Future Relationship Between the UK and the EU

Steve Baker Excerpts

Wednesday 18th July 2018 Commons Chamber

[Wera Hobhouse (Bath) (LD)]

Will the Secretary of State give way?

[Mr Steve Baker (Wycombe) (Con)]

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

[Dominic Raab]

May I make some progress? As a result of the further measures that we will be taking, more of the preparations will become public facing. It is important that we talk about that in order to reassure the public that it is the responsible thing to do.

[Mr Baker]

I congratulate my right hon. Friend on taking up his new post. As he knows, I am well familiar with the work that has been done. He may have heard my question at PMQs earlier, but may I put to him what I put to the Prime Minister? When technical notices or any communications related to no deal are released, will he please ensure that they are shaped to ensure that they support the credibility and feasibility of our plans, not only to give comfort and reassurance to business, but to strengthen our negotiating position?

[Dominic Raab]

This is an opportune moment to pay tribute to my hon. Friend for all his work in the Department, particularly on no-deal planning. He makes an excellent point that will be at the forefront of my mind as we continue to step up our preparations.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Steve Baker (Wycombe) (Con)]

A little over a week ago, I appeared on TV and invited colleagues to take stock, so I hope that in this speech I will make some attempt to do that.

The first thing I should like to say is that I believe we should develop

“a special relationship with”

the European Union,

“aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values”

which we share

“and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation.”

Informed Members of the House will have spotted that in saying that I have transposed article 8 of the treaty on European Union. That should be our common goal.

What kind of character should this co-operation have? I do not want us to build a wall; I want us to remain the closest of friends and partners. In that spirit, I propose, first, that

“as we are confronted with similar security threats…the EU and the UK continue our common fight against terrorism and international crime.”

Secondly, I propose that the UK should

“participate in EU programmes in the fields of research and innovation, as well as in education and culture. This is key to maintain mutually beneficial and enriching personal networks in these…areas, and for our shared common community of values to prosper…in future.”

Thirdly, I would like to

“avoid that particularly absurd consequence of Brexit that is the disruption of flights between the UK and the EU.”

I would also like to make sure that there is no disruption on data, the channel tunnel or roll-on/roll-off ferries. Finally, I

“propose that we aim for a trade agreement covering all sectors and with zero tariffs on goods. Like other free trade agreements, it should address services. And in fisheries, reciprocal access to fishing waters and resources should be maintained.”

In saying that, I have just stuck very closely, with some variations, to quoting President Donald Tusk’s statement on the draft guidelines on the framework for the future relationship with the UK, issued on 7 March 2018.

I have been astonished recently to learn just how many colleagues had not noticed that offer which was placed before us—a wide-ranging offer including free trade and no tariffs in all sectors, including services. We have to ask why we have not taken this path. I have concluded from my experience that it is first and foremost because the establishment, the governing class of this country, does not believe in Brexit. The governing class believes in EU membership and is trying to deliver something as close as possible to the EU—not the EEA and the customs union because it is known that such an arrangement would not be accepted as leaving, but something like the customs union and EEA-lite, if I might call it that. That is what is before us in the Chequers White Paper.

[Peter Grant (Glenrothes) (SNP)]

Will the hon. Gentleman explain who and what is the governing class? If it is not the former Foreign Secretary, what on earth is it?

[Mr Baker]

As you know, Mr Speaker, I have been asked to keep to a time, and that term is sufficiently familiar to people in this House and across the country so I will not spend minutes defining it. It is the great class of people who govern our country, whether in politics, the civil service or the media, and those who govern our large companies.

[Owen Smith]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr Baker]

No. I am making my points gently and trying to do so in a spirit of co-operation. I heard the hon. Gentleman accuse me from a sedentary position of Trumpism, and I am not willing to go down that path with him.

[Stephen Gethins (North East Fife) (SNP)]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way to me?

[Mr Baker]

I will not; I will go on.

I will say this, because it is important that it is said—[Interruption.]

[Mr Speaker]

Order. There is a rather discordant atmosphere in the House. This is a matter upon which there are passionately held and differing points of view, but Members are entitled to be heard with courtesy. I simply reference the fact that the hon. Gentleman is an immediate-past Minister and he must be heard, and heard with courtesy.

[Mr Baker]

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I will try most sincerely not to be too indiscreet, but before Christmas—I believe it was September or October but my detailed, copious notes are at home and so not available to me—I was asked by a very senior person what the political consequences would be of choosing an EEA-lite deal. I explained that it would be a political cataclysm for the Conservative party and there would be a great political explosion if such a thing were chosen. We discussed it at some length.

Shortly after Christmas, after the Under-Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, my hon. Friend the Member for Fareham (Suella Braverman), joined the Department, I will reveal that we had a ministerial meeting at which all the Ministers looked at the proposals in advice, and we all agreed we should build from a free trade agreement Canada-style rather than take an EEA-lite deal. Yet, despite proceeding on that collective basis in our Department, here we are with a proposal before the House that requires a mandatory degree of high alignment to EU rules. It is an EEA-lite proposal, not a Canada-plus proposal, if I may put it in those terms, despite a long history of Ministers rejecting that.

I have to conclude that it has long been the intention of those providing advice that we should arrive at such a relationship. Those proposing this category of close relationship, with the up-front choice of mandatory alignment, have two profound problems. First, the project of the European Union is in real difficulty. I take no pleasure in that, and no one need take my word for it—Jean-Claude Juncker said on 14 September 2016:

“Our European Union is, at least in part, in an existential crisis.”

Monsieur Macron said in Strasbourg on 17 April this year:

“There is a fascination with the illiberal, and that is growing all the time…Month after month we are seeing views and sensibilities emerge which call into question certain fundamentals. There seems to be a sort of European civil war.”

That is the most of extraordinary thing to have been said, yet it was said by a man who supports the European project. George Soros, who famously supports the project, has said:

“The European Union is mired in an existential crisis. For the past decade, everything that could go wrong has gone wrong.”

[Andrew Lewer (Northampton South) (Con)]

I thank my hon. Friend not only for his words today but for the hard work he put into trying to get us to the right place. Does he recall that it was my view as an MEP at the time, and that of the British people, that it was the EU’s very direction of travel and the concept of it not as a static, safe, solid entity with which we are entering some sort of new relationship but an organisation moving in a particular, disturbing direction, that led the British public to make the decision they did, and it is our responsibility to fulfil that?

[Mr Baker]

I agree with my hon. Friend, but I would extend his remarks by saying that it is clear, across the European Union, that the project is running into the problem, as its proponents have said, that it lacks democratic consent for what is being done. This is a profound problem that should alarm all of us.

If we look at Hungary, we see that almost 70% of the vote share is for parties that could be considered populist. In Germany, Alternative für Deutschland has risen from obscurity to be the third largest party, forcing Frau Merkel into a coalition—an unwanted coalition—to keep it out. In the Netherlands, the major parties have announced that they would do everything they could to keep the so-called Freedom party out of power, refusing to form coalitions with it despite the Freedom party getting the second largest share of the vote. I am very grateful to those in the Italian Parliament for passing a helpful motion, but I hope they will not be offended if I say that their parties are not necessarily considered mainstream. The rejection of the status quo in Italy is indicative of a trend right across Europe where, politically, the project is being rejected.

On the economy, I would just say that, according to the House of Commons Library, the European Central Bank has, in total to date, purchased €2.5 trillion of assets, which includes €2 trillion of Government debt. By the end of 2018, the figure is scheduled to be €2.6 trillion. That is equivalent to about 23% of annual eurozone GDP. This is the most extraordinary economic and monetary period in history. I personally believe that the distortions sown by quantitative easing on such a scale will unwind, and will do so in a very harmful way. That is the first problem faced by those who propose a high-alignment scenario such as this one. It seeks to cling on to institutions and a kind of political economy that are running out of public consent and have economic difficulties.

[Stephen Gethins]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for the speech he is delivering. I am glad that he is using statistics from the House of Commons Library that he clearly believes. As a former Minister, will he reflect on the statistics that the UK Government put together showing just how disastrous every form of Brexit would be?

[Mr Baker]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, but I am afraid that I will just refer him to the answer to the relevant urgent question, which I will stand by for a very long time.

The second point—I have received some private communications reinforcing my view—is that, unfortunately, the establishment believes that any deal will be voted through by this House and is working on that basis. I have to say it is with some horror that I face the possibility that that consideration is being borne in mind by negotiators, because I do not believe for a moment that it is true. I believe that Scottish National party Members will always vote in a way that reinforces their hopes of secession from the UK, which is bound to mean voting against any agreement. I believe that the Labour party, for all the good faith of the shadow Secretary of State, will in the end vote against any agreement—any agreement. That therefore means that people—whether or not they like it, and however impartial they may be—must bring forward a deal that can be voted through by the Conservative party.

The number 40 has been bandied around in this House in the past few days. I am sorry to say it—it gives me no pleasure to say it, but I must do so—“and the rest”. People who have said 40 are not out by a fraction: when they come to consider the number of Members on the Conservative Benches who do not like this deal and are willing to vote in line with that dislike, they are out by a factor, not by a fraction. That means people must face up to the difficult truth that a high alignment—a Brexit that requires a high degree of permanent alignment to the European Union—will not go through this House of Commons; it will fail. Those are the two difficulties that officials—officials—must face up to.

[Stephen Kinnock]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr Baker]

I will give way briefly, and I then want to try to move to a conclusion.

[Stephen Kinnock]

The hon. Gentleman is being very generous in giving way. Will he confirm that he is in effect saying that Chequers is absolutely dead in the water? The implications of that are enormous for the Secretary of State, who is about to go to Brussels to meet Monsieur Barnier. How is he supposed to do that, and on what basis is he conducting those negotiations? If the hon. Gentleman could also say what his alternative plan is, that would be very useful for the House.

[Mr Baker]

I am about to come on to my alternative, but I will not have words put in my mouth. I said when I appeared on the television last Monday that this was a time for reflection and taking stock, because the choices before this country are grave. Every Member of this House, on whichever Bench they sit, needs to think extremely carefully about how we go forward. I will not have words put in my mouth. What I have said, I have said from my knowledge and I believe it. No one should plan on a high-alignment deal—an EEA-lite style deal—going through this House.

Three key steps should be taken as we go forward. The first is that those in the UK who I would call the establishment, the governing class—those who create the climate of opinion—must accept the referendum result and its consequences. I encourage them to look at President Tusk’s March statement on the guidelines. The red lines that the British public expect us to fulfil imply that the common landing ground of our relationship with the EU, which I spelled out, taking words from his statement, is partnership on security, some participation in research, innovation, culture and education, dealing with the absurd consequences that would otherwise arise, and having a free trade agreement in the style of a normal FTA, not EEA-lite. That must be embraced.

Secondly, I refer the House to the question asked of the Prime Minister by my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) today. The Government should table a legal text that should include a solution for the border in Ireland. We should stand ready, open, to negotiate this common ground set out in March.

[Sir Edward Leigh]

The Prime Minister appears to be saying that President Tusk’s suggestion of a Canada deal is not acceptable because it would result in some kind of hard border. That is not something I accept, but perhaps my hon. Friend can comment on it. If we have the facilitated customs arrangement, will we not need some tracking device and, if we have a tracking device, could that not be used to alleviate any hard border in Northern Ireland?

[Mr Baker]

Mr Speaker, I am conscious that I am going beyond the guidance that you gave us, and I am very grateful to you for allowing that.

What I would say to my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) is that I believe that the problems of the Irish border are first and foremost to do with political and administrative will. A great deal has been said about technology, which is in fact a distraction from the reality that there is already a border, particularly in relation to excise. It is necessary to have an element of political and administrative fudge on the border, if I may say so, but to do it in a way that works for both sides. I believe that it really is political and administrative will that stands in the way, and that there are no insurmountable problems on the border. I also believe that there are no insurmountable problems with customs declarations or rules of origin. I very much hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Yeovil (Mr Fysh) might touch on that, as I know that he is an expert on the subject.

The second point is to table legal text to stand ready in good faith to negotiate the landing zone set out by the President and Council and to be ready to deliver in the spirit of article 8.

The third thing we must do is that thing which the Cabinet resolved collectively at Chequers. We must accelerate the delivery of our plans to leave the European Union in the unwanted eventuality that nothing can be agreed. We must be ready. We cannot allow ourselves to be in a position where complacency means that the Government machine goes forward thinking that any deal will go through Parliament, when I feel confident that deals that are, for want of a better term, too soft will be rejected by this House. We cannot allow ourselves to be put in a position in which we are perhaps not as ready as we should be and a deal is unexpectedly voted down.

[Tom Brake (Carshalton and Wallington) (LD)]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr Baker]

I want to wrap up. The right hon. Gentleman intervened on me so many times when I was in another role that I hope that he will forgive me for not giving way now.

I am sure that our country is on the cusp of delivering a catalysing transformation both of global free trade and corresponding political institutions in delivering democratic self-government that can deliver on the aspirations of the British people. There is a greater future ahead for the UK, Europe and the world if we do it, but if those who set the climate of opinion and decide what we shall do persist in turning their face against accepting the democratic decision and the red lines that people expect us to fulfil, and thus rejecting President Tusk’s vision of where we should land together, it will be their fault if we end up exiting this European Union with nothing agreed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Peter Grant]

No, I really cannot, given that one of the hon. Gentleman’s own colleagues has complained that I am going on for too long. I am sorry, but other Members want to speak.

In return for that, it is not at all unreasonable to ask that the Government who lead the negotiations should have proper regard to the fact that two of the four nations in this partnership of equals voted for a different result. Clearly we cannot have an arrangement whereby some parts of the United Kingdom are in the EU and some parts are not, but—with political will, with a willingness to be flexible, with a willingness to do the unprecedented because these are unprecedented times—there are ways in which the Government could present proposals to the EU that would come much closer to respecting the will of the people of Scotland and the will of the people of Northern Ireland than anything that they have been prepared to put forward in the past.

I do not accept the analysis of the hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr Baker), who is trying to tell us that there is a huge and building majority in the House for a hard Brexit, or a Brexit that respects the European Research Group’s eight red lines. These are the people who do not want us to tie the Prime Minister’s hands. They have put down eight red lines, and if she violates any one of them, she would face of vote of no confidence.

[Mr Baker]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way on that point?

[Peter Grant]

No. The hon. Gentleman spoke for long enough.

[Mr Baker]

Will he give way?

--- Later in debate ---

[Hilary Benn (Leeds Central) (Lab)]

May I begin by apologising to you, Madam Deputy Speaker, to the Secretary of State and to the shadow Secretary of State for not being present at the start of the debate? As Mr Speaker was aware, I was questioning the Prime Minister as a member of the Liaison Committee on the subject we are debating now.

I listened to the speech by the hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr Baker) and respect the passion with which he advocates his position, although I profoundly disagree with it. I do, however, gently say to him that I think it is unfair to seek to blame civil servants for the situation in which we find ourselves as a nation when for two years they have had to watch the spectacle of Ministers, including Cabinet Ministers, openly arguing among themselves about the right course of action, and it was not until Chequers that the Prime Minister tried to bring them together.

[Mr Baker]

I did not mean to blame civil servants. I mean to blame the broadest governing class, the establishment, which is well represented in here and which clearly does not believe in leaving the European Union. I have paid tribute to civil servants over and over again. The people I have worked with have been the most outstanding professionals and I am proud to have worked with them.