Sovereign Grant Bill

Debate between Thomas Docherty and Paul Flynn

Thursday 14th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Paul Flynn (Newport West) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Carmarthen East and Dinefwr (Jonathan Edwards). I agree with every single word of his speech.

These are delightful occasions. I am sorry that the hon. Member for the middle ages and North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) has left us, because he gave us another cameo performance today, although he did not give the same peroration. He would have been very much at home in the court of King Canute.

A couple of days ago, the hon. Member for Northampton North (Michael Ellis) rather optimistically sent me a letter—addressed to me by my first name, although I do not really know him in any way—requesting a contribution for the new stained glass window. I am afraid that I had to send him a rather disappointing reply. He did persuade me to put down an early-day motion drawing attention to the fact that we are already fairly well supplied with statues, pictures and paintings of royalty in this place, but very badly off in those things for a range of people, such as the Tolpuddle martyrs, the Chartists and the suffragettes, who have contributed hugely to the strength of our democracy and transformed this country into the proud modern democracy that it is now.

Whenever royalty is discussed, the House becomes infantilised. It is worth mentioning again that because of our own decisions, which go back seven centuries, we are not allowed to criticise not only the monarch, but any member of her family. When an attempt was made to have a debate on the conduct of Prince Andrew on two occasions, I and other Members were gagged in saying anything about him that was not emetic, sycophantic drivel. We must understand that in this debate and many others, we are denied the opportunity as a free Parliament to discuss the personalities and behaviour of the entire royal family—not that I want to be critical tonight.

I tried to make a point in the earlier debate about the special need for the role of the Head of State. The point of the story that I told about Mrs Thatcher is that we need someone who is above politics to act when a Prime Minister gets out of control. There was a possibility in 1990 that Margaret Thatcher could have caused a general election and that Parliament, the Cabinet and the Conservative party would not have been able to stop her. However, the Queen could have stopped her and almost certainly would have done so given the Queen’s personality and status. It is questionable whether other Prime Ministers would have had that strength of character and whether possible other monarchs would have had that strength of character. I am thinking of the Queen’s uncle and the Queen’s successor, who suffers from an incontinence of interference in matters that are way outside what a monarch should be involved in.

[Thomas Docherty]

On a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. Could you remind me whether it is appropriate for an hon. Member to make remarks that appear to be disparaging about a member of the royal household?

Afghanistan and Pakistan

Debate between Thomas Docherty and Paul Flynn

Wednesday 6th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Paul Flynn (Newport West) (Lab)]

It is a great pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Croydon South (Richard Ottaway). I thank him for, and congratulate him on, the quality of his Committee’s reports, particularly the last report on this subject.

It was a disappointment to hear the Prime Minister present a statement that was very much the traditional one of unreasonable optimism, of exaggerating the threat of terrorism from the Taliban, which is almost non-existent—there is a threat from al-Qaeda, but not from the Taliban—and of ignoring altogether the most optimistic sign: namely, the possibility of talks with the Taliban.

We have heard so much accentuating the positives and ignoring the negatives. The Prime Minister spoke of the progress with the Afghan army and police, but said not a word about the fact that NATO delivered the final blow by bringing the helicopter in following the recent attack on the Intercontinental hotel, and made no mention of the group of UN workers who were lynched by a mob, even though they were being protected by the Afghan police and army. Nor did he mention the most depressing incident, when 500 prisoners, many of them Taliban who were captured at grievous cost in blood and treasure, escaped, almost certainly with the collusion of local Afghans. Those 500 are now free to attack our soldiers again.

I am concerned greatly by our attitude. We are trying to deny the truth and to protect ourselves, but there are no good reasons for that. It is extremely wounding to the families of the bereaved to suggest that the cause in which their loved ones died bravely was a noble but vain one, but we must get that across. The Prime Minister has a difficult task to convince the country that we must not only talk to but negotiate with the enemy. That will be difficult for the relatives or loved ones of the fallen.

It is disappointing that the Prime Minister did not give a clear answer on the hurt that will be caused if the plan to take the remains of the fallen to Brize Norton continues. They would then be taken via a circuitous route that avoids the most populated areas. Local people, supported by many of the families of the bereaved, say that they want and appreciate the opportunity to give public expression to their grief, as happened in Wootton Bassett. The public would like to pay their respects as they have done before. No impression should be left that there is any attempt by the Government or local people to deny the country the chance to pay its tributes and accept the true effects of war.

That has been done twice before. Last year on a Monday and a Tuesday, the names of the fallen were announced, but that was at a time when the House did not have the maximum attendance, or the attention focused on it, that it has at Prime Minister’s Question Time when those names are announced. It is impossible now, because of the rules of the House, to do what I have done in the past, which is to read out the names of the fallen in Iraq and Afghanistan. That is now forbidden. I would not look forward to doing that again, though, because to read the names of the fallen in Afghanistan and the thousands with serious injuries would take about an hour and a half, if I was to include their ranks and give a suitable pause to each one. None the less, that is the most effective way of getting across to the House the consequences of decisions that we took.

I was grateful to see the report on Helmand on BBC 2. It is worth remembering that, as has been repeated, politically we went into Helmand because senior politicians believed we would be there for three years and hoped that not a shot would be fired. We are grateful for the evidence given to the Foreign Affairs Committee and to the Public Administration Committee in which we saw the incredibly trivial reasons we went into Helmand. At that point, we had lost two soldiers in combat—five in other regions—but now it is 375. A written report to the FAC attributed it to the hubris of the Foreign Office, which felt that it might suddenly become a footnote. The conflict in Iraq was coming to an end and it wanted to be in the limelight. The military use the expression, “We must use them or lose them”, knowing that if their battle groups are suddenly stood down, there is the threat of major cuts in a future defence review.

[Thomas Docherty (Dunfermline and West Fife) (Lab)]

Although I disagree with my hon. Friend, I have huge respect for his principled stance. However, when the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff came before the Defence Committee only three weeks ago, that was not the reason they gave for the Army going into Helmand. They gave completely different reasons: there was a job that had to be done, and if it was not done by the British, it would fall to one of our partners in the international security assistance force.

[Paul Flynn]

The evidence is in the reports from both Committees—in evidence from a distinguished former ambassador in Kabul and from two senior people in the civil service to the PAC. The evidence is clear. One witness said that no attention was paid to the national interest. It is difficult to see where on earth the national interest lay in stirring up a hornets’ nest in Helmand, but we know the result. This was a peaceful province. We went in to ensure reconstruction, but the result, tragically, was the loss of an unknown number of lives—possibly 9,000—and there was no reconstruction. Instead there was destruction on a massive scale from collateral damage alone. We set up posts that we defended at huge cost in lives to our own people and to the others.

This is a calamity on a scale nearly unprecedented in our military history—and that is saying something. When we went in, we did not take a decision in the House, but we had a debate. In that debate, someone said that this would be worse than the charge of the Light Brigade. This time Blair to the left of them, Bush to the right of them, holler’d and thunder’d:

“Theirs not to reason why,

Theirs but to do and die:

Into the valley of Death”,

into the mouth of Helmand, drove the 5,000. Before, there were two dead; now it is 375. That is three times the number killed in the charge of the Light Brigade and twice the number killed in the Iraq war, and I challenge anyone to come up with any improvements that resulted from the incursion into Helmand. What is better now? It was peaceful when we went in. There was no threat.

[Thomas Docherty]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for giving me the chance to intervene on him again. The Chief of the General Staff, Peter Wall, and the Chief of the Defence Staff made it absolutely clear to the Defence Committee that if we had not gone into Helmand, the Taliban would have moved north towards Kabul. It is completely untrue to say that Helmand was a peaceful province; or rather, it was peaceful only because the Taliban had complete control over the area.

[Paul Flynn]

I was not present on the Committee, but I saw the sitting on the Parliament channel and was profoundly unimpressed by the evidence given. However, I do not want to dwell on this issue; I want to give other people a chance to speak—I have the advantage of speaking early. I believe that at some point an investigation has to be conducted into why we went into Helmand. Of course it cannot be done now, while we are still there, but I believe that the story revealed will be one of military incompetence and political weakness. We are in the position now—the hopeful time—of talking to the Taliban. I do not know why the Prime Minister does not emphasise this more, but for the first time we are in the position of taking practical steps to build peace that would result in bringing our troops home.

The alternative is that we are currently in a period like that the Americans found themselves in in 1970 and 1971, when they knew that the war was coming to an end in Vietnam. We know that there is no happy ending in Afghanistan, and we should not build up the prospect of an Afghanistan that will somehow be like a Scandinavian democracy or anything of the sort. The ending will be messy.