Educating Engineers
Debate between Stephen Mosley and Andrew Miller(10 years, 12 months ago)
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Andrew Miller (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)
It is the first time I have served under your chairmanship, Mr Walker, so I welcome the opportunity to do so by addressing the Chamber on the Select Committee on Science and Technology’s report, “Educating tomorrow’s engineers: the impact of Government reforms on 14–19 education”. The Committee produced the report unanimously back in February. We dealt with the impacts of the English baccalaureate, university technical colleges and changes to the engineering diploma. I will also comment on the Government’s response to our report, and as we are in education mode, I will be generous and offer the Minister seven out of 10 for that response. It is a good score—I never got those sorts of marks in my classes.
Engineering is crucial to the economy. It has been estimated that the engineering work force produces a fifth of our GDP and half of UK exports. In 2010, the sector generated 25% of UK turnover—that is three times the size of the financial services sector. It is not just the economy that benefits from engineering; we also need to look at health care, energy, transport, construction, defence and many other sectors.
Despite engineering’s importance, the UK is facing a shortfall in the numbers and quality of engineers. About 820,000 science, engineering and technology professionals will be required by 2020, with 80% of those required in engineering. The engineering work force is ageing, and we will need around 82,000 engineers and technicians just to deal with the requirements up to 2016. That demand will not just be met by university graduates; we only produce 23,000 engineering graduates a year, and not all of them stay in engineering. The loss is a particular concern when it comes to women. Only 12% of engineering students in higher education are women, and it gets worse.
Stephen Mosley (City of Chester) (Con)
One of the most inspiring sessions that we did during the Committee’s inquiry involved three young ladies who came to speak to us. There was Kirsty, who is currently an apprentice at National Grid, Georgie, who was studying her A-levels, and Georgia, who was doing her GCSEs. They told us that a couple of things that were very important in getting ladies into engineering were having role models and having experience of engineering. Will the hon. Gentleman give us his thoughts on that?
Andrew Miller
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. National Grid, in its briefing notes for the debate, quotes Kirsty, who said:
“I decided to do an apprenticeship as I could get qualifications and learn a trade at the same time; to do a job that means something; to be able to go into work in the morning and leave knowing I have made a difference to something.”
That young woman was an inspiring witness, as was a young lady from Novartis who spoke to the Cogent awards last year. She explained how she did a higher apprenticeship and was able to say cheerfully, at the end of it, that not only is she ahead of her peer group for her age, but she has a degree, and what is more, she does not have a student debt. She has done rather well. The hon. Gentleman is spot on in terms of the importance of women.
In the Queen’s Speech debate, I spoke about the importance of breaking the artificial barrier between vocational and academic qualifications. In the eyes of far too many people, there is a brick wall between vocational and academic. It is a continuum, and we need to support that continuum’s development.
Andrew Miller
My hon. Friend will find some very talented students, inspiring teachers and fantastic equipment. It is worth examining whether we can develop that in other UTCs.
Stephen Mosley
As a Committee, we were really impressed by the UTCs, the students and the head teachers; we thought that they were a fantastic idea and that they should be rolled out. However, we had a little concern that that must not be at the expense of teaching science and engineering in mainstream schools. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman could touch on that.
Andrew Miller
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. The Government must focus on good engineering education in all schools and colleges, and not just silo it in a few specialist institutions. That is hugely important, and it is one of the issues we all need to consider in relation to the success of UTCs. We must not silo them, but integrate them as part of the mainstream offer; indeed, in some towns and cities, we must look at how schools can collaborate to make possible a wider spread of engineering skills among students. That is an important point.
We have just heard about the Education Committee’s inquiry into careers guidance. Its report set out in detail the importance of face-to-face careers advice for young people and recommended that
“the Department for Education introduces into the statutory guidance a requirement for schools to publish an annual careers plan, to include information on the support and resources available to its pupils in planning their career development.”
We looked at careers advice from the engineering perspective, and we concluded that the duty on schools to provide access to impartial, independent advice was laudable.
In principle, we support greater autonomy for schools to provide careers advice. However, the duty poses problems in practice. First, there are resource implications for schools, which are given more responsibility but no additional budget to secure careers guidance. Secondly, there is little guidance on the quality of careers guidance that should be available to students. That partly comes back to the fact that there is insufficient time in the school day for teachers to have the continuous professional development training that would enable them to be on top of what is happening in the economy and in the area surrounding the school. There is a gap, and successive Governments have tried to wrestle with the problem, but we must address it.
The quality of careers guidance can go up only if those giving it have at least some understanding of what being an engineer means. An interesting discovery that we made in research for another Committee report, entitled “Bridging the valley of death”, on the economics of developing small high-tech businesses, was that Lloyds Bank had found time to send some managers on engineering training courses. If a busy commercial bank can do it, it is not beyond the wit of Ministers to develop a similar scheme that would work for teachers, to try to help them to understand a bit more about the jobs available in the communities where they teach.
Stephen Mosley
The hon. Gentleman has not yet touched on the value of experience in getting people interested in engineering. One witness went to a lecture on the Bloodhound supersonic car. That young lady said that for her it was a turning point: she had to study engineering, build cars and race them across the world. Opportunities for people to get experience in engineering are hugely important, whether they happen through work experience or education field trips. Does the hon. Gentleman have any thoughts on that?
Medical Implants (EU and UK)
Debate between Stephen Mosley and Andrew Miller(11 years, 2 months ago)
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Andrew Miller (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to speak to the Select Committee’s report today. I start by paying tribute to my fellow members of the Select Committee on Science and Technology who work extremely hard on very technical matters such as this one. I particularly want to pass on our thanks to staff of the House, such as Committee Clerks and specialists, who have done such a wonderful job supporting the Committee in this Parliament.
I would like to focus on the health issues considered in our report on the regulation of medical implants in the EU and UK, which was published in October last year. It was prompted partly by the scandal over PIP breast implants and the less publicised but equally concerning problem with metal-on-metal hip implants. In addition, the European Commission has drafted proposals to revise the medical devices directive, and we hope not just to influence but to assist the Government in developing a strong negotiating position on that directive.
Under the directive, a medical device is used in health care for diagnosing, preventing, monitoring or treating illness or disability. The definition does not include medicines, which have their own regulatory structure. Nevertheless, medical device regulations cover a wide range of products, from pacemakers to spectacles. Devices are classified according to the risk that they pose to patients. A device such as a stethoscope or a dental filling is a class I or a class II, while medical implants are always class IIb or class III. The classification determines how much assessment is required.
Medical implants must be verified by a notified body before they can be placed on the market. Notified bodies are overseen by a competent authority in each member state. I use the word “competent” loosely, because there are some questions about that. In the United Kingdom, the competent authority is the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency, which oversees six notified bodies. They are private organisations which assess high-risk devices and ensure that an implant complies with the essential requirements specified by the directives—the main one, of course, being the medical devices directive.
When an implant has been given the stamp of approval, the manufacturer places the CE mark on the device, and is free to put it on the market in all European countries without further controls. I should emphasise that point, because it shows how crucial it is to get the pre-market approval process right. Once the implant has been approved by one notified body in one EU country, it can go on the market anywhere in the EU. Manufacturers can approach a notified body in any member state to get approval; what is more, if a manufacturer has previously approached a regulator who has said “That device is not up to scratch”, and then approaches another and gets approval, the first part of the information is, ridiculously, regarded as commercial in confidence. That must clearly be changed.
There are more than 70 such notified bodies in Europe. I am pleased to say that the Committee heard no evidence criticising those in the United Kingdom, but we did hear concern expressed about the possibility that those in other countries might not apply the same high standards. Such differences are open to exploitation, as a manufacturer can choose to approach a notified body that is more likely to provide approval, a practice that is sometimes described as forum shopping. There is a real lack of transparency, and we simply do not know how widespread the problem is.
A useful insight was provided on 24 October last year by The Daily Telegraph and the British Medical Journal. Notified bodies were approached to approve a metal-on-metal hip implant that was known to be faulty. Shockingly, bodies in Slovakia and the Czech Republic were prepared to approve it. Many Members will remember the names of the authors of the article in The Daily Telegraph, because they have previously been involved in stings affecting Members of Parliament, but on this occasion they did an extraordinarily important job. I have gone on record as giving credit to those journalists for uncovering what I think was a trail of deception. I hope that, in his negotiating stance, the Minister will ensure that we have a mechanism that avoids that kind of risk in the future, and I intend shortly to illustrate to him a way in which procurement can be developed to avoid it.
I am pleased that the Commission has recognised the need to improve the scrutiny of notified bodies. For example, it has been proposed that manufacturers should be unable to apply to more than one notified body at a time. Our report made a number of recommendations about notified bodies, chiefly calling for a record of all approaches by manufacturers and supporting the Commission’s proposals to use teams of experts from member states to oversee the designation of notified bodies.
These notified bodies also audit manufacturers, and that includes an assessment of their facilities. In the PIP implants story, it was the inspection of the manufacturer’s facility that led to the discovery that an unapproved implant filler was being used. Although the PIP scandal was a case of deliberate fraud, not of the failure of the regulatory system, it demonstrated the importance of inspections and audits. We were therefore supportive of the Commission’s proposals to enforce unannounced audits of manufacturers and we further recommended that audits should take place at least annually.
Another key flaw in the current system is the overuse of equivalence data in approving implants. We now come to the key difference between medicines and medical devices. Every new human medicine has to go through rigorous clinical trials to test for efficacy and safety, but medical devices do not. The clinical data that the manufacturer must provide can come from clinical investigations of that particular device or from equivalence data, which are clinical data on another device that is similar. That may sound reasonable, and in most cases it probably is reasonable, but the problem is that even a small change to the design or material of a device can radically change how it behaves in the body. Also, if we keep approving devices on the basis of equivalence but with a small change each time, we will end up approving devices that are very different from those originally envisaged.
It is not practical to demand a clinical investigation of each and every device, as there are hundreds of thousands of devices in the EU, and doing so would not necessarily pick up the problems of wear and tear that happen over a long period of time or take account of how patients interact with their implants, but we were unimpressed by the extent to which reliance on equivalence data appeared to be acceptable for high-risk devices such as implants. We concluded that revisions of the directive should draw a clear distinction between where equivalence data are and are not acceptable.
Before moving to the second half of the regulatory system, which is the post-market surveillance, I want to make a point about the transparency of clinical data. Very little information about a device is public. Clinical data are generally not published, which makes clinical decision-making and informing patients difficult. I think we would all agree that patients have a right to know what is being put inside them and the associated risks. The Commission proposed to make manufacturers of high-risk devices publish summaries of safety and performance with key pieces of clinical data. We did not think that went far enough and called for all clinical data to be made available for both new implants and those already on the market. Similar transparency issues are being explored in our current inquiry on clinical trials, which starts very soon.
I said I would offer the Minister a practical solution to address the challenges of what is a very complex regulatory structure. We need to ensure that both doctors and patients have the fullest possible information about any product that is being used and inserted in a person as a medical device. It seems to me that the answer lies very much with the Minister. I had this discussion when some of his support team came to see me recently with Sir Bruce Keogh, who is doing the work on some of the medical implant devices, particularly those relating to cosmetic use. It strikes me that there is an obvious way forward, and it is a way in which other countries operate European procurement rules. Whoever sets out the procurement process—in whichever trust or at whichever level in the NHS—should simply make a requirement that anyone bidding for the contract must provide the fullest and most transparent data about the trials that have been conducted, the design of the product and the regulatory processes it has gone through, including the ones where there has been a failure. That is a perfectly reasonable regulatory requirement for the Minister to impose on anyone seeking to sell products that are to be used in the NHS.
Stephen Mosley (City of Chester) (Con)
It is worth saying that the Committee also saw the importance of ensuring that negative data are released and made available. We often find that similar products are available and if something is failing in one product, there will often be a similar problem in another product. If we do not produce those negative data to show where problems are with some products, we may miss problems with other medical implants.
Andrew Miller
The hon. Gentleman, who works hard on the Select Committee, is absolutely right in what he says. I stress to the Minister that not only was this report unanimously endorsed by the Committee members, but we were angry at the lack of available information. That was no fault of the Minister or his predecessors; it resulted from a system that had grown, as the use of implants had grown, into a mechanism that was not fit for purpose. The Minister is rightly participating in the process of revising the directive, but some urgent requirements mean that he has to take a proactive approach and encourage—indeed, instruct, if he has that power—procurement offices of the NHS to set a new standard. They should simply require anyone tendering for a product in this category to provide, as part of the tendering process, totally transparent information about the process and the regulatory regime it has gone through.
Andrew Miller
The hon. Lady, another hard-working member of the Committee, is absolutely right and that could take us on to a much more complex debate about how we move from where we are in today’s medicine to future developments in stratified medicine and so on. The way in which our medical profession works in such a strong collegiate manner helps to maintain standards at the highest level. Lessons can be learned in that regard that underline the importance of the NHS as the lead body in this area.
Post-market surveillance is a crucial element of the regulatory system and is technically the responsibility of the manufacturers. However, the notified bodies also have some oversight through auditing. The Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency investigates adverse incidents once they have been reported. Again, we called for greater transparency by recommending that manufacturers publish the results of post-market surveillance studies. We proposed that a system such as the MHRA’s black triangle system, which flags up new medicines approved on limited clinical data, should be adopted for devices approved on equivalence alone. We found some evidence that clinicians under-report adverse incidents, so we wanted the Government to consider making reporting mandatory.
One place to keep post-market data is a registry. The National Joint Registry for England and Wales—meaning joints in the body, not joint between England and Wales—is a success story. It collects data on all joint replacements in the NHS and the private sector and is the biggest such register in the world. The NJR provided data on the DePuy metal-on-metal hip implant, which was then recalled worldwide in 2010.
Registries do not always succeed. Between 1996 and 2003, we had the national breast implant registry, but that failed, partly because of the unwillingness of patients to give follow-up information. Nevertheless, our colleagues on the Health Committee called for Sir Bruce Keogh to pursue the creation of a register of breast implants in his review of PIP implants. I hope that the Government will put in place measures to ensure that any new registry learns lessons from the NJR’s successes.
I recently went through a minor medical procedure and was asked to provide data as part of a broader clinical dataset and to allow them to be used. The form started off by saying how to opt out of providing that data, rather than explaining to me as the patient why it was beneficial for those data to be collected. When such registers are produced, I hope that the Minister will agree that the starting point should be that the authorisation form should not start with the negative procedure of how to opt out but start with positive information about why such data are beneficial to the individual and to society more broadly.
Stephen Mosley
The NJR is a fantastic resource that is very well used, but it might be worth while pointing out that problems with metal hips were first detected in Australia in 2007 because there is a registry there that allowed them to be noticed. The metal hips were withdrawn in Australia in 2009, but it took until 2010 for the problems to be noticed by the British registry and they were withdrawn in the UK. Although it can be a good system, it is not perfect and it needs people to monitor it and ensure that any problems are picked up.
Andrew Miller
You will be pleased to know, Mr Deputy Speaker, that the hon. Gentleman has just taken the next paragraph out of my speech. He is absolutely right, but the interesting point is that the Government told us that the Australian regulator did not communicate its data to the MHRA or other international regulators and the MHRA first learned of safety concerns in April 2010. Although it is not necessarily the MHRA’s job to keep an eye on adverse incidents worldwide, we must remember that over those two or three years many risky implants were put into patients, with some devastating consequences. The hon. Gentleman’s observation is spot on.
The European Commission and the UK Government must seek to improve the speed of reaction to incidents such as the two adverse ones that were picked up outside the EU and I will be interested to hear the Minister’s suggestions about how that can be achieved. I believe there is general agreement between the Committee and the Government on the broad principles of the system and what needs to be changed. I hope hon. Members will agree that our inquiry shed some light on important issues affecting UK patient safety.
In conclusion, I will sum up our inquiry on the regulation of medical implants in the EU and the UK as a call for two things: better use of evidence in implant approvals and more transparency throughout the system. I hope we can find a way forward.
Stephen Mosley
The hon. Gentleman has gone through almost the entire checklist of points that I wanted to make. However, one aspect that he has not covered yet is self-reporting by patients. We heard examples in Committee and we suggested that it would be good practice if patients self-reported, which might allow problems to be picked up earlier than they are through the formal channels. Does the hon. Gentleman have any comments on self-reporting?
Andrew Miller
I have some ideas about how that can be developed. That angle, although not central to the inquiry, is important for the development of a registry. I gave an example of people being invited to opt out of a registry before anything else is put to them. What needs to be explained to them are the health benefits of working in a more collegiate way and sharing data, and they should be encouraged both for their personal health and for broader societal benefit to self-report. That is a hugely important area that we need to develop through better engagement between clinician and patient at the point when the procedure is about to start.
This is a complex subject and I do not envy the Minister his task in negotiating on it. Unfortunately, some regulators have demonstrably not maintained the standards that occur in most of the 27 countries, but in the interests of patient safety and the advancement of medical science it is vital that we work together and solve the problems that the report has highlighted.
Scientific Advice (Emergencies)
Debate between Stephen Mosley and Andrew Miller(12 years, 7 months ago)
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Andrew Miller (Ellesmere Port and Neston) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve for the first time under your chairmanship, Sir Alan, and to be opening the first debate that the Select Committee on Science and Technology has held in Westminster Hall during this Parliament. The occasion is tinged with regret, shared by all Committee members, because it is the last time we will have with us our excellent Clerk, Glenn McKee, who has served the Committee brilliantly. We wish him well in his new career. I think it is a punishment that he has been sent to the Select Committee on Communities and Local Government, but that is another matter.
This is a particularly important report. It was published in March 2011 and it looks at the Government’s use of science in emergency preparation and response at a national level. We built on two of our predecessor Committee’s reports—one written in 2006 entitled “Scientific Advice, Risk and Evidence Based Policy Making”, and one entitled “Putting Science and Engineering at the Heart of Government Policy,” which was published in 2009. This is a complex area and we tried to consider four different case studies: looking backwards over two events that have occurred, looking forwards at one event that is certainly going to occur, and looking at an event that has a potentially high impact but low probability. I will cover those events during my contribution.
In the first case, we looked at the 2009-10 H1N1 flu pandemic, otherwise known as swine flu. In the second case, we looked at volcanic ash and the disruptions that occurred to our air space last April. Looking forward, we considered the potential for cyber-attacks, which are a very real threat. The event that has potentially high impact but low probability is the occurrence of solar flares, which are caused by adverse space weather and have the potential to disrupt electrical systems. Again, I will cover some of that later.
Hon. Members might wonder why we chose those four case studies. Obviously, the first two—swine flu and volcanic ash—were the most recent emergencies that the UK had experienced and were very high-profile events, both here and abroad. In addition, both events relied heavily on science and engineering to provide answers to very important questions—for example, who should be vaccinated against swine flu or how much volcanic ash an aircraft can fly through safely.
We then chose the other two risks that could lead to an emergency in the UK. People are obviously more familiar with cyber-attacks than with the space weather event. Fortunately, we have not encountered either on an emergency scale. However, the name of the game is to be prepared; we wanted to see whether the Government were prepared and what they were doing to be ready for potential events.
I would like to make a couple of personal observations. I welcome the degree of co-operation that we had from Government officials, particularly those from the Cabinet Office, the lead Department. I have been involved with issues to do with information assurance and the cyber security world for a number of years, so I found it very refreshing that there was an acceptance that such matters had to be dealt with on a much more collegiate basis than was historically the case.
These things do not just belong to Cheltenham and the dark arts down there; there are serious issues and we must engage every citizen in looking after their personal data and their security. A cyber-attack could clearly be targeted at something such as a bank or a utility, which could have a serious impact on the nation state. We are not talking about a traditional warfare target, but such an attack could nevertheless be very effective.
It is clear to me that the Government take planning for emergencies seriously and recognise the need to draw in scientific advice. However, it is never safe to say that there is no scope for improvement. Our inquiry identified some weaknesses that we regarded as serious. I will start at the beginning of the emergency planning process: the national risk assessment. That is a comprehensive and, in some parts, classified assessment of the most significant emergencies that the UK could face over the next five years. Its counterpart is the national risk register, which is the unclassified bit that gets into the public domain.
There are broadly three stages to the risk assessment: the identification of hazards, the assessment of risk, and risk comparison. If I were a fly on the wall in some Departments, I imagine that I could hear some very interesting discussions about what is scientifically plausible and what ought to go into the realms of science fiction. As Chair of the Select Committee, I get all sorts of letters from people who postulate things that do not quite add up to the laws of physics as I understand them, so I guess that the Government face the same problems.
For every risk that makes it on to the national risk assessment—whether we are talking about attacks on the infrastructure or pandemic disease—the Government produce a reasonable worst-case scenario, which is a prediction of the worst that might realistically happen, rather than a prediction of what will happen. Unsurprisingly, that is a difficult concept to convey to the public and the media.
The House must take seriously its responsibility to communicate issues of risk to the public and should work with communities to help to improve public understanding of what risks really are. Certainly, some of the red tops are not exactly famed for being proportionate and level headed in these circumstances—indeed, some of the broadsheets are not immune to criticism about being sensationalist when it comes to reporting risk. My first plea, to the broader community, the science community and journalists, is for there to be an improved and responsible way of communicating what risks actually are.
I will give an example of where the worst-case scenario can fall down. During the flu pandemic in 2009, the Department of Health held a press briefing. The media immediately reported the worst-case scenario—that there could be up to 65,000 deaths in the UK. At that time there had been 30 deaths, and at the end of the pandemic the total number was just over 450. That was a terrible tragedy for anyone involved, but the irresponsible communication of information by some journalists had the potential to cause panic. The result was a sense that things had been exaggerated by the Government.
No Minister, and no one else in a responsible position, could have withheld the 65,000 figure. The then Secretary of State for Health, my right hon. Friend the Member for Leigh (Andy Burnham), was provided with the data; he could not have withheld that information from the public, but we must ask ourselves whether there was a better way of communicating it. Focusing on the most likely scenarios might give us a better way of doing that. Yes, a Minister must say, “These are the extremes”, but we need to persuade reporters of the most likely scenario rather than the extreme possibilities.
It was not just the communication of the reasonable worst-case scenario that was the problem. The reasonable worst case was a 2% fatality rate, which meant that 2% of those infected would die. That was based on evidence from the 1918 Spanish pandemic. However, avian flu—bird flu—has an alarmingly higher fatality rate. We heard that it was simply not possible for the NHS to plan for such a scenario, so 2% was used. Our Science and Technology Committee was greatly concerned that the reasonable worst case was based not on the best available evidence, but on the need to determine how much to spend on planning.
I am pleased that the Government agreed that more could be done and that a review is under way to consider the reasonable worst-case concept. I hope that the Minister will tell us when we can expect the conclusions of the review and how the Government plan to try to develop the concept so that it becomes an accepted way of working aimed at reducing panic and concern when such events occur, as they inevitably will.
On the national risk assessment, we were disappointed to discover that the Government chief scientific adviser, Professor Sir John Beddington, had not been directly involved with the NRA, and had not had much involvement with the horizon scanning activities building up to it. We found that surprising; it appeared that the guy appointed to co-ordinate the best available science policy for the Government was not being brought in at the early stage of such an important field of activity. Of course, the co-ordination involves every scientific discipline; it is not just pure science. It involves statistics, engineering, behavioural science and a whole range of other issues. Science should be central to identifying, assessing and comparing risks.
Risk assessment must be informed by many sources of scientific advice, but clearly the Government’s own chief scientist should be part of the process at a high level. We came down quite strongly on this matter and proposed ways of increasing his involvement with the Cabinet Office and, specifically, the NRA. We have had partial success in getting our recommendations accepted by the Government.
As I said, the NRA is classified and not available to the public, so we ourselves cannot see how well science is being used. That was one factor influencing our recommendation that an independent scientific advisory committee on risk assessment should be set up to review the NRA. That would make Parliament and the public more confident that the process is as evidence-based as possible. At our follow-up evidence session in June, we heard from the Government that there will indeed be such a committee. I will be interested to hear from the Minister what progress has been made in forming that committee.
Risk assessment is the foundation underpinning a good emergency response. What happens when that foundation is missing was unfortunately demonstrated by the 2010 volcanic ash emergency; that took the Government by surprise, because it had not been considered a likely emergency and therefore little or no preparation had been done. It was not part of the NRA, and in fact the risk of disruption to aviation from natural hazards was removed from the NRA in 2009.
I have not been able to find anyone who admits to taking responsibility for that, but just a year later there was quite a serious emergency. That will tie back into some of the things I will be saying later about the need for greater transparency. Having spoken to a lot of earth scientists with expertise in the Icelandic area, I am certain that they would have been knocking at the Minister’s door as soon as they saw that such events were taken off the register. Within the earth science community, it has been an accepted fact that there was the potential risk of massive explosions in that area.
Once such information was in the public domain, I would have expected the Civil Aviation Authority to tie it together and come up with some conclusions and advice for the Cabinet Office. However, something went wrong. I do not suppose that I have to ask the question; I bet the Minister will not be leaving the issue off the NRA again. I suspect it will be there in the next published register later this year.
As a consequence of the lack of planning, airspace over the whole of the UK and many parts of Europe remained closed for a whole week while engineers figured out what was acceptable and what ash concentrations were safe for planes to fly through. At the time, the only available guidance was to avoid the ash: “If it is visible, do not fly through it”—hardly scientific and hardly a comforting policy for people sitting nervously in planes. It was a very expensive mess that cost airlines millions of pounds and stranded Britons all over the place all over the world.
When we were again disrupted by another unpronounceable Icelandic volcano in May, more specific guidance and protocols were in place to deal with it. That was a testament to the work of the CAA, which led to work within Europe to update the requirements for operating in and around volcanic ash.
Before I turn to how the Government respond to emergencies, I want to touch briefly on the issue of space weather. Changes in the sun’s atmosphere affect the space environment near to Earth. Events could involve injections of plasma—particles of radiation from the sun. Solar activity changes according to a cycle of approximately 11 years. Many scientists believe that we will have a solar maximum next year, coinciding with the Olympics. There is long probability, but there would be high impact if something went pear-shaped. If a small event occurs, taking out a few transformers and, just as the starter’s gun for the 100 metres is being fired, no transmissions occur from any broadcaster in the UK, we would be somewhat embarrassed. That is clearly a long probability event, but one of enormous political and economic significance. We cannot simply ignore these events.
One problem is that when one looks back at the history of similar events, comparisons are a little difficult because we have become so much more reliant on electrical gadgets and devices. I do not suppose there is anyone in the Chamber who does not have a mobile phone with them, and nobody in the Chamber who is not entirely reliant on electronic technologies. In 1989, an event caused Quebec to lose its power grid for approximately nine hours. That was a serious event, and one that could easily happen again.
The earliest well-documented event took place in 1859, recorded as the Carrington event, when telegraph systems were taken out. It disrupted systems all around the world, and that was before we became so reliant on electricity-based technologies. We do not really know what the effects of another Carrington event would be on, for example, the national grid, satellites, the global positioning system, computer chips or avionics. It is reasonably well known that some satellite technologies are built to higher standards now. I suspect that most of the military technologies that I have looked at have the capacity to be taken out of harm’s way, or are sufficiently well shielded, but an awful lot of infrastructure is not.
The Committee’s interest in space weather coincided with work that the Government were doing. Sir John Beddington had started work almost at the same time. Our inquiry kept being told that this was work in progress and that we should expect space weather to appear on the 2011 national risk assessment register. I would be grateful if the Minister could tell us whether that has happened.
No matter how good an assessment is, we cannot prevent some emergencies from occurring. In any emergency that requires scientific input, a scientific advisory group in emergencies is set up—its acronym is, appropriately, SAGE—to advise Government and Cobra, central Government’s crisis management committee. SAGE should be the funnel for scientific advice from all sources—I stress all sources. The membership of each SAGE committee will vary according to the emergency, but most members will be scientists. The Committee felt that improvements could be made in the pre-identification of possible SAGE members, at least for every risk that is on the current risk register. We felt that that could save valuable time in bringing the right people together should an event occur. Indeed, that recommendation was accepted by the Government.
SAGE is a relatively new mechanism. With every emergency for which a SAGE committee was set up, lessons have been learned and improvements made. Things are moving in the right direction. It was disappointing to find, at the start of our inquiry, that information on the SAGE committees for swine flu and volcanic ash was more or less hidden from public view. That does not help us learn lessons. We have to be totally transparent, returning to the points I made earlier. It is also quite odd, when you consider the importance of communication and openness in an emergency, that SAGE committees have not worked in an open manner.
We found other problems. The independence of SAGE from Government was ambiguous. Scientific advisory committees really should be independent of Government to ensure that their advice is impartial. We also heard concerns from some scientists who were members of SAGE committees. They felt unable to talk to the media, thus depriving the media access to the real experts. There are problems in communicating some of these issues, and some experts are very good at communicating risk to the public. All in all, the Committee was pretty unclear about the rules governing SAGE. Our recommendations can be summed up in two points: be more transparent; and publish guidance on how SAGE should operate and stick to it. That way we will know what to expect. We were told that guidance would be produced this summer; the Minister might like to update us on progress. Putting those concerns aside, overall SAGEs have been a useful mechanism for getting scientific advice to Government quickly. Adjustments need to be made, but we were not calling for a major rethink. Sometimes a subtly different approach is needed for different events.
Nine days after our report was published, a massive earthquake and tsunami hit the north coast of Japan, causing massive loss of life and severe damage to infrastructure. Japan will be dealing with the consequences of that tragedy for some considerable time. An immediate concern was the integrity of the Fukushima nuclear power station and the risks it posed to human health. We watched with interest as the UK Government and a new SAGE committee swung into action to assess whether there was a need to evacuate British nationals. This time—this relates to the point I made about lessons learned—the SAGE committee had a higher public profile. Sir John Beddington was very prominent in briefing both the media and Britons in Japan via teleconferences. A few months down the line, it is clear to me that the UK’s reaction has been proportionate and evidence based. SAGE played a crucial part in that. I would like to think that our work influenced the positive way in which the Government and SAGE worked during that emergency.
My final point is on cyber-attacks. We were slightly limited by the classified nature of some information, but we took some fascinating evidence in this case study. It was the only risk examined that could be the result of malicious human activity. The Stuxnet worm, which targeted Iran’s uranium-enrichment programme, was a real-life example of how organised and structured cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure could succeed, and cyber-technology, unlike some conventional weapons, can be copied.
Cyber-security has received a huge amount of attention recently, with the publication of the Government’s 2009 “Cyber security strategy of the United Kingdom”. The subsequent formation of the Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance was welcome, because so many public and private bodies are tasked with ensuring our security in cyber-space. However, tasking a body with providing direction and co-ordination is pointless if it has no powers and insufficient funding. We recommended that the Government clarify the funding and powers of the new office. Again, we have not yet received a response and would welcome comments from the Minister.
Stephen Mosley (City of Chester) (Con)
I apologise for my fleeting visit to the debate. I am on a Public Bill Committee this afternoon but, as a member of the Science and Technology Committee, I thought it important to support the debate.
In terms of cyber-security, so much of the UK’s national infrastructure is dependent on the private sector, so one of the key tasks of the OCSIA is to work with those private sector defenders and providers of our national infrastructure, to ensure that they are well protected. One of the issues in Committee was what powers the OCSIA had to oblige those private sector providers to look after their cyber-security. Perhaps that is an area on which the Minister might enlighten the Chamber later.
Andrew Miller
I thank the hon. Gentleman who, in Chester, is my neighbour. He is always posing me challenging questions, but he makes a fascinating point. The threat to national security from cyber-attack is clearly as serious in the private sector as it is in the public sector, and probably more so. That is a great challenge. We cannot have a world in which everyone who worked in a bank would be security cleared to the level that the Minister’s staff are—that is not realistic and it could not be done for every utility. That is why extensive sharing of expertise across boundaries is necessary in the sector, to ensure that lessons from the public sector are learned in the private sector, and vice versa, including sharing information with academics.
The hon. Member for City of Chester must recall one academic witness, a man who was held in extremely high regard by the current Government because he was party to writing a paper for them, when they were in opposition. He said that he did not want to be security cleared, so there are some interesting dichotomies. The Minister needs to contemplate that problem and, I hope, answer the challenging question posed by the hon. Gentleman. In that complex world, without becoming obsessed by security clearance for everyone on the planet, how do we improve information sharing and expertise in and out of and across the boundaries between the private and public sectors?
Soon after the second volcanic ash event, when we were reflecting on the report and talking about some of the information, communication and technology issues, one of the officials said in a meeting I was at that, when the second volcano erupted, they reached for the Select Committee’s report to see how to handle things. I know that that was intended to butter me up a little—I welcome it—but, all in all, the Committee has done a sound piece of work which I hope is taken on board by the Government.
I hope that Members will agree that our inquiry on “Scientific advice and evidence in emergencies” continues to be pertinent to how disasters and emergencies, here or abroad, are handled by the Government. Last winter we had a resurgence of swine flu cases, and we are currently approaching the peak flu season this year again. This May there was another volcanic eruption, which affected our airspace briefly in Scotland and northern England. Severe weather is occurring more frequently, and last winter we had extraordinarily low temperatures that I do not recall having before. Also, as I said earlier, we are approaching the solar maximum. I do not want to scaremonger and create panic. What I want to do is to highlight the fact that the issue is live.
With the right processes in place, and good use of scientific advice and evidence, emergencies can be planned for and effectively managed and information can be communicated to the public. We all in the House would agree that it is our responsibility, collectively, to handle situations such as the ones I have described in a manner that crosses the political divide. I hope that the Minister will agree that we can all learn lessons from each other and we need better ways of working with outside agencies, whether that is people responsible for communicating information to the public or experts who can provide information. I hope that the House will take note of our report and that the Government will act positively on the outstanding issues I have listed.