Oral Answers to Questions

Steve Baker Excerpts

Tuesday 25th October 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Gauke]

The UK is in discussions with the EIB.

[Mr Steve Baker (Wycombe) (Con)]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that reducing anti-competitive market distortions is both a great fiscal way to promote manufacturing and a way of ensuring our country is best placed for new trade deals?

[Mr Gauke]

I agree that removing distortions in the economy results in a more efficient economy. The UK Government have a record of doing that, by, for example, reducing corporation tax.

Quantitative Easing

Steve Baker Excerpts

Thursday 15th September 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Steve Baker (Wycombe) (Con)]

I welcome this debate. I wonder whether the hon. Gentleman saw the editorial in The Daily Telegraph of 13 September headed, “A pension scandal at the Bank of England”, which discussed the fact that senior staff had been given massive increases in their pension contributions in order to fight the phenomenon he mentions. I am afraid that what is sauce for the goose in the case of the Bank of England is not sauce for the gander. Does he agree that the Bank of England is in danger of being accused of hypocrisy again and again as this proceeds?

[Ian Blackford]

The hon. Gentleman makes a very good point. I have not read the article, but I have seen the press headlines about it. That is exactly the point I have tried to make in painting a picture of the inequality. Those at the top or in the vanguard of society, if one wants to put it that way, are seen as benefiting from the quantitative easing programme—it benefits the pension schemes of those in the Bank of England—while ordinary workers and savers have been penalised. He is absolutely right, and one therefore recognises why we have the disconnect in society.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Steve Baker (Wycombe) (Con)]

I am delighted to participate in this debate and congratulate the hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber (Ian Blackford) on securing it. I certainly support him. Like him, I am pleased to agree with my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister’s comments on monetary policy. That is certainly a first for me, and I hope to explore more with her how we should move forward.

I pay tribute to the journalist Tim Price of MoneyWeek for bringing forward a petition on the parliamentary website against QE, which has so far secured more than 4,700 signatures. I hope that by the end of this debate, with the enormous audience it is bound to draw, there will be a few more signatures.

One of the great tragedies of this subject is that, although we might think it is one of the most important issues of our time, it is not well understood, as can be seen from the attendance in the Chamber. Although the public feel the effects of it widely, their representatives are not as well equipped to participate in debates on the subject as they might be.

I will talk about the two areas mentioned in the motion: the effects of QE and the future development of policy. It might be helpful first to turn to page iv of the last inflation report, which sets out the channels through which monetary policy works. The first is by bringing forward spending by lowering the “real interest rate”. The next is by lowering debt servicing costs, which is the “cash-flow channel”. There is the lowering of funding costs, which is the “credit channel”. It also mentions the “wealth channel”, which is people selling assets to the Bank, so that they can

“reinvest the money received in other assets”,

thereby supporting asset prices. The “exchange rate channel” bears consideration, given that our exchange rate has just dropped. That is an object of Bank policy. There is also the “confidence and expectations channel”, which demonstrates that the Governor, the Bank and the Monetary Policy Committee are aware of the importance of their role in the markets of creating expectations and the effect that that has on the real economy.

The hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber made some good points about wealth inequality—a matter on which I will dwell. In 2012, the Bank of England wrote a report on the distributional effects of asset purchases. It states:

“By pushing up a range of asset prices, asset purchases have boosted the value of households’ financial wealth held outside pension funds, but holdings are heavily skewed with the top 5% of households holding 40% of these assets.”

After the MPC’s last inflation report, the Treasury Committee picked up on wealth inequality and the extent to which it is promoted by what I would call “easy money” and by QE specifically. The Committee is increasing its focus on the issue. I am glad to see present the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman), who serves with me on the Committee, and I look forward to hearing what she has to say. I think that hon. Members on both sides of the House are converging on a genuine concern that the processes of the market are being undermined in their justice by the current set of monetary policies.

If anything, QE has an upside: it has made explicit a phenomenon that has been going on for a long time. The hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber mentioned the quantities of M4 outstanding. If we look back a bit further, we will see that M4 outstanding in 1997 was about £700 billion. If we plot the quantity of M4 outstanding, we will see an accelerating rush through that supposed moderation and in the quantity of M4 outstanding. Is it any wonder that we seemed to have abolished boom and bust, and seemed to be getting better off, when actually there was an enormous acceleration in the supply of credit, leading to a crisis, broadly a stagnation in the creation of money, and the categorically different economic environment in which we find ourselves today?

This has gone on for a long time. The Office for National Statistics and the Library published a paper looking at price inflation back to 1750. It has an instructive chart—I regret that I cannot put it on the record—which shows, on a linear scale, that the value of money was broadly flat until about 1914-18. There was some inflation during the wars and then, from 1971, the value of money collapsed. What happened in 1971? The final link to gold was severed and money became inflationary. As ever, Governments’ third means of financing themselves after tax and borrowing has been currency debasement, and it is that continuous, chronic expansion of credit that has brought us to the position we are in. Although we are now increasingly concerned about the wealth equality effects—the justice effects—of QE, the point is that the money supply has been chronically expansionary since 1971, and therefore those effects have been going on throughout my lifetime.

I will not read out the whole passage, but in “The Economic Consequences of the Peace”, Keynes wrote:

“By a continuing process of inflation”—

that is, increasing the money supply—

“governments can confiscate, secretly and unobserved, an important part of the wealth of their citizens. By this method they not only confiscate, but they confiscate arbitrarily; and while the process impoverishes many, it actually enriches some. The sight of this arbitrary rearrangement of riches strikes not only at security, but at confidence in the equity of the existing distribution of wealth.”

What has changed? Nothing much. That was, of course, only Keynes; I am not quoting some wild-eyed libertarian monetary scholar.

Is it any wonder—I have given advance notice of this—that we see reported in The Daily Telegraph today a speech by the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell), in which he said:

“We’ve got to demand systemic change. Look, I’m straight, I’m honest with people: I’m a Marxist… This is a classic crisis of the economy—a classic capitalist crisis. I’ve been waiting for this for a generation!”?

He went on to say, if the House will forgive me for repeating this:

“For Christ’s sake don’t waste it, you know; let’s use this to explain to people this system based on greed and profit does not work.”

I have covered this theme before. The point is that, if this is capitalism, I am not a capitalist. It is not capitalism when money, under the centrally planned and directed policy of a committee of wise men and women at the central Bank, creates a chronically expansionary environment, which we are now beginning to realise has real wealth effects. That is not capitalism. If the outcome is unjust, that is because of our monetary arrangements, in my view. There will be other factors, but I think that that is potentially a profound cause of wealth inequality and injustice in the market economy.

[Jeremy Quin]

I am interested in my hon. Friend’s speech; as is so often the case, he is sharing interesting ideas with the House. I totally get a lot of what he is saying about the inflationary trajectory, but, as a monetarist, would he have supported QE when the policy was launched in 2009—I know that I am going back a bit—given the circumstances at the time? He seems to think that it has run its course and ceased to be effective, but would he have supported it initially?

[Mr Baker]

My hon. Friend asks a magnificent question, one that is discussed on the website of the Cobden Centre—a think-tank that I co-founded. [Interruption.] There, I said it. The question is, “Would Hayek have supported QE?” The consensus of Hayek scholars is that, given all the circumstances at the time, he would have supported it, to prevent the money supply collapsing and the horrific humanitarian consequences that that would have involved. But would he have supported it now to try to stimulate the economy, creating patterns of economic activity sustained only by that expansion of the money supply? Flatly, no. I was not in Parliament at the time, and I am happy to tell my hon. Friend that I did not have to make that decision. We are where we are.

My second point is that I believe policy is now ineffective and counter-productive. The Governor told the Treasury Committee that we have “extraordinary, if not emergency” monetary policy; we have had it since 2009. I believe that if, during that seven-year period, productive investments could have been made, brought forward and induced by these low interest rates, they would have been made by now. When it comes to real productive investment, I think we are into the law of diminishing returns. We therefore run the risk of inducing firms to engage in activities that will not have a return—in other words, banks will make non-performing loans. That is, of course, the problem afflicting the Italian banking system, as we sit here.

The question is whether this monetary policy can produce a self-sustaining recovery and do it in a non-inflationary way. One of my advisers wrote to me before this debate to say that if we

“remove the base effects from the collapse in oil prices—as will happen over the coming months—and then just let the underlying ‘core’ inflation trends continue as they are, CPI would be 4%+ by mid-2017.”

That is something I shall ask the Governor about next time we see him.

Further to what the hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber said, Andrew Lilico, an economist at Europe Economics, has pointed out:

“In the three months to July 2016…the UK’s broad money supply (on the Bank of England’s preferred ‘M4ex’ measure) grew at an annualised rate of 14.7%”.

When I raised this with the Governor at the last Treasury Committee meeting—I used the monthly figures; it is far starker if we look at it quarterly—I asked whether, if the money supply is currently growing by 14.7% annualised over three months, we should expect more or less inflation next year. I think that I know the answer, but when I put it to the Governor, his answer was that aggregates had moved away from the whole problem of inflation targeting. I encourage the hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber to have a look at exactly what he said. I shall return to some of the Governor’s remarks in a few moments.

[Ian Blackford]

I am very much enjoying listening to the hon. Gentleman’s contribution. Given the case that he outlines, does he consider that there is a bubble in financial assets and, indeed, in property assets, and if he does, what would he do about it today?

[Mr Baker]

I certainly agree with the hon. Gentleman. Indeed, the Bank of England’s Andy Haldane said that the Bank had deliberately inflated the biggest bond market bubble in history. That is not a literal quote because I do not have it before me, but that is broadly what he said. If we look at the period 1997 to 2010, the period before the crisis, and look at the regional distribution of house prices, we find an eerie correlation between it and the increase in the money supply. That distribution of changes correlates with what one might expect of Cantillon effects—in other words, in London and the south-east, house prices rocket away quicker and earlier, while in the north-east and Scotland, house prices increase more slowly as the money spreads out. My point is that there is a good case for saying that Cantillon effects and the increase of the money supply have a profound effect not only on particular assets, but on the regional distribution of prices. It is something that the Bank should consider in its report. It should speak to and address the issue. Speaking as a humble aerospace and software engineer who has only read a few books, it is not within my gift to produce the research.

My next point is that this is a deliberate policy of manipulating asset prices, disrupting the price mechanism in the capital markets. Therefore, there will be a misallocation of capital. The Governor made a speech in New York at a monetary policy conference in which he acknowledged this phenomenon. I have tried to raise it further with him, but he is very good at moving the subject on. His speech was in defence of inflation targeting, and he dealt with four criticisms of it. The first was that price stability does not guarantee financial stability. He went on:

“Second, the stronger critique of the Austrian school is that inflation targeting can actively feed the creation of financial vulnerabilities, especially in the presence of positive supply shocks… From the Austrian perspective, this misguided response”—

the response of the central bank—

“stokes excess money and credit creation, resulting in an intertemporal misallocation of capital and the accumulation of imbalances over time. These imbalances eventually implode, leading to crisis and ‘bad’ deflation.”

It cannot be said that the Governor of the Bank of England is unaware of the somewhat unfortunately titled Austrian school of economics, which I believe in and which tells us that money creation has real structural effects on the economy that affect people’s everyday lives. I was going to challenge the Bank to include in its report an assessment of these things, to demonstrate whether or not it was aware of these effects, but the Governor’s speech has shown us that the Bank is aware. It should not only show in its report that it is aware, but justify what the Governor went on to imply, which is that, by using other instruments, it could deal with these structural consequences. That is one of the big questions of our time: whether or not the structural consequences of easy monetary policy can be dealt with using its other instruments. I am absolutely convinced they cannot be dealt with, and therefore we will have a worse crisis later than the one in 2008.

I sense that Mr Deputy Speaker would like me to wrap up, so I will just make the following point. This has gone from an exercise in saving the financial system to an exercise in kicking the can down the road. How will it develop in future? We have gone from low rates to QE, and I think we will go to negative rates. There has already been talk of banning cash. There have been discussions of helicopter money, too, and at the recent inflation report meeting, out of four people, only the Governor would rule out helicopter money. It is encouraging a misguided belief that if only we printed money and gave it to everybody, there would be justice. This kind of naive inflationism is madness.

[Ian Blackford]

indicated assent.

[Mr Baker]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for agreeing with me.

We have got to get to a point where we escape from easy monetary policies. That will come through one of three mechanisms: a self-sustaining recovery, which I emphasise I very much hope for—I hope that the Bank, and all the central banks, are right on that—or the next phase will be massive inflation, or there will be an abandonment of easy monetary policies before either of those things, at which point there will be an horrific correction.

The great question for society and us as representatives, and indeed for monetary economists, is going to be what went wrong. Will people blame the free market and vote for the policies of certain Opposition Members, which will lead to more statism and I would argue impoverishment and misery? Or will people blame central planning by central banks, which is deliberately dislocating our economy, manufacturing injustice and undermining faith in the market economy and has dropped us into a profound crisis of political economy?

I very much welcome this motion. I shall certainly support it, and I congratulate the hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber on moving it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Roger Mullin (Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath) (SNP)]

It is with some inevitable trepidation that I stand to speak in the debate, given the eloquence and experience of those who have spoken before me, not least the experience of a modest crofter from Skye, my hon. Friend the Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber (Ian Blackford). I was taken not only by his great eloquence but by every contribution this afternoon in what, inevitably, is one of the most important debates that I have taken part in. It is also one of the most thoughtful. While others can wax eloquent given their experience in the financial sector over many years and their distinguished careers, I come to this issue trying perhaps to give voice to others who do not have that background.

The ordinary person in the street would recognise that we live in troubled times. There is increased uncertainty and the stability and certainties of the past seem to have flown past. For example, who could have foreseen at the outset of QE that today many economies would be experiencing weak growth, low business investment, collapsing prospects for pensions, near negative interest rates penalising savers and a huge increase, as the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman) said, in wealth inequality.

I would like to add something else to the equation. We need to recognise the political instability that has arisen. People are feeling that they are disfranchised, have no voice and are losing hope. That is one of the profound social and political consequences that deserves to be considered.

It was not supposed to be like this. It may be wise to cast a critical eye over what seemed to most people, myself included, an entirely logical response to the crisis some years ago. It is good that people are able to reflect. Although it comes hard for many politicians, it is good when we, too, are modest enough to recognise that we do not always get it right and that we need to learn from experience. For example, many people in recent years feel that the UK Government’s economic plan has been blind to some of the consequences of QE. That is seen in the poverty, in many cases, of the fiscal response to aid those who are not benefiting from the increasing wealth. The Treasury needs to think about doing more to achieve a better balance between the fiscal response and the monetary response. The time is surely right for it to mount a rigorous and open appraisal of the balance between monetary policy and fiscal measures, and of whether each of the rounds of QE has had the desired effect. The Bank could also look at that question.

Let us recall some of the antecedents of QE. I might not have worked in a bank at any time—the only time I go into the bank is when I receive a phone call from it—but in a past life, I used to read quite a lot about this subject. Everyone attending this debate will recall that it was back in 1969, in a paper by Milton Friedman entitled “The Optimum Quantity of Money”, that the idea of what we know today as QE was created. Friedman contended that if policy interest rates reached the lower bound of zero, it would be appropriate for a central bank to purchase assets—Government bonds in the first instance—to create a wealth effect that it was no longer possible to achieve through the conventional interest rate policy of the central bank. Friedman’s notion of quantitative easing was that asset prices would be boosted, leading to an increase in confidence and spending through the wealth effect. In turn, economic activity would be given a boost.

In more recent times, however, even that great monetarist Allan Meltzer—who has written widely on the development and application of monetary policy and on the history of central banking in the US—has questioned the efficacy of QE, arguing that it has not led to what Friedman expected. In particular, the key aim of creating an increase in confidence and therefore investment has not transpired as hoped. Today, too, central bankers seem content to see inflated asset prices. But who speaks for the millions of savers around the world? Who speaks for the ordinary men and women who have paid the price of banking failure? Where were the UK Government when our economy failed to diversify or balance in the aftermath of the global financial crisis? Where were the necessary fiscal measures when it transpired that the relatively poor were paying the price for the mistakes of the wealthy? The SNP and others understood the use of quantitative easing by the Bank of England as a response to the 2008 crisis to be a temporary measure to help to regain stability. How long, I now ask, is this temporary measure going to last?

I agree with my hon. Friend the crofter that the effects of monetary policy have to a great extent been undermined by the austerity agenda, which is now leaving a legacy of unintended consequences that is placing an unprecedented burden on future generations. Broadly speaking, the policies being followed by central banks around the world benefit a relatively narrow group of people—equity-rich individuals and investment banks, for example—but few others. It is the unintended consequences—I admit that they are unintended—of QE that must now be the focus of policymakers.

[Mr Baker]

I agree with much of what the hon. Gentleman is saying. The Bank of England is not represented here, and I do not agree with it, but if it were here, I suspect that it would say that everybody benefited, given the reality that there would have been a worse recession if it had not acted. Does he agree that that argument is now wearing thin?

[Roger Mullin]

The hon. Gentleman must have read the next part of my speech. However, that allows me to haste along and agree precisely with what he has said.

A friend of mine, Dr Jim Walker, wrote to me recently and pointed out that

“interest rates throughout history have not only been the cost of capital (or the reward to thrift) but have also been a signalling mechanism about the future”.

We now know that zero interest rates and QE tell business owners and entrepreneurs that there is little or no growth coming. They therefore encourage businesses to hold cash and be extremely cautious about investment. The signalling mechanisms have had a different effect from those predicted by Friedman. It is again time to review the situation. It would be difficult to argue that QE has therefore led to the increase in confidence and investment that was the argument for it.

We can also see other consequences. Despite eight years of near zero interest rates, UK real gross fixed capital formation is 2.8% lower than its 2007 peak. Therefore, investment in the real economy has not been boosted in the way that was originally thought. A similar phenomenon has being going in other aspects of the economy on the demand side, such as in how households have been afflicted. Zero interest rates and asset purchases were supposed to convince ordinary people to borrow and spend more immediately, but some key groups have reacted to zero interest rates by saving more. Why? In order to provide for old age, they can no longer rely on the positive compounding effect of above zero interest rates; nor can they rely on getting the type of annuity for which they may have planned. Instead of encouraging that group to spend, policies have encouraged them to save more due to fear for the future. Such savers are understandably angry. After years of saving some of their income, many people have zero income from their savings.

I am not somebody who is disadvantaged—I have a well-paid job in this House—but I wonder how people who, like me, have a cash ISA are feeling. Before the crash, it was fairly common to get 6% interest, but I received a letter a few weeks ago to point out that from 1 December the interest rate is going to be reduced yet again to 0.1%. The time has come to undertake a critical review of the policies of recent years.

Oral Answers to Questions

Steve Baker Excerpts

Tuesday 19th July 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Steve Baker (Wycombe) (Con)]

The business rates system sometimes interacts with the planning system to leave premises empty, but incurring tax. Will the Government work to ensure that councils are appropriately incentivised to ensure that premises are productively occupied so that business owners have a chance of paying the tax they incur?

[Jane Ellison]

I hear the point that my hon. Friend makes. That is clearly something to which further consideration will be given.

Oral Answers to Questions

Steve Baker Excerpts

Tuesday 19th April 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Gauke]

The hon. Gentleman will be aware of the Treasury analysis published yesterday that shows the various models and the consequences were we to leave the EU, including a permanent reduction in our GDP compared with what it otherwise would be and significant damage to productivity growth. The hon. Gentleman is right to highlight that point.

[Mr Steve Baker (Wycombe) (Con)]

Do the Government welcome the opportunity to bring forward actual data without the need to project forward 14 years using techniques that have proved to be inaccurate every six months?

[Mr Gauke]

As I said, HMRC has gone through the data and will provide them to the ONS. It is for the ONS to decide the timing, but I have drawn the House’s attention to what it has said.

Returning to the Treasury analysis, it compares one scenario with other scenarios, and all three possible scenarios for leaving the EU would leave this country poorer than we otherwise would be.

Budget Resolutions and Economic Situation

Steve Baker Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd March 2016 Commons Chamber

[George Kerevan]

Indeed, and I welcome all the supply-side measures, but—[Interruption.] Wait for it! We have had five Budgets in the past 15 months. Why did those measures not appear in the last four of them? In fact, if we count today as well as last week, we have had six Budgets in that time. Why did those measures not appear before? This is not about the Treasury officials, who are bright men and women; this is about the fact that there is no strategy apart from trying to run a budget surplus in a particular year, because the Chancellor knows that if he does not deliver in 2020, what is left of his reputation after this week will be in shreds.

[Mr Steve Baker (Wycombe) (Con)]

I should like to draw the hon. Gentleman’s attention to page 2 of the Red Book. It states:

“This is precisely why the UK has been working through its long-term economic plan. Since 2010 the plan has been focussed on reducing the deficit, while delivering the supply side reforms necessary to improve long-term productivity growth.”

Will he at least concede that the Chancellor has in his Red Book precisely the kind of strategy that he is criticising him for not possessing?

[George Kerevan]

I cannot accept that. There is a tension in the Chancellor’s mind. It is like good and evil sitting on either shoulder. One side is telling him to run a budget surplus, because that is an easy road to take. That is not badly thought out. Given the number of rules that Chancellors have thought up over the years and then failed to implement, running a budget surplus is an extremely simple rule. It is just too crude, however. That argument vies with the supply-side strategy.

Following on from the question from the hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr Baker), another friend from the Treasury Select Committee, let us look at what the Office for Budget Responsibility says in its report about how the Budget supply-side measures will work. It states:

“We also expect smaller positive contributions to potential output growth over the next five years from population growth, while average hours worked are expected to trend down over time.”

With a decrease in average hours, in input and in population growth, where is the productivity increase going to come from? I should like to hear the answer from the Chancellor.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Steve Baker (Wycombe) (Con)]

I rise to support the Budget and, in particular, to welcome the Government’s supply-side reforms. This has been a dramatic Budget, and I would be failing the Government if I did not concentrate on the areas of drama. First, on the disability reforms, the challenge before the Government is clear: to deliver a policy that we can all be proud to defend in our constituencies and in front of any objective scrutiny. I do not think we would have been able to do that if the Government had not wisely made the decisions that they have over the past few days.

When I look at page 150 of the OBR’s report, on the successive forecasts for spending on disability benefits, I can see that the Government’s envelope within which to deliver this humane disability policy is very clear. When we came to power in 2010, the Government were spending £12 billion on disability benefits, which rose to £16 billion by now, which is an increase of a third. The figure is forecast, with the reversal of the PIP measures, to reach £18 billion by 2020-21. It is clear that the Government have an envelope within which to work to ensure that we have a world-class policy that any of us can defend, even in an environment of fierce and partisan political attack.

I signed the two amendments on VAT to highlight the extent to which VAT is controlled by our membership of the European Union. Neither amendment has legislative effect. I congratulate the hon. Member for Dewsbury (Paula Sherriff) on her amendment, which, as she said, makes clear our intent to zero rate tampons and other sanitary products. Of course, both amendments are pursuant to Government policy, and this is the bitter irony of our membership of the EU. We had to have a dramatic row over VAT in the context of an EU referendum in order to secure the following commitment from the European Council:

“The European Council notes that the Commission intends to publish shortly a communication on an action plan on VAT. It welcomes the intention of the Commission to include proposals for increased flexibility for Member States with respect to reduced rates of VAT, which would provide the option to Member States of VAT zero rating for sanitary products.”

That is welcome, and it is clear that the Government’s policy and the House’s wish is that sanitary products should be zero-rated. It is welcome that the Government have secured this change of EU policy but, particularly as a participant in the campaign, I do not want us to have an EU membership referendum every time we want a different policy on our second largest tax.

[Mr Kenneth Clarke]

Will my hon. Friend accept that British Governments have always supported the idea of having an EU framework on VAT? Otherwise, the problem is that there is pressure on Governments to compete with each other in lowering the tax on selected products when they think that their manufacturers or producers will benefit. Also, it is very difficult to operate an open trade area if everybody is going for competitively different tax rates. If we go too far down that path, the main beneficiaries are smugglers.

[Mr Baker]

My right hon. and learned Friend raises some interesting points and, although I am grateful for the additional minute for my speech that he has given me, I cannot touch on all of them. He illustrates the difficulty of operating a customs union among interventionist nation states. The old doctrines of liberalism did not require that one got rid of non-trade barriers, for the most part. There were no non-trade barriers because laissez-faire was the norm. I abridge an argument that could be made at much greater length, but at the heart of the exchange that we have just had is the difficulty involved in interventionist nation states attempting to engage in free trade. In a world of globalisation, air travel and the internet, we need some degree of harmonisation on a global scale, provided that that enjoys democratic consent. That is probably a subject for another debate, but I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend for his intervention.

Until the VAT directive 2006/112/EC is changed, it will be technically unlawful under EU law for any amendment to be introduced in UK law, even if it is not applied and takes effect in the future. That is the situation that we face. It is similar to the situation concerning insulation products, on which a judgment in the European Court of Justice on 4 June 2015 ruled that

“The United Kingdom cannot apply, with respect to all housing, a reduced rate of VAT to the supply and installation of energy-saving materials, since that rate is reserved solely to transactions relating to social housing.”

That is the position in law while we are in the EU. Although I hear what my right hon. and learned Friend says, it is a fact that while we remain in the EU, we cannot control what is currently our second-biggest tax. I am grateful that we have had this opportunity to put this part of the EU membership debate on the public record and have it discussed in the media. I am particularly grateful that the Government will not be opposing either amendment. If there is a Division, I shall certainly vote for amendment (a) and I shall probably abstain on amendment (b).

Perhaps the most dramatic aspect of the Budget is a subject that I have talked about at every Budget. It is a subject that I mentioned in my maiden speech—the insane state of monetary policy all around the world. If the European Central Bank was printing €80 billion of new money every month in paper and shipping it around the continent in articulated lorries, it would already have destroyed faith in paper currency. Yet, because the process is one of buying Government and corporate bonds, we simply notice a recirculation of money and celebrate the coarse aggregate results. In 25 seconds, I cannot give a lecture on capital-based macro-economics—[Hon. Members: “Oh!”] If Opposition Members would like to call a Back-Bench debate on the subject in their own time, I would be glad to give them the lesson. I welcome this Budget, but its dramatic consequences will be felt much later as a result of easy money.

Oral Answers to Questions

Steve Baker Excerpts

Tuesday 1st March 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Osborne]

It is not illogical that if the country votes to leave, we leave the European Union. That is the choice for the people of this country. The only available mechanism is the triggering of article 50, which gives a two-year time limit. Of course, we would try to negotiate in good faith and an extension can be achieved, but only with the consent of 27 other nations. People need to be aware that there are not going to be two referendums. It is decision day on 23 June. People need to choose and I think that voting to remain in the EU is the best outcome for our economic and national security.

[Mr Steve Baker (Wycombe) (Con)]

Is it not extraordinary that the Chancellor asked the G20 to make that statement, and is it not the case that he made that request so that it could tee up this element of “Project Fear”?

[Mr Osborne]

The idea that the US Treasury Secretary, the head of the International Monetary Fund and, indeed, the Governor of the Central Bank of China dance to a British tune is, I am afraid, fanciful. Governors of central banks and the Finance Ministers of the G20 are saying the same thing as every major independent economic institution: that a British exit would cause an immediate economic shock and have longer economic costs. I totally understand why many of the people advocating exit want to do so, but, to be frank, they accept that there would be a short-term and potentially long-term economic cost. We should have that on the table, which is why the Treasury is going to produce its analysis.

Financial Conduct Authority

Steve Baker Excerpts

Monday 1st February 2016 Commons Chamber

[Harriett Baldwin]

I would love to, but I do not have time.

[Mr Steve Baker (Wycombe) (Con)]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Harriett Baldwin]

No, because the hon. Gentleman was not even present for the debate.

The hon. Member for Edinburgh West, my hon. Friend the Member for Aberconwy, the hon. Member for Ceredigion, my hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon and the hon. Member for Brentford and Isleworth also mentioned interest rate hedging products and businesses that were suffering as a result of interest rates that were lower than expected. The Government have made it clear from the beginning that mis-selling of financial products is unacceptable, and that businesses affected by it should be compensated. The FCA has established a redress scheme for small businesses that were mis-sold interest rate hedging products to ensure that eligible businesses are compensated. So far the scheme has paid out on 18,000 cases, and more than £2 billion has been paid in redress, including £464 million to deal with consequential losses.[Official Report, 4 February 2016, Vol. 605, c. 8MC.]

As we have heard tonight, there are still some cases outstanding. As at year end, these include 700 cases in which full refunds have yet to be accepted. Businesses that are considered larger and more sophisticated are not covered by the redress scheme, but they can of course take advantage of the first-class brains in our legal profession. The FCA considers that there is merit in holding a review of how the scheme has worked when these legal cases have been concluded.

The question of Connaught was raised by the hon. Member for Motherwell and Wishaw, my hon. Friend the Member for Aberconwy, the hon. Member for East Renfrewshire and my hon. Friend the Member for South Suffolk. The Government and the FCA understand the serious financial difficulty and distress that this issue has caused to many investors. As hon. Members might be aware, the FCA published an update to investors on its website this week on Connaught Income Fund, series 1. The update highlights that a settlement agreement has been reached between the liquidators of the fund and Capita Financial Managers Ltd. The FCA has asked the liquidators of the fund to distribute the settlement sum to investors as soon as possible. The investigation that the FCA is pursuing will continue independently of the settlement.

The Global Restructuring Group was mentioned by the hon. Member for Edinburgh West and my hon. Friend the Member for Hazel Grove. Let me reassure the House that I expect to see the conclusions of the FCA’s investigation into this matter in the first quarter of the year. On the point made by the hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber and my hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest on Treasury Select Committee scrutiny of FCA appointments, we have agreed that the Committee will be able to carry out a pre-commencement hearing before the new CEO starts at the FCA.

A number of questions have been raised about FCA independence. The FCA is of course operationally independent of the Government. We appoint the chief executive and the board, and the FCA’s objectives and duties were voted into statute during the last Parliament. I firmly believe in the independence of the FCA. It is vital that consumers and firms know that regulatory decisions are being taken in an objective and impartial way. Contrary to what the hon. Member for East Renfrewshire seems to think, I have met the acting chief executive of the FCA and her predecessor from time to time. I regret the fact that the hon. Lady has formed a different impression.

The hon. Member for Salford and Eccles raised the question of operational matters. I am afraid that she cannot have this both ways. If she wants the Treasury to interfere in operational decisions at the FCA, she is asking for something that completely contradicts the spirit of independent regulation that I have supported this evening. No one is denying that the FCA has a tough job ahead. That is why it is essential that it is well prepared, well staffed and well equipped to do that job, and that it has the best leadership possible. I am confident that the FCA has the right mandate and team.

Like my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset, I believe that today’s motion is neither well founded nor well timed, given that a new chief executive and a new team are in place. I strongly urge hon. Members to ignore the motion before us tonight.

HMRC and Google (Settlement)

Steve Baker Excerpts

Monday 25th January 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Gauke]

All businesses have to pay tax under the law. It is under this Government that we have seen the diverted profits tax brought in, and it is under this Government that we are seeing the BEPS process change the behaviour of companies. We did not see any of this from the last Labour Government, and all we end up with is unsubstantiated claims about sweetheart deals, insulting HMRC staff, who have worked for years to ensure that Google and other companies pay the tax due under the law.

[Mr Steve Baker (Wycombe) (Con)]

Does the Minister agree that in the mad world of corporation tax on international companies this sum of money is at once derisory, substantial, lawful and completely unacceptable to the public, and will he therefore also agree that it is time for a complete overhaul of the corporate tax system?

[Mr Gauke]

The point I would make is that this is a highly complex area, but there is a need for international co-operation in it, which is why we instigated the OECD looking at this as part of the BEPS process. That process has come forward with a number of recommendations. We have already legislated for two of those recommendations. There is a third that we are specifically looking at and consulting upon in terms of interest deductibility. It is right that we bring the international tax system up to date to reflect the way multinational companies are working. This has been left for too long; we are taking action.

European Union Referendum Bill

Steve Baker Excerpts

Tuesday 8th December 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jenkin]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his intervention. I have already said that the first publication is perfectly justified, as the Government are entitled to explain what they have negotiated and to give their opinion on that. If he would like to do so, he might explain how they are going to give

“information about rights, and obligations, that arise under European Union law as a result of the United Kingdom’s membership of the European Union”

in a concise and simple fashion which is not loaded. Perhaps he could tell us which countries should be used as

“examples of countries that do not have membership of the European Union”

in order to explain the consequences of leaving the European Union. We are talking about very subjective judgments, and of course that is what the debate between the yes and the no campaigns will be about.

My hon. Friend is right to say that people trust what the Government say, which is exactly why what they say should be curtailed and limited: it has a disproportionate effect on the voters. There is absolutely no doubt about that. If a leader of a party says something, that has less of an effect than if the Prime Minister says something. That is why we have a purdah period, and the House has forced the Government to accept that there will be a proper purdah period. Otherwise, if we have what we had in 1975, whereby the Government can carry on regardless, being the Government and yet expressing partisan views on one side of the argument and not the other, an unfair referendum would be created. That is why all referendums throughout the world have systems to try to contain what Governments do during the final phases of the referendum, in order to try to create some fairness.

[Mr Steve Baker (Wycombe) (Con)]

I wonder whether my hon. Friend has seen, as I have, the poster produced by the pro-EU BSE—Britain Stronger in Europe—campaign which co-opts the Governor of the Bank of England under the headline “Think UK’s economy is stronger in Europe”. BSE has also co-opted the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of India. Does my hon. Friend share my concern that it appears that the campaign to remain in is willing to co-opt public officials, who ought not to be dragged into one side of such a campaign?

[Mr Jenkin]

I have to be mindful about whether that is taking us beyond the scope of what we are discussing, but it reminds me of a very controversial element of the Government’s conduct of the Scottish referendum, and I have some sympathy with arguments that have been made on this point. I refer to the use of a permanent secretary to give a speech on behalf of the Government’s view while this was purporting to be the publication of advice to Ministers. Such advice should never be published. On any orthodox analysis, the opinions of civil servants in the form of advice to Ministers should never be published, but this was used as part of the propaganda. Many Scottish National party Members would regard that as a gross misuse of civil servants during a referendum period, and we need to try to avoid that.

I leave two questions for the Minister as he responds to this debate on Lords amendments 5 and 6. First, what does “publish” actually mean? What do the Government intend to do by way of the publication of these two reports? Are they just to be White Papers or are they to be propaganda circulated by the Government in some way much more widely? Secondly, how will he ensure that this is done in the highest spirit of impartiality, using that word in the way most people would expect it to be used? How is he going to ensure that these publications are genuinely objective and not just a means of advancing one side of the argument against the other?

Royal Bank of Scotland

Steve Baker Excerpts

Thursday 5th November 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Steve Baker (Wycombe) (Con)]

I agree with the hon. Gentleman that this is a live issue on the right, and I, too, would like to see a much more diverse banking sector. Let me bring him back to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Horsham (Jeremy Quin). Is it not a problem for the hon. Gentleman and me, and for all those who want a more diverse, more co-operative and mutual banking sector, that the entire atmosphere of co-operative banking in the UK has been established by the circumstances of our own Co-operative bank?

[Jon Cruddas]

The hon. Gentleman seems to be hiding behind one example when all the evidence across western market economies suggests that more co-operative banking does indeed have a part play in creating a more resilient modern capitalism.

What does all this mean for RBS? The Government have presented an artificial choice between business as usual with taxpayer ownership and business as usual with private ownership. This could be deemed outdated thinking. We need so much more imagination and so much more ambition if we are really going to build a better banking system. We urgently need to nurture new kinds of bank that exist in almost every other developed economy—banks that are rooted in local communities, accountable to more than quarterly profit figures, focused on supporting real economic activity, and run with an ethic of public service attached to them. The reason this debate is so obviously important is that with economists the world over warning that the next financial crisis could be just round the corner, the stakes literally could not be higher.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jeremy Quin]

Of course, we must maximise the returns, but we must do so in the context of the broader picture for the UK. I acknowledge that the banking system is incredibly important to our economy, including what it can provide to the real economy.

[Mr Baker]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Jeremy Quin]

I will give way briefly to my hon. Friend, but I know that other Members want to speak.

[Mr Baker]

I am most grateful to my hon. Friend. Having listened to the debate, one of my advisers has texted me to say that according to the International Monetary Fund, as retrospectively analysed by Ewald Engelen et al, the taxpayer cost of saving the banking system was £500 billion, which is way more than the equity injected into it. Has my hon. Friend taken into account the IMF’s calculations, and does he think we will get that £500 billion?

[Jeremy Quin]

I am grateful for the wisdom and insight that has flashed on to my hon. Friend’s machine. His staff are very attentive and I look forward to them providing me with the IMF report so that I can go through it in great detail. I look forward to discussing it with him later. I am being intervened on from all sides. My hon. Friend makes me take on board the £500 billion mentioned by the IMF, while the hon. Member for East Lothian (George Kerevan) simply wants us to hit the five pounds tuppence per share. I am being pulled in different directions, but we all agree that RBS needs to be productive for the real economy.

That takes me to the heart of the motion tabled by the hon. Member for Edmonton. The long-delayed and long-drawn-out splitting off of Williams & Glyn from RBS has cost billions and taken a huge amount of management time. With the best will in the world, splitting up such organisations takes time, effort and money. I am really concerned that it could be an unnecessary distraction to try to pull a bank in as many as 130 different directions, as the hon. Lady proposes. I fear that the creation of multiple banks will lead to multiple dis-synergies and create entities that will find it much harder to access capital markets. It could be a very costly distraction and I am very nervous that it would not act in the interests of the broader economy. There are advantages that flow from a large, well-capitalised and well-regulated bank being able to spread its assets across the UK.

Although I wish the initial public offering of the Clydesdale and Yorkshire Bank well, if it goes ahead in the new year, I fear that investors prefer the spread of banks across asset classes and across the whole of the UK, rather than regional entities. One only needs to remember the passion in this place regarding the steel industry to recognise how a major problem can have a ripple effect on small and medium-sized enterprises locally and cause huge problems for a regional economy. I fear that capital markets would reflect those risks in a higher cost of capital and scarce resources, particularly in those very areas of the country where we all wish to see the maximum amount of lending.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Bailey]

I take my hon. Friend’s point.

[Mr Baker]

I share the hon. Gentleman’s sense of irony, but is it not the case that communist China has such assets only in so far as it has adopted the market economy principles of private property rights and the freedom to make contracts?

[Mr Bailey]

I broadly agree with the hon. Gentleman’s thesis, but I do not think that he would agree with mine: that if we had the sort of financial services industry that was focused in the right direction, it would not really matter anyway what progress they were making.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Steve Baker (Wycombe) (Con)]

Some lessons of history are so well established as to virtually be axioms: the Government ought not to own banks and private enterprises ought not to be bailed out by the taxpayer. Unfortunately, the Government do own banks and those banks were bailed out by the taxpayer. I think that the taxpayer bail-outs, which involved the privatisation of profit combined with the socialisation of risk, together with all the conduct issues that we all know so well, have done a great deal to undermine faith in the market economy, which we know is the only way to sustain billions of people on the face of the earth.

Some of the issues that have come up today go to the heart of how we should structure a market economy. In my view, in a market economy there should be a plurality of ownership models for banks. One of the great mistakes of the 1980s was the demutualisation of building societies. [Interruption.] I see my hon. Friend the Member for Horsham (Jeremy Quin) nodding furiously in agreement, for which I am grateful. As a teenager, I knew instinctively that the mutual model aligned interests in a way that the shareholder model did not. I was opposed to the demutualisation, or carpet-bagging as it was called, that went on then. These days, I have more theoretical grounding for my views and I certainly believe that we should have a more diverse banking sector, with more mutuals and co-operatives.

I should say briefly that the systemic problems that have affected the entire banking system around the world, irrespective of ownership models, are symptomatic of far deeper problems in the institutional arrangement of money and banking, which I have talked about at great length on other occasions.

[Kelvin Hopkins]

The problems around the world derive from the fact that we have a globalised financial system with no boundaries between countries, so money can flow freely around the world. Had we been insulated from what happened in America, we might have survived rather better.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Baker]

The hon. Gentleman knows that I often agree with him, but on this point I do not. I am an old English liberal free trader and I think that the fundamental problem is the chronically inflationary system of fiat money. I hope that he will forgive me if I talk instead about the Royal Bank of Scotland, because I have put the other issues on the record since my maiden speech.

I have two long-standing misgivings that come to a head in RBS. The first is about the effect that the international financial reporting standards have on our ability to see the true and fair position of banks. The other is about the stress tests. I am grateful to Professor Kevin Dowd, Gordon Kerr and John Butler of Cobden Partners for their advice, but any errors or omissions are my own. I should say that I have no financial interest whatever in Cobden Partners, although it was a spin-out from the Cobden Centre, which I co-founded to advance the ideas on which they are now working.

I have said many times that the IFRS allow, enable and encourage banks to overstate their asset values, and therefore their profits, and to understate their losses. In May, we conducted an exercise in which we compared the accounts of RBS with the statement of its accounts in the asset protection scheme. We believed that its capital was overstated by £20 billion. We had a meeting with RBS at which that was admitted.

If it is the case that the IFRS encourage banks to overstate their capital positions to such an extreme degree, I am not in the least convinced that we are selling something that we truly understand. Indeed, as the hon. Member for Edmonton (Kate Osamor) was opening the debate, on which I congratulate her, Gordon Kerr texted me to say that if we broke up the bank into 130 pieces, it would reveal its insolvency. I am not asserting the insolvency of RBS; what I am saying is that with the IFRS the way they are, we simply cannot know whether RBS is in the position it appears to be in.

In such circumstances, the paying of dividends, which has been proposed, would be extremely unwise. It would risk exposing taxpayers to future claims from stakeholders ranking superior to those common stakeholders. The claim will be that their entitlements have been improperly paid out as dividends, when those funds should lawfully have been held back and attributed to creditors and depositors. Tim Bush of Pensions & Investment Research Consultants, Gordon Kerr and others argue that we should have strong reservations about the integrity of the numbers and the ability of the firm to distribute profits under the law.

[Ian Blackford]

The hon. Gentleman is painting an interesting picture of the deficiencies of the IFRS. If we believe it for a second, does it not behove the Government to do a proper analysis of the true value of Royal Bank of Scotland, given that we own over 70% of it?

[Mr Baker]

I banged on in the last Parliament about the IFRS and their shortcomings. Indeed, I introduced a Bill to require parallel accounts to use the UK generally accepted accounting principles, precisely because I think there is a serious problem. I refer the House to Gordon Kerr’s book “The Law of Opposites”, published by the Adam Smith Institute, which not only covers this problem in detail, but explains how it feeds into the problem of derivatives being used specifically to manufacture capital out of thin air to circumvent regulatory capital rules. That is an extremely serious problem that might mean that the entire banking system is in a far worse place than we might otherwise think.

[Jeremy Quin]

I am genuinely curious about what my hon. Friend is saying. A lot of work was done on the balance sheet of RBS at the time of the asset protection scheme. Does he not think that any accounting issues would have been picked up at that stage?

[Mr Baker]

As I said earlier, we compared the asset protection scheme’s accounts with those of RBS and found a £20 billion difference in capital. When I write to my hon. Friend with the details from the IMF, I will introduce him to the people who did that work. I would be glad to sit down with him and my advisers and see what he thinks, because I recognise and respect his vast experience. I am, of course, only a humble engineer who sat in banks asking people how the system worked and found that they often could not tell me.

These concerns are not ones that I have made up. I have in my hand a letter from the Local Authority Pension Fund Forum that explains to our commissioner at the European Union in considerable detail over eight pages what is wrong with the IFRS. I would be pleased to share that with Members who are interested.

I am extremely uncomfortable with the idea that we understand the true and fair position of RBS, or indeed any other banks, because of the imposition of the IFRS. Particularly in relation to RBS, that has meaningful consequences when it comes to thinking about selling the shares. There are also consequences that we should consider when any consideration is given to paying out dividends.

Secondly, I want to raise Professor Kevin Dowd’s extended criticisms of the stress tests. He has made the point to me that under the 2014 stress tests, RBS had a projected post-stress, post-management action ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets of 5.2%. That was sufficiently poor that the bank was required to take further action on its capital position. Of course, it now wants to hand out dividends. That seems to both of us to make no sense. He continued:

“This 5.2% ratio compares to the 4.5% hurdle the Bank used, which is actually less than the 7% imposed on UK banks last year, and much less than the 8.5% to 11% minimum that will be imposed when Basel III is fully implemented in 2019.”

The range arises because of the counter-cyclical capital buffer. That is rather bizarre because it appears that RBS did not meet the Bank of England’s minimum requirements in the stress tests.

I am afraid that it gets worse. Because market events do not follow a normal distribution, there are severe problems with the risk-weighted assets measure that perhaps even render it useless. Therefore, the only measure that really makes sense is the leverage ratio, which is the ratio of capital to total assets, with none of the risk weighting. Under Basel last year, the absolute minimum leverage ratio was 3% and the Bank of England expected UK banks to meet that minimum. That 3% minimum was low. Some of my advisers suggest that a minimum of 15% is necessary, and possibly even double that for the bigger banks. That would be a radical departure. What did RBS achieve under the stress tests? It achieved 2.3%.

I am grateful for the work of Kevin Dowd, Gordon Kerr and John Butler at Cobden Partners on the IFRS and the stress tests. The problems that they have put in front of us are potentially extremely severe. I encourage the Government to meet my colleagues, to look at this matter again in great detail and to understand what has happened with this accounting, so that they can see what it means for our ability to see the true position of banks and how it incentivises structures that we subsequently find, as was pointed out earlier, are of no social value—structures that often serve to deceive and to create an impression of capital where there is none.

It is highly unlikely that RBS is in the state it appears to be in, and I agree with those who have called for diversity in ownership models. The challenges of providing those diverse banks out of RBS in its current condition are probably insurmountable, and I would welcome Government policy action to encourage mutuals and co-operatives. Above all, I encourage the Government to take all possible steps to establish the true position of RBS and the entire banking system, by comprehensively investigating the flaws in IFRS that have been well set out.