Asked by: Siobhain McDonagh (Labour - Mitcham and Morden)
Question to the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy:
To ask the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, if he will take steps to ensure that children’s hospice and palliative services, including those provided by the voluntary sector, are on the Protected Sites List as part of the Electricity Emergency Supply Code.
Answered by Graham Stuart - Minister of State (Department for Energy Security and Net Zero)
Children’s hospice and palliative services are not listed as ‘Approved Designated Services’ as set out in section 5.2 of the Electricity Supply Emergency Code, and therefore do not qualify for Protected Site status unless they are located within a hospital.
The restrictive Protected Site criteria is essential as there are technical requirements under the Electricity Supply Emergency Code that limit the Protected Sites List to 10% of total demand. To keep many children’s hospice and palliative services connected would involve keeping all other properties in the area also connected and therefore the majority do not meet the criteria.
Sites are ultimately responsible for their own business continuity and should not rely on being on the Protected Sites List as their power resilience. The Electricity Supply Emergency Code only applies to certain scenarios and does not give sites complete coverage for all possible power disruption events.
Asked by: Siobhain McDonagh (Labour - Mitcham and Morden)
Question to the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy:
To ask the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, in the context of Octopus Energy's takeover of Bulb, what assessment he has made of the implications for his policies of Octopus Energy’s commercial links with the China Electronics Corporation.
Answered by Graham Stuart - Minister of State (Department for Energy Security and Net Zero)
In the context of the sale of Bulb to Octopus Energy, the Government has assessed commercial aspects of Octopus. This review has not identified any areas for concern.
The Government’s priority is to ensure continued energy supply to Bulb’s customers at the lowest practicable cost.
Asked by: Siobhain McDonagh (Labour - Mitcham and Morden)
Question to the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy:
To ask the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, whether he has made assessment of any potential threat to national security of the rollout of Kaifa Technology UK’s smart meters in UK homes.
Answered by Graham Stuart - Minister of State (Department for Energy Security and Net Zero)
I refer the Hon. Member to the answers given on 20th October 2022 to Questions UIN 60918, UIN 60919 and UIN 60920.
The smart metering system has been designed in consultation with industry experts and the National Cyber Security Centre (part of GCHQ), with a comprehensive security model at its heart. Smart meters only respond to communications that are sent securely by authorised organisations such as energy suppliers, rather than meter manufacturers.
Security risk assessment reviews are conducted on a regular basis and consider the range of certified devices used within smart metering, including the system resilience benefits that diversity of devices bring.
Asked by: Siobhain McDonagh (Labour - Mitcham and Morden)
Question to the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy:
To ask the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, whether the Government has made an assessment of the links between Kaifa Technology UK and the (a) China Electronics Corporation and (b) Chinese armed forces.
Answered by Graham Stuart - Minister of State (Department for Energy Security and Net Zero)
I refer the Hon. Member to the answers given on 20th October 2022 to Questions UIN 60918, UIN 60919 and UIN 60920.
The smart metering system has been designed in consultation with industry experts and the National Cyber Security Centre (part of GCHQ), with a comprehensive security model at its heart. Smart meters only respond to communications that are sent securely by authorised organisations such as energy suppliers, rather than meter manufacturers.
Security risk assessment reviews are conducted on a regular basis and consider the range of certified devices used within smart metering, including the system resilience benefits that diversity of devices bring.
Asked by: Siobhain McDonagh (Labour - Mitcham and Morden)
Question to the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy:
To ask the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, what assessment he has made with Cabinet colleagues of the potential impact of allowing Chinese state affiliated companies to be part of the smart meter roll-out on national security.
Answered by Graham Stuart - Minister of State (Department for Energy Security and Net Zero)
I refer the Hon. Member to the answers given on 20th October 2022 to Questions UIN 60918, UIN 60919 and UIN 60920.
The smart metering system has been designed in consultation with industry experts and the National Cyber Security Centre (part of GCHQ), with a comprehensive security model at its heart. Smart meters only respond to communications that are sent securely by authorised organisations such as energy suppliers, rather than meter manufacturers.
Security risk assessment reviews are conducted on a regular basis and consider the range of certified devices used within smart metering, including the system resilience benefits that diversity of devices bring.
Asked by: Siobhain McDonagh (Labour - Mitcham and Morden)
Question to the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy:
To ask the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, what assessment has been made of the potential risk of China Electronics Corporation’s role in the rollout of smart meters across the UK.
Answered by Graham Stuart - Minister of State (Department for Energy Security and Net Zero)
Smart metering infrastructure in Great Britain has been developed in close coordination with industry security experts and the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) to ensure the most robust security controls are in place.
The system includes rigorous safeguards that are resilient to the global nature of supply chains. This includes a requirement that certain key smart metering system security controls are provided and maintained within the UK.
Smart meters require certification under the NCSC’s Commercial Product Assurance Scheme (CPA) prior to being installed by energy suppliers.
Asked by: Siobhain McDonagh (Labour - Mitcham and Morden)
Question to the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy:
To ask the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, whether he is aware of Kaifa Technology’s role in the rollout of smart meters in the UK.
Answered by Graham Stuart - Minister of State (Department for Energy Security and Net Zero)
Smart metering infrastructure in Great Britain has been developed in close coordination with industry security experts and the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) to ensure the most robust security controls are in place.
The system includes rigorous safeguards that are resilient to the global nature of supply chains. This includes a requirement that certain key smart metering system security controls are provided and maintained within the UK.
Smart meters require certification under the NCSC’s Commercial Product Assurance Scheme (CPA) prior to being installed by energy suppliers.
Asked by: Siobhain McDonagh (Labour - Mitcham and Morden)
Question to the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy:
To ask the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, what assessment he has made of the potential risk of the involvement of Chinese state-owned manufacturers in the rollout of smart meters across the UK.
Answered by Graham Stuart - Minister of State (Department for Energy Security and Net Zero)
Smart metering infrastructure in Great Britain has been developed in close coordination with industry security experts and the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) to ensure the most robust security controls are in place.
The system includes rigorous safeguards that are resilient to the global nature of supply chains. This includes a requirement that certain key smart metering system security controls are provided and maintained within the UK.
Smart meters require certification under the NCSC’s Commercial Product Assurance Scheme (CPA) prior to being installed by energy suppliers.
Asked by: Siobhain McDonagh (Labour - Mitcham and Morden)
Question to the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy:
To ask the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, pursuant to the Answer of 13 October 2020 to Question 98870, how many proposed redundancies were indicated on HR1 forms received by the Redundancy Payments Service in (a) October and (b) November 2020.
Answered by Paul Scully
The table below sets out the number of HR 1 forms received in October and November 2020, and the number of proposed dismissals indicated on those forms:
Month | Number of HR1 forms received | Number of proposed dismissals on HR1s |
Oct 20 | 844 | 51,351 |
Nov 20 | 552 | 36,686 |
Employers are only required to file a Form HR1 where they are “proposing” to dismiss 20 or more employees at a single “establishment”.
“Propose” and “establishment” have distinct meanings in this context.
The aggregate number could include proposed dismissals due to insolvency, restructuring of a solvent/continuing business, or proposed relocation of employees, for example.
It should be noted that a proposal to make a given number of dismissals does not necessarily result in all or any of the proposed dismissals occurring.
Asked by: Siobhain McDonagh (Labour - Mitcham and Morden)
Question to the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy:
To ask the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, pursuant to the Answer of 13 October 2020 to Question 98870, how many proposed redundancies were indicated on HR1 forms received by the Redundancy Payments Service in each of the last 12 months.
Answered by Paul Scully
Forms received from all employers where there are proposals to dismiss 20 or more employees at an establishment, over the last 12 months, are set out in the following table:
Month | Number of HR1 Forms received from all employers | Number of proposed dismissals on HR1s |
Sep 19 | 303 | 26,716 |
Oct 19 | 343 | 23,882 |
Nov 19 | 305 | 27,820 |
Dec 19 | 196 | 16,733 |
Jan 20 | 372 | 29,884 |
Feb 20 | 329 | 28,674 |
Mar 20 | 485 | 44,465 |
Apr 20 | 447 | 62,443 |
May 20 | 871 | 73,331 |
Jun 20 | 1,888 | 155,739 |
Jul 20 | 1,784 | 149,688 |
Aug 20 | 966 | 58,056 |
Sep 20 | 1,734 | 82,029 |
Please note that employers are only required to file a Form HR1 where they are “proposing” to dismiss 20 or more employees at a single “establishment”.
“Propose” and “establishment” have distinct meanings in this context.
The aggregate number could include proposed dismissals due to insolvency, restructuring of a solvent/continuing business, changes to terms and conditions, or proposed relocation of employees, for example.
It should also be noted that a proposal to make a given number of dismissals does not necessarily result in all or any of the proposed dismissals occurring.