Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-ninth sitting)

Debate between Stephen Kinnock and Sarah Olney
Sarah Olney Portrait Sarah Olney
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The clause, when amended by amendment 545, which we will vote on shortly, brings into stark relief how much of the Bill is to be left to regulations and how little say MPs will eventually get over it. When it comes to voting on Third Reading, MPs will have little certainty on how the Bill will actually operate—so much is to be taken on trust. If, through the gaps and grey areas, people come to harm, that will be on Parliament for failing to address these issues while we had the chance.

Let us consider all the powers that the Bill creates. Clause 5 creates a power to determine what goes into the first declaration, subject to the requirements of amendment 418. Clauses 5, 8 and 19 create powers to determine the training, qualifications and experience of the medical practitioners, with no minimum floor, and we do not even know who will ultimately decide the training—that, too, is to be left to regulations under amendment 186. Clause 6 creates powers to determine the forms of proof of identity, with no requirement for those to be photographic or to prove residency.

Clauses 7, 13 and 21 create powers to determine the statements, declarations and reports required from the doctors and the applicant. Clause 11 creates powers to make regulations for the replacement of the co-ordinating doctor if they have died, are ill or are otherwise unable or unwilling. Clause 15 creates a new power to determine who can be a proxy. Clause 20 creates a power for the approval of drugs and substances to end people’s lives. Clause 28 creates a power to determine the prescribing, dispensing and transporting of approved lethal substances —the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire has called this purely administrative. Clause 29 creates a power to make regulations relating to the registration, certification and recording of deaths. Clause 30 creates a power to issue codes of practice that practitioners must simply “have regard to”.

Clause 32 will create an extraordinarily broad Henry VIII power, as we are completely in the dark as to how the assistance will actually be provided. Clause 33 creates a power to determine which events should be notified to the commissioner and how to enable the exchange of information. That is all to be decided by the Secretary of State, with the detail removed from the Bill.

All those things are to be subject to the negative procedure, except the training and qualification requirement for the first and second doctor, the codes of conduct, and the power for the Secretary of State to arrange for delivery of assisted dying. When a statutory instrument is made through the negative procedure, there is no need for a vote. The only exception, by convention, is when the Leader of the Opposition asks for one, but they understandably would not do so on a conscience issue. In practice, Parliament will never get a say on these matters. Is the Committee content with that?

Even on affirmative statutory instruments, Parliament’s say is limited to a 90-minute debate on a motion that cannot be amended. Suppose that the Secretary of State published a code of practice on the assessment of capacity that MPs felt did not take sufficient account of mental health conditions. They would be faced with the option to vote for it despite its inadequacy, or to vote against it and risk creating a position where there are no codes of practice at all. That is an impossible position to place parliamentarians in, yet that is what the Bill does. It is a massive blank cheque to the Executive.

I say to Government Members, who I know have great faith in the Health Secretary, that according to the Interpretation Act 1978, “Secretary of State” means any Secretary of State. The powers will not necessarily be exercised by the Health Secretary; they could be exercised by another Secretary of State. Indeed, under the doctrine of ministerial delegation, they could be delegated to another Minister who is not a Secretary of State.

I make these points to illustrate that there is an issue of principle that cannot be waved away on the basis that we think someone sensible will exercise the powers. Parliamentary scrutiny matters, and I very much regret that the Bill avoids it through these wide regulation-making powers.

Stephen Kinnock Portrait Stephen Kinnock
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The Government have worked with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley on amendment 223, which would broaden the regulation-making power using standard legal wording so that any regulations made under the Bill can ensure that it works effectively with other legislation.

Amendment 223 agreed to.

Amendment proposed: 545, in clause 39, page 23, line 6, leave out subsections (3) to (5) and insert—

“(3) The Secretary of State may not make a statutory instrument containing (whether alone or with other provision) regulations under section 5(3A), 8(6A),30(3), (Voluntary assisted dying services: England) or (Voluntary assisted dying services: Wales) unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.

(4) Any other statutory instrument made by the Secretary of State containing regulations under this Act is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.

(5) The Welsh Ministers may not make a statutory instrument containing regulations under section (Voluntary assisted dying services: Wales) unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, Senedd Cymru.”—(Kim Leadbeater.)

This amendment brings together the various provisions about the procedure for regulations. It also makes regulations under clauses 5 and 8 about training, qualifications and experience, and regulations under NC36 and NC37, subject to the draft affirmative procedure.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-fifth sitting)

Debate between Stephen Kinnock and Sarah Olney
Tuesday 18th March 2025

(1 year, 4 months ago)

Public Bill Committees
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Sarah Olney Portrait Sarah Olney
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I hope the Minister can answer a question for me. I hear what he is saying about concerns with the amendments themselves, which makes a lot of sense, and the policy objectives of the hon. Member for Spen Valley. What I am concerned about is that in the Bill as drafted, notwithstanding that various amendments have been tabled, it is not clear what the doctor should do in the event of complications. There may well have been an earlier conversation with the patient, but the patient’s request may still leave the doctor in the position of committing a criminal offence.

I would like to know whose responsibility it is to ensure that doctors are not left in that position, which could come about either because the Bill as drafted is not clear or the amendments do not make the appropriate clarification. The hon. Member for Spen Valley has done a marvellous job, but in terms of policy intention the Bill does not cover this aspect. The Minister is saying that it is his job only to ensure that the amendments are appropriate. I am still very concerned that there is a big gap here and that we are potentially leaving doctors in the very difficult position of not knowing whether or not carrying out the patient’s intentions would leave them in the position of breaking the law. I would like to know whose responsibility it is to ensure that doctors are not left in that situation.

Stephen Kinnock Portrait Stephen Kinnock
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The hon. Lady will know that we rely on medical practitioners to make professional judgments all the time. My hon. Friend the Member for Stroud has set out the range of things that medical practitioners can do when they are dealing with end-of-life care. That happens all the time.

In these circumstances, it is the view of the Government that we should continue to rely on the skill, judgment and expertise of medical practitioners, underpinned by the various codes of practice—the GMC, or good medical practice, being probably the most obvious one. There is an understandable desire to use primary legislation to address issues of this kind, but it is important to point out that that could prove to be counterproductive and that we could end up with a Bill that becomes less workable and therefore potentially less safe—what one might call the law of unintended consequences.

Sarah Olney Portrait Sarah Olney
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The Minister is talking about somebody making a medical judgment, which would obviously be the right thing to do in the normal course of events, but we are talking about a doctor being left in a position of not knowing whether to take a further step that would end somebody’s life or to take the step that would be natural for a doctor—to try to revive the patient. This is about what the legal position is in that case—it is not a matter for medical judgment.

Stephen Kinnock Portrait Stephen Kinnock
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My response would be to refer the hon. Lady to clause 30(1), which sets out that the Secretary of State will produce a code of practice. Amendment 430, which my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has said she is minded to support, would also ensure that the code of practice includes guidance on the matter that the hon. Lady raises. I think there is a commitment to a code of practice, and if amendment 430 passes then it would be explicitly in the Bill that that code of practice should include the issue that she raises.

Amendment 533 places a duty on the Secretary of State to make regulations specifying where the provision of assistance under the Bill may take place. It sets out a requirement on the Secretary of State to consult such persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate prior to making such regulations, including certain specified groups.

Amendment 430 would broaden the Secretary of State’s power to issue codes of practice under clause 30. It would explicitly enable the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice in connection with responding to unexpected complications that arise in relation to the administration of the approved substance under section 18, including when the procedure fails.

I understand that amendment 255 is no longer relevant as it relates to schedule 6, which is going to be changed—I think that is right—so, in that sense, the amendment is null and void. I hope that those observations were helpful.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-third sitting)

Debate between Stephen Kinnock and Sarah Olney
Stephen Kinnock Portrait The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)
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It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Roger. We have been working with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley on these amendments, and changes have been mutually agreed by her and the Government. The amendments aim to ensure that the Bill, if passed, is legally and operationally workable. I offer a technical and factual explanation and rationale for the amendments.

Amendments 469 and 472 are supplementary to amendment 208, which provides that the form of the statement made by the co-ordinating doctor, in relation to the second declaration, is to be set out in regulations. Amendment 472 sets out the information that the regulations must require the statement to include, as well as some additional declarations by the co-ordinating doctor.

Amendment 470 is supplementary to amendment 207, which provides that the form of a second declaration is to be set out in regulations. Amendment 470 sets out the information that the regulations must require the second declaration to include, as well as some additional declarations by the person. That applies to regulations made under clause 13(3)(a). I hope that was useful for the Committee.

Amendment 469 agreed to.

Amendments made: 372, in clause 13, page 9, line 12, leave out from third “the” to end of line 13 and insert

“certificate of eligibility was granted,”.

This amendment is consequential on NC21.

Amendment 373, in clause 13, page 9, line 17, leave out “declaration was made” and insert “certificate was granted”.—(Kim Leadbeater.)

This amendment is consequential on NC21.

Sarah Olney Portrait Sarah Olney
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I beg to move amendment 457, in clause 13, page 9, line 17, after “made,” insert

“and have not voluntarily stopped eating and drinking”.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty First sitting)

Debate between Stephen Kinnock and Sarah Olney
Stephen Kinnock Portrait Stephen Kinnock
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This is one of the amendments on which the Government have worked with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley to ensure that the Bill is legally robust and workable. As the Bill is currently drafted, in clause 11 there is provision to replace a registered medical practitioner acting as the co-ordinating doctor if they become ill or die. However, there is no similar provision to replace a registered medical practitioner acting as the independent doctor should they be unable to complete their role.

Amendment 205 makes provision under clause 10 that a further referral may be made by the co-ordinating doctor to another independent doctor if the second independent doctor becomes unable or unwilling to continue to make a report of their assessment due to their death or illness, provided that the second independent doctor has not prepared a report. It would thereby ensure internal consistency in the Bill in relation to this matter.

Sarah Olney Portrait Sarah Olney (Richmond Park) (LD)
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I reiterate the concern I raised when speaking to my amendments this morning: as far as I can see, seeking the second opinion of a second independent doctor allows the person seeking assisted suicide to have a second bite at the cherry if their first independent doctor has not granted permission. I do not think anyone has an objection to going to a second independent doctor if the first independent doctor has been unable, through either death or illness, to complete the task; nor is there any objection if there has been a material change of circumstances, which my amendment 458 sought to add.

However, the possibility of seeking the view of another doctor simply because the first one did not give the desired answer is a troubling one. There is no objection to patients seeking a second, third or even fourth opinion in medicine when it is about what different treatment pathways might be available, but there is a crucial difference between seeking different appropriate treatment options and what is being proposed in the Bill. In the Bill, the function of the two doctors is not primarily diagnostic or advisory; it is a safeguarding role.

The doctors will have been entrusted by Parliament to make sure that the criteria for assisted dying are met. Their determination makes the difference between a lawful act and the commission of an act that, as per clause 24, Parliament would still regard as sufficiently serious to be a crime. Their role is therefore that of a decision maker, and in no other setting can someone go to a different decision maker if they do not like the answer given by the first. Even in appeals before our courts, an appellate judge would not interfere with a decision simply because they would have reached a different conclusion; the appellate judge must consider that the decision was in some way incorrectly reached.

It is also true that in some settings one can ask a decision maker to reconsider a matter, but that is not what is being proposed in clause 10 either. Instead, the clause allows the person to try again with a different referee if the first one did not give the desired answer. It is true that there is an added layer of protection from the High Court or the possibility of a panel, but under the Bill as it currently is there is no procedure whereby the High Court or the panel will hear from the first independent doctor. That is concerning. They would have to go simply on the basis of the second independent doctor, without any awareness of why the two disagreed.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eighth sitting)

Debate between Stephen Kinnock and Sarah Olney
Stephen Kinnock Portrait Stephen Kinnock
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I am on the Committee as a Member of Parliament and I vote as such. When I speak on the Committee, I speak as a Government Minister in order to provide factual and technical explanations. As the Bill is a matter of conscience, I will be voting with my conscience on all the amendments as they come forward.

The amendments that we are now debating have been tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley in consultation with the Government. They relate to the location of the person seeking assistance under the Bill and are designed to ensure that the service can only be accessed by an individual present in England and Wales, with a view to preventing medical tourism.

I will take the amendments in turn. Amendments 178 and 193 would ensure that only a terminally ill person in England or Wales may be provided with assistance in accordance with the Bill. Further to that, a requirement is placed on the co-ordinating doctor to ascertain whether, in their opinion, the person who made the first declaration is in England and Wales as part of their first assessment. Amendment 179 would limit the assistance that may be provided in accordance with the Bill to assistance in England or Wales only. Amendment 180 would require the steps taken under clauses 5, 7, 8 and 13 that relate to both declarations and both doctors’ assessments to be taken by persons in England or Wales.

Amendment 182 would limit the provision of clause 4(3), where a person indicates to a registered medical practitioner their wish to seek assistance to end their own life, to cases where the person is physically present in England or Wales. It would prevent people who are outside of England or Wales from accessing assistance in accordance with the Act—for example, by online consultations from abroad.

As I said earlier, the Government will continue to remain neutral on the substantive policy questions relevant to how the law in this area could be changed. That is, as I have made clear, a matter for the Committee and for Parliament as a whole. However, I hope that these observations are helpful to Members in considering the Bill and the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley.

Amendment 178 agreed to.

Sarah Olney Portrait Sarah Olney (Richmond Park) (LD)
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I beg to move amendment 34, in clause 1, page 1, line 4, leave out “capacity” and insert “ability”.

This replaces the concept of capacity based on the Mental Capacity Act and replaces it with a new concept of ability which is defined in NC1.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Ninth sitting)

Debate between Stephen Kinnock and Sarah Olney
Tuesday 11th February 2025

(1 year, 6 months ago)

Public Bill Committees
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Stephen Kinnock Portrait Stephen Kinnock
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The Government choose when to bring forward an impact assessment based on the passage of the Bill through the House. We have had reports today about a very substantial amendment to clause 12 that may well be brought forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, for example. It is not possible for the Government to conduct and publish an impact assessment when quite significant changes are being made.

I also gently point out to the hon. Member for East Wiltshire that this is not a Government Bill; it is a private Member’s Bill. It is also worth noting that it is unprecedented, as far as I know, to have oral evidence sessions for a private Member’s Bill, so we are already on relatively uncharted territory. It is also relatively uncharted territory to have, on a Bill Committee, Ministers who are neutral because the position of the Government is neutral. But that reflects the fact that this is indeed uncharted territory, so that is where we stand.

The hon. Gentleman made a point about our own positions on the subject; I speak also for the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Finchley and Golders Green. It is a matter of public record that I supported the Bill on Second Reading. It is also the case that we vote, as members of the Committee, on the basis of our conscience because this is a matter of conscience; that is why the Government are neutral on it. There is no whipping from the usual channels.

At the same time, we are articulating the position of the Government. The hon. Member for East Wiltshire asked how we come to that position. It is through the usual process of engaging with officials and experts in the field, and through taking into account all the considerations that the Government need to take into account for the operationalisation of the Bill. The Government then come to a view, and that is the view that I express when I am on the Committee.

Sarah Olney Portrait Sarah Olney (Richmond Park) (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The Minister says that the Government have made their own choice about when to do the impact assessment on the Bill. Does he not accept that it would have made sense to have done it before the Committee stage? Then, any evidence that the assessment threw up could have given rise to amendments tabled during the Committee stage—that would have made it an appropriate time to have done the impact assessment. The impact assessment could then always have been updated depending on how the Bill was then amended during Committee.

Stephen Kinnock Portrait Stephen Kinnock
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The hon. Member makes an interesting point. I simply reiterate that this is a very dynamic Bill Committee; I believe that 362 amendments have been tabled. Given the Government’s focus on establishing the Bill’s implementability, the coherence of the statute, the legal dimensions and the complexity of what we are dealing with, we took the position that it was better to wait for the Bill to clear Committee stage before producing an impact assessment. To do otherwise could have involved a large amount of second-guessing based on radical changes that might well have come out of the Bill Committee. I reiterate the logic of that sequencing.

On the point about the established legal framework, which clinicians have been applying since 2007, “capacity” would still be used for other decisions about care and treatment.

I turn to amendment 202, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley on the advice of the Government. It ensures that the assessment of “capacity” is utilised by the assessing doctor, and corrects a typographical error in clause 9 to ensure that an assessment of capacity will apply consistently throughout the Bill. As I said earlier, how and whether the law on assisted dying should change is a matter for this Committee and for Parliament as a whole. However, I hope that these observations are helpful to the Committee when considering potential changes put forward.

--- Later in debate ---
Stephen Kinnock Portrait Stephen Kinnock
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I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. My understanding is that it is termed as a treatment under the law. The Government do not take a view on the semantics of the word; my understanding is that that is how it is classified under the law.

Sarah Olney Portrait Sarah Olney
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It is really important that we establish whether this will be defined as a treatment or indeed as something quite distinct in law. My understanding is that the word “treatment” should never apply to assisted dying. I would be grateful for the Minister’s clarification.

Stephen Kinnock Portrait Stephen Kinnock
- Hansard - -

I apologise; I think I misunderstood the intervention of my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West, so my comments were not clear. I meant the treatment of this matter under the law. As I said, the justification test requires that the treatment in question is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. That means the way in which the matter is treated under the law. That is what I meant; I think we got our wires crossed.

Finally, let me address amendments 356, 357 and 358, whose purpose is to exclude those who are homeless within the meaning of section 175 of the Housing Act 1996 from the definition of a “terminally ill person”. The effect of amendment 356 would be to amend the definition of a “terminally ill person”, as set out in clause 1 of the Bill, to expressly exclude a person who, notwithstanding that they met all the other requirements set out in paragraphs (a) to (d) of subsection (1), was homeless within the meaning of section 175 of the Housing Act 1996.

Amendments 357 and 358 seek to make consequential amendments to clause 7 on the first doctor’s assessment and clause 12 on court approval. These amendments would require the co-ordinating doctor and the court to be satisfied that, in their opinion, the person was not homeless within the meaning of section 175 of the Housing Act 1996 before making their statement or declaration to allow the person to proceed to the next stage of the assisted dying process.

Article 14 states that the rights set out in the ECHR should be secured for everyone without discrimination on any ground. This amendment engages article 8 on the right to respect for private and family life. Making those who are homeless ineligible for assisted dying would lead to a difference in treatment that will need to be objectively and reasonably justified. The justification test requires that the treatment in question is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.

I hope these observations may be helpful to Members in considering these amendments and making a determination about who should be eligible for accessing assisted dying services, should the Bill pass.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Ninth sitting)

Debate between Stephen Kinnock and Sarah Olney
Stephen Kinnock Portrait Stephen Kinnock
- Hansard - -

The Government choose when to bring forward an impact assessment based on the passage of the Bill through the House. We have had reports today about a very substantial amendment to clause 12 that may well be brought forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, for example. It is not possible for the Government to conduct and publish an impact assessment when quite significant changes are being made.

I also gently point out to the hon. Member for East Wiltshire that this is not a Government Bill; it is a private Member’s Bill. It is also worth noting that it is unprecedented, as far as I know, to have oral evidence sessions for a private Member’s Bill, so we are already on relatively uncharted territory. It is also relatively uncharted territory to have, on a Bill Committee, Ministers who are neutral because the position of the Government is neutral. But that reflects the fact that this is indeed uncharted territory, so that is where we stand.

The hon. Gentleman made a point about our own positions on the subject; I speak also for the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Finchley and Golders Green. It is a matter of public record that I supported the Bill on Second Reading. It is also the case that we vote, as members of the Committee, on the basis of our conscience because this is a matter of conscience; that is why the Government are neutral on it. There is no whipping from the usual channels.

At the same time, we are articulating the position of the Government. The hon. Member for East Wiltshire asked how we come to that position. It is through the usual process of engaging with officials and experts in the field, and through taking into account all the considerations that the Government need to take into account for the operationalisation of the Bill. The Government then come to a view, and that is the view that I express when I am on the Committee.

Sarah Olney Portrait Sarah Olney (Richmond Park) (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The Minister says that the Government have made their own choice about when to do the impact assessment on the Bill. Does he not accept that it would have made sense to have done it before the Committee stage? Then, any evidence that the assessment threw up could have given rise to amendments tabled during the Committee stage—that would have made it an appropriate time to have done the impact assessment. The impact assessment could then always have been updated depending on how the Bill was then amended during Committee.

Stephen Kinnock Portrait Stephen Kinnock
- Hansard - -

The hon. Member makes an interesting point. I simply reiterate that this is a very dynamic Bill Committee; I believe that 362 amendments have been tabled. Given the Government’s focus on establishing the Bill’s implementability, the coherence of the statute, the legal dimensions and the complexity of what we are dealing with, we took the position that it was better to wait for the Bill to clear Committee stage before producing an impact assessment. To do otherwise could have involved a large amount of second-guessing based on radical changes that might well have come out of the Bill Committee. I reiterate the logic of that sequencing.

On the point about the established legal framework, which clinicians have been applying since 2007, “capacity” would still be used for other decisions about care and treatment.

I turn to amendment 202, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley on the advice of the Government. It ensures that the assessment of “capacity” is utilised by the assessing doctor, and corrects a typographical error in clause 9 to ensure that an assessment of capacity will apply consistently throughout the Bill. As I said earlier, how and whether the law on assisted dying should change is a matter for this Committee and for Parliament as a whole. However, I hope that these observations are helpful to the Committee when considering potential changes put forward.

--- Later in debate ---
Stephen Kinnock Portrait Stephen Kinnock
- Hansard - -

I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. My understanding is that it is termed as a treatment under the law. The Government do not take a view on the semantics of the word; my understanding is that that is how it is classified under the law.

Sarah Olney Portrait Sarah Olney
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

It is really important that we establish whether this will be defined as a treatment or indeed as something quite distinct in law. My understanding is that the word “treatment” should never apply to assisted dying. I would be grateful for the Minister’s clarification.

Stephen Kinnock Portrait Stephen Kinnock
- Hansard - -

I apologise; I think I misunderstood the intervention of my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West, so my comments were not clear. I meant the treatment of this matter under the law. As I said, the justification test requires that the treatment in question is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. That means the way in which the matter is treated under the law. That is what I meant; I think we got our wires crossed.

Finally, let me address amendments 356, 357 and 358, whose purpose is to exclude those who are homeless within the meaning of section 175 of the Housing Act 1996 from the definition of a “terminally ill person”. The effect of amendment 356 would be to amend the definition of a “terminally ill person”, as set out in clause 1 of the Bill, to expressly exclude a person who, notwithstanding that they met all the other requirements set out in paragraphs (a) to (d) of subsection (1), was homeless within the meaning of section 175 of the Housing Act 1996.

Amendments 357 and 358 seek to make consequential amendments to clause 7 on the first doctor’s assessment and clause 12 on court approval. These amendments would require the co-ordinating doctor and the court to be satisfied that, in their opinion, the person was not homeless within the meaning of section 175 of the Housing Act 1996 before making their statement or declaration to allow the person to proceed to the next stage of the assisted dying process.

Article 14 states that the rights set out in the ECHR should be secured for everyone without discrimination on any ground. This amendment engages article 8 on the right to respect for private and family life. Making those who are homeless ineligible for assisted dying would lead to a difference in treatment that will need to be objectively and reasonably justified. The justification test requires that the treatment in question is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.

I hope these observations may be helpful to Members in considering these amendments and making a determination about who should be eligible for accessing assisted dying services, should the Bill pass.