Employment Rights Bill

Baroness Coffey Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 16th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendments tabled after Clause 75, which would require the Secretary of State to assess the impact of repealing the Strikes (Minimum Service Levels) Act 2023 in terms of emergency service provision and the broader resilience of our public infrastructure during industrial action. These are pragmatic and proportionate amendments, and I regret that they are even necessary, but the manner in which Clause 75 proposes to repeal this legislation—abruptly and with no review, consultation or supporting evidence—leaves us no choice.

The 2023 Act was narrowly drawn. It applied only to a tightly defined set of sectors—ambulance services, fire and rescue, health, transport, nuclear decommissioning and border security—in which a complete withdrawal of labour poses serious and obvious risks to life, safety, national security or national functioning. It did not ban strikes or criminalise union membership. It allowed a minimum service level to be set, by regulation, after consultation with affected sectors. In other words, it was a public protection measure, a mechanism of last resort, and it mirrored provisions already in countries across Europe and beyond.

The Government now seek to repeal the law, seemingly on the basis that it achieved nothing. They will no doubt point to the fact that industrial action has continued since the Act came into force. Indeed, we know from statistics that 160,000 working days were lost to strike action in the first quarter of 2025 alone. However, that statistic proves nothing about the value, or otherwise, of the Act. It proves only that the right to strike continues to be exercised, as it should be.

The Strikes (Minimum Service Levels) Act was never intended to eliminate strike action, and its success should not be judged by whether workers stopped striking. It should be judged by whether the public was kept safe when strikes did happen, whether ambulances still reached heart attack victims, basic fire cover was maintained and border infrastructure functioned at a minimum level.

That is a relevant test, and the Government have produced no evidence to show that those minimum protections were either unnecessary or ineffective. In fact, if the Act truly achieved nothing, why the rush to repeal it? Governments do not normally spend valuable legislative time repealing laws that they believe have no impact. The truth is that this law has teeth: it provides leverage, and it establishes a legal baseline. The Government want to remove it not because it is useless but because it places limits on how far certain interests can allow disruption to stretch.

Even if one believes the Act was flawed, the responsible course would be to review its effects before repealing it, particularly when the law was so recent and implementation across sectors was still under way. Consultations on minimum staffing levels had not been concluded in all sectors, practical guidelines had only begun to take shape and the real-world application of the law was still emerging, so to repeal it now is to abandon public protection in the name of political symbolism, to uproot a tree before it even had time to settle and declare it a failure for not bearing fruit.

What is most striking, however, is that the Government have provided no evidence that repealing the Act will lead to improved industrial relations, despite making that very claim in the impact assessment for this Bill. It is asserted almost in passing that the removal of the Act will restore trust or reduce tensions in negotiations, but where is the proof of that? Where is the analysis? Where is the independent data or stakeholder feedback to support that optimism?

We are told to take it on faith that repealing a legal framework designed to protect the public will somehow produce a more harmonious climate between unions and employers. But we are not here to govern by faith—we are here to scrutinise and to ask hard questions, and to legislate with due diligence. I put this to the Minister directly: can the Government point to any serious evidence, whether from unions, employers, emergency service leadership or international examples, that repealing this Act will improve negotiation outcomes, reduce disruption or lead to faster resolution of disputes? If not, why are we legislating in the dark?

What is the Government’s alternative? If we strip away the only existing mechanism for maintaining safe service levels during strikes, what replaces it? Nothing in the Bill offers an equivalent safeguard. There is no provision for voluntary cover agreements, no incentives for minimum staffing, no rapid arbitration scheme and no contingency powers for life and limb services. We must assume that the Government are content to simply let key public services fall to zero capacity during industrial disputes. There will be no legal recourse, no duty to plan and no obligation to protect the public. That is not reform.

Meanwhile, the public, who continue to support the right to strike in principle, also expect a functioning state. They expect to be able to call an ambulance and get one; they expect transport to limp along during industrial disputes, not collapse entirely; and they expect public safety to be preserved. The amendments before us are not extreme; they merely require a clear-sighted review of the implications of this repeal, something that any responsible Government would do as a matter of course.

I urge noble Lords to support these amendments. If the Government are confident that repealing the Act would strengthen industrial relations and carry no risk to public welfare, they should have no objection to reviewing that impact and reporting to Parliament. If they are not confident, I submit that the repeal should not proceed at all.

In short, the issue here is not ideology; it is competence. We are about to discard the only statutory mechanism for ensuring minimum service level provision during strikes—a model recognised across Europe and endorsed by ILO principles—without evidence, without a plan and without a single word of accountability to Parliament. As I said earlier, that is not governance; it is recklessness. I beg to move.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to each of the three amendments in this group, starting with Amendment 254. A significant part of the reason for the minimum services, as my noble friend has just laid out, was to recognise that certain issues were affecting daily life.

It is worth while considering the timing of aspects of this, not long after the end of the Covid lockdowns, and recognising the economic challenges that our country faced. In combination with people’s need to access urgent medical support, bearing in mind that a number of activities had been cancelled many times already, the impact of seeing further strikes—cancelling a basic level of operation for patients—was starting to become potentially very difficult for the country to manage and for patients in getting better.

Other sectors were also discussed, and transport is a good example. I expect that none of the train operating companies used this, partly because many of them found different ways to keep trains running on a basic level—good examples of that would be Greater Anglia or South Western Railway. Greater Anglia will soon become a nationalised rail operator, so I would be very interested to know—I appreciate that the Minister may not have an answer today—what the practice will be in the future as a consequence of this. At the time, the operating company Abellio was able potentially to have gone to this piece of legislation to keep trains running, although it did not have to. Will nationalised rail companies be allowed to continue to keep services running so that users can get to work, or wherever they need to go, even though there are other people on strike? My expectation, candidly, is that no nationalised company will in any way go against any trade union strike. I cannot see a Labour Government Minister using that, so by repealing this legislation the Government will have lost a lever on behalf of many of the users of public services, or services put forward for public use, across the country.

At one point there was a discussion about schools. A similar issue had arisen with children during Covid, through no fault of their own and no fault of the teachers. Schools were kept open, by and large, physically for certain workers but also online. Undoubtedly, there was a challenge for education but also, frankly, the inconvenience to working parents when schools go on strike is particularly harmful and is disruptive to those families and the wider economy. But it was decided not to do that. We reverted back to making sure, in the spirit of the Act’s intentions, that we would keep it to what were deemed to be absolutely key public services. Otherwise, there would have been significant detriment to the wider public.

Amendment 258, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, on a review into the impact on small businesses, would be very helpful. Huge changes are being put in place after nine years of a piece of legislation that from the economy’s perspective has worked reasonably well. I appreciate that the trade unions may not have liked it—and I recall it being voted against, back when this was being debated in the House a decade ago—but it is vital to the wider economy that we get our companies growing.

It seems to change every time, but I think that overall the number one mission of this Government is growth and the economy. Yet they are starting to do things, through this Bill and other situations, that seem to be driven by ideology rather than pragmatism and practicality. As a consequence, the basics and the consequences of some of this legislation, or the repealing of existing legislation, need to be considered in proper economic depth. I would love this to have happened with an updated impact assessment for us to consider before we conclude the Bill. By the way, I am grateful to the Minister for making sure that the letter the Secretary of State sent me has been placed in the Library so that every Peer can see it, but it worries me that that issue will not be considered further.

Amendment 256 links with the idea of a certification officer. I will come to series of amendments on that soon, so I am not sure how much of a certification officer role will be left. When it applies its thoughts on how it goes about the enforcement of the laws to which it is subject—and which it is also doing on behalf of trade union members—it should consider our role in the world and, in particular, how that contributes to make sure that we have a growing economy. I am sure all Members of your Lordships’ House would agree that we need it to grow.

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Debate on whether Clause 76 should stand part of the Bill.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, this whole group of stand part notices is basically about the removal of powers from the certification officer. We have already debated Clause 77. In thinking through what is going on here, I wondered whether there would be anything of a certification officer left, because it feels like a lot of this stripping out of certain aspects—for example, in Clauses 79 to 83—is very limiting in terms of what could be left to be done.

Since the Trade Union Act 2016 came into effect, the world has somewhat moved on in terms of transparency and wanting to know what is going on in an organisation. I appreciate they are not state bodies, but trade unions play an important role in our country. It is important that, while recognising there is a declining membership, not in the public sector but in the private sector, for those people who are contributing money every week, every month, every year—whatever it is—having a good amount of information in a consistent way is a good thing in terms of thinking about how we promote aspects of transparency.

We have had considerable debate, as I say, about Clause 77. But I am struggling to understand what the issue really is—why it is so difficult for these things to be produced. In thinking about investigatory powers, let us put a bit of reality or real life into this. There has been a situation within the last six months where an election for the general secretary of the Fire Brigades Union happened. On a 29% turnout, a person was elected. That turnout of votes equated to something like fewer than 10,000 people casting their votes in favour of that candidate. However, it was subsequently discovered that 3,000 ballot papers were not issued. I am happy to be corrected if I am wrong, but the difference between winning and losing was less than 3,000. Understandably, the person who lost, who had been in post for nearly 20 years, was somewhat aggrieved. However, when it was decided there had obviously been a breach and something had gone wrong, the certification officer went through a proper process. The Government may well argue that it would have been safer to email out ballots, or do an online ballot, rather than relying on the post. I am sure the union staff were not the only people struggling with things not being delivered by Royal Mail at that time. However, after that process, the losing candidate chose not to require the election to be rerun, which would have been within the gift of the certification officer. In terms of general justice, without having to go to the expense of going to the High Court, a certification officer was a simple way to try to remediate something that was clearly unfair.

However, the person who lost—I am not going to name them—was then very quickly appointed general secretary of another trade union. This time, that was challenged directly by the union’s members. In that instance, I think they went not to the certification but immediately to the High Court. So, one person having lost an election, another trade union—that is the teaching union—used its procedures incorrectly to put them in place as its new general secretary. Then, thanks to the legal challenge, the executive committee of that union recognised that it had not acted properly. This same person, by the way, is still acting general secretary of that trade union. The election commences on Thursday; it is up to the members who they decide to vote for, of course.

I looked at the fairness of a variety of the decisions that the certification officer made over time, and the same teaching union was in breach a few years ago because its general secretary outstayed their elected term. They were then made an acting general secretary and, about a year later, there was another election. It is very expensive if trade union members have to go to the courts over these sorts of things. As I researched these clauses and found out what has happened in real life, it reminded me somewhat of Animal Farm, and how—what was it?—“Two legs bad, four legs good” evolved over time to suit the needs of those who decided that they would be in charge.

I appreciate that trade unions might feel that we should not need to have a certification officer, but these are good examples of where people have had recourse to an independent person who, by law, is not subject to ministerial direction. Those people can have complete confidence in the integrity of the certification officer, and that going to them will lead to somebody having a look, without the cost of going to the High Court—as we know, that is expensive. I understand that Labour has this mantra that it is going to repeal anything to do with the 2016 Act, but I really want the Government to consider why, seeing some of the changes that have happened. By the way, at the same time, they are bringing in different rules for employers in dealing with their employees. It is perfectly valid for them to do so, but just imagine the impact these sorts of stories have. It so happens that both the trade unions in my examples are public sector unions, and we have seen their overall membership increase, but we should not be surprised if lack of confidence has started to drift people’s concerns away on why they need to pay to be a member of a trade union.

I wish the Government would consider carefully what the removal of any of these clauses would do to help the average worker and the average trade unionist, who may not be highly connected and may not have chosen to join a political party or to dedicate their lives, from quite an early age, to being part of that trade union leadership. They should also think about, and this is one of the reasons why I got triggered, what happens when somebody completely left-field—or right-field, whatever—comes in and their union’s ruling body decides, “Yeah, we like the look of that person” and they are not sure why; it may have felt sorry that he had just lost an election elsewhere. Let us think carefully about whether it is the right approach to remove all these powers from the certification officer, which I think people from every level can see are used, rarely and not extensively, to apply some common sense.

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak in support of my noble friend Lady Coffey. I thank her for bringing forward these crucial amendments to oppose Clauses 76 and 78 to 83 standing part of the Bill. In doing so, she not only upholds the integrity of trade union regulation but calls out a deeply troubling double standard in the Government’s approach to industrial relations.

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Moved by

[Baroness Coffey]

257A: After Clause 83, insert the following new Clause—
“Right to consider employer offerAfter Section 69 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, insert the following new section—“69A Right to consider employer offerA trade union must present any offer from the employer to their membership for a vote whether or not the trade union supports the offer.””

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, noble Lords may think that this amendment is a little odd: why does there need to be a right to consider an employer offer? It came about because of something that happened in the Port of Felixstowe within the last few years. At one point there was huge frustration on the part not just of the employer but of several workers, because, with the union and the employer negotiating in good faith—I am not criticising the union at all—the offer then made did not need to be put to the members. I am not suggesting that this is a loophole: I appreciate that there is back and forth and a current requirement to give lots of notice, with everything being done by post and so on. I can understand that it may not be reasonable that, every time an employer moves by a penny or so, that has to be spelt out. That would be truly ridiculous, but there is something to be said for establishing what is going on. Where is the leverage being applied?

Unfortunately—and I am not saying that there is a causal link between the two issues, but there is definitely a correlation—after a considerable number of strikes in the port of Felixstowe, within 18 months it was announced that a significant shipping line would no longer use Felixstowe as its principal destination in the United Kingdom but would go to the new London port at Tilbury instead. As I say, I am not saying there is a direct causal link, but I have my concerns about the lack of reliability. This, by the way, was the first dispute in 30 years at the port of Felixstowe, and it was quite fractious. It got more fractious because people started to break the strike. I understand that that is not the ideal place for people to be; nevertheless, people—although not everybody—felt that their union was not looking after them and their interests, but perhaps starting to look after the national interest. That led to quite a lot of aggro, not just face to face but on Facebook, with families falling out. In quite a small community, the impact of that can be quite substantial.

When I was speaking to people who worked at the port and to the employer, what stayed with me for some time was that they would have liked the chance to vote, even though the organisers of their local union—or, as they believed, the national union—decided they could not. For that reason, and recognising the transition that is coming as a consequence of the Bill, such as moving to much greater use of digital ballots, there is something to be said for enabling workers not to have to go through something as awful as breaking a strike. I understand why trade union members do not want to do that; but they feel that things need to be done in their interests locally, and that their employer should be allowed to make the offer.

I have put the amendment in this way—I am conscious of what the noble Lord, Lord Prentis of Leeds, who is no longer in his place, said earlier—because employers should not be trying to get around all sorts of rules to stop people being members of trade unions. That is already protected in law; the noble Lord referred to a situation that has only recently been resolved.

In effect, this amendment addresses one of the trade union disputes in my experience that I believe has had a consequential economic impact on a key part of the east coast. I should say that I intend to respond to comments made on this amendment.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)]

The noble Baroness will need to because it is an amendment, and therefore at the end one has to ask for it to be either considered or, by leave, withdrawn.

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[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, for tabling Amendment 257A. I am happy to explain to the noble Baroness that this amendment is not appropriate.

As the noble Baroness knows, trade unions are already required by existing legislation to ballot their members before commencing any industrial action. Union executives are therefore required to obtain a mandate from their members to negotiate with their employer on their behalf before industrial action can commence. We believe that union executives, as representatives of their members, are best placed to judge whether an offer is acceptable and in the best interests of the union members before deciding whether to ballot their members. Balloting members is a considerable financial and administrative challenge and repeated ballots could cause an unnecessary burden—as well as confusing members as to what was being proposed and the likelihood of a higher offer.

Amendment 257A would also remove the power of union executives to negotiate on behalf of their members for a deal that they consider will deliver before balloting members on an offer. This is one of the main reasons that members join a union: they delegate to those negotiators to get the best deal for them. The negotiators will have done a great deal of detailed research on economic indicators, what is happening in their market, on the knowledge of the financial stability of the business, and so on. They will take a very wide range of factors into account into that bargaining process. This is why, quite often, negotiations take time, because all those factors have to be discussed in some detail in a way that an individual member would not be able to do.

Furthermore, the amendment has no safeguards to prevent gaming. Were we to accept it, there are risks that employers could submit multiple derisory offers to unions in order to interfere with the industrial action ballot mandate by forcing the union to constantly re-ballot members on derisory offers at the cost of the union. As the noble Baroness said, balloting on small increases would be ridiculous, but this is exactly what her amendment would require.

We consider, therefore, that existing legislation is effective. As union representatives are elected by their members to represent them, union executives should have the discretion as to whether they put an offer by an employer to their membership. If a union executive believes an offer is acceptable, they should be free to put that offer to their membership and make that judgment at the time.

We think the noble Baroness’s amendment is unnecessary; the current system works well, and it brings great benefits to individual members. I therefore ask the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

I thank the Minister for her reply. She will be aware that I am a Back-Bencher and I do not have hundreds of civil servants crafting the perfect amendment and saying when to discuss these sorts of issues.

I am conscious that through the Bill, the mandate will be extended to 12 months. There is, therefore, the potential for handing over considerable power that is delegated to negotiators. I fear there will be situations that develop that can have economic consequences on workers when there are spats that not everybody wants to be involved in. I recognise all the other changes the Government are making in digitising the operations of the trade unions, and that is why I thought it was worth discussing at this point.

This has been a very useful debate. I thank my noble friends Lord Fuller and Lord Hunt for their support and consideration—and their experience, particularly that of my noble friend Lord Fuller. Having taken all this into account, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 257A withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Coffey]

257B: Clause 85, page 106, line 11, leave out “subsection (5)” and insert “this section”

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, I have tabled Amendment 257B simply because I did not see the answer in the Explanatory Notes to the Bill. This is quite a straightforward one for the Minister.

In Section 293 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, the regulations are normally done by negative resolution—or the annulment, as set out in new subsection (6). However, I want to understand why the Government felt that these particular regulations needed to be done through the affirmative procedure. They are not the only changes—that I am aware of—in the Bill to that section, or others, of the Act. Can the Minister explain why they have been singled out? Given the trend of your Lordships’ House over many years, why do we not move to having affirmative resolutions instead of annulments for these ones in the future? I beg to move.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Coffey for her amendments; they are measured, necessary and principled amendments to Clause 85, which rightly restore a degree of parliamentary scrutiny that had been quietly eroded in the original draft of the Bill. As we stated at Second Reading, there are 173 delegated powers in the Bill, which is unacceptable—not just to those the legislation will impact, but to the House.

In the Minister’s contributions on similar legislation in the past, she expressed her strong reservations about the use of delegated powers. I recall well her interventions, which were made with clarity and conviction, as she tabled amendments recommended by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. But we now find ourselves considering a clause that does precisely what she once warned against because it carves out certain sensitive and constitutionally significant areas and exposes them only to selective scrutiny.

The original version of Clause 85 created a two-tier system. Some regulations would require affirmative approval from this House, while others—no less consequential—would not. This piecemeal approach to oversight is not only undesirable but unnecessary. Regulations made under Section 293 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act are not merely technical: they pertain to fundamental matters, such as the rights of trade unions, the balance of power between employers and employees, and the protections afforded to those who take lawful industrial action. It is therefore only right and proper that all regulations made under this section should be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure: they should be laid before and approved by both Houses of Parliament.

My noble friend’s amendment achieves this. It does so with economy of language, but with significant constitutional consequence. It removes the artificial distinction introduced by subsection (5), and instead applies a uniform standard of scrutiny to the entirety of Section 293.

Since the Government took office, many of us across these Benches have expressed concern about the growing use of skeleton Bills, Henry VIII clauses and broad enabling powers that allow Ministers to legislate without adequate consultation or scrutiny. This amendment is a quiet but firm step in the other direction back towards balance, principle and the proper functioning of Parliament.

Again, I thank my noble friend for tabling her amendment, and I hope the Government will not merely accept it but embrace it to show their commitment to transparency and to the constitutional propriety of this House.

[Lord Leong (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, for his contribution. I remember standing before him during the PRaM Bill and we discussed this very matter. Some of this negative resolution is required because not only does it save parliamentary time but it is technical. Anyway, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, for tabling Amendments 257B and 257C, which would make all the powers under Clause 56 subject to the affirmative procedure, as well as existing regulation-making powers that are currently covered by the negative procedure, by virtue of current Section 293 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992.

It is worth noting that most of the access regulations are already subject to the affirmative procedure. Indeed, as the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, mentioned, only four of the 12 delegated powers are subject to the negative procedure. Given the technical nature of those delegated powers, and to save parliamentary time, the Government are of the position that making them subject to the affirmative procedure would not be appropriate.

Further to this, as mentioned in previous debates, all regulations under Clause 57 will be consulted on via public consultation, the outcome of which will be published for all to see. This is an important process, which will help ensure that our policy development is informed by the practical experience and needs of trade unions, businesses and stakeholders.

The noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, and the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, will have noted in previous debates in this place that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee said that

“it is heartening that in a Bill with so many delegated powers”—

the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, mentioned 173—it had

“only found four on which to raise concerns”.

Clause 56 was not one of those. Therefore, I ask that the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, to withdraw Amendment 257B.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for his comments. Undoubtedly, in the last decade, this House has started to move to have far more under the affirmative procedure, so it gets a level of scrutiny, although I appreciate your Lordships’ House does not vote against them. That is how to make sure legislation is properly considered, recognising it will be put to debate, which is certainly not the case with many regulations considered in the negative way. With that, I beg to withdraw.

Amendment 257B withdrawn.