government a good track record in how transparent they are willing to be. No warning was provided and no indication was given of the impact. Frankly, there was a blatant lack of transparency.
We call on the UK Government to ensure that future decisions are taken in a transparent and consultative way and in an inclusive manner. At the moment, the set-up does not give anyone reassurance that that will happen, so we support the amendment.
Richard Harrington
I have been very interested in our tour around Henry VIII and the French royal family and its possible member, Henry IX, which you did not rule outside the scope of discussions, Mr Gray, but you are entitled to use your judgment. However, neither Henry VIII nor Henry IX had to come up with a nuclear safeguards regime; I wonder what would have happened if they had.
In all seriousness—[Interruption.] The hon. Member for Southampton, Test is on great, humorous form, as well as making serious points, which I will try to answer, I hope, in a suitably serious manner. The fundamental difference between us, forgetting the “may” and “must” difference for the moment—we will come on to that—is about the actual powers and why we need them. I find the Henry VIII expression a bit misleading—not that the hon. Member for Southampton, Test is trying to mislead the House—given the way it is always referred to in the press and so on. We are talking about very limited non-primary legislation here.
Changing minor references, whether saying that that calls for Henry VIII powers or not, would not be a good use of parliamentary time, given that Governments have to govern and Parliament must in some way ration its time so that it can deal with the fundamental matters that it has to deal with. I know the Opposition’s view generally on Henry VIII powers, but I think there should be some leeway within that for what genuinely needs to be delegated, and which is comparatively minor in nature, so that we can act quickly. I am sure the hon. Gentleman and the Opposition Front Bench recognise that in practice. Sometimes principle is a great thing in life, but it has to be adapted pragmatically to deal with circumstances. I will park that for the moment.
As it stands, clause 2 will create a limited power, enabling regulations to amend the Nuclear Safeguards and Electricity (Finance) Act 1978, the Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000 and the Nuclear Safeguards (Notification) Regulations 2004. It will be a narrow power to amend references in those laws to provisions of the existing agreements with the IAEA. Those references enable the IAEA to carry out its activities in the UK, including, importantly, by providing legal cover for the UK activities of its inspectors. The references and the legal cover they have will need to be updated after the new agreements have been concluded with the IAEA; it cannot be done before.
At present, our nuclear safeguards regime complies with international safeguards and non-proliferation standards agreed between the three parties—ourselves, Euratom and the IAEA. The UK applies those standards primarily through its membership of Euratom. They are set out in two tripartite safeguards agreements between the UK, the IAEA and Euratom: the voluntary offer agreement and the additional protocol. At the moment, they rely on the UK’s membership of Euratom. Following our withdrawal from the European Union and Euratom, these agreements will become ineffective. That is why the Bill has to ensure that a domestic civil nuclear safeguards regime is put in place. The UK will need to conclude new agreements with the IAEA to detail the international safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation standards with which the UK agrees to comply. Without those, no regime we could have will be recognised by the international community.
Amendment 5, as tabled and eloquently articulated by the hon. Member for Southampton, Test, intends to require—rather than enable—the Secretary of State to make regulations under clause 2. I welcome the Opposition’s change of position on clause 2 since Second Reading. Amendment 5 clearly recognises the need to have the power in clause 2 to ensure the necessary legislative amendments are made in time to give effect to the new IAEA agreements, and to therefore ensure that the UK has a civil nuclear safeguards regime that gives effect to international standards on the UK’s withdrawal from the Euratom treaty.
However, making the Secretary of State’s power in clause 2 mandatory does not provide any additional value. Following the negotiation of the new agreements, the references to the old agreements in the legislation mentioned in this power automatically become ineffective —they will not work. The inspection of UK facilities by IAEA inspectors is a vital part of our agreement with the IAEA. It is not in anyone’s interest to fail to make the necessary consequential amendments to existing safeguards once new agreements with the IAEA are agreed. Requiring the exercise of the power in the Bill is therefore unnecessary.
I want to assure hon. Members that we are currently negotiating new agreements with the IAEA on the same principles as the existing agreements and that the consequential changes are expected to be minor. That will ensure that the IAEA retains its right to inspect all civil nuclear facilities and continues to receive all current safeguards reporting, ensuring that international verification of our safeguards activity continues to be robust.
Dr Whitehead
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right because we are in the dark as far as what is going to come out and the IAEA are concerned. We think that an agreement will be reached and that there will be a new voluntary treaty arrangement. We think that when that new arrangement has been reached, it will be suitable for the purposes for which we have made all these legislative changes. Indeed, the legislative changes will be scrutinised effectively by the IAEA before that treaty can come about. The IAEA wants to be sure that we have put a regime in place that does the job in changing the relationship of this country as far as nuclear safeguarding is concerned from Euratom to ONR.
Richard Harrington
Does the hon. Gentleman agree—and I am also trying to answer the Scottish National party’s spokesman about the principle and the way it might be changed—in practical terms, forgetting principle for the moment, that we cannot be sure exactly when the agreements with the IAEA will be finalised? Certainly, it is in our gift but it is also with the IAEA. We may well be under great time pressure to make sure that the new inspectors—who might even be the same inspectors—have the legal cover to maintain the safeguards we all want. There are times when some things have to be delegated and moved very quickly to deal with an expediency. I felt that was an example.
Dr Whitehead
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. I accept that in cases of dire emergency, where the enemy is about to invade or some such, action needs to be taken that may not necessarily carry out the full intent of the parliamentary procedure. We are not in that position. As the Minister has said—he put it very well—there could be time constraints, that’s all. The limited time available for us to get this done could be problematic.
Richard Harrington
I do not want to be dramatic, but not having a nuclear safeguards regime because of the lack of an inspector’s legal power to inspect, as far as we are concerned, would be pretty much a national emergency.
Dr Whitehead
Indeed, the Minister is right, in principle. That may be something we might address with one of the amendments we may discuss this afternoon.
The fact of the matter is that putting something in this legislation simply because it might be a little inconvenient to have it any other way, given time constraints, is not a justification for using Henry VIII clauses. As I have mentioned, it is not beyond the wit of Government under those circumstances to introduce primary legislation that can be carried through this House very quickly indeed. If the Minister is so concerned about time constraints, he should also understand that other people will be concerned about time constraints as well and would be willing to make sure that that kind of legislation went through speedily.
This morning, he is giving assurances that this will all be done in the proper way and that it will be okay. We can give assurances on the other side that yes, if he did it in a proper way, we would make sure that this was done properly. Those assurances are of about equal weight. He simply has not made the case that the arrangements are necessary for the purpose of translating all the stuff in question into UK law. I remind the Committee that the Department, setting out the context and purpose of the clauses, has emphasised that it is necessary to take the action in question, but there is no mention in the document of the necessity to do it in time that is not otherwise available to Parliament. The document does not make that argument.
Because we have tried to be so reasonable and careful in our approach, but have not received anything coming the other way—
Richard Harrington
I remind the Committee that the changes under the Henry VIII power are about changing references to specific articles in the existing legislation. They are not changes to substance or principle.
Dr Whitehead
Indeed, which is why it would be easy to take a new Bill through the House, to make that evident with respect to the relevant provisions. Everyone would agree that that Bill should move through the House quickly. I think I could get an absolute assurance of that from the Opposition. For that reason, it is not necessary to cast the measure in its present form.
Richard Harrington
Is the hon. Gentleman saying that he would rather there was a brief period with no safeguards regime because there were no inspectors with the legal cover to inspect, so that the Bill could be brought through the House under an emergency procedure?
Dr Whitehead
No. I should rather that the Government organised their business so that it could be done properly in the time available, and that we could then carry out proper parliamentary procedure, to make sure that the power of Parliament was behind whatever was agreed.
Richard Harrington
But the hon. Gentleman would accept that, as it takes two to tango, a lot depends on timing with the IAEA, which is another organisation.
Dr Whitehead
Yes, indeed. The Minister is straying slightly, I think, into concerns that we may well address this afternoon: it is true that there are time constraints, and there are ways to sort that out.