Pension Schemes Bill

Baroness Coffey Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd January 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will be exceedingly brief. I may participate on an occasional basis on this Bill, despite the fact that it is very important. However, we have many people with exceptional expertise in the Room, for which I am extraordinarily grateful.

I have Amendment 167 in a later group on its own, which has relevance to one of the issues raised by my noble friend Lady Bowles in Amendment 46A, in which she introduces the concept that value-for-money regulations must take account of certain factors. Proposed new paragraph (c) particularly interests me, on

“the characteristics of the members of the scheme”.

In all the discussions that I have heard in the Mansion House compact and in the Bill, very little attention is paid to the characteristics of the members of the schemes, because they differ widely. I am particularly concerned that people on low salaries, whose primary savings for pensions and then investment is through auto-enrolment and default funds, have a very different risk profile from those of many people who otherwise engage in pension savings.

This is a group for whom the downside has far more serious consequences than for other groups. Many of us can afford to take a chance with parts of our pensions: if we lose some money, we are still going to be in relative comfort. That is essentially not true for this group. The upside benefit of taking risk and doing well from that risk is nice, but the consequences of taking risk and losing because of that risk are far more serious. I want to draw the Committee’s attention to that issue. As I said, I will pick it up again in Amendment 167, because to me it has been overlooked.

It is key that, when we devise pension arrangements, we recognise the very different risk profiles of members, so that what they are required to do—auto-enrolment and default schemes are in effect a requirement—matches their risk profile. I hope that we will begin to start to shift some of our thinking. There are amendments, in this group and in others, that could help very much with that issue.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

This group of amendments is quite interesting in starting to sketch out what is important in the value-for-money approach that is being adopted through the Bill. I did not know when the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, would speak to Amendment 49 and I will be interested to hear what he has to say on this, because the only other form of occupational pension is, in effect, the defined benefit, where you know what you are getting. I was a bit surprised that he felt that that would need to go further, because that is a direct relationship between somebody and their employer. Nevertheless, I am sure he will explain further.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, has tabled Amendments 55 and 56 to Clause 12, which are sensible, but one thing that concerns me at the start of that clause is the word “may”. We should be beyond that at this stage, which is why I also support my noble friends on the Front Bench in opposing Clause 13 standing part of the Bill. There are just too many ifs, buts and maybes, but when it comes to Clause 13 there is nothing at all. It is just a blank cheque for the future. I am conscious that things can vary over time, but we should be in a position where we are getting some clarity on what will be in these value-for-money assessments so that people can make choices. We should be getting that clarity now. If necessary, we can put down regulations for affirmative procedures but, candidly, I do not think it is good enough that we have this sort of approach to defining what is there for the future.

I say to the Minister that I appreciate that this is a real step forward and I welcome that. People put their money in, they are not exactly sure what return they are getting and they might look every now and again at where it is coming out. I appreciate that there is a whole journey to go on in pensions education, as well as for the trustees, in terms of what is really happening with their advisers who continue to do low-risk, low-reward. I encourage the Minister, however, to come back on Report with a much stronger sketching out of what will be in these assessments, as required by Clause 13. For example, instead of just having the word “may”, have some “must” in there and then open up the power later to adjust as necessary. It is also valuable to be able to repeal.

Amendment 74 concerns the “Duty to formalise the Value for Money framework”; I know that my Front Bench will speak to that shortly. It is a useful exercise to check whether it is working. There are other amendments which basically make comparisons with other pension providers. That gets trickier if it is done at such a detailed level because, again, people might want some basic information on what is happening with their money. To pick at random, they might want their money with Standard Life instead of Scottish Life; if there is some variation, they might want to make a change. It is those sorts of things that I encourage the Minister to have more detail on by the time we reach Report.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, as has been expressed, this group establishes the foundation of the value-for-money framework. We welcome the ambition to improve outcomes for savers. However, the effectiveness of value for money will depend on how it is defined, measured and implemented, and I welcome the comments from the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles, Lady Altmann and Lady Kramer, which elaborated on these points.

I shall concentrate on Amendments 49 and 54 and I hope I can persuade the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, that they are of value. These amendments will extend the scope of the Bill’s value-for-money provisions. They ensure that they apply not only to defined contribution schemes but defined benefit occupational pension schemes as well.

The arrangements make it clear that regulations can make different provision for different types of scheme. Critically, however, all schemes must be covered by the value-for-money assessment, with a proper value-for-money rating. Members of DB schemes deserve the same transparency and assurance about value for money as members of DC schemes. DB schemes still represent a significant part of the pensions landscape. Excluding them risks creating an uneven playing field and less scrutiny where it is still needed.

A single, consistent framework across occupational pensions improves comparability, avoids regulatory gaps and ensures that all savers benefit from the same standards of accountability. The two amendments in my name would ensure that the Bill delivers on its promise of value for money across all pension schemes. The measure is simple: every saver in every scheme, whatever its type, deserves value for money. Other noble Lords have expressed this in detail.

The noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, spoke about pensions jargon. We are here in a very rarefied atmosphere, where people have some knowledge—I have less than many in the Room—of what pensions are about and what phrases such as “default pensions” mean. We need to make it clear to people who have no interest in pensions other than receiving a cheque at the end of the month at a certain age what it all means. Some people need to be clear about the choices they make, and we need to do as much as we can. These amendments, both those that have been spoken to already and the two in my name, seek to protect people’s interests.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 58. My remarks will apply to all the other amendments in this group, apart from Amendments 64 and 65, to which I will speak shortly, and Amendment 69 in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, which I also support.

My views on this group of amendments follow on from the comments I made earlier about jargon and trying to make pensions more member-friendly—more intelligible to the ordinary person. I believe that this is an extremely important area, having met so many members who simply do not understand what they are being told. The remarks from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, encapsulate some of that: if we cannot understand what we are being told in the communications, neither can members.

It was interesting to see that the original consultation suggestions of red, amber and green, which people would have at least a good chance of understanding, have instead been put into the Bill as “fully delivering”, “intermediate” and “not delivering”. Delivering what? We are talking about value; this is not Ocado or Amazon. The noble Baroness, Lady Warwick, in her remarks on the first group used the terms “good value” and “poor value” as if they were in the Bill—but they are not. My proposals in these amendments—to change the term “fully delivering” to “good value”, and “not delivering” to “poor value”—simply respond to what most people would expect this clause to tell them. I hope that the Minister understands that. Obviously, this is a probing amendment, so she may prefer other ways to express what we are trying to achieve here, but I hope that the intention behind these amendments will, in some way, feed into both the Bill and how the value-for-money framework will be considered when we develop it. It is a very sketchy framework at the moment.

I take the point about the consultation, but I have a related question. The critical players in moving away from the idea of cost to value, when assessing the merits of any particular scheme being used for the workforce in auto-enrolment, will be the employee benefit consultants. They advise the employers that they currently simply use cost as their major recommendation metric. They are not, in any way, properly scrutinised or regulated. Having done all this work to develop a value-for-money framework, will any attention be given to ensure that the people advising the employers on whether a scheme should be used will properly use the value-for-money framework that we will devise?

Amendments 64 and 65, which are also probing amendments, specifically address the “intermediate” rating, which is designed to have many levels or gradations. However, it seems that all of them could lead to scheme closure. They will all certainly lead to significant costs for a scheme rated “intermediate” due to the extensive reports and explanations that need to be given. My amendments simply seek to avoid significant extra costs, or the risk of scheme disclosure, for schemes that receive an “intermediate” rating on a shorter-term basis. It seems that it is almost possible that a “not delivering” rating will have a similar outcome to an “intermediate” rating because of how the Bill is phrased.

My suggestion is—and it is, as I said, probing and open for discussion and change—that you have to have an intermediate rating every year for, say, four years before the extensive requirements of this section kick in, so that in cases of up to five years you would need to notify the employer if you have changed from a good value to intermediate and the scheme would need to explain why this rating has been given and what plans it has for improvements. That would not be an extensive report, but it would obviously be helpful and would focus the minds of the scheme without the draconian implications that seem implied by the consequences of the intermediate rating as specified in the Bill. That brings me briefly to my support for Amendment 69, tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, and the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, which probes what the penalties are, how they have been assessed and whether they are appropriate. I beg to move Amendment 58.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, this is an interesting group of amendments. My noble friend has explained the importance of clarity in who decides whether something is fully delivering. I want to ask about the different assessments being made at this point. We are now, effectively, on Clause 15 onwards. We have the ratings coming through. My noble friends on the Front Bench will explain why they do not agree with certain elements. There is merit, however, in trying to work out whether something is taking a nosedive and whether it is it fixable, but we need to be more specific about a reasonable period, and then a prescribed number of VFM periods needs to be put in the Bill, which it is not at the moment.

Thinking through what has been suggested, I am trying to understand how this will work. Clause 13, which we have discussed briefly, has a certain amount of potential calculations. We then have the trustees doing their own assessment, and then we jump forward to Clause 18 and the Pensions Regulator may check. This is all feeling quite random. Normally when we do ratings, the CQC or Ofsted make that judgment, so I am trying to understand how this will work in practice. Are the guidelines going to be fixed—for example, the average or the benchmark across all pension schemes is this, or the FTSE 100 index has changed this much, or the costs are this percentage? It would be helpful to start to get a proper pitch. I appreciate that the consultation may have gone out, but there must be thinking in the Government’s mind, not just the regulator’s, on what “good” looks like. There are risks, as identified by my noble friends, that we may be overburdening to the point that the minutiae become an industry in their own right. I am surprised to see the penalties put in primary legislation, which is unusual nowadays, although I agree that we need a better sense of how that compliance element, as set out in Clause 18, will work alongside the other amendments. My noble friend is right to say that we need to keep this straightforward and simple for people to be able to understand.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

These are obviously probing amendments. They are all to do with the jargon: if we are arguing about the jargon, how much more confused will the normal punter be in trying to understand the jargon. This group focuses on how value for money is expressed, enforced and communicated.

We support the principle that members should be able to understand whether their scheme is performing well. However, value-for-money ratings also carry significant power. They will influence trustee behaviour, in particular, as well as employer decisions and market structure. That makes proportionality and precision essential.

I am particularly concerned about overreliance on short-term performance metrics. Saving for a pension is, or certainly should be, inherently long-term. Schemes should not be penalised for temporary underperformance driven by market cycles or responsible long-term investment strategies.

We also question whether compliance mechanisms become blunt instruments. Labelling schemes “poor value” without clear context may drive consolidation for the wrong reasons, reducing competition without improving outcomes. Clear language matters—I use the word “jargon” once again—but so does nuance. Members need information they can trust, not simplified labels about market complexity.

I have some questions for the Minister. How will this regime distinguish between persistent structural failure and short-term variation? How will it use this intermediate rating? How will it encourage genuine improvement rather than defensive behaviour by trustees? Trustees are meant to be very careful; they will be cognisant of the intermediate position. I will be interested to hear the Minister’s views on that.

--- Later in debate ---

In conclusion, I thank noble Lords for their constructive interest in these amendments and the development of the VFM framework. It is the Government’s view that the current provisions, including the detail in the consultation and that which I have set out, strike the right balance between flexibility and accountability and allow for sufficient consultation on the technical detail. These provisions are essential for delivering value for money and maintaining public confidence in our pension schemes. I therefore ask the Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

I am keen to get a sense of what the Government think the current spread is between the different ratings. For example, what proportion might be red? Is there any sense of this at all?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I am absolutely not going to answer that. If there is answer which is known to me, then I will be happy to share it with her, but it certainly not known to me.

--- Later in debate ---

I hope that the Minister will accept that the power should have some constraints on it in order to avoid the possibility that it could be used for what I will loosely call “improper purposes” at a later stage.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, this is an interesting part. It recognises a lot of our labour market, where people are working with multiple employers over a variety of time periods. Even those young people who were on the Kickstart scheme will have got contributions to a pension scheme, which they may completely forget about once they go to their next, perhaps longer-term, job.

I remember a few years ago the lovely people over in the Department for Culture, Media and Sport. They have a “good purposes” fund where they go after dormant assets all over the place and take them away, with a general promise that the money will come back if somebody tries to get it. I seem to recall telling them to jog on when it came to pension funds, although some negotiation might have been arranged.

I am just trying to understand how all of this is going to fit together. That is why I think Amendment 83 is particularly helpful; basically, it says that the pensions dashboard must be in place. This is about making an informed choice. One of the things I am trying to understand is whether Clause 22(3)(b), which my noble friends on the Front Bench have suggested should be removed, is passive and non-engaged. Will the trustees running the scheme be required to make some effort to try to contact that person so that it does not just slide away without people even realising?

In terms of the other aspect, I assume, under Amendments 80 and 81, it is right to try to get into some more detail about prescribing, which could perhaps be further enhanced by just getting to understand in Clause 25 what the Minister is thinking at this point, especially when it suggests that the trustees or managers of a scheme can determine whether it is the best interests for this to transfer or not. Are we talking about, say, people who are in prison, people who have gone abroad or people who are on a career break? It would be helpful to have a sense of what Ministers are thinking in terms of having this variety of powers, first, to be able to do it, but then to say, “Actually, we’ll leave it to the managers or trustees of the scheme to determine whether it is that person’s best interests”. I would be grateful for some understanding, again, of how this might work in practice, but the solution will definitely be Amendment 83 and I hope that the Minister will give that consideration for Report.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, this is an appropriate time to stand, because Amendment 83 is signed by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and by me. In the absence of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, today, and having discussed the matter with him, I speak on my behalf and his to Amendment 83. As has been stated, it is intended to deal with the risk that consolidating small pots might worsen the problem of lost or forgotten pensions.

We are all aware of the problem of people losing track of small pension pots: a problem that has increased in recent years as people tend to move between jobs more frequently, and may therefore end up with several small pensions, perhaps from many years ago. Chapter 2 of the Bill allows the Government to make regulations to consolidate small, dormant pension pots. I, and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, support this as we believe that providing additional scale to small, dormant pots should enable greater efficiencies and a reduction in costs.

However, a possible unintended consequence could be to make it more difficult for a person to trace a forgotten pot if it is moved to a consolidator without their knowledge: for example, if any notice is sent to an old address. The introduction of a pension dashboard, as enabled by the Pension Schemes Act 2021, was intended to make it easier for people to identify pensions that they have lost track of or even forgotten. This has been somewhat delayed, but progress does, at last, seem to be happening. The connection deadline is October 2026, so hopefully people may start to be able to access the dashboard in the not-too-distant future.

In order to avoid making the problem of lost pensions worse, Amendment 83, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and myself, simply says that the regulations that would mandate the consolidation of a dormant, small pot could not be made until the dashboard had been available for at least three months. The three months is designed to give a bit of time to ensure that it is actually working and that any teething issues have been resolved. I think it prudent to ensure that we do not cause unintended consequences from what is otherwise a good policy, I hope the Minister will be sympathetic to the intention of the course outlined in Amendment 83.

[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I support the amendments in this group, particularly Amendment 83, which has received wide support. I think it is really important, as is the idea of lengthening the 12-month period for so-called dormant pots, and Amendment 81 from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, where, for example, a woman may take time off to care for children or other loved ones and intends to return, but her pension will have been moved before she gets back. Those are distinct possibilities under this scheme. We are talking about moving somebody’s savings—or investments; I am doing it myself—from one place to another, just because they have not done anything with their pension for a while. The pension fund is not meant to have anything done with it when you are younger; it is meant to just sit there and stay there.

Of course, the big problem that needs to be solved here is the costs to providers of administering all these very small pots. But the aim of the dashboard itself is meant to be to help people move their pots from one place to another. It seems to me that this particular section of the legislation is trying to deal with something that is meant to be dealt with by a different policy area. The consolidators, of course, will be attractive to providers to establish, and the money saving from not administering these small pots will also be attractive to the providers. But have the Government given any consideration to the idea of making, for example, NEST the consolidator? That is a Government-sponsored scheme. It has obviously had to have reasonable charges. Any transfers do not incur an upfront fee. That would run less of a risk of having consolidators that end up perhaps not performing well.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

I understand what the noble Baroness is saying about NEST. It is a brilliant organisation. But my recollection is that it does charge 2% on the transfer of assets into it. That is not something we should be particularly encouraging.

[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

No. I was just saying, if you transfer assets in, that 2% charge does not apply and will not apply. Otherwise, obviously, it would be uneconomic. But I understand that the idea of NEST is that the transfer in of a pension from another provider does not incur the upfront charge of, I think, 1.8%. So that would not be an issue. It is just a 0.3% flat fee. I hope the Minister will be able to respond on that element. There is a residual risk to government in moving somebody’s long-term assets from one provider to another if the other provider eventually proves not to deliver good value.